A RATIONAL AND HUMANE SCIENCE

In bringing before you this subject of a Rational and Humane Science you

will perhaps forgive me if I dwell for a few moments on some points of

personal history in relation to it. After reading mathematics for some

four years at Cambridge, it happened to me for the next ten years or so

to be engaged in the study of the physical sciences, and in lectures on

these subjects. Naturally, during the earlier part of this period I

accepted the current methods and conclusions without any question. But

as time went on I became aware of a certain dissatisfaction; I felt that

many of the laws of Science, enounced as universal truths, were of very

limited application only, that many of the conclusions, so strongly

insisted on, were of quite doubtful validity; and at last this

increasing dissatisfaction culminated in a rather violent attack or

criticism of Modern Science which I wrote and published about the year

1884.[40]

Now, looking back, at this interval of time, though I admit that my

attack was somewhat hasty and crude in detail, I feel that in its main

contention it was thoroughly justified, and I do not feel the least

inclined to withdraw it.

What was that main contention? It was as follows. Modern Science is an

attempt (and no doubt it would accept this definition of itself) to

survey and classify the phenomena of the world in the pure dry light of

the intellect, uncoloured by feeling; and so far is an effort to

separate the intellectual in man from the merely perceptive, the

emotional, the moral, and so forth. It was in this very fact that my

criticism lay; for I contended that such a separation was in the long

run quite impossible.

But before proceeding to defend this position, let me admit at once that

this attempt of Modern Science to get rid of human feeling and to look

at everything in the dry light of the intellect was in some respects a

very grand one. When you consider what the Old-time Science was, with

its fancies and prejudices, its dragons pasturing upon the sun and moon

in eclipses, its immolations of hundreds of human beings to appease some

god of pestilence or earthquake, its panics, its superstitions, and its

incapability of regarding anything except from the point of view of that

thing's influence on man's own comfort and his little hopes and fears,

it was indeed a grand advance to try and see _facts_, uncoloured and for

themselves alone. It was an effort of Man as it were to rise above

himself, to which I accord the fullest credit and honour.

And yet, during the time spoken of, it kept growing on me: first, that

the attempt was an impossible one; secondly, that the Science so-called

was not a true Science; and thirdly, that in its pretence to an

intellectual exactitude which it did not really possess, this Modern

Science was leading to a narrow-mindedness and a dogmatism as bad as the

old.

There is in fact (so I think) a fallacy in the attempt. But how shall I

describe it? Our relations to the world may, quite roughly speaking, be

divided into three groups--those that are sensuous and perceptional,

those that are purely intellectual, and those that are of an emotional

and moral order. Take any object of Nature--a bird, for instance. We may

look upon the bird as an object of sense-perceptions--its form, its

colour, its song, and so forth. Some people attain to extraordinary

skill and quickness in this department, recognising in a moment the note

or even the flight of a songster. Then again we may look upon the bird

from the intellectual side--we may study it in relation to its

surroundings--the form of its wings, the length of its leg, the

character of its beak, and their adaptation to its habits, to its

locality, to its food, and so forth. Thus we may get a whole series of

purely intellectual results--relations of the bird to the world in which

it lives. This is the special field of the present-day Science. But,

again, we may regard the bird in its emotional and moral relations to

_us_. One man at the sight of it may be affected with admiration of its

beauty, with tenderness towards it, or sympathy; another may be

stimulated to wonder whether he can kill it, or whether it is good to

eat! Modern Science is indifferent to what this last set of relations

may be; it does not concern itself much with the first; but it takes the

middle term, the purely intellectual, and seeks to abstract that from

the others, to study the bird, or whatever the object may be, in the one

aspect only. But can that really be done? The answer is, of course, No.

To show my general meaning, and why I consider the claim an impossible

one, let us imagine a little cell--one of the myriads which constitute

the human body--professing in the same sort of way to stand outside the

body and explain the laws of the other cells and the body at large. It

is obvious that the little cell, swept along in the currents of the body

and swayed by its emotions, in close proximity and contact with some

portions of the organism, and far remote from others, cannot possibly

pretend to any such impartial judgment. It is obvious not only that it

would not have all the clues of the problem at its command, but that its

own needs and experiences would prejudice it frightfully in the

interpretation of such clues as it had. Yet man is such a little cell in

the body of Nature, or, if you like, in the body of the Society of which

he forms a part.

There is, however, one way, it seems to me, in which a cell in the

human body _might_ come to an adequate understanding of the body; and

that would be rather through experience than through direct reasoning.

It is conceivable that there might be some cell in the body which,

through the nerves, etc., was in actual touch and sympathetic

relationship with every other cell. Then it certainly would have the

materials of the required solution. Every change in other parts of the

body would register itself in this particular cell; and its little brain

(if it had one), without exactly making any great effort, would reflect

sympathetically the structure of the whole body--would become, in fact,

a mirror of it. This will perhaps give you the key to my notion of what

a true Science might be.

But before proceeding to that, I want to go a little more in detail into

the fallacy of the absolute intellectual view of Science. I say, first,

that a complete summary of any object or process in Nature is

impossible; secondly, that such summary as we do make is, and must

inevitably and necessarily be, coloured by the underlying _feeling_ with

which we approach that phase of Nature.

To take the first point. You say, Why is a complete summary not

possible? A watch or other machine may be completely described and

defined; why should not (with a little more knowledge) a fir-tree, or

the human eye, or the solar system, be completely described and defined?

And this brings us to what may be called the Machine-view of Science.

It is curious (and yet I think it will presently be seen that it is

quite what might have been expected) that during this century or so, in

which Machinery has played such an important part in our daily and

social life, mechanical ideas have come to colour all our conceptions of

Science and the Universe. Modern Science holds it as a kind of ideal

(even though finding it at times difficult to realise) to reduce

everything to mechanical action, and to show each process of Nature

intelligible in the same sense as a Machine is intelligible. Yet this

conception, this ideal, involves a complete fallacy. For the moment you

come to think of it, you see that _no_ part of Nature really even

resembles a machine.

What is a machine in the ordinary sense? It is an aggregation of parts

put together to fulfil certain definite actions and no others. A

sewing-machine fulfils the purpose of sewing, a watch fulfils that of

keeping time, and they fulfil those purposes only. All their parts

subserve those actions, and in that sense may be completely

described--as far as just their mechanical action is concerned--the same

by a thousand mechanicians. But I make bold to say that _no_ object in

Nature fulfils just one action, or series of actions, and no others. On

the contrary, every object fulfils an endless series of actions.

Let us take the Human Eye. And I choose this as an instance most adverse

to my position, for there is no doubt that the Human Eye is one of the

most highly specialised objects in creation. Helmholtz, as you know, is

said to have remarked concerning it that if an Optician had sent him an

instrument so defective he should have returned it with his compliments.

Helmholtz was a great man, and I will not do him the injustice to

suppose that he did not know what he was saying. He knew that, regarded

as a machine for focussing rays of light, the eye was decidedly

defective; but then he knew well enough, doubtless, _why_ it was

defective--namely, because it is by no means merely such a machine, but

a great deal more.

The Eye, in fact, not only fulfils the action of focussing rays of

light--like an Opera Glass or a Telescope--but it might be compared to

another instrument, a Photographic Camera, in respect of the fact that

it forms a picture of the outer world which it throws on a sensitive

plate at the back--the Retina. But then, again, it is unlike any of

these "machines," in the fact that it was never made by any Optician,

human or divine, for any one definite purpose. On the contrary, as we

know, it has grown, it has evolved; it has come down to us over the

centuries, and over thousands and thousands of centuries, from dim

beginnings in the lowliest organisms who first conceived the faculty of

Sight, continually modified, continually shapen by small increments in

various directions, in accordance with the myriad needs of a myriad

creatures, living, some of them in water, some of them in air, requiring

some of them to see at close quarters, some at great distances, some by

one kind of light, some by another, and so forth. So that to-day it not

only contains a great range of inherited, yet latent, faculties, but it

is actually, in its complex structure, an epitome and partial record of

its own extraordinary history.

As an instance of this last point, let me remind you that Sight was

originally a differentiation of Touch. The light, the shadows, falling

on the sensitive general surface of a primitive organism provoke a

tactile irritation. In the course of evolution this sense specialises

itself at some point of the surface into what we call Sight. Now,

to-day, when the little picture formed by the fore-part of the Human Eye

falls upon the Retina at the back, it falls upon a screen formed by the

myriad congregated finger-tips, so to speak, of the optic nerve--the

rods and cones, so-called--which cover like a mosaic the whole ground of

the Retina, and _feel_ with their sensitive points the images of the

objects in the outer world. And so Sight is still Touch--it is the power

of feeling or touching at a distance--as one sometimes in fact becomes

aware in looking at things.

But then again on and beyond all these things--beyond the focussing and

photographing of rays, beyond the latent adaptations to the needs of

innumerable creatures, and the epitomising of ages of evolution--the

Human Eye has faculties even more far-reaching perhaps and wonderful. It

is the marvellous organ of human Expression. By the dilatations and

contractions of the iris, by the altering convexities of the lens and

the eyeball, and in a hundred other ways, it manages somehow to convey

intelligence of Command, Control, Power, of Pity, Love, Sympathy, and

all those myriad emotions which flit through the human mind--an endless

series--a perfect encyclopædia. It is difficult even to imagine the eye

without this power of language. And what other functions it may have it

is not necessary to inquire. Highly specialised though it is, it is

already obvious enough that to call it a Machine for focussing rays of

light is monstrously and ludicrously inadequate--even as it would be to

call the Heart (the very centre of emotion and life, and the symbol of

human love and courage) a common Pump.

Nature is an infinitude, and can at no point be circumscribed by the

human intellect. Nor obviously is there any sense in taking one little

portion of Nature and isolating it from the rest, and then describing it

exhaustively _as if_ it really were so isolated. A thousand mechanicians

will agree, as I have said, in their description of a machine, because

in fact they will agree to view the machine just in the one aspect of

its particular action; but ask a thousand people to describe one and the

same face--or, better still, get a thousand portrait-painters, skilled

in their art, to paint portraits of the same face--and you know

perfectly well that all the likenesses will be different. And why will

they be different? Simply because every face, however rude, has infinite

sides, infinite aspects, and each painter selects what he paints from

his own point of view. And the same is true of every object and process

in Nature.

Then if these things are true (you ask again) how is it that scientific

men _do_ arrive at definite conclusions, and do agree with each other so

far as they do?

It is, and obviously must be, by the method of isolation; by the method

of selecting certain aspects of the problems presented to them, and

ignoring others. For since _all_ the relations of any phenomenon of

Nature cannot possibly be compassed, the only way _must_ be to ignore

some and concentrate attention on others; and when there is a kind of

tacit agreement as to which aspects shall be passed over and which

considered, there is naturally an agreement in the results. Thus by this

method, waiving all other aspects of the problem, the Eye may be

described and defined as an optical instrument, the Heart as a common

Pump, and the Solar System as a neat illustration of certain mechanical

laws discovered by Galileo and Newton.

On the subject of the Solar System and Astronomy I will dwell for a few

moments, as here--in this great example of the perfection of Modern

Science--we have again a case apparently most adverse to my contention.

The generalisations by which Newton established the nature of the

planetary orbits has been a wonder to succeeding generations; the

positions of the planets can be foretold, eclipses can be calculated

with amazing accuracy. Yet every tyro in Mathematics knows that the

equations which give these results can only be solved by what is called

"neglecting small quantities"--that is, the problems cannot be solved in

their entirety, but by leaving out certain terms and elements, which do

not appear important, a solution can be approached. And naturally it has

been an important point to show that these small quantities _may_ be

safely neglected. In the case, for instance, of the orbits of the

planets round the sun, and of the moon round the earth, it was for a

long time taken as proved that the small variations in the shape and

position of each elliptic orbit would never be accompanied by any

permanent increase or diminution in its _size_--that is, that the _mean

distances_ of the planets from the sun, and of the moon from the earth,

would always remain within certain limits. Of late years however

Professor George Darwin, taking up one of these poor little neglected

quantities in the theory of the moon, found that it indicated after all

very vast and very permanent, though of course very slow, changes in her

mean distance from the earth; so that now it appears probable that the

Moon's true orbit, instead of being a limited ellipse, is a continually

though gradually enlarging Spiral, which may some day carry the Moon to

a great distance from the earth. If an eclipse were calculated for

twenty years in advance on the Elliptic theory or the Spiral theory, it

would probably--so slow would be the divergence--make no perceptible

difference; but in a hundred centuries the two theories would lead to

results utterly different.

Thus the certitude of Astronomy as a Science arises largely from the

fact that our _times_ are so brief compared with Celestial periods. The

proper periods of Celestial changes are to be reckoned by thousands,

perhaps millions, of years; but we, ignoring _that_ aspect of the

problem, fix our observations on one little point of time, and are quite

satisfied with the result!

As another illustration of my meaning, consider the Fixed Stars,

so-called. These stars in their groups and clusters, which we know so

well by sight, have remained apparently in the very same, or nearly the

same, relative positions during all the 2,000 or 3,000 years that we

have any record of the shapes of the Constellations. Yet now by minute

telescopic and spectroscopic examination we know that they are moving,

and have been moving all the time, in various differing directions with

great velocities, amounting to miles per second. Nevertheless, so great

are the spaces concerned, so great the times, that all this long period

has not sufficed to bring them into any greatly changed attitude with

regard to each other! What would you think of an intelligent foreigner

who, coming to England to study the game of cricket, remained on the

cricket field for a quarter of a minute--during which time the players

would have hardly changed their positions--and having noted a few

points, went away and wrote a volume on the laws of the game? And what

are we to think of poor little Man who, having noted the stars for a

few centuries, is so sure that he understands their movements, and that

he is versed in all the "ordinances of heaven."

Thus it would appear that every Nature-problem is so enormously complex

that it can only be got at by what we have called the Method of

Ignorance. Let us take a practical Science problem like that of

Vaccination. The question here, put in its simplest terms, seems to be,

Whether Vaccination, with calf or human lymph, prevents or alleviates

Smallpox; and if it does, whether it does so without engendering other

evils at least as great. At first sight this may appear to you a very

simple question, and easy to solve; but the moment you come to think

about it, you see its extreme complexity. In the first place, it is

obvious that in a question like this, individual cases afford no test.

It is obvious that the fact that A. is vaccinated and has not taken

small-pox proves nothing, for there is nothing to show that he would

have taken it if he had not been vaccinated. And when you have got

people vaccinated by the hundred and the thousand, you still are not

certain; for these people may belong to a certain class, or a certain

locality, or may have certain habits and conditions of life, which may

account for their comparative immunity, and these causes must be

eliminated before any definite conclusion can be reached. Thus it is not

till the great mass of the population is vaccinated that we can expect

reliable statistics. But the introduction of a practice of this kind on

so great a scale necessarily takes a long period of years, and meanwhile

changes are taking place in the habits of the people, Sanitation is

being improved, customs of Diet are altering, possibly (as so often

happens in the history of an epidemic) the disease, having run its

course, is beginning spontaneously to decline. And thus another series

of possible causes has to be discussed.

Then, supposing the question, notwithstanding all these difficulties, to

be so far settled in favour of the present system--there still arises

that whole other series of difficulties with regard to the possibility

of the spread of _other_ diseases by the practice, and with regard to

the _extent_ of such spread, before we can arrive at any finale. This

series of questions is almost as complex as the other; and it includes

that great element of uncertainty--the question what interval of time

may elapse between inoculation with a disease and its actual appearance.

For if in several cases children break out with erysipelas immediately

after vaccination, of course there is a certain presumption that

vaccination has been the cause; but if the erysipelas only appears some

years after, its connection with the operation may, though real, be

impossible to trace.

The matter standing thus, it seems to us almost a mystery how it was

that the medical authorities of the early days of Jennerism were so

cocksure of their conclusions--until we remember that in arriving at

those conclusions they practically _ignored_ all these other points

that I have mentioned, like changes of Sanitation, spontaneous decline

of Small-pox, the spread of other diseases, etc., and simply limited

themselves to one small aspect of the problem. But now, after this

interval of time, when the neglected facts and aspects have meanwhile

_forced_ themselves on our attention, how remarkable is the change of

attitude as evidenced by the finding of the late Royal Commission!

(1896).

From all this do not understand me to deride Science--for I have no

intention of doing that; on the contrary, I think the debt we owe to

modern investigation quite incalculable; but I only wish to warn you how

complex all these problems are, how impossible that notion of settling

even one of them by a cut-and-dried intellectual formula.

But you will ask (for this is the second point I mentioned some little

time back) _how_ people's emotions and feelings come in to colour their

scientific conclusions? And the answer is--very simply, namely by

directing their choice as to what aspects of the problem they will

ignore and what aspects they will envisage; by determining their point

of view, in fact. To return to that illustration of several

portrait-painters painting the same face; just as each painter is led by

his feeling, his sympathies, his general temperament, to select certain

points in the face and to pass over others, so each group of scientific

men in each generation is led by its sympathies, its idiosyncrasies, to

envisage certain aspects of the problems of the day and to ignore

others.

The whole history of Science illustrates this. We are all familiar with

the way in which the predilections of religious feeling in the time of

Copernicus and Galileo retarded the progress of astronomical Science. As

long as people believed that a divine drama of redemption had been

enacted on this earth alone, they naturally concluded that this earth

was the centre of the universe, and refused to look at facts which

contradicted their conclusion. When Galileo turned his newly-made

telescope on Jupiter and saw it circled by its satellites, he saw in

this an image of the Copernican system and of the planets circling round

the central Sun; but when he asked others to share his observation and

his inference, they would not. "O, my dear Kepler," he writes in a

letter to his fellow astronomer, "how I wish we could have one hearty

laugh together. Here at Padua is the principal Professor of Philosophy,

whom I have repeatedly and urgently requested to look at the moon and

planets through my glass; but he pertinaciously refuses to do so. What

shouts of laughter we should have at this glorious folly!"

And though we laugh at the folly of those before us, we do the same

things ourselves to-day. Take the science of Political Economy. A

revolution has taken place in that, almost comparable to the change from

the geocentric to the heliocentric view in Astronomy. During the

distinctively commercial period of the last 100 years, the leading

students of social science, being themselves filled with the spirit of

the time, have been fain to look upon the acquisition of private wealth

as the one absorbing motive of human nature; and so it has come about

that the economists, from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill, have founded

their science on self-seeking and competition, as the base of their

analysis. To-day another series of economists coming to the front--their

minds preoccupied with the great facts of Community of life and

Co-operation--have discovered that Society is in the main an

illustration of these latter principles, and have evolved a quite new

phase of the science. It is not that Society has changed so much during

this period, as that the altered point of view of the students of

Society has caused them simply to fix their attention on a different

aspect of the problem and a different range of facts.

I have alluded already to the way in which the prevalent use of

Machinery in practical life has affected our mental outlook on the

world. It is curious that during this mechanical age of the last 100

years or so, we have not only come to regard Society in a mechanical

light, as a concourse of separate individuals bound together by a mere

cash-nexus, but have extended the same idea to the universe at large,

which we look upon as a concourse of separate atoms, associated together

by gravitation, or possibly by mere mutual impact. Yet it is certain

that both these views are false, since the individuals who compose

Society are _not_ separate from each other; and the theory that the

universe, in its ultimate analysis, is composed of a vast number of

discrete atoms is simply unthinkable.

When we come to a practical and modern question like Medicine, the

influence of the spirit in which it is approached on the course of the

science is very easy to see. For if the science of Medicine is

approached (as it perhaps mostly is to-day) in a spirit of combined Fear

and Self-indulgence--fear for one's own personal safety, combined with a

kind of anxiety to continue living in the indulgence of habits known to

be unhealthy--if it is approached in this uncomfortable and

contradictory state of mind, it is pretty obvious that its course will

be similarly uncomfortable: that it will consist for the most part in a

search for drugs which shall, without effort on our part, palliate the

effects of our misconduct; in the discovery, as in a kind of nightmare,

that the air round us is full of billions of microbes; in a terrified

study of these messengers of disease, and in a frantic effort to ward

them off by inoculations, vaccinations, vivisections, and so forth,

without end.

If, on the other hand, the science is approached from quite a different

side--from that of the love of Health, and the desire to make life

lovely, beautiful and clean; if the student is filled not only with

this, but with a great belief in the essential _power_ of Man, and his

command in creation, to control not only all these little microbes

whose name is Legion, but through his mind all the processes of his

body; then it is obvious enough that a whole series of different facts

will arise before his eyes and become the subject of his study--facts of

sanitation, of the laws of cleanly life, diet, clothing and so forth,

methods of control, and the details and practice of the influence of the

mental upon the physical part of man--facts quite equally real with the

others, equally important, equally numerous perhaps and complex, but

forming a totally different range of science.

In conclusion, you begin to see doubtless that I do not believe in a

science of mere Formulas, which can be poured from one brain to another

like water in a pot. I believe in something more organic to

Humanity--which shall combine Sense, Intellect and Soul; which shall

include the keenest training of the Senses, the exactest use of the

Brain, and the subordination of both of these to the finest and most

generous attitude of Man towards Nature.

To come to quite practical aspects, I think that Physical Science, and

for that matter Natural History too, ought to be founded on the closest

observation and actual intimacy with Nature. It is notorious that in

many respects the perceptions, the Nature-intuitions, of savage races

far outdo those of civilised man. We have let that side go slack, and

too often the man of science when he comes out of his study is a mere

baby in the external world. I look back with a kind of shame when I

think that I studied the mathematical side of Astronomy for three or

four years at Cambridge and absolutely at the time hardly knew one star

from another in the sky. But such are the methods of teaching that have

been in use. They ought however to be reversed, and practical

acquaintance with the facts should come a long way first, and then be

succeeded by inductive and deductive reasoning when the difficulties of

the subject have forced themselves on the student's mind.

Then in Natural History and Botany I think that we have hitherto not

only neglected the perceptive side, but also what may be called the

intuitive and emotional aspects. If any one will attend to the subject,

I believe they will perceive that there are dormant in the mind the

finest intuitions and instincts of relationship to the various animals

and plants--intuitions which have played a far more important part in

the life of barbaric races than they do to-day.[41] Primitive peoples

have a remarkable instinct of the medicinal and dietetic uses of herbs

and plants--an instinct which we also find well developed among

animals--and I believe that this kind of knowledge would grow largely

if, so to speak, it were given a chance. The formal classification of

animals and plants--which now forms the main part of these

sciences--would then come in simply as an aid and an auxiliary to the

more direct and human study.

Again, let us take the science of Physiology. At present this is mainly

carried on by means of Dissection or Vivisection. But both these methods

are unsatisfactory. Dissection, because it amounts to studying the

organisation of a living creature by the examination of its dead

carcase; and Vivisection, because it is not only open to a similar

objection, but because it necessarily violates the highest relation of

man to the animal he is studying. There is, I believe, another method--a

method which has been known in the East for centuries, though little

regarded in the West--which may perhaps be called the method of Health.

It consists in rendering the body, by proper habits of life, pure and

healthy, till it becomes, as it were, transparent to the inner eye, and

then projecting the consciousness _inward_ so as to become almost as

sensible of the structure and function of the various internal organs,

as it usually is of the outer surface of the body. Of course this is a

process which cannot be effectuated at once, and which may need help and

corroboration by external methods of study, but I believe it is one

which will lead to considerable results. There is no doubt that many of

the Yogis of India attain to great skill in it.

Similarly, from what we have already said about Political Economy, it

is obvious that satisfactory results in that science must depend

immensely on the high degree of social instinct and feeling with which

the student approaches it, and on the thoroughness of his acquaintance

with the _actual life_ of a people; and that the development of these

factors is fully as important a part of the science as that which

consists in the logical ordering and arrangement of the material

obtained.

I need not, I think, go any further into detail of new methods in each

Science. You remember what I said at the beginning about the Cell

studying the Body of which it formed a part. We may imagine, if we like,

three stages in this process. In the first stage the Cell regards the

other cells and the Body simply from the point of view of how they

affect _it_, and its comfort and safety. This might be taken to

correspond to the Old-time Science. In the second stage the Cell, with

its tiny experience of the other cells and the small part of the body in

which it is placed, becomes highly intellectual, and professes to lay

down the laws of the structure of the body generally. This corresponds

to the attitude of Modern Science. In the third stage the Cell, growing

and evolving, and coming daily into closer sympathetic relationship with

all parts of the body, begins to find its true relation to the other

cells, not to use _them_, but to fulfil its part in the whole. Gradually

drawing all the threads together and coming more and more, so to say,

into a central position, it at last in its little brain spontaneously

and inevitably reflects the whole, and becomes the mirror of it. This

would answer to what we have called a really rational and humane

Science.

Man has to find and to _feel_ his true relation to other creatures and

to the whole of which he is a part, and has to use his brain to further

this. Science _is_, as we all know, the search for Unity. That is its

ideal. It unites innumerable phenomena under one law; and then it unites

many laws under one higher; always seeking for the ultimate complete

integration. But (is it not obvious?) Man cannot find that unity _of_

the Whole until he feels his unity _with_ the Whole. To found a Science

of one-ness on the murderous Warfare and insane Competition of men with

each other, and on the Slaughter and Vivisection of animals--the search

for unity on the practice of disunity--is an absurdity, which can only

in the long run reveal itself as such.

I do not know whether it seems obvious to you, but it does to me, that

Man will never find in theory the unity of outer Nature till he reaches

in practice the unity of his own. When he has learnt to harmonise in

himself all his powers, bodily and mental, his desires, faculties,

needs, and bring them into perfect co-operation--when he has found the

true hierarchy of himself--then somehow I think that Nature round him

will reflect this order, and range itself in clear and intelligible

harmony about him.

But I can say no more. I have dragged you by the neck, as it were,

through a recondite and difficult subject; and even so I do not feel

that I have by any means done justice to it. But it is possible,

perhaps, that I have cast the germ of an idea among you, which, if you

think over it at leisure, may develop into something of value.

Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure; and Other Essays · 第 31 / 71 题