HUME AND SCEPTICISM

It may be said of David Hume that he initiated the attack on pure

reason. My own labours in the investigation of this subject were

occasioned by his sceptical teaching, for his assault made them

necessary. He argued that without experience it is impossible to know

the difference between one thing and another; that is, we can know _a

priori_, and, therefore, the notion of a cause is fictitious and

illusory, arising only from the habit of observing certain things

associated with each in succession of connections.

On such principles we can never come to any conclusion as to causes and

effects. We can never predict a consequence from any of the known

attributes of things. We can never say of any event that it must

_necessarily_ have followed from another; that is, that it must have had

an antecedent cause. And we could never lay down a rule derived even

from the greatest number of observations. Hence we must trust entirely

to blind chance, abolishing all reason, and such a surrender establishes

scepticism in an impregnable citadel.

Mathematics escaped Hume, because he considered that its propositions

were analytical, proceeding from one determination to another, by reason

of identity contained in each. But this is not really so, for, on the

contrary, they are synthetical, the results depending ultimately on the

assent of observers as witnesses to the universality of propositions. So

Hume's empiricism leads inevitably to scepticism even in this realm.

My investigations led me to the conclusion that the objects with which

we are familiar are by no means things in themselves, but are simply

phenomena, connected in a certain way with experience. So that without

contradiction they cannot be separated from that connection. Only by

that experience can they be recognised. I was able to prove the

objective reality of the concept of cause in regard to objects of

experience, and to demonstrate its origin from pure understanding,

without experimental or empirical sources.

Thus, I first destroyed the source of scepticism, and then the resulting

scepticism itself. And thus was subverted the thorough doubt as to

whatever theoretic reason claims to perceive, as well as the claim of

Hume that the concept of causality involved something absolutely

unthinkable.

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