THE ARABI TRIAL
While these great events were happening on the Nile, I at my home at
Crabbet spent the summer sadly enough. My sympathies were, of course,
still all with the Egyptians, but I was cut off from every means of
communication with them, and the war fever was running too strongly
during the first weeks of the fighting for further words of mine to be
of any avail. Publicly I held my peace. All that I could do was
to prepare an "Apologia" of the National movement and of my own
connection with it--for this was now being virulently attacked in the
press[29]--and wait the issue of the campaign.
Nevertheless, though in dire disgrace with the Government, I did not
wholly lose touch with Downing Street. I saw Hamilton once or twice, and
submitted proofs of my "Apologia" to him and Mr. Gladstone before it was
published, and this was counted to me by them for righteousness. It
appeared in the September number of "The Nineteenth Century Review,"
and at a favourable moment when the first sparkle of military glory had
faded, and reasonable people were beginning to ask themselves what after
all we were fighting in Egypt about. Written from the heart even more
than from the head, my pleading had a success far beyond expectation
and, taken in connection with an anti-war tour embarked on in the
provinces by Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Mr. Seymour Keay and a few other
genuine Radicals, touched at last what was called the "Nonconformist"
conscience of the country and turned the tide of opinion distinctly in
my favour. This encouraged me. About the same time, too, a letter
reached me from General Gordon, dated "Cape Town, the 3rd of August," in
which he avowed his sympathy with the cause I had been advocating, and
which elated me not a little. It was as follows:
"Cape Town, 3, 8, 82.
"_My Dear Mr. Blunt_,
"You say in 'Times' you are going to publish an account of what
passed between you and the Government. Kindly let me have a copy
addressed as enclosed card. I have written a MS. bringing things
down from Cave's mission to the taking of office by Cherif, it is
called 'Israel in Egypt,' and shall follow it with a sequel, 'The
Exodus.' I do not know whether I shall print it, for it is not
right to rejoice over one's enemies. I mean _official_ enemies.
What a fearful mess Malet and Colvin have made, and one cannot help
remarking the _finale_ of all Dilke's, Colvin's, and Malet's
secretiveness. Dilke, especially, in the House evaded every query
on the plea that British interests would suffer. Poor thing. I
firmly believe he knows no more of his policy than the Foreign
Office porter did; he had none. Could things have ended worse if he
had said everything? I think not. No more Control--no more employés
drawing £373,000 a year--no more influence of Consuls-General, a
nation hating us--no more Tewfik--no more interest--a bombarded
town, Alexandria--these are the results of the grand secret
diplomacy. Colvin will go off to India, Malet to China--we shall
know no more of them. All this because Controllers and
Consuls-General would not let Notables see the Budget when Cherif
was in office. As for Arabi, whatever may become of him
individually, he will live for centuries in the people; they will
never be 'your obedient servants' again.
"Believe me, yours sincerely,
"C. G. GORDON."
The value to me of this letter I saw at once was great, for, though out
of favour with the Foreign Office, Gordon's name was one to conjure with
in the popular mind, and especially with that "Nonconformist conscience"
which, as I have said, was beginning now to support me, and consequently
I knew with Gladstone; and it was on the text of it that I began a fresh
correspondence with Hamilton. Mr. Gladstone had stated in Parliament
that I was the "one unfortunate exception," among Englishmen who knew
Egypt, to the general approval of the war; and I sent him, through
Hamilton, a copy of Gordon's letter, and at the same time invited his
attention to accounts which had begun to appear in the newspapers of
certain atrocities of vengeance which had been indulged in by Tewfik and
his new Circassian Ministers at Alexandria on Nationalist prisoners made
during the war. Torture had, it was related, been inflicted on Mahmud
Fehmi, the engineer General, and the thumbscrew and kurbash were being
used freely. I asked whether such was the state of things Mr. Gladstone
had sent troops to Egypt to re-establish. The letter brought a prompt
and interesting answer, and one which proved of value to me a few days
later when it came to my pleading that Arabi should not be done to death
by the Khedive without fair trial.
"10, Downing Street, Whitehall,
"_September 8th, 1882_.
"I need hardly say that Mr. Gladstone has been much exercised in
his mind at the rumours about these 'atrocities.' I can call them
by no other name. Immediate instructions were sent out to inquire
into the truth of them, and to remonstrate strongly if they were
confirmed. I am glad to say that, as far as our information at
present goes, the statements appear to be unfounded. The strictest
orders have been given for the humane treatment of the prisoners.
There seems to be some doubt as to whether thumbscrewing was not
inflicted on a spy in one case; and searching inquiries are to be
instituted with peremptory demands of explanation and guarantees
against recurrence. You may be quite sure that Mr. Gladstone will
denounce 'Egyptian atrocities' as strongly as 'Bulgarian
atrocities.'
"I cannot help thinking that your and Chinese Gordon's opinion of
Arabi would be somewhat modified if you had seen some of the
documents I have read.
"Some months ago (this, please, is quite private) certain inquiries
were made about Chinese Gordon. He had suggestions to make about
Ireland, and the result of these inquiries were, to the best of my
recollection, that he was not clothed in the rightest of minds."
The last paragraph is historically curious. The proof Gordon had given
Mr. Gladstone's Government of his not being clothed in his right mind
was that he had written, during a tour in western Ireland, to a member
of the Government, Lord Northbrook, recommending a scheme of Land
Purchase and, if I remember rightly, Home Rule as a cure for Irish
evils.
I was thus once more in a position of semi-friendly intercourse with
Downing Street and of some considerable influence in the country when
the crowning glory of the war, the news of the great victory of
Tel-el-Kebir, reached England, and soon after it of Arabi's being a
prisoner in Drury Lowe's hands at Cairo. The completeness of the
military success for the moment turned all English heads, and it was
fortunate for me that I had had my say a fortnight before it came, for
otherwise I should have been unable to make my voice heard, either with
the public or at Downing Street, in the general shriek of triumph. It
had the immediate result of confirming the Government in all its most
violent views, and of once more turning Mr. Gladstone's heart, which had
been veering back a little to the Nationalists, to the hardness of a
nether millstone. The danger now was that in order to justify to his own
conscience the immense slaughter of half-armed peasants that had been
made at Tel-el-Kebir, he would indulge in some conspicuous act of
vengeance on Arabi, as the scapegoat of his own errors. His only excuse
for all this military brutality was the fiction that he was dealing with
a military desperado, a man outlawed by his crimes, and, as such,
unentitled to any consideration either as a patriot or even the
recognized General of a civilized army. I have reason to know that if
Arabi had been captured on the field at Tel-el-Kebir, it was Wolseley's
intention to give him the short benefit of a drum-head court martial,
which means shooting on the spot, and that it was only the intervention
of Sir John Adye, a General much older in years and in length of service
than Wolseley, that prevented it later--Adye having represented to
Wolseley the disgrace there would be to the British army if the regular
commander of an armed force, whom it had needed 30,000 troops to subdue,
should not receive the honourable treatment universally accorded to
prisoners of war. At home, too, I equally know that Bright, in indignant
protest, gave his mind on the same point personally to Gladstone. It
must not, however, at all be supposed that anything but the overwhelming
pressure of public opinion brought to bear, as I will presently
describe, frustrated the determination of our Government, one way or
other, to make Arabi pay forfeit for their own political crime with his
life. Mr. Gladstone was as much resolved on this as was Lord Granville,
or any of the Whig lords in his Cabinet. To explain how their hands were
forced in the direction of humanity I must go into detail.
The capitulation of Cairo and Arabi's surrender to Drury Lowe were
announced in the "Times" of the 16th, and with it a telegram from its
Alexandria correspondent, Moberley Bell, who represented the
Anglo-Khedivial official view, demanding "exemplary punishment" on
eleven of the National leaders, whom he named, including Arabi. I knew
that this could only mean mischief resolved on of the gravest kind, and
I consequently telegraphed at once to Button, asking him what the
position in official circles was. His first answer was reassuring. "I
can't think there is the least danger of their shooting anybody. You
should, however, take immediate steps to appeal for merciful treatment."
Two hours later, however, a second message from him came. "I don't like
official tone with regard to your friends. Write me privately such a
letter as I can show to my chief." By his "chief" he, of course meant
Chenery, the "Times" editor, with whom, as I have said, he was on very
intimate terms. I consequently wrote at once to Hamilton:
"I cannot think there should be any danger of death for the
prisoners taken at Cairo, but should there be, I trust you will
let me know in time, as I have certain suggestions to make
regarding the extreme difficulty of obtaining them a fair trial
just now, and other matters."
To this it is significant that I received no answer for two days, and
then an off-hand one, to the effect that Hamilton was about to leave
London for the country, "and so would be a bad person to depend upon for
any intimation such as I wished." But I was not thus to be put off, and
passing beyond Hamilton, I wrote once more direct to Mr. Gladstone. I
did this after consultation with Button and with Broadley, whom I met at
his house on the afternoon of the 19th. We decided that the latter would
be the man for our purpose, and that the best chance of saving Arabi's
and the other prisoners' lives would be for me to take Broadley out with
me at once and produce him as their legal defender. Button, who knew the
ins and outs of most affairs, was certain there was no time to lose, and
we half engaged Broadley at a fee of £300, afterwards increased to £800
with refreshers. In the meantime Button rendered the cause a great
service in the immediate crisis by managing that it should be announced
next morning in the "Times" that Arabi and his companions were not to be
executed without the consent of the English Government, and that they
were to be defended by efficient counsel. Of course, we had not a shadow
of authority to go upon for this statement, but the "Times" having
announced it made it very difficult for the Government to go back upon a
humane decision so publicly attributed to them.
My letter to Mr. Gladstone, sent in the same evening, was as follows:
"_Sept. 19, 1882._
"MY DEAR SIR,
"Now that the military resistance of the Egyptians is at an end,
and Arabi and their chief leaders have surrendered to Her Majesty's
forces, I venture once more to address you in the interests of
justice no less than of those whom the fortune of war has thus
suddenly thrown into your hands. It would seem to be contemplated
that a Court Martial should assemble shortly to try and judge the
military leaders for rebellion, and, in the case of some of these,
and of civil tribunal to inquire into their alleged connection
with certain violent proceedings. If this should be the truth, I
would earnestly beg your attention to certain circumstances of the
case which seem to demand careful consideration.
"1. The members of the proposed Court Martial, if Egyptians and
appointed by the Khedive, can hardly be free agents or uninfluenced
in their feelings towards the prisoners. They would be chosen from
among the few officers who espoused the Khedive's cause, and would
of necessity be partisans.
"2. Even were this not the case, native false witness is so common
in Egypt, and the falsification of Arabic documents so easy, that
little reliance could be placed upon the testimony adduced. The
latter would need to be submitted to experts before being accepted
with any certainty.
"3. Native evidence, if favourable to the prisoners, will be given
under fear. There will be a strong inducement to withhold it, and
as strong an inducement in the desire of Court favour to offer
evidence unfavourable. The experts charged with examining documents
will, if natives, be equally subject to these influences.
"4. The evidence of Europeans settled in Egypt, though given
without fear of consequences, may be expected to be strongly
coloured by resentment. These Europeans are, it would seem,
themselves in some measure parties to the suit. They will many of
them have lost property or have been injured in their trade during
the late troubles or have personal insults to avenge. The
vindictive tone of the English in Egypt is every day apparent in
their letters published by the English Press.
"5. It will be insufficient, if full justice for the prisoners is
to be secured, that the ordinary form of Her Majesty's
representative being present through a dragoman or otherwise, at
the proceedings, should be the only one observed. Political feeling
has probably run too high at Cairo during the last six months for
quite impartial observation.
"6. Should English officers, as it may be hoped will be the case,
be added to the native members of the Court Martial, they will be
ignorant or nearly ignorant of the language spoken by the
prisoners, and will be unable themselves to examine the documents
or cross-examine the witnesses. They will necessarily be in the
hands of their interpreters, who, if unchecked, may alter or
distort the words used to the detriment of the prisoners. Nearly
all the dragomans of the Consulates are Levantine Christians
violently hostile to the Mussulman Arabs, while it may safely be
affirmed that there are no Englishmen in Egypt both fully competent
and quite unbiassed who could be secured in this capacity. Arabic
is a language little known among our officials, and their
connection with the late troubles is too recent to have left them
politically calm.
"It would seem, therefore, that unless special steps are taken
there is grave danger of a miscarriage of justice in the trial.
"To remedy this evil as far as possible I have decided, at my own
charge and that of some of my friends, to secure the services of a
competent English counsel for the principal prisoners, and to
proceed with him to Cairo to collect evidence for the defence. I
shall also take with me the Rev. Mr. Sabunji as interpreter, and
watch the proceedings on behalf of the prisoners. My knowledge of
Arabic is too imperfect for me to act alone, but Mr. Sabunji is a
friend of the chief prisoners, and is eminently capable of speaking
for them. He knows English, French, Turkish, and Italian well, and
is probably the first Arabic scholar now living. The prisoners have
full confidence in him, and I believe also that they have full
confidence in me. Thus alone, perhaps, they will obtain, what I
submit they are entitled to, a full, a fair, and--to some
extent--even a friendly hearing.
"In conclusion, it may not be unnecessary that I should promise you
that while thus engaged I, and those with me, would scrupulously
avoid all interference with contemporary politics. I shall esteem
it a favour if I can be informed at as early a date as possible
what will be the exact nature of the trial and what the principal
charges made. I hope, too, that every facility will be accorded me
and those with me in Egypt to prosecute our task, and I cannot
doubt that your personal sense of justice will approve it.
"I am, &c.,
"WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT."
This letter, which I knew it would be difficult for Mr. Gladstone to
answer with a refusal, especially after his recent assurances about
"Egyptian atrocities" and "Bulgarian atrocities," I sent at once to
Downing Street, having previously called there and seen Hamilton,
to whom I explained my plan. He did not, however, give me much
encouragement, as his answer to a further note I sent him next morning
proves. My note was that I was writing to Arabi, and to ask him how the
letter should be sent, and expressing a hope to have an answer from his
Chief before Friday, the next mail day. Hamilton's answer suggests
procrastination:
"Your letter, I am sorry to say, just missed the bag last night. It
reached me about three minutes too late; but in any case I don't
think you must count on a very immediate reply. Mr. Gladstone is
moving about, and moreover will most likely have to consult some
one before he gives an answer. I am absolutely ignorant myself as
to questions which your intended proceedings may raise; and
therefore I have no business to hazard an opinion. But is it not
open to doubt whether according to international law or
prescription a man can be defended by foreign counsel? I am equally
ignorant about the delivery of letters to prisoners of war; but I
should presume that no communication could reach Arabi except
through and with the permission of the Khedive and our
Commander-in-Chief. In any case Malet will probably be your best
means of communication."
According to this suggestion I wrote a letter to Arabi telling him of
our plans of legal defence and enclosed it, with a draft of the letter,
to Malet, and for more precaution sent both by hand to the Foreign
Office, to be forwarded, with a note to Lord Tenterden commending it to
his care. By a singular accident, however, both note and letter were
returned to me with the message that His Lordship had died suddenly that
morning, and I was obliged, as the mail was starting, to send it by the
same hand, Button's servant Mitchell, to Walmer Castle where Lord
Granville was, and it was only just in time. In the sequel it will be
seen that the packet, though despatched to Cairo, was not delivered
farther than into Malet's hands and then with the instruction that my
letter to Arabi should be returned to me. Malet's official letter to me
performing his duty is sufficient evidence, if any were needed, to show
how far the Government was from co-operating at all with me in my
design of getting the prisoners a fair trial. It is very formal and
unmistakable:
"Cairo, _Oct. 4, 1882_.
"SIR,
"Acting under instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State I return you herewith the letter for Arabi Pasha which you
sent to me to be forwarded in your letter of the 22nd ultimo.
"I am, etc., EDWARD B. MALET."
My letter to Arabi had been as follows:
"_To My Honourable Friend H. E. Ahmed Pasha Arabi._
"May God preserve you in adversity as in good fortune.
"As a soldier and a patriot you will have understood the reasons
which have prevented me from writing to you or sending you any
message during the late unhappy war. Now, however, that the war is
over, I hope to show you that our friendship has not been one of
words only. It seems probable that you will be brought to trial,
either for rebellion or on some other charge, the nature of which I
yet hardly know, and that, unless you are strongly and skilfully
defended, you run much risk of being precipitately condemned. I
have therefore resolved, with your approval, to come to Cairo to
help you with such evidence as I can give, and to bring with me an
honest and learned English advocate to conduct your defence; and I
have informed the English Government of my intention. I beg you,
therefore, without delay, to authorize me to act for you in this
matter--for your formal assent is necessary; and it would be well
if you would at once send me a telegram, and also a written letter,
to authorize me to engage counsel in your name. Several
liberal-minded Englishmen of high position will join me in
defraying all the expenses of your case. You may also count upon
me, personally, to see, during your captivity, that your family is
not left in want. And so may God give you courage to endure the
evil with the good.
"WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.
"_Sept. 22, 1882._ "Crabbet Park, Threebridges, Sussex."
Gladstone's answer, which came sooner than I expected, shows as little
disposition to favour any idea of a fair trial as was that of the
Foreign Office. It came in this form from Hamilton:
"10 Downing Street,
"_Sept. 22, 1882_.
"Mr. Gladstone has read the letter which you have addressed to him
about Arabi's trial and your proposal to employ English counsel.
All that he can say at the present moment is that he will bring
your request under the notice of Lord Granville with whom he will
consult, but that he cannot hold out any assurance that it will
admit of being complied with."
This was very plain discouragement, though short of a direct refusal,
and a few words added by Hamilton in a separate note were even more so:
"I confess," he says, "that the more I think of it the greater is the
number of difficulties which present themselves to my mind involved by
such a proposal as yours. You will, I presume, hear further on the
subject in a day or two but not from me, because I am off as you know."
I was left, therefore, still in doubts while the situation was daily
becoming more critical. I dared not leave for Egypt without having
received a definite answer, for I knew that at Cairo I should be
powerless, if unarmed with any Government authority, and should probably
not even be allowed to see the prisoners, while Broadley, tired of
waiting, had gone back to Tunis. The Parliamentary session was over and
every one was leaving London, the work of the Ministers being left to
Under-Secretaries, and all business practically at a standstill.
Meanwhile the question of Arabi's death was being keenly debated in the
Press, and all the Jingo papers were clamouring for his execution, only
here and there a feeble voice being raised in protest. Sir Wilfrid
Lawson's Egyptian Committee, which had done such good work during the
summer, had become silent, and from Lawson himself I received just then
a most desponding letter: "I greatly doubt," he said, "whether they will
allow Arabi to have anything like a _fair_ trial. They know well enough
that if they do it will end in their own condemnation, and 'Statesmen'
are too crafty to be led into anything of that sort. At any rate you
are right in _trying_ to get fair play for him." All I could do was to
stay on in London and still worry Downing Street for an answer and go on
prompting the "Times." Therefore, after waiting five more days, I wrote
again to Gladstone for a definite answer, the situation having become to
the last degree critical at Cairo.
"_Sept. 27, 1882._
"I wrote to you about ten days ago, stating my intention of
engaging competent English counsel for Arabi Pasha and the other
chief Egyptian prisoners in case they should be brought to trial,
and of going myself to Cairo to procure evidence for them and watch
the proceedings; and I begged you to give me early notice of any
decision that might be come to regarding them.
"Your reply, through Mr. Hamilton, though giving me no assurance
that English counsel would be allowed seemed to suggest that my
proposal would be considered; and I accordingly retained,
provisionally, a barrister of eminence to act for the prisoners,
should it be decided they should be thus defended. In view also of
the legal necessity of gaining the prisoners' consent to the
arrangement, I wrote, under cover to Sir Edward Malet, to Arabi
Pasha, begging his authorization of my thus defending him, a letter
to which I have as yet received no answer; nor have I received any
further communication from yourself or from Lord Granville, to whom
you informed me the matter would be referred.
"Now, however, I see it reported in the 'Times,' from Cairo, that a
Military Court to try all offenders will be named no later than
to-morrow, the paragraph being as follows:
"'The Military Court to try all offenders will be named tomorrow.
The Khedive, Sherif, and Riaz all insist strongly on the absolute
necessity of the capital punishment of the prime offenders, an
opinion from which there are few, if any, dissentients. Sherif,
whose gentleness of character is well known, said to me to-day: "It
is not because I have a feeling of spite against any of them, but
because it is absolutely necessary for the security of all who wish
to live in the country. An English expedition is an excellent
thing, but neither you nor we want it repeated every twelve
months."'[30]
"If this statement is true it would seem to confirm my worst
suspicions as to the foregone decision of the Khedive's advisers to
take the prisoners' lives, and to justify all my arguments as to
the improbability of their obtaining a fair trial. I therefore
venture once more to urge a proper legal defence being granted
them, such as I have suggested; and, in any case, to beg that you
will relieve me of further doubt and, if it must be so,
responsibility in the matter, by stating clearly whether English
counsel will be allowed or refused in the case of Arabi Pasha and
the chief prisoners, and whether proper facilities can be promised
me in Egypt of communicating with the prisoners, and obtaining them
competent interpretation.
"In the present state of official feeling at Cairo, it would be
manifestly impossible for me, and those I have proposed to take
with me, to work effectually for the prisoners without special
diplomatic protection and even assistance.
"The urgency of the case must be my excuse with you for begging an
immediate answer."
This last letter, however, never reached its destination. Gladstone had
left London, and Horace Seymour, his secretary in charge of his
correspondence, under cover to whom I had sent it, handed it on, whether
by order or not I do not know, to the Foreign Office. "Mr. Gladstone,"
he explained, "is out of Town, so upon receipt of your letter yesterday
I sent the further communication which you addressed to him straight to
the Foreign Office.... I did so because he had placed your former letter
in Lord Granville's hands, as Hamilton informed you, and also because I
gathered from your note that this would meet your wish and save time. I
understand that you will shortly receive an official reply from Lord
Granville conveying to you the view of the Government on the matters to
which you refer." Gladstone therefore, had shifted his responsibility of
saying "yes" or "no" on to Granville, and Granville being of course also
out of town it was left for the Foreign Office clerks to deal with
according to their ways. In spite of Seymour's promise that the view of
the Government would shortly be conveyed to me, all the answer I
received was one signed "Julian Pauncefote," stating that Mr. Gladstone
had referred my two letters of the 19th and 27th to Lord Granville, and
that Lord Granville regretted that he did not feel justified in entering
into correspondence with me on the subject. It was thus that Gladstone,
who had made up his mind that Arabi should be executed no less than had
the Foreign Office, finally evaded the responsibility with which I had
sought to bind him. I give the incident in detail as an illustration of
official craft no less than as one of historical importance.
This "Pauncefote" reply decided us to waste no more time. In
consultation with Button and with Lord De la Warr, who had come to
London and had been working to get an answer from Lord Granville on
independent lines, and who now offered to share with me the costs of the
trial if we could secure one (a promise which I may note Lord De la Warr
failed to redeem), it was agreed that we should telegraph at once to
Broadley at Tunis to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Egypt, and
that in the meanwhile we should send out to Cairo by that very night's
mail the first briefless barrister we could lay our hands on as
Broadley's junior till his arrival, and be on the spot to act as
circumstances should suggest. Lord Granville had not agreed, nor had he
at that time the least intention of agreeing, to the appearance of
English counsel on behalf of the prisoners. But the "Times," as we have
seen, had already committed the Government to a statement that Arabi was
not to be executed without its consent, and that he was to be defended
by efficient counsel; and this they had not the face publicly to
disavow. And now Button's influence was so great with Chenery that he
was confident he could again force Lord Granville's hand in the matter
of English counsel through the insistence of the "Times" on a fair
trial.
All that day, therefore, we searched the Inns of Court, which were
almost empty, it being holiday time, and it was only at the last moment
that we were fortunate enough to light upon the man we wanted. This was
Mark Napier, than whom we could not have found a better agent for our
purpose, a resourceful and determined fighter with a good knowledge of
the law and one difficult to rebuff. He had the immense advantage, too,
through his being the son of a former British Ambassador, of
understanding the common usages and ways of diplomacy as also of
speaking French fluently, a very necessary qualification at Cairo.
Having agreed to go he received our short instructions, which were that
he was to go straight to Malet and say that he had arrived as Arabi's
counsel, and insist on seeing his client. This was all he could hope at
present to achieve, and if he could do this he would do much. If Malet
should refuse he was to protest and take advantage of every opening
given him to emphasize the refusal. Above all he was to keep us
constantly informed by telegram of what was going on, while we on our
side would fight the battle no less energetically at the Foreign Office
and in the Press. Mark, as I have said, had the great advantage of
having had a diplomatic training and so could not be imposed upon by the
prestige and mystery with which diplomacy is invested for outsiders, and
which gives it so much of its strength. We could not possibly have lit
upon a better man. He started, as proposed, that night by the Brindisi
mail, taking with him a cipher code and two or three letters of
introduction. That, with a hand-bag, was all his luggage.
As to myself, De la Warr, who knew the temper of the Foreign Office and
their personal rage against me, was very insistent that I should not go
to Cairo and to this I assented. At Cairo I should have been only
watched by spies, possibly arrested and sent home, while here I could
continue far more effectively the Press campaign which, of course, could
only really win our battle. Button that very night managed a new
master-stroke in the "Times." De la Warr had succeeded in getting from
Granville an assurance that all reasonable opportunities would be given
by the Khedive for the defence. This assurance was of course illusory as
far as a really fair trial went, as the only legal assistance procurable
at the time by the prisoners at Cairo was that of the various Levantine
lawyers who practised in the international Courts, and these could be no
better depended upon than were the terror-stricken native lawyers
themselves to serve their clients honestly by telling the whole truth,
though a defence of this perfunctory kind would be sufficient to serve
our Government's purpose of being able, without risk of a conflict with
English popular opinion, to ratify the intended sentences of death. It
was intended to have the trial in the Egyptian Court over in a couple of
days, and having proved "rebellion," to proceed at once to execution;
and English counsel would, no doubt, have been ruled out of the
proceedings as a preposterous intervention of foreigners with no legal
status in the country.
Granville's words to De la Warr had been no more than this: "I have no
reason to doubt that the Khedive, with whom the proper authority rests,
will give all reasonable opportunities for Arabi's defence which may not
involve any extraordinary or unnecessary delay, and it devolves on the
prisoners and their friends to take such measures as they may think fit
on their own responsibility." This Button cleverly reproduced next
morning in the "Times" as follows: "Lord Granville has written that
every reasonable facility will be afforded the prisoners in Egypt and
their friends for obtaining counsel for their defence. Mr. Broadley has
therefore been telegraphed to to go at once to Cairo." It is clear from
Lord Granville's angry expostulation with Lord De la Warr (see Blue
Book) how little intention he had of having his words thus interpreted.
But, once published in the "Times," he could not with any decency back
out of the position; and thus by a very simple device we again forced
his hand and this time on a point which, in the event, gained for us the
whole battle.[31]
Nevertheless, we were very nearly being tricked out of our fair trial
after all, and a singularly ugly circumstance of the position in our
eyes was the sudden reappearance, just then at Cairo, of Colvin, the man
of all others most interested, after the Khedive, in preventing
publicity. The Foreign Office object clearly now was to hurry on the
trial, so as to get it over before Broadley should have time to arrive,
for Tunis was and still is without any direct communication with Egypt,
and it was probable that ten days would elapse before he could be there.
Of Napier's sending they had no knowledge. Orders, therefore, were at
once given as a first step that Arabi should be transferred from the
safe keeping of the British Army to the ill-custody of the Khedivial
police, where communication with the outside world would be effectually
barred for him without the English Government incurring thereby any
odium. This was done on the 4th of October, two days before Napier's
arrival; and the trial was fixed for the 14th, while Broadley did not
succeed in reaching Cairo till the 18th. Nothing but Napier's unexpected
appearance at the English Agency disarranged the concerted plan.
A further step taken to hasten the end and make an English defence
difficult was to select the French criminal military code for use in the
court martial, a form which under an unscrupulous government gives great
advantages to the prosecution. According to it a full interrogatory of
prisoner and witnesses is permitted before these have seen counsel and
they are thus easily intimidated, if they take a courageous attitude,
from repeating their evidence at the trial. Thus both Arabi and others
of his fellow prisoners were during the interval between the
interrogatory and the day fixed for trial secretly visited by a number
of the Khedive's eunuchs, who brutally assaulted and ill-treated them in
their cells with a view of "breaking their spirit." Lastly, the Egyptian
Government were permitted to declare that no counsel should be allowed
to plead except in Arabic, thus excluding those we were sending to the
prisoners' help. These particulars were telegraphed me by Napier soon
after his arrival and made us anxious.
All that the English Government had done in some measure to protect the
prisoners from the Khedive's unregulated violence was to appoint two
Englishmen who had a knowledge of Arabic to be present at the
proceedings. These by a great stroke of good fortune were both honest
and humane men, and, as it happened, old friends of my own, Sir Charles
Wilson, whom I had travelled with in 1881 from Aleppo to Smyrna (not to
be confounded with Sir C. Rivers Wilson), and Ardern Beaman, whom I had
known at Damascus, and who now was Malet's official interpreter at the
Agency. Both these men had been favourably impressed by Arabi's
dignified bearing during the days of his detention as English prisoner
of war, and now willingly gave Napier what little private help they
could.
With Malet himself Napier succeeded at least so far as to get his status
and that of the solicitor Eve, whom he had fortunately found at Cairo,
recognized as legal representatives of Arabi's friends, though he could
not obtain from him any definite promise or more than a vague assurance
that English counsel would be allowed to represent Arabi himself. His
applications to see his client were constantly put off by Malet by
referring him to Riaz Pasha, the Khedivial Minister of the Interior, who
as constantly refused, and in the meanwhile the trial was being pushed
forward with all haste, so that it was clear to Napier that he was being
played with and that the trial would be over before the question of the
admissibility of English counsel had been plainly decided.
Things were standing thus when on the 12th of October I received a
sudden warning from De la Warr, who was still in communication with the
Foreign Office: "From what I hear, unless vigorous steps are taken,
Arabi's life is in great danger. You have probably received information
from Mr. Napier." With this ill news I rushed off immediately to
Button's rooms and there fortunately found him, and as all his
information tallied with mine we agreed that a supreme appeal must be
made to the public, and that the Foreign Office must be directly and
strongly attacked and Gladstone compromised and forced into a
declaration of policy. I consequently sat down and wrote a final letter
to Gladstone, in which I spared nothing in my anger of accusation
against Granville and was careful to insist on his own connection with
the matter, and his early sympathies with the Nationalist leader, and,
without troubling ourselves to ask for an answer in Downing Street,
Button "plumped" it into next morning's "Times," Chenery generously
giving it full prominence and directing attention to it in a leading
article. He had ascertained that the intention of the Government was
that the trial should commence on Saturday, that sentence should be
pronounced on Monday, and that Arabi's execution should instantly
follow. It was already Friday, so we only had three days (one of them a
Sunday when no newspapers are published) in which to rouse English
feeling against this _coup de Jarnac_. Fortunately it was enough. I
believe it was on this occasion that Bright, learning from my letter how
things stood, went down to Gladstone and told him personally and plainly
that he would be disgraced through all history as a renegade from his
humaner principles if he allowed the perpetration of so great a crime.
Be this as it may, the Foreign Office capitulated to us there and then,
and, admitting our plea of the necessity of a fair trial, gave
instructions to Malet to withdraw his opposition and treat the counsel
sent to Arabi favourably. The following telegram from Napier announces
our success: "Granville has directed Malet to require that Arabi shall
be defended by English counsel. Proceedings expected to be lengthy."
I have thought it necessary to go into very minute detail in narrating
these early phases of Arabi's trial, because in this way only is it
possible to refute the false and absurd legend that has sprung up in
Egypt to the effect that there was from the first some secret
understanding between Gladstone and Arabi that his life should be
spared. I can vouch for it, and the documents I have quoted in large
measure prove it, that so far from having any sentiment of pity for, or
understanding with, the "arch rebel," Gladstone had joined with
Granville in the design to secure his death, through the Khedive's
willing agency, by a trial which should be one merely of form and should
disturb no questions, as the surest and speediest method of securing
silence and a justification for their own huge moral errors of the last
six months in Egypt. It was no qualm of conscience that prevented
Gladstone from carrying it through to the end, only the sudden voice of
the English public that at the last moment frightened him and warned him
that it was dangerous for his reputation to go on with the full plan.
This is the plain truth of the matter, whatever glosses Mr. Gladstone's
apologists may put on it to save his humane credit or whatever may be
imagined about it by French political writers desirous of finding an
explanation for a leniency shown to Arabi after the war, which has
seemed to them inexplicable except on the supposition of some deep
anterior intrigue between the English Prime Minister and the leader of
the Egyptian rebellion.
This supreme point of danger past, it was not altogether difficult to
foresee that the trial could hardly now end otherwise than negatively. A
fair trial in open court with the Khedivial rubbish heap turned up with
an English pitchfork and ransacked for forgotten crimes was a thought
not to be contemplated by Tewfik without terror, while for the British
Government as well there would be revelations destructive of the theory
of past events constructed on the basis of official lies and their own
necessity of finding excuses for their violence. The Sultan, too, had to
be safeguarded from untimely revelations. The danger for the prisoners'
lives was not over, but there seemed fair prospect of the thing ending
in a compromise if we could not gain an acquittal. The changed state of
things at Cairo is announced by Napier as early as the 16th October; and
I will give the rest of my story of the trial mainly in the form of
telegrams and letters.
_Napier to Blunt, Oct. 20th_:
"It is believed the Egyptian Government will try to quash the trial
altogether, and that the chief prisoners will be directed to leave
the country. I have not sufficient facts at my command to form a
judgment on this point, but I think it not unlikely."
And again from Broadley, just arrived at Cairo:
_Broadley to Blunt, Oct. 20th_:
"Borelli Bey, the Government prosecutor, admitted frankly that the
Egyptian Government had no law or procedure to go by, but suggested
we should agree as to a procedure. He admitted the members of the
Court were dummies and incompetent. He hoped I should smooth the
Sultan and let down Tewfik as _doucement_ as possible."
_Napier to Blunt, Oct. 20th_:
"I think now we can guarantee a clean breast of the whole facts. It
is as much as the Khedive's throne is worth to allow the trial to
proceed."
The chief danger we had to face was a desire, not yet extinct at the
Foreign Office, still by hook or crook to establish some criminal charge
against Arabi which should justify his death. Chenery writes to me 21st
October: "Among important people there is a strong feeling against him
[Arabi] on the alleged ground that he was concerned with, or connived
at, the massacre in Alexandria. The matter will almost certainly come up
at the trial." This danger, however, did not at Cairo seem a pressing
one, and certainly it was one that the prosecution was least likely to
touch, the Khedive himself being there the culprit. Nothing is more
noticeable in the interrogatories than the pains taken by the members of
the Court to avoid questions tending in that direction and the absence
on that point of all evidence which could incriminate any one. It was
one, however, of great political importance to our Government that it
should be proved against Arabi, for on it they had based the whole of
their wilful insistence in forcing on a conflict, and without it their
_moral_ excuse for intervention fell flatly to the ground. The same
might be said in regard to another absurd plea, insisted upon personally
by Gladstone, that there had been an abuse of the white flag during the
evacuation of Alexandria, a supposition which he had caught hold of in
one of his speeches and made a special crime of, though in truth
withdrawal of troops while a white flag is flying is permitted according
to all the usages of war. Otherwise the coast seemed clear enough of
danger, for it was evident that the British public would no longer allow
our Government to sanction Arabi's death for mere political reasons.
Meanwhile at Cairo things were going prosperously. On the 22nd Broadley
and Napier were admitted to Arabi's cell and speedily found in what he
could tell them the groundwork of a strong defence. Arabi's attitude in
prison was a perfectly dignified one, for whatever may have been his
lack of physical courage, he had moral courage to a high degree, and his
demeanour contrasted favourably with that of the large majority of those
who had been arrested with him and did not fail to impress all that saw
him. Without the smallest hesitation he wrote down in the next few days
a general history of the whole of the political affairs in which he had
been mixed, and in form which was frank and convincing. No less
outspoken was he in denouncing the ill-treatment he had received since
he had been transferred to his present prison from those scoundrels, the
Khedive's eunuchs, who had been sent at night by their master to assault
and insult him. Not a few of the prisoners had been thus shamefully
treated; yet by a singular lack of moral courage the greater number
dared not put into plain words a crime personally implicating the
cowardly tyrant who had been replaced as master over them. Nothing is
more lamentable in the depositions than the slavish attitude assumed by
nearly all the deponents towards the Khedive's person, hated as he had
been by them and despised not a month before. A more important event
still was the recovery from their concealment of Arabi's most important
papers, which had been hidden in his house and which he now directed
should be sought out and placed in Broadley's hands. It was with great
difficulty that his son and wife in their terror could be brought to
allow the search--for they, too, had been "visited" by the Khedive's
servants--but at last the precious documents were secured and brought to
Broadley by Arabi's servant already mentioned, Mohammed Sid Ahmed. They
proved of supreme value--including as they did the letters written by
order of the Sultan to Arabi and others of a like compromising kind. The
news of the discovery struck panic into the Palace and there seemed
every chance that the trial would be abandoned.
Napier writing to me October 30th says: "The fact is I believe we are
masters now, and that the Khedive and his crew would be glad to sneak
out of the trial with as little delay as possible. The fidelity of
Arabi's servant and the constancy of his wife enabled us to recover all
his papers but one. They are now in a safe deposited in Beaman's room at
the Consulate.... The Government cannot face our defence. They will
offer a compromise, banishment with all property reserved. What better
could be got?... This question will probably soon have to be
considered."
It will be understood that the changed aspect of affairs at Cairo found
its echo, and more than its echo, in the London Press. Cairo was full of
newspaper correspondents, and Broadley, who was a past master in the
arts of journalism, soon had them mostly on his side. His hospitality
(at my expense) was lavish, and the "chicken and champagne" were not
spared. Malet and Colvin, supreme in old days, were now quite unable to
stem the torrent of news, and revelation followed revelation all
destructive of the theory they had imposed on the Government, that Arabi
and the army had been alone in opposing the English demands and that the
National movement had been less than a universal one. Colvin was now
become discredited at the Foreign Office as a false guide, and Malet's
incapacity was at last fully recognized. Lord Granville, furious at our
success, and seeing the political situation in Egypt drifting into a
hopeless muddle, did what was probably his wisest course in submitting
the whole matter to Lord Dufferin for a settlement. I had early notice
from Button of this new move and that Dufferin's first business on
arriving at Cairo would be to bring about a compromise of the trial. My
letter of instructions to Broadley in view of the situation thus created
is worth inserting here:
_Blunt to Broadley, Nov. 2, 1882._
"I wish to state over again my ideas and hopes in undertaking
Arabi's defence and that of his companions, which if they are
realized will repay me for the cost even though larger than I had
originally thought probable. Of course the main object was to save
the prisoners' lives, and that I think we may consider already
accomplished, for public opinion has declared itself in England,
and, the preliminary investigation having so entirely failed in the
matter of the June riots and the burning of Alexandria, no evidence
that now could be produced and no verdict given by the judges could
any longer place them in jeopardy. Since your arrival, however, and
through your skill and good fortune, a flush of trumps has come
into our hands. Instead of Arabi's papers being locked up in the
Foreign Office they are in our possession, and, as you tell me
to-day, our defence is perfect while we hold such a commanding
position over the enemy that we can fairly dictate them terms. We
cannot, therefore, be content with anything less than an honourable
acquittal or the abandonment of the trial. At present the latter
seems the most probable. Lord Dufferin has been ordered to Egypt;
the Premier yesterday threw out a feeler for a compromise, and from
everything I hear proposals will shortly be made for some
arrangement of the affair by which the scandal and discredit of an
exposure will be avoided. It depends, therefore, entirely on us to
save not only Arabi's life but his honour and his freedom and also
I believe the lives and freedom of all the political prisoners
inculpated with him.
"I believe a strong attempt will be made by Lord Dufferin to get
Arabi to agree to a detention in the Andaman Islands, or some part
of the British Empire where he would remain a political prisoner
treated with kindness but not suffered to be at large. I believe
also he will endeavour to get from him a cession of his papers.
Neither of these attempts must be allowed to succeed, and all
proposals including them must be rejected. It is no business of
ours to save the Sultan's or the Khedive's honour nor to save Lord
Granville from embarrassment, and I shall consider our failure a
great one if we do not get far more. I think Arabi should, in the
first place, state that he demands a trial in order to clear his
honour, and especially to demonstrate the innocence of those who
acted with him during the war, viz., the whole nation, or, if not
brought to trial, that the charges against them should be withdrawn
as well as against himself. There should, in fact, be a general
amnesty, also he should retain his papers, though probably he might
give an understanding that they should not be published for a term
of years. We cannot, under the circumstances, object absolutely to
exile, because I suppose it would be argued the Khedive could exile
him by decree, but even this I should make a matter of favour,
because the Constitution of February, 1882 (which I hope you have
closely studied, and which is a most valuable document from the
fact of its having been confirmed by the Sultan as well as granted
by the Khedive) forbids such exiling. Still the point would have to
be conceded. We should, however, refuse anything like imprisonment.
The Khedive might exile him from Egypt, and the Sultan from the
Ottoman Empire, but neither would have a right to fix the place or
nature of his abode beyond them.
"Nor could the English Government, having handed Arabi to the
Khedive for trial, let him be taken back untried to be dealt with
as a criminal by England. The English Government has recognized
this by refusing so to take him back. Still less could it imprison
him if so taken without trial. It is, therefore, clear that unless
tried and convicted he must leave Egypt a free man. Nor can he
legally be deprived in Egypt of his rank and pay. But I should
suppose that he will agree to retiring with military rank only, and
a small maintenance to save him from actual poverty and the
necessity of working with his hands. I think these terms would be
dignified, and they are terms we can insist upon. Otherwise I urge
the necessity of a defence tooth and nail, and I sincerely trust
that you will not listen to any proposal which may be made of a
_pro formâ_ trial and letting the Khedive down _doucement_, as
Borelli proposed. There should either be a real honest exposure of
_all_ the facts, or an honourable withdrawal of _all_ the charges.
I trust in you to co-operate with me fully in obtaining this
result, without regard for the feelings of Consuls or Ambassadors
or Viceroys. They are nothing to us, and our client's honour and
cause are everything. Your diplomatic skill is, I have no doubt, a
match for Lord Dufferin's, and it will be a great game to win. You
have made Malet do what you wanted, and so you will make Dufferin
do. If you achieve this we will not talk more about the fee. I
enclose a letter of introduction to Lord Dufferin."
The following from Mr. Beaman, Malet's official interpreter, and a
witness of unimpeachable authority, is of the highest historical
importance. Beaman had been in charge of the Agency at Cairo during the
last weeks before the bombardment, and being a good Arabic scholar knew
more of the true state of affairs than any one employed there. He had
been appointed a few days before the date of his letter to superintend,
on Malet's part, the trial:
_Beaman to Blunt, Cairo, Nov. 6, 1882._
"... This is our last day before the adjournment.... The Palace
people here are in a great stew at the advent of Lord Dufferin, who
arrives to-morrow. Broadley's arrival has been an agony to them,
but this is the last blow. I believe Dufferin is a man who will
quickly see through our friend Tewfik, and as I hear that his ears
are open to everybody the temporary Embassy will be better
informed, I expect, than the Agency has ever been. I had a great
deal of intercourse with natives before the bombardment of all
classes and parties, and knew the whole of the game from the four
sides, English, Turkish, Arabi, and Tewfik. They were each quite
distinct. As I could not have given my authorities, and as people
would not have accepted my word for things I could have told, I
kept my information for myself, but I have given some good hints to
Sir Charles Wilson, who now has a fairer idea of the Egyptian
question than any of our officials here. He is an extremely
cautious man, with a great share of shrewdness and true judgment
which he does not allow to be warped. Through him I have been able
to get facts to Malet which I should never have told Malet himself.
I think now that Malet has quite lost any respect he could ever
have had for the Khedive. Throughout our proceedings he has acted
with the greatest fairness to us, although dead against his own
interests.... You know how deeply he was pledged to the Khedive,
and it is quite bitter enough a cup to him to see his idol come
down from the card house which is breaking up.... I think the
Ibrahim Agha business alone is quite enough to show the Khedive in
his true colours. I heard the whole story direct from the Palace,
how the _titunji_, the Khedive's pipe bearer, had kissed the
Khedive's hand, and asked permission to spit in the faces of the
prisoners, and it was on this that Sir Charles Wilson made inquiry
and found it all true. Nevertheless, because it was evident that
the Khedive had a very dirty piece of linen to be washed in the
business, it was left alone. I suggested when all the witnesses
swore falsely that the oath of triple divorce should be
administered to them, and Sir Charles Wilson was in favour of it
too, but it was hushed up. His Highness's own family now no longer
pretend to deny it among themselves. And this is the man for whom
we came to Egypt.[32]
"If I was not bound by my position here not to advise Broadley, I
could give him hints enough for his cross-examination to turn out
the Khedive to-morrow. I hope it will come out nevertheless. The
first man to be got rid of is Riaz. He is playing the very devil
through Egypt. The other day he said: 'The Egyptians are serpents
and the way to prevent serpents from propagating is to crush them
under foot. So will I crush the Egyptians.' And he is doing it."
Matters stood thus in the first week of November, the date of Lord
Dufferin's arrival at Cairo. It was a fortunate circumstance for us who
were defending the cause of justice in England that Parliament that year
happened to be holding an autumn session. It brought to our aid
in the House of Commons several Members of first rate fighting
value--Churchill, Wolff, Gorst, Lawson, Labouchere, besides Robert
Bourke, Lord John Manners, W. J. Evelyn, and the present Lord Wemyss, of
the regular Tory opposition, with two or three Irish Members. Percy
Wyndham, to his credit, was the only Tory who had voted with the
minority of twenty-one against the war.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] One of the matters principally laid to my charge was due to a
Reuter's telegram announcing that my country house near Cairo had been
broken open by Arabi's order, and that seventeen cases of firearms had
been found in it. The foundation of this story was as follows: In 1881,
when I was on my way, as I intended, to Arabia, I had brought with me
some Winchester rifles and revolvers for the journey, amounting to
seventeen rifles in all, as well as a small brass cannon of the kind
used on yachts, as a present, if I could find a way to send it to him,
to Ibn Rashid at Haïl. These were still stored in my house, and some one
having announced the fact to the provincial authorities, they had taken
possession of them, and removed them to the Cairo citadel. In the
confusion after the war I could gain no intelligence of what had become
of my property except the story which was afloat in London that my brass
cannon had been taken there as a trophy of war, and was forming an
ornament at the Admiralty. It was not till some ten years afterwards
that having lunched one day with my cousin, Colonel Wyndham, at the
citadel at Cairo, he took me afterwards to visit the arsenal, where I
soon recognized my cannon and other property intact. As the box
containing the rifles had my name on it, no difficulty was made in
restoring all to me.
[30] Telegram from Moberly Bell.
[31] I have been recently asked to explain that the true reason why the
"Times" so strongly supported us in our attempt at this critical
juncture to obtain for Arabi a fair trial was the Machiavellian one of
forcing the British Government to undertake responsibilities which would
entail their assumption of full authority in Egypt. I heard, however,
nothing of this at the time, and I prefer still to believe that it was a
generous impulse more worthy of the "Times's" better tradition and of
Chenery's excellent heart.
[32] The fact of Tewfik's having sent his eunuchs to insult the
Nationalist leaders in prison is attested by Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, who
was among the earliest arrested, and was himself one of its victims. He
recorded his prison experience in a declaration submitted to Sir Charles
Wilson 29th October, but which is absent from the Blue Books.