to the whole contested territory; that each may recede from its extreme
pretensions without impairing national honor or wounding national pride;
and that the way is therefore still open for a renewal of negotiations.
2. That the avowed object of the United States, in giving notice of the
abrogation of the convention, is the determination to assert and
maintain their assumed right of absolute and exclusive sovereignty over
the whole territory; that Great Britain is fully committed on that
point, and has constantly and explicitly declared that such an attempt
would be resisted, and the British interests in that quarter be
protected; and that war is therefore the unavoidable consequence of such
a decisive step--a war not only necessarily calamitous and expensive,
but in its character aggressive, not justifiable by the magnitude and
importance of its object, and of which the chances are uncertain.
3. That the inconveniences of the present state of things may in a great
degree be avoided; that, if no war should ensue, they will be the same,
if not greater, without than under a convention; that not a single
object can be gained by giving the notice at this time, unless it be to
do something not permitted by the present convention, and therefore
provoking resistance and productive of war. If a single other advantage
can be gained by giving the notice, let it be stated.
4th. That it has been fully admitted by Great Britain that, whether
under or without a convention, the United States have the same rights as
herself, to trade, to navigate, and to occupy and make settlements in
and over every part of the territory; and that, if this state of things
be not disturbed, natural causes must necessarily give the whole
territory to the United States.
Under these circumstances, it is only asked, that the subject may be
postponed for the present; that Government should not commit itself by
any premature act or declaration; that, instead of increasing the
irritation and excitement which exist on both sides, time be given for
mutual reflection, and for the subdual or subsidence of angry and
violent feelings. Then, and then only, can the deliberate opinion of the
American people on this momentous question be truly ascertained. It is
not perceived how the postponement for the present and for a time can,
in any shape or in the slightest degree, injure the United States.
It is certainly true that England is very powerful, and has often abused
her power, in no case in a more outrageous manner than by the
impressment of seamen, whether American, English, or other foreigners,
sailing under and protected by the American flag. I am not aware that
there has ever been any powerful nation, even in modern times, and
professing Christianity, which has not occasionally abused its power.
The United States, who always appealed to justice during their early
youth, seem, as their strength and power increase, to give symptoms of a
similar disposition. Instead of useless and dangerous recriminations,
might not the two nations, by their united efforts, promote a great
object, and worthy of their elevated situation?
With the single exception of the territory of Oregon, which extends from
42 to 54° 40´ north latitude, all the American shores of the Pacific
Ocean, from Cape Horn to Behring's Straits, are occupied, on the north
by the factories of the Russian Fur Company, southwardly by
semi-civilized States, a mixture of Europeans of Spanish descent and of
native Indians, who, notwithstanding the efforts of enlightened,
intelligent, and liberal men, have heretofore failed in the attempt to
establish governments founded on law, that might ensure liberty,
preserve order, and protect persons and property. It is in Oregon alone
that we may hope to see a portion of the western shores of America
occupied and inhabited by an active and enlightened nation, which may
exercise a moral influence over her less favored neighbors, and extend
to them the benefits of a more advanced civilisation. It is on that
account that the wish has been expressed that the Oregon territory may
not be divided. The United States and England are the only Powers who
lay any claim to that country, the only nations which may and must
inhabit it. It is not, fortunately, in the power of either Government to
prevent this taking place; but it depends upon them, whether they shall
unite in promoting the object, or whether they shall bring on both
countries the calamities of an useless war, which may retard but not
prevent the ultimate result. It matters but little whether the
inhabitants shall come from England or from the United States. It would
seem that more importance might be attached to the fact that, within a
period of fifteen years, near one million of souls are now added to the
population of the United States by migrations from the dominions of
Great Britain; yet, since permitted by both Powers, they may be presumed
to be beneficial to both. The emigrants to Oregon, whether Americans or
English, will be united together by the community of language and
literature, of the principles of law, and of all the fundamental
elements of a similar civilisation.
The establishment of a kindred and friendly Power on the North-west
Coast of America is all that England can expect, all perhaps that the
United States ought to desire. It seems almost incredible that, whilst
that object may be attained by simply not impeding the effect of natural
causes, two kindred nations, having such powerful motives to remain at
peace, and standing at the head of European and American civilisation,
should, in this enlightened age, give to the world the scandalous
spectacle, perhaps not unwelcome to some of the beholders, of an
unnatural and an unnecessary war; that they should apply all their
faculties and exhaust their resources in inflicting, each on the other,
every injury in their power, and for what purpose? The certain
consequence, independent of all the direct calamities and miseries of
war, will be a mutual increase of debt and taxation, and the ultimate
fate of Oregon will be the same as if the war had not taken place.
APPENDIX.
WAR EXPENSES.
Those expenses may be arranged under three heads: 1st. Such as are of a
permanent nature, and should be considered as belonging to the Peace
establishment of the country. 2dly. Those which should be adopted when
there is an impending danger of war. 3dly. Those which actual war
renders necessary.
To the first class belong all those, which provide for objects that
require considerable time to be executed, and cannot, without great
difficulty, be accomplished pending a war. Such are fortifications,
building ships of war including steamers, accumulating materials for the
same purpose, Navy Yards, providing a sufficient artillery, and other
important objects of the ordnance department. It may be taken for
granted, that Government has done, or will do all that is necessary and
practicable in that respect.
The preparatory measures which should be adopted, when there is danger
of war, are those respecting which the greatest variety of opinions must
be expected. It has been repeatedly asserted, that such is the structure
of our Government, that it never will or can prepare for war, till after
it has actually commenced; that is to say, that, because Congress was
dilatory in making effectual provision for carrying on the last war
against Great Britain, and because the Administration, at the time when
it was declared, was inefficient and not well calculated for conducting
it, the United States are bound for ever to incur, at the commencement
of every war, the disasters of one or two years, before they can be
induced to put on their armor. The past is irrevocable and of no other
use, than as far as it may teach us to avoid the faults that were
formerly committed. When our Government relies on the people for being
sustained in making war, its confidence must be entire. They must be
told the whole truth; and if they are really in favor of war, they will
cheerfully sustain Government in all the measures necessary to carry it
into effect. The frank annunciation of the necessity of such measures is
called, "creating a panic." It is not the first time that under similar
circumstances the same language has been held. If there be no danger or
intention of making war, those create a panic, who proclaim a
determination to assert the exclusive sovereignty of the United States
over the whole contested territory, with the full knowledge that Great
Britain has uniformly and explicitly declared, that she would resist any
such attempt. If instead of telling the people the whole truth, the
attempt to conceal from them the necessity of the measures requisite for
carrying on the war should be successful, a reaction in the public
sentiment will most certainly take place, whenever it will have become
impossible to delay any longer the heavy burden of taxation, for which
the Nation had not been prepared.
I will not dwell on the necessary preparations of a military character,
otherwise than by referring to some notorious facts.
The primary causes of the disastrous results of the campaign of 1812,
were the want of a naval force on the Lakes, and that of a sufficient
regular force. Government had obtained a correct statement of the
regular force of the British in Canada, with the exception of the
garrison of Quebec. This last was estimated at about three thousand men,
and could not be lessened without great inconvenience and some danger.
The regular force at Montreal, St. John's, and Three Rivers, amounted to
1130 men; that in the whole of Upper Canada, to 720. The act to raise an
additional military force of 25,000 men was passed on the 11th of
January, 1812. The selection of the officers was not completed before
the termination of that year; the recruiting service was not organized
in time; the enlistments for the regular army fell short of the most
moderate calculation; and the total number recruited was so small, as to
render it impossible to strike a decisive blow on any one of the most
important points from Montreal upwards, insignificant as was the force
by which they were defended. The volunteer act was also extremely
unproductive. At that time the treasury was amply supplied; and the want
was not that of money, but of a regular force.
Such force cannot be raised without money; and yet it will be admitted
that it would be extremely difficult to induce Congress to lay internal
taxes or duties before war was declared or certain. In order to provide
means for having an additional regular force ready to act as soon as
actual war takes place, a loan and Treasury notes must be resorted to.
But it is deemed absolutely necessary, that the internal taxes should be
imposed simultaneously with the declaration of war, and that provision
should be made for their immediate collection. With the exception of the
act for doubling the duties on importations, Congress did not pass any
law for imposing any new taxes or duties, till more than one year after
the declaration of the last war; nor did it even lay a second direct tax
in the year 1814. It was not till after public credit was ruined, after
Treasury notes which were had due remained unpaid, and after Mr. Dallas
had been placed at the head of the Treasury, that at last the laws for
imposing a double direct tax, for increasing the rate of the existing
internal duties, and for laying new ones, were enacted. The peace was
ratified immediately after; and in point of fact, no more than 3,877,000
dollars were paid in the Treasury before the end of the war, on account
of the direct tax and all other internal taxes or duties. There were
received from the same sources 20,654,000 dollars in the years 1815,
1816 and 1817.
The preparatory measures necessary, in order to insure an immediate
collection of internal taxes, whenever the laws imposing such taxes
shall have been passed, are those on which I may speak with confidence.
These consist simply in a previous organization of the machinery
necessary for the collection of every species of internal taxes, and the
assessment of a direct tax. The proper selection of the numerous
officers necessary for the collection always consumes several months. A
previous selection and appointment of those officers would obviate that
difficulty, and would cost nothing, as though appointed they should
receive no pay till called into actual service; this would be the
natural consequence of the manner in which collectors are paid, this
being a per centage on the money collected. The only other necessary
measure in that respect, is that the Secretary of the Treasury should,
at the time of their appointment, supply the collectors with all the
necessary forms of keeping and rendering their accounts.
The assessment in each State of the taxable property of every individual
who possesses such property, is the only operation which requires
considerable time and causes a proportionate delay. This cannot be
otherwise obviated than by making that assessment a preparatory measure,
to be completed before actual war takes place.
In order to facilitate and hasten the process of assessment, I
undertook, in the year 1812, to apportion the direct tax on the several
Counties and State Districts in each State; and the Act of 2d August,
1813, which laid a direct tax of three millions of dollars, was passed
in conformity with that apportionment The process was easy for every
State in which there was a direct State tax; but though derived from the
best data that could be collected, it was defective and partly arbitrary
for the States in which there was no State tax. As there is at present
hardly any (if any) State which has not laid a direct State tax, this
mode may be adopted for the proposed preparatory assessment. This will
reduce the duty of the assessors to the assessment of the quota of each
County or District, on the several individuals liable to the tax, and
the total expense of the assessment to a sum not exceeding probably two
hundred thousand dollars. A more regular and correct assessment will, of
course, be provided for, with respect to the direct taxes which may be
laid after the first year of the war.
The only objection is that of the expense, which would prove useless if
the tax should not be laid, or in other words, if war should not take
place; but certainly this is too small an item to deserve consideration.
This organization, easy and cheap as it is, is all that is necessary in
order to secure an immediate collection of a direct and other internal
taxes and duties, from the moment when they shall have been imposed by
Congress.
The probable annual expenses which must be incurred in a war with
England, and the resources for defraying them, are the next objects of
inquiry.
It is extremely difficult to draw any correct inference from the
expenses of the last war with England: the amount of the arrearages due
on account of the military services at the time when the peace was
ratified, is not stated with precision in any of the public documents
which I have seen. Although the laws show the number of men voted, that
of those actually raised has never to my knowledge been officially
stated. There can be no doubt that the want of a proper organization
increased the amount of expenditure much beyond that which would have
been sufficient under a regular and efficient system. This has
undoubtedly been much improved; yet the expenses incurred in the
Seminole war, compared with the number of men employed and that of the
hostile Indians, show that either there are still some defects in the
organization, or that there were great abuses in the execution.
The payments from the Treasury for the military department, embracing
only those for the army proper, militia and volunteers, and exclusive of
those for fortifications and the Indian department, amounted for the
year 1813 to 18,936,000 dollars, and for the year 1814 to 20,508,000
dollars. The disbursements for the navy are stated at 6,446,000 and
7,311,000 dollars for these two years respectively. By comparing the
reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury of December 1815, 1816, 1817,
it would appear that the arrearages due on 1st January, 1815, exceeded
ten millions of dollars: and it seems certain that the actual war
expenses of 1814 could not have fallen short of 35 to 40 millions of
dollars. It has been asserted that the regular force during that year
amounted to 35,000 men.
The population of the United States has nearly trebled during the
thirty-four years which have elapsed since that in which the last war
against England was declared. Their wealth and resources have increased
in the same ratio; and that, in case of war, these should be brought
into action as promptly as possible, admits of no doubt. Once engaged in
the conflict, to make the war as efficient as possible will shorten its
duration, and can alone secure honorable terms of peace. I have not the
documents necessary for making an approximate estimate of the annual
expenses of a war with Great Britain; and if I had, I could not at this
time perform that amount of labor which is absolutely necessary in order
to draw correct inferences. Taking only a general view of the subject,
and considering the great difference of expense in keeping a navy in
active service, between one of eight frigates and one of ten ships of
the line, fourteen frigates and a competent number of steamers; that
Texas and Oregon are additional objects of defence; that the extensive
system of fortifications which has been adopted will require about
fifteen thousand additional men; and that, in order to carry a
successful and decisive war against the most vulnerable portion of the
British dominions, a great disposable regular force is absolutely
necessary; I am very sure that I fall below the mark in saying that,
after the first year of the war, and when the resources of the country
shall be fully brought into action, the annual military and naval
expenses will amount to sixty or seventy millions of dollars. To this
must be added the expenses for all other objects, which, for the year
ending on the 30th of June, 1845, amounted to near fifteen millions, but
which the Secretary of the Treasury hopes may be reduced to eleven
millions and a half. The gross annual expenses for all objects will be
estimated at seventy-seven millions; to be increased annually by the
annual interest on each successive loan.
In order to ascertain the amount of new revenue and loans required to
defray that expense, the first question which arises, is the diminution
of the revenue derived from customs, which will be the necessary
consequence of the war.
The actual receipts into the Treasury, arising from that source of
revenue, were in round numbers for the years 1812, 1813, 1814,
respectively 8,960,000, 13,225,000, and 6,000,000 of dollars; and the
nett revenue which accrued during those three years respectively
amounted to 13,142,000, 6,708,000, and 4,250,000 dollars. From the 1st
of July, 1812, the rate of duties on importations was doubled; and in
order to compare these receipts with those collected in peace time, they
must be reduced for those three years respectively, to 7,470,000,[3]
6,600,000 and 3,000,000; or, if the revenue accrued be compared (which
is the correct mode), to 9,850,000,[3] 3,354,000, and 2,125,000 dollars.
At that time the duties accrued were, on account of the credit allowed,
collected on an average only six or eight months later; and the
unexpected importations in the latter half of the year 1812 in American
vessels which arrived with British licenses, subsequent to the
declaration of war and to the act which doubled the rate of duties,
swelled considerably the receipts of the year 1813. It was only in 1814
that the full effect of the war on the revenue derived from that source
was felt.
The diminution in the amount of American and foreign tonnage employed in
the foreign trade of the United States is strongly exhibited by the
following statement:
Tonnage in foreign trade, U. S. American ves. Foreign ves. Total.
Year 1811 948,207 33,203 981,450
" 1812 667,999 47,099 715,098
" 1813 237,348 113,827 351,175
" 1814 59,626 48,302 107,928
And it must be recollected that during the last nine months of 1814,
Great Britain was at peace with all the other Powers of Europe, and that
these were therefore neutrals. Yet they hardly ventured to trade with
us.
The amount of receipts into the Treasury derived from customs, as well
as that of the revenue accrued, exceeded, during the eleven years 1801
to 1811, 132,700,000 dollars, being an annual average of about
12,000,000 dollars. During the same eleven years the average amount of
tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States was 943,670
tons, of which 844,170 were in American, and 99,500 foreign vessels.
Thus in the year 1814, the revenue derived from customs had been
reduced to one fourth part (to nearly one sixth part, if compared
according to the revenue accrued, or amount of importations), the
tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States to nearly one
ninth; and that of the American vessels employed in that trade, to one
fourteenth part of their respective average amount during the eleven
years of peace.
The small American navy did during the last war with England all and
more than could have been expected. The fact was established to the
satisfaction of the world and of Great Britain herself, that the navy of
the United States, with a parity of force, was at least equal to that of
England. But the prodigious numerical superiority of the British navy
rendered it impossible for a few frigates to protect the commerce of the
United States, which was accordingly almost annihilated. We have now ten
ships of the line, and a proportionate number of frigates and smaller
vessels. The great numerical superiority of the British navy still
continues; and it cannot be doubted that, in case of war, every exertion
will be made by the British Government to maintain its superiority in
our seas and on our coasts. Still it is but a portion of her force that
can be employed in that way, and, taking every circumstance into
consideration, it may be confidently hoped that our commerce, though
much lessened, will be partially protected by our navy. Although the
actual diminution which will be experienced is altogether conjectural, I
think that no great error is to be apprehended in estimating the revenue
from customs, after the first year of the war, at about one half of its
present amount; and the whole revenue from that source, from the sale of
lands and all the branches of the existing income, at fourteen millions
of dollars; leaving to be provided for sixty to sixty-five millions,
besides the interest on loans, which, for a war of three years, may be
estimated at about six millions of dollars on an average. However
energetic and efficient Congress and the Executive may be, the resources
and strength of the nation can be but gradually brought forth: the
expenses will therefore be less during the first year, after which the
whole amount will be required and will be annually wanted. In reference
therefore to the second year of the war--
Assuming the total war expenses at $65,000,000
All the others at 12,000,000
------------
In all, $77,000,000
From which deduct for existing revenue, 14,000,000
------------
To be provided for by taxes and loans, $63,000,000
On the principle that the amount of annual taxes
should be at least equal to the expenses of
the peace establishment and the interest on
the war loans, annual peace expenses at 27,000,000
And for interest on the loans of 1st and 2d years,
viz. 1st year 25, and 2d year 45 millions at
7 per cent. 5,000,000
------------
Together, $32,000,000
From which deduct existing revenue, 14,000,000
------------
Leaves to be provided for by new taxes, at least $18,000,000
And by loans, 45,000,000
------------
$63,000,000