THE ARMISTICE OF PUNCHAUCA.
1821.
At the commencement of the year 1821 the Royalist cause appeared
completely lost in Peru. Pezuela, at a council of general officers,
declared, without reserve, “the impossibility of continuing the defence
of the country.”
This speaks highly for the political and military talents of San Martin,
who in four short months had achieved this result. That the Spanish
leaders, abandoned by the mother country, should raise up the fallen
standard of the King, and with resources drawn from the country itself
should maintain the struggle for yet another four years, speaks quite as
highly for their talents and energy.
When Badajoz was besieged by the French in 1811, Colonel Menacho, who
was San Martin’s first chief, was in command of the garrison. He died,
and in a council of war then held, one officer only voted for holding
out. The city surrendered. The following year the Regency, with the
approval of the Cortes, declared that in such a case, “if one officer
voted for resistance, even though he was a subaltern, the garrison
should not capitulate, and the said officer should take the command.”
The leaders of the Spanish forces in Peru maintained that this decision
gave them the right to refuse to surrender. The Liberal ideas brought by
late reinforcements from Spain, while they weakened political authority,
strengthened the power of the military element.
The ill-concerted measures adopted by the Viceroy to meet invasion, the
timid prosecution of the war, and the successes of the Patriots,
deepened the antagonism of the different parties into which the Royalist
camp was divided. The idea of treachery on the part of the Viceroy
became general; it was believed that he contemplated a shameful
capitulation. Before adopting extreme measures, the Liberal leaders,
headed by La Serna and Valdés, prevailed upon Pezuela to create a “Junta
of War,” which worked like a fifth wheel in a coach; and the inactivity
of the Viceroy on the occasion when San Martin advanced to Retes,
precipitated matters. It was resolved to depose him.
On the night of 28th January, 1821, La Serna withdrew from the
encampment at Asnapuquio. The next day Canterac and Valdés paraded the
army, and the officers being convened to a council of war, summoned the
Viceroy to lay down the supreme command in four hours, “as the only
means of preventing disturbances and preserving Peru to Spain.” Pezuela
resigned, and the power fell into the hands of the Spanish
Constitutionalists, who were thus forced, in defence of the rights of
the mother country, to fight in the cause of an absolute King, against
their own principles as upheld by the Patriots of America.
The first act of La Serna, now Viceroy, was to invite San Martin to send
Commissioners to a conference, for the purpose of putting an end to the
disputes between Spaniards and Americans. San Martin joyfully acceded,
and named Guido and Alvarado representatives of the Patriot cause. La
Serna on his side appointed Colonels Valdés and Loriga.
The Commissioners met at a farm-house near Retes, when the Spanish
officers presented a modification of the proposals of Miraflores, on the
basis of the acceptance of the Spanish Constitution. The others declined
to negotiate on any other basis than the recognition of the independence
of Peru.
Alvarado then asked Loriga to walk out with him, leaving the other two
to discuss the question. The Spanish officer accepted the invitation,
and during their promenade informed Alvarado that they thought of
abandoning Lima and retiring to the more healthy Highlands, where, with
abundant supplies at command, they could easily beat off any attack of
the Patriots. This information was the only immediate result of the
conference, but it gave rise to further negotiations, on the basis of
the establishment of an independent monarchy in Peru.
The change of Viceroys in no way improved the position of the Royalists;
on the contrary, fresh disasters befell the army of Lima, and the new
general fell into the same errors as his predecessor. The scarcity of
provisions became worse in the city, and yellow fever broke out in the
army, while the arrival of a royal commissioner from Spain prevented La
Serna from taking any decided step.
The condition of the Patriot army at Huara was not much better. It also
suffered greatly from fever, so that barely a thousand men were fit for
service. San Martin himself fell ill, but his guerillas cut off supplies
from Lima, and expeditions along the coast or into the Highlands kept
the enemy in continual alarm.
On the 25th March the envoy from the new Government of Spain, a naval
officer named Abreu, arrived at Huara, where he was well received. Four
days he remained there, holding long conversations with San Martin, for
whom he conceived a great admiration. At his instigation La Serna
attempted to negotiate privately with San Martin, but San Martin replied
that he would listen to nothing which was not proposed officially, and
about the same time sent a column of his sickly troops, commanded by
Miller, to act under Cochrane’s orders against Callao, and another under
Arenales into the Highlands. Then leaving a strong rear-guard in charge
of the hospitals and park at Huara, he embarked the rest of his troops
in transports, and dropped down the coast to Ancon, whence his cavalry,
aided by guerillas, scoured the country, and shut up the Royalists
within a small triangle formed by the encampment at Asnapuquio, Lima,
and Callao, and there awaited the opening of a formal negotiation.
After the Liberal movement in Spain in 1820 the revolusionists of South
America were no longer spoken of as rebels or insurgents, but were
recognized by the Home Government as belligerents, and were now invited
by King Ferdinand, by a proclamation, to treat for peace with their
brethren of the old country, “as their equals,” but they were offered
only the Constitution of 1812, which they had already rejected by
declaring themselves independent, and were threatened with forcible
compulsion in case of refusal. This olive-branch of peace, wafted across
the seas, only supplied fresh fuel to the flames of war.
Envoys from Spain bearing this message of peace had reached the northern
part of the continent in December, 1820, during an armistice between
Bolívar and Morillo. They had persuaded Bolívar to send Columbian
commissioners to Spain, but in April, 1821, before anything could be
known as to their prospects of success, hostilities recommenced, and
there were no further attempts at negotiation.
To Mexico also the same message was sent, a message apparently one of
peace and conciliation, which, when looked into, was seen to mean
submission or war, and to which, in Mexico as elsewhere, answer was
given in one formula, independence or war.
When in 1820 the revolution broke out in Spain the revolution in Mexico
was crushed. General Vicente Guerrero, with a handful of men, alone
upheld the flag of insurrection in the rough country to the south. In
Mexico the movement was chiefly the work of the indigenous element of
the population, and assumed the character of a rising of the proletariat
against the superior classes, thus arousing a spirit of resistance in
the country itself, which powerfully aided the efforts of the Royalist
troops for its suppression. But amid this discord of opinions a
sentiment for independence was latent in the hearts of all, so that the
defeat of the insurrection combined with the Liberal movement in Spain
to bring about a pacific evolution.
The proclamation of a Liberal _régime_ in the mother country produced in
Mexico a split among the various parties who had upheld the colonial
system. While Spaniards became Absolutists or Constitutionalists, the
natives became Republicans or Monarchists. Apodaca was at that time
Viceroy. He put himself at the head of a reaction, and is said to have
been incited thereto by the King, who, fearful of the fate of Louis
XVI., proposed withdrawing from Europe to Mexico, there to reign with
absolute power, free from the trammels of a Constitution. This reaction
could not triumph without the aid of the native Monarchists.
Among the Creoles who had served in the Royalist ranks, and had
distinguished himself by cruelties to his own countrymen, was a man
named Agustin Iturbide, then thirty-seven years of age. Unscrupulous in
the pursuit of wealth, of life either dissolute or ascetic as best
served his interests, and with some natural talent, he was possessed by
a secret ambition, in which race-patriotism had a place. His sleep was
broken by envious dreams of the laurels gained by Bolívar and San
Martin, and though lacking the great qualities of either of them, he
aspired to be the liberator of Central America. This was the man
selected by Apodaca to aid his plan of reaction, by leading the natives
to support his policy. He appointed him Commandant-General of the South,
and sent him with a division of native troops to stamp out the embers of
insurrection kept alive by Guerrero. Iturbide soon came to an
understanding with Guerrero and threw off the mask.
On the 24th February, 1820, in the town of Iguala, one hundred and
twenty-seven miles from the city of Mexico, Iturbide published a
document known to history as the “Plan of Iguala.” In it he proclaimed
the independence of Mexico, and at the same time hoisted a flag symbolic
of the new revolution, a tri-colour, white, red, and green; white
signifying religious purity, red signifying friendship with Spain, and
green signifying the hope of emancipation. The plan was in three parts,
from which it took the name of the plan of the “three guarantees,” a
name which was also applied to the army which upheld it. The first part
stipulated the establishment of the Catholic religion to the exclusion
of every other; the second part declared Mexico an independent state,
under a monarchical government tempered by a constitution; the third
part stipulated the union of Americans and Europeans. King Ferdinand was
recognized as Emperor of Mexico, if he would come and swear to the
constitution, and after him his brothers in natural succession; in
default of whom, Congress should name a prince of one of the royal
houses of Europe. Further, the equality of all the races--indigenous,
African, and European--was proclaimed, without other distinction between
them than that given by individual merit or virtue.
The leaders of the insurrection, with Guerrero, abjuring for the moment
their Republican principles, placed themselves under the orders of
Iturbide for the sake of national independence. The Creoles who had
opposed the revolution gave in their adhesion to the new “Plan.” The
clergy adopted it in hatred of the reforms of the Spanish Liberals; the
Spanish Absolutists in hatred of the Constitution; and the
Constitutionalists for the sake of peace. The whole country pronounced
in favour of the “Plan of Iguala.” The Royalists, conquered without
fighting, held only the capital, the port of Vera Cruz, and the fortress
of San Juan de Ulua. In July, 1821, Iturbide was acclaimed Liberator of
the country.
By this means a solution was found for the dilemma--submission, or
independence and war. The bond with the mother country was untied but
was not broken. Thus was it understood by O’Donoju, the successor to
Apodaca, who subscribed to the “Plan of Iguala” by treaty, in August,
1821.
In Brazil, about this time, took place an evolution similar to the plan
proposed by Iturbide, while in Columbia the armistice was broken, and in
Peru negotiations, based on ideas similar to those enunciated in the
“Plan of Iguala,” came to an end.
We have nothing more to do with the history of Mexico. Suffice it that
the Spanish Government rejected the treaty signed by O’Donoju; that
Mexico was lost for ever to Spain; that Iturbide seated himself on the
vacant throne and was crowned Emperor, only to be deposed soon
afterwards and banished. On attempting to recover his dignity he was
shot.
The negotiations initiated confidentially by the Viceroy in Peru were
more formally carried forward by an official invitation from him. La
Serna appointed Don Manuel de Llano y Najera and Don Mariano Galdiano,
both of whom were Americans, as colleagues to Abreu. San Martin
appointed Guido, Garcia del Rio, and José Ignacio de la Rosa, formerly
Governor of San Juan, to represent the Patriots. The farm-house of
Punchauca, fifteen miles from Lima, was made the meeting place of the
Commissioners. Neither party made any preliminary stipulation, both
professed to be anxious for peace and union.
The Royalist Commissioners were instructed to propose the acceptance of
the Spanish Constitution, with some concessions in detail, in accordance
with the spirit of the proclamation of King Ferdinand. Those of the
Patriots were instructed by San Martin to reject the Spanish
Constitution as a bond of union, and to insist upon the recognition of
the independence of Chile, of the Provinces of the River Plate, and of
Peru, without consenting to any armistice, except on this basis. In case
it were proposed that the Patriots should send Commissioners to Spain
to treat of this matter, they were to demand, as a preliminary, the
evacuation of Lima, and were to refuse to enter into any treaty for the
conduct of the war, which had been spoken of, as it had up to then been
carried on in accordance with the law of Nations.
The Royalist Commissioners opened the discussion by presenting a note,
on the 4th May, 1821, stating that in regard to the suggestion made by
San Martin at Miraflores, that independence should be secured by the
establishment of a monarchy with a sovereign from the royal house of
Spain, they had no power to make any such arrangement, and recommended
the adoption of the Spanish Constitution since it was a proof of the
liberal sentiments of the Spanish Government and of their desire for
reconciliation. Further, they proposed an armistice, while commissioners
were sent by both parties to Spain, as had been done by Bolívar in
Columbia. To this the Patriot Commissioners replied, on the day
following, that no negotiations could be entertained except on the basis
of the recognition of independence, but in view of the inability of the
Spanish Commanders to make this recognition, they were willing to
consent to a suspension of arms, with some guarantee, and that they
hoped no further mention would be made of the Spanish Constitution, the
very name being obnoxious to the liberties of the New World.
To this no answer was given, but an armistice of sixteen months was
proposed by the Royalist Commissioners. Then the Patriots demanded that
the fortifications of Callao should be handed over to them intact, as a
guarantee, to be delivered up if hostilities should again break out, and
their note concluded as follows:--
“If Don José de San Martin be determined to achieve the independence of
America by arms or by negotiation, he is no less desirous of uniting
this part of the New World to the mother country by those bonds of
friendship and commerce which would redound to the prosperity of both.”
To the surprise of the Patriot Commissioners themselves, the Viceroy
acceded to the terms of the proposed armistice, only stipulating that he
should withdraw twelve heavy guns from Callao. It then became easy to
arrange the terms of a provisional armistice of twenty days, during
which it was stipulated that La Serna and San Martin, accompanied by
their respective commissioners, should meet on the 23rd May.
Neither party seems to have acted in good faith on this occasion. La
Serna had written, on the 7th April, to his generals in the Highlands,
that he did not believe that the negotiation would lead to any result,
and instructed them to occupy advantageous positions which they might
hold during a possible suspension of hostilities. San Martin afterwards
declared, in a confidential letter to O’Higgins, that the division of
Arenales required a rest after passing through the Highlands, and that
he himself had twelve hundred sick. He knew very well that arrogant
Spain would never admit a recognition of independence which was forced
upon her.
On the 2nd June, the interview between San Martin and La Serna took
place at Punchauca. The two leaders met very cordially, with expressions
of mutual esteem. San Martin proposed the appointment of a regency for
the independent government of Peru, until the arrival of a prince of the
Royal House of Spain; the said regency to consist of La Serna as
President, with two colleagues, one named by the Royalists, the other by
the Patriots, and offered to go himself to Spain as a commissioner to
arrange matters with the Home Government.
Abreu expressed himself warmly in favour of the proposition, and the
Viceroy appeared willing to accept it, but desired to consult the
various corporations of the Viceroyalty before concluding so important
an arrangement, and promised an answer in two days. They then discussed,
informally, the mode in which the troops of both armies should unite in
the public square of Lima to solemnise the declaration of the
independence of Peru. To the interview succeeded a banquet, at which the
most friendly toasts were exchanged.
In all this the policy of San Martin was fundamentally wrong. He had no
authority to make any such proposition. It was not in accordance with
the principles for which he fought, and the applause with which it was
received by the Monarchists of the Holy Alliance, implies its
condemnation by the Republicans of America.
La Serna was more clear-sighted. Instead of consulting the corporations
he consulted his officers, who, without absolutely rejecting the
proposition, declined to accept it immediately, as it was in direct
contravention of their orders, which forbade them to treat on the basis
of colonial independence. On this, La Serna sent Valdés and Camba to
arrange, if possible, with San Martin for a suspension of hostilities,
until he had time to consult the Home Government. On the refusal of San
Martin to listen to this proposal the commissioners again met at
Miraflores, and, as neither party was ready to resume hostilities, the
armistice was prolonged for twelve days, and San Martin consented to
relax the blockade of Lima so as to permit the entrance of supplies
sufficient for the daily wants of the citizens, “as he did not make war
upon the people.” This measure greatly increased the power of the
partisans of the Patriot cause in the capital, and they prevailed upon
the Cabildo to make a representation to the Viceroy in favour of peace,
to which representation he paid no attention, and it produced great
irritation in the army.
At this time San Martin received a visit from Captain Basil Hall, of the
British navy, who, in his Journal, has given a very graphic account of
the policy of the great General.[17]
During the rest of the armistice the Commissioners kept up appearances
by still continuing to meet, while both parties actively prepared for
the resumption of hostilities. La Serna detached Canterac with the most
healthy of his troops, to occupy Huancavelica, thus to be ready to meet
the advance of Arenales into the Highlands. San Martin returned with all
his army to Huacho.
On the 4th July, the armistice having run out, La Serna publicly
announced his determination to abandon Lima, and delegated the supreme
authority to the Marquis of Montemira. He left a garrison of 2,000 men
in the fortifications of Callao, 1,000 sick in the hospitals, and, on
the morning of the 6th, marched off with barely 2,000 men, by the valley
of Cañete.
The city was panic struck. The leading Spaniards fled with their
families to Callao. The women rushed to the monasteries. San Martin
hastened to reassure the people by a letter to the Archbishop, and,
faithful to his declared policy, made no attempt to occupy the city. A
deputation of the inhabitants waited upon him, asking his protection:
whereupon he ordered the guerillas, of whom they were most afraid, to
retire from the neighbourhood, and surrounded the city with a cordon of
regular troops, placing them under the orders of the civil governor.
Still the citizens could not believe that he was acting in good faith
till an order from the Governor to a regiment of cavalry, which had
encamped a mile and a half from the city, to retire to a greater
distance, was at once obeyed, when confidence was restored, and, at the
invitation of the authorities, at sundown on the 9th, a division of the
army entered the city amid the shouts of the populace.
The next day, after sundown, San Martin, accompanied only by an
aide-de-camp, rode quietly through the streets of the city to the palace
of the Viceroys, where the citizens thronged to give him welcome, and
the members of the Cabildo, hurriedly convened, presented him with an
address. He soon wearied of their enthusiastic protestations of regard,
and, remounting his horse at half past ten, he rode out to the village
of Mirones, half-way to Callao, where he had established the
headquarters of his army, as a preliminary step to laying siege to the
fortress.
On the 11th he issued various proclamations to the citizens, and the
royal arms were torn down from over the doors of the public offices, the
escutcheon of Peru being put in their place, with the inscription _Lima
Independiente_.
San Martin also issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the
liberated departments, calling them to arms, and promising, with their
assistance, to finish the campaign in forty days. But he took no active
measures in furtherance of this project. Apparently he attached too much
importance to the possession of Lima, for, with the exception of
Trujillo, the country had as yet made no effort to second him, and
remained passively watching the course of events.
The Viceroy, with his dispirited army, was allowed to retreat almost
unmolested, though his loss by desertion was very great. Canterac was
already securely established in the Highlands. San Martin here repeated
the mistake he was guilty of after Chacabuco. Again he showed want of
energy in following up a victory. He attached too much importance to the
success which had so far attended his political combinations.