Treason and escape of Arnold.... Trial and execution of
Major André.... Precautions for the security of West
Point.... Letter of General Washington on American
affairs.... Proceedings of congress respecting the army....
Major Talmadge destroys the British stores at Coram.... The
army retires into winter quarters.... Irruption of Major
Carlton into New York.... European transactions.
[Sidenote: 1780.]
While the public mind was anticipating great events from the
combined arms of France and America, treason lay concealed in the
American camp, and was plotting the ruin of the American cause.
The great services and military talents of General Arnold, his courage
in battle, and patient fortitude under excessive hardships, had
secured to him a high place in the opinion of the army and of his
country.
Not having sufficiently recovered from the wounds received before
Quebec and at Saratoga to be fit for active service, and having large
accounts to settle with the government which required leisure, he was,
on the evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778, appointed to the command in
that place.
Unfortunately, that strength of principle and correctness of judgment,
which might enable him to resist the various seductions to which his
fame and rank exposed him in the metropolis of the Union, were not
associated with the firmness which he had displayed in the field, and
in the most adverse circumstances. Yielding to the temptations of a
false pride, and forgetting that he did not possess the resources of
private fortune, he indulged in the pleasures of a sumptuous table and
expensive equipage, and soon swelled his debts to an amount which it
was impossible to discharge. Unmindful of his military character, he
engaged in speculations which were unfortunate; and with the hope of
immense profit, took shares in privateers which were unsuccessful. His
claims against the United States were great, and he looked to them for
the means of extricating himself from the embarrassments in which his
indiscretions had involved him; but the commissioners to whom his
accounts were referred for settlement, had reduced them considerably;
and, on his appeal from their decision to congress, a committee
reported that the sum allowed by the commissioners was more than he
was entitled to receive.
He was charged with various acts of extortion on the citizens of
Philadelphia, and with peculating on the funds of the continent. Not
the less soured by these multiplied causes of irritation, from the
reflection that they were attributable to his own follies and vices,
he gave full scope to his resentments, and indulged himself in
expressions of angry reproach against, what he termed, the ingratitude
of his country, which provoked those around him, and gave great
offence to congress. Having become peculiarly odious to the government
of Pennsylvania, the Executive of that state exhibited formal charges
against him to congress, who directed that he should be arrested and
brought before a court martial. His trial was concluded late in
January, 1779, and he was sentenced to be reprimanded by the
Commander-in-chief. This sentence was approved by congress and carried
into execution.
From the time the sentence against him was approved, if not sooner,
his proud unprincipled spirit revolted from the cause of his country,
and determined him to seek an occasion to make the objects of his
resentment, the victims of his vengeance. Turning his eyes on West
Point as an acquisition which would give value to treason, and inflict
a mortal wound on his former friends, he sought the command of that
fortress for the purpose of gratifying both his avarice and his
hate.[42]
[Footnote 42: The author is informed by General Lafayette that Arnold,
while commanding at West Point, endeavoured to obtain from General
Washington the names of his secret emissaries in New York, and his
means of communicating with them. He pressed Lafayette, who had also
his private intelligencers, for the same information. His applications
were of course unsuccessful. It cannot be doubted that his object was
to commit the additional crime of betraying them to Sir Henry
Clinton.]
To New York, the safety of West Point was peculiarly interesting; and,
in that state, the reputation of Arnold was particularly high. To its
delegation he addressed himself; and one of its members had written a
letter to General Washington, suggesting doubts respecting the
military character of Howe, to whom its defence was then entrusted,
and recommending Arnold for that service. This request was not
forgotten. Some short time afterwards, General Schuyler mentioned to
the Commander-in-chief a letter he had received from Arnold intimating
his wish to join the army, but stating his inability, in consequence
of his wounds, to perform the active duties of the field. General
Washington observed that, as there was a prospect of a vigorous
campaign, he should be gratified with the aid of General Arnold. That
so soon as the operations against New York should commence, he
designed to draw his whole force into the field, leaving even West
Point to the care of invalids and a small garrison of militia.
Recollecting however the former application of a member of congress
respecting this post, he added, that "if, with this previous
information, that situation would be more agreeable to him than a
command in the field, his wishes should certainly be indulged."
This conversation being communicated to Arnold, he caught eagerly at
the proposition, though without openly discovering any solicitude on
the subject; and, in the beginning of August, repaired to camp, where
he renewed the solicitations which had before been made indirectly.
At this juncture, Sir Henry Clinton embarked on an expedition he
meditated against Rhode Island, and General Washington was advancing
on New York. He offered Arnold the left wing of the army, which that
officer declined under the pretexts mentioned in his letter to General
Schuyler.
Incapable of suspecting a man who had given such distinguished proofs
of courage and patriotism, the Commander-in-chief was neither alarmed
at his refusal to embrace so splendid an opportunity of recovering the
favour of his countrymen, nor at the embarrassment accompanying that
refusal. Pressing the subject no farther, he assented to the request
which had been made, and invested Arnold with the command of West
Point. Previous to his soliciting this station, he had, in a letter to
Colonel Robinson, signified his change of principles, and his wish to
restore himself to the favour of his Prince by some signal proof of
his repentance. This letter opened the way to a correspondence with
Sir Henry Clinton, the immediate object of which, after obtaining the
appointment he had solicited, was to concert the means of delivering
the important post he commanded to the British general.
Major John André, an aid-de-camp of Sir Henry Clinton, and adjutant
general of the British army, was selected as the person to whom the
maturing of Arnold's treason, and the arrangements for its execution
should be entrusted. A correspondence was carried on between them
under a mercantile disguise, in the feigned names of Gustavus and
Anderson; and, at length, to facilitate their communications, the
Vulture sloop of war moved up the North River, and took a station
convenient for the purpose, but not so near as to excite suspicion.
[Sidenote: Treason and escape of Arnold.]
The time when General Washington met the Count de Rochambeau at
Hartford was selected for the final adjustment of the plan; and, as a
personal interview was deemed necessary, Major André came up the
river, and went on board the Vulture. The house of a Mr. Smith,
without the American posts, was appointed for the interview; and to
that place both parties repaired in the night--André being brought
under a pass for John Anderson, in a boat despatched from the shore.
While the conference was yet unfinished, day light approached; and, to
avoid discovery, Arnold proposed that André should remain concealed
until the succeeding night. He is understood to have refused
peremptorily to be carried within the American posts; but the promise
to respect this objection was not observed. They continued together
the succeeding day; and when, in the following night, his return to
the Vulture was proposed, the boatmen refused to carry him because she
had shifted her station during the day, in consequence of a gun which
was moved to the shore without the knowledge of Arnold, and brought
to bear upon her. This embarrassing circumstance reduced him to the
necessity of endeavouring to reach New York by land. To accomplish
this purpose, he reluctantly yielded to the urgent representations of
Arnold; and, laying aside his regimentals, which he had hitherto worn
under a surtout, put on a plain suit of clothes, and received a pass
from General Arnold, authorizing him, under the name of John Anderson,
to proceed on the public service to the White Plains, or lower if he
thought proper.
With this permit, he had passed all the guards and posts on the road
unsuspected, and was proceeding to New York in perfect security, when
one of three militia men who were employed between the lines of the
two armies, springing suddenly from his covert into the road, seized
the reins of his bridle, and stopped his horse. Losing his accustomed
self-possession, Major André, instead of producing the pass[43] from
General Arnold, asked the man hastily where he belonged? He replied
"to below;" a term implying that he was from New York. "And so," said
André, not suspecting deception, "am I." He then declared himself to
be a British officer on urgent business, and begged that he might not
be detained. The appearance of the other militia men disclosed his
mistake, too late to correct it. He offered a purse of gold, and a
valuable watch, with tempting promises of ample reward from his
government, if they would permit him to escape; but his offers were
rejected, and his captors proceeded to search him. They found
concealed in his boots, in Arnold's hand writing, papers containing
all the information which could be important respecting West Point.
When carried before Lieutenant Colonel Jameson, the officer commanding
the scouting parties on the lines, he still maintained his assumed
character, and requested Jameson to inform his commanding officer that
Anderson was taken. Jameson despatched an express with this
communication. On receiving it, Arnold comprehended the full extent of
his danger, and, flying from well merited punishment, took refuge on
board the Vulture.
[Footnote 43: Mr. Johnson says he did produce it; but that, on being
surprised, he had thrust a paper containing a plan of the route in his
boot, which, having been perceived, was demanded, and led to his
discovery.]
[Illustration: Where Washington Stayed During André's Trial
_In this brick house at Tappan, Rockland County, New York, the
American Commander-in-Chief, during September, 1780, awaited the
result of the trial of Major John André, who conspired with Benedict
Arnold for the betrayal of West Point to the British. Fourteen
American officers sat in judgment on André and ordered his execution
on October 2, 1780. In Tappan also is still standing the old Tavern
where André was imprisoned._]
When sufficient time for the escape of Arnold was supposed to have
elapsed, André, no longer affecting concealment, acknowledged himself
to be the adjutant general of the British army. Jameson, seeking to
correct the mischief of his indiscreet communication to Arnold,
immediately despatched a packet to the Commander-in-chief containing
the papers which had been discovered, with a letter from André,
relating the manner of his capture, and accounting for the disguise he
had assumed.
The express was directed to meet the Commander-in-chief, who was then
on his return from Hartford; but, taking different roads,[44] they
missed each other, and a delay attended the delivery of the papers,
which insured the escape of Arnold.
[Footnote 44: General Lafayette adds some circumstances which are not
found among the manuscript papers of General Washington. The
Commander-in-chief with Generals Lafayette and Knox had turned from
the direct route in order to visit a redoubt. Colonels Hamilton and
M'Henry, the aids-de-camp of Generals Washington and Lafayette, went
forward to request Mrs. Arnold not to wait breakfast. Arnold received
André's billet in their presence. He turned pale, left them suddenly,
called his wife, communicated the intelligence to her and left her in
a swoon, without the knowledge of Hamilton and M'Henry. Mounting the
horse of his aid-de-camp, which was ready saddled, and directing him
to inform General Washington on his arrival that Arnold was gone to
receive him at West Point, he gained the river shore, and was conveyed
in a canoe to the Vulture.
The Commander-in-chief, on his arrival, was informed that Arnold
awaited him at West Point. Taking it for granted that this step had
been taken to prepare for his reception, he proceeded thither without
entering the house, and was surprised to find that Arnold was not
arrived. On returning to the quarters of that officer he received
Jameson's despatch, which disclosed the whole mystery.]
[Sidenote: Precautions for the security of West Point.]
Every precaution was immediately taken for the security of West Point;
after which, the attention of the Commander-in-chief was turned to
André. A board of general officers, of which Major General Greene was
president, and the two foreign generals, Lafayette and Steuben, were
members, was called, to report a precise state of his case, and to
determine the character in which he was to be considered, and the
punishment to which he was liable.
The frankness and magnanimity with which André had conducted himself
from the time of his appearance in his real character, had made a
very favourable impression on all those with whom he had held any
intercourse. From this cause he experienced every mark of indulgent
attention which was compatible with his situation; and, from a sense
of justice as well as of delicacy, was informed, on the opening of the
examination, that he was at liberty not to answer any interrogatory
which might embarrass his own feelings. But, as if only desirous to
rescue his character from imputations which he dreaded more than
death, he confessed every thing material to his own condemnation, but
would divulge nothing which might involve others.
[Sidenote: Trial and execution of Major André.]
The board reported the essential facts which had appeared, with their
opinion that Major André was a spy, and ought to suffer death. The
execution of this sentence was ordered to take place on the day
succeeding that on which it was pronounced.
Superior to the terrors of death, but dreading disgrace, André was
deeply affected by the mode of execution which the laws of war decree
to persons in his situation. He wished to die like a soldier, not as a
criminal. To obtain a mitigation of his sentence in this respect, he
addressed a letter[45] to General Washington, replete with the
feelings of a man of sentiment and honour. But the occasion required
that the example should make its full impression, and this request
could not be granted. He encountered his fate with composure and
dignity; and his whole conduct interested the feelings of all who
witnessed it.
[Footnote 45: See note No. IV. at the end of the volume.]
The general officers lamented the sentence which the usages of war
compelled them to pronounce; and never perhaps did the
Commander-in-chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of
duty and policy. The sympathy excited among the American officers by
his fate, was as universal as it is unusual on such occasions; and
proclaims alike the merit of him who suffered, and the humanity of
those who inflicted the punishment.
Great exertions were made by Sir Henry Clinton, to whom André was
particularly dear, first, to have him considered as protected by a
flag of truce, and afterwards, as a prisoner of war.
Even Arnold had the hardihood to interpose. After giving a certificate
of facts tending, as he supposed, to exculpate the prisoner,
exhausting his powers of reasoning on the case, and appealing to the
humanity of the American general, he sought to intimidate that
officer, by stating the situation of many of the most distinguished
individuals of South Carolina, who had forfeited their lives, but had
hitherto been spared through the clemency of the British general. This
clemency, he said, could no longer be extended to them should Major
André suffer.
It may well be supposed that the interposition of Arnold could have no
influence on Washington. He conveyed Mrs. Arnold to her husband in New
York,[46] and also transmitted his clothes and baggage, for which he
had written; but, in every other respect, his letters, which were
unanswered, were also unnoticed.
[Footnote 46: General Lafayette mentions a circumstance not previously
known to the author, which serves to illustrate the character of
Washington, and to mark the delicacy of his feelings towards even the
offending part of that sex which is entitled to all the consolation
and protection man can afford it.
The night after Arnold's escape, when his letter respecting André was
received, the general directed one of his aids to wait on Mrs. Arnold,
who was convulsed with grief, and inform her that he had done every
thing which depended on him to arrest her husband, but that, not
having succeeded, it gave him pleasure to inform her that her husband
was safe. It is also honourable to the American character, that during
the effervescence of the moment, Mrs. Arnold was permitted to go to
Philadelphia, to take possession of her effects, and to proceed to New
York under the protection of a flag, without receiving the slightest
insult.]
The mingled sentiments of admiration and compassion excited in every
bosom for the unfortunate André, seemed to increase the detestation in
which Arnold was held. "André," said General Washington in a private
letter, "has met his fate with that fortitude which was to be expected
from an accomplished man and a gallant officer; but I am mistaken if
_at this time_ Arnold is undergoing the torments of a mental hell. He
wants feeling. From some traits[47] of his character which have
lately come to my knowledge, he seems to have been so hardened in
crime, so lost to all sense of honour and shame, that, while his
faculties still enable him to continue his sordid pursuits, there will
be no time for remorse."
[Footnote 47: This allusion is thus explained in a private letter from
Colonel Hamilton--"This man (Arnold) is in every sense despicable. In
addition to the scene of knavery and prostitution during his command
in Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his papers has unfolded,
the history of his command at West Point is a history of little as
well as great villanies. He practised every dirty act of peculation,
and even stooped to connexions with the suttlers to defraud the
public."]
From motives of policy, or of respect for his engagements, Sir Henry
Clinton conferred on Arnold the commission of a brigadier general in
the British service, which he preserved throughout the war. Yet it is
impossible that rank could have rescued him from the contempt and
detestation in which the generous, the honourable, and the brave,
could not cease to hold him. It was impossible for men of this
description to bury the recollection of his being a traitor, a sordid
traitor, first the slave of his rage, then purchased with gold, and
finally secured at the expense of the blood of one of the most
accomplished officers in the British army.
His representations of the discontent of the country and of the army
concurring with reports from other quarters, had excited the hope that
the loyalists and the dissatisfied, allured by British gold, and the
prospect of rank in the British service, would flock to his standard,
and form a corps at whose head he might again display his accustomed
intrepidity. With this hope he published an address to the inhabitants
of America, in which he laboured to palliate his own guilt, and to
increase their dissatisfaction with the existing state of things.
This appeal to the public was followed by a proclamation addressed "To
the officers and soldiers of the continental army, who have the real
interests of their country at heart, and who are determined to be no
longer the tools and dupes of congress or of France."
The object of this proclamation was to induce the officers and
soldiers to desert the cause they had embraced from principle, by
holding up to them the very flattering offers of the British general,
and contrasting the substantial emoluments of the British service with
their present deplorable condition. He attempted to cover this
dishonourable proposition with a decent garb, by representing the base
step he invited them to take, as the only measure which could restore
peace, real liberty, and happiness, to their country.
These inducements did not produce their intended effect. Although the
temper of the army might be irritated by real suffering, and by the
supposed neglect of government, no diminution of patriotism had been
produced. Through all the hardships, irritations, and vicissitudes of
the war, Arnold remains the solitary instance of an American officer
who abandoned the side first embraced in this civil contest, and
turned his sword upon his former companions in arms.
When the probable consequences of this plot, had it been successful,
were considered, and the combination of apparent accidents by which it
was discovered and defeated, was recollected, all were filled with
awful astonishment; and the devout perceived in the transaction, the
hand of Providence guiding America to independence.
The thanks of congress were voted to the three militia men[48] who had
rendered this invaluable service; and a silver medal, with an
inscription expressive of their fidelity and patriotism, was directed
to be presented to each of them. In addition to this flattering
testimonial of their worth, and as a farther evidence of national
gratitude, a resolution was passed granting to each, two hundred
dollars per annum during life, to be paid in specie or an equivalent
in current money.
[Footnote 48: Their names were John Paulding, David Williams, and
Isaac Vanwert.]
The efforts of General Washington to obtain a permanent military
force, or its best substitute, a regular system for filling the vacant
ranks with draughts who should join the army on the first day of
January in each year, were still continued. Notwithstanding the
embarrassments with which congress was surrounded, it is not easy to
find adequate reasons for the neglect of representations so
interesting, and of recommendations apparently so essential to the
safety of the United States.
[Sidenote: Parties in Congress.]
Private letters disclose the fact that two parties still agitated
congress. One entered fully into the views of the Commander-in-chief.
The other, jealous of the army, and apprehensive of its hostility to
liberty when peace should be restored, remained unwilling to give
stability to its constitution by increasing the numbers who were to
serve during the war. They seemed to dread the danger from the enemy
to which its fluctuations would expose them, less than the danger
which might be apprehended for the civil authority from its permanent
character. They caught with avidity at every intelligence which
encouraged the flattering hope of a speedy peace,[49] but entered
reluctantly into measures founded on the supposition that the war
might be of long duration. Perfectly acquainted with the extent of the
jealousies entertained on this subject, although, to use his own
expressions to a friend, "Heaven knows how unjustly," General
Washington had foreborne to press the necessity of regular and timely
reinforcements to his army so constantly and so earnestly as his own
judgment directed. But the experience of every campaign furnished such
strong additional evidences of the impolicy and danger of continuing
to rely on temporary expedients, and the uncertainty of collecting a
force to co-operate with the auxiliaries from France was so peculiarly
embarrassing, that he at length resolved to conquer the delicacy by
which he had been in some degree restrained, and to open himself fully
on the subject which he deemed more essential than any other to the
success of the war.
[Footnote 49: The following extract from a private letter of General
Washington to a member of congress, shows how sensible he was of the
mischief produced by this temper. "The satisfaction I have in any
successes that attend us, even in the alleviation of misfortunes, is
always allayed by the fear that it will lull us into security.
Supineness, and a disposition to flatter ourselves, seem to make parts
of our national character. When we receive a check and are not quite
undone, we are apt to fancy we have gained a victory; and when we do
gain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive, and expect the war
immediately to end. The history of the war is a history of false hopes
and temporary expedients. Would to God they were to end here! This
winter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassing
scene than we have yet experienced, to the southward. I have little
doubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clinton
will detach to the southward to extend his conquests. I am far from
being satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts."]
[Sidenote: August.]
In August, while looking anxiously for such a reinforcement to the
Chevalier de Tunay as would give him the command of the American seas,
and while uncertain whether the campaign might not pass away without
giving a single advantage promised at its opening, he transmitted a
letter to congress, fully and freely imparting his sentiments on the
state of things.
[Sidenote: Letter of General Washington on American affairs.]
As this letter contains an exact statement of American affairs,
according to the view taken of them by General Washington, and a
faithful picture of the consequences of the ruinous policy which had
been pursued, drawn by the man best acquainted with them, copious
extracts from it will, at least, be excused.
After examining the sources of supplies for the campaign, he proceeds
to say--"But while we are meditating offensive operations which may
not be undertaken at all, or, being undertaken, may fail, I am
persuaded congress are not inattentive to the present state of the
army, and will view in the same light with me the necessity of
providing in time against a period (the first of January) when one
half of our present force will dissolve. The shadow of an army that
will remain, will have every motive, except mere patriotism, to
abandon the service, without the hope which has hitherto supported
them, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and
certainly will not outlive the campaign, unless it finds something
more substantial to rest upon. This is a truth of which every
spectator of the distresses of the army can not help being convinced.
Those at a distance may speculate differently; but on the spot an
opinion to the contrary, judging human nature on the usual scale,
would be chimerical.
"The honourable the committee of congress, who have seen and heard for
themselves, will add their testimony to mine; and the wisdom and
justice of congress can not fail to give it the most serious
attention. To me it will appear miraculous, if our affairs can
maintain themselves much longer in their present train. If either the
temper or the resources of the country will not admit of an
alteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating
condition of seeing the cause of America, in America, upheld by
foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has a claim to all our
confidence, and all our gratitude; but it is neither for the honour of
America, nor for the interest of the common cause, to leave the work
entirely to them."
He then reviewed the resources of Great Britain; and, after showing
her ability still to prosecute the war, added--"The inference from
these reflections is, that we can not count upon a speedy end of the
war; and that it is the true policy of America not to content herself
with temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to give
consistency and solidity to her measures. An essential step to this
will be immediately to devise a plan and put it in execution, for
providing men in time to replace those who will leave us at the end of
the year; and for subsisting and for making a reasonable allowance to
the officers and soldiers.
"The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation, and such
as will execute itself. Experience has shown that a peremptory draught
will be the only effectual one. If a draught for the war or for three
years can be effected, it ought to be made on every account; a shorter
period than a year is inadmissible.
"To one who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by short
enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond
description; and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a
change. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have met
with in the military line, are to be attributed to this cause.
"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the
continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of
discipline, we never should have to retreat with a handful of men
across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which
nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should
not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with
sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary
guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only
thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the
necessity of fighting at Brandywine with an unequal number of raw
troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a
victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less
than half the force of the enemy, destitute of every thing in a
situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New
York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of
these states, while the principal part of their force was detached for
the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this
spring so weak as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable to
protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good
countenance, and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not
have been, the greatest part of the war, inferior to the enemy,
indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the
mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them, pass
unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able
to afford; to see the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the
inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same
cause."
After presenting in detail the embarrassments under which the civil
departments of the army also had laboured, in consequence of the
expensiveness and waste inseparable from its temporary character, he
proceeded to observe--"There is every reason to believe, that the war
has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, made
the successes of the enemy greater. The fluctuation of the army kept
alive their hopes; and at every period of a dissolution of a
considerable part of it, they have flattered themselves with some
decisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy
could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have
listened to terms long since. If the army is left in its present
situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the
enemy; if it is put in a respectable one, it must have a contrary
effect; and nothing I believe will tend more to give us peace the
ensuing winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation.
An army on foot, not only for another campaign, but for several
campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable
us to insist upon favourable terms in forcible language. An army
insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, crumbling to pieces, would be
the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a
little longer. It is an old maxim that the surest way to make a good
peace is to be well prepared for war.
"I can not forbear returning in this place to the necessity of a more
ample and equal provision for the army. The discontents on this head
have been gradually matured to a dangerous extremity. There are many
symptoms that alarm and distress me. Endeavours are using to unite
both officers and men in a general refusal of the money, and some
corps now actually decline receiving it. Every method has been taken
to counteract it, because such a combination in the army would be a
severe blow to our declining currency. The most moderate insist that
the accounts of depreciation ought to be liquidated at stated periods,
and certificates given by government for the sums due. They will not
be satisfied with a general declaration that it shall be made good.
"I have often said, and I beg leave to repeat it, the half pay
provision is in my opinion the most politic and effectual that can be
adopted. On the whole, if something satisfactory be not done, the
army (already so much reduced in officers by daily resignations as not
to have a sufficiency to do the common duties of it) must either cease
to exist at the end of the campaign, or will exhibit an example of
more virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance, than has
perhaps ever yet been paralleled in the history of human enthusiasm.
"The dissolution of the army is an event that can not be regarded with
indifference. It would bring accumulated distress upon us; it would
throw the people of America into a general consternation; it would
discredit our cause throughout the world; it would shock our allies.
To think of replacing the officers with others is visionary. The loss
of the veteran soldiers could not be replaced. To attempt to carry on
the war with militia against disciplined troops, will be to attempt
what the common sense and common experience of mankind will pronounce
to be impracticable. But I should fail in respect to congress, to
dwell on observations of this kind in a letter to them."
[Sidenote: Proceedings of Congress respecting the army.]
At length the committee presented their report, reorganizing the
regiments, reducing their number, and apportioning on the several
states their respective numbers to complete the establishment. This
report, being approved by congress, was transmitted to the
Commander-in-chief for his consideration. By this arrangement, the
states were required to recruit their quotas for the war, and to
bring them into the field by the first of January; but, if in any
state, it should be found impracticable to raise the men for the war
by the first day of December, it was recommended to such state to
supply the deficiency with men engaged to serve for not less than one
year.
In compliance with the request of congress, General Washington
submitted his objections to the plan, in a long and respectful letter.
He recommended that legionary corps should be substituted in the place
of regiments entirely of cavalry. He thought it more adviseable that
the infantry attached to the cavalry should compose a part of the
corps permanently, than that it should be drawn occasionally from the
regiments of foot.
The reduction in the number of regiments appeared to him a subject of
great delicacy. The last reduction, he said, had occasioned many to
quit the service, independent of those who were discontinued; and had
left durable seeds of discontent among those who remained. The general
topic of declamation was, that it was as hard as dishonourable, for
men who had made every sacrifice to the service, to be turned out of
it, at the pleasure of those in power, without an adequate
compensation. In the maturity to which their uneasiness had now risen
from a continuance of misery, they would be still more impatient under
an attempt of a similar nature.
It was not, he said, the intention of his remarks to discourage a
reform, but to show the necessity of guarding against the ill effects
which might otherwise attend it, by making an ample provision both for
the officers who should remain in the service, and for those who
should be reduced. This should be the basis of the plan; and without
it, the most mischievous consequences were to be apprehended. He was
aware of the difficulty of making a present provision sufficiently
ample to give satisfaction; but this only proved the expediency of
making one for the future, and brought him to that which he had so
frequently recommended as the most economical, the most politic, and
the most effectual, that could be devised; this was half pay for life.
Supported by the prospect of a permanent provision, the officers would
be tied to the service, and would submit to many momentary privations,
and to those inconveniences, which the situation of public affairs
rendered unavoidable. If the objection drawn from the principle that
the measure was incompatible with the genius of the government should
be thought insurmountable, he would propose a substitute, less
eligible in his opinion, but which would answer the purpose. It was to
make the present half pay for seven years, whole pay for the same
period. He also recommended that depreciation on the pay received,
should be made up to the officers who should be reduced.
No objection occurred to the measure now recommended, but the expense
it would occasion. In his judgment, whatever would give consistency to
the military establishment, would be ultimately favourable to economy.
It was not easy to be conceived, except by those who had witnessed it,
what an additional waste and increased consumption of every thing, and
consequently what an increase of expense, resulted from laxness of
discipline in an army; and where officers thought they did a favour by
holding their commissions, and the men were continually fluctuating,
to maintain discipline was impossible. Nothing could be more obvious
to him than that a sound military establishment and real economy were
the same. That the purposes of war would be greatly promoted by it was
too clear to admit of argument. He objected also to the mode of
effecting the reduction. This was by leaving it to the several states
to select the officers who should remain in service. He regretted that
congress had not thought proper to retain the reduction and
incorporation of the regiments under their own discretion. He
regretted that it should be left to the states, not only because it
was an adherence to the state system, which in the arrangements of the
army, he disapproved; but because also he feared it would introduce
much confusion and discontent in a business which ought to be
conducted with the greatest circumspection. He feared also that
professing to _select_ the officers to be retained in service would
give disgust both to those who should be discontinued, and to those
who should remain. The former would be sent away under the public
stigma of inferior merit, and the latter would feel no pleasure in a
present preference, when they reflected that, at some future period,
they might experience a similar fate.
He wished with much sincerity that congress had been pleased to make
no alteration in the term of service, but had confined their
requisition to men who should serve for the war, to be raised by
enlistment, draught, or assessment, as might be found necessary. As it
now stood, there would be very few men for the war, and all the evils
of temporary engagements would still be felt. In the present temper of
the states, he entertained the most flattering hopes that they would
enter on vigorous measures to raise an army for the war, if congress
appeared decided respecting it; but if they held up a different idea
as admissible, it would be again concluded that they did not think an
army for the war essential. This would encourage the opposition of men
of narrow, interested, and feeble tempers, and enable them to defeat
the primary object of the revolution.
This letter was taken into consideration; and the measures it
recommended were pursued in almost every particular. Even the two
great principles which were viewed with most jealousy,--an army for
the war, and half pay for life,--were adopted. It would have greatly
abridged the calamities of America, could these resolutions have been
carried into execution. Every effort for the purpose was made by the
Commander-in-chief.
To place the officers of the army in a situation which would render
their commissions valuable, and hold out to them the prospect of a
comfortable old age, in a country saved by their blood, their
sufferings, and the labours of their best years, was an object which
had always been dear to the heart of General Washington, and he had
seized every opportunity to press it on congress. That body had
approached it slowly, taking step after step with apparent reluctance,
as the necessity of the measure became more and more obvious.
The first resolution on the subject, passed in May, 1778, allowed to
all military officers who should continue in service during the war,
and not hold any office of profit under the United States or any of
them, half pay for seven years, if they lived so long. At the same
time the sum of eighty dollars, in addition to his pay, was granted to
every non-commissioned officer and soldier who should serve to the end
of the war. In 1779 this subject was resumed. After much debate, its
farther consideration was postponed; and the officers and soldiers
were recommended to the attention of their several states, with a
declaration that their patriotism, valour, and perseverance, in
defence of the rights and liberties of their country, had entitled
them to the gratitude, as well as the approbation of their fellow
citizens.
In 1780, a memorial from the general officers, depicting in strong
terms the situation of the army, and requiring present support, and
some future provision, was answered by a reference to what had been
already done, and by a declaration "That patience, self-denial,
fortitude and perseverance, and the cheerful sacrifice of time and
health, are necessary virtues which both the citizen and soldier are
called to exercise, while struggling for the liberties of their
country; and that moderation, frugality, and temperance, must be among
the chief supports, as well as the brightest ornaments of that kind of
civil government which is wisely instituted by the several states in
this Union."
This philosophic lecture on the virtues of temperance to men who were
often without food, and always scantily supplied, was still calculated
to assuage irritations fomented by the neglect which was believed to
have been sustained. In a few days afterwards, the subject was brought
again before congress, and a more conciliating temper was manifested.
The odious restriction, limiting the half pay for seven years to those
who should hold no post of profit under the United States or any of
them, was removed; and the bounty allowed the men was extended to the
widows and orphans of those who had died or should die in the service;
at length, the vote passed which has been stated, allowing half pay
for life to all officers who should serve in the armies of the United
States to the end of the war.
Resolutions were also passed, recommending it to the several states to
make up the depreciation on the pay which had been received by the
army; and it was determined that their future services should be
compensated in the money of the new emission, the value of which, it
was supposed, might be kept up by taxes and by loans.
While the government of the Union was thus employed in maturing
measures for the preservation of its military establishment, the time
for action passed away without furnishing any material event. The
hostile armies continued to watch each other until the season of the
year forced them out of the field.
Just before retiring into winter quarters, a handsome enterprise was
executed by Major Talmadge, of Colonel Sheldon's regiment of light
dragoons. That gentleman had been generally stationed on the lines, on
the east side of the North River, and had been distinguished for the
accuracy of his intelligence.
He was informed that a large magazine of forage had been collected at
Coram, on Long Island, which was protected by the militia of the
country, the cruisers in the Sound, and a small garrison in its
neighbourhood.
[Sidenote: Major Talmadge destroys the British stores at Coram.]
[Sidenote: Nov. 21.]
At the head of a detachment of eighty dismounted dragoons, under the
command of Captain Edgar, and of eight or ten who were mounted, he
passed the Sound where it was twenty miles wide, marched across the
island in the night, and so completely surprised the fort, that his
troops entered the works on three different sides before the garrison
was prepared to resist them. The British took refuge in two houses
connected with the fortifications, and commenced a fire from the doors
and windows. These were instantly forced open; and the whole party,
amounting to fifty-four, among whom were a lieutenant colonel,
captain, and subaltern, were killed or taken. Stores to a considerable
amount were destroyed, the fort was demolished, and the magazines were
consumed by fire. The objects of the expedition being accomplished,
Major Talmadge recrossed the Sound without having lost a man. On the
recommendation of General Washington, congress passed a resolution,
expressing a high sense of the merit of those engaged in the
expedition.
[Sidenote: December.]
[Sidenote: The army retires into winter quarters.]
No objects for enterprise presenting themselves, the troops were
placed in winter quarters early in December. The Pennsylvania line was
stationed near Morristown; the Jersey line about Pompton, on the
confines of New York and New Jersey; and the troops belonging to the
New England states, at West Point, and in its vicinity, on both sides
the North River. The line of the state of New York remained at Albany,
to which place it had been detached for the purpose of opposing an
invasion from Canada.
[Sidenote: Irruption of Major Carlton into New York.]
Major Carlton, at the head of one thousand men, composed of Europeans,
Indians, and Tories, had made a sudden irruption into the northern
parts of New York, and taken forts Ann and George, with their
garrisons. At the same time, Sir John Johnson, at the head of a corps
composed of the same materials, appeared on the Mohawk. Several sharp
skirmishes were fought in that quarter with the continental troops,
and a regiment of new levies, aided by the militia of the country.
General Clinton's brigade was ordered to their assistance; but before
he could reach the scene of action, the invading armies had retired,
after laying waste the whole country through which they passed.
[Sidenote: European transactions.]
While the disorder of the American finances, the exhausted state of
the country, and the debility of the government, determined Great
Britain to persevere in offensive war against the United States, by
keeping alive her hopes of conquest, Europe assumed an aspect not less
formidable to the permanent grandeur of that nation, than hostile to
its present views. In the summer of 1780, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark,
entered into the celebrated compact, which has been generally
denominated "THE ARMED NEUTRALITY." Holland had also declared a
determination to accede to the same confederacy; and it is not
improbable that this measure contributed to the declaration of war
which was made by Great Britain against that power towards the close
of the present year.
The long friendship which had existed between the two nations was
visibly weakened from the commencement of the American war. Holland
was peculiarly desirous of participating in that commerce which the
independence of the United States would open to the world: and, from
the commencement of hostilities, her merchants, especially those of
Amsterdam, watched the progress of the war with anxiety, and engaged
in speculations which were profitable to themselves and beneficial to
the United States. The remonstrances made by the British minister at
the Hague against this conduct, were answered in the most amicable
manner by the government, but the practice of individuals continued
the same.
When the war broke out between France and England, a number of Dutch
vessels trading with France, laden with materials for shipbuilding,
were seized, and carried into the ports of Great Britain, although the
existing treaties between the two nations were understood to exclude
those articles from the list of contraband of war. The British cabinet
justified these acts of violence, and persisted in refusing to permit
naval stores to be carried to her enemy in neutral bottoms. This
refusal, however, was accompanied with friendly professions, with an
offer to pay for the vessels and cargoes already seized, and with
proposals to form new stipulations for the future regulation of that
commerce.
The States General refused to enter into any negotiations for the
modification of subsisting treaties; and the merchants of all the
great trading towns, especially those of Amsterdam, expressed the
utmost indignation at the injuries they had sustained. In consequence
of this conduct, the British government required those succours which
were stipulated in ancient treaties, and insisted that the _casus
foederis_ had now occurred. Advantage was taken of the refusal of
the States General to comply with this demand, to declare the treaties
between the two nations at an end.
The temper produced by this state of things, inclined Holland to enter
into the treaty for an armed neutrality; and, in November, the Dutch
government acceded to it. Some unknown causes prevented the actual
signature of the treaty on the part of the States General, until a
circumstance occurred which was used for the purpose of placing them
in a situation not to avail themselves of the aid stipulated by that
confederacy to its members.
While Mr. Lee, one of the ministers of the United States, was on a
mission to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, he fell in company with a
Mr. John de Neufwille, a merchant of Amsterdam, with whom he held
several conversations on the subject of a commercial intercourse
between the two nations, the result of which was, that the plan of an
eventual commercial treaty was sketched out, as one which might
thereafter be concluded between them. This paper had received the
approbation of the Pensionary Van Berkel, and of the city of
Amsterdam, but not of the States General.
Mr. Henry Laurens, late president of congress, was deputed to the
States General with this plan of a treaty, for the double purpose of
endeavouring to complete it, and of negotiating a loan for the use of
his government. On the voyage he was captured by a British frigate;
and his papers, which he had thrown overboard, were rescued from the
waves by a British sailor. Among them was found the plan of a treaty
which has been mentioned, and which was immediately transmitted to Sir
Joseph Yorke, the British minister at the Hague, to be laid before the
government.
The explanations of this transaction not being deemed satisfactory by
the court of London, Sir Joseph Yorke received orders to withdraw from
the Hague, soon after which war was proclaimed against Holland.
This bold measure, which added one of the first maritime powers in
Europe to the formidable list of enemies with whom Britain was already
encompassed, was perhaps, not less prudent than courageous.
There are situations, to which only high minded nations are equal, in
which a daring policy will conduct those who adopt it, safely through
the very dangers it appears to invite; dangers which a system
suggested by a timid caution might multiply instead of avoiding. The
present was, probably, one of those situations. Holland was about to
become a member of the armed neutrality, after which her immense
navigation would be employed, unmolested, in transporting the property
of the enemies of Britain, and in supplying them with all the
materials for shipbuilding, or the whole confederacy must be
encountered.
America, however, received with delight the intelligence that Holland
also was engaged in the war; and founded additional hopes of its
speedy termination on that event.