MAIPO.
1818.
At daybreak on the 20th March the Royalist army, although triumphant,
was in utter confusion. Only one battalion, that of Arequipa, under
Rodil, had not dispersed. Osorio, leaving his convent, rode over the
field of battle, endeavouring to estimate the value of the victory he
had done nothing to win. The orderly retreat of Las Heras filled him
with apprehension, and his own cavalry was worn out. He crossed the
Lircay and advanced to Pangue, from whence he despatched Ordoñez with a
flying column in pursuit, and returned with the rest of his force to
Talca to reorganize. Ordoñez reached Quecheraguas the next day, when Las
Heras had already crossed the Lontué. On the 24th he was joined by
Osorio with the rest of the army.
The country was a desert; the roads were inundated by the waters from
the irrigating ditches which the Patriots had cut as they retreated; the
Royalist general could learn nothing of the position or condition of the
Patriot army. Marching blindly on, he reached San Fernando on the 28th,
and sent forward a detachment of 200 horse, which, being attacked and
dispersed by sixty grenadiers under Captain Cajaravilla on the 30th,
were the first to give him certain information that there still remained
an enemy in front of him.
On the 31st the Royal army, 5,500 strong, crossed the Cachapoal, and
advanced so cautiously that only on the afternoon of the 2nd April did
it encamp on the left bank of the Maipó. Leaving the main road, Osorio
crossed by a ford lower down, and encamped at Calera on the 3rd, moving
on in the afternoon to the farmhouse of Espejo, where he established his
headquarters, with the Patriot army close at hand. On the 4th he held a
council of war, and proposed to retire on Valparaiso. Ordoñez, Rivera,
and the principal officers opposed this idea, so it was resolved to
fight the next day.
The scene of the decisive battle of the 5th April, 1818, is a plain
bounded on the east by the river Mapocho, which divides the city of
Santiago, on the north by a range of hills which separates it from the
valley of Aconcagua, and on the south by the river Maipó,[11] which
gives it its name. The west of this plain consists of a series of downs,
with some low hills, covered with natural grasses and occasional clumps
of thorny trees. From Santiago there runs in this direction a stretch of
high land called the “Loma Blanca,” from the chalky nature of the soil.
On the crest of this Loma the Patriot army was encamped. In front of the
western extremity of this Loma rose another of triangular form, beyond
the south-western angle of which stood the farmhouse of Espejo,
communicating with the higher ground by a sloping road of about
twenty-five yards in width, shut in by vineyards and by the mud walls of
enclosures, and crossed at the foot by a ditch. This Loma was occupied
by the Royalist army. Between the two Lomas lay a stretch of low ground,
varying in width from 300 to 1,250 yards, which was shut in on the west
by a hillock which formed a sort of advanced work on the left of the
Royalist position.
The position held by the Patriot army commanded the three roads from the
capital to the passes of the Maipó, and the road to Valparaiso. For its
further security San Martin had entrenched the city, and garrisoned it
with 1,000 militia and one battalion of infantry, under command of
O’Higgins, whose wound precluded him from service in the field. The army
was in three divisions: the first, under Las Heras, on the right; the
second, under Alvarado, on the left; and a reserve in a second line,
under Quintana. Balcarce was in general command of the infantry, San
Martin keeping the cavalry and the reserve under his own orders. San
Martin issued the most precise orders for the regulation of the troops
in action, especially enjoining upon every corps, whether cavalry or
infantry, that they should never await a charge from the enemy, but
that, when fifty paces distant, they should rush forward with sabre or
bayonet.
During the whole day of the 4th April skirmishers of the Patriot army
were constantly engaged with the enemy advancing from the fords of the
Maipó. Early on the morning of the 5th San Martin, attended by O’Brien
and D’Albe, with a small escort, rode to the edge of the Loma to watch
for himself the movements of the foe. He feared that they would go far
to the west and secure the road to Valparaiso for retreat in case of a
reverse. As he saw them occupy the high ground in front of him with
their left only extending to the road, he exclaimed:--
“What brutes these Spaniards are! Osorio is a greater fool than I
thought him. I take the sun for witness that the day is ours.”
At that moment the sun shone forth over the snowy crests of the Andes
from a cloudless sky upon him.
At half-past ten the Patriot army advanced by the crest of the Loma from
its camping-ground. On the march, Marshal Brayer presented himself to
San Martin, asking permission to retire to the Baths of Colina.
“You have the same permission you took on the field of Talca,” replied
San Martin. “But as half an hour will decide the fate of Chile, as the
enemy is in sight, and the baths are thirteen leagues off, you may stay
if you can.”
The Marshal answered that he could not “because of an old wound in the
leg.”
“Señor General,” replied San Martin, “the lowest drummer in the united
army has more honour than you.” And, turning rein, he gave orders to
Balcarce to announce to the army that the general of twenty years of
warfare was cashiered for unworthy conduct.
On reaching the edge of the Loma, the army was drawn up in order of
battle, four heavy guns in the centre, the light pieces and the cavalry
on the wings, and the reserve two hundred yards in the rear.
The first movement of the Royalist general was to detach Primo de Rivera
with eight companies of infantry and four guns to occupy the detached
hill on his left, threatening the right of the Patriots, taking them in
flank if they crossed the low ground, and securing, as he thought, the
road to Valparaiso; Morgado, with some cavalry, keeping up the
connection with the main body. The crest of the Loma was occupied by the
infantry in two divisions with four guns each, the rest of the cavalry
being stationed on the extreme right. Both armies were in such excellent
positions that neither could attack except at a disadvantage.
San Martin, uncertain of the whereabouts of the enemy’s artillery, was
the first to open fire with his four heavy guns from the centre. The
reply gave him the information he required, and he at once ordered the
two divisions to attack the enemy. Las Heras advanced resolutely with
the 11th battalion, under the fire of the four guns on the hill, to
another hill to the right of Primo de Rivera, while the grenadiers,
under Escalada, Medina, and Zapiola, drove Morgado and his horsemen in
confusion from the field. Rivera was thus cut off from the main body. At
the same time the left wing crossed the hollow, ascended the slope in
front of them, and reached the high ground without seeing an enemy, but
were then vigorously charged by the bulk of the Royalist infantry, under
Ordoñez and Morla, and driven back with heavy loss; but the Royalists
pursuing them down the slope were in their turn forced to retire by a
withering fire from the Chilian guns, under Borgoño, which had remained
on the crest of the Loma Blanca.
San Martin now sent orders to the reserve to advance at once, in support
of the left wing, by an oblique movement across the low ground, so as to
fall upon the flank of the Spanish infantry. On his way Quintana was
joined by three battalions of those that had been driven back, and fell
with great impetuosity upon the Royalists, who, however, held their
ground most tenaciously. Meantime Freyre, with the Chilian cavalry, had
charged and put to flight the Royalist cavalry on the right, and now
came back upon the other flank of the Spanish infantry. Alvarado, having
rallied his broken division, came to the assistance of Quintana with
Borgoño and his eight guns.
Osorio, after sending orders to Rivera to withdraw from his advanced
position, fled, leaving Ordoñez in command, who at once commenced to
retreat in excellent order upon the farmhouse of Espejo.
At this moment O’Higgins, wounded as he was, appeared upon the field,
and, meeting San Martin, greeted him as the saviour of Chile; but it was
already five o’clock, and the battle was not yet won. Ordoñez, with
heavy loss, had made good his retreat to the farmhouse, where he made
the most active preparations for defence.
Las Heras, in pursuit of the left wing, was the first to arrive there,
but found several detached corps there before him. He immediately
ordered the occupation of the high grounds around it, which commanded
the position, but Balcarce coming up ordered an immediate attack by the
road. Colonel Thompson, with a battalion of Chilian light infantry, led
the assault, but was beaten back with grape and musketry, losing 250
killed, and all his officers wounded. Borgoño and Blanco Encalada from
the high ground then opened fire with seventeen guns, and soon drove the
enemy from his outer defences into the houses and vineyards. Then the
11th battalion, supported by pickets of the 7th and 8th, broke their way
through the mud walls and took the houses by assault. The carnage was
frightful till Las Heras succeeded in putting a stop to it.
Ordoñez and all his principal officers, with the exception of Rodil, who
escaped, gave up their swords to Las Heras, and the victory was
complete. This was the hardest fought battle in all the War of
Independence. The Royalists lost 1,000 killed, twelve guns, four flags,
and a great quantity of small arms, ammunition, and baggage captured;
and one general, four colonels, seven lieutenant-colonels, 150 officers,
and 2,200 men were made prisoners. The Patriots lost more than 1,000 men
killed and wounded, the greatest sufferers being the freed negroes of
Cuyo, of whom more than half remained upon the field.
Great tactical skill was displayed by San Martin in this battle. The
victory was achieved by the opportune attack of the reserve upon the
weakest flank of the enemy. Like Epaminondas, he won only two great
battles, and both by the oblique movement invented by the Greek general.
Its importance was only equalled by that of Boyacá and that of Ayacucho;
and without Maipó neither the one nor the other would have been fought.
Maipó crushed the spirit of the Spanish army in America, and that of all
adherents to the cause of royalty from Mexico to Peru. It had, further,
the singular merit of being won by a beaten army fifteen days after its
defeat.
The Arequipa battalion retreated in good order, under Rodil, but
dispersed after crossing the Maule. This battalion and the dispersed
cavalry were all who escaped from the field. San Martin had witnessed
the flight of Osorio, and sent O’Brien after him with a party of
cavalry. However, he escaped by the coast, leaving his carriage, with
all his correspondence, in the hands of his pursuer, and reached
Talcahuano on the 14th April with fourteen men. There he was joined by
600 more of the fugitives--all that remained of the victors of
Cancha-Rayada.
San Martin made small use of his victory. He at once despatched Freyre
in pursuit with a party of cavalry, but not until the guerillas began to
commit depredations did he send Zapiola with 250 grenadiers to maintain
order in the South. Osorio made use of this respite to strengthen
himself in Concepcion and Talcahuano, and, by calling in outlying
detachments, succeeded in collecting 1,200 men by the middle of May.
Pezuela, who fully appreciated the magnitude of the disaster, wrote to
the Viceroy of New Granada and Venezuela for reinforcements. Sámano sent
him the Numancia battalion, 1,200 strong, weakening himself at the time
that he was threatened by Bolívar; but Morillo could send him none from
Venezuela, and he confined his efforts to making preparations against
invasion, leaving Osorio unaided to sustain himself in Chile as he
could.
On the 21st May Osorio sent two detachments across the Nuble, one of
which surprised the town of Parrol. Zapiola sent off Captain Cajaravilla
with 200 horse to retake the town, which task he gallantly accomplished,
capturing 70 prisoners; while Lieutenant Rodriguez of the grenadiers cut
the other detachment to pieces at Quirihue. This put a stop to the
efforts of the Royalists for that time, and Zapiola, being reinforced,
determined to attack Chillán, where Colonel Lantaño was in command with
a garrison of 500 men. The expedition was confided to Cajaravilla, who
attempted to carry the place by assault, but was beaten off and
compelled to retire.
Osorio, fearing that he would be attacked in the spring by the whole
united army, resolved to evacuate Talcahuano, and to return to Peru.
Accordingly, on the 5th September, he left Colonel Sanchez in command of
the Chilian Royalists, and, after dismantling the fortifications, sailed
for Callao on the 8th with thirty-five heavy guns, a great quantity of
war material, and 700 Spanish troops--all that remained of the strong
reinforcement he had brought with him.