THE FIRST NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF PERU.
1822--1823.
One of the heaviest charges brought by his contemporaries against San
Martin, and which history has repeated, is the precipitate manner of his
retirement from Peru. He left his army under the command of a General
without prestige; he left the country in the hands of a Government which
had no authority; and he made no provision for an efficient Government.
If he had delayed his departure until he had arranged all this it is
probable that he would never have gone at all. The fact is that he left
everything in a state of complete disorganization. It was more than an
abdication, he abandoned the country.
Congress instead of appointing at once an efficient executive appointed
a governing Junta of three of its own members, two of whom were
foreigners. General La Mar, a native of Quito, was President; his
colleagues were Don Felipe Alvarado, a brother of the Argentine General,
and Don Manuel Salazar y Baquijano, Count of Vista Florida, a citizen of
Lima, and a leader of society. The selection pleased nobody. The popular
party, headed by Riva-Agüero, commenced to conspire. The new Government
had no support, save in Congress itself. Abandoned by the Protector, the
only hope of Peru was now in the Liberator.
Bolívar no sooner saw the coast clear than he wrote to the new
Government offering them a reinforcement of 4,000 men, and promising,
if these were not sufficient, six or eight thousand more. Bolívar had
not seen that San Martin was eager to open the way for him; San Martin
had failed to see that by rousing the national spirit of the Peruvians
he had shut them off from help. Government suspected the intentions of
Bolívar, and coldly declined his proffered assistance. The answer was
long in coming, and Bolívar in alarm wrote to General Castillo, the
commander of the Columbian contingent, not to incur any risk of defeat,
but rather to retire on Columbia, and afterwards notified these
instructions to the Government of Peru.
Jealousy of foreign influence then induced Congress to decree that all
vacancies in the civil, military, and naval services should be filled by
Peruvians alone, and then set to work to debate what constitution they
should give to the country.
The nation was named “The Peruvian Republic;” the constitution was drawn
up on the basis of popular sovereignty, and a special clause was
inserted providing that executive offices should be neither for life nor
hereditary, which was directed against Bolívar.
The plan drawn up by San Martin for the ensuing campaign depended upon
the efficient co-operation of two armies; one acting in the South under
Alvarado, the other in the Centre under Arenales.
The whole line of the main Cordillera was held by the Royalists, but the
Patriots commanding the sea had the choice of the point of attack. The
bulk of the Royalists, under Canterac, occupied the Centre of their line
from Jauja to Huancayo. Arequipa was weakly garrisoned. La Serna had his
head-quarters at Cuzco with a reserve at Puno. Olañeto was at Potosí,
and Valdés was fully occupied in Upper Peru by Lanza the guerilla
chieftain. Consequently, a simultaneous attack from the South and Centre
would place the main army between two fires. This plan was adopted by
Government.
The Army of the South, consisting of 1,700 Argentines, 1,200 Chilians,
and about 1,600 Peruvians, with ten light field pieces, embarked on
transports at Callao in September. Alvarado wished to take the Columbian
contingent also, but Castillo refused to go. The expedition did not sail
till October, and was fifty-seven days on the voyage; a most
unfavourable commencement which presaged a catastrophe.
On the 3rd December the convoy reached Arica, but Alvarado sent one
battalion to Iquiqui, which landed there on the 7th. Miller, with a very
small force, had performed wonders in the previous campaign in this
district, but Alvarado remained three weeks at Arica without doing
anything. He consulted Miller, who told him anything was right if it was
only done quickly. He then detached Miller with 120 men further north to
make a diversion, and occupied Tacna with a strong vanguard under
General Martinez. These long delays had given the Royalists time to
concentrate their forces, and the indefatigable Valdés, with a flying
column of 800 men, descended the hills, crossed the sandy plain, and on
the 1st January, 1823, encamped in a fertile valley about twelve miles
from the city. The Patriots were so superior in number that his position
was one of great peril; nevertheless he put on a bold front, and while
Martinez was wasting time in an attempt to surround him, he succeeded in
effecting his retreat during the night and the following day to the foot
of the hills at Moquegua.
On the 13th January Alvarado occupied the valley of Locumba, but again
by dilatory movements lost his chance of overwhelming a small force of
Royalists which had been detached by Valdés to watch him. Valdés, who
was expecting Canterac with a strong force, allowed Alvarado to occupy
the city of Moquegua on the 18th without resistance, but then prepared
to dispute his further progress.
Beyond Moquegua the ground rises in abrupt steps which give great
facilities for defence. The Royalist skirmishers covered the heights,
and detached parties lay in ambush in the hollows. One by one they were
driven from these positions, but at Torata Valdés drew up his force in
line of battle. On the afternoon of the 19th the two armies faced each
other, and the Patriots advanced to the attack. A Spanish battalion in
skirmishing order covered the centre, and at the same moment the heights
beyond were occupied by an advanced party of Canterac’s division, whose
shouts of “Viva el Rey!” re-echoed from the mountain sides. Canterac
strengthened his right flank and beat back a vigorous attack of the left
wing of the Patriots, upon which the whole Royalist line advanced and
drove the Patriot infantry, who had exhausted their ammunition, before
them in utter rout with great slaughter. The Patriots lost about 500 men
killed and wounded, the Royalists about half that number. The Peruvian
legion, which was now for the first time under fire, distinguished
itself by its steady behaviour.
The routed battalions rallied under the fire of their artillery, but
during the following night the whole army retreated, and encamped next
day at Moquegua, seventeen miles from the field of battle. The
ammunition was nearly exhausted. Alvarado summoned a council of war, but
the advice of his officers was so discordant, that before he had formed
any resolution the enemy was again in his front on the 21st.
Alvarado then took up a strong position, with his left resting upon the
suburbs of the city, and his line extending along the ridge of a steep
declivity, broken in the centre by a road which was swept by the fire of
his artillery. His right rested upon a bare hill. Valdés, with two
battalions and two squadrons of horse, seized this hill and turned the
right flank of the Patriots, while the rest of the Royalist cavalry
menaced the left, and Canterac led the main body against the ridge.
Alvarado wheeled back his right wing, and for a short time the Patriots
held their ground with great determination, but were at length driven
from the position and totally routed with a loss of 700 in killed and
wounded, and 1,000 prisoners. The mounted grenadiers, led by Lavalle,
made two desperate charges to cover the retreat, but were in their turn
overwhelmed by the Royalist horse.
About 1,000 men reached Ilo with General Martinez, and embarking there,
returned to Lima. Alvarado went to Iquiqui in search of the detachment
he had left there, and on the 14th February landed a small party on
shore, which was all either captured or destroyed by Olañeta, who had
occupied the city. Alvarado then invited Olañeta to a conference
concerning the prisoners, and found this general to be so disaffected to
the Viceroy and his adherents, whom he styled “traitorous Liberals,”
that he declared his intention of separating from them and confining
himself to the defence of Upper Peru for the King.
Miller, with his 120 men, accomplished more than all the rest of the
army; he alarmed all the South, and kept the whole reserve under
Caratala in check.
Meantime Arenales lost much time in endeavouring to persuade General
Castillo to incorporate his auxiliaries with the army he was organizing
for the attack on the centre of the Royalists. Castillo refused to join
at first, on the plea that success was doubtful, and then demanded that
a Peruvian should be appointed to command the allied army. His demand
being refused, he then asked permission to retire altogether from the
country. Government, anxious to free itself from so arrogant an ally,
furnished transports, and the Columbian contingent left Peru for
Guayaquil, taking with it the Numancia battalion, 600 strong, which
Bolívar had claimed, as being a Columbian corps. This Columbian
contingent had cost Peru 190,000 dollars and had been of no service
whatever.
Nevertheless Arenales, who hoped to make up by speed for paucity of
numbers, had organized a column of 2,000 men, when Martinez arrived with
a remnant of the Army of the South. The news brought by him produced
great irritation, but by no means disheartened the people, who were
confident of ultimate success. Their anger was turned against
Government; the army encamped at Miraflores was almost in open revolt.
Arenales was asked to put himself at the head of the movement, but this
stout soldier would have none of it, and giving up the command to Santa
Cruz left Peru for ever.
The leaders of the army headed by General Martinez, on the 26th
February, 1823, presented an address to Congress, asking that
Riva-Agüero might be placed at the head of the Executive. The city
militia supported them. Congress yielded, and on the 27th Riva-Agüero
was named President of the Republic, and afterwards Grand Marshal of the
armies, although he was simply a colonel of militia and had never been
under fire.
Riva-Agüero was a true representative of the people, and his popularity
was enhanced by his activity and by the skill shown in the first
measures he adopted. He reorganized the army, making Santa Cruz
general-in-chief, and Martinez general of the division of the Andes and
Chile. He reopened relations with Chile, and wrote to Bolívar accepting
the help which Congress had refused. Bolívar made a treaty with him, in
which he promised 6,000 men, who were to be equipped and paid by Peru.
Chile promised a further contingent of from 2,000 to 2,500 men, and
1,500 muskets in addition. San Martin in Mendoza pushed on the
organization of an Argentine division, which was to operate on the
frontiers of Salta, under the orders of Urdininea. At the same time news
was received that the Peruvian commissioners, in London, had abandoned
their monarchical schemes, and had effected a loan of _one million two
hundred thousand pounds sterling_, which was ratified by Congress.
Before two months had passed Peru had an army of 5,000 men ready for the
field, in addition to the Argentine and Chilian auxiliaries, who were
2,500 more. Riva-Agüero determined upon another expedition to the
intermediate ports, directed against Arequipa and Puno, while another
army, composed of troops of the four Allied Nations, should advance by
Jauja upon the centre, a repetition of the previous plan. Bolívar
approved of the plan when his opinion was asked, and promised his 6,000
men. Chile again promised a fresh contingent, which should be sent to
the south of Peru, and offered to supply horses for the expedition. The
Royalists, ignorant of these preparations, made ready on their part for
an attack upon Lima.
Five thousand Peruvian troops left Callao in May for the South under
General Santa Cruz, with Colonel Gamarra as chief of the staff. For the
first time Peru had an army of her own, commanded by Peruvian generals.
Before leaving, Santa Cruz presented himself to Congress and swore to
return triumphant or to die. He did neither the one thing nor the other.
Santa Cruz showed more activity than Alvarado had done. On the 17th June
the convoy reached Arica. On that same day Canterac, with an army of
9,000 men, rushed down from the Highlands and captured Lima. The
expedition was thus isolated, but the move was a false one on the part
of the Royalists.
Bolívar did not share in the general confidence, he was more clear
sighted than most others, as is seen in a notable letter which he wrote
at this time to General Sucre. He had concentrated his forces at
Guayaquil, and on hearing of the disasters of Torata and Moquegua,
before signing the treaty of which we have already made mention, he at
once sent off an expedition of 3,000 men under Sucre, with instructions
to gain possession of the fortresses of Callao at any cost. Sucre, whom
he called “his right arm,” was also named minister plenipotentiary to
Peru, and was sent to prepare the way for the accomplishment of the
secret designs of the Liberator, who saw that Peru would soon be in a
condition to welcome him as her saviour.
The occupation of Lima by the Royalists was a mistake, it gave them no
military advantage while Callao and the ocean were held by the Patriots.
The Government fled to Callao, and the army collected under shelter of
the guns of that fortress. Sucre was made general-in-chief. Congress
dispersed; some of the members went over to the enemy; but a minority,
who were hostile to Riva-Agüero, kept together, and sent for Bolívar on
the 19th June, 1823, giving him the title of Generalissimo and ample
powers for the salvation of the country. Riva-Agüero retained the title
of President, but was sent out of the way to Trujillo.
Bolívar accepted the invitation, saying that “for a long time his heart
had yearned towards Peru.” Pending his arrival Sucre exercised his
powers as his representative; the secret wish of Bolívar was
accomplished, he was master of Peru.
The Viceroy soon perceived the mistake he had made, and recalled his
army from Lima. On the 16th July Canterac evacuated the city, and
returned to the Highlands unmolested. On the 20th Sucre sailed
southwards with 3,000 Columbians and Chilians and a squadron of Peruvian
cavalry, leaving an army of Peruvians, Argentines, and Columbians at
Lima with orders to occupy Jauja and secure the line of the Apurimac.
His intention was to combine the movements of the three armies, with
Arequipa as the base of his operations, and to advance on Cuzco with
8,000 or 12,000 men, but when he reached the south coast Santa Cruz was
already far inland. He then landed at Quilca and marched on Arequipa;
but the same day Santa Cruz had fought a battle of doubtful result on
the borders of Lake Titicaca.
Santa Cruz had changed the plan. Instead of keeping his army together he
had divided it into two columns, directed against Upper Peru. With the
first he landed near Ilo, and advanced to Moquegua, while the second,
under command of Gamarra, landed at Arica, and occupied Tacna. Here he
remained till the middle of July, awaiting the Chilian contingent; but
as it did not come he, on the 13th July, ascended the Cordillera,
crossed the Desaguadero by the bridge of the Inca without opposition,
and on the 8th August occupied the city of La Paz. Gamarra at the same
time marched by the Tacora road, crossed the Desaguadero lower down, and
occupied the city of Oruro, which is about 170 miles from La Paz.
Olañeta, who was retreating towards Potosí with 1,500 men, was almost
surprised by Gamarra, of whose movements he knew nothing, and withdrew
to the South. Gamarra was then joined by Lanza, the Guerilla chieftain,
with 600 men, and learned that Urdininea, with the Argentine division,
was advancing from Salta; but he lost the opportunity of destroying
Olañeta, which was part of the plan of Santa Cruz, by remaining inactive
at Oruro.
Santa Cruz, hearing that La Serna was concentrating his scattered
divisions at Puno, then turned back to cover the line of the
Desaguadero, and stationed himself on the left bank at the bridge of the
Inca. Valdés advanced against him with 2,000 men, but finding the bridge
was defended by artillery, he withdrew to the town of Zepita. Santa Cruz
crossed the bridge and went after him, and overtook him in a strong
position between the mountains and the lake of Titicaca. By a feigned
retreat he drew Valdés into the plain, where two Peruvian squadrons cut
the Royalist horse to pieces, but the attack upon the infantry was less
successful, and night put a stop to the action. Both sides claimed the
victory, but Valdés retreated, and soon after Santa Cruz returned to his
position on the Desaguadero. This was the first and last battle of the
expedition.
La Serna joined Valdés at Zepita, and crossed the Desaguadero with 4,500
men. Santa Cruz retreated before him, and on the 8th September joined
Gamarra to the south of Oruro. He then manœuvred to prevent a
junction between La Serna and Olañeta, who was returning from Potosí
with 2,500 men, but La Serna by a flank march over the heights succeeded
in effecting the junction on the 14th September. Santa Cruz thought
himself lost, and without attempting to bring on an action in which the
chances would have been in his favour, retreated precipitately. The
retreat soon became a flight, arms and baggage were thrown away, and he
recrossed the Desaguadero utterly routed, without fighting and without
even seeing an enemy. He left a company of infantry with two guns to
defend the bridge, who capitulated to the Royalist vanguard at the
first summons. Barely 1,000 men reached the coast, and the Chilian
contingent, which just then arrived, returned at once to their own
country.
Sucre, seeking to affect a junction with Santa Cruz, had shown in the
prosecution of his arduous task both the prudence and the ability of a
master in the art of war. At Arequipa he heard of the fight at Zepita,
and marched on Puno supposing that Santa Cruz was still holding his
ground at the bridge of the Inca, but was met by the intelligence of the
total dispersion of the Patriot army, and of the concentration of the
Royalists. Placing himself so as to cover the flight of the fugitives,
he steadily retreated and re-embarked at Quilca.
Before the result of the first expedition to the intermediate ports was
known, two of the admirers of San Martin had written to him in his
retirement at Mendoza, telling him that “the hand of San Martin alone
can crown his work and give liberty to Peru.” Even Riva-Agüero wrote to
him, beseeching him to return to public life. After the disasters of
Torata and Moquegua, the eyes of all Peruvians were turned to their late
Protector, and a multitude of letters to the same effect reached him in
his solitude. The new Government of Chile wrote to him that posterity
would forget his immense services unless he completed his work. After
the failure of the second expedition a council of Peruvian officers,
headed by General Porto Carrero and Admiral Guise, with the
authorization of Riva-Agüero, passed a resolution that all Peruvians of
every class called upon their Protector to fly to their assistance, now
that their country was in danger. Guido wrote to him that all Patriots
looked to him for help. Riva-Agüero, who had quarrelled with Congress,
and was opposed to the alliance with Columbia, offered him the supreme
power, by a special messenger. But San Martin had no faith in
Riva-Agüero, and wrote to him to re-establish the authority of Congress,
and on his refusal, rejected his offers with disdain.
Riva-Agüero, in his semi-exile at Trujillo, had dissolved Congress, and
on the 19th July had convened a Senate of his own selection, but he had
no support in public opinion. On the 6th July thirteen members of the
late Congress met at Lima, called up some substitutes, formed themselves
into a sovereign Congress, appointed Torre-Tagle chief of the Executive,
and on the 8th August declared Riva-Agüero an outlaw. He replied by
declaring them traitors and their decrees null and void. He then
collected an army of some sort, proposed an armistice to the Spaniards
and offered to dismiss the auxiliaries. But the auxiliaries refused to
recognise his authority, and the Columbian troops called upon him to lay
down the command.
Then came Bolívar. The castles of Callao thundered him a welcome; Lima
decked herself in flags in his honour. He landed in Peru on the 1st
September; no American ever received so enthusiastic a reception.
Congress made an appearance of consulting him, but in reality only
awaited his orders. As at Caracas, at Angostura, in New Granada, and at
Cúcuta, he renounced all claim to civil power, placing only his sword at
their disposal. Congress paid no attention to these empty phrases,
invested him as Liberator with supreme authority, both military and
civil, and voted him an annual salary of 50,000 dollars, which, with his
usual disinterestedness, he declined to touch.
At a banquet which followed, the name of San Martin was not mentioned
among the many toasts proposed. Whereupon Bolívar rising to his feet
proposed one himself:--
“To the good genius of America, which brought General San Martin with
his liberating army from the banks of La Plata to the shores of Peru;
and to General O’Higgins who had sent him on from Chile.”
Then as the banquet drew to an end, he proposed another:--
“That the peoples of America may never raise a throne upon their soil.”
At night as he entered the theatre, the whole audience rose to their
feet. He occupied the official box with the President, under a drapery
of the festooned flags of Peru and Columbia.
Procter, an English traveller who was present on this occasion, thus
describes him:--
“He is very thin, but his whole person shows great activity. His
features are well formed, but are worn by fatigue and anxiety. The fire
of his black eyes draws attention at once. Never did the exterior give a
more exact idea of the man himself. Egoism, determination, activity,
intrigue, and a persevering spirit, are clearly expressed in his
bearing, and in each movement of his body.”
Bolívar’s first care was to put an end to the dispute with Riva-Agüero,
but finding all friendly overtures unsuccessful, he resolved upon using
force. The country seemed on the verge of a civil war, when his own
troops mutinied against the ex-President. He disappeared from public
life, and the danger was averted.
Bolívar remained absolute master of Peru. He thought that all America
was now his.