CHAPTER X.

Virginia invaded by Arnold.... He destroys the stores at

Westham and at Richmond.... Retires to Portsmouth.... Mutiny

in the Pennsylvania line.... Sir H. Clinton attempts to

negotiate with the mutineers.... They compromise with the

civil government.... Mutiny in the Jersey line.... Mission

of Colonel Laurens to France.... Propositions to Spain....

Recommendations relative to a duty on imported and prize

goods.... Reform in the Executive departments....

Confederation adopted.... Military transactions....

Lafayette detached to Virginia.... Cornwallis arrives....

Presses Lafayette.... Expedition to Charlottesville, to the

Point of Fork.... Lafayette forms a junction with Wayne....

Cornwallis retires to the lower country.... General

Washington's letters are intercepted.... Action near

Jamestown.

[Sidenote: 1781]

[Sidenote: Virginia invaded by Arnold.]

The evacuation of Portsmouth by Leslie afforded Virginia but a

short interval of repose. So early as the 9th of December, 1780, a

letter from General Washington announced to the governor that a large

embarkation, supposed to be destined for the south, was about taking

place at New York. On the 30th, a fleet of transports under convoy,

having on board between one and two thousand men, commanded by General

Arnold, anchored in Hampton road. The troops were embarked the next

day on board vessels adapted to the navigation, and proceeded up

James' River under convoy of two small ships of war. On the fourth of

January they reached Westover, which is distant about twenty-five

miles from Richmond, the capital of Virginia.

[Sidenote: January 2.]

On receiving intelligence that a fleet had entered the capes, General

Nelson was employed in raising the militia of the lower country; and

on the 2d of January orders were issued to call out those above the

metropolis and in its neighbourhood.

On reaching Westover, Arnold landed with the greater part of his army,

and commenced his march towards Richmond. The few continental troops

at Petersburg were ordered to the capital; and between one and two

hundred militia, who had been collected from the town and its

immediate vicinity, were directed to harass the advancing enemy.

This party was too feeble for its object; and, the day after landing

at Westover, Arnold entered Richmond, where he halted with about five

hundred men. The residue, amounting to about four hundred, including

thirty horse, proceeded under Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe to Westham,

where they burnt a valuable foundry, boring mill, powder magazine, and

other smaller buildings, with military stores to a considerable

amount, and many valuable papers belonging to the government, which

had been carried thither as to a place of safety.

[Sidenote: He destroys valuable stores at Richmond.]

This service being effected, Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe rejoined Arnold

at Richmond; where the public stores, and a large quantity of rum and

salt, the property of private individuals, were entirely destroyed.

[Sidenote: January.]

Leaving Richmond the next day, the army returned to Westover[65] on

the seventh; and, re-embarking on the morning of the tenth, proceeded

down the river. It was followed by the Baron Steuben, who commanded in

Virginia; and, near Hoods, Colonel Clarke drew a party of them into an

ambuscade, and gave them one fire with some effect; but, on its being

partially returned, the Americans broke and fled in the utmost

confusion.[66]

[Footnote 65: While the army lay at Westover, Lieutenant Colonel

Simcoe, at the head of less than fifty horse, attacked and dispersed a

body of militia at Charles City court house, with the loss of only one

man killed, and three wounded.]

[Footnote 66: The author witnessed this skirmish.]

Arnold proceeded slowly down the river; and on the twentieth reached

Portsmouth, where he manifested the intention of establishing a

permanent post.

The loss of the British in this expedition, was stated in the gazette

of New York, at seven killed, including one subaltern, and

twenty-three wounded, among whom was one captain. This small loss was

sustained almost entirely in the ambuscade near Hoods.

In the north, the year commenced with an event, which, for a time,

threatened the American cause with total ruin.

The accumulated sufferings and privations of the army constitute a

large and interesting part of the history of that war which gave

independence to the United States. Winter, without much lessening

their toils, added to those sufferings. The soldiers were perpetually

on the point of starving, were often entirely without food; were

exposed without proper clothing to the rigours of the season, and had

now served almost twelve months without pay.

This state of things had been of such long continuance that scarcely

the hope of a change could be indulged. It produced, unavoidably, some

relaxation of discipline; and the murmurs, occasionally escaping the

officers, sometimes heard by the soldiers, were not without their

influence.

In addition to the general causes of dissatisfaction, the Pennsylvania

line complained of a grievance almost peculiar to itself.

When congress directed enlistments to be made for three years, or

during the war, the recruiting officers of Pennsylvania, in some

instances, instead of engaging their men, definitively, for the one

period or the other, engaged them generally for three years, or the

war. This ambiguity in the terms of enlistment produced its natural

effect. The soldier claimed his discharge at the expiration of three

years, and the officer insisted on retaining him in service during the

war. The soldier submitted with the more reluctance to the supposed

imposition, as he constantly witnessed the immense bounties given to

those who were not bound by a former enlistment.

[Sidenote: Mutiny in the Pennsylvania line.]

The discontents which these various causes had been long fomenting,

broke out on the night of the 1st of January, in an open and almost

universal revolt of the line.

On a signal given, the great body of the non-commissioned officers and

privates paraded under arms, avowing the determination to march to the

seat of congress, and either obtain redress of their complicated

grievances, or serve no longer. In the attempt to suppress the mutiny,

six or seven of the mutineers were wounded on the one side; and on the

other, Captain Billing was killed, and several other officers were

dangerously wounded. The authority of General Wayne availed nothing.

On cocking his pistol, and threatening some of the most turbulent, the

bayonet was presented to his bosom; and he perceived that strong

measures would produce his own destruction, and perhaps the massacre

of every officer in camp. A few regiments who did not at first join

the mutineers, were paraded by their officers; but, had they even been

willing to proceed to extremities, they were not strong enough to

restore order. Infected quickly with the general contagion, or

intimidated by the threats of the mutineers, they joined their

comrades; and the whole body, consisting of about thirteen hundred

men, with six field pieces, marched, under the command of their

sergeants, towards Princeton.

The next day. General Wayne, accompanied by Colonels Butler and

Stewart, officers possessing, in a high degree, the affections of the

soldiery, followed them, in the hope of bringing them back to their

duty, or at least of dividing them. They were overtaken near

Middlebrook, and invited by a written message from General Wayne, to

appoint one man from each regiment to state the grievances of which

they complained.

In consequence of this invitation, a sergeant from each regiment met

the officers at their quarters, and some verbal communications were

made, from the complexion of which sanguine hopes were entertained

that the affair might be terminated without farther hazard, or much

injury to the service.

On the following day, the line of march was resumed, and the soldiers

proceeded to Princeton. The propositions of the general and field

officers were reported to them, and a committee of sergeants, to whom

they were referred, stated their claims. These were,

1st. A discharge for all those who had served three years under their

original engagements, whatever those engagements might have been, and

who had not taken the increased bounty, and re-enlisted for the war.

2nd. An immediate payment of all their arrears of pay and clothing, as

well to those who should be discharged, as to those who should

continue in service.

3rd. The residue of their bounty, and future real pay to those who

should continue in the army.

General Wayne being unwilling to discharge all those who had not

re-enlisted for the war, the subject was referred to the civil power.

On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, congress appointed a

committee to confer with the executive of Pennsylvania respecting it.

The result of this conference was that both the committee, and the

governor with some members of the executive council, left Philadelphia

for the purpose of endeavouring to accommodate this dangerous

commotion.

At his head quarters, at New Windsor, on the North River, General

Washington received intelligence of this alarming mutiny. Accustomed

as he had been to contemplate hazardous and difficult situations, it

was not easy, under existing circumstances, to resolve instantly on

the course it was most prudent to pursue. His first impression--to

repair to the camp of the mutineers--soon gave place to opinions which

were formed on more mature reflection.

It was almost certain that the business was already in the hands of

the civil government, with whose arrangements it might be improper for

him to interfere. Independent of this consideration, other motives of

irresistible influence detained him on the North River.

The most important among those subjects of complaint which were

alleged as the causes of the mutiny, were true in fact, were common to

the whole army, and were of a nature to disseminate too generally

those seeds of disquiet, which had attained their full growth and

maturity in the Pennsylvania line. Strong symptoms of discontent had

already been manifested; and it was, therefore, impossible to say with

confidence, how far the same temper existed among the other troops; or

how far the contagion of example had or would spread.

The danger arising from this state of things was much increased by the

circumstance that the river was perfectly open, and afforded Sir Henry

Clinton an easy and rapid transportation for his army to West Point,

should the situation of its garrison invite an enterprise against that

post.

It was an additional consideration of great weight, that it might have

a most pernicious influence on the discipline of the whole army,

should the authority of the Commander-in-chief be disregarded. He

ought not to place himself in a situation where his orders might be

disobeyed with impunity; an event much to be apprehended, should he

repair to the camp of the mutineers, unattended by a military force

adequate to the occasion.

Such a force could not be immediately commanded. His effectives in the

Highlands amounted only to thirteen hundred and seventy-six men; and

that whole division of the army, dispersed at various and distant

stations, excluding the sick and those on furlough, did not exceed

four thousand. Assuming therefore the fidelity of the troops, it was

impracticable to march immediately with a force sufficient to reduce

the Pennsylvania line, without leaving the Highlands undefended. Nor

was it unworthy of consideration that, in the actual situation of the

mutineers, the probability of their being attacked by such a force

might drive them to the enemy, or disperse them, events, either of

which would deprive the army of a valuable part of its strength.

It was therefore thought adviseable to leave the negotiation with the

civil power, and to prepare for those measures which ought to be

adopted in the event of its failure. The disposition of the troops on

the North River was sounded, and found to be favourable; after which,

a detachment of eleven hundred men was ordered to be in readiness to

move on a moment's warning. On the first notice of the mutiny, the

militia of Jersey took the field under General Dickenson, and measures

were taken to call out those of New York should the occasion require

it.

[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton attempts to negotiate with the

mutineers.]

To avail himself of an event appearing so auspicious to the royal

cause, Sir Henry Clinton ordered a large body of troops to be in

readiness to move on the shortest notice; and despatched three

emissaries with tempting offers to the revolters; and instructions to

invite them, while the negotiation should be depending, to take a

position behind the South River, where they should be effectually

covered by detachments from New York. While these measures were

taking, Sir Henry kept his eye on West Point, and held himself in

readiness to strike at that place, should any movement on the part of

General Washington open to him a prospect of success.[67]

[Footnote 67: Letter of Sir Henry Clinton.]

His emissaries were immediately seized by the revolters, and their

proposals communicated to General Wayne, with assurances of the utter

detestation in which every idea of going over to the common enemy was

held.

This favourable symptom, however, was accompanied by suspicious

circumstances. They retained the British emissaries in their own

possession; and could not be induced to cross the Delaware, or to

march from Princeton. They would not permit any of their former

officers, other than those already mentioned, to enter their camp; and

General St. Clair, the Marquis de Lafayette, and Lieutenant Colonel

Laurens, were ordered to leave Princeton.

Such was the state of things when the committee of congress, and

President Read with a part of his executive council, arrived in the

neighbourhood of the revolters. The former having delegated their

power to the latter, a conference was held with the sergeants who now

commanded, after which proposals were made and distributed among the

troops for consideration.

In these proposals the government offered,

1st. To discharge all those who had enlisted indefinitely for three

years or during the war, the fact to be examined into by three

commissioners, to be appointed by the executive; and to be

ascertained, when the original enlistment could not be produced, by

the oath of the soldier.

2dly. To give immediate certificates for the depreciation on their

pay, and to settle the arrearages as soon as circumstances would

admit.

3dly. To furnish them immediately with certain specified articles of

clothing which were most wanted.

[Sidenote: They compromise with the civil authority.]

On receiving these propositions, the troops agreed to march to

Trenton. At that place the terms were accepted, with the addition that

three commissioners should also be deputed by the line, who,

conjointly with those of the executive should constitute the board

authorized to determine on the claims of the soldiers to be

discharged; and thereupon the British emissaries were surrendered, who

were tried, condemned, and executed as spies.

Until the investigation should be made, and discharges given to those

who should be found entitled to them, the sergeants retained their

command. In consequence of the irksomeness of this state of things,

the business was pressed with so much precipitation, that before the

enlistments themselves could be brought from the huts, almost the

whole of the artillery, and of the five first regiments of infantry,

were liberated on the testimony of their own oaths. The enlistments

being then produced, it was found that not many of the remaining

regiments had engaged on the terms which, under the compact, would

entitle them to leave the service; and that, of those actually

dismissed, far the greater number had been enlisted absolutely for the

war. The discharges given, however, were not cancelled; and the few

who were to remain in service received furloughs for forty days.

Thus ended, in a temporary dissolution of the whole line of

Pennsylvania, a mutiny, which a voluntary performance of much less

than was extorted, would have prevented; and which, in the actual

condition of the army, was of a nature and extent to inspire the most

serious alarm.

[Sidenote: Mutiny in the Jersey line.]

The dangerous policy of yielding even to the just demands of soldiers

made with arms in their hands, was soon illustrated. The success of

the Pennsylvania line inspired that of Jersey, many of whom were also

foreigners, with the hope of obtaining similar advantages. On the

night of the 20th, a part of the Jersey brigade, which had been

stationed at Pompton, rose in arms; and, making precisely the same

claims which had been yielded to the Pennsylvanians, marched to

Chatham, where a part of the same brigade was cantoned, in the hope of

exciting them also to join in the revolt.

General Washington, who had been extremely chagrined at the issue of

the mutiny in the Pennsylvania line, and who was now assured of the

confidence to be placed in the fidelity of the eastern troops, who

were composed of natives, determined, by strong measures, to stop the

farther progress of a spirit which threatened the destruction of the

army, and ordered a detachment to march against the mutineers, and to

bring them to unconditional submission. General Howe, who commanded

this detachment, was instructed to make no terms with the insurgents

while in a state of resistance; and, as soon as they should surrender,

to seize a few of the most active leaders, and to execute them on the

spot. These orders were promptly obeyed, and the Jersey mutineers

returned to their duty.

In the hope of being more successful with the revolters of Jersey than

he had been with those of Pennsylvania, Sir Henry Clinton offered them

the same terms which had been proposed to the mutineers at Princeton;

and General Robertson, at the head of three thousand men, was

detached to Staten Island with the avowed purpose of crossing over

into Jersey, and covering any movement which they might make towards

New York. The emissary, being in the American interest, delivered his

papers to the officer commanding at the first station to which he

came. Other papers were dispersed among the mutineers; but the mutiny

was crushed too suddenly to allow time for the operation of these

propositions.

The vigorous measures taken in this instance were happily followed by

such an attention on the part of the states, to the actual situation

of the army, as checked the progress of discontent. Influenced by the

representations of the Commander-in-chief, they raised three months'

pay in specie, which they forwarded to the soldiers, who received it

with joy, considering it as evidence that their fellow citizens were

not entirely unmindful of their sufferings.

Although the army was thus reduced to such extreme distress, the

discontents of the people were daily multiplied by the contributions

which they were required to make, and by the irritating manner in

which those contributions were drawn from them. Every article for

public use was obtained by impressment; and the taxes were either

unpaid, or collected by coercive means. Strong remonstrances were made

against this system; and the dissatisfaction which pervaded the mass

of the community, was scarcely less dangerous than that which had

been manifested by the army.

To the judicious patriots throughout America, the necessity of giving

greater powers to the federal government became every day more

apparent; but the efforts of enlightened individuals were too feeble

to correct that fatal disposition of power which had been made by

enthusiasm uninstructed by experience.

[Sidenote: Mission of Colonel Laurens to France.]

To relieve the United States from their complicated embarrassments, a

foreign loan seemed an expedient of indispensable necessity, and from

France they hoped to obtain it. Congress selected Lieutenant Colonel

Laurens, a gentleman whose situation in the family of the

Commander-in-chief had enabled him to take a comprehensive view of the

military capacities and weaknesses of his country, for this

interesting service; and instructed him also to urge the advantage of

maintaining a naval superiority in the American seas. Before his

departure, he passed some days at headquarters, and received from

General Washington in the form of a letter, the result of his

reflections on the existing state of things.

In this paper he detailed the pecuniary embarrassments of the

government, and represented, with great earnestness, the inability of

the nation to furnish a revenue adequate to the support of the war. He

dwelt on the discontents which the system of impressment had excited

among the people, and expressed his fears that the evils felt in the

prosecution of the war, might weaken the sentiments which began it.

From this state of things, he deduced the vital importance of an

immediate and ample supply of money, which might be the foundation for

substantial arrangements of finance, for reviving public credit, and

giving vigour to future operations; as well as of a decided effort of

the allied arms on the continent to effect the great objects of the

alliance, in the ensuing campaign.

Next to a supply of money, he considered a naval superiority in the

American seas, as an object of the deepest interest.

To the United States, it would be of decisive importance, and France

also might derive great advantages from transferring the maritime war

to the coast of her ally.

The future ability of the United States to repay any loan which might

now be obtained was displayed; and he concluded with assurances that

there was still a fund of inclination and resource in the country,

equal to great and continued exertions, provided the means were

afforded of stopping the progress of disgust, by changing the present

system, and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the

nation, and more capable of infusing activity and energy into public

measures; of which a powerful succour in money must be the basis.

"The people were discontented, but it was with the feeble and

oppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself."

With reason did the Commander-in-chief thus urge on the cabinet of

Versailles, the policy of advancing a sum of money to the United

States which might be adequate to the exigency. Deep was the gloom

with which their political horizon was overcast. The British, in

possession of South Carolina and of Georgia, had overrun the greater

part of North Carolina also; and it was with equal hazard and address

that Greene maintained himself in the northern frontier of that state.

A second detachment from New York was making a deep impression on

Virginia, where the resistance had been neither so prompt nor so

vigorous[68] as the strength of that state and the unanimity of its

citizens had given reason to expect.

[Footnote 68: A slave population must be unfavourable to great and

sudden exertions by militia.]

The perplexities and difficulties in which the affairs of America were

involved, were estimated by the British government even above their

real value. Intercepted letters of this date from the minister,

expressed the most sanguine hopes that the great superiority of force

at the disposal of Sir Henry Clinton, would compel Washington with his

feeble army to take refuge on the eastern side of the Hudson.

[Sidenote: Propositions to Spain.]

Even congress relaxed for an instant from its habitual firmness; and,

receding from the decisive manner in which that body had insisted on

the territorial and maritime rights of the nation, directed the

American minister at Madrid to relinquish, if it should be absolutely

necessary, the claims of the United States to navigate the Mississippi

below the thirty-first degree of north latitude, and to a free port on

the banks of that river within the Spanish territory. It is remarkable

that only Massachusetts, Connecticut, and North Carolina, dissented

from this resolution; New York was divided.[69] On a subsequent day,

the subject was again brought forward, and a proposition was made for

still farther concessions to Spain; but this proposition was negatived

by all the states.[70]

[Footnote 69: Secret journals of Congress, v. 2, pp. 393, 396, 407.

This measure was moved by the delegation from Virginia, in consequence

of instructions of 2d Jan. 1781. Sec. 10, H. at large, 538.]

[Footnote 70: Secret journals of Congress, v. 2, p. 468.]

Happily for the United States, Mr. Jay, their minister at the court of

Madrid, required as the price of the concessions he was instructed to

make, that the treaty he was labouring to negotiate should be

immediately concluded.

[Sidenote: Recommendations relative to a duty on imported and prize

goods.]

The establishment of a revenue subject to the exclusive control and

direction of the continental government, was connected inseparably

with the restoration of credit. The efforts therefore to negotiate a

foreign loan were accompanied by resolutions requesting the

respective states to place a fund under the control of congress, which

should be both permanent and productive. A resolution was passed,

recommending to the respective states to vest a power in congress to

levy for the use of the United States a duty of five _per centum ad

valorem_ on all goods imported into any of them; and also on all

prizes condemned in any of the American courts of admiralty.

This fund was to be appropriated to the payment of both the principal

and interest of all debts contracted in the prosecution of the war;

and was to continue until those debts should be completely discharged.

Congress, at that time, contained several members who perceived the

advantages which would result from bestowing on the government of the

nation the full power of regulating commerce, and, consequently, of

increasing the import as circumstances might render adviseable; but

state influence predominated, and they were overruled by great

majorities. Even the inadequate plan which they did recommend was

never adopted. Notwithstanding the greatness of the exigency, and the

pressure of the national wants, never, during the existence of the

confederation, did all the states unite in assenting to this

recommendation; so unwilling are men possessed of power, to place it

in the hands of others.

[Sidenote: Reform in the organization of the executive departments.]

About the same time a reform was introduced into the administration,

the necessity of which had been long perceived. From a misplaced

prejudice against institutions sanctioned by experience, all the great

executive duties had been devolved either on committees of congress,

or on boards consisting of several members. This unwieldy and

expensive system had maintained itself against all the efforts of

reason and public utility. But the scantiness of the national means at

length prevailed over prejudice, and the several committees and boards

yielded to a secretary for foreign affairs, a superintendent of

finance, a secretary of war, and a secretary of marine. But so

miserably defective was the organization of congress, as an executive

body, that the year had far advanced before this measure, the utility

of which all acknowledged, could be carried into complete operation by

making all the appointments.

[Sidenote: Confederation adopted.]

About this time the articles of confederation were ratified. Much

difficulty was encountered in obtaining the adoption of this

instrument. The numerous objections made by the states yielded

successively to the opinion that a federal compact would be of vast

importance in the prosecution of the war. One impediment it was found

peculiarly difficult to remove. Within the chartered limits of several

states, were immense tracts of vacant territory, which, it was

supposed, would constitute a large fund of future wealth; and the

states not possessing that advantage insisted on considering this

territory as a joint acquisition. At length this difficulty also was

surmounted; and, in February, 1781, to the great joy of America, this

interesting compact was rendered complete.[71] Like many other human

institutions, it was productive, neither in war nor in peace, of all

the benefits which its sanguine advocates had expected. Had peace been

made before any agreement for a permanent union was formed, it is far

from being improbable that the different parts might have fallen

asunder, and a dismemberment have taken place. If the confederation

really preserved the idea of union until the good sense of the nation

adopted a more efficient system, this service alone entitles that

instrument to the respectful recollection of the American people, and

its framers to their gratitude.

[Footnote 71: The secret journals of congress, published under the

resolutions of March 27th, 1818, and April 21st, 1820, contain "A

History of the Confederation." The course of public opinion on a most

important point--the nature of the connexion which ought to be

maintained between these United States--may be in some degree

perceived in the progress of this instrument, and may not be entirely

uninteresting to the American reader.

So early as July, 1775, Doctor Franklin submitted "Articles of

Confederation and perpetual union" to the consideration of congress,

which were to continue in force until a reconciliation with Great

Britain should take place on the terms demanded by the colonies. Into

this confederation, not only all the British colonies on the

continent, but Ireland and the West India islands were to be admitted.

Congress was to consist of members chosen by each colony in proportion

to its numbers, and was to sit in each successively. Its powers were

to embrace the external relations of the country, the settling of all

disputes between the colonies, the planting of new colonies; and were

to extend to ordinances on such general subjects as, though necessary

to the general welfare, particular assemblies can not be competent to,

viz. "Those that may relate to our general commerce, or general

currency; the establishment of ports; and the regulation of our common

forces."

The executive was to consist of a council of twelve, selected by

congress from its own body, one-third of whom were to be changed

annually.

Amendments were to be proposed by congress; and, when approved by a

majority of the colonial assemblies, were to become a part of the

constitution.

In June, 1776, a committee was appointed to prepare and digest the

form of a confederation to be entered into between the United

Colonies, which brought in a draft (in the hand writing of Mr. John

Dickinson) on the 12th of the succeeding month.

This report was under debate until the 14th of November, 1777, on

which day congress agreed on the articles afterwards adopted by the

states.

In the scheme supposed to be prepared by Mr. Dickinson, the

confederation is considered as an alliance of sovereign states, who

meet as equals by their deputies assembled to deliberate on their

common concerns, each sovereign having a voice. This principle was

retained; but several modifications in the language and principle of

the original scheme were made, which indicate a watchful and growing

jealousy of the powers of congress.

In each, an article is introduced reserving the rights of the states.

That which is found in the report, "reserves to each state the sole

and exclusive regulation and government of its internal police, in all

matters that _shall not interfere with the articles of this

confederation_."

This article was so modified as to declare that "each state retains

its sovereignty," "and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is

not by this confederation _expressly_ delegated to the United States

in congress assembled."

This denial of all incidental powers had vast influence on the affairs

of the United States. It defeated, in many instances, the granted

powers, by rendering their exercise impracticable.

The report permits the states to impose duties on imports and exports;

provided they "do not interfere with any stipulations in treaties

hereafter entered into by the United States."

The confederation confines this restriction on the power of the state

to such duties as interfere with the stipulations in treaties entered

into "in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by congress to the

courts of France and Spain."

Each plan assigns to the state in which troops shall be raised for the

common defence, the power of appointing the field and inferior

officers. The confederation adds the power of filling up such

vacancies as may occur.

The report inhibits a state from endeavouring by force to obtain

compensation for advances made or injuries suffered during the war,

which shall not be allowed by congress.

The confederation omits this inhibition.

The report gives to congress the power of making treaties.

The confederation adds a proviso, "that no treaty of commerce shall be

made whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be

restrained from imposing such imports and duties on foreigners as

their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation

or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatever."

The report authorizes congress to appoint "courts for the trial of all

crimes, frauds, and piracies committed on the high seas, or on any

navigable river not within a county or parish."

The confederation limits the jurisdiction to "piracies and felonies

committed on the high seas."

Both empower congress to appoint courts for the trial of appeals in

cases of capture; but the confederation provides that no member of

congress shall be appointed a judge of any such court.

Both empower congress to settle differences between the states. The

confederation prescribes minutely the manner in which this power shall

be exercised.

Both empower congress "to regulate the trade and manage all affairs

with the Indians." The confederation provides "that the legislative

right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or

violated."

The report gives the power of "establishing and regulating post

offices throughout all the United Colonies (states) _on the lines of

communication_ from one colony (state) to another."

The confederation varies the phraseology and adds, "and exacting such

postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to

defray the expenses of the said office."

The report places many important portions of the executive power in a

council of state, to consist of one delegate from each state to be

named annually by the delegates of that state.

The confederation empowers congress to appoint a committee to sit in

the recess of congress, to be denominated "a committee of the states,"

and to consist of one delegate from each state, to exercise such

powers as congress might from time to time vest them with.

A few of the states agreed to ratify the confederation

unconditionally. By many, amendments were proposed which were steadily

rejected by congress. It was obvious that the delays would be almost

interminable should congress relax this determination, because every

change would make it necessary again to submit the instrument as

amended to the several states. It is remarkable that Jersey alone

proposed an enlargement of the powers of congress. That state was

desirous of investing the representatives of the state with the power

of regulating commerce.

The states possessing no vacant lands, or an inconsiderable quantity

within their chartered limits, pressed earnestly and perseveringly

their claim to participate in the advantages of territory, which was,

they said, acquired by the united arms of the whole; and Maryland

refused, on this account, to accede to the confederation. At length,

several of the states empowered their members in congress to ratify

that instrument as forming a union between the twelve states who had

assented to it. Maryland, alarmed at the prospect of being excluded

from the union, gave her reluctant consent to the confederation,

accompanied by a protest, in which she still asserted her claim to her

interest in the vacant territory which should be acknowledged at the

treaty of peace, to be within the United States.

It required the repeated lessons of a severe and instructive

experience to persuade the American people that their greatness, their

prosperity, their happiness, and even their safety, imperiously

demanded the substitution of a government for their favourite league.]

[Sidenote: Military transactions.]

Such was the defensive strength of the positions taken by the adverse

armies on the Hudson, and such their relative force, that no decisive

blow could be given by either in that quarter of the continent. The

anxious attentions of General Washington, therefore, were

unremittingly directed to the south. One of those incidents which

fortune occasionally produces, on the seizing or neglect of which the

greatest military events frequently depend, presented, sooner than was

expected, an opportunity which he deemed capable of being improved to

the destruction of the British army in Virginia.

The French fleet, from its arrival on the American coast, had been

blocked up in the harbour of Newport; and the land forces of that

nation had been reduced to a state of inactivity by the necessity of

defending their ships. Late in January, a detachment from the British

fleet was encountered on the east end of Long Island by a furious

storm, in which such damage was sustained as to destroy for a time the

naval superiority which Arbuthnot had uniformly preserved.

To turn this temporary superiority to advantage, Monsieur Destouches

resolved to detach a ship of the line, with two frigates, to the

Chesapeake; a force which the delegation from Virginia had assured him

would be sufficient for the purpose.

On receiving certain accounts of the loss sustained in the storm,

General Washington conceived the design of improving that

circumstance by immediate and powerful operations against Arnold.

Confident that the critical moment must be seized, or the enterprise

would fail, he ordered a detachment of twelve hundred men, under the

command of the Marquis de Lafayette, to the head of the Chesapeake;

there to embark for that part of Virginia which was to become the

theatre of action, under convoy of a French frigate, for which he

applied to the admiral. He immediately communicated this measure to

the Count de Rochambeau, and to Monsieur Destouches, to whom he also

stated his conviction that no serious advantage could be expected from

a few ships, unaided by land troops. "There were," he said, "a variety

of positions to be taken by Arnold, one of which was Portsmouth, his

present station, where his ships might be so protected by his

batteries on the shore as to defy a mere naval attack; and where he

would certainly be able to maintain himself until the losses sustained

in the late storm should be repaired, and the superiority at sea

recovered, when he would unquestionably be relieved."

To insure the success of the expedition, he recommended that the whole

fleet should be employed on it, and that a detachment of one thousand

men should be embarked for the same service.

[Sidenote: February 9.]

These representations did not prevail. The original plan had already

been put in execution. On the 9th of February, a sixty-four gun ship

with two frigates, under Monsieur de Tilley, had sailed for the

Chesapeake; and, as some of the British ships had been repaired, the

French admiral did not think it prudent to put to sea with the residue

of his fleet.

As had been foreseen by General Washington, de Tilley found Arnold in

a situation not to be assailed with any prospect of success. After

showing himself therefore in the bay, and making an ineffectual

attempt to enter Elizabeth River, he returned to Newport. At the

capes, he fell in with the Romulus, a fifty gun ship, coming from

Charleston to the Chesapeake, which he captured.

Both the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier Destouches, being well

disposed to execute the plans suggested by General Washington, they

determined, on the return of Monsieur de Tilley, to make a second

expedition to the Chesapeake with the whole fleet, and eleven hundred

men. General Washington, therefore, hastened to Newport, that in a

personal conference with them, he might facilitate the execution of an

enterprise from which he still entertained sanguine hopes.

[Sidenote: March 6.]

Early on the 6th of March he reached Newport, and went instantly on

board the Admiral, where he was met by the Count de Rochambeau. It was

determined that a detachment from the army, then in perfect readiness,

should be embarked under the Count de Viominil; and that the fleet

should put to sea as soon as possible. The wind was favourable to the

French, and adverse to the British. Yet the fleet did not sail until

the evening of the eighth. It appears from a letter of Monsieur

Destouches, that this delay was in some measure attributable to a

disaster which befel one of his frigates in getting out of port; and

there is reason to suppose that it may be ascribed to a want of

supplies. Whatever may have been the cause, Arnold is most probably

indebted to it for his escape from the fate which his treason merited.

Two days after Destouches had sailed, he was followed by Arbuthnot,

who overtook him off the capes of Virginia. A partial engagement

ensued which continued about an hour, when the fleets were separated.

The French admiral called a council of war the next day, in which it

was declared unadviseable to renew the action, and he returned to

Newport.

[Sidenote: March 26.]

The arrival of two thousand men commanded by General Philips, gave the

British a decided superiority in Virginia, and changed the destination

of Lafayette, who had been ordered to join the southern army, but to

whom the defence of that state was now committed. The troops under his

command being taken chiefly from the eastern regiments, had imbibed

strong prejudices against a southern climate; and desertions became so

frequent as to threaten the dissolution of the corps.

This unpromising state of things was completely changed by a happy

expedient adopted by Lafayette. Appealing to the generous principles

of his soldiers, principles on which the feelings of his own bosom

taught him to rely, he proclaimed in orders, that he was about to

enter on an enterprise of great danger and difficulty, in which he

persuaded himself his soldiers would not abandon him. If, however, any

individual of the detachment was unwilling to accompany him, a permit

to return should most assuredly be granted him.

This measure had the desired effect, and put an end to desertion.[72]

To keep up the good dispositions of the moment, this ardent young

nobleman, who was as unmindful of fortune as he was ambitious of fame,

borrowed from the merchants of Baltimore, on his private credit, a sum

of money sufficient to purchase shoes, linen, spirits, and other

articles of immediate necessity for the detachment.[73]

[Footnote 72: The author was assured by General Lafayette that this

was true. Such was the enthusiasm of the moment, that a lame sergeant

hired a place in a cart to keep up with the army.]

[Footnote 73: It is not unworthy of notice, that the ladies of

Baltimore charged themselves with the toil of immediately making up

the summer clothing for the troops. Innumerable instances of their

zeal in the common cause of their country were given in every state in

the union.]

Having made these preparations for the campaign, he marched with the

utmost celerity to the defence of Virginia. That state was in great

need of assistance. The enemy had penetrated deep into its bosom, and

was committing those excesses on its inhabitants to which a country

unable to repel invasion must always be exposed.

General Philips, on his arrival, took command of all the British

troops in Virginia; and, after completing the fortification of

Portsmouth, commenced offensive operations.

[Sidenote: April 24.]

About two thousand five hundred men were embarked on board some small

vessels, and landed at various places in the neighbourhood of

Williamsburg. Different detachments spread themselves over the lower

part of that neck of land which is made by York and James Rivers; and,

after destroying, without opposition, a ship yard belonging to the

state, with some armed vessels and public stores, re-embarked and

proceeded to City Point, where they landed in the afternoon of the

24th. The next day they marched against Petersburg, at which place,

immense quantities of tobacco and other stores were deposited.

Baron Steuben was not in a situation to check their progress. The

levies of Virginia had marched to the aid of General Greene; and the

whole number of militia, at that time in the field, did not much

exceed two thousand men. Unwilling to abandon so important a place as

Petersburg without the semblance of fighting, the baron posted about

one thousand men a mile below the town with orders to skirmish with

the enemy. The British troops, without being able to bring him to a

close engagement, were two or three hours employed in driving him

across the Appomattox, the bridge over which being taken up as soon as

the militia had passed it, farther pursuit became impracticable.

This skirmish having terminated with scarcely any loss on either side,

the baron retreated towards Richmond, and Philips took quiet

possession of Petersburg; where he destroyed a considerable quantity

of tobacco, and all the vessels lying in the river.

This service being accomplished, Arnold was detached through Osbornes

to Warwick, between which place and Richmond, a respectable naval

force, consisting of small armed vessels, had been collected with the

intention of co-operating with the French fleet against Portsmouth;

and a few militia were stationed on the northern bank of the river to

assist in defending the flotilla.

[Sidenote: April 30.]

The crews of the vessels, on receiving a fire from a few field pieces

ordered by Arnold to the bank, scuttled them, escaped to the opposite

shore, and dispersed with the militia. Philips marched with the

residue of the army to Chesterfield court house, the place of

rendezvous for the new levies of Virginia, where he destroyed the

barracks with a few public stores; after which he joined Arnold in the

neighbourhood of Warwick, and marched without interruption to

Manchester, a small town on the southern bank of James River,

immediately opposite to Richmond; where, as was the general practice,

the warehouses were set on fire, and all the tobacco consumed.

On the preceding evening, the Marquis de Lafayette, who had made a

forced march from Baltimore, arrived with his detachment at Richmond;

and that place, in which a great proportion of the military stores of

the state were then collected, was saved, for the time, from a visit

which was certainly designed.

The regular troops composing this detachment were joined by about two

thousand militia, and sixty dragoons. Not thinking it adviseable to

attempt the passage of the river in the presence of so respectable an

army, General Philips retired to Bermuda Hundred, a point of land in

the confluence of the James and Appomatox, [Transcriber's Note: sic]

at which place he re-embarked his troops, and fell down the river to

Hog Island.

The Marquis fixed his head quarters on the north of Chiccahominy,

about eighteen miles from Richmond; where he remained until a letter

from Lord Cornwallis called Philips again up James River.

When that nobleman determined on marching from Wilmington into

Virginia, he signified his wish that the British troops in that state,

should take their station at Petersburg.

On receiving this letter, Philips proceeded to comply with the request

it contained. As soon as the fleet moved up the river, Lafayette

returned to the defence of Richmond. Having, on his arrival, received

intelligence that Lord Cornwallis was marching northward, and finding

Philips landed at Brandon on the south side of the river, he was

persuaded that a junction of the two armies must be intended, and

hastened to take possession of Petersburg[74] before Philips could

reach that place. In this however he was anticipated by the British

general; upon which he recrossed James River, and, encamping a few

miles below Richmond, used his utmost exertions to remove the military

stores in that town to a place of greater security.

[Footnote 74: General Lafayette states that this movement also

facilitated the transportation of some military stores to the southern

army, which were greatly needed.]

[Sidenote: Cornwallis arrives.]

In this position his army was permitted to repose itself but a few

days. Lord Cornwallis, after passing through North Carolina and the

southern parts of Virginia without encountering much opposition, and

effecting a junction with Arnold, who had succeeded by the death of

Philips to the command of the army in Virginia,[75] found himself at

the head of a force which nothing in that state could resist; and

determined on a vigorous plan of offensive operations. His immediate

object was to bring the Marquis to an action; for which purpose he

crossed James River at Westover, where he was joined by a

reinforcement from New York, and attempted, by turning the left flank

of the American army, to get into its rear. Lafayette was not in a

condition to risk an engagement. His objects were the security of the

public stores, the preservation of his small army for future services,

and a junction with the Pennsylvania line which was on its march

southward, under the command of General Wayne. As Lord Cornwallis

crossed James River, he retired towards the upper country, inclining

his route to the north in order to favour a junction with Wayne.

[Footnote 75: General Philips died the day on which the army entered

Petersburg. Arnold on succeeding to the command addressed a letter to

Lafayette, which the American general refused to receive, informing

the officer who brought it, and whom he treated in other respects with

great politeness, that he would receive no letter from Arnold.--_Cor.

of Lafayette._]

The fine horses found in the stables of private gentlemen, gave to the

British general an efficient cavalry; and enabled him to mount so

many infantry, as to move large detachments with unusual rapidity.

With these advantages, he was so confident of overtaking and

destroying his enemy, as to say exultingly in a letter which was

intercepted, "the boy can not escape me." His sanguine hopes, however,

were disappointed. Lafayette moved with so much celerity and caution

as to convince Cornwallis of the impracticability of overtaking him,

or of preventing his junction with Wayne.

After marching some distance up the northern side of Northanora, his

lordship relinquished the pursuit, and turned his attention to other

objects which were more attainable.

Military stores had been collected in various parts of the middle

country, and, among others, at the Point of Fork, a point of land made

by the confluence of the Rivanna and Fluvanna, the two branches of

James' River. Colonel Simcoe was detached with five hundred men

against this post, which was protected by between five and six hundred

new levies, and a few militia. Tarlton, with two hundred and fifty

cavalry and mounted infantry, was ordered at the same time against

Charlottesville, where the general assembly was in session. So rapid

were his movements that a mere accident prevented his entering the

town before any notice of his approach was given. A private gentleman,

Mr. Jouiette, who was acquainted with a nearer route than the great

road, hastened to Charlottesville on a fleet horse with the

interesting intelligence, and entered the town about two hours before

the British cavalry. Nearly all[76] the members of the legislature

made their escape, and reassembled at Staunton, on the western side of

the Blue Ridge. Tarlton, after destroying the stores at

Charlottesville, proceeded down the Rivanna to the Point of Fork.

[Footnote 76: Seven fell into the hands of Tarlton.]

The detachment commanded by Simcoe, being composed chiefly of

infantry, could not move with equal celerity. That officer, however,

conducted his march with so much secrecy and address, that Steuben

seems to have been either unapprized of his approach, or to have had

no accurate information of his numbers. Intelligence of the expedition

to Charlottesville had reached him, and he had prudently employed

himself in removing his stores from the Point of Fork to the south

side of the Fluvanna.

The river was at the time unfordable; and the boats were all secured

on the southern bank. Yet Steuben, suspecting the detachment of Simcoe

to be the van of the British army, or apprehending that Tarlton might

get into his rear, withdrew precipitately in the night, and marched

near thirty miles, leaving behind him such stores as could not be

removed. These were destroyed next morning by a small detachment of

men who crossed the river in a few canoes.

[Sidenote: Presses Lafayette over the Rapidan.]

To secure his junction with Wayne, and to keep open his communication

towards the north, Lafayette had crossed the Rapidan.

[Sidenote: Lafayette forms a junction with Wayne.]

These movements of the two armies had thrown Lord Cornwallis between

Lafayette and the military stores which had been transported from

Richmond up James' River, and deposited at different places, but

principally at Albemarle old court house, high up that river. To this

place Lord Cornwallis directed his march.

The Marquis, having effected a junction with the Pennsylvania line

consisting of eight hundred men, recrossed the Rapidan, and advanced

with so much celerity towards the British army, that he encamped

within a few miles of it, while upwards of a day's march from its

point of destination.

Confident that the object of the American general must be to protect

the magazines on the Fluvanna, Lord Cornwallis encamped at Elk Island,

and advanced his light troops to a position commanding the road, by

which it was supposed the Americans must pass.

Lafayette, however, discovered in the night a nearer road which had

long been disused; and the next morning the British general had the

mortification to perceive that the American army had crossed the

Rivanna, and taken a strong position behind the Mechunk creek, which,

in a great measure, commanded the route leading from the camp of his

lordship to Albemarle old court house. At this place a considerable

reinforcement of mountain militia was received.

[Sidenote: Cornwallis retires to the lower country.]

Apprehending the force opposed to him to be greater than it was in

reality, and probably desirous of transferring the war to the lower

country, Lord Cornwallis abandoned the objects he had pursued, and

retired first to Richmond, and afterwards to Williamsburg.

[Sidenote: June 18.]

The Marquis followed with cautious circumspection. On the 18th of

June, he was reinforced by four or five hundred new levies under the

Baron Steuben, which augmented his army to four thousand men, of whom

two thousand were regulars. That of Lord Cornwallis was, probably,

rather more numerous.

As the British army retreated to Williamsburg, Lafayette, who sought a

partial, though he avoided a general engagement, pressed its rear with

his light parties. Colonel Simcoe, who covered the retreat, was

overtaken by Colonel Butler about six miles from Williamsburg, and a

sharp action ensued. The Americans claimed the advantage; but were

compelled to retire by the approach of the whole British army.

In the bold and rapid course taken by Lord Cornwallis through the

lower and central parts of Virginia, much private as well as public

property[77] was destroyed; and the resources of the state were

considerably diminished; but no solid advantage was obtained.

Although, from various causes, especially from a want of arms, and

from that general repugnance which a harassed, unpaid militia, will

universally manifest to military service, less resistance was

encountered than was to be expected from the strength and population

of the state; no disposition was openly manifested to join the royal

standard, or to withdraw from the contest. The Marquis complained of

"much slowness, and much carelessness in the country; but the

dispositions of the people," he said, "were good, and they required

only to be awakened." This, he thought, would be best effected by the

presence of General Washington, an event for which he expressed the

most anxious solicitude. But Washington deemed it of more importance

to remain on the Hudson, for the purpose of digesting and conducting a

grand plan of combined operations then meditated against New York, by

the execution of which he counted more certainly on relieving the

southern states, than by any other measure it was in his power to

adopt.

[Footnote 77: While the British army overran the country, their ships

sailed up the rivers, pillaged the farms, received the slaves who fled

from their masters, and, in some instances, reduced the houses to

ashes. While they were in the Potowmac, a flag was sent on shore at

Mount Vernon, requiring a supply of fresh provisions. The steward of

General Washington, believing it to be his duty to save the property

of his principal, and entertaining fears for the magnificent buildings

of the Commander-in-chief, went on board with the flag, carried a

supply of fresh provisions, asked the restoration of the slaves who

had taken refuge in the fleet, and requested that the buildings might

be spared. Mr. Lund Washington, to whom the general had entrusted the

management of his estate, communicated these circumstances to him, and

informed him that he too had sustained considerable losses. "I am

sorry," said the general, in reply, "to hear of your loss; I am a

little sorry to hear of my own. But that which gives me most concern

is, that you should have gone on board the vessels of the enemy and

furnished them with refreshments. It would have been a less painful

circumstance to me to have heard, that in consequence of your

non-compliance with their request, they had burnt my home and laid the

plantation in ruins. You ought to have considered yourself as my

representative, and should have reflected on the bad example of

communicating with the enemy, and making a voluntary offer of

refreshment to them, with a view to prevent a conflagration."]

[Sidenote: General Washington's letters are intercepted.]

An express carrying letters, communicating to congress the result of

his consultations on this subject, with the commanders of the land and

naval forces of France, was intercepted in Jersey. The interesting

disclosure made by these letters, alarmed Sir Henry Clinton for the

safety of New York, and determined him to require the return of a part

of the troops in Virginia. Supposing himself too weak, after complying

with this requisition, to remain at Williamsburg, Lord Cornwallis took

the resolution of retiring to Portsmouth.

In pursuance of this resolution, he marched from Williamsburg and

encamped in such a manner as to cover the ford into the island of

Jamestown. On the same evening, the Queen's rangers crossed over into

the island; and the two succeeding days were employed in passing over

the baggage.

The morning after the evacuation of Williamsburg, Lafayette changed

his position, and pushed his best troops within nine miles of the

British camp, with the intention of attempting their rear, when the

main body should have passed into Jamestown.

[Sidenote: July 6.]

Suspecting his design, Lord Cornwallis encamped the greater part of

his army on the main land as compactly as possible, and displayed a

few troops on the island in such a manner as, in appearance, to

magnify their numbers. All the intelligence received by Lafayette

concurred in the representation that the greater part of the British

army had passed over to the island in the night. Believing this to be

the fact, he detached some riflemen to harass their out-posts, while

he advanced at the head of the continental troops in order to cut off

the rear.

Every appearance was calculated to countenance the opinion he had

formed. The British light parties were drawn in, and the piquets were

forced by the riflemen without much resistance, but an advanced post

which covered the encampment from the view of the Americans, was

perseveringly maintained, though three of the officers commanding it

were successively picked off by the riflemen. Lafayette, who arrived a

little before sunset, suspected from the obstinacy with which this

post was maintained, that it covered more than a rear guard, and

determined to reconnoitre the camp, and judge of its strength from his

own observation.[78] It was in a great measure concealed by woods;

but from a tongue of land stretching into the river, he perceived the

British force to be much more considerable than had been supposed, and

hastened to call off his men.

[Footnote 78: Correspondence with Lafayette.]

[Sidenote: Action near Jamestown.]

He found Wayne closely engaged. A piece of artillery had been left

weakly defended, which Wayne determined to seize. Scarcely was the

attempt made, when he discovered the whole British army, arranged in

order for battle, moving out against him. To retreat was impossible,

and the boldest had become the safest measure. Under this impression

he advanced rapidly, and, with his small detachment, not exceeding

eight hundred men, made a gallant charge on the British line. A warm

action ensued, which was kept up with great spirit until the arrival

of Lafayette, who, perceiving Wayne to be out-flanked both on the

right and left, ordered him to retreat and form in a line with the

light infantry, who were drawn up about half a mile in his rear. The

whole party then saved itself behind a morass.

Fortunately for Lafayette, Lord Cornwallis did not improve the

advantage he had gained. Suspecting this to be a stratagem of the

American general to draw him into an ambuscade, a suspicion equally

favoured by the hardiness and time of the attack, Lord Cornwallis, who

supposed his enemy to be stronger than he was in reality, would allow

no pursuit; and, in the course of the night, crossed over into the

island, whence he, soon afterwards, proceeded to Portsmouth.

In this action, the Americans lost one hundred and eighteen men, among

whom were ten officers; and two pieces of artillery were left on the

field, the horses attached to them being killed. The British loss was

less considerable.

All active operations were now suspended; and the harassed army of

Lafayette was allowed some repose.

Although no brilliant service was performed by that young nobleman,

the campaign in Virginia enhanced his military reputation, and raised

him in the general esteem. That with so decided an inferiority of

effective force, and especially of cavalry, he had been able to keep

the field in an open country, and to preserve a considerable

proportion of his military stores, as well as his army, was believed

to furnish unequivocal evidence of the prudence and vigour of his

conduct.

The Life of George Washington, Vol. 3 Commander in Chief of the American Forces During the War which Established the Independence of his Country and First President of the United States · 第 10 / 11 章