CANCHA-RAYADA.
1817--1818.
The year 1817 had commenced with a victory and ended with a defeat, the
year 1818 was to commence with a defeat to be followed by a victory
which would decide the fate of Chile. From that moment all the forces of
the revolution in South America would converge from the extremities
towards the centre, shutting up the colonial power of Spain in its last
stronghold, Peru, where the two great liberators of the South and the
North, San Martin and Bolívar, would join hands.
In the epoch at which we have now arrived, Chile had as yet no definite
form, but possessed all the elements of a vigorous nationality,
patriotism, energy, and a pronounced tendency to independence; a
democracy yet in embryo, combined with an aristocracy at once
territorial and political. The instincts of the masses decided them for
the cause of independence, while their political organization assumed
the most elemental form, that of a people become an army, under the
direction of a class and under a military dictatorship to which all were
subject. The revolution and the leveling pressure of despotic rule, had
destroyed provincialism and the social inequalities which stood in the
way of national unity; common misfortunes and common efforts had created
public spirit. Independence thus became a fact, and the establishment of
a republic the necessary sequence. With the assent of all the
convocation of a Congress was still postponed, but the political
situation was compact. Yet there was some resistance to this system of
government: the educated classes accepted it only as a transient
necessity, and there were still some partisans of the royal cause in the
South. Among the rulers themselves there were still some who clung to
the fallen party of the Carreras; but for the presence of Argentine
bayonets and the influence of San Martin the intestine dispute would
have broken out afresh.
Viceroy Abascal, who had crushed the revolution in Upper Peru, in Quito,
and in Chile, had in 1815 been replaced by General Pezuela, and the army
of Upper Peru was put under the command of General La Serna. Pezuela
lacked the talents of his predecessor but he continued his policy.
Seeing Chile threatened by an invasion from Mendoza, he ordered La Serna
to effect a diversion by marching on Tucuman. But La Serna was held in
check by the Gauchos of Salta and Jujui under Martin Güemes, and the
successful passage of the Andes by San Martin forced upon him a
disastrous retreat.
Pezuela did not fully appreciate the importance of the victory of
Chacabuco, and contented himself with sending back the fugitives, in the
belief that the Royalist army was still able to hold the country
unaided. The defeat of Ordoñez at Gavilán opened his eyes to the danger,
and the arrival of reinforcements from Spain enabled him to fit out a
fourth expedition. While busied in these preparations, the British ship
of war _Amphion_, Captain Bowles, anchored at Callao, bringing Don
Domingo Torres as special envoy from San Martin. So far as its
ostensible object was concerned the mission was a complete failure, but
Torres succeeded in communicating with the Patriots of Peru, and took
back with him in January, 1818, full particulars of the expedition which
followed close upon his heels.
Three thousand four hundred well equipped men reached Talcahuano early
in January, in four ships mounting 234 guns. Most of these were veteran
troops, and were commanded by General Osorio, the conqueror of Chile in
1814, who was sent to supersede Ordoñez. His instructions were, after
driving the Patriot army to the north of the Maule, to re-embark his
entire force, land in the neighbourhood of Valparaiso, and march on the
capital. The plan was apparently a good one, but was drawn out in
ignorance of the strength of the Patriots. The losses in the army of the
Andes had all been made up, and the new Chilian army by this time almost
equalled it in number. The united army now consisted of 9,000 men, of
whom three-fourths were well drilled troops, while the total force
collected at Talcahuano did not much exceed 5,000 men with twelve guns.
The cannon which roared a welcome to the Spanish squadron at Talcahuano,
were heard by the Patriot army then in full retreat upon the capital.
Osorio saw at once that he had failed to surprise the enemy, and that
all chance of an easy landing in the neighbourhood of Valparaiso was at
an end. He despatched the squadron to blockade that port, and after
fifteen days spent in organizing his forces at Concepcion, he marched
for the North, stimulated to activity by Ordoñez. On the 12th February
his advanced posts on the Maule heard the salute fired by O’Higgins at
Talca, in celebration of the first anniversary of Chacabuco.
The rôles were now changed; the general of the Army of the Andes,
instead of choosing the place of invasion on a line of 1,300 miles of
Cordillera, had now to defend 1,300 miles of coast. He expected the
enemy to land near Valparaiso, and in December had written to O’Higgins
to make every preparation for a rapid retreat, leaving the country
behind him destitute of horses and supplies. O’Higgins commenced his
retreat on the 1st January, 1818, and on the 20th reached Talca,
accompanied by more than 50,000 people with their cattle and horses,
and there proclaimed triumphantly the Independence of the Chilian
Republic, which, in default of a Congress, had been decreed by a general
vote of the Chilian people on the 17th November previous.
At Santiago, Don Luis de la Cruz, Deputy Director, presided at a solemn
ceremony in the great square. Guido was the bearer of the standard of
the new Nation; beside it the President of the Municipality carried that
of the United Provinces. The Declaration of Independence being read, De
la Cruz was the first to swear to maintain it, he was followed by the
Bishop and by San Martin; then the people kneeling down, repeated the
oath, and commemorative medals were distributed among them.
Meantime San Martin had drawn the greater part of his troops from the
city and had established an encampment at Las Tablas near the coast, in
readiness to meet the enemy at any point, giving the command there to
Balcarce, and looking himself to the construction of bridges over the
rivers to the south of Santiago, to facilitate the concentration of the
different corps when requisite.
By the end of February he was no longer in doubt as to the intentions of
the enemy. O’Higgins was directed to evacuate Talca and retreat sixty
miles to the north. Early in March the concentration was complete, and
San Martin had under his command 4,500 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and
thirty-three guns.
On the 4th March, Osorio crossed the Maule and encamped at Talca. On the
14th the united army broke up from quarters and marched against him. The
same day the Royalist army left Talca, and Primo de Rivera, chief of the
staff, crossed the river Lontué with a strong detachment of infantry and
cavalry to reconnoitre the position and force of the Patriots, of which
Osorio as yet knew nothing, recrossing the river the same night. On the
15th, Freyre, supported by Brayer with the bulk of the cavalry and eight
guns, crossed the river with 200 light horse, advanced to Quecheraguas,
where the Royalist vanguard was quartered, and summoned Primo de Rivera
to surrender, but receiving no support from Brayer, who did not even
cross the river, he was forced to retire with the loss of seventeen men.
Rivera after this success retreated upon his reserves at Camarico.
On the 16th, the entire Patriot army crossed the Lontué and encamped at
Quecheraguas, while Osorio retired precipitately. San Martin, afraid
that he would repass the Maule, marched inland to cut him off. The two
armies marched on parallel lines at a distance of only seven miles one
from the other; both crossed the Lircay on the 19th. On the afternoon of
the same day, Osorio, whose rear was greatly harassed by the Patriot
cavalry under Balcarce, wheeled into line in an excellent position, his
right resting on the suburbs of Talca, his left on the Claro River, and
his front defended by a stretch of broken ground known as the
Cancha-Rayada, which he occupied with 500 horse. Balcarce, ignorant of
the nature of the ground, charged this advanced corps, and coming under
fire of the Royalist artillery, was compelled to retire in disorder.
O’Higgins, with twenty guns, forced back the enemy’s right wing into the
suburbs of Talca, but as darkness came on, decisive action had to be
postponed till next day.
In the twilight the Royalist generals, after gazing upon the Patriot
army from the church towers of Talca, held a council of war. Before them
was an enemy greatly superior in numbers, behind them flowed a deep and
rapid river. Osorio talked of continuing the retreat to Talcahuano, but
was overruled by Ordoñez, who said that the attempt could only result in
the total destruction of the army, and advised a night attack upon the
Patriot position. Most of the officers supported him, and Osorio retired
to a convent, leaving him in command. At 8 P.M., under a cloudy sky,
Ordoñez drew up his army in line of battle, with cavalry on the wings
and guns in the intervals between the different battalions. He himself
took charge of the centre, Primo de Rivera led the right wing and
Colonel Latorre the left; so, in deep silence, they marched across the
Cancha-Rayada, straight upon the watch-fires of the Patriot vanguard.
Meantime San Martin, warned by a spy of what was going forward in the
Royalist camp, and seeing that his troops were in the worst possible
position to resist a night attack, had marched several battalions and
the Chilian artillery from his front to a strong position on his extreme
right. The broken nature of the ground much retarded the manœuvre,
and the rest of the army had not moved at all when the cavalry outposts
gave warning of the approach of the enemy.
The right of the Royalist army, having the least distance to march, was
the first to come into action, and was received by O’Higgins with so
heavy a fire, whilst at the same time a detached company under Captain
Dehesa opened fire on their left, that for a moment the advance was
checked, till Ordoñez in person led them again to the charge. O’Higgins
had his horse killed under him and received a ball in the elbow. From
this moment all was confusion in the Patriot camp. The artillery was
abandoned and the grenadiers on the extreme left, roused from sleep by
the firing, fled in a panic. The cavalry of the right retired upon the
reserves, and were received by a volley of musketry under the belief
that they were Spaniards. Alvarado, with the 1st Light Infantry, passed
behind the Royalist line and joined the right wing, being also taken for
a Spanish corps and losing twenty-one men by the fire of his own friends
before the mistake was discovered. The 2nd Chilian infantry, under
command of an Italian officer, moved to the rear, and also reached the
right wing in safety.
Ordoñez pushed on to a hill in the rear, of the Patriot position, then
halted and opened fire in every direction. One of these chance shots
killed an aide-de-camp of San Martin at his side, and after some
fruitless efforts to restore order he was forced to repass the Lircay
with the fugitives, and was followed by O’Higgins with the remains of
his division and the reserve artillery. All seemed lost.
It was eleven o’clock, and the autumn moon shone down through the heavy
clouds upon the plain so lately occupied by an army. In the distance
were heard occasional shots and the gallop of Spanish horse in pursuit,
while the right wing in its secure position listened in silence,
receiving no orders and knowing nothing of what had happened. The
commander, Colonel Quintana, had gone off for orders and had not
returned. The officers held a council of war and put themselves under
command of Las Heras. He found himself with 3,500 men, but had no
ammunition for his guns and no cavalry. He placed his guns in front,
and, forming his infantry into one compact column, commenced his retreat
soon after midnight, pursued by a squadron of Royalist horse, which did
not dare to attack him. At daybreak he was sixteen miles from the field
of battle. He rested for an hour, and found that 500 men had deserted
during the night. At 10 A.M. he continued his march, and at five in the
afternoon reached Quecheraguas, where he remained till midnight, when he
crossed the Lontué, and, resuming his march next morning, reached
Chimbarongo at midday, where he received news that San Martin and
O’Higgins were at San Fernando with the 8th battalion, occupied in
collecting the dispersed cavalry.
San Martin came to meet him, and praised the soldiers for their steady
behaviour. He was by no means cast down, and directed Las Heras to
continue his march to Santiago. O’Higgins suffered much from his wound,
but was more determined than ever.
By the dispersion of Cancha-Rayada the Patriots lost 120 killed, 22
guns, and 4 flags, but the nucleus of the army was saved, and with it
the independence of America. The Royalists had more than 200 killed and
wounded, and had so many missing that they could not at once follow up
their victory.
News of the disaster reached Santiago on the afternoon of the 21st,
carried there by some of the principal officers, among them being
Brayer. According to them everything was lost, San Martin killed, and
O’Higgins mortally wounded. Consternation spread over the city, and
shouts of “Viva el Rey!” were heard occasionally in the streets. Some
talked of flying to Mendoza, or to the ships at Valparaiso. The
Royalists and some of the leading citizens opened communications with
the conqueror. One of them even had a horse shod with silver to present
to him on his arrival. No one slept that night in Santiago.
Government hastily resolved to erect a fort on the southern road, and to
send the public treasure to the North for safety, while they called in
outlying detachments of troops and summoned the National Guard. The next
day news was received that San Martin was at San Fernando.
Brayer, interrogated by the Deputy Director, affirmed that the country
could never recover from such a defeat, an opinion which was warmly
disputed by Guido. On the 23rd April a despatch was received from San
Martin announcing the safe retreat of Las Heras, and stating that he had
4,000 men under his orders. Still the panic was not allayed, and Dr.
Rodriguez, taking advantage of the circumstances, rode on horseback
through the streets, haranguing the people till he induced them to meet
in an open Cabildo and appoint him coadjutor to La Cruz. His fantastic
measures were of no real use, but they served the temporary purpose of
raising the spirits of the people till the real leaders arrived upon the
scene.
Early the next morning O’Higgins reached the city. He soon put an end to
disorder, purchased horses, and prepared supplies of ammunition. On the
25th he was joined by San Martin, who, worn out by fatigue and want of
sleep, yet found strength as he drew rein at the gate of his palace to
make the one speech of his life, in which he assured the excited people
that the cause of Chile would yet triumph, and promised them soon a day
of glory for America. On the same day a council of war was held in his
apartments, at which O’Higgins was present, when it was resolved to
establish a camp on the plain of Maipó about seven miles to the south of
the city, there to await the approach of the enemy. On the 28th Las
Heras joined the army with his division, and day and night were spent in
active preparation.
Public confidence revived, but San Martin trusted nothing to fortune, he
prepared for any contingency, gave secret orders for concentration on
Coquimbo in case of a second reverse, established stores of supplies on
the way there, and despatched Colonel de la Cruz to organize the
northern provinces. He also established guards at the entrances to the
passes of the Andes, and a park at Santa Rosa, so as to secure his
retreat to the east. Further, he stationed a strong corps of cavalry at
Rancagua, fifteen miles to the south of his camp.
Ten days after the dispersion the united army was reorganized and ready
for the fray. It consisted of five battalions of Chilian and four of
Argentine infantry, in all nearly 4,000 strong, two regiments of
Argentine and one of Chilian cavalry with 1,000 sabres and twenty-two
guns, in all more than 5,000 men.