Distress in the American camp.... Expedition against Staten
Island.... Requisitions on the states.... New scheme of
finance.... Committee of congress deputed to camp....
Resolution to make up depreciation of pay.... Mutiny in the
line of Connecticut.... General Knyphausen enters Jersey....
Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York.... Skirmish at
Springfield.... Exertions to strengthen the army.... Bank
established in Philadelphia.... Contributions of the
ladies.... Farther proceedings of the states.... Arrival of
a French armament in Rhode Island.... Changes in the
quartermaster's department.... Enterprise against New York
abandoned.... Naval superiority of the British.
[Sidenote: 1780.]
While disasters thus crowded on each other in the southern states,
the Commander-in-chief found himself surrounded with difficulties,
which required his utmost exertions to avoid calamities equally
distressing. His urgent requisitions for men to supply the places of
those who were leaving the service, were not complied with, and the
soldiers who remained, could scarcely be preserved from either
perishing with cold and hunger, or dispersing and living on plunder.
General Greene and Colonel Wadsworth, who had, for the preceding year,
been at the head of the quartermaster and commissary departments,
possessed distinguished merit, and had employed assistants of
unquestionable ability and integrity. Yet, for a great part of the
campaign, the rations were frequently reduced, and the army was
rarely supplied with provisions for more than a few days in advance.
Soon after coming into winter quarters, the magazines were exhausted,
and afforded neither meat nor flour to be delivered to the men.
This state of things had been long foreseen; and all the means in the
power of the Commander-in-chief had been used to prevent it. Repeated
representations of the actual famine with which the army was
threatened, had been made to congress, and to the state governments;
but no adequate relief was afforded; and such was the condition of the
finances, so embarrassing the state of affairs, that it was perhaps
attainable only by measures which the governments could not venture to
adopt.
The rapid depreciation of the continental currency, had long been
viewed with apprehensive anxiety by the enlightened friends of the
revolution, and various unsuccessful expedients had been essayed for
the purpose of checking its progress. All perceived that the great
quantity in circulation was the principal cause of the diminution of
its value; and congress had resolved not to exceed two hundred
millions of dollars in their emissions. In the mean time, the utmost
endeavours were used to defer an evil so justly dreaded, and among the
expedients employed, was that of withholding from the public agents,
the money which was necessary for public purposes. This unwise
experiment, while it defeated its own object, threatened the
dissolution of the American army.
The difference between the value of the article at the times of
contract and of payment was soon perceived, and, of course, influenced
its price. But this was the least mischievous consequence of this
mistaken policy. The public agents contracted enormous debts which
they were unable to discharge. Repeated disappointments destroyed
their credit; and, towards the close of the year 1779, they found it
impracticable to obtain supplies for the subsistence of the army.
From these causes, the contracts entered into could not be
co-extensive with the public wants; and many of those which were made
were not complied with.
In this critical state of things, an entire revolution was made in the
commissary department. Such was the prejudice against the system
adopted by Great Britain, for supplying by contract, that it had been
usual to allow, as a compensation to the commissary, a stipulated
commission on all the monies expended on public account. After some
time, this allowance was supposed to be an inducement to purchase at
high prices; and an arrangement was made on the first of January, by
which the commissary general was to receive a fixed nominal salary in
the paper currency, and was permitted to appoint assistants whose
compensations were also fixed, and who were to defray, out of those
compensations, all the expenses attending the transactions of the
business. The practice of allowing them rations and forage was
discontinued.
This new system was unfortunately so modified as to increase the
embarrassments of the department. It was found difficult to obtain
assistants and agents for the compensation allowed; and those who were
willing to be employed, were unequal to the duties assigned them.
For several days, the soldiers were reduced to half allowance, and
sometimes to less. At length, affairs came to the crisis which had
long been threatened; and, early in January, a letter was received
from Colonel Wadsworth, informing the general that it was absolutely
out of his power to supply the army longer with meat, as he was
without money, and had totally exhausted his credit. About the same
time, the assistant commissary, residing in camp, gave notice that his
stock of provisions was on the point of being expended, and that he
had no immediate prospect of a farther supply.
This state of things compelled the Commander-in-chief to adopt
efficacious measures, to relieve the immediate and pressing wants of
his soldiers. He required from each county in the state of Jersey, a
quantity of meat and flour proportioned to its resources, to be raised
and forwarded to the army within a limited time, not exceeding six
days. In a circular letter addressed to the magistrates, he stated the
pressing wants of the army, and the necessity of resorting to coercion
should his requisition fail.
To the honour of the magistrates and people of New Jersey, although
their country was much exhausted, the supplies required were instantly
furnished, and a temporary relief obtained.
The patient and uncomplaining fortitude with which the soldiers bore
their sufferings, was strong evidence of their patriotism, and could
not fail to make a deep impression on their general. But while their
virtues excited his sensibilities, he expressed his fears very freely
to congress, that they might be too severely tried.
The unusual severity of the winter, seemed to furnish an opportunity
for active enterprise, which the Commander-in-chief observed, without
being able to improve. The garrison of New York and its immediate
dependencies, was supposed to be reduced to ten or eleven thousand
effectives; and the security heretofore derived from its insular
situation no longer existed. The ice was so strong that the whole
army, with its train of wagons and artillery, might pass over without
danger. This circumstance afforded a glorious occasion for striking a
blow, which, if successful, would most probably terminate the war.
The effort would seem not to have exceeded the strength of America,
could that strength have been exerted in proper season; but the
government possessed neither sufficient energy nor concentration of
power to call it forth; and this opportunity passed away, as many
which present themselves in the course of human affairs, must pass
away, if those who should take advantage of them, only begin to
deliberate about making preparations in the season for action.
The force under the immediate command of General Washington, was
decidedly inferior to that in New York; and so far was he from having
reason to expect immediate reinforcements, that congress had not
agreed on making a requisition for them. In addition to this
feebleness in point of numbers, the soldiers were not half clothed;
provisions for immediate use could be obtained only by contributions
from the people; the quartermaster's department was unable to put an
army in motion; and the military chest did not contain a dollar.
Under the pressure of this combination of discouraging circumstances,
the active mind of Washington still looked forward to the possibility
of deriving some advantage from the exposed situation of his
adversary.
The troops on Staten Island were computed at one thousand or twelve
hundred men; and the firm bridge of ice now uniting that island to
the Jersey shore, seemed to furnish an opportunity for bearing off
this corps. General Washington determined to make the attempt with two
thousand five hundred men, to be commanded by Major General Lord
Stirling. The more distant troops moved down on sleds; and, to favour
a surprise, the opinion was inculcated that they only constituted a
relief for the detachment already on the lines.
[Sidenote: January.]
On the night of the 14th of January, Lord Stirling moved over from De
Hart's point; and, detaching Lieutenant Colonel Willet to Decker's
house, where Buskirk's regiment was stationed, proceeded himself to
the watering place, where the main body was posted. Notwithstanding
the precautions which had been taken, the alarm had been given at each
post, and the troops had saved themselves in their works; so that only
a few prisoners were made. Contrary to the intelligence previously
received, the communication with New York was still open; and the
works appeared too strong to justify the hazard of attempting to carry
them by assault.
[Sidenote: January 17.]
The object of the expedition being unattainable, Lord Stirling
commenced his retreat, which was effected with inconsiderable loss. A
body of cavalry, which charged his rear, was repulsed; but, from the
intenseness of the cold, and the defectiveness of his means to protect
his men from it, some of them were frost bitten, and a few stragglers
were made prisoners.
The excessive cold continuing, the rivers were soon afterwards
completely blocked up. Even arms of the sea were passable on the ice;
and the islands about the mouth of the Hudson, presented the
appearance of one whole and unbroken continent. This state of things
produced a great degree of suffering among all classes in New York.
The supplies usually received by water failed totally, and a great
scarcity of provisions and of fuel was the consequence. To increase
this scarcity, the American troops on the lines were so disposed as to
interrupt the communication between the country and the town; and
these arrangements produced a partisan war, in which the advantage was
rather on the side of the British.
In one of the most important of these skirmishes, Captain Roberts, of
Massachusetts, with fourteen of his men, were killed on the spot;
seventeen were wounded, of whom three died in a few days; and
Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, of Massachusetts, who commanded the
party, two captains, four subalterns, and ninety non-commissioned
officers and privates were made prisoners.
The emission of the full sum of two hundred millions of dollars in
continental bills of credit, which congress had solemnly resolved not
to exceed, had been completed in November, 1779, and the money was
expended. The requisitions on the states to replenish the treasury by
taxes were not fully complied with; and, had they even been strictly
observed, would not have produced a sum equal to the public
expenditure. It was therefore necessary to devise other measures for
the prosecution of the war. During the distresses which brought the
army to the brink of dissolution, these measures were under
consideration. So early as December, 1779, congress had determined to
change the mode of supplying the army from purchases to requisitions
of specific articles on the several states. As preliminary to this
system, commissioners were appointed to make the estimates, and to
introduce every practicable reform in the expenditures. This subject
was under deliberation until the 25th of February, when sundry
resolutions were passed, apportioning on the states their respective
quotas of provisions, spirits, and forage, for the ensuing campaign.
The value of the several articles was estimated in specie; and
assurances were given that accounts between the states should be
regularly kept, and finally settled in Spanish milled dollars.
For the purpose of inducing and facilitating a compliance with these
requisitions, congress also resolved, "that any state which shall have
taken the necessary measures for furnishing its quota, and have given
notice thereof to congress, shall be authorized to prohibit any
continental quartermaster or commissary from purchasing within its
limits."
These resolutions, constituting the basis of a new system on which the
future subsistence of the army was essentially to depend, were too
deeply interesting not to receive the anxious attention of the
Commander-in-chief. With regret, he communicated to congress the
radical defects he perceived in their arrangements, with his
apprehensions that this untried scheme would fail in practice.
His judgment, and the judgment of all men engaged in high and
responsible situations, was decidedly in favour of conducting the war
on a national rather than on a state system. But, independent of this
radical objection, economy had been so much more consulted than the
probable necessities of the army, that, in almost every article, the
estimate had fallen far short of the demand to be reasonably expected.
The total omission to provide means for supplying occasional
deficiencies from the surplus resources of any particular state, was
an error of still greater magnitude. It was obvious that the demand in
any state which should become the theatre of war, would be much
greater than its quota; and experience had shown that the carriage of
specific articles from distant places was always difficult and
expensive, and sometimes impracticable. Yet no means were adopted to
supply such extraordinary demand, whatever might be the resources of
the country. A still more radical objection to the system was the
principle, enabling any state which should take means to comply with
the requisition, and should notify those means to the government of
the United States, to prohibit the continental agents from making any
purchases within its territory. Among the states which adopted the
proposition of congress was New Jersey, in which the largest division
of the army was stationed. Its legislature passed an act prohibiting
the purchase of provisions within its jurisdiction by the staff of the
continental line, under severe penalties; and refused to authorize its
own agents to provide for any emergency however pressing. It was an
additional objection to these requisitions, that they specified no
periods of the year within which certain portions of the articles
demanded should be raised, and consequently might be complied with,
although the army should be left destitute of every necessary for a
considerable part of the campaign.
These suggestions, however, with others less material to the military
operations, did not receive the attention which was due to their
importance. A disposition in the members of congress, growing
inevitably out of the organization of the government, to consult the
will of their respective states, and to prefer that will to any other
object, had discovered itself at an early period, and had gained
strength with time. The state of the national treasury was calculated
to promote this disposition. It was empty, and could be replenished
only by taxes, which congress had not the power to impose; or by new
emissions of bills of credit, which the government had pledged the
public faith not to make, and which would rest for their redemption
only on that faith, which would be violated in the very act of their
emission. Under these circumstances, it required a degree of energy
seldom found, to struggle with surrounding difficulties for the
preservation of a general system, and to resist the temptation to
throw the nation at the feet of the states, in whom the vital
principle of power, the right to levy taxes, was exclusively vested.
While the continental currency preserved its value, this essential
defect of the constitution was, in some measure, concealed. The
facility with which money was obtained from the press, was a temporary
substitute for the command of the resources of the country. But when
this expedient failed, it was scarcely possible to advance a single
step, but under the guidance of the respective states.
[Sidenote: Financial regulations.]
Whatever might be the future effect of this system, it was
impracticable to bring it into immediate operation. The legislatures
of the several states, by whom it was to be adopted, and carried into
execution, were, many of them, not then in session; and were to meet
at different times through the ensuing spring. It was consequently to
be expected that great part of the summer would pass away before the
supplies to be raised by the measure, could be brought into use. In
the mean time, and until a new scheme of finance, which accompanied
the requisition of specific articles, should be tried, there was no
regular provision for the army. Bills to the amount of £100,000
sterling, payable at six months' sight, were drawn on Mr. Jay, and
others to the same amount, on Mr. Laurens, who were empowered to
negotiate loans in Europe. These bills were sold in small sums on
pressing occasions; and the loan offices remained open for the purpose
of borrowing from individuals.
This new scheme of finance was a second essay to substitute credit
unsupported by solid funds, and resting solely on the public faith,
for money.
The vast quantity of bills unavoidably emitted before the
establishment of regular governments possessing sufficient energy to
enforce the collection of taxes, or to provide for their redemption,
and before the governments of Europe were sufficiently confident of
their stability to afford them aid or credit, was assigned by congress
as the principal cause of that depreciation which had taken place in
the continental currency. The United States were now, they said, under
different circumstances. Their independence was secure; their civil
governments were established and vigorous; and the spirit of their
citizens ardent for exertion. The government being thus rendered
competent to the object, it was necessary to reduce the quantity of
paper in circulation, and to appropriate funds that should ensure the
punctual redemption of the bills.
For these purposes, the several states were required to continue to
bring into the continental treasury, monthly, from February to April
inclusive, their full quotas of fifteen millions of dollars. In
complying with this requisition, one Spanish milled dollar was to be
received in lieu of forty dollars of the paper currency.
The bills so brought in were not to be reissued, but destroyed; and
other bills, not to exceed one dollar for every twenty received in
discharge of taxes, were to be emitted.
These bills were to be redeemable within six years, and were to bear
an interest of five _per centum per annum_, to be paid at the time of
their redemption in specie, or, at the election of the holder,
annually, in bills of exchange drawn by the United States on their
commissioners in Europe, at four shillings and six pence sterling for
each dollar. They were to be issued in ascertained proportions on the
funds of the several states, with a collateral security on the part of
the government, to pay the quota of any particular state, which the
events of the war might render incapable of complying with its own
engagements. The bills were to be deposited in the continental
loan-offices of the several states, and were to be signed only as the
money then in circulation should be brought in by taxes or otherwise.
After being signed, six-tenths of them were to be delivered to the
states on whose funds they were to be issued, and the remaining
four-tenths to be retained for the use of the continent.
The operation of this scheme of finance was necessarily suspended by
the same causes which suspended that for requiring specific articles.
It depended on the sanction and co-operation of the several state
legislatures, many of which were yet to convene.
As it would be impracticable to maintain the value of the money about
to be emitted, should the states continue to issue bills of credit,
they were earnestly requested to suspend future emissions, and to call
the current paper out of circulation. But the time for this measure
was not yet arrived, and many of the states continued the use of the
press till late in the following year.
The establishment of the army for the ensuing campaign was fixed at
thirty-five thousand two hundred and eleven men, and the measures for
recruiting it were founded on the state system, which was become
entirely predominant.
The few intelligent statesmen who could combine practical good sense
with patriotism, perceived the dangerous inefficacy of a system which
openly abandoned the national character, and proceeded on the
principle that the American confederacy was no more than an alliance
of independent nations.
That great delays would be experienced, that the different parts of
the plan would be acted on too unequally and too uncertainly to
furnish a solid basis for military calculations, that the system would
be totally deranged in its execution, were mischiefs foreseen and
lamented by many, as resulting inevitably from a course of measures to
which the government of the Union was under the painful necessity of
submitting.
"Certain I am," said the Commander-in-chief, in a confidential letter
to a member of the national legislature, "that unless congress speaks
in a more decisive tone; unless they are vested with powers by the
several states, competent to the great purposes of the war, or assume
them as matter of right, and they and the states respectively act with
more energy than they hitherto have done, our cause is lost. We can no
longer drudge on in the old way. By ill-timing the adoption of
measures; by delays in the execution of them, or by unwarrantable
jealousies; we incur enormous expenses, and derive no benefit from
them. One state will comply with a requisition from congress; another
neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ in
the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are all
working up hill; and, while such a system as the present one, or
rather want of one, prevails, we ever shall be unable to apply our
strength or resources to any advantage.
"This, my dear sir, is plain language to a member of congress; but it
is the language of truth and friendship. It is the result of long
thinking, close application, and strict observation. I see one head
gradually changing into thirteen; I see one army branching into
thirteen; and, instead of looking up to congress as the supreme
controlling power of the United States, consider themselves as
dependent on their respective states. In a word, I see the power of
congress declining too fast for the respect which is due to them as
the great representative body of America, and am fearful of the
consequences."
But whatever might be his objections to the proposed system, General
Washington was unremitting in his endeavours to render the plan
perfect in detail, and to give to its execution all the aid which his
situation and influence enabled him to afford.
The distresses of the army for food, which had found temporary relief
in the particular exertions of the magistrates and people of New
Jersey, soon returned; and it became once more necessary, even after
the magazines had been in some degree replenished, to recur to the
same persons for assistance. The supplies of forage had failed, and a
great proportion of the horses had perished, or been rendered unfit
for use. Neither funds nor credit were possessed for the purchase of
others, and the quarter-master-general found himself unable to
transport provisions from remote magazines into camp. This
circumstance reduced the Commander-in-chief to the painful necessity
of calling on the patriotism of private citizens, under the penalty of
a military impressment, should a voluntary contribution be refused,
for those means of conveyance which the government could not supply.
The want of food was not the only difficulty to be surmounted. Others
of a serious nature presented themselves. The pay of an officer was
reduced by the depreciation of the currency, to such a miserable
pittance as to be unequal to the supply of the most moderate demands.
The pay of a major general would no longer hire an express rider, and
that of a captain would not purchase the shoes in which he marched.
The American officers were not rich; and many of them had expended
their _little all_ in the service. If they had exhausted their private
funds, or if they possessed none, they could rely only on the state to
which they belonged for such clothing as the state might be willing or
able to furnish. These supplies were so insufficient and unequal, as
to produce extreme dissatisfaction. In the lines of some of the
states, the officers gave notice in a body, of their determination to
resign on a given day, if some decent and certain provision should not
be made for them. The remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief produced
an offer to serve as volunteers until their successors should be
appointed; and, on the rejection of this proposition, they were with
difficulty induced to remain in service.
Under these complicated embarrassments, it required all that
enthusiastic patriotism which pre-eminently distinguishes the soldier
of principle; all that ardent attachment to the cause of their country
which originally brought them into the field, and which their
sufferings could not diminish; all the influence of the
Commander-in-chief, whom they almost adored; to retain in the service
men who felt themselves neglected, and who believed themselves to be
the objects of the jealousy of their country, rather than of its
gratitude.
Among the privates, causes of disgust grew out of the very composition
of the army, which increased the dissatisfaction produced by their
multiplied wants.
The first effort made to enlist troops for the war had, in some
degree, succeeded. While these men found themselves obliged to
continue in service without compensation, and often without the common
necessaries of life, they perceived the vacant ranks in their
regiments filled up by men who were to continue only for a few months,
and who received bounties for that short service, from individuals or
from the states, which were of great real value, and which appeared to
soldiers not acquainted with the actual state of depreciation, to be
immense. They could not fail to compare situations, and to repine at
engagements which deprived them of advantages which they saw in
possession of others. Many were induced to contest those
engagements;[36] many to desert a service in which they experienced
such irritating inequalities; and all felt with the more poignant
indignation, those distressing failures in the commissary department,
which so frequently recurred.
[Footnote 36: In some instances, the civil power of the state in which
such soldiers happened to be, attempted to interfere and to discharge
even those belonging to the lines of other states, who asserted their
right to be discharged. It was with some difficulty the general could
arrest this dangerous interposition.]
[Sidenote: Committee of Congress deputed to camp.]
In consequence of the strong representations made to congress on these
various causes of disquiet, a committee of three members repaired to
camp for the purpose of consulting with the Commander-in-chief on such
arrangements as the means in possession of the government would enable
it to make, and the present state of the army might require. In
representing the condition of the troops, they said, "That the army
was unpaid for five months; that it seldom had more than six days'
provisions in advance, and was on several occasions, for several
successive days, without meat; that the army was destitute of forage;
that the medical department had neither tea, chocolate, wine, nor
spirituous liquors of any kind; that every department of the army was
without money, and had not even the shadow of credit left; that the
patience of the soldiers, borne down by the pressure of complicated
sufferings, was on the point of being exhausted."
To relieve this gloomy state of things by transfusing into it a ray of
hope for the future, a resolution was passed, declaring that congress
would make good to the line of the army, and to the independent corps
thereof, the deficiency of their original pay, which had been
occasioned by the depreciation of the continental currency; and that
the money or other articles heretofore received, should be considered
as advanced on account, to be comprehended in the settlement to be
finally made. The benefits of this resolution were confined to those
who were then in actual service, or should thereafter come into it,
and who were engaged for the war or for three years.
This resolution was published in general orders, and had considerable
influence on the army, but not sufficient to remove the various causes
of dissatisfaction which existed, and were continually multiplying.
The engagement to make good the depreciation of their pay, was an act
of justice too long withheld; and no promise for the future, could
supply the place of present comfortable subsistence. No hope was
given that their condition, in this respect, would be improved. For a
considerable time, the troops received only from one-half to
one-eighth of a ration of meat; and, at length, were several days
without a single pound of that necessary article.
This long course of suffering had unavoidably produced some relaxation
of discipline, and had gradually soured the minds of the soldiers to
such a degree, that their discontents broke out into actual mutiny.
[Sidenote: May 25.]
On the 25th of May, two regiments belonging to Connecticut paraded
under arms with a declared resolution to return home, or to obtain
subsistence at the point of the bayonet. The soldiers of the other
regiments, though not actually joining the mutineers, showed no
disposition to suppress the mutiny. By great exertions on the part of
the officers, aided by the appearance of a neighbouring brigade of
Pennsylvania, then commanded by Colonel Stewart, the leaders were
secured, and the two regiments brought back to their duty. Some
sentiments, however, were disclosed by the soldiers, in answer to the
remonstrances of their officers, of a serious and alarming nature.
Their pay was now five months in arrear, and the depreciation of the
money, they said, was such, that it would be worth nothing when
received. When reminded of the late resolution of congress for making
good the loss sustained by depreciation, of the reputation acquired by
their past good conduct, and of the value of the object for which
they were contending; they answered that their sufferings were too
great to be longer supported; that they wanted present relief; and
must have some present substantial recompense for their services. A
paper was found in the brigade, which appeared to have been brought by
some emissary from New York, stimulating the troops to the abandonment
of the cause in which they were engaged.
[Sidenote: June 6.]
[Sidenote: General Knyphausen enters Jersey.]
The discontents of the army, and the complaints excited in the country
by the frequent requisitions on the people of New Jersey, had been
communicated, with such exaggeration, to the officer commanding in New
York, as to induce the opinion that the American soldiers were ready
to desert their standards; and the people of New Jersey to change
their government. To countenance these dispositions, General
Knyphausen embarked at Staten Island, and landed in the night with
about five thousand men at Elizabethtown Point, in New Jersey. Early
next morning he marched towards Springfield, by the way of Connecticut
Farms, but soon perceived that the real temper, both of the country
and the army, had been misunderstood.
On the appearance of the enemy, the militia assembled with alacrity,
and aided the small patrolling parties of continental troops in
harassing him on his march from Elizabethtown to the Connecticut
Farms, a distance of five or six miles, where a halt was made. In a
spirit of revenge, unworthy the general of an army, more in the
character of Tryon who was present, than of Knyphausen who commanded,
this settlement was reduced to ashes.[37]
[Footnote 37: This circumstance would scarcely have deserved notice
had it not been accompanied by one of those melancholy events, which
even war does not authorize, and which made, at the time, a very deep
impression.
Mrs. Caldwell, the wife of the clergyman of the village, had been
induced to remain in her house, under the persuasion that her presence
might protect it from pillage, and that her person could not be
endangered, as Colonel Dayton who commanded the militia determined not
to stop in the settlement. While sitting in the midst of her children,
with a sucking infant in her arms, a soldier came up to the window and
discharged his musket at her. She received the ball in her bosom, and
instantly expired.]
From the Farms, Knyphausen proceeded to Springfield. The Jersey
brigade, commanded by General Maxwell, and the militia of the adjacent
country, took an advantageous position at that place, and seemed
determined to defend it. Knyphausen halted in its neighbourhood, and
remained on his ground until night.
Having received intelligence of this movement, General Washington put
his army in motion early in the same morning that Knyphausen marched
from Elizabethtown Point, and advanced to the Short Hills, in the rear
of Springfield, while the British were in the neighbourhood of that
place. Dispositions were made for an engagement the next morning, but
Knyphausen retired in the night to the place of his disembarkation.
General Washington continued on the hills near Springfield, too weak
to hazard an engagement, but on ground chosen by himself. His
continental troops did not exceed three thousand men. A return of the
whole army under his immediate command, made on the 3d of June,
exhibited in the column, of present, fit for duty, only three thousand
seven hundred and sixty, rank and file. So reduced was that force on
which America relied for independence. "You but too well know," said
General Washington in a letter to a friend, giving an account of this
incursion, "and will regret with me the cause which justifies this
insulting manoeuvre on the part of the enemy. It deeply affects the
honour of the states, a vindication of which could not be attempted in
our present circumstances, without most intimately hazarding their
security; at least so far as it may depend on the preservation of the
army. Their character, their interest, their all that is dear, call
upon them in the most pressing manner, to place the army immediately
on a respectable footing."
The long continuance of Knyphausen at Elizabethtown, strengthened a
suspicion that Sir Henry Clinton was about to return from South
Carolina, and intended, without disembarking his troops, to proceed up
the Hudson to West Point; and that the movement into Jersey was a
feint designed to cover the real object.
The letters of the Commander-in-chief, addressed about this period, to
those who might be supposed to possess influence in the government of
the Union, or in those of the states, exhibit his conjectures
respecting the designs of his adversary, as well as his apprehensions
from the condition of his own army. To the committee of congress, in
camp, he observed, "General Knyphausen still continues in the Jerseys
with all the force which can be spared from New York, a force greatly
superior to ours. Should Sir Henry join him, their superiority will be
decided, and equal to almost any thing they may think proper to
attempt. The enemy, it is true, are at this time inactive; but their
continuance in their present position proves that they have some
project of importance in contemplation. Perhaps they are only waiting
until the militia grow tired and return home, (which they are doing
every hour,) to prosecute their designs with the less opposition. This
would be a critical moment for us. Perhaps they are waiting the
arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, either to push up the North River
against the Highland posts, or to bend their whole force against this
army. In either case, the most disastrous consequences are to be
apprehended. You, who are well acquainted with our situation, need no
arguments to evince the danger.
"The militia of this state have run to arms, and behaved with an
ardour and spirit of which there are few examples. But perseverance,
in enduring the rigours of military service, is not to be expected
from those who are not by profession obliged to it. The reverse of
this opinion has been a great misfortune in our affairs, and it is
high time we should recover from an error of so pernicious a nature.
We must absolutely have a force of a different composition, or we must
relinquish the contest. In a few days, we may expect to rely almost
entirely on our continental force, and this, from your own
observation, is totally inadequate to our safety. The exigency calls
loudly on the states to carry all the recommendations of the committee
into the most vigorous and immediate execution; but more particularly
that for completing our batteries by a draught with all possible
expedition."
[Sidenote: June 18.]
[Sidenote: Sir Henry Clinton returns to New York.]
In this precise state of things, he received intelligence of the
return of Sir Henry Clinton from the conquest of South Carolina.
The regular force in New York and its dependencies was now estimated
at twelve thousand men, great part of whom might be drawn into the
field for any particular purpose, because Sir Henry Clinton could
command about four thousand militia and refugees for garrison duty.
In communicating to congress the appearance of the British fleet off
the Hook, General Washington observed, "a very alarming scene may
shortly open, and it will be happy for us if we shall be able to
steer clear of some serious misfortune in this quarter. I hope the
period has not yet arrived, which will convince the different states
by fatal experience, that some of them have mistaken the true
situation of this country. I flatter myself, however, that we may
still retrieve our affairs if we have but a just sense of them, and
are actuated by a spirit of liberal policy and exertion equal to the
emergency. Could we once see this spirit generally prevailing, I
should not despair of a prosperous issue of the campaign. But there is
no time to be lost. The danger is imminent and pressing; the obstacles
to be surmounted are great and numerous; and our efforts must be
instant, unreserved, and universal."
On the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton, the design of acting offensively
in the Jerseys was resumed; but, to divide the American army,
demonstrations were made of an intention to seize West Point. To be in
readiness for either object, General Greene was left at Springfield
with two brigades of continental troops, and with the Jersey militia;
while, with the greater part of his army, General Washington proceeded
slowly towards Pompton, watching attentively the movements of the
British, and apparently unwilling to separate himself too far from
Greene. He had not marched farther than Rockaway, eleven miles beyond
Morristown, when the British army advanced from Elizabethtown towards
Springfield in great force. General Washington detached a brigade to
hang on their right flank, and returned with the residue of his army
five or six miles, in order to be in a situation to support Greene.
[Sidenote: June.]
[Sidenote: Skirmish at Springfield.]
Early in the morning of the 23d, the British army moved in two
columns, with great rapidity, towards Springfield. Major Lee was
advanced on the Vauxhall road, which was taken by the right column;
and Colonel Dayton on the direct road, which was taken by the left.
Both these corps made every possible exertion to check the advancing
enemy, while General Greene concentrated his little army at
Springfield. Scarcely had he made his dispositions, when the British
front appeared, and a cannonade commenced between their van and the
American artillery which defended a bridge over Rahway, a small river
running east of the town, which was guarded by Colonel Angel with less
than two hundred men. Colonel Shreve was posted at a second bridge,
also over a branch of the Rahway, in order to cover the retreat of
Angel from the first. Major Lee with his dragoons and the piquets
under Captain Walker, supported by Colonel Ogden, was directed to
defend a bridge on the Vauxhall road. The residue of the continental
troops were drawn up on high ground, in the rear of the town, with the
militia on their flanks.
The right column of the British advanced on Lee, who disputed the
passage of the bridge until a considerable body of the enemy forded
the river above him, and gained the point of a hill which endangered
his position. At this instant, their left attacked Colonel Angel, who
defended himself with persevering gallantry. The conflict was sharp,
and was maintained for about half an hour, when, compelled by superior
numbers to give way, he retired in good order, and brought off his
wounded. His retreat was covered by Colonel Shreve, who, after Angel
had passed him, was ordered by General Greene to join his brigade. The
English then took possession of the town and reduced it to ashes.
The obstinate resistance which had been encountered; the gallantry and
discipline displayed by the continental troops who had been engaged;
the strength of Greene's position; the firm countenance maintained by
his troops, small detachments of whom kept up a continual skirmishing
with a view to save a part of the town; all contributed to deter Sir
Henry Clinton from a farther prosecution of his original plan. He
withdrew that afternoon to Elizabethtown; and, in the following night,
passed over to Staten Island. It is probable that the caution
manifested during this expedition is to be ascribed to the
intelligence that a formidable fleet and army from France was daily
expected on the coast.
When the Marquis de Lafayette obtained permission to visit his native
country, he retained, with his rank in the American army, that zeal
for the interests of the United States, which the affectionate
attentions he had received, and the enthusiasm of a soldier in the
cause of those for whom he had made his first campaigns, were
calculated to inspire in a young and generous mind, in favour of an
infant people, struggling for liberty and self-government with the
hereditary rival of his nation.
He was received at the court of Versailles with every mark of favour
and distinction;[38] and all his influence was employed in impressing
on the cabinet, the importance and policy of granting succours to the
United States.
[Footnote 38: After he had visited the ministers, an arrest of eight
days, during which he resided with his relation the Marshal de
Noailles, was imposed on him for the sake of form and in honour of the
royal authority, which he had disregarded by proceeding to America.
After the expiration of this term he presented himself to the King,
who graciously said he pardoned his disobedience, in consideration of
his good conduct and of his services.--_Letter from Gen. Lafayette._]
[Sidenote: Lafayette brings intelligence of aid from France.]
[Sidenote: Exertions of Congress and of the Commander-in-chief to
strengthen the army.]
Having succeeded in this favourite object, and finding no probability
of active employment on the continent of Europe, he obtained
permission to return to America. He arrived late in April at Boston,
and hastened to head quarters; whence he proceeded to the seat of
Government with the information that his most Christian Majesty had
consented to employ a considerable land and naval armament in the
United States, for the ensuing campaign. This intelligence gave a new
impulse both to congress and the state legislatures. The states from
New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive were required to pay, within
thirty days, ten millions of dollars, part of their quotas which
became due on the first of March; and specie bills to the amount of
fifty thousand dollars were drawn on Messieurs Franklin and Jay. These
sums were sacredly appropriated to the objects of bringing the army
into the field, and forwarding their supplies.
The defects in the requisition system, which had been suggested by
General Washington, were corrected; and the committee in camp, at the
head of which was the late General Schuyler, was empowered, at the
request of the Commander-in-chief, to take such measures as were in
the power of congress, for drawing out the resources of the nation.
To give effect to these resolutions, the several state legislatures
from New Hampshire to Virginia inclusive, were requested to invest the
Executives, or some other persons, with powers sufficiently ample to
comply with such applications as might be made to them by the
committee in camp, and a circular letter was addressed to the state
governments, urging them to second the efforts of Congress.
Letters equally stimulating were written by the committee from camp;
and the well earned influence of the Commander-in-chief was also
employed to induce an exertion proportioned to the crisis. In addition
to those incentives which might operate on ardent minds, he
endeavoured, by a temperate review of the situation and resources of
the belligerent powers, to convince the judgment that America would
have real cause to fear the issue of the contest, should she neglect
to improve the advantage to be afforded by the succours expected from
France.[39]
[Footnote 39: See note No. III. at the end of the volume.]
Under the impressions produced by these representations, the state
legislatures, generally, passed the laws which were required; but the
energy displayed in their passage was not maintained in their
execution. In general, the assemblies followed the example of
congress, and apportioned on the several counties or towns within the
state, the quota to be furnished by each. This division of the state
was again to be subdivided into classes, each of which was to furnish
a man by contributions or taxes imposed upon itself.
[Sidenote: Tardy proceedings of the states.]
These operations were slow and unproductive.
It was not on the state sovereignties only that beneficial effects
were produced by a candid statement of public affairs, several
patriotic individuals contributed largely from their private funds to
the aid of the public. The merchants, and other citizens of
Philadelphia, with a zeal guided by that sound discretion which turns
expenditure to the best account, established a bank, for the support
of which they subscribed £315,000, Pennsylvania money, to be paid, if
required, in specie, the principal object of which was to supply the
army with provisions and rum. By the plan of this bank, its members
were to derive no emolument whatever from the institution. For
advancing their credit and their money, they required only that
congress should pledge the faith of the Union to reimburse the costs
and charges of the transaction in a reasonable time, and should give
such assistance to its execution as might be in their power.
The ladies of Philadelphia too gave a splendid example of patriotism,
by large donations for the immediate relief of the suffering army.
This example was extensively followed;[40] but it is not by the
contributions of the generous that a war can or ought to be
maintained. The purse of the nation alone can supply the expenditures
of a nation; and, when all are interested in a contest, all ought to
contribute to its support. Taxes, and taxes only, can furnish for the
prosecution of a national war, means which are just in themselves, or
competent to the object. Notwithstanding these donations, the
distresses of the army, for clothing especially, still continued; and
were the more severely felt when a co-operation with French troops was
expected. So late as the 20th of June, General Washington informed
congress, that he still laboured under the painful and humiliating
embarrassment of having no shirts for the soldiers, many of whom were
destitute of that necessary article. "For the troops to be without
clothing at any time," he added, "is highly injurious to the service,
and distressing to our feelings; but the want will be more peculiarly
mortifying when they come to act with those of our allies. If it be
possible, I have no doubt, immediate measures will be taken to relieve
their distress.
[Footnote 40: This instance of patriotism on the part of our fair and
amiable countrywomen, is far from being single. Their conduct
throughout the war was uniform. They shared with cheerfulness and
gaiety, the privations and sufferings to which the distress of the
times exposed their country. In every stage of this severe trial, they
displayed virtues which have not been always attributed to their sex,
but which it is believed they will, on every occasion calculated to
unfold them, be found to possess. With a ready acquiescence, with a
firmness always cheerful, and a constancy never lamenting the
sacrifices which were made, they not only yielded up all the
elegancies, delicacies, and even conveniences to be furnished by
wealth and commerce, relying on their farms and on domestic industry
for every article of food and raiment, but, consenting to share the
produce of their own labour, they gave up without regret, a
considerable portion of the covering designed for their own families,
to supply the wants of the distressed soldiers; and heroically
suppressed the involuntary sigh which the departure of their brothers,
their sons, and their husbands, for the camp, rended from their
bosoms.]
"It is also most sincerely wished, that there could be some supplies
of clothing furnished to the officers. There are a great many whose
condition is still miserable. This is, in some instances, the case
with the whole lines of the states. It would be well for their own
sakes, and for the public good, if they could be furnished. They will
not be able, when our friends come to co-operate with us, to go on a
common routine of duty; and if they should, they must, from their
appearance, be held in low estimation."
This picture presents in strong colours, the real patriotism of the
American army. One heroic effort, though it may dazzle the mind with
its splendour, is an exertion most men are capable of making; but
continued patient suffering and unremitting perseverance, in a service
promising no personal emolument, and exposing the officer unceasingly,
not only to wants of every kind, but to those circumstances of
humiliation which seem to degrade him in the eyes of others,
demonstrate a fortitude of mind, a strength of virtue, and a firmness
of principle, which ought never to be forgotten.
As the several legislative acts for bringing the army into the field,
did not pass until the months of June and July, General Washington
remained uninformed of the force on which he might rely, and was
consequently unable to form any certain plan of operations.
This suspense was the more cruelly embarrassing, as, in the event of
an attempt upon New York, it was of the utmost importance that the
French fleet should, on its arrival, take possession of the harbour,
which was then weakly defended. But, should this measure be followed
by a failure to furnish the requisite support, it would not only be
ineffectual; but, in a very possible state of things, might sacrifice
the fleet itself.
Should it be ascertained that the states were either unable or
unwilling to make the exertions necessary for the siege of New York,
other objects presented themselves against which the allied arms might
be turned to advantage. To avoid the disgrace and danger of attempting
what could not be effected, and the reproach of neglecting any
attainable object, were equally desirable, and equally required a
correct knowledge of the measures which would be taken by the states.
In a letter to congress communicating his anxiety on this interesting
subject, and his total want of information respecting it, General
Washington observed, "The season is come when we have every reason to
expect the arrival of the fleet, and yet, for want of this point of
primary consequence, it is impossible for me to form a system of
co-operation. I have no basis to act upon; and, of course, were this
generous succour of our ally now to arrive, I should find myself in
the most awkward, embarrassing, and painful situation. The general and
the admiral, from the relation in which I stand, as soon as they
approach our coast, will require of me a plan of the measures to be
pursued, and there ought of right to be one prepared; but
circumstanced as I am, I can not even give them conjectures. From
these considerations, I have suggested to the committee, by a letter I
had the honour of addressing them yesterday, the indispensable
necessity of their writing again to the states, urging them to give
immediate and precise information of the measures they have taken and
of the result. The interest of the states, the honour and reputation
of our councils, the justice and gratitude due to our allies, all
require that I should, without delay, be enabled to ascertain and
inform them, what we can or can not undertake. There is a point which
ought now to be determined, on the success of which all our future
operations may depend, on which, for want of knowing our prospects, I
can make no decision. For fear of involving the fleet and army of our
allies in circumstances which would expose them, if not seconded by
us, to material inconvenience and hazard, I shall be compelled to
suspend it, and the delay may be fatal to our hopes."
The tardy proceedings of the states were not less perplexing to
congress than to the Commander-in-chief. To the minister of his most
Christian Majesty, who had in the preceding January communicated the
probability of receiving succour from France, that body, without
calculating accurately the means of complying with its engagements,
had pledged itself unequivocally for effectual co-operation. The
minister was assured, that the United States had expectations on which
they could rely with confidence, of bringing into the field, for the
next campaign, an army of twenty-five thousand men; and that such
numbers of militia might be added to this continental force, as would
render it competent to any enterprise against the posts occupied by
the British within the United States.
Assurances were also given that ample supplies of provisions for the
combined armies should be laid up in magazines under the direction of
congress. The French minister addressed congress on this subject about
the time that General Washington expressed so strongly, the necessity
of knowing with certainty, on what reinforcements he was to calculate.
Thus pressed by their general and their ally, congress renewed their
urgent requisitions on the states, and desired the several governments
to correspond weekly with the committee at head quarters, on the
progress made in complying with them.
In the mean time, General Washington meditated unceasingly on the
course to be pursued in the various contingencies which might happen;
and endeavoured to prepare for any plan of operations which
circumstances might render adviseable. The arrival of Sir Henry
Clinton diminished the variety of aspects in which the relative
situation of the two armies was to be contemplated, and rendered the
success of an attempt on New York more doubtful. It was now thought
adviseable that the armament from France, instead of sailing directly
to the Hook, should proceed in the first instance to Rhode Island;
where, after disembarking the troops, and providing for the sick, it
might wait until a definitive plan of operations should be concerted.
[Sidenote: July 13.]
[Sidenote: Arrival of a French armament in Rhode Island.]
On the 13th of July, while the result of the measures adopted by the
several states remained uncertain, the French fleet entered the
harbour of Newport, and letters were soon afterwards received from the
Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Tunay, the officers commanding
the land and naval forces, transmitting to General Washington an
account of their arrival, of their strength, their expectations, and
their orders.
The troops designed to serve in the United States had assembled, early
in the year, at Brest; but the transports at that place having been
chiefly employed for an armament destined for the West Indies; and the
ports from which it had been intended to draw others, being blockaded,
only the first division, consisting of five thousand men, had arrived
at Newport; but letters from France contained assurances that the
second division of the army might soon be expected.
To obviate those difficulties which had occurred on former occasions
respecting rank, the orders given to Lieutenant General Count de
Rochambeau, which were inclosed in his first letter, placed him
entirely under the command of General Washington. The French troops
were to be considered as auxiliaries, and were, according to the
usages of war, to cede the post of honour to the Americans.[41]
[Footnote 41: These orders were given at the instance of General
Lafayette.--_Correspondence with General Lafayette._]
Convinced that cordial harmony between the allied forces was essential
to their success, both generals cultivated carefully the friendly
dispositions felt by the troops towards each other. Warm professions
of reciprocal respect, esteem, and confidence, were interchanged
between them; and each endeavoured to impress on the other, and on all
the military and civil departments, the conviction that the two
nations, and two armies, were united by the ties of interest and
affection. On this occasion, General Washington recommended to his
officers, as a symbol of friendship and affection for their allies, to
engraft on the American cockade, which was black, a white relief, that
being the colour of the French cockade.
Late as was the arrival of the French troops, they found the Americans
unprepared for active and offensive operations. Not even at that time
were the numbers ascertained which would be furnished by the states.
Yet it was necessary for General Washington to communicate a plan of
the campaign to the Count de Rochambeau.
The season was already so far advanced that preparations for the
operations contemplated eventually, on the arrival of the second
division of the French fleet, must be immediately made, or there
would not be time, though every circumstance should prove favourable,
to execute the design against New York. Such a state of things so ill
comported with the engagements of congress, and with the interests of
the nation, that, trusting to his being enabled, by the measures
already taken by the states, to comply with what was incumbent on him
to perform, he determined to hazard much rather than forego the
advantages to be derived from the aids afforded by France. In
communicating this resolution to congress, he said--"Pressed on all
sides by a choice of difficulties in a moment which required decision,
I have adopted that line of conduct which comported with the dignity
and faith of congress, the reputation of these states, and the honour
of our arms. I have sent on definitive proposals of co-operation to
the French general and admiral. Neither the period of the season, nor
a regard to decency, would permit delay. The die is cast, and it
remains with the states either to fulfil their engagements, preserve
their credit, and support their independence, or to involve us in
disgrace and defeat. Notwithstanding the failures pointed out by the
committee, I shall proceed on the supposition that they will,
ultimately, consult their own interest and honour and not suffer us to
fail for the want of means which it is evidently in their power to
afford. What has been done, and is doing, by some of the states,
confirms the opinion I have entertained of sufficient resources in the
country. Of the disposition of the people to submit to any arrangement
for bringing them forth, I see no reasonable ground to doubt. If we
fail for want of proper exertions in any of the governments, I trust
the responsibility will fall where it ought; and that I shall stand
justified to congress, my country, and the world."
[Illustration: Beverly Robinson Mansion at West Point
_Benedict Arnold made this house his headquarters while in command of
the fort and garrison there. It was here that Washington came to
breakfast with Arnold, one September morning in 1780 and made the
discovery that his host had turned traitor and was conspiring to
surrender West Point to the British._]
A decisive naval superiority, however, was considered as the basis of
any enterprise to be undertaken by the allied arms. This naval
superiority being assumed, the outlines of the plan were drawn, and
the 5th of August was named as the day on which the French troops
should re-embark, and the American army assemble at Morrissania.
This plan was committed to Major General the Marquis de la Fayette,
who was authorized to explain the situation of the American army, and
the views of the General, to the Count de Rochambeau. It was to be
considered as preliminary to any operation--that the fleet and army of
France should continue their aid until the enterprise should succeed,
or be abandoned by mutual consent.
The Chevalier de Tunay did not long maintain his superiority at sea.
Three days after he reached Newport, Admiral Greaves arrived with six
ships of the line, and transferred it to the British. On his
appearance off the Hook, Arbuthnot passed the bar with four ships of
the line; and hearing that De Tunay had reached Rhode Island,
proceeded thither, and cruised off the harbour. The Count de
Rochambeau had been put into possession of all the forts and batteries
about Newport, and the fleet had been moved in a line so as to
co-operate with the land forces. This position appearing too
formidable to be attempted by the fleet alone, Arbuthnot continued to
cruise off Block Island.
As the commanders of the allied forces still cherished the hope of
acquiring a superiority at sea, the design on New York was only
suspended. This hope was strengthened by intelligence that the Count
de Guichen had been joined in the West Indies by a powerful Spanish
armament. The Chevalier de Tunay had despatched a packet to inform him
that he was blocked up by a superior force, and to solicit such
reinforcements as the situation of the Count might enable him to
spare. Relying on the success of this application, and on the arrival
of the second division of the squadron from Brest, the American
general impatiently expected the moment when De Tunay would be enabled
to act offensively.
In this crisis of affairs, a derangement took place in a most
important department, which threatened to disconcert the whole plan of
operations, though every other circumstance should prove favourable.
The immense expenditure of the quartermaster's department--the
inadequacy of the funds with which it was supplied--the reciprocal
disgusts and complaints produced by these causes, had determined
congress to make still another radical change in the system. This
subject had been taken up early in the winter; but such were the
delays inseparable from the proceedings of the government, that the
report of the committee was not made until the month of March, nor
finally decided on until the middle of July.
This subject was too interesting to the army, and to the important
operations meditated for the campaign, not to engage the anxious
attention of the Commander-in-chief. At his request, the quartermaster
general, while the army lay in winter quarters, repaired to
Philadelphia for the purpose of giving congress all the information he
possessed. He proposed to withdraw the management of the department
almost entirely from the civil government, and to place it under the
control of the person who should be at its head, subject only to the
direction of the Commander-in-chief.
The views of congress were entirely different. While the subject
remained suspended before that body, it was taken up by the committee
of co-operation at head quarters, where the combined experience and
talents of Generals Washington, Schuyler, and Greene, were employed in
digesting a system adapted to the actual situation of the United
States, which was recommended to congress. To give the more weight to
his opinion by showing its disinterestedness, General Greene offered
to continue in the discharge of the duties assigned to him, without
any other extra emolument than his family expenses. This plan,
whatever might have been its details, was, in its general outlines,
unacceptable to congress. A system was, at length, completed by that
body, which General Greene believed to be incapable of execution.
Resolving not to take upon himself the responsibility of measures the
issue of which must be calamitous and disgraceful, he determined to
withdraw from a station in which he despaired of being useful.
Apprehending the worst consequences from his resignation in so
critical a moment, General Washington pressed him to suspend this
decisive step, until the effect of an application from himself and
from the committee of co-operation should be known. Their
representations produced no effect. The resolution to make this bold
experiment was unalterable. General Greene's resignation was accepted;
and the letter conveying it excited so much irritation, that a design
was intimated of suspending his command in the line of the army. But
these impressions soon wore off, and the resentment of the moment
subsided. Colonel Pickering, who succeeded General Greene, possessed,
in an eminent degree, those qualities which fitted him to combat and
subdue the difficulties of his department. To great energy of mind and
body, he added a long experience in the affairs of the continent, with
an ardent zeal for its interests; and General Greene himself, with
several of the former officers, at the request of the
Commander-in-chief, continued for some time after their resignation,
to render all the services in their power; but there was a defect of
means, for which neither talents nor exertion could compensate.
In the commissary department the same distress was experienced.
General Washington was driven to the necessity of emptying the
magazines at West Point, and of foraging on a people whose means of
subsisting themselves were already nearly exhausted by the armies on
both sides. The inadequate supplies drawn from these sources afforded
but a short relief; and, once more, at a time when the public
imagination was contemplating brilliant plans, the execution of which
required steady courage with persevering labour, and consequently
ample magazines, the army was frequently reduced to the last extremity
by the want of food.
So great were the embarrassments produced by the difficulty of
procuring subsistence that, although the second division of the fleet
from Brest was daily expected, General Washington found it necessary
to countermand the orders under which the militia were marching to
camp.
Such was the state of preparation for the campaign, when intelligence
was brought by the Alliance frigate that the port of Brest was
blockaded. In the hope, however, that the combined fleets of France
and Spain would be able to raise the blockade, General Washington
adhered steadily to his purpose respecting New York, and continued his
exertions to provide the means for its execution. The details of the
plan of co-operation continued to be the subject of a correspondence
with the Count de Rochambeau, and the Chevalier de Tunay; and, at
length, a personal interview was agreed upon, to take place on the
21st of September, at Hartford, in Connecticut.
[Sidenote: Enterprise against New York relinquished.]
In this interview, ulterior eventual measures, as well as an explicit
and detailed arrangement for acting against New York, were the
subjects of consideration. No one of the plans, however, then
concerted for the present campaign, was carried into execution. All,
except an invasion of Canada, depended on a superiority at sea, which
was soon rendered almost hopeless by certain information that the
Count de Guichen had sailed for Europe.
[Sidenote: Naval superiority of the British.]
Not long after receiving this information, Admiral Rodney arrived at
New York with eleven ships of the line and four frigates. This
reinforcement not only disconcerted all the plans of the allies, but
put it in the power of the British to prosecute in security their
designs in the south.
[Sidenote: Plans for the campaign abandoned.]
It may well be supposed that the Commander-in-chief did not
relinquish, without infinite chagrin, the sanguine expectations he had
formed of rendering this summer decisive of the war. Never before had
he indulged so strongly the hope of happily terminating the contest.
In a letter to an intimate friend, this chagrin was thus expressed.
"We are now drawing to a close an inactive campaign, the beginning of
which appeared pregnant with events of a very favourable complexion. I
hoped, but I hoped in vain, that a prospect was opening which would
enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and restore me to
domestic life. The favourable disposition of Spain, the promised
succour from France, the combined force in the West Indies, the
declaration of Russia, (acceded to by other powers of Europe,
humiliating the naval pride and power of Great Britain) the
superiority of France and Spain by sea in Europe, the Irish claims and
English disturbances, formed in the aggregate an opinion in my breast,
(which is not very susceptible of peaceful dreams) that the hour of
deliverance was not far distant; for that, however unwilling Great
Britain might be to yield the point, it would not be in her power to
continue the contest. But alas! these prospects, flattering as they
were, have proved delusive; and I see nothing before us but
accumulating distress. We have been half of our time without
provisions, and are likely to continue so. We have no magazines, nor
money to form them. We have lived upon expedients until we can live no
longer. In a word, the history of the war is a history of false hopes
and temporary devices, instead of system and economy. It is in vain,
however, to look back, nor is it our business to do so. Our case is
not desperate, if virtue exists in the people, and there is wisdom
among our rulers. But to suppose that this great revolution can be
accomplished by a temporary army; that this army will be subsisted by
state supplies; and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants, is
in my opinion absurd, and as unreasonable as to expect an inversion of
the order of nature to accommodate itself to our views. If it were
necessary, it could be easily proved to any person of a moderate
understanding, that an annual army, or any army raised on the spur of
the occasion, besides being unqualified for the end designed, is, in
various ways that could be enumerated, ten times more expensive than a
permanent body of men under good organization and military discipline;
which never was, nor will be the case with raw troops. A thousand
arguments, resulting from experience and the nature of things, might
also be adduced to prove that the army, if it is to depend upon state
supplies, must disband or starve, and that taxation alone (especially
at this late hour) can not furnish the means to carry on the war. Is
it not time to retract from error, and benefit by experience? Or do we
want farther proof of the ruinous system we have pertinaciously
adhered to."