with constitution and constitutionalism are thus, it will be
seen, mainly of modern and European origin. They are wholly
inapplicable to the primitive and simple societies of the
present or of the former times. The discussion of forms of
government occupies a large space in the writings of the Greek
philosophers,--a fact which is to be explained by the existence
among the Greeks of many independent political communities,
variously organized, and more or less democratic in character.
Between the political problems of the smaller societies and
those of the great European nations there is no useful parallel
to be drawn, although the predominance of classical learning
made it the fashion for a long time to apply Greek speculations
on the nature of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy to public
questions in modern Europe. Representation . . . the
characteristic principle of European constitutions, has, of
course, no place in societies which were not too large to admit
of every free citizen participating personally in the business
of government. Nor is there much in the politics or the
political literature of the Romans to compare with the
constitutions of modern states. Their political system, almost
from the beginning of the empire, was ruled absolutely by a
small assembly or by one man."
[97-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15.
[97-2] A. V. Dicey, _The Law of the Constitution_, London, 1885,
p.25.
[98-1] H. E. Egerton, _Federations and Unions within the British
Empire_, Oxford, 1911, p. 33.
[98-2] Goldwin Smith, "Canada, England, and the States," in
_Contemporary Review_, London, March 1907, p. 851.
[98-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. ii. p. 966.
[99-1] W.B. Worsfold, _The Union of South Africa_, London, 1912,
p. 128.
[99-2] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1897, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p.462.
[100-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xvii. p. 858: "Finding themselves
without warrant in a region beyond their patent, . . . they drew
up and signed before landing a democratic compact of government
which is accounted the earliest written constitution in
history."
[100-2] _Ibid._, vol. xvii. p. 858.
[101-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 658.
[101-2] _Ibid._
[102-1] J.B. Thayer, _John Marshall_, Boston, 1901, p. 63
[103-1] J.B. Thayer, _John Marshall_, Boston, 1901, p. 61.
[104-1] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 62.
[104-2] _Ibid._, p. 62.
[105-1] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 62.
[105-2] "Pacificus," _Federalism and Home Rule_, London, 1910,
p. 2.
[105-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15: "Again, as a term of
party politics, constitutional has come to mean, in England, not
obedience to constitutional rules . . . but adherence to the
existing type of the constitution or to some conspicuous
portions thereof,--in other words, conservative."
[107-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p. 378.
[107-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 14.
[108-1] The fact that so-called "governors" are sent out from
the British Isles to the five newer Britannic nations does not
affect the statements in this paragraph. Such "governors" do not
share in legislation, but acquiesce in legislation formulated by
others. Such "governors" are best considered as ambassadors with
peculiar local recognition, who act under orders from and in
behalf of the government of the British Isles, and act also
wherever possible in behalf of all six of the Britannic nations
and their dependencies. _Cf. ante_, p. 89.
[109-1] The Seventeenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
initiated by Congress in 1912, requiring the direct election of
senators by the voters of each state, came into force May 31,
1913. The practical effects of direct election were, however,
previously obtained in some states, the legislatures electing as
senators candidates already designated by the voters. This
instance, in which the working Constitution violated the spirit
of the written Constitution, is interesting as evidence of the
flexity of the American Constitution and of the strength of the
spirit of local self-government. Cf. _Britannica Year Book_,
London, 1913, pp. 744-745.
[110-1] That Australia may change its Constitution regardless of
the wishes of the British Isles, _cf._ Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, chapter viii. paragraph 128, and comments
thereon in C.P. Lucas, _A Historical Geography of the British
Colonies,_ vol. vi., _Australasia_, by A. D. Rogers, Oxford,
1907, pt. i., p. 289.
[111-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p.462.
[111-2] Concerning the alteration in procedure of the American
Electoral College whereby presidential electors are pledged
before their election, cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 655.
[112-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. p. 845.
[113-1] _Cf._ W.H. Moore, _The Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Australia_, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1910, p. 297: "Further, the
Constitution recognizes, if it does not establish, the Cabinet
system in the Commonwealth, and the responsibilities of the
Executive extend to the consideration of the subjects committed
to Parliament, and, if need be, to the initiation of legislation
upon them," Also B, R. Wise, _The Commonwealth of Australia_,
London, 1909, pp. 193-194: "At the same time, the provisions
which enable its [responsible government] continuance are
sufficiently wide to allow of other systems, should this one
prove unsuited to a Federation. Except that Ministers must sit
in Parliament, there seems no limit to the changes which might
be made with the acquiescence of the Governor-General, in the
method of appointment, tenure of office, or function," _Cf._
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter i., part i.,
paragraph 5.
[114-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p. 889, gives this lack of local self-government as one of
the causes of the American Revolution.
[115-1] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. pp. 845-849; and _Britannica
Year Book_, London, 1913, pp. 491-497 and 480-482.
[115-2] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American
Union_, London, 1906, p. 447. Students who are mystified by
allusions to the "Crown," the "King in Council," and the "King
has graciously consented," etc., should find the sentence above
quoted a valuable explanation.
[117-1] Constitution of the United States, art. ii. sec. 3.
[118-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p. 572: "Government, in its last analysis, is organized
force. . . . The machinery of government necessary to such an
organization consists of instrumentalities fitted to enforce in
the conduct of the common affairs of the community the will of
the sovereign men: the sovereign minority, or the sovereign
majority."
{120}
VI
DANGERS
DANGER may arise to menace the Pan-Angle civilization from three
sources: from within any of the seven groups; from between any
of the groups; or from outside civilizations.
The first of these sources exists in every body politic. Civil
discord whenever it becomes active must be cured as it
develops--from within. The soundness of a nation lies in its
ability to cope with internal disorder and still maintain its
integrity before the world. Any interference, however kindly
meant, only exasperates those on the spot. No Britisher, for
example, can improve the situation in South Africa by
sympathizing with "Hindus" that South Africa does not
want.[120-1] And especially is it true among Pan-Angles to whom
local self-government is instinctive, that {121} each political
entity must look to the order of its own household.
The second source of danger is more grave. As long as the seven
nations remain in real or hazily defined independence of each
other frictions are bound to arise. These frictions may grow
from the competitions of commerce. They may cause reprisals of
commerce. Commerce affords the quickest attack on a nation's
standard of living. Those who abhor war often overlook the fact
that trade reprisal may also produce similar inexpressible
suffering. The frictions of commerce in the thirteen American
nations in the eighteenth century, the similar discords in
Australia before 1900, and in South Africa before 1910, point
the same lesson--an adequate central government to adjust such
differences. While lacking such an adequate central government
for the seven Pan-Angle nations, our only recourse when
interests conflict is to our mutual forbearance.
Within a nation a government hales offenders before a court
empowered to enforce its decisions. Between nations there is no
such tribunal. A court is "a body in the government to which the
public administration of justice is delegated."[121-1] This
presupposes in the court power to bring parties before it; a law
governing the case; and power to enforce a decision. The Hague
Tribunal or any other existing so-called "international {122}
arbitration court" has no one of these three attributes. It is
no court at all. Any body of presumably well-intentioned persons
anywhere can listen to a dispute and give advice. This is all
the Hague Tribunal, for all its name, can do. The contending
parties can take the advice or not as they like. No parties can
be compelled to appear before this non-governmental body; no one
can know beforehand, except by frangible mutual agreement with
his opponents and with the "court," what rules are to govern the
decision; and on no party can a decision be enforced. "In
international affairs the primitive rule, that 'might is right'
still holds good, for either side to a quarrel can insist on a
resort to force. In the outer void of world politics there is no
reign of law, for there is no law-maker; there is no assured
justice, for there is no judge; there is no safety for the weak,
for there are no police to whom they can appeal.
"Why is this? It is because no nation is willing to submit its
destinies to a tribunal over which it has no control, or to
surrender its armaments to a world authority which will use them
to enforce some international code of its own creation."[122-1]
Inter-Pan-Angle frictions in the past have been numerous, the
American Revolution being merely the most disastrous. Troubles
that have arisen {123} between the British Isles and Canada and
between the British Isles and the United States since the peace
of 1814 may be passed over because more happily
terminated.[123-1] Other of the nations have likewise had their
family quarrels with the British Isles. Three years before the
Boer War, a South African wrote: "The most powerful factor which
makes for disunion at present is the interference of the British
Government in the internal affairs of South Africa. . . .
England's periods of active interference in South Africa have
always been disastrous to herself and to South Africa--indeed
the present troubles may all be traced directly to Lord
Carnarvon's attempt to force his policy on South Africa."[123-2]
Twelve years later, the Boer War being over, and the union of
the four South African provinces being not yet accomplished,
another South African wrote: "Directly after [after the Chinese
indentured labourers in the Transvaal were 'freed' by the
British Isles Government][123-3] came the Zulu rebellion in
Natal, and so enraged were the South African colonies, so bitter
and so angry with the Home Government, that, had it been
possible, they would have broken away. Given another crisis of
the kind in more prosperous times, and the British will go solid
with the Dutch for independence and a Republic."[123-4] The same
dangers lurked in the recent suggestion that the British {124}
Isles should interfere in South Africa in reference to Asiatic
Indians in Natal.
Nor is it alone in the realms of legislation and administration
where partisan politics may be factors that such frictions
arise. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the
British Isles is still, however rarely used, the supreme
appellate court for the five over-seas Britannic nations.
Against its fitness for the position, the Court of Appeal of New
Zealand in 1903 passed formal and deliberate
resolutions--reading, in part, as follows: "That the decisions
of this Court should continue to be subject to review by a
higher Court is of the utmost importance. The knowledge that a
decision can be reviewed is good alike for Judges and litigants.
Whether, however, they should be reviewed by the Judicial
Committee, as at present constituted is a question worthy of
consideration. That Court, by its imputations in the present
case, by the ignorance it has shown in this and other cases of
our history, of our legislation and of our practice, and by its
long-delayed judgments, has displayed every characteristic of an
alien tribunal. If we have spoken strongly it is because we feel
deeply. And we speak under grievous and unexampled
provocation."[124-1] It is inevitable that different political
groups without {125} more adequate cohesion than sentiment and
shifting political desires should have had such family quarrels.
It is unnecessary here to quote other instances from the past.
To-day's inter-Pan-Angle frictions are the inevitable results of
the international conflicts of local national policies. Some of
them are trivial; others, vital. And from even trivial questions
improperly handled grow wars. "A White Australia," "No Indians
for the Transvaal," "No Hindus for British Columbia,"[125-1] are
familiar slogans suggesting all sorts of possible disagreements
for the settlement of which there is no court in existence. The
questions of Asiatic migrations are not trivial to the six
nations exasperated thereby. Yet even if all these questions
were removed, there would remain many opportunities for discord
still unadjusted. For the six Britannic nations Downing Street
is the only medium for adjusting such discords. And the lack of
power behind the decrees of Downing Street results in an
accumulation of makeshifts that is provocative of future
troubles.
Between the United States and the British Isles the Monroe
Doctrine has at times bulked large as a possible source of
disagreement. The question of Panama Canal tolls has recently
rasped these nations' amiability. It is worth while to examine
into these trouble breeders and to see how the situations would
be altered if the two countries were {126} treating not as
independent units but as parties to a huge federation.
The Monroe Doctrine was dictated to American statesmen by the
fear of Europe. To the people of the United States its
maintenance has meant safety from aggression. It has lived by
their sanction alone. "It would have been forgotten within 60
days after President Monroe first formulated it in a
presidential message if it had not met with a response in
popular feeling. . . . the popular feeling existed long before
Monroe was president, for Jefferson stated principles of foreign
policy which embodied the ideas associated now for 90 years with
Monroe's name. . . . And thus America has always, down to the
present crisis with Mexico, followed the national instinct
concerning entanglements on its own part in Europe's affairs,
and interferences on Europe's part in the affairs of this
hemisphere." ". . . Whenever a specific issue arises in our
relations with Latin-America, a practical test of what the
public feeling in this country amounts to is offered. Our
history for the past dozen years abounds in 'incidents' that
revealed the public temper. It is certain that whenever such a
test has been made in the Latin-American states around the
Caribbean Sea, the fear of the jealousy of European encroachment
manifests itself instantly and warns the administration of the
day what the people expect the government to do. The Monroe
doctrine, or the idea, feeling or instinct upon which it is
based, thus is repeatedly referred to the people for a fresh
expression of their sentiment, and there is no prospect that it
will become an obsolete feature of our foreign policy so long as
these re current {127} tests find the people vitally interested
in its preservation."[127-1]
The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, whatever it may mean, is
to the American voter what the maintenance of a Big Fleet,
whatever the size may be, is to the British voter. A Britannic
authority thus expresses the feelings of the average Britisher:
"Our 'man on the omnibus' has never failed as yet to respond to
an agitation on behalf of the Fleet. He did so instantly in
1909, and he will always do so again. Given a serious division
between the parties on the naval question, there can be no doubt
which will win. . . . Whenever the controversy is taken to the
country, the country decides for the larger Fleet."[127-2] The
American Monroe Doctrine and the British Big Fleet are the
outcome of the instinctive fears Pan-Angles hold towards Europe.
The Monroe Doctrine was not designed as a weapon against the
British Isles any more than the Big Fleet is built to fight
American ships. The older country was in hearty agreement with
President Monroe's original pronouncement. "Indeed it was
Canning's policy, summed up three years later by his famous
reference to the necessity of calling the New World into
existence to restore the balance of the Old."[127-3] As long,
however, as the British Isles remains an outsider it falls
within the definition of "any European power" of the message,
just as there is nothing to prevent the {128} United States, as
long as it remains an outsider, from suffering from the strength
of the Big Fleet.
The two countries are independent now and must in the last
resort each protect itself from the other, however much they may
prefer friendship. As members of a federation each would be
spared the necessity of self-protection against the other. In
such event the Monroe Doctrine would apply to non-Pan-Angles
only and the Fleet would be the instrument by which it was
enforced.
The question of Canal tolls to many Americans to-day is a matter
of only national, not international, politics. They believe
tolls should be paid for Canal privileges. They also, however,
seek a means of lowering transcontinental freight rates. As only
American ships are allowed by law to engage in American
coastwise trade, these are the only competitors of the
railroads. To free such ships from Canal tolls might be a means
toward lowering transcontinental freight rates. Those Americans
who so believe are pleased if the Hay-Pauncefoote treaty seems
to allow an interpretation favourable to their purpose. Other
Americans believe no such interpretation possible, whatever the
problems of national economics. To both, however, outside
criticism of "violation of treaty" may induce merely the
exasperation that leads to refusal to discuss the question.
The difficulty, as our nations are now organized, is that a
question of mutual interest is decided by the majority in power
in one of the nations. In the present instance it was the United
States that {129} controlled the situation. The United States
decided. Afterwards the British Isles might, if it wished,
protest in terms of whatever mildness or vigour its public
policy dictated. The British Government has shown itself
forbearing. It protested but did not press its claims in terms
incompatible with peaceful relations. The American government,
unantagonized, was left in a mood to review the matter and, as
seems probable, to alter its previous decision. In some other
matter the tables may be reversed. The British Isles may hold in
its power the solution of some question of interest to the
United States. And the United States may have only the
opportunity to remonstrate in its turn against what it considers
an "unfair" interpretation of a treaty. Such remonstrance is apt
to be tinged with hostility, the thing we wish most of all to
avoid. Having no common government, the two nations have no
court to decide the case. Were they members of a federation,
such machinery would be established and in constant working
order.
Separate political existences of seven Pan-Angle nations do not
make for peace. If for us is coming the great millennium, so
sweetly dreamed of by so many, it will not come the sooner by
perpetuating opportunities for discord. A common government over
Pan-Angles would be copying what we have already done
successfully in smaller "closer unions." Before the formation of
one of these, it was stated: "Three choices therefore lie before
the people of South Africa. The make-shift regime of the High
Commissioner, the jarring separation of the States of South
America, the noble union of the States of {130} North
America."[130-1] This might be paraphrased. Three choices lie
before the Pan-Angles: the make-shift regime of Downing Street
and the gambling uncertainties of arbitration boards, the
jarring separation we have known in our past, the noble method
of union which our race has evolved, tested, and in four
separate nations adopted. By solving our international
differences of opinion in a federal government we can husband
our strength for self-defence as a united power against other
civilizations.
Despite our self-esteem we are not the only civilization in the
world. There are others who need land for their children, as
much or more than we do. These others wish to see the world
"bettered" by their ideas. If we are wise we shall recognize
these foreign aspirations to be as normal as our own. As we have
progressed other civilizations have progressed, even though
differently. And difference does not mean inferiority. Once we
could believe that our rivals, personal, national, or racial,
were bad because different; but nowadays we cannot call it wrong
when others, less favourably situated than we in the sunshine of
this world, strive like ourselves for comfort. "The tragedy of
history is not the conflict between right and wrong, but the
conflict between right and right." Each civilization knows it is
right. Each is right {131} till another civilization is proved
to be not only right, but better. A civilization is better than
ours if it shall prove its people able to conquer our
people--through cutting off our food by more resourceful
trading, thriftier living, or war. As it has always been since
the Pan-Angles were a people, the world is now an
inter-civilization competition selecting the fittest to survive.
Four nations of men, white like ourselves and holding some of
the same ideals, have been in the past our life and death
rivals. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France all were great
before we were. They discovered and pre-empted a large part of
the world. To the shores of almost everyone of the seven
Pan-Angle nations their keels have come with intent to seize
land. Our rivals often succeeded and held the land for a time
until we grew strong enough to take it from them. Our struggles
against these out-run powers make thrilling stories, for they
tested the courage, the resources, and the tenacity of the
Pan-Angle victors.
Portugal and Spain once shared between them the seas of the
world--according to a Pope's decree. They raced in opposite
directions to see which first should reach the Antipodes. Macao
and Manila, lying opposite each other, show where the two routes
terminated. To-day Spain holds no land outside of Europe except
the Canaries and odd inconsequential bits of Africa. From before
the days of the Armada to the conclusion of the Spanish-American
War, Pan-Angles have been plundering Spain. Some of the spoils
they kept for themselves, some they gave away. The Ladrones in a
recent division were allotted to {132} Germany. Portugal holds
more extensive reminders of its former empire. The Azores, the
Cape Verdes, Timor and Goa, and strips of East and West Africa
show where that nation was once supreme. Both the African areas
are bordered by Pan-Angle and German holdings, and it requires
no shrewd forecasting to predict their future.[132-1]