THE CIRCASSIAN PLOT
How fair the prospects in Egypt still were in the first week of April,
notwithstanding the many rumours of disturbance there which were being
spread through Europe, may be judged from the following two letters
written to me at that time by Arabi, and still more by a third which I
received at the same time from Sheykh Mohammed Abdu. Sheykh Mohammed
Abdu's high character throughout his life for the strictest veracity and
the exalted position he now holds as Grand Mufti of Egypt, give to his
testimony a historical value which can hardly be exaggerated, and may
well be placed in accepted contradiction of the multiform falsehoods of
the Blue Books. His functions that spring as Director of the Official
Journal and Censor of the Press at Cairo put him, moreover, in a
position of knowledge as to what was passing in the counsels of the
National Ministry, which neither Malet nor Colvin nor any European in
Egypt could at all pretend to. I draw the special attention, therefore,
of historians to these convincing documents:
"Cairo, _April 1st, 1882_.
"_To our respected, sincere, and free-minded friend, Mr. Wilfrid
Blunt, may God prosper his best projects._
"After offering praise to God, the conqueror of the strong and the
upholder of truth, I beg to say that your letter dated March 10th
has reached me, and caused me an immense pleasure. Without doubt it
will please every free man to see men free like you, and truthful
in their sayings and doings, and determined to carry out their high
projects for the benefit of mankind generally, and the advantage of
their own country in particular.
"The contents of your letter prove that you are enamoured of the
freedom of mankind, and that you are trying your best to serve the
interests of your English nation, being aware that those interests
in the East, and especially in Egypt, can only be made secure
forever by helping the Egyptians to be free and thus gaining their
affection. Free Englishmen should surely help those who are
striving for the independence of their country, for its reform, and
for the establishment of an equitable Government. Your praiseworthy
endeavours will, we do not doubt, secure for you an honourable name
with your countrymen, when they shall come to discover in what way
you have laboured to remove the veil of untruth which interested
men have spread before their eyes.
"As to ourselves, we thank you for your good services as they
concern both Egypt and England, which country we hope will be the
most powerful friend to assist us in establishing good order on a
basis of freedom, and an imitation of civilized and free nations.
Please God, we shall soon see the success of your endeavours, and
we therefore consider your safe arrival home a good omen of
success.
"With regard to the advice you kindly gave us we have to thank you
for it, and beg to say that we are trying our best to keep things
quietly and in order, because we consider it one of our most
important duties to do so, and we are endeavouring to succeed. We
can assure you that all is now tranquil. Peace reigns over the
country; and we and all our patriotic brethren are with our best
will defending the rights of those who dwell in our land, no matter
of what nation they may be. All treaties and international
obligations are fully respected; and we shall allow no one to touch
them as long as the Powers of Europe keep their engagements and
friendly relations with us.
"As to the menaces of the great bankers and financial people in
Europe, we shall bear them with wisdom and firmness. In our
opinion, their threats will only hurt themselves and injure those
Powers who are misled by them.
"Our only aim is to deliver the country from slavery, injustice and
ignorance, and to raise our people to such a position as shall
enable them to prevent any return of the despotism which in time
past desolated Egypt.
"These words which I write to you are the thoughts of every
thoughtful Egyptian and free-minded lover of his country.
"Please remember me kindly to your good lady, and oblige your
sincere friend,
"AHMED ARABI."
"Cairo, _April 6th, 1882_.
"_To our true friend, Mr Wilfrid Blunt._
"After returning thanks to God for the freedom and reforms with
which He has been pleased to bless us, I beg to say that I received
your second letter after having sent you the reply to your former
letter. I avail myself of this fortunate occasion to repeat my
sincere thanks for your good endeavours. I consider it to be my
duty, and the duty of every pure conscience, even the duty of all
men, to thank you for your good services. In acknowledging benefits
the ties of friendship are strengthened, and so between nations. We
are extremely anxious to come to an understanding about the
friendship and mutual interests of ourselves and the Powers with
whom we are under engagements, for it is only through friendship
that those who have the rights in our country can enjoy the fruit
of treaties and contracts, which we consider it our duty to respect
and defend. If any rupture should take place, it would affect not
us only or principally, but all other Powers, and principally Great
Britain. No large-minded Statesman can fail to foresee the
advantage which must result to England from befriending us, and
helping us in our struggle.
"As to the Control, you may rest assured it will not be hindered in
the discharge of its duty, according to the rights guaranteed it by
international treaties. It has never been our intention, or the
intention of any in this country to touch the rights of the
Controllers, or to trespass on any international treaty.
"Should the representatives of the Powers in this country be
faithful to their duty, and to the interests of their own
countries, they cannot do better than help us in our truly National
enterprise, and prove in acts what they promise us in words.
"We have made up our mind to do all we can to give our nation a
position among civilized nations by spreading knowledge through the
country, maintaining union and good order, and administering
justice to every one. Nothing will make us go back an inch from
this determination; threats or menaces will not deter us from it;
we yield only to friendly feelings, and these we appreciate
immensely.
"As to the tranquillity of the country, it is not disturbed. We are
endeavouring to efface the bad traces left behind by former
Governments.
"As to the questions which you put to us, we have already sent
their replies through Sheykh Mohammed Abdu by telegraph. Truly all
the rumors spread in Europe about the excessive military
expenditure are void of foundation. The military budget has neither
increased a para, nor decreased a dirhem. It stands just as it was
fixed on 21st December, 1881 in the time of Sherif Pasha. Hence you
may rest assured that the rumours you took the trouble to mention
are spread only by unscrupulous persons. We regret to see falsehood
thus finding continually its way into the newspapers of civilized
Europe.
"Let us pray God that He may guide the thoughtful statesmen of
Europe to find out the truth, and better learn the condition of our
country. So they will render service to their own countries as well
as ours by strengthening the ties of good feeling. May God grant us
all to enjoy the blessing of peace and a friendly understanding.
"AHMED ARABI."
These letters, written in answer to mine conveying my "impression" of
the Prime Minister's friendly sentiments, and which I forwarded at once
on receiving them, in translation, to Mr. Gladstone, would, I feel sure,
have received his attention had not he been just then away from London
and occupied with what was to him a far more absorbing and important
affair--for it was threatening the existence of his Government--the
condition, almost one of revolution, in Ireland. Nor had I any
opportunity of seeing either him or Hamilton till the Easter recess was
over at the end of the month. In the meanwhile events in Egypt had again
become most critical through what is historically known as the
Circassian plot, the news of which reached London in the third week of
April. I did not pay it much attention at the time, looking upon it as
only one of the many false rumours being printed. But it soon turned out
to be serious enough, not only in itself, but especially as giving our
diplomacy the opportunity it had been waiting for of setting the
Khedive in open quarrel with his Ministers. Malet was by this time
completely subjugated by Colvin, and was henceforth guided in his action
to the end by Colvin's Anglo-Indian suggestions.
The author of the conspiracy was without question the ex-Khedive Ismaïl.
I know this, among other sources of information, from his then
secretary, Ibrahim Bey Mouelhi. The ex-Khedive from his retreat at
Naples was still pulling the strings of his party at Cairo, and giving
advice through them to his son. His chief agent was one Ratib Pasha,
whom I remember hearing of in the previous autumn as among the worst
enemies of the Nationalists, and it was through him that the plot was
worked. The idea was to get up among the Circassian officers of the army
a reactionary movement against the fellahin. Arabi and the chief fellah
officers were to be assassinated, and a counter-revolution brought
about, which Ismaïl hoped might in the whirligig of things lead to his
own restoration. I am convinced that there was never at any time the
least chance of this, but it will be remembered that Rivers Wilson
believed in it as possible, and had, perhaps, even come round to
thinking it financially desirable as an alternative to the utter
weakness of Tewfik and his inability to support the Control. Tewfik, as
usual, was halting between two courses, that of going on with the
Constitutional Ministry and Arabi, of whom he was now profoundly
jealous, and that of joining the Turkish reaction at the risk of
bringing back his father. Sherif and Malet were working together, and
Sherif's house had become a centre of the diplomatic intrigue against
the Ministry inspired by Colvin. I do not say that either Colvin or
Malet, or even, perhaps Sherif, were cognizant of the intended blow, but
it was well known that they would favour any party which should succeed
in overthrowing the Ministry, and that gave confidence to the
conspirators. The plot, however, was betrayed to Arabi before it had
time to come to a head, though not until an unsuccessful attempt had
been made on Abd-el-Aal Bey, and the conspirators were promptly arrested
and imprisoned. The details of the plot will be found, with other
interesting matter, in the following letter I received at the time from
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, dated April 25th:
"As to the promotions of the officers, of which European newspapers
are making so much talk, allow me to explain the facts. In the
first place, the promotions were not made by Arabi Pasha's sole
will and pleasure, nor were they a bribe to gain the officers'
affections towards Arabi. They were made in consequence of the new
military law, which prescribes that officers, after a certain age,
or sick, or infirm, or disabled, should retire from active service
with a pension. In Sherif Pasha's time this military law began to
take effect, and accordingly 558 officers were put on the retired
list. Next 96 officers were sent a year ago to the frontier of
Abyssinia, Zaila, and elsewhere, while 100 officers left the army
and took civil employ. The total number thus retired is 754. It was
thus natural that promotions should be made to fill up vacancies.
There are still fifty vacancies reserved for the cadets of the
Military School.
"Arabi's title of Pasha was not forced on him by the Sultan, but by
the Khedive, who insisted that all his Ministers should hold that
rank.
"Let me now dispel from all minds, once for all, the false idea
that Arabi, or the Military party, or the National party, are tools
of the Turks. Every Egyptian, whether he be a learned man (of the
Ulema) or a fellah, an artisan or a merchant, a soldier or a
civilian, a politician or not a politician, hates the Turks and
detests their infamous memory. No Egyptian can look forward to the
idea of a Turk landing in his country without feeling an impulse to
rush to his sword to drive out the intruder.
"The Turks are tyrants who have left calamities behind them in
Egypt which still make our hearts sore. We cannot wish them back,
or wish to have anything more to do with them. The Turks have
footing enough with their firmans in Egypt. They must stop there,
and try nothing further. But if any attempt of this kind comes to
our knowledge, we shall hail it as a not altogether unwelcome
accident. We have had already some presentiment about this, and it
has been the cause of our preparations. We shall make use of the
event, if it happens, to recover our full independence. Our
clearest minded statesmen are now watching every movement of
Turkish policy in this country to check it the moment it oversteps
its limits. I do not deny that there are Turks and Circassians in
Egypt who advocate the cause of the Porte, but they are
few--nothing to those who love their country.
"With regard to the Circassian conspiracy against Arabi Pasha's
life, it is not really a serious danger.
"The ex-Khedive Ismaïl, the greatest enemy Egypt ever had, and one
still envious of her happiness, has long been mining us with plots
to destroy (blow up) our present Government, thinking in so doing
to prepare the way for his return. But God Almighty has scattered
to the wind his hopes, since every Egyptian knows that Ismaïl's
return means the ruin of Egypt. The tyrant (_Faraoun_), however,
hoping against hope, sent to Egypt one of his followers, Ratib
Pasha, who had been banished; and he, by underhand means in Sherif
Pasha's time, received admission to Egyptian soil, where he joined
his brother, Mahmud Effendi Talaat Beg-bashi, and later secured to
his service Yusuf Bey Najati, Mahmud Bey Fouad, Kosrow Pasha's
nephew and Otheman Pasha Rifki (all these are Circassians). These
worked to make converts to their plan, which was to destroy the
actual Ministers, and kill the superior officers of the army,
beginning with Arabi Pashi. Through their efforts, about forty of
the inferior officers joined their plan, swearing alliance, but at
first put off its execution for want of a pretext. This was found
in the discontent of nine Circassian officers, who objected to
being ordered for service to the Soudan. Ratib's party became aware
of what was going on among them, and took advantage of it to
suggest to the nine Circassians that they should refuse to go
except with promotion.
"The Ministry has long had a suspicion of the mischief which was
impending. As long ago as when Ratib first returned to the country,
Mahmud Sami, the present Prime Minister when Minister of War,
requested Sherif Pasha, in the Khedive's presence, to expel Ratib.
He suspected something wrong in the fact that Ratib had left the
ex-Khedive so suddenly at Naples. But Sherif refused, although
Mahmud Sami warned him that he would be held responsible for all
that might one day happen. This because Ratib was Sherif's
son-in-law, and, as is thought, also perhaps his accomplice in the
design of restoring Ismaïl.
"It happened, however, that Ratib's party invited a certain
Circassian officer, Rashid Effendi Anwar, to join them, and that
this officer refused to have anything to do with their plan, and,
leaving the conspirators where they were, came straight to Arabi
and disclosed the plot. Thus they were arrested, and brought to
trial by court-martial.
"The event has caused little excitement among the common people.
Every one knows that Arabi's life is exposed as other men's, to
dangers daily. Nor is it possible for a man, however great he be,
that all should wish him well. But we should only laugh if it were
stated publicly that England was on the verge of anarchy because a
madman, soldier or civilian, had tried to shoot your Queen.
"The Circassians in the army number in all eighty-one persons, and
no one in his senses need be alarmed at the chance of so small a
number of men succeeding against the Government.
"Now, as to the Slave Trade. The present Ministry is trying hard to
suppress domestic slavery. The Mohammedan religion offers no
obstacle at all to this; nay, according to Mohammedan dogma Moslems
are not allowed to have slaves except taken from infidels at war
with them. In fact, they are captives or prisoners taken in legal
warfare, or who belonged to infidel peoples not in friendly
alliance with Mohammedan princes, nor protected by treaties or
covenants. But no Moslem is allowed to be taken as a slave.
Moreover, if a person is an infidel, but belongs to a nation in
peaceful treaty with a Mohammedan prince, he cannot be taken as a
slave. Hence the Mohammedan religion not only does not oppose
abolishing slavery as it is in modern time, but radically condemns
its continuance. Those learned gentlemen in England and elsewhere
who hold a contrary opinion should come here and teach us, the
Sheykhs of the Azhar, the dogmas of our faith. This would be an
astonishing spectacle. The whole Mohammedan world would be struck
dumb when it learned that a Christian had taken upon him the task,
in the greatest Mohammedan University in the world, of teaching its
Ulema, professors, and theologians the dogmas of their religion,
and how to comment on their Koran.
"A Fewta will in a few days be issued by the Sheykh el Islam to
prove that the abolition of slavery is according to the spirit of
the Koran, to Mohammedan tradition, and to Mohammedan dogma.
"The Egyptian Government will endeavour to remove every obstacle in
the way, and will not rest till slavery is extirpated from Egyptian
territory.
"MOHAMMED ABDU."
The plot thus on the 25th of April seemed to be frustrated, nor would it
have led to any more serious complications but for the action taken by
Malet in regard to it. Instead of supporting the Ministry against whom
it had been directed, his official sympathies were given wholly to the
conspirators. These had been tried by court-martial and condemned to the
not overwhelming punishment of being banished to the White Nile, a
penalty constantly enforced in Egypt even in the time of the Dual
Control. Malet, however, wrote home that the sentence was a monstrous
one, equivalent to death, while the "Times" correspondent was allowed to
publish the story, an altogether false one, that Arabi had privately
visited the prison and there had had the conspirators tortured under his
eyes. That there was no truth in this tale it is hardly necessary to
affirm. Yet Malet gave it a certain countenance in his despatches to the
extent of mentioning it as a report prevalent, and that cries had been
heard issuing at night from the prison. What is certain is that it was
made a pretext with him for encouraging the Khedive to quarrel with his
Ministers by taking the case out of their hands into his own, and
commuting their sentence into one of simple exile, an act which
according to the new Constitution was beyond his right.
To go back to my journal in London, I find that on 28th April I went to
Downing Street "rather wroth" about nothing having been done for Egypt,
but Hamilton bade me be patient and said that my idea of a Commission
had been taken up. Also, the next day, Button congratulated me on my
success. "He tells me there has been a fearful crisis about Egypt; that
the Sultan was for sending troops there, deposing Tewfik, setting up
Halim, and hanging Arabi. The English and French Governments, however,
have prevented this, and Arabi is to be supported and a Commission
sent." On Tuesday there was to be a declaration of their Egyptian
policy in the House of Lords by the Government. This news of the
Sultan's intervention seems, in fact, to have been a crisis of the
moment brought on by the Rothschilds with the support of Bismarck. The
relations between Constantinople and the National Party in Egypt had
become strained in the last few weeks through various circumstances
which it is time now to explain, as well as the peculiar communications
which passed in the month of February between the Sultan and Arabi,
communications which are of the greatest possible importance in
estimating Arabi's growing position of political power in Egypt superior
to that of his fellow Ministers.
It will be remembered that when the Sultan's Commissioners visited Egypt
in the autumn of 1881 Ahmed Pasha Ratib (not to be confounded with Ratib
Pasha, the ex-Khedive's agent), who was one of them and the Sultan's A.
D. C., met Arabi in the train on his way to Suez and Mecca, and that
they had interchanged ideas and made friends, and that the Pasha had
promised to represent him favourably to his master as a good Mohammedan
and one loyal to the Caliphate. This had led to correspondence between
them, of which I have in my possession the originals of the following
two important documents. They came into my hands, with a mass of other
papers, at the time of Arabi's trial. The two letters were written
within three weeks after the Government of Mahmud Sami was formed, in
February, 1882, in which Government Arabi was Minister of War. The first
is from Ahmed Ratib, the second from Sheykh Mohammed Zafir, one of the
great religious sheykhs of Constantinople, who at that time was charged
with the Sultan's secret correspondence; and both were written at the
Sultan's personal command.
"TO THE EGYPTIAN MINISTER OF WAR, AHMED ARABI BEY
"I related to His Majesty the Sultan the conversation we had on the
railway between the stations of Zagazig and Mahda on my return to
Constantinople, and it caused great pleasure to His Majesty, and he
ordered me to communicate to you his Imperial compliments. I
related to His Majesty all the kind treatment I received at your
hands and the courtesy my eyes witnessed while I was at Cairo, and
His Majesty was extremely gratified thereat, so that the
satisfaction he felt in your devotion and fidelity was increased
manyfold. People had made him think that you were acting, I know
not how, contrary to right, and had succeeded in perverting His
Majesty's idea about you, but now as I have exposed the true state
of the case to him, I swear to you that His Majesty deeply regrets
ever having paid any attention to these false and lying statements
about you; and as a good proof of this His Majesty has commanded me
to write this letter, and to express to you the sentiments which
follow:
"It matters nothing who is the Khedive of Egypt. The thoughts of
the ruler of Egypt, his intentions and his conduct must be governed
with the greatest care, and all his actions must tend to secure the
future of Egypt and to uphold intact the sovereignty of the Caliph,
while he must show the most perfect faith in upholding the faith
and the country's rights. This will be required of him of the
persons who have been on the Khedivial Throne. Ismaïl Pasha and his
predecessors gave bribes to Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Midhat Pasha and
their representatives of the Sublime Porte, traitors; and, after
shutting the eyes of the officials, dared to overtask and oppress
the Egyptians. And, in addition to this, they made heavy debts and
brought the Egyptians under a grievous yoke. And today, in the eyes
of the world, their state has specially appealed to our pity, but
the whole position is an extremely delicate one which calls for the
necessity of finding a speedy and sure remedy. Therefore it
behooves you above all things to prevent anything that might lead
to foreign intervention, and never to stray from the just and true
path nor to listen to any treacherous falsehoods, but in every way
with watchful care to hinder the seditious projects of foreigners.
This is the great hope of the Sultan.
"And, since we two shall correspond in the future, you must take
necessary precautions to prevent our letters from falling into
strange hands. For this the easiest way at present, and there is no
safer channel you can find, is to submit your correspondence to the
true and trusty man who carries this letter and that of Sheykh
Mohammed Zafir.
"I would also add that it is indispensable that you should send
secretly some officer who knows well what is going on in Egypt,
and who is a trusted friend of yours, to present at the footstool
of His Majesty the reports on the state of the country in true
detail.
"I beg you to send the answer by the man who brings this letter.
AHMED RATIB, Aide-de-Camp of the Sultan.
"_4th Rebi ul Akhar._ _22nd Feb., 1882._"
"_To His Excellency the Egyptian Minister of War._
"I have presented your two faithful letters to His Majesty the
Sultan, and from their contents he has learnt all your sentiments
of patriotism and watchfulness, and especially have the promises
you make of your efforts to guard faithfully and truly His
Majesty's interests been a cause of lively satisfaction to His
Majesty, so much so that His Majesty ordered me to express his
pleasure and his favour to you, and further bade me write to you as
follows, viz.:--As the maintenance of the integrity of the
Caliphate is a duty which touches the honour of every one of us it
is incumbent on every Egyptian to strive earnestly after the
consolidation of my power, to prevent Egypt from passing out of our
hands into the rapacious grasp of foreigners as the Vilayet of
Tunis has passed, and I repose all my confidence in you, my son, to
exert all your influence and to put forth every effort to prevent
such a thing happening. And you are to beware never for one moment
to lose sight of this important point, and to omit none of the
precautionary measures which are called for by the age in which we
live, keeping all ways before you, as a perpetual goal, the defence
of your faith and of your country; and especially you are to
persist in maintaining your confidence and the ties which bind you.
"That country (Egypt) is of the highest importance to England and
France, and most of all to England, and certain seditious intrigues
in Constantinople, following in the path of these Governments,
have, for some time past, been busy with their treacherous and
accursed projects, and, since they have found it to their profit
zealously to promote these intrigues and seditions in Egypt, it is
the especial desire of His Majesty that you should keep a very
careful eye on these persons (or things?). And, according to the
telegrams and news sent by the Khedive, Tewfik Pasha, one of this
party, we see that he is weak and capricious; and also it is to be
remarked that one of his telegrams does not corroborate another,
but they are all in contradiction (wound each other). In addition
to this I may tell you that Ali Nizami Pasha and Ali Fuad Bey have
spoken to His Majesty most highly in your favour, and Ahmed Ratib
Pasha also has repeated to His Majesty the substance of the
conversation he had with you in the railway carriage between the
stations of Zagazig and Mahda, and as His Majesty places the
greatest confidence in Ahmed Pasha, His Majesty desires me again
for this to express his trust in you, and to say that as he
considers you a man of the highest integrity and trustworthiness he
requires of you, above all things, to prevent Egypt from passing
into the hands of strangers, and to be careful to allow them no
pretext for intervention there.
"The orders which Ahmed Pasha Ratib will receive on this head will
be separately communicated to you. Both my letter and that of Ahmed
Pasha Ratib, by order of His Majesty, have been written by one of
His Majesty's own private secretaries, and after we have affixed
our seals to the letters; we also put an extra seal on the
envelopes.
"And, in a special and secret manner, I tell you that the Sultan
has no confidence in Ismaïl, Halim, or Tewfik. But the man who
thinks of the future of Egypt and consolidates the ties which bind
her to the Caliphate; who pays due respect to His Majesty and gives
free course to his firmans; who assures his independent authority
in Constantinople and elsewhere; who does not give bribes to a
swarm of treacherous sub-officials; who does not deviate one
hair's-breadth from his line of duty; who is versed in the
intrigues and machinations of our European enemies; who will watch
against them and ever preserve his country and his faith intact--a
man who does this will be pleasing and grateful, and accepted by
our great lord the Sultan.
"If I have not entered into any further details in this letter of
mine, I beg you to excuse me because Ahmed Ratib Pasha only arrived
three days ago, and yet in that time, owing to his declarations of
your fidelity and true intentions, His Majesty has expressed his
full confidence in you. I only received the message I have just
given you yesterday. I hope to be able to send you by next week's
post a more detailed letter. In every case be careful not to let
any letter you send fall into strange hands but try to get a
special messenger, and, as for this time; it would be better if you
would send your answer by the hand of the man who brings this
letter.
"Your Servant, MOHAMMED ZAFIR.
"_4th Rebi ul Akhar, 22nd Feb., 1882._"
These two letters are records of such high historical importance that if
ever my memoirs come to be printed they should be annexed to them in
facsimile. They explain much of what happened later in June at the time
of the Dervish Mission, and they prove that if Arabi took upon himself
then and during the months of the war the position in some degree of
dictator in Egypt, it was not without ample justification from a
Mohammedan point of view, in the commands of the Caliph as head of his
religion to protect the province against Christendom. They show, too,
why it was that in the month of August Abdul Hamid was so loath to
proclaim him a rebel, and how absurd was the charge of rebellion brought
against him at his trial.
Nevertheless, it must not be assumed from this that Arabi had made
himself the Sultan's tool in anything that concerned the administrative
independence of his country. His position on this point was a firm one.
He hated the Turks, and would certainly have resisted in arms any
attempt from Constantinople at military intervention. Of this Sheykh
Mohammed Abdu's letter is ample proof, and it is in harmony with all
that Arabi has himself told me. His position, therefore, at the Caliphal
Court was a changing and precarious one. He had strong friends there in
Ahmed Ratib and Mohammed Zafir, but he also had strong enemies. Sabit
Pasha, the Khedive's Turkish secretary, was especially one of them, and
reported to Yildiz everything he could find against him. Thus, when the
arrest of the Circassian conspirators occurred, among whom were Osman
Pasha Rifki, and other important Turks, it is quite possible there was a
wave of anger against Arabi in the Sultan's mind. But it does not seem
to have lasted, and from the moment when it became once more a question
of resisting Europe, Arabi again had the Sultan's approval. As between
Tewfik, the puppet of the Anglo-French Control, and Arabi the defender
against the two Christian Powers of the independence of a Moslem state,
there could be no hesitation in the Caliph's sympathies.
I think it is to be regretted that the Sultan's wish to depose Tewfik
and set up Halim was not carried out. Though Arabi did not belong to the
party of Halim in Egypt, he would certainly not have opposed it after
Tewfik had gone over to the English against him, and it would have been
accepted by a considerable number of respectable men in Egypt who knew
Halim to be both more intelligent and more liberal in his views than the
other. The Sultan's intervention, therefore, would have been a peaceable
one if he had refrained from sending an army to enforce it. On the whole
it was probably the best solution. The French Government, however, were
strongly opposed to the immixture of the Sultan in Egyptian affairs, and
our diplomacy at Cairo was pledging itself more and more every day to
Tewfik. All that came of the idea of Turkish intervention and of the
commission I had asked for, and which had been almost promised, was an
absurd compromise of the two things, in the shape of a proposal made,
but not insisted on, by Lyons to Freycinet at Paris, that a French, an
English, and a Turkish general should be sent to Egypt to "restore
discipline in the Egyptian army." Lord Lyons, be it remarked, had a
special reason for taking Malet's view of the situation in Egypt in the
fact that Malet had been for years his private secretary and devoted
servant in the profession.
Nothing, therefore, was really done of what I had been told at Downing
Street to expect, not even those few words of goodwill in Parliament
which Gladstone had begged Arabi to wait for. By a synchronism, tragic
for Egypt, the crisis at Cairo, so long worked up to, coincided exactly
with that other crisis which had also been impending in Ireland. There a
_régime_ of threats and coercion under Forster, the Chief Secretary, had
been tried all through the winter. Members of Parliament had been
imprisoned without trial, and the arts of police despotism had been put
into more rigorous practice than for many years, and without any result
of pacification. Gladstone had persuaded his Cabinet to try conciliatory
measures. According to a secret arrangement made with Parnell, the Irish
leader, while he was in gaol at Kilmainham, and known as the Kilmainham
treaty, Parnell and his political friend, Dillon, had been released;
and, as a consequence, Forster on the 2nd of May resigned his office and
attacked the Government for their pusillanimity in the House of Commons.
The very same day, 2nd May, had been fixed for a Ministerial statement
about Egypt, on a motion made by Lord De la Warr in the House of Lords,
and I find the following entry in my journal:
"_May 2._--Met Lord De la Warr at the House of Lords. He took me in, and
I expected to hear the promised statement about Egypt, but heard instead
Lord Granville's announcement of Mr. Forster's resignation in Ireland. A
good deal of excitement. Lord Granville seemed rather shy and badgered.
Lord Salisbury interrupted once or twice.... I heard Rosebery say a few
words in a very impressive and dignified manner, etc., etc. Egyptian
affairs are put off as of no importance." Ireland for the next few weeks
drove out all English interest in Egypt, so much so that when on the 6th
I took Mohammed Abdu's important letter, explaining the Circassian plot,
to Morley, he refused to publish it on the ground of its length, and
that "nobody cared about Egypt."
This, however, was but the first act of the coming tragedy. On the 7th
Lord Frederick Cavendish, a brother of Lord Hartington and an intimate
friend of Gladstone's, who had been appointed Chief Secretary in
Forster's place to carry out the new policy of conciliation, was
assassinated at Dublin with Mr. Burke, the chief permanent official, by
members of an Irish secret society, known as the "Invincibles." These
were in reality quite unconnected with Parnell's Parliamentary party,
but the public did not discriminate between the two, and the result was
a universal cry for strong measures against all forms of rebellion. For
a moment Gladstone battled against this, and it was proposed to Dilke,
who, as an advanced Radical, was with Chamberlain at that time friendly
to the Parnellites, that he should take the post of danger at Dublin and
continue, as Cavendish's successor, the task of conciliating Ireland.
But Dilke did not like the look of things, and refused the post. It was
found difficult to get any one to accept it. What, however, decided the
abandonment of the policy of conciliation was the attitude of
Hartington. He took the matter of his brother's death, which he felt
deeply, as a personal wrong to be avenged, and from that moment became
the most determined enemy of Irish Nationalism. Gladstone had to choose
between resignation and the abandonment of his policy, and, seeing a
majority of his Cabinet against him, he chose the latter. Trevelyan was
sent to Dublin and new coercive measures were resolved on. And so, too,
as to Egypt. Up to this point, in spite of the unconciliatory views of
the Foreign Office, Gladstone, supreme in the Cabinet, had been able to
put a veto on any active form of armed intervention. But now he found
himself out-voted, and Egypt, too, was thrown to the wolves. "Look," his
colleagues seem to have said to him, "where your policy of conciliation
has led us in Ireland." If I have been rightly informed, a policy of
coercion in Ireland and of intervention in Egypt was decided on at one
and the same Cabinet in the second week of May. I quote some extracts
from my Diary in illustration of the double situation.[12]
"_May 8._--In consequence of the ugly look of things in Egypt I have
written an ultimatum to Gladstone begging him to relieve me of the
dilemma I am in, caused by the Government's silence. I have said that I
must speak the whole truth if Lord Granville won't. All the world,
however, is agog about Ireland. Yesterday came the astounding news of
Lord Frederick Cavendish's and Mr. Burke's murder at Dublin. At first it
seemed as if the Government would have to resign, but to-day Parnell has
written to disown all connection with the crime, and I think Gladstone
will be the stronger for it. On Friday when I was in the lobby of the
House of Commons Artie Brand (the Speaker's son), who was there, pointed
me out 'the three Irish conspirators' talking together. Parnell is a
tall, good-looking man of about 32, with nothing of the murderer about
him. Dillon is tall and very pale and dark, and would do for Guy Fawkes
in a cloak and dagger. They looked very much like gentlemen among the
cads of the lobby.
"_May 11._--There is bad news from Egypt. The Khedive having refused to
sign the Circassian sentences, Arabi has convoked the Chamber and they
talk of deposing Tewfik. I went at once to Downing Street and saw
Godley, on whom I urged the necessity of Gladstone giving me an
immediate answer. Gladstone is away at Lord Frederick's funeral, and I
have agreed to wait till to-morrow for an answer; but Godley saw I was
in earnest and promised it should be given. It is, of course, an
unfortunate moment." I have a vivid recollection of Godley's sympathy on
this occasion. I was myself deeply moved. It seemed to me so tragic a
thing that the whole fate of a nation and of the best hopes of reform
for a religion, both historic in the world, should depend on the
possibility of securing the attention of one old man for half an hour,
for I felt sure I could again persuade him. I did not, of course, know
the exact position of the Cabinet, but Godley must have known, and he
seemed almost as much to feel it, as myself. I know he all along
disapproved the Foreign Office policy in Egypt, and I think he felt
deeply the disgrace of Mr. Gladstone's share in it when, in spite of his
Midlothian speeches, he came forward as the apologist of a war against
Oriental freedom in the interests of finance. Very shortly after his
chief's change of policy he left his service for a permanent post
elsewhere, and I have always fancied it was more or less in protest.
"_May 12._--Freycinet has declared he will not let the Turks intervene,
so I feel easier.... Rode to George Howard's who approved my plan (of
publishing the whole truth). I have all ready now ... and the 'Times'
will publish. It appears that Rothschild has been working hard with
Freycinet to get the French Government to set up Halim instead of
Tewfik.... In the meanwhile all that has actually been done is to order
a fleet to be ready in a fortnight at Plymouth.... Saw Eddy Hamilton. He
promises the answer to-night. The Howards are very angry with Dilke
because he has refused the Chief Secretaryship for Ireland. 'He will
lose caste by this.' They looked upon it as the shirking of a post of
danger, but it is quite possible that Dilke was better pleased to remain
where he was, at the Foreign Office, pulling the strings for Granville
in Europe. It would have been well for Egypt if he had accepted.
"_May 13._--Gladstone's answer has come; he cannot tell me any details,
but Lord Granville will speak on Monday, and he begs me to wait till
then. He only promises that the Liberal policy shall be in accordance
with Liberal doctrines. So I am satisfied. I have written (to Gladstone)
to offer to go out as mediator between Arabi and the Khedive. I have
sent the following telegram to Arabi: 'I entreat you have patience. Do
nothing rashly or without Parliament sanction. Delay action against the
Khedive. I am working hard for you, but must have time. There is real
danger.' At five o'clock I received an answer from Gladstone to say that
he supposed my last letter was written before the arrival of recent
news. I cannot understand what he means by that, as there is nothing in
the evening papers.... Late at night an answer from Arabi: 'Mai 13. Je
vous remercie de vos conseils. Différend déféré aux délégués.
Tranquillité complète. Certainement aucune crainte pour Européens. Ahmed
Arabi.'"
The true history of the crisis which had taken place that first
fortnight of May at Cairo, as I afterwards learned it, was this. On the
second, the Khedive finding himself pressed by Arabi, his Minister of
War, to sign the sentences of exile on the Circassian officers, some of
whom were His Highness's personal friends, called Malet to his counsels
and received from him the advice, fortified by a promise of English
support, that he should refuse his signature; and this must be
considered the moment at which Tewfik first resolved to throw himself
especially upon English protection in his quarrel with his Ministers.
Malet thereupon wrote an important despatch which is published in the
Blue Books, extolling in high terms the character of the Khedive, as one
deserving the full confidence of Her Majesty's Government. The Khedive,
therefore, refused to sign, though constitutionally his signature to the
decision of the court-martial could not be withheld.
The refusal, aggravated by the fact, which at once became known, that it
had been suggested by a foreign Consul, angered the Nationalist
Ministry, and letters were addressed by the Prime Minister, Mahmud Sami,
to the members of the National Parliament requesting their attendance at
Cairo. This was no doubt an irregular proceeding, inasmuch as the
Parliament could only be legally summoned by the Khedive, and it gave
umbrage to some of the members who were also annoyed at being called
again to Cairo from their country homes at an inconvenient season of the
year. Nevertheless, a large proportion of them came in answer to Mahmud
Sami's letters, and though they had no formal sitting, decided at a
meeting held in Sultan Pasha's house to support the Ministers, and it
was resolved by forty-five to thirty, that, if Tewfik persisted in
intriguing with the English and French Consuls against them, there was
no other way than to impeach and depose him. Malet, however, having by
this time received a telegram of approbation from the Foreign Office,
and finding the Khedive wavering, informed him that the English and
French fleets had been ordered to Alexandria on a plea of protecting
European subjects. Upon this the Khedive sent for Sultan Pasha, the
President of the Chamber, and exposed the situation to him, and so
worked upon his fears, and upon a certain personal jealousy which he
knew to have grown up in the Sultan's mind toward Arabi, that he
persuaded him to take part with him, and trust to European support
rather than run the risk of war. Sultan then, at a new informal meeting
of the Deputies, declared himself on the Khedive's side against the
Ministers, and obtained the adhesion of six other Deputies to his view,
though the large majority of them remained faithful to the Ministry. It
was at this juncture that my telegram to Arabi was received at Cairo,
and it seems to have had some effect with Sultan, to whom it was
doubtless shown. But the English papers of the thirteenth asserted that
the Chamber had joined the Khedive against Arabi, and on the fifteenth
that Mahmud Sami had resigned. The following is from my journal.
"_May 14._--Sunday, at Crabbet. I see in the 'Observer' that Sultan
Pasha went yesterday to the Khedive to make terms between him and Arabi;
so I conclude my telegram came just in time. The papers all say that he
and the Chamber have sided against Arabi with the Khedive, but I will
not believe that till I hear further. What is likely is that Sultan
Pasha has been put out at the Chamber being invoked without a legal
summons, and at an inconvenient time of the year. The army has had too
much influence in the Ministry not to have made itself enemies. There is
probably jealousy, but I do not believe in more. The whole thing has
doubtless been fostered by Colvin and Malet. and the Circassians have
been encouraged by the idea of Turkish intervention. They have ordered
ships to Alexandria, which, if I am not mistaken, will have the effect
of uniting all once more against the Europeans.
"In the afternoon a perplexing telegram from Abdu, 'Il n'y a pas
discorde entre Sultan Pasha et le Parlement. Le loup (meaning the
ex-Khedive Ismaïl) dont participation dans le complot Circassian est
supposé dans ma lettre a Sabunji, est en effet complice. Différend
principal est déféré aux délégués. Tranquillité publique n'est pas
menacée.'"
Van Benningsen, the distinguished Dutch judge, author, under the title
of "Un Juge Mixte," of one of the most valuable works about Egypt under
the Dual Control, was staying with me at Crabbet at the time, and I
found him an ardent sympathizer with the Nationalists.
The next day, 15th May, was that of the long promised explanation by the
Government of their Egyptian policy, and I went up to London in high
hopes of something good, being fortified by the telegram I had received.
I was doomed, however, to a new disappointment. Though the matter of
Egypt was discussed in the House of Lords, Granville had nothing better
to promise the Egyptians than a repetition of the old menace of
Gambetta's Joint Note, and the statement, which I felt certain was
untrue, that the Deputies at Cairo and the whole country were supporting
the Khedive in his quarrel with his Ministers. This, then, was the
famous "Liberal policy" Hamilton had promised me. I felt myself absolved
from all obligation of reticence towards Gladstone, who seemed to have
played with and deceived me. I left the House of Lords as soon as I had
heard the speech, in great anger, and resolved henceforth to act without
further reference to prudence on my part or the Government's
convenience. After thinking the matter over during the night in much
perplexity, I decided upon a bold step. I was resolved to defeat the
intrigue I knew was going on. As soon as the telegraph offices were open
in the morning, 16th May, I sent the following message to Cairo:
"To Arabi Pasha, Minister of War. Lord Granville states in Parliament
that Sultan Pasha and the Deputies have joined the Khedive against you.
If untrue, let Sultan Pasha telegraph me contradiction. United you have
nothing to fear. Could you not form a Ministry with Sultan Pasha as
Prime Minister? But stand firm."
"To Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Deputies. I trust that all
who love Egypt will stand together. Do not quarrel with Arabi. The
danger is too great."
Also to each of the following Deputies: "Butros Pasha, Abu Yusuf, and
Mahmud Pasha Falaki. Parti national, est il actuellement content
d'Arabi? Le Gouvernement Anglais prétend le contraire. Si vous vous
laissez désunir de l'année, l'Europe vous annexera."
And I sent the same last telegram to Mohammed Abdu, to Sheykh el
Hajrasi, and to Abdallah Nadim, the orator. All the eight telegrams were
signed with my name, and I knew that in thus sending them I was sure to
incur the anger of the Foreign Office, if not of Mr. Gladstone, for it
could hardly be unknown to the Agency at Cairo, as messages sent by the
Eastern Telegraph Company were at that time pretty well common property
there. I was resolved, however, to run the risk of this, my only doubt
being how to express succinctly the nature of the danger against which I
warned the Deputies. The words, "Europe will annex you," seemed to me to
do this best, for though, perhaps, our Government had no immediate
thought of annexation nor yet the French Government, the ultimate end
seemed certain, and Colvin's words rang in my ears; nor do I think that
the event so far has otherwise than justified me. Then, having fired my
shot, I went back to the country repose of Crabbet to wait for what
should happen. The answer came sooner than I at all expected, and that
very evening, as I was sitting down to dinner, I received the following
from Sultan Pasha:
"Le différend qui existait entre le Khedive et les Ministres
complètement disparu. Nous sommes tous d'accord à maintenir le repos et
la tranquillité et à appuyer le Ministère actuel. Sultan."
In delight I telegraphed it at once to Gladstone, and to the "Times" for
publication.
"_May 17._--To London again in the highest spirits, and on my way
received new answers."
From the Sheykh el Islam, el Embabeh:
"Le différend entre le Khedive et le Ministère est applani. Le Parti
National est content d'Arabi. Le nation et l'armée sont unies."
Another unsigned, but no doubt from one of the Deputies:
"Tout le pays avec Arabi and le Ministère Sami. Fellahs, Bedouins,
Ulemas, tous sont unis. Il n'y a qu'un seul d'entre nous qui soit contre
la liberté Egyptienne et qui tache de fausser l'opinion publique."
And a third of like character from Mohammed Abdu.
Moreover, in confirmation of the glorious news, the morning papers
announced that in the afternoon of yesterday the Khedive, through Sultan
Pasha's mediation, had forgiven the Ministry. It was clear that I had
won a first diplomatic victory. With such powerful proofs in my hand, I
went with a light heart to Downing Street and showed my telegrams, and
found Hamilton and Godley, who congratulated me on my success. I told
them the telegrams I had sent had cost me £20, and Hamilton said they
ought to be repaid me out of the Secret Service Fund. Though this was,
of course, said jokingly, it proves that, at least on Mr. Gladstone's
side of Downing Street the result I had gained against the Foreign
Office was cordially approved. Moreover, as I had not seen Gladstone
himself, Hamilton and Godley advised me to write him another formal
letter and press home my point against the Foreign Office, on the ground
of their false information, and I agreed to do so, and spent the night
at this work, having first arranged with Button that, if need should be,
the letter should be published in the "Times," and in the meanwhile I
sent Sultan a telegram begging him to congratulate the Khedive.
The morning, nevertheless, was to bring me a sharp reverse, if not yet a
defeat. At a very early hour, having slept in London at my then town
house, 10, James Street, Buckingham Gate, I sent for the morning papers,
and found in all of them a Reuter's telegram from Cairo giving the text
of my telegram to the Deputies, the one ending "Europe will annex you,"
as having been addressed by me to the Sheykh el Islam, and stating that
the Sheykh el Islam had since recanted the telegram he had sent me
in reply. Also in the "Standard" there was a telegram from its
correspondent at Cairo saying that he was authorized by Sultan Pasha to
contradict the telegram from him which had been published in the "Times"
of yesterday, the same having been written under military intimidation.
I consequently at once wrote a second letter to Gladstone, and sent him
the two by the same messenger before noon, with a note to Hamilton
saying, that I considered it necessary both should be published. I had
found Button at home, and had shown him the letters, which he promised
should appear in the morrow's "Times." He was delighted with them, and
assured me they would make a sensation.[13]
Nevertheless, though they had already been put in type, for I had left
copies of them with Button, the two letters were not published. The
reason for this is given in my diary. At six o'clock I found a note from
Eddy Hamilton saying he would be at home all the afternoon, so I went to
him. He said he thought the telegram to the Sheykh el Islam an
unfortunate one, and advised me strongly not to publish. "I asked him
what assurance he could give me that nothing violent was intended at
Alexandria. He said he understood that the fleet going there only meant
the securing of the lives of British subjects. He did not think it at
all likely there would be any demand made for the disbanding of the
Egyptian army or any disembarkation of troops. Also he assured me that a
Commission, such as I had proposed, would be sent to Egypt. I am quite
satisfied with this, and have sent David (my servant) to the 'Times'
office to stop the publication of the letters."
I do not doubt that the assurances given me in Downing Street on this
occasion were given in good faith, but they were soon belied by the
Foreign Office, and my silence as to the telegrams did me, from that
time forth, an injury with the public. The "St. James's Gazette" spoke
of me that very evening as an "incendiary," and other journals, seeing I
did not reply, followed suit. Their language re-acted on the Government,
and doubtless also on Gladstone, though he knew the truth, which the
public as yet did not. I continued, it is true, my communications and
visits to Downing Street, but they became inevitably on a less and less
intimate footing. For this reason I regret that I allowed myself to be
persuaded, and that the letters did not appear, as had been arranged
that night, in the "Times." Had they done so I cannot help thinking that
the fatal ultimatum of 25th May would not have been issued.
FOOTNOTES:
[12] See Lord Eversley's letter quoted in the Preface.
[13] These two letters are practically embodied in my letter
subsequently published on June 20. See Chapter XIV.