CHAPTER XVIII

DUFFERIN'S MISSION

Lord Dufferin's arrival at Cairo on the 6th November placed matters

there on an entirely new footing. Up to that point Riaz Pasha and the

rest of the Khedive's Ministers had been doing pretty much as they

liked, subject only to Malet's weak supervision. But Dufferin was a man

of another mould, and soon showed the Khedive that his position while in

Egypt was to be that of master, not adviser. He paid little attention to

his tales, and not much, I believe, to Malet's, but opened the doors of

his Embassy to every one who could give information. Mackenzie Wallace,

his chief assistant, in a very few days acquired a good general

knowledge of what had been going on in Egypt during the last two years,

and his book about it gives more of the truth than any other yet

published in English. Dufferin, though an idle man, was a rapid worker,

and where he had something serious to do, knew how easiest to do it.

Nevertheless, for the first fortnight after Dufferin's arrival, and

until he had quite assured himself of his ground, the prosecution of

Arabi was allowed to work on in its own casual way, swayed by the

Khedive's ever shifting impulses of a desire to conceal the truth on the

one hand, and an unwillingness on the other to let go his prey. These

will be best recorded by simply reproducing the letters and telegrams

which now passed almost daily between me in London and Messrs. Broadley

and Napier at Cairo, as will the successive steps by which a compromise

of the trial was eventually come to.

_Broadley to Blunt, November 6th (in answer to his letter of

November 2nd)_:

"I entirely concur in all you say, and shall exercise the greatest

prudence. I am completing a perfect case for defence, showing:

"(1) Purity, honesty of Arabi's inspirations.

"(2) Perfect concurrence of Tewfik till July 12.

"(3) Perfect concurrence of the Sultan throughout.

"(4) Universality of the movement.

"(5) Wholly illegal constitution of the Court Martial.

"(6) Absurdity of the white flag (on which subject Napier has

secured A 1 deposition from Lambton).

"(7) Abnormal humanitarian character of Arabi.

"(8) Abnormal iniquity of all proceedings until our arrival.

"(9) Torture of prisoners.

"(10) Letters from Tewfik to Constantinople against England.

"(11) Systematic falsification of the 'Moniteur.'

"Shall demand release of all the accused. _Keep this private._

"Now all I fear is the enormous expense of a protracted trial of

eight or nine months. Arabi _alone_ calls 400 witnesses.... I spend

freely. I entertain the correspondents. I have wheedled the

'Egyptian Gazette' into being our special organ. I have turned

public opinion here quite in favour of Arabi. We are obliged to

employ a dozen interpreters at salaries varying from £1 to £2

10_s._ a week.... My absence from Tunis means utter loss of _all_

there. All my pending cases have been given up, including some of

great magnitude. Bourke will tell you I have one retainer alone of

£250 a year, and another of £100.... I hope you will take all this

into consideration.... I only say I believe all will depend on

liberal if not lavish expenditure. Remember we have every one

against us, and people don't work without a reward here.... An

Arabi fund should be raised. The nine months' Tichborne trial is a

specimen. But I don't think we should exceed _one-tenth_ of that at

the worst.... All I say hinges on expenses. Don't think of me but

only of incidental expenses.... I work sixteen hours a day....

Napier is invaluable."

_Napier to Blunt, November 6th_:

"You seem to be doubtful about the _acte d'accusation_. We have not

had it officially communicated. It is not proposed by the

prosecution to frame it until the close of the evidence. But in

substance it is fairly stated in a telegram I think to the

'Times':

"(1) The abuse of the White Flag.

"(2) Complicity in massacres and pillage, June 11.

"(3) Complicity in destruction by fire of the city.

"(4) Carrying war into territory of the Sultan.

"(5) General acts of mutiny and rebellion against the Khedive and

the Sultan."

_Broadley to Blunt, November 7th (telegraphed)_:

"If you don't mind expense great success sure--see my yesterday's

letter. I shall crush Tewfik and his crew past hope of redemption."

_Napier to Blunt, November 10th_:

"I have seen Dufferin to-day. He received me most kindly, though he

declined to enter on business at once. He had only just received

his instructions. Broadley and I are to meet him to-morrow.

"There seems to be a desire to burk inquiry into the rebellion

question. The Government and all the papers are pledged to the

ridiculous rebel cry, the one of all others that incenses me most.

It is an old trick that has been played in Afghanistan, the Cape,

and elsewhere. Any one can see that it may be smashed into a cocked

hat at once.... Proposals for a compromise must come from the other

side, must be put in writing, and must contain all that you

claim--indeed I think they ought to amount to unconditional

surrender. Of this of course more fully afterwards. You may be

assured that we will not consent to anything without communication

with you, and fullest deliberation."

_Napier to Blunt, November 15th_:

"I suppose you can guess the innumerable difficulties with which we

have to deal. In the first place since we were not permitted to be

present at the examination of the witnesses, it is necessary for us

not only to have the whole of the evidence copied, but also to

submit the whole of it to each of the prisoners for his observation

and consideration.... There are 136 witnesses who will be brought

against us. Besides these, 125 prisoners have been interrogated,

and their answers will be used against each other. Then anybody who

pleases seems to have been allowed to write letters to the Court,

among others, H. H. the Khedive and, I believe, the Ministers, or

some of them.... Not one word of the evidence is on oath, and most

of it consists of hearsay and opinion.... 'In your opinion is Arabi

a rebel?' 'I don't know.' 'You bad, wicked man, why don't you

know?' 'I can't tell why I don't know.' 'Then think it over, and

to-morrow bring a written statement of what you do know.' To-morrow

the wretch arrives with a written statement that the prisoner in

question is a rebel and incendiary.

"Then again the translations afforded us are not correct

translations from the originals, and the originals are not true

records of the evidence of the witnesses themselves....

"Thank Heaven they have imprisoned a man named Rifaat. [He had been

Secretary to the Government and Director of the Press.] They could

not have done anything so destructive to their own case. Not only

does he know French well, but he has good literary ability, and a

very fair knowledge of all these tortuous and involved intrigues

rolled up one within another the untanglement of which is a

business enough to make the head reel. How if it were to appear

that the Abdin, Sept. 9, demonstration had been got up by the

Khedive as the best means of ridding him of the disagreeable

tutelage of Riaz and his Ministry! And how if the dark deeds of

June 11 were plotted in the Palace to force the English and French

to crush the now uncontrolled and uncontrollable National movement!

"I have been in hopes all along that the Government would not face

the trial, and that they would find some means to put an end to the

scandal that must ensue. But I begin to think that that will not be

so. Many people in high places are prompted by motives of revenge,

and still hope to wreak it upon their enemies. Others hope that by

the unworthy devices of the Court a fair trial may yet be

prevented. And I have no doubt they will in a great measure

succeed. Again, perhaps it is the policy of the English Cabinet to

insist upon the matter being threshed out, so as to give them time

to meet the storm, and an opportunity of throwing over the Turks

and perhaps Tewfik. If the trial is to go on I cannot tell what the

expense will be, but I fear it will be very great."

_Napier to Lady Anne Blunt, November 16th_:

"Lord Dufferin began at once by lending us his assistance. Broadley

and I called a day or two after his arrival. Broadley made a very

masterly statement which put him in possession of the whole of our

numerous causes of complaint. He has also been given copies of our

formal protests, and I believe will indirectly assist us to defeat

the Court of imbeciles with whom we have to deal.... The

correspondents, with the exception of Bell, are all, I believe,

favourable. The 'Daily News' especially. Wallace of the 'Times' has

just arrived, and I believe his influence will go far to counteract

Bell's extraordinary correspondence. Bell will particularly be

called to account for his 'Arabi's head-in-a-charger' policy. I

think he seems a little uncomfortable on the prospect of being

examined on his telegrams in Court."

Mackenzie Wallace, here alluded to, arrived with Dufferin from

Constantinople, where he was "Times" correspondent, and afterwards

became Dufferin's private secretary when His Lordship went to India as

Viceroy. He was an able man, and acted while in Egypt entirely in

concert with Dufferin, and has written the only English narrative of the

events of 1882 which has any historical value.

What follows is in connection with the final attempt made by the

prosecution to get evidence against Arabi on a point which might be

treated as a capital one, namely, the arrest of Suliman Sami, who had

been in command of the Egyptian rear-guard at the evacuation of

Alexandria, and who, having been subjected to the usual intimidation

treatment in prison, was now said to be ready to give evidence that

Arabi had ordered him to burn the city. It was this sudden desperate

attempt to obtain a capital verdict that brought matters to a crisis at

Cairo, and resulted, as we shall see, in the compromise effected by

Dufferin of the trial.

_Broadley to Blunt, November 17th_:

"An attempt has been made to force Suliman Bey to implicate Arabi.

It has been done so clumsily that Suliman has contradicted every

other witness called to prove the same thing, _but_ I believe it

was done at a midnight or secret sitting when Wilson was absent....

Try and make your peace with the Foreign Office, Dufferin is

square, and we could get a lot by soft words."

_Beaman to Blunt, November 17th_:

"I just write a line ... to say that things are going on very well.

The evidence of Suliman Sami, which seems to have rejoiced the

prosecution, is not worth a straw, having been palpably invented

for the occasion, and not supported by any of the preceding

testimony. The only question seems to be if the prisoners will get

off without a trial, or if they will have a chance of being fairly

heard in their own defence. I am convinced that the Government here

is using every effort to quash the proceedings, as the facts that

would come out in cross-examination would be compromising to every

man almost now in power, and would lay bare some very unpleasant

facts about the Khedive. For this last reason it is just possible

that our Government may feel inclined to propose terms to Arabi, as

it will be a rough _exposé_ if the trial proves the biggest scamp

in Egypt is the man whom we brought an army here to uphold.

Personally I have very little doubt that the Khedive and Omar

Loutfi arranged the Alexandrian massacre in order to aim a blow at

Arabi, who had just declared himself responsible for public safety.

I hold proofs which carry me half way to conviction, but the time

has not yet come to produce them."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 18th_:

"Believe excellent compromise possible. Do not attack the Foreign

Office. Absolute secrecy necessary."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 20th_:

"London parleys Dufferin. Egyptian Government's desire to

compromise lessened by thinking public opinion in England changed

owing to Suliman Sami's perjury."

_Broadley to Blunt, November 21st_:

"Important crisis imminent. The friends of the Egyptian Government

assert intention of hanging Arabi. Remain in London."

_Broadley to Blunt, November 21st_:

"Nothing I could say could give you an idea of the infamous conduct

of the Egyptian Government. They set our procedure rules at

defiance, and say they do not care a curse, as they are treating

diplomatically for the hanging of Arabi."

_Napier to Blunt, November 21st:_

"We are simply fighting all the force of the Egyptian Government

single-handed, though I believe Lord Dufferin will come to the

rescue. They are striving to procure the judicial murder of these

prisoners, and it takes all our time to meet their many wiles.

Wilson and Dufferin are helping us, but they, the Egyptian

Government, are quick and unscrupulous. We are necessarily more

slow and cautious."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 26th:_

"Egyptian Government proposes to try Arabi alone. Telegraph your

opinion."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 27th:_

"Letters explaining situation fully posted. Reason to believe if

Arabi, Mahmud Sami and Toulba consent to admit formal charges of

rebellion or continuing war against orders of the Khedive, the

Egyptian Government will consent to exile or internment at the Cape

of Good Hope, or elsewhere, some of the accused simple exile, the

majority amnesty. I implore absolute secrecy. Napier and myself

favourable to compromise seeing difficulty of proving efforts to

prevent burning, etc."

_Blunt to Broadley, November 28th:_

"Cannot approve terms named--certainly not Cape, but am consulting

friends to-night about funds. Our political position immensely

strong. Definite answer later."

_Broadley to Blunt. Letter. November 27th, 1882_:

("_Private and most urgent._)

"MY DEAR BLUNT,

"I invite _all_ your prudence, calm consideration and tact to the

subject of this letter. I have had a long interview [with] Dufferin

to-day. He is most friendly. The dossier is before us. _Nothing_

presents difficulties but the burning of Alexandria. As regards

this I believe the proof will fail as to Araby's orders, but many

ugly facts remain, viz.: no efforts to stop conflagration and

loot. (2) Continued intimacy with Suliman Sami _afterwards_. (3) No

punishment of offenders. (4) Large purchases petroleum. (5)

Systematic manner of incendiarism by soldiers.

"This is _the rub_. Could Arabi have not stopped the whole thing?

Besides, some of his former speeches, etc., have a very burning

appearance.

"If Arabi will plead _guilty formally to_ one _of the charges of

rebellion_ (_i. e_., his continuing war after Khedive's orders) he

will be exiled.

"Cape of Good Hope under certain conditions with sufficient

allowance. I think I can secure these terms for him, Mahmud Sami

and Toulba. Rest, simple exile or pardon. Can I think secure

_allowance_ or with forfeiture property--retention military rank.

"Against this we have enormous length trial--chances of turn public

opinion--expense _and_ the five facts which I allude to above.

"If a word of this transpires you will do me incalculable injury.

Think over all this and remember our great and grave

responsibility. Dufferin is charming. Please at once telegraph as

follows: If you say 'I accept the principle. Make best possible

terms,' say _pax_. I _advise_ this course as best. If you say, 'Go

on--no sort of compromise can be accepted,' say _bellum_.

"I am prepared to fight manfully to the bitter end strongly as

ever. I leave all to you--but think well over all the

contingencies.

"Very faithfully yours, "A. M. BROADLEY."

_Napier to Blunt. Letter. November 27th_:

"Cairo, _Nov. 27th, 1882_.

"DEAR BLUNT,

"It is much to be regretted that the Post Office people have found

out our correspondence, for they have, to my knowledge, opened your

last letter to me registered and received last Friday. It contained

the Borelli charges returned, and a short note from you. I do not

think anything was abstracted. I shall send this by ordinary post

under cover to H. H. Asquith, Temple, E. C., in the hope that it

may escape their vigilance. I, of course, protested at once, but

do not suppose that they will mend their ways. I also greatly

regret that I have no time to keep copies of my own letters to you

for reference. You must not be surprised therefore if you sometimes

meet with repetition. I cannot tell you of all the tricks they have

played upon us, as they would fill volumes. The letter had been

obviously opened by being slit across above the seal, and gummed up

again. It had been cleverly done, and I might not have discovered

it but for the fact that the gum used was not quite set. It

therefore opened along the line of the slit, and I at once found

the gum where no gum should have been. I will send you a short note

by the direct mail so that you shall not be surprised at the delay

in the delivery of this. Although we have been hard at work since

last mail, I do not know that anything of much importance has

occurred except that we have been admitted to the defence of Mahmud

Sami, with whom we have had several long conferences. Toulba is

ill, suffering from nervous excitement, I think, and asthma. I do

not know whether he will die, but I have done everything in my

power to get him proper medical assistance, a change of room, a

companion, and, if possible, a raised bed.

"The last evidence in the question of the burning of Alexandria has

not been communicated to us except through the medium of the

Egyptian Gazette, which may or may not be correct. It is not

formidable in itself, but it is quite sufficient to give colour to

a finding against the prisoner on that charge. It becomes,

therefore, of the most vital importance to consider whether there

is no way out other than through the portals of the court martial.

There is no doubt that we could discredit the evidence, and even

smash it up in cross-examination. And besides, on the other charges

of Rebellion and Massacre of June 11th I feel sure we could make it

hot for the prosecution, but there is an opinion in a very high

quarter that there is a strong determination to execute if the

Court should find guilty. Assume, therefore, that the Court Martial

find the prisoner (for I am only speaking of the chief now) guilty,

it will be for the English Government to reverse the sentence. I am

of opinion that it would be dangerous to trust them to carefully

examine the evidence and the manner in which it has been obtained.

I think it possible that that matter would be hastily disposed of

in the Foreign Office, and that they might leave the prisoner to

the Court, declaring that everything had been done to secure a

fair trial, and that they could not interfere with a verdict

deliberately arrived at after the fullest opportunity given to the

defence. And besides, it is more than probable that they would

allow _some_ sentence to pass--any sentence suffered here would be

most dangerous to the prisoner. After careful consideration I dare

not advise the prisoner to trust to the trial if he have an

alternative. If terms of banishment are offered, with proper

safeguards and provision for maintenance, I shall be strongly in

favour of accepting them. To sum up: If found guilty by the Court,

some punishment, perhaps death, certainly a serious one, will be

inflicted: If acquitted, either voluntary banishment without means,

or remaining in the country at the mercy of the Government here. If

he leaves the country under a compromise all charges except that of

rebellion would have to be withdrawn, and provision for his life in

a suitable place would have to be accorded. I have reason to

believe that the course of a compromise finds favour with all but

Riaz, and is also favourably regarded by Dufferin.

"Give us your opinion, and believe me ever very sincerely yours,

"MARK NAPIER.

"P. S.--As far as the case goes nothing could be better. In law, in

fact, and in the infamous manner it has been conducted. _But_ there

are the dangers and considerations I have alluded to. Broadley has

in my opinion conducted all the different discussions with the

Court and Dufferin with the greatest energy, skill, and judgment.

The law of the case is perfect for us, _but_ it is a case which

will be decided in the Cabinet and not in the Court. It is

impossible to rebut hearsay, and as I have had no opportunity to

consider the whole evidence, I will not offer an opinion on that

now."

_Broadley and Napier to Blunt. Telegram. November 28th, 7.42 p.

m._:

"Long interview with Dufferin. I entreat you give us discretion to

obtain best terms possible. We know delay fatal. Rely on our

judgment. Foreign Office's support unreliable. Dufferin disposed

to exceed his instructions on our behalf. Dufferin rules Egyptian

Government. Defense case burning Alexandria suspicious. Hence

anxiety. Embrace present moment. Dufferin's good offices absolutely

necessary. Telegraph instantly full discretion. Interview Dufferin

ten to-morrow.

"BROADLEY, NAPIER."

_Napier to Blunt. Same date_:

"I give you my honour I most strongly concur in our telegram

herewith. Strongest cause for full immediate discretion. Every

personal interest contrary to our request. NAPIER, private."

_Blunt to Broadley, November 28th midnight_:

"Cannot approve terms less than honourable exile--not

internment--Aden, Malta, Cyprus. Within these limits use

discretion."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 29th_:

"Arabi gives us written authority to act with discretion in concert

with Dufferin, who proposes Arabi pleads guilty on formal charge of

rebellion--others abandoned. Sentence read commuting punishment to

exile--exile simple on parole--good place which you can settle with

the Foreign Office--perhaps Azores. Suitable allowance granted and

compensation for loss of property entailed by sentence. You

probably fail to realize difficulty of rebutting case of burning

Alexandria and obtaining evidence for defence. Foreign Office

certainly indisposed to interfere in any Egyptian sentence short of

death--for example, long detention in an Egyptian prison. Am

convinced ultimate result inevitably worse, dreading great

responsibility, having full knowledge of the position of affairs. I

trust you will leave us discretion, to avoid possible disaster."

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 29th, 3 p. m._:

"Have consulted De la Warr. We approve full discretion on basis of

telegram just received."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 30th_:

"All progressing well. Try to negotiate in concert with De la Warr

the place of exile--Fiji suggested. Gratified at your confidence."

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 30th, 2.30 p. m._:

"Reject Fiji or Azores. Insist on Moslem country for religious

life. They cannot refuse. Will consult Chenery. De la Warr away."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 1st_:

"Dufferin's conduct admirable. Suggests De la Warr's arranging

place of exile with Foreign Office. Prisoners entirely satisfied."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 3rd_:

"Arabi's trial over. For correct account see 'Standard.' Egyptian

Government fulfilled all engagements to the letter."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Arabi delighted at result and sends thanks--inclined Cape.

Dufferin brick [_sic_]."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th, 4.50 p. m._:

"Surprised your not wiring. Success complete. Anglo-Egyptian colony

furious."

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Congratulate all. De la Warr says place of exile in English

territory left to Dufferin. I don't fancy Cape. How about Gibraltar

or Guernsey. Consult Arabi."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Many thanks kind telegram."

It will be perceived by these telegrams that it was not without

reluctance that I agreed to the compromise proposed by Dufferin. We had

at the moment the full tide of English opinion with us, and I knew that

the Foreign Office could not do otherwise than agree to almost any terms

we chose to impose, and I was most unwilling that the charge of

rebellion should be admitted by us. At the same time it was not possible

for me in the face of Broadley's, and especially Napier's, telegrams to

withhold my assent. The responsibility was too great. I had also the

question of costs to consider. It is true that a public subscription

had been opened which had brought us valuable names. But the actual sums

subscribed did not yet amount to £200, while Broadley's bill was running

already to £3,000. A continuation for another month of the trial would

have meant for me a larger expenditure than I was prepared to face in a

political quarrel which was not quite my own. I therefore took counsel

with De la Warr, and especially with Robert Bourke, of whom I have

already spoken, and who warned me how frail a thing public opinion was

to rely on, and advised me strongly to consent. I remember walking up

and down with him in Montagu Square, where he lived, in indecision for

half an hour before I was finally convinced and yielded. I consequently

sent the telegram of approval, and eventually, after much argument, we

succeeded in obtaining as Arabi's place of exile the Island of Ceylon,

the traditional place of exile of our father Adam when driven out of

Paradise. No more honourable one could possibly have been fixed upon.

The exact terms of the arrangement come to with Dufferin were

unfortunately not committed by him to writing, an oversight on

Broadley's part, who ought to have insisted on this and thus saved us

much after trouble and misunderstanding. The negligence allowed the

Egyptian Government to inflict degradation of rank on the prisoners,

which was certainly not in the spirit of Lord Dufferin's arrangement,

though, perhaps, legally following the _pro formâ_ sentence of death for

rebellion. Room, too, was left for dispute as to what was the amount of

the allowance intended as compensation for the confiscations. Broadley

seems to have exaggerated to his clients the promises on this head.

Personally I consider that they were not illiberally dealt with, as the

property of most of them was insignificant, and they were allowed to

retain property belonging to their wives. The only considerable sufferer

pecuniarily was Mahmud Pasha Sami, who had a large estate which he

forfeited. As to Arabi, his sole worldly possessions, besides what

furniture was in his house at Cairo, a hired one, and some horses in his

stable, consisted of the eight acres of good land he had inherited from

his father in his native village, to which he had at various time added

parcels of uncultivated land on the desert edge, amounting to some six

hundred acres, paid for out of his pay in prosperous days. These at the

time of the confiscation cannot have been worth much over £2,000 or

£3,000, for barren land was then selling for only a few reals the acre,

and he had not had time to reclaim or improve them.[33]

A point, too, which was long disputed, but which is no longer of

importance, was whether the _paroles_ of the prisoners were given to the

Egyptian or the English Governments. But with these matters I need not

trouble myself more than to say that the English Government, having

gained its end of getting the rebellion admitted by us, and so a title

given for their intervention in Egypt, gave little more help to the

defence of certain unfortunate minor prisoners who on various pretexts

found themselves excluded from the amnesty, and were subjected to all

the injustices of the Khedive's uncontrolled authority. These, however,

belong to a period beyond that of which I now propose to write, namely,

that of the permanent Occupation, and cannot be detailed in my present

memoir, which now, I think, has made clear at least my own part in the

events of the revolution to the last point where that part was personal.

Looking back at my action in Egypt during that period, with its early

successes and its final failure to obtain for the National Government

fair treatment at English hands, I cannot wholly regret the course I

took. I made, of course, many mistakes, and I feel that I am in

considerable measure responsible for the determination the Nationalists

came to to risk their country's fortune on the die of battle. But I

still think their fate would have been a worse one if they had not

fought, tamely surrendering to European pressure. They at least thus got

a hearing from the world at large, and if any attention since has been

paid to fellah grievances it has been won wholly by Arabi's persistence,

which I encouraged, in accepting the logic of their political principles

even to the point of war. It obliged England to listen to their

complaints and, if it could not prevent her from depriving them of their

political liberty, it has forced her since to remedy most of their

secular material wrongs.

What the future may bring to Egypt I know not. She has grown rich under

English tutelage, and though I do not consider riches synonymous with

the well being of a nation, they have been in Egypt of at least this

value, that they have enabled the native Nile population so far to hold

its own against foreign intrusion as owner of the soil. While this is,

the Nation will remain alive, and the day may yet come for the fellah

race when self-government will be restored to them, and the armed

struggle of 1882 will appear to them in its true light as the beginning

of their national life, and one, as such, glorious in their annals. To

that day of final emancipation I still pin my hopes, though it is not

likely I shall live to see it.[34]

If my life is prolonged for a few years, it is my intention to continue

the writing of my memoirs, and this will include much that is of

importance to Egypt, though nothing of such high historical value as the

recital already made. The present volume may well stand by itself, and

so with regret I leave it. I should have wished to include in it an

account of Lord Dufferin's mission of reconstruction, and the weak

efforts made by Gladstone to undo the wrong he had inflicted on the

cause of liberty, and on his own reputation as a man of good. But this

would lead me too far, and I prefer to end my actual narrative at the

point where we have now arrived, the close of the eventful year, 1882.

On one of the last days of it I received a second characteristic letter

from Gordon in which, speaking of the war and the suppression of liberty

in Egypt, he quotes the following appropriate verse:

"When thou seest the violent oppression of the poor, or the

subversion of justice, marvel not at it, for the Higher than the

Highest regardeth it."

FOOTNOTES:

[33] A claim made recently in his name for a large indemnity in regard

to these lands, and embodied in a petition addressed to our King Edward,

is an entire illusion on Arabi's part, and marks the fact, otherwise

very apparent to those who know him, that he has fallen into a condition

of senile decay for which there is no remedy.

The worst oversight was that the promised general amnesty was not

exactly defined. Hence the later prosecutions on so-called "criminal"

charges.

[34] This was written in 1904.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

ARABI'S ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND OF THE EVENTS OF 1881-1882, AS TOLD TO

ME, WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT, IN ARABIC YESTERDAY, MARCH 16TH, 1903, AT

SHEYKH OBEYD

I was born in the year 1840 at Horiyeh, near Zagazig, in the Sherkieh.

My father was Sheykh of the village, and owned eight and a half feddans

of land, which I inherited from him and gradually increased by savings

out of my pay, which at one time was as much as £250 a month, till it

amounted to 570 feddans, and that was the amount confiscated at the time

of my trial. I bought the land cheaply in those days for a few pounds a

feddan which is worth a great deal now, especially as it was in a poor

state (_wahash_) when I bought it and now is in good cultivation. But

none of it was given me by Saïd Pasha or any one, and the acreage I

inherited was only eight and a half. I invested all the money I could

save in land, and had no other invested money or movable property except

a little furniture and some horses and such like, which may have been

worth £1,000.

As a boy I studied for two years at the Azhar, but was taken for a

soldier when I was only fourteen, as I was a tall well grown lad and

Saïd Pasha wanted to have as many as possible of the sons of the village

Sheykhs, and train them to be officers. I was made to go through an

examination, and what I had learned at the Azhar served me well, and I

was made a _boulok-amin_, clerk, instead of serving in the ranks, at

sixty piastres a month. I did not, however, like this, as I thought I

should never rise to any high position, and I wished to be a personage

like the Mudir of our province, so I petitioned Ibrahim Bey, who was my

superior, to be put back into the ranks. Ibrahim Bey showed me that I

should lose by this as my pay would then be only fifty piastres, but I

insisted and so served. I was put soon after to another examination, out

of which I came first, and they made me _chowish_, and then to a third

and they made me lieutenant when I was only seventeen. Suliman Pasha el

Franzawi was so pleased with me that he insisted with Saïd Pasha on

giving me promotion, and I became captain at eighteen, major at

nineteen, and Lieutenant-Colonel, _Caimakam_, at twenty. Then Saïd Pasha

took me with him as A. D. C. when he went to Medina, about a year before

he died. That was in A. H. 1279 (1862?).

Saïd Pasha's death was a great misfortune to me and to all, as he was

favourable to the children of the country. Ismaïl was quite otherwise.

In his time everything was put back into the hands of the Turks and

Circassians, and the Egyptians in the army got no protection and no

promotion. I went on serving as Caimakam for twelve years without much

incident till war came with Abyssinia. I was not sent to the war with

Russia, but when the war with Abyssinia broke out all available troops

were wanted, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the stations on the

Haj Road, and I was sent to do this. I was sent quite alone without a

single soldier or a single piastre and had to get there as best I could

on a camel. I went in this way to Nakhl and Akaba and Wej collecting the

garrisons and putting in Arabs to take charge of the forts there as

_ghaffirs_. Then we crossed over the sea to Kosseir and so by Keneh to

Cairo. I was not paid a penny for this service or even my expenses. The

country was in a fearful state of oppression, and it was then I began to

interest myself in politics to save my countrymen from ruin. I was sent

on to Massowa from Cairo and took part in the campaign of which Ratib

Pasha was commander-in-chief, with Loringe Pasha, the American, as Chief

of the Staff. I was not present at the battle of Kora, being in charge

of the transport service between Massowa and the army. It was a

disastrous battle, seven _ortas_ being completely destroyed. Loringe

Pasha was the officer mostly in fault. The Khedive's son, Hassan, was

there, but only as a boy, to learn soldiering. He was not in command nor

is it true that he was taken prisoner by the Abyssinians.

After this I thought much about politics. I remember to have seen Sheykh

Jemal-ed-Din, but not to speak to, but my former connection with the

Azhar made me acquainted with several of his disciples. The most

distinguished of them were Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and Sheykh Hassan el

Towil. The first book that ever gave me ideas about political matters

was an Arabic translation of the "Life of Bonaparte" by Colonel Louis.

The book had been brought by Saïd Pasha with him to Medina, and its

account of the conquest of Egypt by 30,000 Frenchmen so angered him that

he threw the book on the ground, saying "See how your countrymen let

themselves be beaten." And I took it up and read all that night, without

sleeping, till the morning. Then I told Saïd Pasha that I had read it

and that I saw that the French had been victorious because they were

better drilled and organized, and that we could do as well in Egypt if

we tried.

You ask me about the affair of the riot against Nubar Pasha in the time

of Ismaïl and whether I had a hand in it. I had none, for the reason

that I was away at Rashid (Rosetta) with my regiment. But the day before

the thing happened I was telegraphed for by the War Office with my

fellow Caimakam, Mohammed Bey Nadi, to deal with the case of a number of

soldiers that had been disbanded by the new Ministers without their

arrears of pay or even bread to eat, and who were at Abbassiyeh. But I

knew nothing of what was being arranged against Nubar. That was done by

order of the Khedive, Ismaïl Pasha, through a servant of his, Shahin

Pasha, and his brother-in-law, Latif Eff. Selim, director of the

military college. These got up a demonstration of the students of the

college, who went in a body to the Ministry of Finance. They were joined

on the way by some of the disbanded soldiers and officers, not many, but

some. At the Ministry they found Nubar getting into his carriage, and

they assaulted him, pulled his moustache, and boxed his ears. Then

Ismaïl Pasha was sent for to quell the riot and he came with

Abd-el-Kader Pasha and Ali Bey Fehmy, the colonel of his guard, whom he

ordered to fire on the students, but Ali Fehmy ordered his men to fire

over their heads and nobody was hurt. Ali Fehmy was not with us at that

time. He was devoted to Ismaïl, having married a lady of the palace, but

he did not like to shed the blood of these young men.

Ismaïl Pasha, to conceal his part in it and that of those who got up the

affair, accused Nadi Bey and me and Ali Bey Roubi of being their leaders

and we were brought before a _mejliss_ on which were Stone Pasha and

Hassan Pasha Afflatoun with Osman Rifki, afterwards Under-Secretary of

War, and others. I showed, however, that it was impossible we could be

concerned in it as we had only that very night arrived from Rosetta.

Nevertheless we were blamed and separated from our regiments, Nadi being

sent to Mansura, Roubi to the Fayum, and I to Alexandria where I was

given a nominal duty of acting as agent for the Sheykhs of Upper Egypt,

whose arrears of taxes in the shape of beans and other produce were to

be collected and sent to Alexandria in security for money advanced to

Ismaïl by certain Jews of that place. But before we separated we had a

meeting at which I proposed that we should join together and depose

Ismaïl Pasha. It would have been the best solution of the case, as the

Consuls would have been glad to get rid of Ismaïl in any way, and it

would have saved after complications as well as the fifteen millions

Ismaïl took away with him when he was deposed. But there was nobody as

yet to take the lead, and my proposal, though approved, was not

executed. The deposition of Ismaïl lifted a heavy load from our

shoulders and all the world rejoiced, but it would have been better if

we had done it ourselves as we could then have got rid of the whole

family of Mohammed Ali, who were none of them, except Saïd, fit to rule,

and we could have proclaimed a republic. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din proposed to

Mohammed Abdu to kill Ismaïl at the Kasr-el-Nil Bridge and Mohammed Abdu

approved. Ismaïl collected the money of the Mudiriehs six months before

his deposition. Latif afterwards avowed his part in the affair. Latif

was put in prison but released on application of the freemasons to

Nubar.

Tewfik Pasha, when he succeeded Ismaïl, by his first act made public

promise of a Constitution. You ask me whether he was sincere in this. He

never was sincere, but he was a man incredibly weak, who never could say

"no," and he was under the influence of his Minister, Sherif Pasha, who

was a sincere lover of free forms of government. Tewfik, in his father's

reign, had amassed money, which was what he cared for most, by receiving

presents from persons who had petitions to make, and who thought he

could forward their ends. He had no wish for a Constitution, but he

could not say "no" when Sherif pressed him. So he promised. Two months

later he fell under the stronger influence of the Consuls, who forbade

him to decree it. On this Sherif called the Ministers together, and they

all gave him their words of honour that they would resign with him if he

resigned. And so it happened. But some of them, notwithstanding their

promise, joined Riaz Pasha when he became Prime Minister in Sherif's

place. In order to persuade them Riaz engaged that each Minister should

be supreme in his own department, and that they would not allow Tewfik

to interfere in any way with the administration. Mahmud Sami joined him

as Minister of the _Awkaf_, Ali Mubarak as Minister of Public Works, and

Osman Pasha Rifki, a Turk of the old school, who hated the fellahin, was

made Minister of War. The new government was a tyrannical one. Hassan

Moussa el Akkad, for signing a petition against the breaking of the

Moukabala arrangement, was exiled to the White Nile, and Ahmed Fehmi for

another petition, and many other people were got rid of who incurred the

displeasure of the Ministers. Of all the Ministers the worst was Osman

Rifki.

We colonels were now once more with our regiments, and as native

Egyptians subject to much oppression. On any pretext a fellah officer

would be arrested, and his place filled by a Circassian. It was the plan

to weed the whole army of its native officers. I was especially in ill

favour because I had refused to allow my men to be taken from their

military duty and put to dig the Tewfikieh Canal, which it was the

practice to make them do without extra pay. Plans were made to involve

me in some street quarrel with the view to my assassination, but through

the love of my soldiers I always escaped. All officers who were not

Circassians were in danger, and all were alarmed. It was thus that Ali

Fehmy, who was a fellah born, though through his wife connected with the

Court, came to join us, for he feared he, too, would be superseded. He

was Colonel of the 1st Regiment of Guards, and stationed at Abdin; I was

at Abbassiyeh with the 3rd Regiment, and Abd-el-Aal Helmi was at Toura.

Ali Roubi commanded the cavalry.

Matters came to a crisis in January, 1881. I had gone to spend the

evening with Nejm ed Din Pasha, and there were at his house some pashas

talking over the changes Osman Rifki had in hand, and I learned from

them that it had been decided that I and Abd-el-Aal should be deprived

of our commands, and our places given to officers of the Circassian

class. At the same moment a message arrived for me from my house to say

that Ali Fehmy had come there with Abd-el-Aal and was awaiting me. So I

went home and I found them there, and from them I learned the same evil

news. We therefore took council what was to be done. Abd-el-Aal proposed

that we should go in force to Osman Rifki's house and arrest or kill

him, but I said, "No, let us petition first the Prime Minister, and

then, if he refuses, the Khedive." And they charged me to draw the

petition up in form. And I did so, stating the case, and demanding the

dismissal of Osman Rifki, and the raising of the army to 18,000 men, and

the decreeing of the promised Constitution. [N. B.--I think Arabi makes

a mistake here, confusing these last two demands with those made on the

9th of September. But he insisted on it the three proposals were first

made in February, and made in writing then.] This we all three signed,

though knowing that our lives were at stake.

The following morning we went with our petition to the Minister of the

Interior and asked to see Riaz. We were shown into an outer room and

waited while the Minister read it in an inner room. Presently he came

out. "Your petition," he said, "is _muhlik_" (a hanging matter). "What

is it you want? to change the Ministry? And what would you put in its

place? Whom do you propose to carry on the government?" And I answered

him, "_Ye saat le Basha_, is Egypt then a woman who has borne but eight

sons and then been barren?" By this I meant himself and the seven

ministers under him. He was angry at this, but in the end said he would

see into our affair, and so we left him. Immediately a council was

assembled with the Khedive and all his Court, and Stone and Blitz also.

And the Khedive proposed that we should be arrested and tried, but

others said, "If these are put on trial, Osman Pasha also must be

tried." Therefore Osman was left to deal with it alone. And the rest you

know.

You ask did the Khedive at that time know of our intention to petition.

He did not know that nor that Ali Fehmy came to us. But afterwards he

knew. You ask did I know the Baron de Ring. I did not know him, nor any

one of the Consuls, but I heard that the French Consul had the most

influence, and I wrote to him telling him what our position was, and

begging him to let the other Consuls know that there was no fear for

their subjects. You ask if I knew Mahmud Sami. I did not know him yet.

But he was friends with my friend Ali Roubi, and I had heard a good

account of him as a lover of freedom. He was of a Circassian family, but

one that had been 600 years in Egypt.

As to the second demonstration of September 9th, we knew then that the

Khedive was with us. He wished to rid himself of Riaz, who disregarded

his authority. I saw him but twice to speak to that summer, and never on

politics. His communication was through Ali Fehmy, who brought us word

to the following effect: "You three are soldiers. With me you make

four." You ask me whether he was sincere. He never was sincere. But he

wished an excuse to dismiss Riaz. We therefore demanded next time the

dismissal of Riaz, as well as the rest, knowing he would be pleased. On

the morning of the 9th September we sent word to the Khedive that we

should come to the _asr_ to Abdin to make demand of the fulfilment of

his promises. He came, and with him Cookson, and it was with Cookson

that I debated the various proposals made. He asked if we should be

content with Haidar Pasha, but I said "we want no relation of the

Khedive." There were no written demands the second time, only a renewal

of the three demands of the 1st February, the Chamber of Notables, the

raising of the army to 18,000 men, according to the firmans, and the

dismissal of Riaz. They agreed to all. The Khedive was delighted. I know

nothing of Colvin having been there, or of any advice he gave to the

Khedive. The only ones I saw were Cookson and Goldsmid. It was Cookson

who talked to me. If the Khedive had tried to shoot me, the guns would

have been fired on him, and there would have been bad work. But he was

entirely pleased with the whole of the proceedings.

You ask about Abu Sultan (Sultan Pasha). He was disappointed, because

when the Ministry was formed under Sherif Pasha he was not included in

it. It was thought, however, that the post of President of the Chamber

of Deputies was more honourable and more important. Only he did not take

this view, and was put out at being omitted from the Ministry. That was

the beginning of his turning against us.

To your question about the ill-treatment of the Circassians arrested for

a plot while I was Minister of War, I answer plainly, as I have answered

before, I never went to the prison to see them tortured or ill-treated,

I simply never went near them at all.

About the riots of Alexandria there is no question but that it was due

to the Khedive and Omar Pasha Loutfi, and also to Mr. Cookson. The riots

were certainly planned several days beforehand, and with the object of

discrediting me, seeing that I had just given a guarantee of order being

preserved. The Khedive sent the cyphered telegram you know of to Omar

Loutfi, and Omar Loutfi arranged it with Seyd Kandil, the chief of the

Alexandria _mustafezzin_. Seyd Kandil kept the thing from us who were at

Cairo. Mr. Cookson's part in it was that a number of cases of firearms

were landed, and sent to his consulate, obviously with the intention of

arming somebody. The moment I heard of what had happened, I sent Yakub

Sami to Alexandria with orders to make a full inquiry, and the facts

were abundantly proved. Much of what has been said however was

incorrect. It is not true that the bodies of Christians were found

dressed as Moslems. The riot began with a Maltese donkey boy, but that

was only the excuse. Omar Loutfi, as you say, was a strong partisan of

Ismaïl's. You ask why a man so dangerous was left in a post where he

could work so much mischief. I can only say that he was not under the

orders of the Minister of War, but of the Interior. It was a misfortune

he was left there. Neither Nadim nor Hassan Moussa el Akkad went to

Alexandria on any business of that kind. Hassan Moussa went there on a

money errand.

What you ask me is true about Ismaïl Pasha. He made us an offer of

money. The circumstances of it were these. We had ordered a number of

pieces of light artillery from Germany, but they would not deliver them

without payment, and we had none. Ismaïl Pasha offered to let us have

£30,000 to pay this, on condition that we would allow it to be said that

we were acting in his interests. The offer was made through M. Mengs

[Max Lavisson], Ismaïl's Russian agent, and Hassan Moussa had some hand

in it. But it was never produced, and if Ismaïl really sent it to

Alexandria, it remained there in their hands. We never touched it.

I do not remember to have heard of any offer such as you speak of having

been made by the Rothschilds [this was an offer made as I heard at the

time by the Paris Rothschilds of a pension to Arabi of £4,000 (100,000

francs) yearly, if he would leave Egypt], but I received soon after the

leyha [the note sent in by the Consuls demanding the dismissal of the

Mahmud Sami Ministry], a visit from the French Consul, during which he

asked me what my pay then was, and offered me the double--that is to

say, £500 a month from the French Government if I would consent to leave

Egypt and go to Paris and be treated there as Abd-el-Kader was treated.

I refused, however, to have anything to do with it, telling him that it

was my business, if necessary, to fight and die for my country, not to

abandon it. I never heard of the Rothschilds in connection with this

offer.

I will now give you an account of how Tel-el-Kebir was lost. Some days

before, when the English were advancing, we made a plan to attack them

at Kassassin. Mahmud Sami was to advance on their right flank from

Salahieh, while we were to advance in front, and a third body was to go

round by the desert, south of the Wady, and take them in the rear. The

attack was tried and put partly in execution, but failed because the

plan had been betrayed by Ali Bey Yusuf Khunfis, who sent the original

sketch made by me to Lord Wolseley. He and others in the army had been

corrupted by Abou Sultan acting for the Khedive. When Mahmud advanced,

he found artillery posted to intercept him and retreated, leaving us

unsupported, and the battle was lost. Sir Charles Wilson, while I was in

prison at Cairo, brought me my plan, and asked me whether it was in my

own hand, and I said "yes," and he told me how they had come by it. "It

is a good plan," he said, "and you might have beaten us with it."

This was our first misfortune. At Tel-el-Kebir we were taken by surprise

and for the same reason of treachery. The cavalry commanders were all

seduced by Abou Sultan's promises. They occupied a position in advance

of the lines, and it was their duty to give us warning of any advance by

the English. But they moved aside and gave no warning. There was also

one traitor in command within the lines, Ali Bey Yusuf Khunfis. He lit

lamps to direct the enemy, and then withdrew his men, leaving a wide

space open for them to pass through. You see the marks upon this carpet.

They just represent the lines. That is where Ali Yusuf was posted.

Mohammed Obeyd was there, and I was at this figure on the carpet a mile

and a half to the rear. We were expecting no attack as no sound of

firing had been heard. I was still asleep when we heard the firing close

to the lines. Ali Roubi, who was in command in front, sent news to me to

change my position as the enemy was taking us in flank. I said my prayer

and galloped to where we had a reserve of volunteers, and called to them

to follow me to support the front line. But they were only peasants, not

soldiers, and the shells were falling among them and they ran away. I

then rode forward alone with only my servant Mohammed with me, who,

seeing that there was no one with me and that I was going to certain

death, caught hold of my horse by the bridle and implored me to go back.

Then seeing that the day was lost already, and that all were flying, I

turned. Mohammed continued with me and we crossed the Wady at

Tel-el-Kebir, and keeping along the line of the Ismaïlia Canal reached

Belbeis. There I had formed a second camp, and I found Ali Roubi arrived

before me, and we thought to make a stand. But on the arrival of Drury

Lowe's cavalry none would stay, and so we abandoned all and took train

for Cairo. Ali Roubi made mistakes by extending the lines too far

northwards, but he was loyal. The traitors were Abdul Ghaffar, I think,

and certainly his second in command of the cavalry, Abd-el-Rahman Bey

Hassan, and Ali Yusuf Khunfis. You say Saoud el Tihawi, too. It may be

so. Those Arabs were not to be trusted. His grandfather had joined

Bonaparte when he invaded us a hundred years ago.

Now I return home after twenty years of sorrowful exile, and my own

people I laboured to deliver have come to believe, because the French

papers have told them so, that I sold them to the English!

THE GRAND MUFTI'S REMARKS ON THE ABOVE

[N. B.--On March 18th, 1903, I read the foregoing account to Sheykh

Mohammed Abdu at his house at Aïn Shems. He approved most of it as

correct, but made the following remarks:

1. _As to the riot against Nubar._--Arabi's account of this is correct,

except that the order given to Ali Ferny to fire on the students was not

intended to be obeyed and was part of the comedy. Ali Fehmy fired over

their heads by order. Latif Bey was arrested and imprisoned after the

riot by Nubar, but was released on an application made to Nubar by the

freemasons, Latif being a member of that body. Latif in after days

freely acknowledged his share in the affair. As to what Arabi says of

his having proposed at that time to depose Ismaïl, there was certainly

secret talk of such action. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din was in favour of it, and

proposed to me, Mohammed Abdu, that Ismaïl should be assassinated some

day as he passed in his carriage daily over the Kasr el Nil bridge, and

I strongly approved, but it was only talk between ourselves, and we

lacked a person capable of taking lead in the affair. If we had known

Arabi at that time, we might have arranged it with him, and it would

have been the best thing that could have happened, as it would have

prevented the intervention of Europe. It would not, however, have been

possible to establish a republic in the then state of political

ignorance of the people. As to Ismaïl's having taken away fifteen

millions with him to Naples, nobody knows the amount. All that is known

is that it was very large. For the last few months of his reign Ismaïl

had been hoarding money, which he intercepted as it was sent in to the

Finance Office from the Mudiriehs.

2. _As to Tewfik in his father's time._--What Arabi says of Tewfik

having taken presents for presenting petitions to Ismaïl may be true,

but the thing was not talked of, nor is it in accordance with Tewfik's

conduct when in power. I do not believe it.

3. _As to Riaz' tyranny._--Riaz was tyrannical, but not to the point of

shedding blood. This he was always averse to. I do not remember any talk

about the people being made away with secretly by him. There was no

danger of such at any rate before the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil. During

the summer, however, of that year, 1881, there was talk of attempts

against Arabi and the other colonels.

4. _As to the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil, February 1st, 1881._--Arabi's

account is confused and incorrect. The first petition made by Arabi and

the officers was simply one of injustice being done them. It was made by

Osman Rifki, and it drew down upon them the anger of the Minister of

War, who determined to get rid of them, and first brought Arabi under

the notice of the Consuls. Baron de Ring, who had a quarrel with Riaz,

interested himself in their case, but only indirectly. The petition

talked of by Arabi as having been drawn up in January by him and taken

to Riaz, certainly contained no reference to a Constitution or to the

increase of the army to 18,000 men. These demands were not made until

the September demonstration. The petition of the Kasr-el-Nil time was

simply a strong complaint to Riaz of Osman Rifki's misdoings, and

demanding his dismissal from the Ministry of War. Riaz, at the council

after the demonstration, was in favour of its being made the subject of

an inquiry, which would have necessitated the trial by court-martial not

only of the petitioners, but also of Osman Rifki. Riaz was not in favour

of violence. But it was pointed out to him, privately, that if he

opposed the more violent plan it would be said he was seeking to curry

favor with the soldiers as against the Khedive, and he, therefore, left

the matter to Osman Rifki, to be dealt with as he pleased.

5. _As to the demonstration of Abdin, September 9th, 1881._--The seven

months between the affair of Kasr-el-Nil and the demonstration of

September were months of great political activity, which pervaded all

classes. Arabi's action gained him much popularity, and put him into

communication with the civilian members of the National party, such as

Sultan Pasha, Suliman Abaza, Hassain Shereï, and myself, and it was we

who put forward the idea of renewing the demand for a Constitution. The

point of view from which he at that time regarded it was as giving him

and his military friends a security against reprisals by the Khedive of

his Ministers. He told me this repeatedly during the summer. We

consequently organized petitions for a Constitution, and carried on a

campaign for it in the press. Arabi saw a great deal of Sultan Pasha

during the summer, and Sultan, who was very rich, made much of him,

sending him presents, such as farm produce, horses, and the rest, in

order to encourage him, and to get this support for the constitutional

movement. It was in concert with Sultan that the demonstration of Abdin

was arranged, and it is quite true that Sultan expected to be named to a

Ministry after the fall of Riaz. But Sherif Pasha, who became Prime

Minister, did not think of him and overlooked him. Afterwards Sultan was

pacified and pleased when he was offered the presidency of the new

Chamber of Notables. It was not till after the _leyha_, ultimatum, that

he had any quarrel with Arabi. Then it is true that Arabi drew his sword

in Sultan's presence and that of other members of the Chamber when they

hesitated and were afraid to oppose the leyha. Up to this they had acted

together. Arabi's account of the Khedive's message, "You three are

soldiers. With me you are four," is excellent, and exactly shows the

situation as between him and the officers. Colvin certainly was with the

Khedive at Abdin, but as he knew no Arabic he probably was not noticed

by Arabi. It was Cookson who did the talking. Baron de Ring had been

recalled by his government on the request of Riaz, who complained of his

encouragement of the officers.

6. _As to the riots of Alexandria._--Arabi is correct in his account as

regards Omar Loutfi and the Khedive, who had been arranging the riot for

some weeks. But it is not true as regards Seyd Kandil, who was only weak

and failed to prevent it. He is also wrong about Cookson. The firearms

introduced into the Consulate were for the defence of the Maltese and

other English subjects. Seyd Kandil was exiled for twenty years, but was

allowed quietly to come back, and is now at his country place in Egypt,

and I have often talked over the affair with him. If you like we will go

together and pay him a visit next autumn. Arabi is right in saying that

neither Hassan Moussa nor Nadim were concerned in the riot. Nadim went

down to Alexandria to deliver a lecture and Hassan on money business.]

[The Mufti also added the following remarks on March 20th, 1903.

There was an attempt to introduce freemasonry into Egypt in the later

years of Ismaïl Pasha. The lodges were all connected with lodges in

Europe. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din joined one, but he soon found out that there

was nothing of any value in it and withdrew. Ismaïl encouraged it for

his purposes when he began to be in difficulties, but freemasonry never

was a power in Egypt.

Mohammed Obeyd was certainly killed at Tel-el-Kebir. There were rumours

for a long time of his having been seen in Syria, and we used to send

from Beyrout when we were living there in exile to try and find him for

his wife's sake, who was at Beyrout, but they always turned out to be

false reports.

Mahmud Sami was one of the original Constitutionalists, dating from the

time of Ismaïl. He was a friend of Sherif and belonged to the same

school of ideas. It is most probable that he gave warning to Arabi of

his intended arrest, as he was one of the Council of Ministers and must

have known. After the affair of Kasr-el-Nil he was altogether with Arabi

and the Colonels. That was why Riaz got rid of him from the Ministry and

appointed Daoud Pasha in his place.

Riaz, at the beginning, underrated the importance of Arabi's action.

Afterwards he was afraid of it. He began by despising it as he did all

fellah influence in politics.

Sherif Pasha resigned in February, 1882, not on account of any quarrel

with Arabi, but because he was afraid of European intervention. He was

opposed to an insistence on the power of voting the budget claimed by

the Chamber of Notables, and he retired so as not to be compromised.

Ragheb Pasha is (as mentioned by Ninet) of Greek descent, though a

Moslem. He had been Minister under Ismaïl, but was a Constitutionalist.

After the leyha he was named Prime Minister, with Arabi for Minister of

War. He acted honestly with Arabi, and remained with the National Party

during the war.

Butler gives May 20th, 1880, as the date of the first military petition.

That is probably correct.

Ibrahim el Aghany was one of the best and ablest of Jemal ed Din's

disciples at the Azhar. He is still living and employed in the Mékhemeh

(?).

When the Council was summoned to consider Arabi's petition asking for

Osman Rifky's dismissal, the Khedive was with Osman Rifky for having

Arabi arrested and sent up the Nile, but Riaz at first was for an

inquiry. During an adjournment, however, of the Council, Taha Pasha

persuaded Riaz that if he was for lenient measures it would be thought

he was intriguing with the soldiers against the Khedive--to make himself

Khedive--and Riaz thereupon made no further opposition. This I learned

afterwards from Mahmud Sami who, as one of the Ministers, was present at

the Council.

Ibrahim Eff. el Wakil with Hassan Shereï and Ahmed Mahmud were the

leaders of the liberal party in the Chamber of Notables.]

FURTHER ACCOUNT GIVEN BY SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU, DECEMBER 22ND, 1903

[When Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din was exiled a few days after the Sherif's

dismissal in 1879, I was told to leave Cairo where I was professor in

the normal school, and to go to my village. My successor at the school

was Sheykh Hassan the blind. I was soon tired of being in my village and

went to Alexandria where I was watched by the police, so I went secretly

to Tantah and wandered about for a long while. Then I came back to Cairo

hoping to see Mahmud Sami, who was my friend, and at that time Minister

of the Awkaf, but he was away, so I went to Ali Pasha Mubarak's,

Minister of Public Works, who was also a friend, but he received me

badly, and everybody advised me not to stay, as it would be thought I

came in connection with a secret society which had been recently formed

by Shahin Pasha and Omar Lutfi and other Ismaïlists against Riaz, so I

went to my village again. But again I grew tired of it, as the villagers

were always quarrelling and resolved to return once more and lecture at

the Azhar. Riaz Pasha was at that time in difficulty to find any one who

could write good Arabic in the Official Paper, and he consulted Mahmud

Sami, who told him that if there were but three more like me Egypt could

be saved. And my successor, Sheykh Hassan, gave him the same opinion of

me.

So I was appointed at the end of Ramadan (October, 1880), third Editor

of the Journal. But my two senior Editors were jealous and would give me

no work to do. So the Journal was no better written. At this Riaz was

displeased, and made inquiry, and as the result I was made Editor, and a

little later Director of the Press. This was before the end of 1880. The

first time I saw you was when I called on you with Rogers Bey at the

Hôtel du Nil, and it was I who recommended to you Mohammed Khalil, and

afterwards he brought you to see me at my house. I criticized the

Government strongly in the Official Journal, and as Director of the

Press allowed all liberty. But I was not in favour of a revolution, and

thought that it would be enough if we had a Constitution in five years'

time. I disapproved of the overthrow of Riaz in September, 1881, and,

about ten days before the military demonstration at Abdin, I met Arabi

at the house of Toulba Ismat, and Latif Bey Selim had come with him, and

there were many there. And I urged him to moderation, and said, "I

foresee that a foreign occupation will come and that a malediction will

rest for ever on him who provokes it." On this Arabi said that he hoped

it would not be he. And he told me at the same time that Sultan Pasha

had promised to bring petitions from every Notable in Egypt in favour of

the Constitution. This was true, for all the Omdehs were angry with Riaz

for having put down their habit of employing forced labour. Suliman

Abaza would not join in the revolution as he thought it premature, and

Shereï Pasha was also against it. But when once the Constitution was

granted we all joined to protect it. But Arabi could not control the

army, where there were many ambitions.

I did not know of the intended demonstration at Abdin, as I was known to

be friendly to Riaz, but it was arranged with Sultan Pasha and Sherif

Pasha. The Khedive was in a constant change of mind about Arabi at that

time, and joined Riaz and Daoud Pasha in their attempt to crush Arabi,

but the day before the event they told the Khedive, who, to overthrow

Riaz, approved.]

CONVERSATION WITH ARABI AT SHEYKH OBEYD, JANUARY 2ND, 1904

You ask me at what date the Khedive Tewfik put himself first into

communication with us soldiers. It was in this way. Shortly before the

affair of the Kasr-el-Nil he encouraged Ali Fehmy to go to us, with whom

we were already friends, his intention being to use him as a spy on us,

he being Colonel of the Guard. But Ali Fehmy joined us in our petition

to Riaz Pasha, and was involved with us in our arrest. After the affair

of the Kasr-el-Nil, and seeing the position we had gained in the minds

of the people, the Khedive thought to make use of us against Riaz, and

he sent Ali Fehmy to us with the message, "You three are soldiers. With

me you make four." That was about a month after the affair, and we knew

he was favourable to us also through Mahmud Sami, who was then Minister

of War. And Mahmud Sami told us, "If ever you see me leave the Ministry,

know that the Khedive's mind is changed to you, and that there is

danger." In the course, therefore, of the summer (1881) when trouble

began to begin for us through the spies of Riaz Pasha, who was Minister

of the Interior, and who had us watched by the police, we had confidence

in Mahmud Sami.

And I was specially involved in displeasure through my refusal to allow

my soldiers to be taken from their military work to dig the Tewfikieh

Canal, they being impressed for the labour by Ali Pasha Moubarak as

Minister of Public Works. For this and for other reasons the Khedive

turned from us, and resolved, with Riaz Pasha, to separate and disunite

the army; and the regiments were to be sent to distant places so that we

should not communicate one with the other. And Mahmud Sami was called

upon, as Minister of War, to work their plan against us, the Khedive at

that time being at Alexandria with the rest of the Ministers. And when

Mahmud Sami refused, Riaz Pasha wrote to him, "The Khedive has accepted

your resignation." And both he and the Khedive notified Mahmud Sami that

he was to go at once to his village in the neighbourhood of Tantah, and

remain there, and not to go to Cairo, and on no account to have

communication with us. He nevertheless came to Cairo to his house there,

and we called on him, but he refused to see us. Then we knew that evil

was intended against us. And the Khedive appointed Daoud Pasha Yeghen in

his place, and the vexation on us increased, and we knew that attempts

were to be made against us. At the beginning of September the Khedive

returned to Cairo with Riaz and the Ministers, and it was resolved to

deal with us. Then I took counsel with Abd-el-Aal and Abd-el-Ghaffar,

the commander of the cavalry at Gesireh, and Fuda Bey Hassan, _Caimakam_

in command at the Kaláa. The miralaï in command at the Kaláa had been

dismissed by Mahmud Sami shortly before leaving office, and had not been

replaced. This miralaï was of us but _khaïn_ (a traitor), and we agreed

that we would make a demonstration and demand the dismissal of the whole

Ministry, and that a Ministry favourable to the Wattan should replace

them, and that a Mejliss el Nawwab should be assembled, and that the

army should be raised to 18,000 men. But we did not tell Ali Fehmy of

our design, for we did not wholly at that time trust him. And the next

morning I wrote stating our demands, and sent it to the Khedive at

Ismaïlia Palace, saying that we should march to Abdin Palace at the

_asr_, there to receive his answer. And the reason of our going to Abdin

and not to Ismaïlia, where he lived, was that Abdin was his public

residence, and we did not wish to alarm the ladies of his household. But

if he had not come to Abdin we should have marched on to Ismaïlia.

When, therefore, the Khedive received our message he sent for Riaz Pasha

and Khairy Pasha and Stone Pasha, and they went first to Abdin Barracks,

where both the Khedive and Riaz Pasha spoke to the soldiers, and they

gave orders to Ali Fehmy that he should, with his regiment, occupy the

Palace of Abdin. And Ali Fehmy assented, and he posted his men in the

upper rooms out of sight, so that they should be ready to fire on us

from the windows. But I do not know whether they were given ball

cartridge or not. Then the Khedive with the Generals went on to the

Kaláa, and they spoke to the soldiers there in the same sense, calling

on Fuda Bey to support the Khedive against us, the Khedive scolding him

and saying, "I shall put you in prison"; but the soldiers surrounded the

carriage, and the Khedive was afraid and drove away, and he went on by

the advice of Riaz to Abassiyeh to speak to me, but I had already

marched with my regiment through the Hassaneyn quarter to Abdin. They

asked about the artillery and were told that it also had gone to Abdin,

and when the Khedive arrived there he found us occupying the square, the

artillery and cavalry being before the west entrance, and I with my

troops before the main entrance, and already when I arrived before the

palace I had sent in to Ali Fehmy, who I had heard was there, and had

spoken to him, and he had withdrawn his men from the palace, and they

stood with us.

And the Khedive entered by the back door on the east side, and presently

he came out to us with his generals and aides-de-camp, but I did not see

Colvin with him, though he may have been there, and he called on me to

dismount, and I dismounted, and he called on me to put up my sword, and

I put up my sword, but the officers approached with me to prevent

treachery, about fifty in number, and some of them placed themselves

between him and the palace, but Riaz Pasha was not with the Khedive in

the square, and remained in the palace. And when I had delivered my

message and made my three demands to the Khedive, he said, "I am Khedive

of the country and shall do as I like" ("_and Khedeywi 'l beled wa 'amal

zey ma inni awze_"). I replied, "We are not slaves, and we shall never

more be inherited from this day forth" ("_Nahnu ma abid wa la nurithu

ba'd el yom_"). He said nothing more, but turned and went back into the

palace. And presently they sent out Cookson to me with his interpreter,

and he asked me why, being a soldier, I made demand of a parliament, and

I said that it was to put an end to arbitrary rule, and pointed to the

crowd of citizens supporting us behind the soldiers. He threatened me,

saying, "We shall bring a British army," and much discussion took place

between us, and he returned six or seven times to the palace, and came

out again six or seven times to me, until finally he informed me that

the Khedive had agreed to all, and the Khedive wished for Haidar Pasha

to replace Riaz. But I would not consent, and when it was put to me to

say I named Sherif Pasha, because he had declared himself in favour of a

Mejliss el Nawwab, and I had known him a little in former times, in the

time of Saïd Pasha, when he served with the army. And in the evening the

Khedive sent for me and I went to him at Ismaïlia Palace, and I thanked

him for having agreed to our request, but he said only, "That is enough.

Go now and occupy Abdin, and let it be without music in the streets"

(lest that should be taken as a token of rejoicing).

And when Ali Pasha Nizami came to Cairo with Ahmed Pasha Ratib from the

Sultan, the Khedive was alarmed lest an inquiry should be made, and

Mahmud Sami being again Minister of War ordered us to leave Cairo, and I

went to Ras-el-Wady and Abd-el-Aal to Damiata, but Ali Fehmy remained at

Cairo. And I saw nothing of Ali Nizami. But being at Zagazig on a visit

to friends, Ahmed Eff. Shemsi and Suliman Pasha Abaza, as I was

returning by train to Ras el Wady, it happened that Ahmed Pasha Ratib

was on his way to Suez, for he was going on to Mecca on pilgrimage. And

I found myself in the same carriage with him, and we exchanged

compliments as strangers, and I asked him his name, and he asked me my

name, and he told me of his pilgrimage and other things, but he did not

speak of his mission to the Khedive, nor did I ask. But I told him that

I was loyal to the Sultan as the head of our religion, and I also

related to him all that had occurred, and he said, "You did well." And

at Ras el Wady I left him, and afterwards he sent me a Koran from

Jeddah, and later, on his return to Stamboul, he wrote to me, saying

that he had spoken favourably of me to the Sultan, and afterwards I

received a letter dictated by the Sultan to Sheykh Mohammed Dhaffar

telling me what I know.

As to Yakub Sami, he was of family originally Greek from Stamboul. He

went by my order to Alexandria to inquire into the affair of the riot,

but they would not allow a true inquiry to be made into it. It was Yakub

Sami who, with Ragheb Pasha, proposed that we should cut off the

Khedive's head. You say we should have done better to do so, but I

wished to gain the end of our revolution without the shedding of a drop

of blood.

APPENDIX II

PROGRAMME OF THE NATIONAL PARTY OF EGYPT, FORWARDED BY MR. BLUNT TO MR.

GLADSTONE, DEC. 20TH, 1881, WITH MR. GLADSTONE'S ANSWERS

1. The National party of Egypt accept the existing relations of Egypt

with the Porte as the basis of their movement. That is to say: They

acknowledge the Sultan Abd el Hamid Khan as their Suzerain and Lord, and

as actual Caliph or Head of the Mussulman religion; nor do they propose,

while his empire stands, to alter this relationship. They admit the

right of the Porte to the tribute fixed by law, and to military

assistance in case of foreign war. At the same time, they are firmly

determined to defend their national rights and privileges, and to

oppose, by every means in their power, the attempts of those who would

reduce Egypt again to the condition of a Turkish Pashalik. They trust in

the protecting Powers of Europe, and especially in England, to continue

their guarantee of Egypt's administrative independence.

2. The National party express their loyal allegiance to the person of

the reigning Khedive. They will continue to support Mohammed Towfik's

authority as long as he shall rule in accordance with justice and the

law, and in fulfilment of his promises made to the people of Egypt in

September 1881. They declare, however, their intention to permit no

renewal of that despotic reign of injustice which Egypt has so often

witnessed, and to insist upon the exact execution of his promise of

Parliamentary government and of giving the country freedom. They invite

His Highness, Mohammed Towfik, to act honestly by them in these matters,

promising him their cordial help; but they warn him against listening to

those who would persuade him to continue his despotic power, to betray

their national rights, or to elude his promises.

3. The National party fully recognize the services rendered to Egypt by

the Governments of England and France, and they are aware that all

freedom and justice they have obtained in the past has been due to them.

For this they tender them their thanks. They recognize the European

Control as a necessity of their financial position, and the present

continuance of it as the best guarantee of their prosperity. They

declare their entire acceptance of the foreign debt as a matter of

_national honour_--this, although they know that it was incurred, not

for Egypt's benefit, but in the private interests of a dishonest and

irresponsible ruler--and they are ready to assist the Controllers in

discharging the full national obligations. They look, nevertheless, upon

the existing order of things as in its nature temporary, and avow it as

their hope gradually to redeem the country out of the hands of its

creditors. Their object is, some day to see Egypt entirely in Egyptian

hands. Also they are not blind to the imperfections of the Control,

which they are ready to point out. They know that many abuses are

committed by those employed by it, whether Europeans or others. They see

some of these incapable, others dishonest, others too highly paid. They

know that many offices, now held by strangers, would be better

discharged by Egyptians, and at a fifth of the cost; and they believe

there is still much waste and much injustice. They cannot understand

that Europeans living in the land should remain for ever exempt from the

general taxation, or from obedience to the general law. The National

party does not, however, propose to remedy these evils by any violent

action; only it would protest against their unchecked continuance. They

would have the Governments of France and England consider that, having

taken the control of their finances out of the hands of the Egyptians,

they are responsible for their prosperity, and are bound to see that

efficient and honest persons only are employed by them.

4. The National party disclaim all connection with those who, in the

interest of Powers jealous of Egypt's independence, seek to trouble the

peace of the country--and there are many such--or with those who find

their private advantage in disturbance. At the same time they are aware

that a merely passive attitude will not secure them liberty in a land

which is still ruled by a class to whom liberty is hateful. The silence

of the people made Ismaïl Pasha's rule possible in Egypt, and silence

now would leave their hope of political liberty unfulfilled. The

Egyptians have learned in the last few years what freedom means, and

they are resolved to complete their national education. This they look

to find in the Parliament just assembling, in a fair measure of freedom

for the press, and in the general growth of knowledge among all classes

of the people. They know, however, that none of these means of education

can be secured except by the firm attitude of the national leaders. The

Egyptian Parliament may be cajoled or frightened into silence, as at

Constantinople; the press may be used as an instrument against them, and

the sources of instruction cut off. It is for this reason and for no

other that the National party has confided its interests at the present

time to the army, believing them to be the only power in the country

able and willing to protect its growing liberties. It is not, however,

in the plans of the party that this state of things shall continue; and

as soon as the people shall have established their rights securely the

army will abandon its present political attitude. In this the military

leaders fully concur. They trust that on the assembling of the

Parliament their further interference in affairs of State may be

unnecessary. But for the present they will continue to perform their

duty as the armed guardians of the unarmed people. Such being their

position, they hold it imperative that their force should be maintained

efficient, and their complement made up to the full number of 18,000

men. They trust that the European Control will keep this necessity in

view when considering the army estimates.

5. The National party of Egypt is a political, not a religious party. It

includes within its ranks men of various races and various creeds. It is

principally Mohammedan, because nine-tenths of the Egyptians are

Mohammedans; but it has the support of the Moors, of the Coptic

Christians, of the Jews, and others who cultivate the soil and speak the

language of Egypt. Between these it makes no distinction whatever,

holding all men to be brothers and to have equal rights, both political

and before the law. This principle is accepted by all the chief Sheykhs

of the Azhar who support the party, holding the true law of Islam to

forbid religious hatred and religious disabilities. With Europeans

resident in Egypt the National party has no quarrel, either as

Christians or as strangers, so long as these shall live comformably with

the laws and bear their share of the burdens of the State.

6. Finally, the general end of the National party is the intellectual

and moral regeneration of the country by a better observance of the law,

by increased education, and by political liberty, which they hold to be

the life of the people. They trust in the sympathy of those of the

nations of Europe which enjoy the blessing of self-government to aid

Egypt in gaining for itself that blessing; but they are aware that no

nation ever yet achieved liberty except by its own endeavours; and they

are resolved to stand firm in the position they have won, trusting to

God's help if all other be denied them.

_December 18, 1881._

MR. GLADSTONE'S ANSWER

Hawarden Castle, Chester,

_Jan. 20th, 1882_.

MY DEAR SIR,

You will I am sure appreciate the reasons which disable me from

offering anything like a becoming reply to your very interesting

letter on Egyptian affairs, which occupy, I am sorry to say, an

insignificant share of my daily attention.

But I am sensible of the advantage of having such a letter from

such an authority, and I feel quite sure that unless there be a sad

failure of good sense on one or both, or, as I should say, all

sides, we shall be enabled to bring this question to a favourable

issue.

My own opinions about Egypt were set forth in the "19th Century" a

short time before we took office, and I am not aware as yet of

having seen any reason to change them.

I remain, my Dear Sir,

Faithfully yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

Wilfrid S. Blunt, Esq.

10, Downing Street, Whitehall,

_Jan. 21st, 1882_.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

I feel I owe you a great apology for your not having received an

earlier acknowledgment of your most able and interesting

communication on the Egyptian movement. Holiday making must be my

excuse; but my absence from Downing Street did not prevent the

prompt submission of your letter to Mr. Gladstone, from whom I

enclose a note. He is sorry that it is somewhat tardy in its

despatch.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to write on the present

critical state of affairs, when the situation may alter from day to

day.

You may imagine that the alleged national character to the movement

necessarily commends itself to Mr. Gladstone with his well-known

sympathy with young nationalities struggling for independence. The

great crux (I am of course only speaking for myself, and with a

strong consciousness of ignorance) seems to be, how to favour such

a movement with due regard to the responsibilities in which we have

been involved, and the vested interests which are at stake. Every

alternative seems to be beset with insuperable objections and

insurmountable difficulties. I can only say that if you can do

anything towards finding a solution for these difficulties you will

be doing a great work for Egypt, for the country, and for the

present Government. I know that you have already been of great

service, and are entitled to speak on this question with greater

authority than almost any one else.

With special regards to Lady Anne, and apologies for such a cursory

uninteresting note in return for your information,

Always yrs. affectionately

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. GLADSTONE'S ANSWER TO MR. BLUNT'S SECOND LETTER DATED CAIRO,

FEBRUARY 7TH, 1882

10, Downing Street, Whitehall,

_2nd March, 1882_.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone has read with much interest your further letter, for

which he is much obliged. He hopes that you will have felt, or will

feel, assured from the language in the speech from the Throne, of

which I enclose by his desire a copy, that the British Government,

while intending firmly to uphold international engagements, have a

sympathy with Egyptian feelings in reference to the purposes and

means of good government.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON.

EXTRACT FROM THE QUEEN'S SPEECH FORWARDED TO MR. BLUNT BY MR. HAMILTON

In concert with the President of the French Republic, I have given

careful attention to the affairs of Egypt, where existing arrangements

have imposed on me special obligations. I shall use my influence to

maintain the rights already established, whether by the Firmans of the

Sultan or by various international engagements, in a spirit favourable

to the good government of the country and the prudent development of its

institutions.

APPENDIX III

TEXT OF THE EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTION OF FEBRUARY 7TH, 1882

(_N.B._--This occurs in Blue Book, Egypt, No. 7 (1882), but is given

there in French only. The clauses embodying the amendments or

explanations obtained at Sir Edward Malet's and Sir Auckland Colvin's

instance by the author on January 19th, 1882, are marked with an

asterisk.)

LETTER FROM MAHMOUD SAMY PASHA ON TAKING OFFICE, FEBRUARY 2ND, 1882, TO

HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE

MONSEIGNEUR,

Your Highness has condescended to entrust to me the care of forming

a new Cabinet; I consider it as the first of my duties to submit to

you the principles which will guide my conduct and inspire that of

the Ministry over which I am to preside.

The events which have succeeded each other in Egypt for some years

past have prejudiced public opinion in various ways here, and in

foreign countries. These prejudices relate to two orders of ideas:

our financial expenditure and our internal reforms.

The general debt of the country was definitely regulated by a

series of Decrees which was itself completed by the Law of

Liquidation of 19th July, 1880.

These laws have acquired the character of International

Conventions. Your Highness's Government has never ceased to respect

them. The Ministry will watch over their exact and faithful

execution.