NO JUST ANALOGY IN THE PRECEDENTS
ADDUCED BY GOVERNMENT.
A thousand precedents would never justify a bad measure—it may
therefore be deemed superfluous to offer a remark on this head; but
as Mr. Canning has argued, that whatever is adopted in one colony
can safely be introduced into all the rest, and as this maxim has
been taken for granted by many persons willing to save themselves the
trouble of thinking, it is necessary to enter into some explanation.
_Section 1._
TRINIDAD.
When the order in council for negro treatment was sent out to
Trinidad, great objections were offered, both generally, and to the
individual clauses which constitute compulsory manumission.
It is not necessary here to inquire how often that order has been
altered, or the reasons why the colonists of Trinidad have been
constrained to submit to the authority imposed upon them. We have
only to show that the case of that island differs from that of the
other British colonies.
Trinidad was originally a Spanish colony; its laws were framed
previously to the abolition of the slave-trade, and have continued
unaltered since the cession of the island to Great Britain.
Now it is apparent that, when fresh slaves can be procured,
compulsory manumission is not so objectionable; because the place
of those who purchase their freedom can be immediately filled up by
others.
It has consequently been considered that, while the slave-trade
was in active operation in the Spanish colonies, the practice of
manumission was encouraged, as increasing the means of preventing
insurrection.
But it is surely unfair to hold up to the imitation of another colony
the enactments and usages introduced by one whose laws were adapted
to a state of things so different; and to require that the provisions
of a code adapted to the existence of the slave-trade, should be
engrafted upon other codes framed since its abolition.
The order in council for Trinidad has not affected the principle of
the Spanish law, or rather the practice in the Spanish colonies,
which allows a slave to enfranchise himself by purchase. But the
British law in our settlements gives no such right whatever to a
slave.
According to those codes, the interest of an owner in his slave is
that of a fee-simple absolute: he purchased upon that tenure, he has
continued to hold upon the same, and cannot be deprived of that legal
title without a direct violation of property.
In Trinidad it is otherwise: a person purchasing a slave in that
colony, knows beforehand that he acquires only a precarious title in
such a slave, which depends on the ability of the slave to purchase
himself.
Nor has sufficient time yet elapsed to make known the great
difference in the working of the measure that must take place now
that the slave-trade has ceased, contrasted with the period when it
was in active prosecution.
It ought also to be stated, that the hardship and evils of the law
in Trinidad, even subsequent to the abolition of the slave-trade,
had not been so much felt, from the nature of its laws not being
generally known in this country: consequently, there was no
extraneous excitement upon the subject given to the minds of the
negroes.
But now, when this excitement has been given, the brief experience
already afforded, tends strongly to corroborate the arguments we have
advanced; and it is credibly asserted, that the Secretary for the
Colonies has received representations and appeals, proving evils to
have proceeded from the operation of this law.
Among these evils, theft is shown to have increased; and the
proceedings before the local magistrates are said to evince a
progressive demoralization amongst the negroes.
It is further known, that instances have occurred where the sum
assessed by the appraisers, as the price of manumission, has been
higher than the negro was able, or considered himself entitled, to
pay; and the being sent back under these circumstances has visibly
produced in him a sullenness and discontent exactly as has been
described, and in all probability as injurious to the interests of
his master, as if he had obtained his discharge at his own valuation.
From these circumstances, it is apparent that there is no analogy
between the case of Trinidad and that of the other British Colonies,
and that thus far no proper precedent is established.
_Section 2._
ST. LUCIE.
In regard to this colony, the measure has been but recently
introduced, and without the spontaneous concurrence of its
inhabitants. It was established there by the force of arbitrary
authority. There was no adequate court or power, similar in
constitution and functions to the Assemblies in the other islands,
to resist its promulgation; and the threat conveyed in the despatch
of Earl Bathurst to the Governor, thus amounted to an imperative
mandate for the adoption of the measure as law in the colony.
Is this a precedent?
_Section 3._
BERBICE.
The case of Berbice is still more flagrant. This colony possessed,
a short time back, a council composed of persons having property
at stake. Before the enactments relating to the slaves in that
colony were brought forward, this council was dismissed, and another
arbitrarily appointed, consisting of persons having no interest in
the cultivation of the colony.
It was previously declared, that the new laws relating to the slaves,
in whatever way they might be finally settled, should not be carried
into operation at Berbice, unless the same measures were at the same
time adopted in Demerara. In the latter colony, all the measures
relating to amelioration were received, and compulsory manumission
alone rejected; but in Berbice, the new council, so appointed and so
composed, passed the latter measure contrary to the wish of every
proprietor in the colony.
It ought moreover to be stated that, before the new laws were
promulgated in Demerara, they were sent home to Lord Bathurst for
confirmation, upon which his Lordship observes,—“The King has been
graciously pleased to approve the decision that you adopted, of
referring the draft of the Act to his Majesty, for his consideration,
instead of immediately promulgating it as a law in the colony.”
But how does the new Council of Berbice act? The most important
of all the new measures they carry at once into effect; that is
to say, they allow no opportunity for parties in England to carry
remonstrance or explanation to the foot of the throne.
Again, let us ask, is this a precedent? What is the meaning of
the term? does it not warrant the inference, in this case, that
some assembly, composed of parties interested, have given their
concurrence? But how marked is the difference between a council
composed of persons possessing little or no property in slaves, and
a court where several of the members hold large plantations, and are
deeply interested in the permanent prosperity of their colony.
The possession of this large stake by the members, and the
circumstance of having delegated interests to represent, peculiarly
conduce to safe and practicable legislation. Such circumstances
present a security against precipitancy,—prompt to a careful and
minute consideration of all local peculiarities,—and procure for
every public measure a full and patient examination of all its
relations, both direct and contingent, before it is permitted to be
put in execution.
And further, in respect to any one of these West India cases, has
there elapsed a time sufficient to enable us to estimate the policy
of the experiment, and still less to pronounce upon its fitness for
the whole of our West Indian possessions?
_Section 4._
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.
How this colony should be referred to as a precedent it is difficult
to explain. Its climate differs materially from that of the West
Indies. In the latter, the evils apprehended from giving freedom to
the slaves arise from the impossibility of procuring free labourers
to supply their place. It is but a very short time since emigration
from this country to the Cape of Good Hope was greatly encouraged;
and it is ascertained, by experience, that Europeans can work without
injury or inconvenience in that climate.
Thus the supply of voluntary labourers not only existing, but
increasing in that colony, the inducements to perpetuate slavery must
progressively expire, and slaves may consequently be freed without
injury to the property of their owners, or danger to the public
safety.
From this obvious difference in physical circumstances between the
West India colonies and the Cape of Good Hope, there is no just
analogy between the two; and though compulsory manumission may be
enacted in the one, it cannot, therefore, be taken as a model for
imitation to the other.
This straining after inapplicable precedent clearly indicates
deficiency of argument.
No enactment containing inherently a principle of evil, even though
acceded to willingly, or acquiesced in passively, by individual
bodies, should ever be set up by a wise government as an example for
general adoption.
* * * * *
It has been more than once remarked in Parliament, by persons of
high character, that the precedent generally existing throughout the
Spanish colonies served as a sufficient ground for the measure.
But there are two points which should never be omitted in reflecting
on the question:
I. As to the opportunity of procuring other labourers.
II. The difference of amount sunk in fixed capital, between the
Spanish colonies and those of Great Britain.
In regard to the first, fresh labourers can be procured in the
Spanish colonies, but cannot in the British; and in regard to the
second, there must surely be some difference in the working of a
measure when the amount of capital to be withdrawn varies in the
proportion of 20,000_l._ in the one case, to a few hundreds in the
other.