THE SECOND CAMPAIGN IN THE HIGHLANDS.
1821.
When Arenales rejoined the main army at Huara, and Ricafort descended by
the mountain passes to Lima, Aldao and his Indian hordes were left in
possession of the greater part of the Highlands, opposed only by a
division under Carratala, who held Huancavelica and Huamanga. Aldao had
given his Indians some sort of organization, styling the cavalry “The
Mounted Grenadiers of Peru,” and the infantry, “The Loyalists of Peru,”
under which names they figured as the two first Peruvian regiments on
the muster roll of the liberating army. San Martin had small faith in
such troops, nevertheless, as a step towards forming a native army, he
appointed Colonel Gamarra, a Peruvian, Commandant-General of the
Highlands, and in February sent him, with a number of officers of all
ranks, to take the command.
About the same time Ricafort returned to Huancavelica, and one of the
first measures of La Serna after he became Viceroy, was to send Valdés
with 1,200 men to support him. The united forces of the Royalists
numbered 2,500 men, but on advancing against Aldao, they found that the
suspension bridges over the Rio Grande had been cut by the Indians.
Nevertheless they found a place at which they could ford the stream and
easily put to flight the raw levies opposed to them.
Before they could reach Gamarra, he had retreated from Jauja and Pasco
with 600 of Aldao’s men, by the pass of Oyuna, where his men dispersed.
Carratala remained watching the pass, while Valdés and Ricafort returned
by Canta to Lima; but were so harassed on the march by Vidal’s
guerillas, that an entire company of light infantry were taken
prisoners, and Ricafort, badly wounded, was carried into Lima on a
stretcher.
It was then that Arenales marched from Huara on his second expedition to
the Highlands. The purpose of this expedition was to hasten the
evacuation of Lima and to occupy such positions as would prevent the
Royalists from re-establishing themselves in the Highlands; then to open
communications at Ica with another expedition, which was sent along the
coast southwards under Miller. For the first of these purposes the
guerillas, guarding the passes from Lima, were instructed to obey all
orders received from Arenales. In case of disaster, Arenales was
instructed to retire on the reserve stationed at Huaylas.
The division of Arenales consisted of 2,200 men, the column under Miller
of 600, thus San Martin was left with about 3,000 sick and convalescent
in front of the Royalist Army of 7,000.
The troops sent with Arenales, worn out by the endemic fevers of the
coast, were more like spectres than men, so that the first movements of
the expedition were very slow. The Cordillera was crossed by the Oyon
Pass on the 6th May. The heights were covered with snow and the cold was
intense. Aldao with the remnants of his division led the van. Pasco was
occupied on the 11th, and Carratala retired precipitately. Tarma and
Jauja were taken on the 20th and 23rd, and Carratala continuing to
retreat, the valley of Huancayo lay open to the Patriots on the 25th.
Arenales now prepared for a vigorous attack upon Carratala, when advice
reached him of the signing of the armistice of Punchauca, which put a
stop to operations for the present, retired to Jauja and employed
himself in reorganizing his force, now swelled by recruiting to over
4,000 men.
Arenales was a peculiar character. Austere and subtile, his military
ideas were as conspicuous for foresight as for audacity, while his every
act was inspired by a sense of justice and duty. He was very strict with
his subordinates, who both feared and respected him. He went about
attended only by an orderly, had only one spare charger and one baggage
mule. He himself saddled and unsaddled his horse, and shod him himself
also. He mended his own boots and uniform, and was so careless of dress
that San Martin at times had his valise replenished for him, unknown to
him. On the march he carried his own provisions in his saddle-bags--a
cheese and a piece of cold beef. San Martin styled him “Mi compañero,”
and was more familiar with him than with any one else. He responded by
exact obedience to orders, but did not scruple to criticise them
whenever he thought proper.
From Jauja Arenales wrote San Martin, earnestly impressing upon him the
advisability of transferring his whole force to the Highlands, leaving
Lima to be watched by the fleet, but at the conclusion of the armistice
he resumed operations by marching against Canterac, who had passed the
Cordillera, when, on the 12th July, he received a despatch from San
Martin, ordering him to retire on Pasco or on Lima, if menaced by the
enemy.
Arenales saw clearly that this movement would entail the destruction of
his division; he had heard of the evacuation of Lima, but knew nothing
of the movements of La Serna. In his perplexity he called a council of
war, at which it was decided to retire to Huancayo.
This movement was the salvation of Canterac, who had lost so heavily on
the march from Lima, that he reached Huancavelica with only 1,500
starving men. La Serna, marching on Jauja, found the passes occupied by
the mountaineers, who rolled great rocks down the mountain slopes upon
his troops, so that, after heavy loss, he was forced to retreat, after
throwing several guns into the river. Then following the route
previously taken by Canterac, he joined him on the 4th August, the
united force numbering barely 4,000 men, of whom many were sick.
At Huancayo Arenales found that Vidal and his guerillas had withdrawn to
Lima, on which he continued his retreat to Jauja. Thence he wrote again
to San Martin, showing him how the occupation of Lima would be as
disastrous to the Patriot as it had been to the Royalist army, but in
obedience to orders continued his retreat, losing hundreds of his new
recruits by desertion.
Again he wrote to San Martin, proposing a new plan of campaign, which
would compensate for the loss of the Highlands. The answer he received
was an order to continue his retreat to Lima.
The division entered the capital in triumph on the day set apart for the
celebration of the Independence of Peru, which by these mistaken
measures was virtually postponed for another four years.