Farther state of affairs in the beginning of the year
1781.... Measures of Mr. Morris, the superintendent of
finances.... Designs of General Washington against New
York.... Count Rochambeau marches to the North River....
Intelligence from the Count de Grasse.... Plan of operations
against Lord Cornwallis.... Naval engagement.... The
combined armies march for the Chesapeake.... Yorktown
invested.... Surrender of Lord Cornwallis.
[Sidenote: 1781]
[Sidenote: State of affairs at the beginning of the year 1781.]
The deep gloom which had enveloped the prospects of America in the
commencement of the year, which darkened for a time in the south, had
also spread itself over the north. The total incompetency of the
political system adopted by the United States to their own
preservation, became every day more apparent. Each state seemed
fearful of doing too much, and of taking upon itself a larger portion
of the common burden than was borne by its neighbour.
The resolutions of congress had called for an army of thirty-seven
thousand men, to be in camp by the first of January. Had this
requisition been made in time, it is not probable that so large a
force could have been brought into the field; but it was made late,
and then the difficulties and delays on the part of the several
states, exceeded every reasonable calculation. The regular force drawn
from Pennsylvania to Georgia inclusive, at no time, during this
active and interesting campaign, amounted to three thousand effective
men; and the states from New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive, so
late as the month of April, had furnished only five thousand infantry.
Of these, the returns for that month exhibit, in the northern
department, less than three thousand effectives. The cavalry and
artillery, at no time, amounted to one thousand men. This small army
was gradually and slowly augmented so as, in the month of May, to
exhibit a total of near seven thousand men, of whom rather more than
four thousand might have been relied on for action.
The prospects for the campaign were rendered still more unpromising by
the failure of supplies for the support of the troops. The long
expected clothing from Europe had not arrived; and the want of
provisions[79] furnished a still more serious cause of alarm.
[Footnote 79: See note No. V. at the end of the volume.]
After congress had come to the resolution of emitting no more bills on
the credit of the continent, the duty of supplying the army with
provisions necessarily devolved on the states, who were required to
furnish certain specified articles for the subsistence of the troops,
according to a ratio established by the federal government. These
requisitions had been neglected to such a degree as to excite fears
that the soldiers must be disbanded from the want of food.
To increase the general embarrassment, the quartermaster department
was destitute of funds, and unable to transport provisions or other
stores from place to place, but by means of impressment supported by a
military force. This measure had been repeated, especially in New
York, until it excited so much disgust and irritation among the
people, that the Commander-in-chief was under serious apprehensions of
actual resistance to his authority.
While in this state of deplorable imbecility, intelligence from every
quarter announced increasing dangers.
Information was received that an expedition was preparing in Canada
against Fort Pitt, to be conducted by Sir John Johnston, and Colonel
Conelly; and it was understood that many, in the country threatened
with invasion, were ready to join the British standard. The Indians
too had entered into formidable combinations, endangering the whole
extent of the western frontier.
In addition to these alarming circumstances, some vessels had arrived
at Crown Point from Canada, with information that three thousand men
had been assembled on the lakes, for the purpose of attempting, once
more, an invasion from that quarter.
This information, though unfounded, was believed to be true, and was,
at that critical moment, the more alarming, because a correspondence
of a criminal nature had just been discovered between some persons in
Albany and in Canada. A letter intercepted by Generals Schuyler and
Clinton, stated the disaffection of particular settlements, the
provision made in those settlements for the subsistence of an invading
army, and their readiness to join such army.
This intelligence from the northern frontier derived increased
interest from the ambiguous conduct observed by the inhabitants of
that tract of country which now constitutes the state of Vermont. They
had settled lands within the chartered limits of New York, under
grants from the governor of New Hampshire; and had, early in the war,
declared themselves independent, and exercised the powers of
self-government. The state of New York, however, still continuing to
assert her claim of sovereignty, the controversy on this delicate
subject had become so violent as to justify the apprehension that, in
the opinion of the people of Vermont, the restoration of British
authority was an evil not of greater magnitude, than the establishment
of that of New York. The declaration was openly made that, if not
admitted into the union as an independent state, they held themselves
at liberty to make a separate peace; and some negotiations had been
commenced, which were believed to manifest a disposition in Vermont,
to abandon the common cause of America.
Accustomed to contemplate all public events which might grow out of
the situation of the United States, and to prepare for them while at a
distance, the American chief was not depressed by this state of
American affairs. With a mind happily tempered by nature, and improved
by experience, those fortunate events which had occasionally
brightened the prospects of his country, never relaxed his exertions,
or lessened his precautions; nor could the most disastrous state of
things drive him to despair. Although entirely uncertain what
operation he might be enabled to undertake during the approaching
campaign, he had adopted such preparatory steps as might enable him to
turn to advantage any fortunate incident which might occur. In
consequence of conferences previously held with the Count de
Rochambeau, for the purpose of digesting a system adapted to
contingent events, orders were transmitted to that officer, directing
him to be in readiness to march as large a body of the French troops
to the North River, as could be spared from the protection of the
fleet.
Early in May, the Count de Barras, who had been appointed to the
command of the French fleet stationed on the American coast, arrived
in Boston accompanied by the Viscount de Rochambeau, and brought the
long expected information from the cabinet of Versailles, respecting
the naval armament designed to act in the American seas. Twenty ships
of the line, to be commanded by the Count de Grasse, were destined for
the West Indies, twelve of which were to proceed to the continent of
America, and might be expected to arrive in the month of July.
[Sidenote: Designs of General Washington against New York.]
An interview between General Washington and the Count de Rochambeau
immediately took place at Weathersfield, in which it was determined to
unite the troops of France to those of America on the Hudson, and to
proceed against New York. The regular army at that station was
estimated at four thousand five hundred men,[80] and though it was
understood that Sir Henry Clinton would be able to reinforce it with
five or six thousand militia, it was believed that the post could not
be maintained without recalling a considerable part of the troops from
the south; in which event, the allied army might be employed
advantageously in that part of the union.
[Footnote 80: Sir H. Clinton in a letter to Lord Cornwallis, dated
June 11, 1781, states his effective force at ten thousand nine hundred
and thirty-one.]
The prospect of expelling the British from New York roused the
northern states from that apathy into which they appeared to be
sinking, and vigorous measures were taken to fill their regiments. Yet
those measures were not completely successful. In the month of June,
when the army took the field, and encamped at Peekskill, its
effective numbers did not exceed five thousand men.
Such was the American force in the north, with which the campaign of
1781 was opened. It fell so far short of that on which the
calculations had been made at Weathersfield, as to excite serious
doubts respecting the propriety of adhering to the plan there
concerted, although some compensation was made for this deficiency on
the part of the states by the arrival of a reinforcement of fifteen
hundred men to the army of Rochambeau under convoy of a fifty gun
frigate.
To supply even this army with provisions, required much greater
exertions than had ever been made since the system of requisitions had
been substituted for that of purchasing. The hope of terminating the
war produced these exertions. The legislatures of the New England
states took up the subject in earnest, and passed resolutions for
raising the necessary supplies. But until these resolutions could be
executed, the embarrassments of the army continued; and, for some time
after the troops had taken the field, there was reason to apprehend,
either that the great objects of the campaign must be relinquished for
want of provisions, or that coercive means must still be used.
New England not furnishing flour, this important article was to be
drawn from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The two first
states were much exhausted; and the application to Pennsylvania did
not promise to be very successful. On this subject, therefore, serious
fears existed.
These were removed, in a great degree, by the activity and exertions
of an individual.
[Sidenote: Superintendent of finances appointed.]
The management of the finances had been lately committed to Mr. Robert
Morris, a delegate to congress from the state of Pennsylvania. This
gentleman united considerable political talents to a degree of
mercantile enterprise, information, and credit, seldom equalled in any
country. He had accepted this arduous appointment on the condition of
being allowed the year 1781 to make his arrangements; during which
time, the department was to be conducted by those already employed,
with the resources which government could command. But the critical
state of public affairs, and the pressing wants of the army, furnished
irresistible motives for changing his original determination, and
entering immediately on the duties of his office. The occasion
required that he should bring his private credit in aid of the public
resources, and pledge himself personally and extensively, for articles
of absolute necessity which could not be otherwise obtained.
Condemning the system of violence and of legal fraud, which had too
long been practised, as being calculated to defeat its own object, he
sought the gradual restoration of confidence by the only means which
could restore it:--a punctual and faithful compliance with his
engagements. Herculean as was this task in the existing derangement of
American finances, he entered upon it courageously; and, if not
completely successful, certainly did more than could have been
supposed possible with the means placed in his hands. It is, in no
inconsiderable degree, to be attributed to him, that the very active
and decisive operations of the campaign were not impeded, perhaps
defeated, by a failure of the means for transporting military stores,
and feeding the army.
On determining to enter on the duties of his office, Mr. Morris laid
before congress the plan of a national bank, whose notes were to be
receivable from the respective states as specie, into the treasury of
the United States. Congress gave its full approbation to this
beneficial institution; and passed an ordinance for its incorporation.
Important as was this measure to the future operations of the army, a
contract entered into with the state of Pennsylvania was of still more
immediate utility.
After furnishing flour to relieve the wants of the moment on his
private credit, Mr. Morris proposed to take on himself the task of
complying with all the specific requisitions made on Pennsylvania, and
to rely for reimbursement on the taxes imposed by law, to be
collected under his direction. This proposition being accepted, the
contract was made; and supplies which the government found itself
unable to furnish, were raised by an individual.
[Sidenote: Count Rochambeau marches to the North River.]
As the French troops approached the North River, intelligence was
received that a large detachment from New York had made an incursion
into Jersey, under appearances indicating an intention not to return
immediately. This being thought a favourable moment for gaining the
posts on the north end of York Island, a plan was formed for seizing
them by a _coup de main_. General Washington fixed on the night of the
second of July for making the attempt; it being supposed that the
Count de Rochambeau might join the American army at Kingsbridge by
that time. An aid-de-camp was therefore despatched to meet that
officer with letters explaining the enterprise, and requesting him to
meet the Commander-in-chief at the time and place appointed.
With the proposed attack on these works, an attempt to cut off some
light troops stationed on the outside of Kingsbridge at Morrissania,
under the command of Colonel Delaney, was to be combined. This part of
the plan was to be executed by the Duke de Lauzun, to whose legion
Sheldon's dragoons, and a small body of continental troops dispersed
on the lines, under the command of General Waterbury, were to be
added.
On the part of the Americans, all that could contribute to the success
of this enterprise was done. A strong detachment commanded by General
Lincoln, which fell down the river in boats with muffled oars, reached
its ground undiscovered on the night of the first of July; and the
army, conducted by General Washington, marched to Valentine's hill.
The next day, Lincoln perceived that the detachment had returned from
Jersey, that the British were encamped in great force on the north end
of the island, and that a ship of war watched the landing place. These
unexpected obstacles having defeated the design upon the works, he
proceeded to execute his eventual orders of co-operation with the Duke
de Lauzun. These were, after landing above Spiken Devil Creek, to
march to the high ground in front of Kingsbridge, and there conceal
his detachment, until the attack on Delaney's corps should commence.
The Duke de Lauzun did not arrive, and the return of day betrayed
Lincoln. A British corps advanced upon him; on hearing which, General
Washington put his troops in motion, and, on his approach, the British
troops retired into the island.
Both parts of the plan having thus failed, the army retreated to
Dobbs' ferry, where it was joined by the Count de Rochambeau on the
sixth of July.
The thanks of the Commander-in-chief were given to that officer in
general orders, for the unremitting zeal with which he had proceeded
to form his so long wished for junction with the American army; and he
was requested to convey to the officers and soldiers under his
command, the grateful sense which the general entertained of the
cheerfulness with which they had performed so long and laborious a
march at so hot a season.
The utmost exertions were made for the grand enterprise against New
York. But as the execution of any plan that could be formed, depended
on events which were uncertain, the Commander-in-chief directed his
attention to other objects, to be pursued if that which was most
desirable should prove unattainable. Should the siege of New York
become unadviseable, his views were turned to Virginia, the Carolinas,
and Georgia.
[Sidenote: Intelligence from the Count de Grasse.]
Early in August, the apprehension that he should be unable to
accomplish his favourite object, began to influence his conduct.
Letters from the Marquis de Lafayette announced that a large portion
of the troops in Virginia were embarked, and that their destination
was believed to be New York. This intelligence induced him to turn his
attention more seriously to the south; but, to conceal from Sir Henry
Clinton this eventual change of plan, his arrangements were made
secretly, and the preparations for acting against New York were
continued. A reinforcement from Europe of near three thousand men,
induced Sir Henry Clinton to countermand the orders he had given to
Lord Cornwallis to detach a part of the army in Virginia to his aid;
and also to direct that nobleman to take a strong position on the
Chesapeake, from which he might execute the designs meditated against
the states lying on that bay, so soon as the storm which threatened
the British power for the moment, should blow over. In a few days
after the arrival of this reinforcement, the Count de Barras gave
General Washington the interesting information, that De Grasse was to
have sailed from Cape Francis for the Chesapeake, on the third of
August, with from twenty-five to twenty-nine ships of the line, having
on board three thousand two hundred soldiers; and that he had made
engagements with the officers commanding the land and naval forces of
Spain in the West Indies, to return to those seas by the middle of
October.
This intelligence manifested the necessity of determining immediately,
and positively, on the object against which the combined forces should
be directed. The shortness of the time appropriated by De Grasse for
his continuance on the American coast, the apparent unwillingness of
the naval officers to attempt to force a passage into the harbour of
New York, and the failure of the states to comply with the
requisitions which had been made on them for men, decided in favour of
operations to the south; and Lafayette was requested to make such a
disposition of his army as should be best calculated to prevent Lord
Cornwallis from saving himself by a sudden march to Charleston.[81]
[Footnote 81: In pursuance of these orders, Wayne was detached to the
south side of James River, under the pretext of reinforcing Greene,
but was ordered to maintain a position which would enable him to
intercept and oppose the march of Lord Cornwallis, should he attempt
to force his way to Charleston. Lafayette was on the alert to
co-operate with Wayne in the event of such a movement.--_Cor. with
Lafayette._]
Conformably to the intelligence communicated by the Count de Barras,
the Count de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake late in August with
twenty-eight ships of the line and several frigates. At Cape Henry he
found an officer despatched by Lafayette with full intelligence of the
situation of the armies in Virginia. Lord Cornwallis had collected his
whole force at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, which he was fortifying
assiduously; and the Marquis had taken a position on James River.
In consequence of this information, four ships of the line and several
frigates were detached to block up the mouth of York River, and convey
the land forces brought from the West Indies, under the command of the
Marquis de St. Simon, up the James to join Lafayette, who, on
receiving this reinforcement, took post at Williamsburg. In the mean
time, the fleet lay at anchor just within the capes. On the 25th of
August the Count de Barras[82] sailed from Newport for the Chesapeake.
[Footnote 82: This admiral was the senior of De Grasse, to whom the
command of the expedition had been entrusted, and was therefore
authorized by the minister of marine, to cruise on the coast of
Newfoundland while his ships should join the grand fleet. He preferred
serving under his junior officer.--_Cor. of Lafayette._]
Rodney was apprized of the destination of De Grasse, but seems not to
have suspected that the whole fleet would sail for the continent of
America. Supposing therefore that a part of his squadron would be
sufficient to maintain an equality of naval force in the American
seas, he detached Sir Samuel Hood to the continent with only fourteen
sail of the line. That officer arrived at Sandy Hook on the
twenty-eighth of August.
Admiral Greaves, who had succeeded Arbuthnot in the command of the
fleet on the American station, lay in the harbour of New York with
seven ships of the line, only five of which were fit for service. On
the day that Hood appeared and gave information that De Grasse was
probably on the coast, intelligence was also received that De Barras
had sailed from Newport.
The ships fit for sea were ordered out of the harbour; and Greaves,
with the whole fleet, consisting of nineteen sail of the line,
proceeded in quest of the French.
Not suspecting the strength of De Grasse, he hoped to fall in with one
or the other of their squadrons, and to fight it separately.
Early in the morning of the 5th of September, while the French fleet
lay at anchor just within the Chesapeake, the British squadron was
descried. Orders were immediately given by De Grasse to form the line,
and put to sea. About four in the afternoon, the action commenced
between the headmost ships, and continued until sunset. Several ships
were much damaged, but neither admiral could claim the victory. For
five successive days the hostile fleets continued within view of each
other. After which, De Grasse returned to his former station within
the capes. At his anchorage ground he found De Barras with the
squadron from Newport, and fourteen transports laden with heavy
artillery, and military stores proper for carrying on a siege. The
British admiral approaching the capes, found the entrance of the
Chesapeake defended by a force with which he was unable to contend,
and therefore bore away for New York.
[Sidenote: Plan of operations against Lord Cornwallis.]
[Sidenote: The combined armies march for the Chesapeake.]
General Washington had determined to entrust the defence of the Hudson
to General Heath, and to command the southern expedition in person.
All the French, and a detachment amounting to upwards of two thousand
men from the continental army, were destined for this service. On the
19th of August, Hazen's regiment and the Jersey line, were directed
to pass the Hudson at Dobbs' ferry, and take a position between
Springfield and Chatham, where they were to cover some bake-houses to
be constructed in the neighbourhood, for the purpose of veiling the
real designs of the American chief, and of exciting fears for Staten
Island. On the same day, the whole army was put in motion; and on the
twenty-fifth the passage of the river was completed.
[Sidenote: September 6.]
To conceal as long as possible the real object of this movement, the
march of the army was continued until the thirty-first, in such a
direction as to keep up fears for New York; and a considerable degree
of address was used to countenance the opinion that the real design
was against that place. The letters which had been intercepted by Sir
Henry Clinton favoured this deception; and so strong was the
impression they made that, even after it became necessary for the
combined army to leave the route leading down the Hudson, he is stated
to have retained his fears for New York, and not to have suspected the
real object of his adversary until he had approached the Delaware;[83]
and it had become too late to obstruct the progress of the allied army
towards Virginia. He then resolved to make every exertion in his power
to relieve Lord Cornwallis, and in the mean time to act offensively
in the north. An expedition was planned against New London, in
Connecticut, and a strong detachment, under the command of General
Arnold, was embarked on board a fleet of transports, which landed
early in the morning of the 6th of September on both sides the
harbour, about three miles from the town.
[Footnote 83: The first indication given by Sir Henry Clinton of
suspecting the southern expedition, is in his letter to Lord
Cornwallis of the 2nd of September, in which he says, "By intelligence
I have this day received, it would seem that Washington is moving
southward."]
New London is a seaport town on the west side of the Thames. A fort
called fort Trumbull, and a redoubt had been constructed just below
it, on the same side of the river; and opposite to it, on Groton hill,
was fort Griswold, a strong square fortification, but not fully
manned. General Arnold, who commanded in person the troops that landed
on the western side of the harbour, advanced immediately against the
posts on that side. These being untenable, were evacuated on his
approach; and he took possession of them with inconsiderable loss. To
prevent the escape of the vessels up the river, Lieutenant Colonel
Eyre, who commanded the division which landed on the Groton side of
the harbour, had been ordered to storm fort Griswold, which had been
represented to Arnold as too incomplete to make any serious
resistance. But the place being of some strength, and the approach to
it difficult, Colonel Ledyard, who commanded it with a garrison of one
hundred and sixty men, determined to defend it. On his refusing to
surrender, the British assaulted it on three sides, and overcoming the
difficulties opposed to them, made a lodgement on the ditch and
fraized work, and entered the embrasures with charged bayonets.
Further resistance being hopeless, the action ceased on the part of
the Americans, and Colonel Ledyard delivered his sword to the
commanding officer of the assailants. Irritated by the obstinacy of
the defence, and the loss sustained in the assault, the British
officer on whom the command had devolved, tarnished the glory of
victory by the inhuman use he made of it. Instead of respecting, with
the generous spirit of a soldier, the gallantry which he had subdued,
he indulged the vindictive feelings which had been roused by the
slaughter of his troops. In the account given of this affair by
Governor Trumbull to General Washington, he says, "The sword presented
by Colonel Ledyard was immediately plunged into his bosom, and the
carnage was kept up until the greater part of the garrison was killed
or wounded."
In this fierce assault, Colonel Eyre was killed, and Major Montgomery,
the second in command, also fell, as he entered the American works.
The total loss of the assailants was not much less than two hundred
men.
The town of New London, and the stores contained in it, were consumed
by fire. To escape the odium which invariably attends the wanton
destruction of private property, this fire was attributed to accident;
but all the American accounts unite in declaring it to have been
intentional.
[Sidenote: September 6.]
The march of General Washington was not arrested by this excursion
into New England. Having made the arrangements for the transportation
of his army down the Chesapeake, he proceeded in person to Virginia,
attended by the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier de Chatelleux;
and, on the 14th of September, reached Williamsburg[84] accompanied by
Rochambeau, Chatelleux, Knox, and Du Portail, he immediately repaired
to the fleet, and a plan of co-operation was adjusted on board the
Ville de Paris, conforming to his wish in every respect, except that
the Count de Grasse declined complying with a proposition to station
some of his ships in the river above Yorktown, thinking it too
hazardous.
[Footnote 84: While the American troops were encamped at Williamsburg
and the French fleet lay in the bay, the Count de Grasse,
circumscribed in point of time, and therefore, unwilling to await the
arrival of the army from the north, urged Lafayette to attack the
British in Yorktown; offering to aid him not only with all the marines
of the fleet, but with as many seamen as he should require. The
Marquis de St. Simon, an officer of great experience, united himself
with the admiral in pressing this measure. He stated that, the works
of Cornwallis being incomplete, Yorktown and Gloucester might, in all
probability, be carried by storm, if attacked by superior numbers. The
temptation was great for a young general scarcely twenty-four years of
age. A full excuse for the attempt was found in the declaration of De
Grasse, that he could not wait for the arrival of the troops from the
north. Success would have given unrivaled brilliancy to the reputation
of Lafayette, but would necessarily have cost much blood. Lafayette
refused to sacrifice the soldiers which were confided to him to his
personal glory, and persuaded De Grasse to await the arrival of
Washington and Rochambeau, when the capture of Cornwallis would be
certainly made without the waste of human life.--_Cor. with
Lafayette._]
While the close investment of the British army was delayed, only until
the troops from the north should arrive, serious apprehensions were
excited that the brilliant results confidently anticipated from the
superiority of the land and naval forces of the allies, would be put
in imminent hazard.
Information was received that a reinforcement of six ships of the line
under Admiral Digby had reached New York. Confident that the British
fleet, thus augmented, would attempt every thing for the relief of
Lord Cornwallis, De Grasse expected to be attacked by a force not much
inferior to his own. Thinking his station within the Chesapeake
unfavourable for a naval combat, he designed to change it, and
communicated to General Washington his intention to leave a few
frigates to block up the mouths of James and York Rivers, and to put
to sea with his fleet in quest of the British. If they should not have
left the harbour of New York, he purposed to block them up in that
place; supposing that his operations in that quarter would be of more
service to the common cause, than his remaining in the bay, an idle
spectator of the siege of York.
The Commander-in-chief was much alarmed at this communication. Should
the admiral put to sea, the winds and many accidents might prevent
his return to the Chesapeake. During his absence, a temporary naval
superiority might be acquired by the British in those waters, and the
army of Lord Cornwallis might be placed in perfect security. The
movement would expose to the caprice of fortune, an object of vast
importance, which was now reduced almost to certainty. The admiral was
therefore entreated to preserve his station.
Fortunately, the wishes of the general prevailed, and the admiral
consented to relinquish those plans of active enterprise which his
thirst for military glory had suggested, and to maintain a station
which the American general deemed so conducive to the interests of the
allies.
[Sidenote: September 25.]
On the 25th of September, the last division of the allied troops
arrived in James River, and were disembarked at the landing near
Williamsburg; soon after which, the preparations for the siege were
completed.
[Sidenote: Yorktown invested.]
York is a small village on the south side of the river which bears
that name, where the long peninsula between the York and the James, is
only eight miles wide. In this broad and bold river, a ship of the
line may ride in safety. Its southern banks are high, and, on the
opposite shore, is Gloucester Point, a piece of land projecting deep
into the river, and narrowing it, at that place, to the space of one
mile. Both these posts were occupied by Lord Cornwallis. The
communication between them was commanded by his batteries, and by some
ships of war which lay under his guns.
The main body of his army was encamped on the open grounds about
Yorktown, within a range of outer redoubts and field works, calculated
to command the peninsula, and impede the approach of the assailants;
and Lieutenant Colonel Dundass, with a small detachment consisting of
six or seven hundred men, held the post at Gloucester Point. He was
afterwards reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton.
The legion of Lauzun, and a brigade of militia under General Weedon,
the whole commanded by the French General de Choisé, were directed to
watch the enemy on the side of Gloucester; and, on the twenty-eighth,
the grand combined army moved down on the south side of the river, by
different roads, towards Yorktown. About noon, the heads of the
columns reached the ground assigned them respectively; and, after
driving in the piquets and some cavalry, encamped for the evening. The
next day, the right wing, consisting of Americans, extended farther to
the right, and occupied the ground east of Beverdam creek; while the
left wing, consisting of French, was stationed on the west side of
that stream. In the course of the night, Lord Cornwallis withdrew from
his outer lines; and the works he had evacuated were, the next day,
occupied by the besieging army, which now invested the town completely
on that side.
Two thousand men were stationed on the Gloucester side for the purpose
of keeping up a rigorous blockade. On approaching the lines, a sharp
skirmish took place which terminated unfavourably for the British;
after which they remained under cover of their works, making no
attempt to interrupt the blockade.
[Sidenote: October 6.]
[Sidenote: October.]
On the night of the sixth of October, until which time the besieging
army was incessantly employed in disembarking their heavy artillery
and military stores, and drawing them to camp, the first parallel was
commenced within six hundred yards of the British lines. This
operation was conducted with so much silence, that it appears not to
have been perceived until the return of daylight disclosed it to the
garrison; by which time the trenches were in such forwardness as to
cover the men. By the evening of the ninth, several batteries and
redoubts were completed, and the effect of their fire was soon
perceived. New batteries were opened the next day, and the fire became
so heavy that the besieged withdrew their cannon from the embrasures,
and scarcely returned a shot. The shells and red hot balls from the
batteries of the allied army reached the ships in the harbour, and, in
the evening, set fire to the Charon of forty-four guns, and to three
large transports, which were entirely consumed. Reciprocal esteem, and
a spirit of emulation between the French and Americans, being
carefully cultivated by the Commander-in-chief, the siege was carried
on with great rapidity. The second parallel was opened, on the night
of the eleventh, within three hundred yards of the British lines. The
three succeeding days were devoted to the completion of this parallel,
during which the fire of the garrison, which had opened several new
embrasures, became more destructive than at any previous time. The men
in the trenches were particularly annoyed by two redoubts advanced
three hundred yards in front of the British works, which flanked the
second parallel of the besiegers. Preparations were made, on the
fourteenth, to carry them both by storm. The attack of one was
committed to the Americans, and of the other to the French. The
Marquis de Lafayette commanded the American detachment, and the Baron
de Viominel the French. Towards the close of the day, the two
detachments marched with equal firmness to the assault. Colonel
Hamilton, who had commanded a battalion of light infantry throughout
this campaign, led the advanced corps of the Americans; and Colonel
Laurens turned the redoubt at the head of eighty men, in order to take
the garrison in reverse, and intercept their retreat. The troops
rushed to the charge without firing a gun and without giving the
sappers time to remove the abattis and palisades. Passing over them,
they assaulted the works with irresistible impetuosity on all sides at
the same time, and entered them with such rapidity that their loss was
inconsiderable.[85] This redoubt was defended by Major Campbell, with
some inferior officers, and forty-five privates. The major, a captain,
a subaltern, and seventeen privates, were made prisoners, and eight
privates were killed while the assailants were entering the works.
[Footnote 85: One sergeant and eight privates were killed; and one
lieutenant colonel, four captains, one subaltern, one sergeant, and
twenty-five rank and file, were wounded.
The irritation produced by the recent carnage in fort Griswold had not
so far subdued the humanity of the American character as to induce
retaliation. Not a man was killed except in action. "Incapable," said
Colonel Hamilton in his report, "of imitating examples of barbarity,
and forgetting recent provocation, the soldiery spared every man that
ceased to resist." Mr. Gordon, in his History of the American War,
states the orders given by Lafayette, with the approbation of
Washington, to have directed that every man in the redoubt, after its
surrender, should be put to the sword. These sanguinary orders, so
repugnant to the character of the Commander-in-chief and of Lafayette,
were never given. There is no trace of them among the papers of
General Washington; and Colonel Hamilton, who took a part in the
enterprise, which assures his perfect knowledge of every material
occurrence, has publicly contradicted the statement. It has been also
contradicted by Lafayette.]
The redoubt attacked by the French was defended by a greater number of
men; and the resistance, being greater, was not overcome so quickly,
or with so little loss. One hundred and twenty men, commanded by a
lieutenant colonel, were in this work, eighteen of whom were killed,
and forty-two, including a captain and two subaltern officers, were
made prisoners. The assailants lost, in killed and wounded, near one
hundred men.
The Commander-in-chief was highly gratified with the active courage
displayed in this assault. Speaking of it in his diary, he says--"The
bravery exhibited by the attacking troops was emulous and
praiseworthy. Few cases have exhibited greater proofs of intrepidity,
coolness, and firmness, than were shown on this occasion." The orders
of the succeeding day, congratulating the army on the capture of these
important works, expressed a high sense of the judicious dispositions
and gallant conduct of both the Baron de Viominel and the Marquis de
Lafayette, and requested them to convey to every officer and man
engaged in the enterprise, the acknowledgments of the
Commander-in-chief for the spirit and rapidity with which they
advanced to the attack, and for the admirable firmness with which they
supported themselves under the fire of the enemy without returning a
shot. "The general reflects," concluding the orders, "with the highest
degree of pleasure, on the confidence which the troops of the two
nations must hereafter have in each other. Assured of mutual support,
he is convinced there is no danger which they will not cheerfully
encounter, no difficulty which they will not bravely overcome."[86]
[Footnote 86: General Lafayette states a fact which proves in an
eminent degree the good feelings of the American soldiers towards
their allies. While encamped together under his command at
Williamsburg, the Americans, who were _bivouacked_, saw their allies
under tents without a murmur; and saw them supplied regularly with
rations of flour for three days from the American magazines, while
corn meal was measured out very irregularly to themselves. The
superior officers lent their horses to those of France and walked
themselves. Although their general was himself a Frenchman, the
Americans saw not only without jealousy, but with pleasure, every
preference given to their allies.]
[Illustration: The Moore House at Yorktown, Virginia
_Where the terms for the surrender of the British army were arranged
between Washington and Cornwallis. The actual drafting of the terms
was done by the Viscount de Noailles and Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens,
representing the French-American forces, and Colonel Dundas and Major
Ross for the British._]
During the same night, these redoubts were included in the second
parallel; and, in the course of the next day, some howitzers were
placed in them, which, by five in the afternoon, were opened on the
besieged.
[Sidenote: October 16.]
The situation of Lord Cornwallis was becoming desperate. His works
were sinking, in every quarter, under the fire of the besiegers. The
batteries already playing on him had silenced nearly all his guns, and
the second parallel was about to open, which must in a few hours
render the town untenable. To suspend a catastrophe which appeared
almost inevitable, he resolved on attempting to retard the completion
of the second parallel, by a vigorous sortie against two batteries
which appeared to be in the greatest forwardness, and were guarded by
French troops. The party making this sortie was led by Lieutenant
Colonel Abercrombie, who attacked the two batteries with great
impetuosity about four in the morning, and carried both with
inconsiderable loss; but the guards from the trenches immediately
advancing on the assailants, they retreated without being able to
effect any thing of importance.
About four in the afternoon the besiegers opened several batteries in
their second parallel; and it was apparent that, in the course of the
ensuing day, the whole line of batteries in that parallel would be
ready to play on the town. The works of the besieged were not in a
condition to sustain so tremendous a fire. In this extremity, Lord
Cornwallis formed the bold design of forcing his way to New York.
He determined to leave his sick and baggage behind, and, crossing over
in the night with his effectives to the Gloucester shore, to attack De
Choisé. After cutting to pieces or dispersing the troops under that
officer, he intended to mount his infantry on the horses taken from
that detachment, and on others to be seized on the road, and, by a
rapid march to gain the fords of the great rivers, and, forcing his
way through Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Jersey, to form a junction
with the army in New York.[87]
[Footnote 87: Stedman, Annual Register, letter of Lord Cornwallis.]
This desperate attempt would be extremely hazardous; but the situation
of the British general had become so hopeless, that it could scarcely
be changed for the worse.
Boats prepared under other pretexts were held in readiness to receive
the troops at ten in the evening, and convey them over the river. The
arrangements were made with such secrecy that the first embarkation
arrived at the point unperceived, and part of the troops were landed,
when a sudden and violent storm interrupted the execution of this
hazardous plan, and drove the boats down the river. The storm
continued till near daylight, when the boats returned. But the plan
was necessarily abandoned, and the boats were sent to bring back the
soldiers, who were relanded on the southern shore in the course of the
forenoon without much loss.
[Sidenote: October 17.]
[Sidenote: October 18.]
[Sidenote: Surrender of Lord Cornwallis.]
In the morning of the seventeenth, several new batteries were opened
in the second parallel, which poured in a weight of fire not to be
resisted. The place being no longer tenable, Lord Cornwallis, about
ten in the forenoon, beat a parley, and proposed a cessation of
hostilities for twenty-four hours, that commissioners might meet at
Moore's house, which was just in the rear of the first parallel, to
settle terms for the surrender of the posts of York and Gloucester. To
this letter General Washington returned an immediate answer declaring
his "ardent desire to spare the further effusion of blood, and his
readiness to listen to such terms as were admissible;" but as in the
present crisis he could not consent to lose a moment in fruitless
negotiations, he desired that "previous to the meeting of the
commissioners, the proposals of his lordship might be transmitted in
writing, for which purpose a suspension of hostilities for two hours
should be granted." The general propositions[88] stated by Lord
Cornwallis as forming the basis of the capitulation, though not all
admissible, being such as led to the opinion that no great difficulty
would occur in adjusting the terms, the suspension of hostilities was
prolonged for the night. In the mean time, to avoid the delay of
useless discussion, the Commander-in-chief drew up and proposed such
articles[89] as he would be willing to grant. These were transmitted
to Lord Cornwallis with the accompanying declaration that, if he
approved them, commissioners might be immediately appointed to digest
them into form. In consequence of this message, the Viscount de
Noailles, and Lieutenant Colonel Laurens, were met next day by Colonel
Dundass and Major Ross; but, being unable to adjust the terms of
capitulation definitively, only a rough draught of them could be
prepared, which was to be submitted to the consideration of the
British general. Determined not to expose himself to those accidents
which time might produce, General Washington could not permit any
suspense on the part of Lord Cornwallis. He therefore immediately
directed the rough articles which had been prepared by the
commissioners to be fairly transcribed, and sent them to his lordship
early next morning, with a letter expressing his expectation that they
would be signed by eleven, and that the garrison would march out by
two in the afternoon. Finding all attempts to obtain better terms
unavailing, Lord Cornwallis submitted to a necessity no longer to be
avoided, and, on the 19th of October, surrendered the posts of
Yorktown and Gloucester Point, with their garrisons, and the ships in
the harbour with their seamen, to the land and naval forces of America
and France.
[Footnote 88: See note No. VI. at the end of the volume.]
[Footnote 89: See note No. VII. at the end of the volume.]
[Sidenote: Nineteenth.]
The army, artillery, arms, military chest, and public stores of every
denomination, were surrendered to General Washington; the ships and
seamen, to the Count de Grasse. The total number of prisoners,[90]
excluding seamen, rather exceeded seven thousand men. The loss
sustained by the garrison during the siege, amounted to five hundred
and fifty-two men, including six officers.
[Footnote 90: The return of prisoners contained two generals,
thirty-one field officers, three hundred and twenty-six captains and
subalterns, seventy-one regimental staff, six thousand five hundred
and twenty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates, and one
hundred and twenty-four persons belonging to the hospital, commissary,
and wagon departments, making in the whole seven thousand and
seventy-three prisoners. To this number are to be added six
commissioned, and twenty-eight non-commissioned officers and privates
made prisoners in the two redoubts which were stormed, and in the
sortie made by the garrison.]
Lord Cornwallis endeavoured to introduce an article into the
capitulation, for the security of those Americans who had joined the
British army; but the subject was declared to belong to the civil
department, and the article was rejected. Its object, however, was
granted without appearing to concede it. His lordship was permitted to
send the Bonetta sloop of war untouched, with despatches to Sir Henry
Clinton; and the Americans whose conduct had been most offensive to
their countrymen were embarked on board this vessel.
The allied army may be estimated, including militia, at sixteen
thousand men. In the course of this siege, they lost, in killed and
wounded, about three hundred. The treaty was opened on the eleventh
day after the ground was broken by the besiegers, and the capitulation
was signed on the thirteenth. The whole army merited great
approbation; but, from the nature of the service, the artillerists and
engineers were enabled to distinguish themselves particularly.
Generals du Portail and Knox were each promoted to the rank of Major
General; and Colonel Govion, and Captain Rochfontaine, of the corps of
engineers, were each advanced a grade by brevet. In addition to the
officers belonging to those departments, Generals Lincoln, De
Lafayette, and Steuben, were particularly mentioned by the
Commander-in-chief, in his orders issued the day after the
capitulation; and terms of peculiar warmth were applied to Governor
Nelson, who continued in the field during the whole siege, at the head
of the militia of Virginia; and also exerted himself, in a particular
manner, to furnish the army with those supplies which the country
afforded. The highest acknowledgments were made to the Count de
Rochambeau; and several other French officers were named with
distinction. So many disasters had attended the former efforts of the
United States to avail themselves of the succours occasionally
afforded by France, that an opinion not very favourable to the
alliance appears to have gained some ground in the country, and to
have insinuated itself into the army. The Commander-in-chief seized
this occasion to discountenance a course of thinking from which he had
always feared pernicious consequences, and displayed the great value
of the aids lately received, in language highly flattering to the
French monarch, as well as to the land and naval forces of that
nation.
Knowing the influence which the loss of the army in Virginia must have
on the war, Sir Henry Clinton determined to hazard much for its
preservation. About seven thousand of his best troops sailed for the
Chesapeake, under convoy of a fleet augmented to twenty-five ships of
the line. This armament left the Hook the day on which the
capitulation was signed at Yorktown, and appeared off the capes of
Virginia on the 24th of October. Unquestionable intelligence being
there received that Lord Cornwallis had surrendered, the British
general returned to New York.
The exultation manifested throughout the United States at the capture
of this formidable army was equal to the terror it had inspired. In
congress, the intelligence was received with joy proportioned to the
magnitude of the event; and the sense of that body on this brilliant
achievement was expressed in various resolutions, returning the thanks
of the United States to the Commander-in-chief, to the Count de
Rochambeau, to the Count de Grasse, to the officers of the allied army
generally, and to the corps of artillery, and engineers particularly.
In addition to these testimonials of gratitude, it was resolved that a
marble column should be erected at Yorktown, in Virginia, with emblems
of the alliance between the United States and his Most Christian
Majesty, and inscribed with a succinct narrative of the surrender of
Earl Cornwallis to his Excellency General Washington, the
Commander-in-chief of the combined forces of America and France; to
his Excellency the Count de Rochambeau, commanding the auxiliary
troops of his Most Christian Majesty in America; and to his Excellency
Count de Grasse, commanding in chief the naval army of France in the
Chesapeake. Two stand of colours taken in Yorktown were presented to
General Washington; two pieces of field ordnance to the Count de
Rochambeau; and application was made to his Most Christian Majesty, to
permit the Admiral to accept a testimonial of their approbation
similar to that presented to the Count de Rochambeau. Congress
determined to go in solemn procession to the Dutch Lutheran church, to
return thanks to Almighty God for crowning the allied arms with
success, by the surrender of the whole British army under Lord
Cornwallis; and also issued a proclamation, appointing the 13th day of
December for general thanksgiving and prayer, on account of this
signal interposition of Divine Providence.
It was not by congress only that the public joy at this great event,
and the public approbation of the conduct of General Washington were
displayed. The most flattering and affectionate addresses of
congratulation were presented from every part of the union; and state
governments, corporate towns, and learned institutions, vied with each
other in the testimonials they gave of their high sense of his
important services, and of their attachment to his person and
character.
The superiority of the allied force opened a prospect of still farther
advantages. The remaining posts of the British in the southern states
were too weak to be defended against the army which had triumphed over
Lord Cornwallis; and the troops which occupied them could neither
escape nor be reinforced, if the Count de Grasse could be prevailed on
to co-operate against them. Although, in his first conference, he had
explicitly declared his inability to engage in any enterprise to be
undertaken subsequent to that against Yorktown,[91] the siege of that
place had employed so much less time than the admiral had consented to
appropriate to it, that the general resumed his plan of southern
operations. In a letter addressed to De Grasse, he used every argument
which might operate on his love of fame, or his desire to promote the
interests of the allies, to prevail on him to co-operate in an
expedition against Charleston. If this object should be unattainable,
his attention was next turned to Wilmington, in North Carolina, which
was still occupied by a small detachment of British troops who kept
that state in check. The capture of this detachment, though not an
object of much consequence in itself, was supposed to derive some
importance from the influence which the complete liberation of North
Carolina might have on the future military operations of the United
States, and on their negotiations. General Washington proposed to send
a detachment intended to reinforce General Greene, as far as
Wilmington, under convoy. The reduction of that place, he supposed,
would detain the fleet but a few days, after which it might proceed to
the West Indies.
[Footnote 91: See note No. VIII. at the end of the volume.]
[Sidenote: October 23.]
To enforce the representations contained in his letter, as well as to
pay his respects to the admiral, and to express in person the high
sense entertained of his important services, the Commander-in-chief
repaired on board the Ville de Paris. The Count acknowledged his
conviction of the advantages to be expected from an expedition against
Charleston; but said, that "the orders of his court, ulterior
projects, and his engagements with the Spaniards, rendered it
impossible for him to remain on the coast during the time which would
be required for the operation." As he also declined taking on board
the troops designed to reinforce General Greene, preparations were
made for their march by land; and Major General St. Clair, who
commanded the detachment, was ordered to take Wilmington in his route,
and to gain possession of that post.
[Sidenote: November.]
The Count de Grasse having consented to remain in the bay a few days
for the purpose of covering the transportation of the eastern troops,
and of the ordnance to the Head of Elk, they were embarked in the
beginning of November, under the command of General Lincoln, who was
directed to march them into New Jersey and New York, and to canton
them for the winter in those states.[92] The French troops remained in
Virginia, not only for the protection of that state, but to be in
readiness to march southward or northward, as the exigencies of the
ensuing campaign might require.
[Footnote 92: See note No. IX. at the end of the volume.]
The transportation of the troops and ordnance to the Head of Elk being
effected, the Count de Grasse sailed for the West Indies, and the
Commander-in-chief proceeded to Philadelphia.
NOTES.
NOTE--No. I. _See Page 3_
_The following petition addressed to Governor Livingston, will furnish
some evidence of the situation to which that part of Jersey was
reduced._
To his excellency William Livingston, esquire, governor, captain
general, and commander-in-chief in and over the state of New Jersey
and the territories thereunto belonging in America, chancellor and
ordinary in the same--the humble petition of the officers, civil and
military, whose names are hereunto subscribed,
Showeth,--That a large detachment of the British army, a few weeks
ago, made an invasion into the lower counties of this state on
Delaware, and plundered a few of the inhabitants. That at present a
large detachment are invading them a second time. That the enemy in
this second incursion, have, as we have been credibly informed, by the
express orders of Colonel Mawhood, the commanding officer, bayoneted
and butchered in the most inhuman manner, a number of the militia who
have unfortunately fallen into their hands. That Colonel Mawhood
immediately after the massacre, in open letters, sent to both officers
and privates by a flag, had the effrontery to insult us with a demand,
that we should lay down our arms, and if not, threatened to burn,
destroy, and lay the whole country waste, and more especially the
property of a number of our most distinguished men, whom he named.
That he has since put his threat into execution, in one instance, by
burning one of the finest dwelling houses in Salem county, and all the
other buildings on the same farm, the property of Colonel Benjamin
Home. That plunder, rapine, and devastation in the most fertile and
populous parts of these counties, widely mark their footsteps wherever
they go. That they are spreading disaffection, they are using every
possible means to corrupt the minds of the people, who, within their
lines, have so little virtue as to purchase from them.
That we are in no state of defence. That we are so exposed by reason
of our situation, that some of our officers, civil and military, have
moved out of the counties for safety. That our militia, during the
last winter, have been so fatigued out by repeated calls and
continued service, and disaffection is now so widely diffused, that
very few can be called out, in some places, none. That we have no
troops of light horse regularly embodied, there is a scarcity of small
arms among us, and no field pieces. That in these two incursions, we
have very sensibly felt the want of field pieces and artillery men,
that the number of us assembled is so small, that though we should use
the greatest conduct and bravery, we could only provoke, not injure
our enemy.
That the extent of our country is so great, that our small number of
men fatigued out, indifferently armed and without field pieces, can
not defend it. That, as Delaware runs all along those counties, we are
liable to be attacked in numberless places.
That the acquisition of these counties would be of great advantage to
the enemy. That they could nearly maintain their whole army a campaign
by the plunder, forage, and assistance they could draw from them. That
although the United States might not need them, yet it might perhaps
be adviseable to defend them, to prevent the advantage the enemy might
receive from them. That our riches, and former virtue, make us a prey
to an enemy, whose tender mercies are cruelties.
That in short, our situation is beyond description deplorable. That
the powers civil and military are daily relaxing, and disaffection
prevailing. That we can neither stay at our houses, go out, nor come
in with safety. That we can neither plough, plant, sow, reap nor
gather. That we are fast falling into poverty, distress, and into the
hands of our enemy. That unless there can be sent to our relief and
assistance a sufficient body of standing troops, we must be under the
disagreeable necessity of leaving the country to the enemy, and
removing ourselves and families to distant places for safety. That
although the present detachment may be fled and gone, before the
relief reaches us, yet a body of troops are necessary for our
protection, as long as the enemy possess Philadelphia. And these are
the sentiments not only of us the subscribers, but of all the rest of
the officers civil and military, and other the good subjects of this
state in these counties.
NOTE--No. II. _See Page 85_
_The following is the report made by the committee:_
"January 1, 1779. The committee appointed to confer with the
Commander-in-chief on the operations of the next campaign, report,
that the plan proposed by congress for the emancipation of Canada, in
co-operation with an army from France, was the principal subject of
the said conference.
"That, impressed with a strong sense of the injury and disgrace which
must attend an infraction of the proposed stipulations, on the part of
these states, your committee have taken a general view of our
finances, of the circumstances of our army, of the magazines of
clothes, artillery, arms and ammunition, and of the provisions in
store, and which can be collected in season.
"Your committee have also attentively considered the intelligence and
observations communicated to them by the Commander-in-chief,
respecting the number of troops and strong holds of the enemy in
Canada; their naval force, and entire command of the water
communication with that country--the difficulties, while they possess
such signal advantages, of penetrating it with an army by land--the
obstacles which are to be surmounted in acquiring a naval
superiority--the hostile temper of many of the surrounding Indian
tribes towards these states, and above all the uncertainty whether the
enemy will not persevere in their system of harassing and distressing
our sea-coast and frontiers by a predatory war.
"That on the most mature deliberation, your committee can not find room
for a well grounded presumption that these states will be able to
perform their part of the proposed stipulations. That in a measure of
such moment, calculated to call forth, and direct to a single object a
considerable portion of the force of our ally, which may otherwise be
essentially employed, nothing else than the highest probability of
success could justify congress in making the proposition.
"Your committee are therefore of opinion that the negotiation in
question, however desirable, and interesting, should be deferred until
circumstances render the co-operation of these states more certain,
practicable, and effectual.
"That the minister plenipotentiary of these states at the court of
Versailles, the minister of France in Pennsylvania, and the minister
of France, be respectively informed that the operations of the next
campaign must depend on such a variety of contingencies to arise, as
well from our own internal circumstances and resources, as the
progress and movements of our enemy, that time alone can mature and
point out the plan which ought to be pursued. That congress,
therefore, can not, with a degree of confidence answerable to the
magnitude of the object, decide on the practicability of their
co-operating the next campaign, in an enterprise for the emancipation
of Canada; that every preparation in our power will nevertheless be
made for acting with vigour against the common enemy, and every
favourable incident embraced with alacrity, to facilitate, and hasten
the freedom and independence of Canada, and her union with these
states--events which congress, from motives of policy with respect to
the United States, as well as of affection for their Canadian
brethren, have greatly at heart."
Mr. de Sevelinges in his introduction to Botta's History, recites the
private instructions given to Mr. Girard on his mission to the United
States. One article was, "to avoid entering into any formal engagement
relative to Canada and other English possessions which congress
proposed to conquer." Mr. de Sevelinges adds that "the policy of the
cabinet of Versailles viewed the possession of those countries,
especially of Canada by England, as a principle of useful inquietude
and vigilance to the Americans. The neighbourhood of a formidable
enemy must make them feel more sensibly the price which they ought to
attach to the friendship and support of the king of France."
The author has reason to believe that this policy was known to the
Marquis de Lafayette when his devotion to the interests of the United
States induced him to add his influence to their solicitations for aid
to this enterprise.
NOTE--No. III. _See Page 233_
_A letter to President Reed of Pennsylvania from which the following
extracts are taken, is selected from many others written with the same
view._
"Morristown, May 28th, 1780.
"DEAR SIR,--I am much obliged to you for your favour of the 23d.
Nothing could be more necessary than the aid given by your state
towards supplying us with provisions. I assure you, every idea you can
form of our distresses, will fall short of the reality. There is such
a combination of circumstances to exhaust the patience of the
soldiery, that it begins at length to be worn out, and we see in every
line of the army, the most serious features of mutiny and sedition:
all our departments, all our operations are at a stand; and unless a
system very different from that which has for a long time prevailed,
be immediately adopted throughout the states, our affairs must soon
become desperate beyond the possibility of recovery. If you were on
the spot, my dear sir, if you could see what difficulties surround us
on every side, how unable we are to administer to the most ordinary
calls of the service, you would be convinced that these expressions
are not too strong: and that we have every thing to dread: Indeed I
have almost ceased to hope. The country in general is in such a state
of insensibility and indifference to its interests, that I dare not
flatter myself with any change for the better.
"The committee of congress in their late address to the several
states, have given a just picture of our situation. I very much doubt
its making the desired impression; and if it does not, I shall
consider our lethargy as incurable. The present juncture is so
interesting, that if it does not produce correspondent exertions, it
will be a proof, that motives of honour, public good, and even
self-preservation, have lost their influence upon our minds. This is a
decisive moment, one of the most, I will go further and say, the most
important America has seen. The court of France has made a glorious
effort for our deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our
supineness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind;
nor can we, after that, venture to confide that our allies will
persist in an attempt to establish what it will appear we want
inclination or ability to assist them in.
"Every view of our own circumstances ought to determine us to the most
vigorous efforts; but there are considerations of another kind, that
should have equal weight. The combined fleets of France and Spain last
year were greatly superior to those of the enemy; the enemy
nevertheless sustained no material damage, and at the close of the
campaign gave a very important blow to our allies. This campaign, the
difference between the fleets, from every account I have been able to
collect, will be inconsiderable: indeed it is far from clear that
there will be an equality. What are we to expect will be the case if
there should be another campaign? In all probability the advantage
would be on the side of the English, and then what would become of
America? We ought not to deceive ourselves. The maritime resources of
Great Britain are more substantial and real than those of France and
Spain united. Her commerce is more extensive than that of both her
rivals; and it is an axiom, that the nation which has the most
extensive commerce will always have the most powerful marine. Were
this argument less convincing, the fact speaks for itself: her
progress in the course of the last year is an incontestable proof.
"It is true France in a manner created a fleet in a very short space,
and this may mislead us in the judgment we form of her naval
abilities. But if they bore any comparison with those of Great
Britain, how comes it to pass, that with all the force of Spain added,
she has lost so much ground in so short a time, as now to have
scarcely a superiority. We should consider what was done by France, as
a violent and unnatural effort of the government, which, for want of
sufficient foundation, can not continue to operate proportionable
effects.
"In modern wars, the longest purse must chiefly determine the event. I
fear that of the enemy will be found to be so. Though the government
is deeply in debt and of course poor, the nation is rich, and their
riches afford a fund which will not be easily exhausted. Besides,
their system of public credit is such, that it is capable of greater
exertions than that of any other nation. Speculatists have been a long
time foretelling its downfall; but we see no symptoms of the
catastrophe being very near. I am persuaded it will at least last out
the war.
"France is in a very different position. The abilities of the present
financier, have done wonders; by a wise administration of the
revenues, aided by advantageous loans, he has avoided the necessity of
additional taxes. But I am well informed if the war continues another
campaign, he will be obliged to have recourse to the taxes usual in
time of war, which are very heavy, and which the people of France are
not in a condition to endure for any length of time. When this
necessity commences, France makes war on ruinous terms, and England,
from her individual wealth, will find much greater facilities in
supplying her exigencies.
"Spain derives great wealth from her mines, but it is not so great as
is generally imagined. Of late years the profit to government is
essentially diminished. Commerce and industry are the best mines of a
nation; both which are wanted by her. I am told her treasury is far
from being so well filled as we have flattered ourselves. She is also
much divided on the propriety of the war. There is a strong party
against it. The temper of the nation is too sluggish to admit of great
exertions; and though the courts of the two kingdoms are closely
linked together, there never has been in any of their wars, a perfect
harmony of measures, nor has it been the case in this; which has
already been no small detriment to the common cause.
"I mention these things to show that the circumstances of our allies,
as well as our own, call for peace, to obtain which we must make one
great effort this campaign. The present instance of the friendship of
the court of France, is attended with every circumstance that can
render it important and agreeable, that can interest our gratitude or
fire our emulation. If we do our duty we may even hope to make the
campaign decisive of the contest. But we must do our duty in earnest,
or disgrace and ruin will attend us. I am sincere in declaring a full
persuasion that the succour will be fatal to us if our measures are
not adequate to the emergency.
"Now, my dear sir, I must observe to you, that much will depend on the
state of Pennsylvania. She has it in her power to contribute, without
comparison, more to our success, than any other state, in the two
essential articles of flour and transportation. I speak to you in the
language of frankness, and as a friend. I do not mean to make any
insinuations unfavourable to the state. I am aware of the
embarrassment the government labours under from the open opposition of
one party and the underhand intrigues of another. I know that with the
best dispositions to promote the public service, you have been obliged
to move with circumspection. But this is a time to hazard, and to take
a tone of energy and decision. All parties but the disaffected will
acquiesce in the necessity and give their support.
"The matter is reduced to a point. Either Pennsylvania must give us
all we ask, or we can undertake nothing. We must renounce every idea
of co-operation, and must confess to our allies that we look wholly to
them for our safety. This will be a state of humiliation and
bitterness against which the feelings of every good American ought to
revolt. Yours I am convinced will, nor have I the least doubt, but
that you will employ all your influence to animate the legislature and
the people at large. The fate of these states hangs upon it. God grant
we may be properly impressed with the consequences.
"I wish the legislature could be engaged to vest the executive with
plenipotentiary powers. I should then expect every thing practicable
from your abilities and zeal. This is not a time for formality and
ceremony. The crisis in every point of view is extraordinary, and
extraordinary expedients are necessary. I am decided in this opinion."
NOTE--No. IV. _See Page 261_
André having been unquestionably a spy, and his sentence consequently
just; and the plot in which he had engaged having threatened
consequences the most fatal to America; his execution, had he been an
ordinary person, would certainly have been viewed with cold
indifference. But he was not an ordinary person. In a letter written
at the time by Colonel Hamilton, who in genius, in candour, and in
romantic heroism, did not yield to this unfortunate Englishman, the
character of André is thus feelingly and eloquently drawn. "There was
something singularly interesting in the character and fortunes of
André. To an excellent understanding, well improved by education and
travel, he united a peculiar elegance of mind and manners, and the
advantages of a pleasing person. It is said he possessed a pretty
taste for the fine arts, and had himself attained some proficiency in
poetry, music, and painting. His knowledge appeared without
ostentation, and embellished by a diffidence that rarely accompanies
so many talents and accomplishments, which left you to suppose more
than appeared. His sentiments were elevated and inspired esteem, they
had a softness that conciliated affection. His elocution was handsome,
his address easy, polite, and insinuating. By his merit he had
acquired the unlimited confidence of his general, and was making rapid
progress in military rank and reputation. But in the height of his
career, flushed with new hopes from the execution of a project the
most beneficial to his party that could be devised, he is at once
precipitated from the summit of prosperity, sees all the expectations
of his ambition blasted, and himself ruined. The character I have
given of him is drawn partly from what I saw of him myself, and partly
from information. I am aware that a man of real merit is never seen in
so favorable a light as through the medium of adversity. The clouds
that surround him are so many shades that set off his good qualities.
Misfortune cuts down little vanities, that in prosperous times, serve
as so many spots in his virtues; and gives a tone to humanity that
makes his worth more amiable.
"His spectators, who enjoy a happier lot, are less prone to detract
from it through envy; and are much disposed by compassion to give the
credit he deserves, and perhaps even to magnify it."
NOTE--No. V. _See Page 377_
On the first of May, 1781, General Washington commenced a military
journal. The following is a brief statement of the situation of the
army at that time. "I begin at this epoch, a concise journal of
military transactions, &c. I lament not having attempted it from the
commencement of the war in aid of my memory: and wish the multiplicity
of matter which continually surrounds me, and the embarrassed state of
our affairs, which is momentarily calling the attention to
perplexities of one kind or another, may not defeat altogether, or so
interrupt my present intention and plan, as to render it of little
avail.
"To have the clearer understanding of the entries which may follow, it
would be proper to recite, in detail, our wants, and our prospects;
but this alone would be a work of much time, and great magnitude. It
may suffice to give the sum of them, which I shall do in a few words,
viz:
"Instead of having magazines filled with provisions, we have a scanty
pittance scattered here and there in the different states.
"Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores,
they are poorly provided, and the workmen all leaving them.--Instead
of having the various articles of field equipage in readiness to
deliver, the quartermaster general is but now applying to the several
states (as the dernier ressort) to provide these things for their
troops respectively. Instead of having a regular system of
transportation established upon credit--or funds in the
quartermaster's hands to defray the contingent expenses of it--we have
neither the one or the other; and all that business, or a great part
of it, being done by military impressment, we are daily and hourly
oppressing the people, souring their tempers, and alienating their
affections. Instead of having the regiments completed to the new
establishments (and which ought to have been so by the ---- of ----
[Transcriber's Note: end parenthesis missing] agreeably to the
requisitions of congress, scarce any state in the union has, at this
hour, one-eighth part of its quota in the field; and there is little
prospect that I can see of ever getting more than half. In a word,
instead of having every thing in readiness to take the field, we have
nothing. And instead of having the prospect of a glorious offensive
campaign before us, we have a bewildered and gloomy prospect of a
defensive one; unless we should receive a powerful aid of ships, land
troops and money from our generous allies: and these at present are
too contingent to build upon."
NOTE--No. VI. _See Page 405_
York in Virginia, 17th October, 1781, half past four, P.M.
SIR,--I have this moment been honoured with your excellency's letter
dated this day. The time limited for sending my answer will not admit
of entering into the details of articles, but the basis of my
proposals will be, that the garrisons of York and Gloucester shall be
prisoners of war with the customary honours; and for the convenience
of the individuals which I have the honour to command, that the
British shall be sent to Britain, and the Germans to Germany, under
engagements not to serve against France, America, or their allies,
until released or regularly exchanged. That all arms and public stores
shall be delivered up to you, but that the usual indulgence of side
arms to officers and of retaining private property shall be granted to
officers and soldiers; and the interests of individuals in civil
capacities, and connected with us, shall be attended to. If your
excellency thinks that a continuance of the suspension of hostilities
will be necessary to transmit your answer, I shall have no objection
to the hour that you propose. I have the honour to be,
Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,
CORNWALLIS.
His excellency General Washington, &c. &c. &c.
NOTE--No. VII. _See Page 406_
Head quarters before York, 18th October, 1781.
MY LORD,--To avoid unnecessary discussions and delays, I shall at
once, in answer to your lordship's letter of yesterday, declare the
general basis upon which a definitive treaty of capitulation must take
place. The garrison of York and Gloucester, including the seamen, as
you propose, will be received prisoners of war. The condition annexed
of sending the British and German troops to the parts of Europe to
which they respectively belong, is inadmissible. Instead of this, they
will be marched to such parts of the country as can most conveniently
provide for their subsistence; and the benevolent treatment of
prisoners, which is invariably observed by the Americans, will be
extended to them. The same honours will be granted to the surrendering
army, as were granted to the garrison of Charleston.
The shipping and boats in the two harbours, with all their guns,
stores, tackling, furniture, and apparel, shall be delivered in their
present state to an officer of the navy appointed to take possession
of them.
The artillery, arms, accoutrements, military chest, and public stores
of every denomination, shall be delivered unimpaired, to the heads of
departments, to which they respectively belong.
The officers will be indulged in retaining their side arms, and the
officers and soldiers may preserve their baggage and effects with this
reserve, that property taken in the country will be reclaimed.
With regard to the individuals in civil capacities, whose interests
your lordship wishes may be attended to, until they are more
particularly described, nothing definitive can be settled.
I have to add, that I expect the sick and wounded will be supplied
with their own hospital stores, and attended by British surgeons
particularly charged with the care of them.
Your lordship will be pleased to signify your determination either to
accept or reject the proposals now offered, in the course of two hours
from the delivery of this letter, that commissioners may be appointed
to digest the articles of capitulation, or a renewal of hostilities
may take place.
I have the honour to be, my lord, &c.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis.
York, in Virginia, 18th October, 1781.
SIR,--I agree to open a treaty of capitulation upon the basis of the
garrisons of York and Gloucester, including seamen, being prisoners of
war without annexing the condition of their being sent to Europe; but
I expect to receive a compensation in arranging the articles of
capitulation for the surrender of Gloucester in its present state of
defence.
I shall in particular desire that the Bonetta sloop of war, may be
left entirely at my disposal from the hour the capitulation is signed,
to receive an aid-de-camp to carry my despatches to Sir Henry Clinton
and such soldiers as I may think proper to send as passengers in her,
to be manned with fifty men of her own crew, and to be permitted to
sail without examination when my despatches are ready; engaging on my
part that the ship shall be brought back and delivered to you, if she
escapes the dangers of the sea; that the crew and soldiers sent as
passengers shall be accounted for in future exchanges as prisoners;
that she shall carry off no officer without your consent, nor public
property of any kind; and I shall likewise desire that the traders and
inhabitants may preserve their property, and that no person may be
punished or molested for having joined the British troops.
If you choose to proceed to negotiation on these grounds, I shall
appoint two field officers of my army to meet two officers from you at
any time and place you think proper, to digest the articles of
capitulation. I have the honour to be, sir,
Your most obedient and most humble servant,
CORNWALLIS.
His excellency General Washington, &c. &c. &c.
NOTE--No. VIII. _See Page 411_
Head quarters, 20th October, 1781.
SIR,--The surrender of York, from which so much glory and advantage
are derived to the allies, and the honour of which belongs to your
excellency, has greatly anticipated our most sanguine expectations.
Certain of this event under your auspices, though unable to determine
the time, I solicited your excellency's attention in the first
conference with which you honoured me, to ulterior objects of decisive
importance to the common cause. Although your excellency's answer on
that occasion was unfavourable to my wishes, the unexpected
promptness with which our operations have been conducted to their
final success having gained us time, the defect of which was one of
your excellency's principal objections, a perspective of the most
extensive and happy consequences, engages me to renew my
representations.
Charleston, the principal maritime port of the British in the southern
parts of the continent, the grand deposite and point of support for
the present theatre of the war, is open to a combined attack, and
might be carried with as much certainty as the place which has just
surrendered.
This capture would destroy the last hope which induces the enemy to
continue the war; for having experienced the impracticability of
recovering the populous northern states, he has determined to confine
himself to the defensive in that quarter, and to prosecute a most
vigorous offensive in the south, with a view of conquering states,
whose spare population and natural disadvantages render them
infinitely less susceptible of defence; although their productions
render them the most valuable in a commercial view. His naval
superiority, previous to your excellency's arrival, gave him decisive
advantages in the rapid transport of his troops and supplies: while
the immense land marches of our succours, too tardy and expensive in
every point of view, subjected us to be beaten in detail.
It will depend upon your excellency, therefore, to terminate the war,
and enable the allies to dictate the law in a treaty. A campaign so
glorious and so fertile in consequences, could be reserved only for
the Count de Grasse.
It rarely happens that such a combination of means, as are in our
hands at present, can be seasonably obtained by the most strenuous of
human exertions.--A decisively superior fleet, the fortune and talents
of whose commander overawe all the naval force that the most
incredible efforts of the enemy have been able to collect; an army
flushed with success, and demanding only to be conducted to new
attacks; and the very season which is proper for operating against the
points in question.
If upon entering into the detail of this expedition, your excellency
should still determine it impracticable, there is an object which
though subordinate to that above mentioned, is of capital importance
to our southern operations, and may be effected at infinitely less
expense; I mean the enemy's post at Wilmington in North Carolina.
Circumstances require that I should at this period reinforce the
southern army under General Greene. This reinforcement transported by
sea under your excellency's convoy, would enable us to carry the post
in question with very little difficulty, and would wrest from the
British a point of support in North Carolina, which is attended with
the most dangerous consequences to us, and would liberate another
state. This object would require nothing more than the convoy of your
excellency to the point of operation, and the protection of the
debarkation.
I intreat your excellency's attention to the points which I have the
honour of laying before you, and to be pleased at the same time to
inform me what are your dispositions for a maritime force to be left
on the American station.
I have the honour to be, &c.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
NOTE--No. IX. _See Page 413_
Late in October an irruption was made into the country on the Mohawk,
by Major Ross, at the head of about five hundred men, composed of
regulars, rangers, and Indians. Colonel Willet, with between four and
five hundred men, partly of the troops denominated levies, and partly
militia, immediately marched in quest of them, and fell in with them
at Johnstown, where they were slaughtering cattle, apparently
unapprehensive of an enemy. Before showing himself, he detached Major
Rowley of Massachusetts with the left wing to fall on the rear, while
he should engage the front. On his appearance the British party
retired to a neighbouring wood, and the American advance was just
beginning to skirmish with them, when that whole wing, without any
apparent cause, suddenly fled from the field, leaving a field-piece
posted on a height in order to cover a retreat, to fall into the hands
of the enemy. Fortunately for the party, Rowley appeared in the rear
at this critical juncture, and regained what the right wing had lost.
Night soon coming on, Major Ross retired further into the wood, and
encamped on the top of a mountain. He seems after this skirmish to
have been only intent on repassing the dreary wilderness in his rear,
and securing his party; an object not to be accomplished without
immense fatigue and great suffering, as Colonel Willet had cut off
their return to their boats, and they were to retreat by the way of
Buck island, or Oswegatchie. With a select part of his troops who
were furnished with five days provisions, and about sixty Indians who
had just joined him, and who, he said, "are the best cavalry for the
service of the wilderness," he commenced a rapid pursuit, and in the
morning of the 30th, at a ford on Canada creek, fell in with about
forty whites and some Indians who were left in the rear to procure
provisions. These were attacked and the greater number of them killed
or taken, upon which the main body fled with such rapidity that the
pursuit proved ineffectual. In the party at Canada creek was Major
Walter Butler, the person who perpetrated the massacre at
Cherry-valley. His entreaties for quarter were disregarded, and he
fell the victim of that vengeance which his own savage temper had
directed against himself.
END OF VOLUME III.