CONSTRUCTION
Spoken matter is a speech only when it possesses three divisions: an
opening, a body, and a conclusion. Without possessing these three
divisions it may be a talk, but it is not a speech. This can be best
explained by the author quoting from one of his previous works:[1]
"Every speech, no matter what its length or what its subject, should
possess three parts: an opening or statement, a body or argument, a
conclusion or appeal. The opening should contain a statement of the
facts to be presented, or the points upon which the argument is to be
made; the body should be given over to a presentation of the facts, a
narration of the story, a description of the scene, or an argument of
the cause; and the conclusion should be devoted to summing up of the
facts, an application of the story or the scene, or a deduction from
the argument on the points.
"The opening may contain as many statements as the speaker desires,
but he must make sure to argue upon and drive home in the body of the
speech all that he mentions in the opening. Every statement in the
opening must be like a plank in a platform, and all such planks, or
statements, must be fastened together properly in the argument,
otherwise there will be gaps in the platform, or statement, through
which the speaker's argument is liable to fall to failure."
A rambling story is not a speech; a talk that has not a clear
opening, a convincing argument, or a logical conclusion, is not a
speech; a statement without a body is not a speech. All these things
may be talks, but only a well-defined, clearly-mapped-out discourse
can be dignified with the name of speech. In order that one may be a
speech-maker and not a babbler, he must work in accordance with a
well-defined plan. He should carefully gather the material that is to
be used, arrange the parts of the speech in their proper places, and
deliver the speech in the best possible manner. No matter how
excellent the material may be, it will prove of little value to the
speaker unless it is arranged consecutively; built, as it were, point
on point, or fact on fact, and developed according to his prearranged
plan. It should be so knitted together as to cohere and form a
structure that, resting on a firm foundation, will be compact and
complete. Desultory talking is not speech making. The speaker should
possess a definite object, and keep to that object until it has been
clearly presented and convincingly demonstrated. Order should reign
everywhere--in the arrangement of the words, the presentation of the
ideas, and the delivery of the matter. Lack of attention to these
details is the cause of many failing as public speakers who, had they
given proper attention to the perfection of the means to be employed,
might have become clear thinkers and masterly presenters of
well-ordered thoughts. Length has nothing whatever to do with the
question as to whether spoken matter is a speech or not. One might
speak for an hour and not deliver a speech; and, on the other hand, a
perfectly constructed speech might be produced in a minute or less.
Here is a matter that occupies less than two lines, or, to be exact,
twenty-two words, and yet it possesses all the requirements of a
speech:
The light of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be
single, thy whole body shall be full of light.[2]
We have the proposition that "The light of the body is the eye"; the
argument, "if therefore thine eye be single"; and the conclusion,
"thy whole body shall be full of light."
Specimen divisions of speeches of Demosthenes are here employed to
emphasize these points, and students are advised to study closely the
means adopted by this master of oratory and rhetoric in arranging his
speeches. Two examples of each of the three divisions of a speech,
and one example of a complete speech, are here presented in order
that students may gain a practical and comprehensive idea regarding
the construction of speeches.
DIVISIONS OF A SPEECH
OPENING
_Against the Law of Leptines_ (355 B.C.). It was chiefly,
men of the jury, because I deemed it good for Athens that
the law should be repealed, but partly on account of the
son of Chabrias, that I engaged to support these men to the
utmost of my ability. It is plain enough, men of Athens,
that Leptines, or whoever else defends the law, will have
nothing to say for it on the merits, but will allege that
certain unworthy persons obtaining immunity have evaded the
public services, and will lay the greatest stress upon this
point. I will pass by the injustice of such proceeding--for
a complaint against some to take the honour from all--for
it has in a manner been explained, and is doubtless
acknowledged by you; but this I would gladly ask him:
Granting most fully that not some but all were unworthy,
why did he consider that you and they were to be dealt with
alike? By enacting that none should be exempted, he took
the exemption from those that enjoyed it; by adding that it
should be unlawful to grant it thereafter, he deprived you
of the power of granting. He can not surely say that, as he
deprived the holders of their privilege because he deemed
them unworthy of it, in the same manner he thought the
people unworthy to have the power of giving their own to
whom they pleased. But possibly he may reply that he framed
the law so because the people are easily misled. Then what
prevents your being deprived of everything, yea, of the
government itself, according to such argument? For there is
not a single department of your affairs in which this has
not happened to you. Many decrees have you at various times
been entrapped into passing. You have been persuaded ere
now to choose the worse allies instead of the better. In
short, amid the variety of your measures there must, I
conceive, happen something of this kind occasionally. Shall
we therefore make a law prohibiting the council and the
people hereafter from passing bills and decrees? I scarcely
think so. We ought not to be deprived of a right, in the
exercise of which we have been deceived; rather should we
be instructed how to avoid such error, and pass a law, not
taking away our power, but giving the means of punishing
those who deceive us.
_On the Navy Boards_ (354 B.C.). It appears to me, O
Athenians, that the men who praise your ancestors adopt a
flattering language, not a course beneficial to the people
whom they eulogize. For attempting to speak on subjects
which no man can fully reach by words they carry away the
reputation of clever speakers themselves, but cause the
glory of those ancients to fall below its estimation in the
minds of the hearers. For my part, I consider the highest
praise of our ancestors to be the length of time which has
elapsed during which no other men have been able to excel
the pattern of their deeds. I will myself endeavour to show
in what way, according to my judgment, your preparations
may most conveniently be made. For thus it is. Though all
of us who intend to speak should prove ourselves capital
orators, your affairs, I am certain, would prosper none the
more; but if any person whomsoever came forward, and could
show and convince you what kind and what amount of force
will be serviceable to the state, and from what resources
it should be provided, all our present apprehensions would
be removed. This will I endeavour to do, as far as I am
able, first briefly informing you what my opinion is
concerning our relations with the king.
BODY
_The first Philippic_ (351 B.C.). First, I say, you must
not despond, Athenians, under your present circumstances,
wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as
regards the past is best for the future. What do I mean?
That your affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do
nothing which is needful; if, notwithstanding you performed
your duties, it were the same, there would be no hope of
amendment.
Consider, next, what you know by report, and men of
experience remember, how vast a power the Lacedaemonians
had not long ago, yet how nobly and becomingly you
consulted the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war
against them for the rights of Greece. Why do I mention
this? To show and convince you, Athenians, that nothing, if
you take precaution, is to be feared; nothing, if you are
negligent goes as you desire. Take for examples the
strength of the Lacedaemonians then, which you overcame by
attention to your duties, and the insolence of this man
now, by which through neglect of our interest we are
confounded. But if any among you, Athenians, deem Philip
hard to be conquered, looking at the magnitude of his
existing power, and the loss by us of all our strongholds,
they reason rightly, but should reflect, that once we held
Pydna and Potidaea and Methone and all the region round
about as our own, and many of the nations now leagued with
him were independent and free, and preferred our friendship
to his. Had Philip then taken it into his head that it was
difficult to contend with Athens, when she had so many
fortresses to infest his country, and he was destitute of
allies, nothing that he has accomplished would he have
undertaken, and never would he have acquired so large a
dominion. But he saw well, Athenians, that all these places
are the open prizes of war, that the possessions of the
absent naturally belong to the present, those of the remiss
to them that will venture and toil. Acting on such
principle, he has won everything and keeps it, either by
way of conquest or by friendly attachment and alliance; for
all men will side with and respect those whom they see
prepared and willing to make proper exertion. If you,
Athenians, will adopt this principle now, though you did
not before, and every man, where he can and ought to give
his service to the state, be ready to give it without
excuse, the wealthy to contribute, the able-bodied to
enlist; in a word, plainly, if you will become your own
masters, and cease each expecting to do nothing himself
while his neighbour does everything for him, you shall then
with Heaven's permission recover your own, and get back
what has been frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not
imagine that his empire is everlastingly secured to him as
a god. There are who hate and envy him, Athenians, even
among those that seem most friendly; and all feelings that
are in other men belong, we may assume, to his
confederates. But now they are all cowed, having no refuge
through your tardiness and indolence, which I say you must
abandon forthwith. For you see, Athenians, the case, to
what pitch of arrogance the man has advanced who leaves you
not even the choice of action or inaction, but threatens
and uses (they say) outrageous language; and, unable to
rest in possession of his conquests, continually widens
their circle and, while we dally and delay, throws his net
all around us. What, then, Athenians, when will you act as
becomes you? In what event? In that of necessity, I
suppose. And how should we regard the events happening now?
Methinks to freemen the strongest necessity is the disgrace
of their condition. Or tell me, do you like walking about
and asking one other, Is there any news? Why, could there
be greater news than a man of Macedonia subduing Athenians,
and directing the affairs of Greece? Is Philip dead? No,
but he is sick. And what matters it to you? Should anything
befall this man you will soon create another Philip if you
attend to business thus. For even he has been exalted not
so much by his own strength but by our negligence. And,
again, should anything happen to him; should fortune, which
still takes better care of us than we of ourselves, be good
enough to accomplish this, observe that, being on the spot,
you would step in while things were in confusion and manage
them as you pleased; but as you are, though occasion
offered Amphipolis, you would not be in a position to
accept it, with neither forces nor counsels at hand.
However, as to the importance of a general zeal in the
discharge of duty, believing you are convinced and
satisfied, I say no more.
_On the Liberty of the Rhodians_ (351 B.C.) One of the
events for which I consider you should be thankful to the
gods is that a people, who to gratify their own insolence
went to war with you not long ago, now place their hopes of
safety in you alone. Well may we be rejoiced at the present
crisis, for if your measures thereupon be wisely taken the
result will be that the calumnies of those who traduce our
country you will practically and with credit and honour
refute. The Chians, Byzantines, and Rhodians accused us of
a design to oppress them, and therefore combined to make
the last war against us. It will turn out that Mausolus,
who contrived and instigated these proceedings, pretending
to be a friend of the Rhodians, has deprived them of their
liberty; the Chians and Byzantines, who called them allies,
have not aided them in misfortune, while you, whom they
dreaded, are the only people who have wrought their
deliverance. And this being seen by all the world, you will
cause the people in every state to regard your friendship
as the token of their security; nor can there be a greater
blessing for you than thus to obtain from all men a
voluntary attachment and confidence.
I marvel to see the same persons advising you to oppose the
king on behalf of the Egyptians, and afraid of him in the
matter of the Rhodian people. All men know that the latter
are Greeks, the former a portion of his subjects. And I
think some of you remember that when you were debating
about the king's business I first came forward and
advised--nay, I was the only one, or one of two, that gave
such counsel--that your prudent course in my opinion was
not to allege your quarrel with the king as the excuse for
your arming, but to arm against your existing enemies, and
defend yourselves against him also if he attempted to
injure you. Nor did I offer this advice without obtaining
your approval, for you agreed with me. Well, then, my
reasoning of today is consistent with the argument on that
occasion; for, would the king take me to his counsels, I
should advise him as I advise you, in defense of his own
possessions to make war upon any Greeks that opposed him,
but not to think of claiming dominions to which he had no
manner of title. If now it be your general determination,
Athenians, to surrender to the king all places that he gets
possession of, whether by surprise or by deluding certain
of the inhabitants, you have determined, in my judgment,
unwisely; but if in the cause of justice you esteem it your
duty either to make war, if needful, or to suffer any
extremity, in the first place, there will be the less
necessity for such trials, in proportion as you are
resolved to meet them; and, secondly, you will manifest a
spirit that becomes you.
That I suggest nothing new in urging you to liberate the
Rhodians, that you will do nothing new in following my
counsel, will appear if I remind you of certain measures
that succeeded. Once, O Athenians, you sent Timotheus out
to assist Ariobarzanes, annexing to the decree "that he was
not to infringe your treaty with the king." Timotheus,
seeing Ariobarzanes had openly revolted from the king, and
that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, under the
appointment of Tigranes, the king's deputy, renounced the
intention of assisting Ariobarzanes, but invested the
island with his forces and delivered it. And to this day
there has been no war against you on that account. Man will
not fight for aggressive purposes so readily as for
defensive. To resist spoliation they strive with all their
might. Not so to gratify ambition; this they will attempt
if there be none to hinder them; but if prevented, they
regard not their opponents as having done them an injury.
My belief is that Artemisia would not even oppose this
enterprise now if our state were embarked in the measure.
Attend a moment and see whether my calculations be right or
wrong. I consider, were my king succeeding in all his
designs in Egypt, Artemisia would make a strenuous effort
to get Rhodes into his power, not from affection to the
king, but from a desire, while he tarried in her
neighborhood, to confer an important obligation upon him,
so that he might give her the most friendly reception; but
since he fares as they report, having miscarried in his
attempts, she judges that this island--and so the fact
is--would be of no further use to the king at present, but
only a fortress to overawe her kingdom and prevent
disturbances. Therefore it seems to me she would rather you
had the island, without her appearing to have surrendered
it, than that he should obtain possession. I think, indeed,
she will send no succours at all, but if she do they will
be scanty and feeble. As to the king, what he will do I can
not pretend to know; but this I will maintain, that it is
expedient for Athens to have it immediately understood
whether he means to claim the Rhodian city or not; for, if
he should, you will have to deliberate not on the concerns
of Rhodes only, but on those of Athens and all Greece.
Even if the Rhodians who are now in the government had held
it by themselves I would not have advised you to espouse
their cause; nor though they promised to do everything for
you. But I see that in the beginning, in order to put down
the democracy, they gained over a certain number of
citizens, and afterward banished those very men when they
had accomplished their purpose. I think, therefore, that
people who have been false to two parties would be no
steadier allies to you. And never would I have proffered
this counsel had I thought it would benefit the Rhodian
people only; for I am not their state friend, nor is any of
them connected with me by ties of private hospitality. And
even if both these causes had existed I would not have
spoken unless I had considered it for your advantage.
Indeed, as far as the Rhodians are concerned, if the
advocate for their deliverance may be allowed to say so, I
am rejoiced at what has happened--that, after grudging to
you the recovery of your rights, they have lost their own
liberty; and, when they might have had an alliance on equal
terms with Greeks and their betters, they are under
subjection to barbarians and slaves, whom they have
admitted into their fortresses. I would almost say that, if
you determine to assist them, these events have turned out
for their good. For, during prosperity, I doubt whether
they would have learned discretion, being Rhodians; but
since they are taught by experience that folly is mightily
injurious to men, they may possibly perhaps become wiser
for the future; and this I think would be no small
advantage to them. I say, therefore, you should endeavour
to rescue these people, and not harbour resentment,
considering that you too have often been deceived by
miscreants, but for no such deceit would you allow that you
merited punishment yourselves.
Observe also, men of Athens, that you have waged many wars
both against democracies and against oligarchies--this,
indeed, you know without my telling--but for what cause you
have been at war with either perhaps not one of you
considers. What are the causes? Against democratical states
your wars have been either for private grievances, when you
could not make public satisfaction, or for territory, or
boundaries, or a point of honour, or the leadership;
against oligarchies for none of these matters, but for your
constitution and freedom. Therefore I would not hesitate to
say I think it better that all the Greeks should be your
enemies with a popular government than your friends under
oligarchal. For with freemen I consider you would have no
difficulty in making peace when you chose, but with people
under an oligarchy even friendship I hold to be insecure.
It is impossible that the few can be attached to the many,
the seekers of power to the lovers of constitutional
equality.
CONCLUSION
_Against the Law of Leptines_ (355 B.C.). One might pursue
the argument and show that in no single respect is the law
proper or expedient for you; but, that you may comprehend
the whole question at once, and that I may have done
speaking, do what I now advise. Make your comparison;
consider what will happen to you if you condemn the law,
and what if you do not; then keep in mind what you think
will be the consequence in either event, that you may
choose the better course. If now you condemn the law, as we
advise, the deserving will have their rights from you; and
if there be any undeserving party, as I grant there may be,
such a one, besides being deprived of his honour, will
suffer what penalty you think proper according to the
amended statute, while the commonwealth will appear
faithful, just, true to all men. Should you decide in its
favour, which I trust you will not, the good will be
wronged on account of the bad, the undeserving will be the
cause of misfortune to others, and suffer no punishment
themselves, while the commonwealth (contrary to what I said
just now) will be universally esteemed faithless, envious,
base. It is not meet, O Athenians, that for so foul a
reproach you should reject fair and honourable advantages.
Remember, each of you individually will share in the
reputation of your common judgment. It is plain to the
bystanders and to all men that in the court Leptines is
contending with us, but in the mind of each of you jurymen
generosity is arrayed against envy, justice against
iniquity, all that is virtuous against all that is base. If
you follow the wiser counsels, and give judgment in my
favour, you will yourselves have the credit of a proper
decision, and will have voted what is best for the
commonwealth; and should occasion ever arise, you will not
lack men willing at their own risk to defend you.
You must give your earnest attention to these things, and
be careful that you are not forced into error. Many a time,
O Athenians, instead of it being proved to you that
measures were just, they have been extorted from you by the
clamour and violence and impudence of the speakers. Let not
this happen now; it would not be well. What you have
determined to be just, keep in mind and remember until you
vote, that you may give your votes conscientiously against
evil counsellors. I marvel when you punish with death those
who debase the coin, if you will give ear to persons who
render the whole commonwealth false and treacherous. You
will not surely! O Jupiter and the gods!
I have nothing more to add, as you seem fully to understand
what has been said.
_On the Navy Boards_ (354 B.C.). Not to trouble you, men of
Athens, with over-many words, I will give you a summary of
my advice and retire. I bid you prepare yourselves against
existing enemies, and I declare that with this same force
you should resist the king and all other people, if they
attempt to injure you; but never inflict an injustice
either in word or deed. Let us look that our actions, and
not our speeches on the platform, be worthy of our
ancestors. If you pursue this course you will do service
not only to yourselves but also to them who give the
opposite counsel, since you will not be angry with them
afterward for your errors committed now.
A COMPLETE SPEECH
_The First Olynthiac_ (349 B.C.). I believe, men of Athens,
you would give much to know what is the true policy to be
adopted in the present matter of inquiry. This being the
case, you should be willing to hear with attention those
who offer you their counsel. Besides, that you will have
the benefit of all preconsidered advice, I esteem it part
of your good fortune that many fit suggestions will occur
to some speakers at the moment, so that from them all you
may easily choose what is profitable.
The present juncture, Athenians, all but proclaims aloud
that you must yourselves take these affairs in hand if you
care for their success. I know not how we seem disposed in
the matter. My own opinion is, vote succour immediately,
and make the speediest preparations for sending it off from
Athens, that you may not incur the same mishap as before;
send also ambassadors to announce this, and watch the
proceedings. For the danger is that this man, being
unscrupulous and clever at turning events to account,
making concessions when it suits him, threatening at other
times (his threats may well be believed), slandering us and
urging our absence against us, may convert and wrest to his
use some of our main resources. Though, strange to say,
Athenians, the very cause of Philip's strength is a
circumstance favorable to you. His having it in his sole
power to publish or conceal his designs, his being at the
same time general, sovereign, paymaster, and everywhere
accompanying his army, is a great advantage for quick and
timely operations in war; but for a peace with the
Olynthians, which he would gladly make, it has a contrary
effect. For it is plain to the Olynthians that now they are
fighting not for glory or for a slice of territory, but to
save their country from destruction and servitude. They
know how he treated those Amphipolitans who surrendered to
him their city, and those Pydneans who gave him admittance.
And generally, I believe, a despotic power is mistrusted by
free states, especially if their dominions are adjoining.
All this being known to you, Athenians, all else of
importance considered, I say you must take heart and
spirit, and apply yourselves more than ever to the war,
contributing promptly, serving personally, leaving nothing
undone. No plea or pretence is left you for declining your
duty. What you were all so clamorous about, that the
Olynthians should be pressed into a war with Philip, has of
itself come to pass, and in a way most advantageous to you.
For, had they undertaken the war at your instance, they
might have been slippery allies, with minds but half
resolved, perhaps; but since they hate him on a quarrel of
their own, their enmity is like to endure on account of
their fears and their wrongs. You must not then, Athenians,
forego this lucky opportunity, nor commit the error which
you have often done heretofore. For example, when we
returned from succouring the Euboeans, and Hierax and
Stratocles of Amphipolis came to this platform, urging us
to sail and receive possession of their city, if we had
shown the same zeal for ourselves as for the safety of
Euboea you would have held Amphipolis then and been rid of
all the troubles that ensued. Again, when news came that
Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, Pagasae, and the other places
(not to waste time in enumerating them) were besieged, had
we to any one of these in the first instance carried prompt
and reasonable succour, we should have found Philip far
more tractable and humble now. But, by always neglecting
the present and imagining the future would shift for
itself, we, O men of Athens, have exalted Philip, and made
him greater than any King of Macedon ever was. Here, then,
is come a crisis, that of Olynthus, self-offered to the
state, inferior to none of the former. And methinks, men of
Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done
for us, notwithstanding many untoward circumstances, might
with reason be grateful to them. Our numerous losses in way
may justly be charged to our own negligence; but that they
happened not long ago, and that an alliance to
counterbalance them is open to our acceptance, I must
regard as manifestations of divine favour. It is much the
same as in money matters. If a man keep what he gets he is
thankful to fortune; if he lose it by imprudence, he loses
withal his memory of the obligations. So in political
affairs, they who misuse their opportunities forget even
the good which the gods send them, for every prior event is
judged commonly by the last result. Wherefore, Athenians,
we must be exceedingly careful of our future measures, that
by amendment therein we may efface the shame of the past.
Should we abandon these men too, and Philip reduce
Olynthus, let any one tell me what is to prevent him
marching where he pleases? Does any of you, Athenians,
compute or consider the means by which Philip, originally
weak, has become great? Having first taken Amphipolis, then
Pydna, Potidaea next, Methone afterward, he invaded
Thessaly. Having ordered matters at Pherae, Pagasae,
Magnesia, everywhere exactly as he pleased, he departed for
Thrace, where, after displacing some kings and establishing
others, he fell sick; again recovering, he lapsed not into
indolence, but instantly attacked the Olynthians. I omit
his expeditions to Illyria and Paeonia, that against
Arymbas, and some others.
Why, it may be said, do you mention all this now? That you,
Athenians, may feel and understand both the folly of
continually abandoning one thing after another, and the
activity which forms part of Philip's habit and existence,
which makes it impossible for him to rest content with his
achievements. If it be his principle ever to do more than
he has done, and yours to apply yourselves vigorously to
nothing, see what the end promises to be. Heavens! which of
you is so simple as not to know that the war yonder will
soon be here if we are careless? And should this happen, I
fear, O Athenians, that as men who thoughtlessly borrow on
large interest, after a brief accommodation, lose their
estate, so will it be with us; found to have paid dear for
our idleness and self-indulgence, we shall be reduced to
many hard and unpleasant shifts, and struggle for the
salvation of our country.
To censure, I may be told, is easy for any man; to show
what measures the case requires is the part of a
counsellor. I am not ignorant, Athenians, that frequently
when any disappointment happens you are angry, not with the
parties in fault, but with the last speakers on the
subject; yet never, with a view to self-protection, would I
suppress what I deem for your interest. I say, then, you
must give a twofold assistance here: first, save the
Olynthians their towns, and send our troops for that
purpose; secondly, annoy the enemy's country with ships and
other troops; omit either of these courses, and I doubt the
expedition will be fruitful. For, should he, suffering your
incursion, reduce Olynthus, he will easily march to the
defense of his kingdom; or, should you only throw succour
into Olynthus, and he, seeing things out of danger at home,
keep up a close and vigilant blockade, he must in time
prevail over the besieged. Your assistance, therefore, must
be effective and twofold.
Such are the operations I advise. As to a supply of money:
you have money, Athenians; you have a larger military fund
than any people, and you receive it just as you please. If
you will assign this to your troops you need no further
supply; otherwise you need a further, or rather you have
none at all. How then? some man may exclaim; do you move
that this be a military fund? Verily, not I. My opinion,
indeed, is that there should be soldiers raised, and a
military fund, and one and the same regulation for
receiving and performing what is due; only you just without
trouble take your allowance for the festivals. It remains,
then, I imagine, that all just contribute; if much be
wanted, much; if little, little. Money must be had; without
it nothing proper can be done. Other persons propose other
ways and means. Choose which you think expedient, and put
hands to work while it is yet time.
It may be well to consider and calculate how Philip's
affairs now stand. They are not, as they appear, or as an
inattentive observer might pronounce, in very good trim, or
in the most favourable position. He would never have begun
this war had he imagined he must fight. He expected to
carry everything on the first advance, and has been
mistaken. This disappointment is one thing that troubles
and dispirits him; another is the state of Thessaly. That
people were always, you know, treacherous to all men, and
just as they ever have been they are to Philip. They have
resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasae, and have
prevented his fortifying Magnesia; and I was told they
would no longer allow him to take the revenue of their
harbours and markets, which they say should be applied to
the public business of Thessaly, not received by Philip.
Now, if he be deprived of this fund, his means will be much
straitened for paying his mercenaries. And surely we must
suppose that Paeonians and Illyrians, and all such people,
would rather be free and independent than under subjection,
for they are unused to obedience, and the man is a tyrant.
So report says, and I can well believe it, for undeserved
success leads weak-minded men into folly; and thus it
appears often that to maintain prosperity is harder than to
acquire it. Therefore must you, Athenians, looking on his
difficulty as your opportunity, assist cheerfully in the
war, sending embassies where required, taking arms
yourselves, exciting all other people, for if Philip got
such an opportunity against us, and there was a war on our
frontier, how eagerly think you he would attack you! Then
are you not ashamed that the very damage which you suffer,
if he had the power, you dare not seize the moment to
inflict on him?
And let not this escape you, Athenians, that you have now
the choice whether you shall fight there, or he in your
country. If Olynthus hold out, you will fight there and
distress his dominions, enjoying your own home in peace. If
Philip take that city, who shall then prevent his marching
here? Thebans? I wish it be not too harsh to say they will
be ready to join in the invasion. Phocians? who can not
defend their own country without your assistance. Or some
other ally? But, good sir, he will not desire! Strange,
indeed, if, what he is thought foolhardy for prating now,
this he would not accomplish if he might. As to the vast
difference between a war here or there, I fancy there needs
no argument. If you were obliged to be out yourselves for
thirty days only, and take the necessaries for camp-service
from the land (I mean without an enemy therein), your
agricultural population would sustain, I believe, greater
damage than what the whole expense of the late war amounted
to. But if a war should come, what damage must be expected?
There is the insult, too, and the disgrace of the thing,
worse than any damage to right-thinking men.
On all these accounts, then, we must unite to lend our
succour, and drive off the war yonder; the rich, that,
spending a little from the abundance which they happily
possess, they may enjoy the residue in security; the young,
that, gaining military experience in Philip's territory,
they may become redoubtable champions to preserve their
own; the orators, that they may pass a good account of
their statesmanship, for on the result of measures will
depend your judgment of their conduct. May it for every
cause by prosperous!
FOOTNOTES:
[1] "Speech-Making," page 1. By Edwin Gordon Lawrence (The
A. S. Barnes Company).
[2] St. Matthew, vi:22.