war. Privateering consists in robbing of their property unarmed and
unresisting men, engaged in pursuits not only legitimate but highly
useful. It is nothing more nor less than legalized Piracy. For this the
United States are not responsible; and it must be admitted, that the
practice of all nations justifies them in resorting to those means, in
order to make the enemy feel the calamities of war. But the necessity of
resorting to means immoral in themselves affords an irrefragable
argument against precipitating the country into war for slight causes,
indeed against any war which is not purely in self defence.
It is equally untrue to assert that the poorer class of people, by which
must be meant all the laborers, or generally those who live on their
wages, have nothing to lose by the war.
In this, and other large cities, for every thousand merchants, or men of
capital who may be injured or thrown out of business, there are ten
thousand men living on wages, whose employment depends directly or
indirectly on the commerce of those cities. The number of common
laborers is proportionately less in the purely agricultural districts.
But it is evident that in both, a considerable number must be thrown out
of employment either by the destruction of commerce, or in consequence
of the lessened value and quantity of the agricultural products. And it
seems impossible that this should take place without affecting the rate
of wages, than which a more afflicting evil could not fall on the
community. There is no man of pure and elevated feelings who does not
ardently wish, that means could be devised to ameliorate the state of
society in that respect, so as that those who live by manual labor
should receive a more just portion of the profits, which are now very
unequally divided between them and their employers.
But even if the rate of wages was not materially affected, yet when it
is said that the poor have nothing to lose by war, it must be because
their lives are counted for nothing. Whether militia, regulars, or
sailors, the privates, the men who actually fight the battles, are
exclusively taken from amongst the poorer classes of society. Officers
are uniformly selected from the class which has some property or
influence. They indeed risk gallantly their lives, but with the hopes of
promotion and of acquiring renown and consideration. According to the
present system, at least of the regular army, it is extremely rare,
almost impossible that a private soldier should ever rise to the rank of
an officer. In the course of a war thousands are killed, more die of
diseases, and the residue, when disbanded, return home with habits
unfavorable to the pursuits of industry. And yet it is asserted that
they are predisposed for war, because they have nothing to lose.
As yet, however, we have had recourse only to voluntary enlistments for
raising a regular force; the pay or bounties must be increased in order
to obtain a sufficient number; and thus far to become a private soldier
has been a voluntary act. The calling of militia into actual service is
a modified species of conscription, and it has also been deemed a
sufficient burthen to limit the time of that service to six months.
Another plan is now contemplated by those who are so eager to plunge the
country into a war. Fearing that the sufficient number of men may not be
voluntarily raised, they propose that the militia should be divided into
two portions; those belonging to the first class shall, if called into
actual service, be bound to serve twelve months instead of six; and the
other portion shall be liable to furnish a number of recruits for the
army, not exceeding one tenth part of their total number. This last
provision seems to be borrowed from the Russian military code. The
Emperor of Russia requires each village to supply him with a certain
number of men, in proportion to that of the male population. In time of
war he requires, at the rate of three men for each hundred males, which
answers nearly to that of ten for every one hundred men enrolled in the
militia; and he also grants to the serfs the same privilege intended to
be allowed to a portion of the militia by the new project, that of
selecting the recruits amongst themselves.
If it be any consolation, it is certain that, although we may not
invade England, the evils arising from the war will be as sensibly and
more permanently felt by Great Britain than by the United States. Her
efforts must be commensurate with those of the United States, much
greater by sea in order to be efficient, in every respect more expensive
on account of her distance from the seat of war. Such is the rapidly
progressive state of America, that the industry of the people will, in a
few years of peace, have repaired the evils caused by the errors of
Government. England will remain burthened with additional debt and
taxation.
An aged man, who has for the last thirty years been detached from party
politics, and who has now nothing whatever to hope or to fear from the
world, has no merit in seeking only the truth and acting an independent
part. But I know too well, and have felt too much the influence of party
feeling, not to be fully aware that those men will be entitled to the
highest praise, who, being really desirous of preserving peace, shall on
this momentous occasion dare to act for themselves, notwithstanding the
powerful sympathies of party. Yet no sacrifice of principles is
required: men may remain firmly attached to those on which their party
was founded and which they conscientiously adopted. There is no
connexion between the principles or doctrines on which each party
respectively was founded, and the question of war or peace with a
foreign nation which is now agitated. The practice which has lately
prevailed to convert every subject, from the most frivolous to the most
important, into a pure party question, destroys altogether personal
independence, and strikes at the very roots of our institutions. These
usages of party, as they are called, make every man a slave, and
transfer the legitimate authority of the majority of the nation to the
majority of a party, and, consequently, to a minority of the sovereign
people. If it were permitted to appeal to former times, I would say
that, during the six years that I had the honor of a seat in Congress,
there were but two of those party meetings, called for the purpose of
deliberating upon the measures proper to be adopted. The first was after
the House had asserted its abstract right to decide on the propriety of
making appropriations necessary to carry a treaty into effect, whether
such appropriations should be made with respect to the treaty with
England of 1794. The other was in the year 1798, respecting the course
proper to be pursued after the hostile and scandalous conduct of the
French Directory. On both occasions we were divided; and on both the
members of the minority of each meeting were left at full liberty to
vote as they pleased, without being on that account proscribed or
considered as having abandoned the principles of the party. This, too,
took place at a time when, unfortunately, each party most erroneously
suspected the other of an improper attachment to one or the other of the
great belligerent foreign nations. I must say that I never knew a man
belonging to the same party as myself, and I have no reason to believe
that there was any in the opposite party, who would have sacrificed the
interests of the country to those of any foreign power. I am confident
that no such person is to be found now in our councils or amongst our
citizens; nor am I apt to suspect personal views, or apprehensive of the
effect these might produce. My only fear is that which I have expressed,
the difficulty for honorable men to disenthral themselves from those
party sympathies and habits, laudable and useful in their origin, but
which carried to excess become a tyranny, and may leave the most
important measures to be decided in the National Councils by an
enthusiastic and inflamed minority.
FOOTNOTE:
[3] Estimated for 1812.