methods change also natural characteristics, to such an extent
as to affect radically those qualities which make for beneficial
citizenship in a foreign country. Stated concretely, this means
that the adoption of Western methods by Japan has in two
generations so changed the Japanese racial characteristics as to
make them readily assimilable with Europeans, so as to be easily
absorbed. This the Japanese in their just pride of race would be
the first to deny. It ignores also the whole background of
European history, and the fact that European civilization (which
includes America) grew up for untold centuries under influences
of which Eastern Asia--including therein Japan--experienced
nothing. The 'Foundations of the Twentieth Century,' are not
only a succession of facts, or combination of factors. They are
to be _found_ chiefly in the moulding of character, national and
individual, through sixty-odd generations.
"It is, I conceive, this deep impress of prolonged common
experience which constitutes the possibility of assimilation,
even among the unhappy, poverty-stricken mass often coming to
us, . . . Undoubtedly they constitute a problem, but one with
which the immense assimilative force of {149} English
institutions, especially when Americanized, has been able so far
to deal successfully, and I believe will continue able. But
there are those who greatly doubt whether, in view of the very
different foundations of the Japanese 20th century, and of the
recognized strength and tenacity of character of the Japanese
people emphasized by strong racial marks, they could be so
assimilated. We who so think--I am one--cordially recognize the
great progresses of Japan and admire her achievements of the
past half century, both civil and military; but we do not
perceive in them the promise of ready adaptability to the spirit
of our own institutions which would render naturalization
expedient; and immigration, as I have said, with us implies
naturalization. Whatever our doubts as to the effect upon
national welfare of the presence of an unassimilable multitude
of naturalized aliens, the presence of a like number of
unnaturalized foreigners of the same type would be even worse.
"The question is fundamentally that of assimilation, though it
is idle to ignore that clear superficial evidences of
difference, which inevitably _sautent aux yeux_, due to marked
racial types, do exasperate the difficulty. Personally, I
entirely reject any assumption or belief that my race is
superior to the Chinese, or to the Japanese. My own suits me
better, probably because I am used to it; but I wholly disclaim,
as unworthy of myself and of them, any thought of superiority.
But with equal clearness I see and avow the difficulties of
assimilation due to formative influences of divergent pasts and
to race. . . .
"Let me say here that . . . is mistaken in the {150} statement
that the United States' within living memory waged the greatest
civil war of modern times in order to establish the claim of
American negroes to equal right of citizenship with the white
population.' With the statement falls necessarily his inference
from it, that 'a colour bar cannot be logically pleaded as
prohibitive.' The United States did not wage the War of
Secession even for the abolition of slavery, still less for
equal rights of citizenship. Goldwin Smith, as a contemporary,
held against us that the war, not being for abolition, was one
of conquest. Lincoln said distinctly:--'I will restore the union
with slavery or without slavery, as best can be.' Myself a
contemporary and partaker, I can affirm this as a general tone,
though there was a strong minority of abolition sentiment. The
abolition proclamation came 18 months after the war began, and
purely as a measure of policy. The full rights of citizenship
came after the war ended, as a party political measure, though
doubtless with this mingled much humanitarian feeling.
Concerning this legislation a very acute American thinker,
himself in the war, said to me within the past two years, 'The
great mistake of the men of that day was the unconscious
assumption that the negro was a white man, with the accident of
a black skin.' That is, the question was not one of colour, but
of assimilation as involved in race character. Now, while
recognizing what I clearly see to be the great superiority of
the Japanese, as of the white over the negro, it appears to me
reasonable that a great number of my fellow-citizens, knowing
the problem we have in the coloured race among us, should dread
the introduction {151} of what they believe will constitute
another race problem; and one much more difficult, because the
virile qualities of the Japanese will still more successfully
withstand assimilation, constituting a homogeneous foreign mass,
naturally acting together irrespective of the national welfare,
and so will be a perennial cause of friction with Japan, even
more dangerous than at present. . . .
[Here follows a personal appreciation of the Japanese as Admiral
Mahan had known them for forty years, and to which most
thoughtful Pan-Angles would gladly subscribe. He then
concludes:]
". . . Despite gigantic success up to the present in
assimilative processes--due to English institutions inherited
and Americanized, and to the prevalence among the children of
our community of the common English tongue over all other
idioms--America doubts her power to digest and assimilate the
strong national and racial characteristics which distinguish the
Japanese, which are the secret of much of their success, and
which, if I am not mistaken, would constitute them continually a
solid homogeneous body, essentially and unchangingly foreign."
If there are, as Admiral Mahan suggests, good reasons why the
Japanese should not be allowed to settle in Pan-Angle countries,
those certainly form the best of reasons why the Pan-Angles
should not allow themselves to occupy a position where Japan
could demand of them this privilege for its subjects.
But while Japanese immigration, for the present peaceful except
in the field of economics, has been {152} agitating the nations
that border the Pacific, half way round the world other
Pan-Angles have had nightmares of a military invasion. "Within
twelve hours' steam of Essex and Lincolnshire is the port of
Emden, recently adapted for the embarkation of large bodies of
troops."[152-1] "The past need not concern us here. However
serious the old scares may have been, at least they came and
went, leaving a clear sky behind them when they had gone. But
now the sky refuses to clear. The 'scare' of 1909, launched on
that March afternoon when Sir Edward Grey told the House of
Commons that, in view of German competition, the whole British
Fleet would have to be rebuilt in Dreadnought form, has left a
permanent mark upon the public mind."[152-2]
There, at England's door, has been growing a nation small in
geographical area but with a population of 65,000,000
whites,[152-3] which, though less than the number of whites of
the United States, is more than the number of whites of the six
Britannic nations. Roughly stated, Germany has about one-half as
many whites as have all the Pan-Angle nations combined.[152-4]
In many respects Germany's position is not unlike Japan's. Both
nations have had a victorious rise based on military efficiency,
and there is no proof that their naval efficiency is not
similarly high. Both nations {153} have, relatively speaking,
but a small subject population to control. Both nations must
necessarily be warlike on account of the pressure of population
about them, and both have birth-rates which are already crowding
their lands more than the Pan-Angles are crowding theirs.
Practically all the non-European areas of the world which the
white race can occupy are held by the seven Pan-Angle nations,
or protected by one of them, or are in the hands of their
out-run rivals, or in the control of Japan, Russia, or China.
The same is true of lands unsuited for white occupation, but
desirable as dependencies. Germany arrived on the scene so
recently that it shared practically only the last divisions of
the lands of the blacks. Consequently, the only lands available
for Germany are those now held by the white and yellow races.
Under such circumstances, if Germany is to take land from
whites, Pan-Angle common-sense suggests that such land should
not be ours. In accord with such policy is Sir Harry H.
Johnston's suggestion that Portugal's African dependencies be
divided between the British Isles and Germany.[153-1] If Germany
should, however, show a preference for Pan-Angle lands and
should ask for those lands on which we now depend for our life
and comfort, common-sense equally suggests that we be in a
position to refuse. We could not expect the Germans to starve
themselves and their children, or even to reduce their standard
of living out of respect for claims we could no longer uphold.
We did not so respect the claims {154} of Portugal or Spain,
Holland or France. Episodes in our own history ought to point
plain the only road to security of possession.
The rise of the German Empire might by Pan-Angles be regarded
with antagonism, if Japan, Russia, and China offered no dangers.
The old and lasting fear that Pan-Angles have for centuries held
toward Europe was the fear that called for the naval supremacy
of the British Isles and for the Monroe Doctrine of America.
Antagonism toward Germany might seem justified were it not that
the fear of these other three powers, so different in
civilization from us, makes Germany our natural and civilization
ally. The victory of Germany over any portion of the Britannic
world would be a Pan-Angle calamity. The fall of modern Germany
would be hardly less of a Pan-Angle calamity. Any thought of the
whites weakening each other, and especially of weakening their
chance for developing their individualism, should be abhorrent
to every Pan-Angle or German who can see further than the mass
of his fellows.
International politenesses often verge towards the extravagant.
But certainly, if human relationships can be ascribed to
nations, Germany is our near of kin. German blood has enriched
ours for fifteen hundred years. Pan-Angle ideals of religious
and political freedom came originally from Germany. Pan-Angle
language, Pan-Angle law, and many of the qualities of which we
are most proud had the same source. Individualism has developed
more highly among the Pan-Angles--at least in matters of
government. This is {155} demonstrated by Pan-Angle and German
ideas regarding civil officers. "Of course, in every nation its
affairs are, and must be, conducted by officials. That is as
true of America as of Germany. The fundamental difference is
that with us these official persons are executive officers only,
the real captain is the people; while in Germany these official
persons are the real governors of the people, subject to the
commands of one who repeatedly and publicly asserts that his
commission is from God and not from the people."[155-1] Contrast
with this the utterance of an American "official": "the people
have not transferred their government to us. They still retain
ownership and all the rights and powers of ownership. We are
merely their temporary agents in performing duties which they
have delegated to us."[155-2] The German point of view would be
intolerable to a Pan-Angle, but there is no reason for assuming
that this bureaucratic country may not develop a truly
representative form of government.[155-3]
To prevent a conflict with Germany should be not merely a matter
of Pan-Angle sentiment, but of Pan-Angle business. If the
Pan-Angles were so strong that Germany was no longer a source of
danger to anyone of their nations, Germany would be changed from
a dangerous rival to a political ally. It would be the buffer
state for the Pan-Angles {156} against Russia, indeed against
all Europe, providing thus greater security for itself as well
as for us. We now realize the world has already been staked off
by the white and yellow races. While the British Isles and
Germany are making extraordinary efforts to build navies, Japan,
Russia, and China are growing unmolested. Germany should be the
nation with which all Europe and all Pan-Angles should unite to
neutralize Japanese and other Asiatic questions that press for
solution, and the nation with which all other whites should
rally if this test of strength ever has to come. Properly
understood in reference to the economic and political struggle
between the white and yellow races, a Pan-Angle federation
should be welcomed by every German.
The Pan-Angles are responsible for large subject populations,
which they both control and protect. This requires a greater or
less military effort according to local circumstance and the
fluctuating make-up of the international situation. Fortunately,
from a military point of view, these Pan-Angle dependencies are
widely scattered over the earth, and of such diverse languages
that no combination among them has thus far appeared probable.
But in case of any conflict with a foreign power they must
always be regarded as an element of weakness to us. The
Pan-Angles are not a military people. In each of our recent wars
we have had to make ready an army after hostilities began--even
though we were not taken unawares. In this regard we are at a
disadvantage with those powers who keep {157} their military
force in constant readiness. In the past we have been willing to
forego a fighting efficiency, if thereby we could be free of a
possibly tyrannical system and obtain greater play for our
individualism. We may continue of this mind for the future. But
if we choose to disregard the usual national precaution of
military safety, we must make doubly sure of other strength as
its equivalent.
The Pan-Angles do not occupy a contiguous land area. They are
scattered over the globe, and are exposed not only on their many
shores but throughout the length of their lines of sea
communication. The oceans sever them from each other and sever
some of them from their food. One answer to the problems which
arise from this wide separation is sea power. On this depends
the very daily existence of some of our groups.
Until recently six of our nations have relied almost entirely
upon the taxing power and efforts of the British Isles to
maintain a navy for them.
The burden on the British Isles has been heavy, and is growing
steadily heavier. To defend the British Isles from Germany the
British navy was withdrawn to European waters. Since 1910 this
concentration has been practically a defence of the North Sea
shores of the British Isles. How long can the British Isles
alone bear the strain of its own naval defence? And who is to
defend the other five Britannic nations? "We have made great
efforts, as in the past, but we are realizing that even so our
efforts, in Great Britain alone, may before long fall short of
what Imperial security requires. And this increasing anxiety is
not due solely to a narrow {158} apprehension of German aims. It
is due to the rate of naval expansion everywhere."[158-1] "It is
quite clear that external pressure is already more severe than
it has been for nearly a hundred years, and that it will
probably become even greater in the future."[158-2]
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have now taken steps towards
maintaining their own navies to co-operate with the British
navy, but it is still true that, "Once the command of the sea is
lost by the [British] Empire no local system of defence, naval
or military, could secure Australia's autonomy, and she would
become the prey of the strongest maritime power."[158-3] A like
statement could be made of the other younger Britannic nations.
And while the American navy is not to be disregarded as a
possible aid, it is not wise for either the Britannic or
American people to assume that navies under separate governments
will act with that promptness possible under a single control.
In comparison with some of their competitors now rising to the
stage of active rivalry, all the seven Pan-Angle nations are
collectively only one first-class world-power. Each Pan-Angle
nation is naturally more solicitous for its own welfare than for
that of its fellow nations. The Englander is exasperated that
the other Britannic nations take so little interest in the
German peril. Australia and South Africa block the immigration
of Asiatics from British dependencies. Canada dallies over {159}
the merits or demerits of a naval appropriation bill. The United
States fortifies its Canal. Our co-operation is still uncertain,
for we are still divided into seven different nations. Neither
New Zealand, nor Australia, nor Newfoundland, nor Canada, nor
South Africa, nor the British Isles, nor the United States would
care to try to stand alone against the possible combinations
that might be brought against it; sentiments of warmest
friendship, or even treaties, are a poor substitute for a
machinery of government tried and tested before the crash comes.
As they now are, the seven Pan-Angle nations offer the maximum
of inducements for inter-Pan-Angle friction and extra-Pan-Angle
aggressions. Together the Pan-Angles could ensure the peace of
the world.
[120-1] _The Times_, London, November 28, 1913, Cape Town
despatch concerning Lord Hardinge's speech at Madras, November
26, in reference to treatment of Indians in South Africa states:
"After criticizing severely several passages in the speech, the
_Cape Times_, referring to the suggestion that the Imperial
Government should intervene in South Africa, utters the warning
that this way madness lies."
[121-1] _Bouvier's Law Dictionary_, Rawle's revision, Boston,
1897, "Court."
[122-1] _Round Table_, London, February 1911, pp. 107-108; _cf._
also _Round Table_, December 1912, p. 29: "Arbitration is no
cure for war so long as there is no agreement between nations to
substitute arbitration for war, and no power strong enough to
enforce such an agreement if made."
[123-1] For an account of some of these discords, _cf._ H. C.
Lodge, _One Hundred Years of Peace_, New York, 1913; also _Round
Table_, London, December 1913, pp. 106-122.
[123-2] P. A. Molteno, _A Federal South Africa_, London, 1896,
p. viii.
[123-3] Concerning these Chinese coolies, cf. _Ency. Brit._,
vol. xxv. p.481.
[123-4] M. C. Bruce, _The New Transvaal_, London, 1908, p. Ill.
[124-1] "Proceedings in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand with
reference to comments made upon that Court by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Wallis and Others,
Appellants, and His Majesty's Solicitor-General for the Colony
of New Zealand, Respondent. Together with the Judgments of the
Court of Appeal and the Privy Council in the same Case," Dunedin
[New Zealand], 1903, p. 28.
[125-1] "Hindus" (an unfortunate application of a religious
creed-name to a people) who had been admitted to the Philippines
and who sailed from Manila to San Francisco were debarred
entrance to United States, according to _Springfield_
(Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_, December 11, 1913.
[127-1] _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_,
November 27, 1913: "The Monroe Doctrine Today."
[127-2] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 680.
[127-3] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xviii. p. 789.
[130-1] _A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British
South African Colonies, to which is appended a Memorandum on
South African Railway Unification_, "Printed by Authority"
[Johannesburg, 1907]; Lord Selborne's letter of January 7, 1907,
p. viii.
[132-1] Sir Harry H. Johnston in _Nineteenth Century_, London,
March 1912, questions the appropriateness of leaving these
dependencies in the care of Portugal. _Cf._ thirteen months
later, _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_, June
12,1913: "That something is brewing in the way of a partition of
Portuguese Africa seems likely despite official disclaimers, and
the London _Spectator_ now sketches a hypothetical division.
. . . " Cf. _Transvaal Leader_, Johannesburg, December 5, 1912,
for an account of Lourenço Marques' "warning against the
neglectful attitude of the Home [Lisbon] Government toward this
Colony."
[132-2] The ratio of the population of British India to the
British Isles is approximately 7 to 1. A like ratio exists
between the populations of the Dutch Indies and Holland. _Cf._
A. Cabaton, _Java, Sumatra, and the other Islands of the Dutch
East Indies_, trans. Bernard Miall, London, 1911, p. 26.
[133-1] George Philip & Son Ltd., _Chamber of Commerce Atlas_,
London, 1912, p. 32.
[134-1] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883,
p. 20.
[134-2] _Cf._ W.M. West, _Modern History_, Boston, rev. ed.,
1907, pp.300-301.
[134-3] _Ibid._, pp. 294, 295.
[134-4] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, p. 95.
This was as of 1758.
[136-1] _Round Table_, London, June 1913, p. 485.
[137-1] Arthur Murphy, _The Works of Cornelius Tacitus_, London,
1798, vol. iv. p. 35.
[138-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxiii. p. 870: "The Russian empire
stretches over a vast territory in E. Europe and N. Asia, with
an area exceeding 8,660,000 sq. m., or one-sixth of the land
surface of the globe. . . ."
[138-2] Cf. _ante_, p. 81, note 1.
[138-3] H. P. Kennard, comp. and ed., _The Russian Yearbook for
1912_, London, 1912, p. 46. This is as of 1910 census.
[139-1] Cf. _ante_, p. 81, note 1.
[141-1] _Round Table_, London, February 1911, p. 140.
[141-2] E. Backhouse and J.O.P. Bland, "Secret Annals of the
Manchu Court," in _Atlantic Monthly_, Boston, December 1913,
p.767.
[142-1] Toyo Kisen Kaisha (Oriental Steamship Company) boats
_Shinyo Maru, Chiyo Maru,_ and _Tenyo Maru_.
[143-1] Cf. _Round Table_, London, May 1911, pp. 263-269.
[144-1] Cf. _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_,
June 26, 1913; and _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, p. 941.
[145-1] Cf. _Round Table_, London, February 1911, pp. 123-153.
[145-2] _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_,
November 27, 1913.
[146-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 602.
[146-2] A. T. Mahan, "Japan among the Nations," a letter to the
editor of _The Times_, in _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London,
June 27, 1913.
[152-1] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908,
Supplement, p. 51.
[152-2] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 675.
[152-3] _Statesman's Yearbook_, London, 1913, p. 857: 1910
population of Germany 64,925,993, which is 310.4 per square
mile.
[152-4] Germany 65,000,000; Japan 49,000,000; America
81,000,000; and all the seven Pan-Angle nations 141,000,000.
[153-1] Cf. _ante_, p. 132, note 1.
[155-1] Price Collier, _Germany and the Germans_, New York,
1913, p.190.
[155-2] Inaugural message of Governor David I. Walsh of
Massachusetts to the State Legislature, January 8, 1914.
[155-3] Note the effort, December 1913, of the lower house of
the German Parliament to make the Chancellor responsible not to
the Emperor but to the lower house.
[158-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 675.
[158-2] _Ibid._, May 1911, p. 244.
[158-3] Admiral Henderson in "Report to Australian Government,"
quoted in _Round Table_, London, May 1911, p. 258.
{160}
VII
TENDENCIES
THE future of the Pan-Angles must flow out of their past. The
course it will take is indicated by our history if, following
Seeley's admonition, the investigator turns "narrative into
problems." "For in history everything depends upon turning
narrative into problems. So long as you think of history as a
mere chronological narrative, so long you are in the old
literary groove which leads to no trustworthy knowledge, but
only to that pompous conventional romancing of which all serious
men are tired. Break the drowsy spell of narrative; ask yourself
questions; set yourself problems; your mind will at once take up
a new attitude; you will become an investigator; you will cease
to be solemn and begin to be serious."[160-1]