Besides this grave danger, which was destined steadily to take more and

more serious proportions, there were smaller political difficulties,

which in their nature must increase in importance with every

embarrassment that the future had in store. The party schism led by

Vice-President Burr was now beginning to rage with fury and to do

infinite mischief in New York. In Pennsylvania matters were still worse,

at least for Mr. Gallatin, whose political interests lay in that State.

The very completeness of the Republican triumph in Pennsylvania was

fatal to the party. The extremists, led by Duane and his friend Michael

Leib, began a schism of their own, the more dangerous because they

avoided the mistake of Burr and declared no war on Mr. Jefferson.

Indeed, they followed the very opposite policy, and, sheltering

themselves under the cover of their pure Republicanism with Mr.

Jefferson for their peculiar patron, they declared war upon Mr.

Jefferson's Cabinet. On the 10th May, 1803, Joseph H. Nicholson warned

Mr. Gallatin of what was to happen: "I have enclosed the President a

letter from Captain Jones to me, which you can see if you please. He

says that Duane and his coadjutors meditate an attack upon Mr. Madison

and yourself for setting your faces against the office-hunters." Mr.

Jefferson on this occasion did not treat Duane as he had treated Burr;

he attempted to intervene and soothe the susceptibilities of his

over-zealous partisans. He consulted Mr. Gallatin on the subject, and

sent him the draft of a letter to Duane. Mr. Gallatin, on the 13th

August, 1803, returned the draft and attempted to dissuade the President

from sending the proposed letter: "Either a schism will take place, in

which case the leaders of those men would divide from us, or time and

the good sense of the people will of themselves cure the evil. I have

reason to believe that the last will happen, and that the number of

malcontents is not very considerable and will diminish.... It is highly

probable that Duane, who may be misled by vanity and by his associates,

but whose sincere Republicanism I cannot permit myself to doubt, will

adhere to us when his best friends shall have taken a decided part....

If a letter shall be written, I think that, if possible, it should be

much shorter than your draft, and have perhaps less the appearance of

apology. The irresistible argument to men disposed to listen to argument

appears to me to be the perfect approbation given by the Republicans to

all the leading measures of government, and the inference that men who

are disposed under those circumstances to asperse Administration seem to

avow that the hard struggle of so many years was not for the purpose of

securing our republican institutions and of giving a proper direction to

the operations of government, but for the sake of a few paltry

offices,--offices not of a political and discretionary nature, but mere

inferior administrative offices of profit."

Mr. Jefferson seems to have followed this advice and to have suppressed

the proposed letter.[63] Duane continued his attacks on the moderate

wing of the Republican party, and Mr. Gallatin's hopes that he would

find no following were soon disappointed. A complete separation took

place between him and Governor McKean. Perhaps the existence of this

schism had something to do with the offer, which Mr. Dallas was now

commissioned to make, of putting Governor McKean in nomination for the

Vice-Presidency in the general election of 1804. The offer was declined,

and George Clinton was substituted in his place, but Governor McKean's

letter of declination is so characteristic as to be worth publication.

THOMAS McKEAN TO ALEXANDER J. DALLAS.

LANCASTER, 16th October, 1803.

DEAR SIR,--Your friendly letter of the 14th has been read with pleasure.

I am much obliged to the kind sentiments of my friends in thinking me a

suitable character to be proposed as a candidate for the dignified

station of Vice-President of the United States, but must absolutely

decline that honor. The office of Governor of Pennsylvania satisfies my

ambition, and it has been conferred in such a manner, at two elections,

that the people are endeared to me; indeed, it appears to me that I am

engaged to continue in this distinguished character the constitutional

term, if it shall be the desire of my fellow-citizens. I am now

descending in the vale of years, and am satisfied with my share of

honors; that of President of the United States in Congress assembled in

the year 1781 (a proud year for Americans) equalled any merit or

pretensions of mine, and cannot now be increased by the office of

Vice-President. But, all personal considerations waived, what would be

the probable result of my acceptance of the proposed post? Little, very

little benefit to the people of America, but at least a doubtful

situation to my fellow-citizens of Pennsylvania. What would be the fate

of my friends, of those I have placed in office, and of the liberty of

the State at this most critical period, were I to resign the office? Who

is there to control the wanton passions of men in general respectable,

suddenly raised to power and frisking in the pasture of true liberty,

yet not sufficiently secured by proper barriers? But I must say no more

on this head, even to a friend; it savors so much of vanity. In brief,

who will be my successor, possessing the same advantages from nativity

in the State, education, experience, and from long public services in

the most influential stations and employments; who can or will take the

same liberty in vetoes of legislative acts, or otherwise, as I have

done? I confess I am at a loss to name him, and yet, when I must resign

by death or otherwise, I trust the world will go on as well as it has

done, if not better, though I never had existed.

Be so good as to pay my most respectful compliments to the President, to

Messrs. Madison, Gallatin, Dearborn, Granger, etc., and compliments to

all mine and your friends. Farewell and prosper. Adieu.

* * * * *

Mr. Jefferson's party required very delicate handling. Embracing, as it

did, materials of the most discordant kind, schism was its normal

condition. Between the purity of Madison and Gallatin and the

selfishness and prejudice of the local politicians, Mr. Jefferson was

obliged to make what compromise he could; but while with quiet

determination he drove Burr out of the party, he tolerated Duane and

Leib with extraordinary patience. There were very strong reasons which

justified or excused his treatment of Burr; particularly the position of

heir-apparent, which the Vice-President occupied, made it necessary

either to recognize or reject his claims, and Mr. Jefferson did not

hesitate to reject them. Whether his treatment of Duane was to be

equally defensible became more and more a subject of vital consequence

to Mr. Gallatin.

So long as Virginia remained steady the Administration had little to

fear, and as yet there was no sign of schism in the Virginia ranks. Of

all the Virginia members John Randolph was the most prominent, and his

support was firm. Mr. Gallatin and he were on the most intimate terms,

and since Gallatin's letters to him are lost, some of his letters to

Gallatin may be worth inserting, to show their relations together:

JOHN RANDOLPH TO GALLATIN.

BIZARRE, 9th April (27th year), 1803.

DEAR SIR,--When your letter arrived I was from home, and, ours being a

weekly post, my reply is necessarily delayed longer than I could wish.

Mr. Griswold's first objections to the report of the commissioners of

the sinking fund are (if in existence, which I very much doubt) among

other loose papers which I left in Georgetown. The paragraph which you

enclose differs from most which have appeared of late in a certain

description of prints, in this, that it contains _some truth_. But, as

it is resorted to only to serve as the vehicle of much falsehood, it is

proper that a correct statement should go forth to the public of this

singular transaction.

If I mistake not, the printing of the report of the sinking fund was

considerably delayed. Be that as it may, when Mr. Griswold moved to

commit it to the Ways and Means he specified no objection; he barely

said that there were some parts which required explanation; but, as all

documents of that sort are of course committed to that committee, there

was no occasion for any reasoning to induce the House to agree to such a

motion. The resolution which he afterwards drafted, and which he showed

to me, was, I believe, couched in the very terms of that which was

passed by the House, the words "in fact" excepted, which at my

suggestion he expunged, since he declared that he had no intention to

criminate the Treasury and doubted not that everything could and would

be satisfactorily explained. I then proposed to him to reduce his

objections to writing. They consisted of a denial of the soundness of

the construction given by the Treasury to the law of 1802 making

provision for the redemption of the whole public debt, which was the

object embraced by the resolution; and an inquiry into the variance

between the report of the Secretary of the Treasury of December, 1801,

and the report of the sinking fund, in respect to the amount of interest

of the public debt and the instalments of the Dutch debt due in 1802.

There may have been some items which I do not recollect. But I perfectly

remember what they did not contain. There was not a syllable about the

unaccounted balance of 114,000 dollars, nor of the detailed accounts in

relation to the remittances on account of the foreign debt, contained in

the 4th, 7th, and part of the 3d queries in my official letter to you

(A. 1). The first intelligence which I had of this unaccounted balance

was from yourself. It made its appearance in a pamphlet ascribed to

Stanley and addressed to his constituents. So careful were the friends

of this little work that it should not get abroad, that by mere accident

a single copy fell into the hands of Alston on the day before Mr.

Griswold brought forward his motion. Huger, who let Alston have it,

enjoined him not to let it go out of his hands. He on the contrary

carried it to you, and during the short time that it was in your

possession I accidentally stepped in whilst you were looking over it,

and this was the first notice which I received of Mr. Griswold's

redoubtable attack on that point. It may be proper to add that when he

put into my hands the paper containing the first objections to the

report, I offered to transmit them to you, provided he would move it in

committee; and the committee were actually convened for that purpose,

but he did not attend. He declined also a proposition of waiting on you

in person when I offered to accompany him. The committee taking no order

on his objections, they were submitted to you by me, and so long a time

elapsed that I really conceived he had abandoned his project. On our

return home Alston told me that Huger was very much irritated against

him, and those in his quarter of the House mortified and astonished,

when I mentioned the coincidence between Griswold's speech and Stanley's

letter.

And now, dismissing this miserable race of cavillers and equivocators,

let me beg you to have a reverend care of your health, and to assure

Mrs. G. (_not_ Griswold) and her sisters of my best wishes for their

health and happiness. Mr. Nym and the young secretary will participate

my friendly inquiries. I do not ask you to continue to write to me,

because I know the demands upon your time both by health and business.

But a line of how and where you all are will always be acceptable to one

who interests himself in everything relating to you.

My health is fluctuating; the weather is raw and the spring a month

behindhand. Moreover, we have had but one rain, and that moderate, since

the last snow on the 8th March. Of course I am vaporish and gouty.

Adieu.

Yours truly.

P.S.--Smith should make a statement "by authority" in his paper

conformably with the within.

At an election at Charlotte C. H. on Monday last, J. Randolph had 717

votes, C. Carrington 2.

JOHN RANDOLPH TO GALLATIN.

BIZARRE, 4th June, 27th year [1803].

DEAR SIR,--Having sustained an injury in my hand, I have been for some

time debarred the use of my pen. The first exercise of my recovered

right shall be to thank you for your last very friendly and acceptable

letter.

Nothing can be more clear and satisfactory than Bayard's answer to

himself, according to your statement of it. But I cannot help suspecting

a difference between the printed speech and the original, not at all to

the advantage of the latter. I am unwilling to believe that he was

guilty of so gross an absurdity (in debate), because I am unwilling to

believe that we were guilty of yet grosser stupidity, even after making

every allowance for being worried down with fatigue. Such a thing might

have escaped me, and perhaps Nicholson; but that General Smith should

fail to detect it appears incredible. So far, however, from overdosing

me with the bank stock, as you seem to apprehend, it is evident you have

not given me quantum suff.

You have seen the result of our elections. Federal exultation has,

however, received a severe check in those of New York. Indeed, I do not

conceive the event here to be indicative of any change in the public

sentiment. The elections, with a single exception, have been conducted

on personal rather than on party motives. Brent completely defeated

himself, and, although I love the man, I cannot very heartily lament his

ill success. By the way, I think you wise men at the seat of government

have much to answer for in respect to the temper prevailing around you.

By their fruit shall ye know them. Is there something more of system yet

introduced among you? or are you still in chaos, without form and void?

Should you have leisure, give me a hint of the first news from Mr.

Monroe. After all the vaporing, I have no expectation of a serious war.

Tant pis pour nous.

You ask if I have seen Rennell's new map of North Africa? forgetting

that I live out of the light of anything but the sun; and he has not

condescended to shine, but at short intervals, for a fortnight. I

suppose it is the map which he compiled from Parke's Travels. Do you

recollect my suggesting to you, soon after the work came out, a

suspicion that the Niger was the true Nile? and your determining that he

should be swallowed up in the sands of the desert, which we carried into

instant execution.

Present me most sincerely, and permit me to add, affectionately, to Mrs.

Gallatin, and believe me, dear sir, most truly yours.

* * * * *

P.S.--I address this to Washington, where it will be put in train to

reach you. I sincerely hope it will find you much recruited by the wise

step which you have taken.

* * * * *

[Sidenote 1803]

The Louisiana treaty threw on Mr. Gallatin a new class of duties. He had

to make all the arrangements not only for payment of the purchase-money

to France, but for the modifications of his financial system which so

large and so sudden an emergency required. Fortunately, Alexander Baring

was the person with whom he had principally to deal in regard to

payments, and his relations with Mr. Baring were very friendly; so

friendly, indeed, as to have a decisive influence, some ten years later,

in a most serious crisis of Mr. Gallatin's life and of our national

history. With Mr. Baring's assistance the business details were

successfully arranged, and it only remained to adjust the new burden of

debt to the national resources.

Congress was called together in October on account of the Louisiana

business. It is curious to notice how, in his comments on this year's

message, Mr. Gallatin gently held the President back from every

appearance of hostility to England and of overwarm demonstrations

towards Bonaparte, and how he still talked of economies in the Navy

Department to supply some of his financial deficiencies, though this

resource was already mentioned only as a desirable possibility. In fact,

Congress was about to abandon the attempt at further economy in that

Department, and in order to relieve the Treasury the Mediterranean fund

was now created for naval expenses. Mr. Gallatin had to look for his

resources elsewhere.

The financial problem was to provide for the new purchase and its

consequent expenditure without imposing new taxes. The point was a

delicate one, and was managed by Mr. Gallatin as follows:

The purchase-money for Louisiana was $15,000,000. Of this sum,

$11,250,000 was paid in new six per cent. stock. There was specie enough

in the Treasury to pay $2,000,000 more; and Mr. Gallatin requested

authority to borrow the remaining $1,750,000 at six per cent.

The consequent increase of annual interest on the debt, including

commissions and exchange, he estimated at $800,000. To provide this he

counted on an increase of revenue from imposts and lands, as indicated

by the returns for the past year, equal to $600,000, and an income of

$200,000 from Louisiana.

An annual appropriation of $700,000 was to be set aside for the interest

on the $11,250,000 new stock, and added to the permanent appropriation

of $7,300,000; so that in future $8,000,000 should be annually applied

to payment of interest and principal of the debt, thus preserving the

ratio of reduction already established.

[Sidenote 1803]

Perhaps as a matter of fact the success of Mr. Gallatin in avoiding new

taxes was rather apparent than real. Had he been able to carry out his

economies in the navy, he might indeed have avoided taxation, but this

was fairly proved impossible, and the confession of a failure here was

only evaded by the fiction of creating a temporary fund for

extraordinary naval purposes, which allowed the supposed regular naval

expenditure to be estimated at Mr. Gallatin's figures. This was

obviously in the nature of a compromise between the Treasury and the

Navy, but it was not the less a real increase of taxation, and, as

events proved, a permanent increase. The capture of the frigate

Philadelphia by the Tripolitans was, it is true, the immediate occasion

for this tax, but not its cause; this lay much deeper, and, as Mr.

Gallatin's letters clearly show, was the result of a failure in the

attempt at economy in the navy.

Even at the last hour, however, the Administration was alarmed by the

fear that Louisiana might after all be lost; the protest of Spain

against the sale gave reason to doubt whether she would consent to

surrender the province. Here again Mr. Gallatin of his own accord urged

increased expenditure, and actively pressed the collection and movement

of troops to take possession by force if the Spanish government should

resist. Fortunately, the alarm proved to be unnecessary: Louisiana was

promptly handed over to the French official appointed for the purpose,

and by him to General Wilkinson and Governor Claiborne; the troops were

stopped on their march from Tennessee and ordered home, and all that

remained to be done was to incorporate the new territory in the old, and

to settle its boundaries with Spain.

The process of incorporation, however, brought into prominence a very

serious constitutional question, which had already been elaborately

argued in the Cabinet. Had the Constitution given to the President and

Congress the right to do an act of this transcendent importance, an act

which could not but result in immense and incalculable changes in the

relations between the States who were the original parties to the

constitutional compact; an act which could only rest on a prodigious

extension of the treaty-making power, such as would legalize the

annexation of Mexico or of Europe itself? Mr. Jefferson was very

strongly of opinion that an amendment to the Constitution could alone

legalize the act, and this opinion seems to have been shared by Mr.

Madison and by the Attorney-General. The tenor of Mr. Gallatin's

reasoning as a member of Congress in opposition certainly leads to the

inference that he would take the same side. His speeches on the alien

bill had carried the doctrine of strict construction to the verge of

extravagance. Nevertheless, Mr. Gallatin did not properly belong to the

Virginia school of strict constructionists, and although, as a member of

Congress, he earnestly resisted the growth of Executive power, he

assumed with difficulty and with a certain awkwardness the tone of

States' rights. In this Louisiana case he wrote on the 13th January,

1803, a letter to Mr. Jefferson, which might have been written, without

a syllable of change, by Alexander Hamilton to General Washington ten

years before:

"To me it would appear, 1st. That the United States as a nation have an

inherent right to acquire territory.

"2d. That whenever that acquisition is by treaty, the same constituted

authorities in whom the treaty-making power is vested have a

constitutional right to sanction the acquisition.

"3d. That whenever the territory has been acquired, Congress have the

power either of admitting into the Union as a new State, or of annexing

to a State with the consent of that State, or of making regulations for

the government of such territory.

"The only possible objection must be derived from the 12th amendment,

which declares that powers not delegated to the United States nor

prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States or to the

people. As the States are expressly prohibited from making treaties, it

is evident that if the power of acquiring territory by treaty is not

considered within the meaning of the amendment as delegated to the

United States, it must be reserved to the people. If that be the true

construction of the Constitution, it substantially amounts to this, that

the United States are precluded from and renounce altogether the

enlargement of territory; a provision sufficiently important and

singular to have deserved to be expressly enacted. Is it not a more

natural construction to say that the power of acquiring territory is

delegated to the United States by the several provisions which

authorize the several branches of government to make war, to make

treaties, and to govern the territory of the Union?"[64]

Mr. Jefferson, it is needless to say, was not convinced by this

reasoning. He mildly replied: "I think it will be safer not to permit

the enlargement of the Union but by amendment of the Constitution."[65]

But the heresy spread into his own Virginia church, and his friend and

confidant Wilson Cary Nicholas became infected by it. In reply to him

Mr. Jefferson wrote a passionate appeal: "Our peculiar security is in

the possession of a written Constitution; let us not make it a blank

paper by construction." For a time he adhered to this view, and framed

an amendment to answer his purpose, but at length he resigned himself to

committing the whole responsibility to Congress, and held his peace. Mr.

Gallatin's opinion became the accepted principle of the party and the

ground on which their legislation was made to rest.

[Sidenote: 1804.]

The same fate attended Mr. Jefferson's vehement remonstrances against

the establishment of a branch bank of the United States at New Orleans,

an object which Mr. Gallatin considered as of the highest importance and

one which he was actively engaged in carrying into effect. Mr.

Jefferson, however, wrote to him on the 13th December, 1803, in the

strongest language against this plan: "This institution is one of the

most deadly hostility existing against the principles and form of our

Constitution.... What an obstruction could not this bank of the United

States, with all its branch banks, be in time of war? It might dictate

to us the peace we should accept, or withdraw its aids. Ought we then to

give further growth to an institution so powerful, so hostile?" And he

went on to give his own views as to the proper course for government to

follow, which was in fact very nearly the plan ultimately realized in

the form of a sub-treasury. Mr. Gallatin, however, attached no great

weight to these arguments; he wrote back on the same day: "I am

extremely anxious to see a bank at New Orleans; considering the distance

of that place, our own security and even that of the collector will be

eminently promoted, and the transmission of moneys arising both from the

impost and sales of lands in the Mississippi Territory would without it

be a very difficult and sometimes dangerous operation. Against this

there are none but political objections, and those will lose much of

their force when the little injury they can do us and the dependence in

which they are on government are duly estimated. They may vote as they

please and take their own papers, but they are formidable only as

individuals and not as bankers. Whenever they shall appear to be really

dangerous, they are completely in our power and may be crushed."

Mr. Jefferson again yielded, and Mr. Gallatin procured the passage of an

Act of Congress authorizing the establishment of a branch bank at New

Orleans. Meanwhile Governor Claiborne had undertaken to establish a bank

there by his own authority. When the news of this proceeding reached Mr.

Gallatin he was very angry, and wrote to Mr. Jefferson at once on April

12, 1804, sharply condemning Governor Claiborne for this unauthorized

act, which, he added, "will probably defeat the establishment of a

branch bank which _we_ considered of great importance to the safety of

the revenue and as a bond of union between the Atlantic and Mississippi

interests." Apparently, therefore, Mr. Gallatin believed that he had

entirely converted his chief; in reality the conversion was only one

more example of that capacity for yielding his own prejudices to the

weight of his advisers, which made Mr. Jefferson so often disappoint his

enemies and preserve the harmony of his party.

On the whole, this third year of the Administration closed not less

satisfactorily than its predecessors, and Congress adjourned without

anxiety after carrying into effect all the measures which Mr. Gallatin

had at heart. So far as he was concerned, hardly a lisp of discontent

was heard, except, perhaps, among the followers of Duane and Leib. By

them he was accused of wishing to build up a third party by the

patronage of the Treasury, a charge which meant only that he had refused

to put his patronage at their disposal.

The summer again found Mr. Gallatin at Washington, alone, discontented,

and occupied only with the details of Treasury work. One pleasure

indeed he had, and as his acquaintance with Alexander Baring was

destined to have no little value to him in future life, so his

acquaintance of this summer with Alexander von Humboldt was turned to

good account in after-years. In a letter to his wife he gave an amusing

account of his first impressions of Humboldt. Among his correspondents

of this year there are none whose letters seem to have any permanent

value, unless one by John Randolph be an exception. In this there are

curious suggestions of restlessness under the sense of political

inferiority. It would be interesting to know what that opinion of Mr.

Gallatin's was which could induce Randolph to concur with it so far as

to favor the creation of a navy to blow the British cruisers out of

water.

GALLATIN TO HIS WIFE.

DATE WASHINGTON, 6th June, 1804.

... I have received an exquisite intellectual treat from Baron Humboldt,

the Prussian traveller, who is on his return from Peru and Mexico, where

he travelled five years, and from which he has brought a mass of

natural, philosophical, and political information which will render the

geography, productions, and statistics of that country better known than

those of most European countries. We all consider him as a very

extraordinary man, and his travels, which he intends publishing on his

return to Europe, will, I think, rank above any other production of the

kind. I am not apt to be easily pleased, and he was not particularly

prepossessing to my taste, for he speaks more than Lucas, Finley, and

myself put together, and twice as fast as anybody I know, German,

French, Spanish, and English, all together. But I was really delighted,

and swallowed more information of various kinds in less than two hours

than I had for two years past in all I had read or heard. He does not

seem much above thirty, gives you no trouble in talking yourself, for he

catches with perfect precision the idea you mean to convey before you

have uttered the third word of your sentence, and, exclusively of his

travelled acquirements, the extent of his reading and scientific

knowledge is astonishing. I must acknowledge, in order to account for

my enthusiasm, that he was surrounded with maps, statements, &c., all

new to me, and several of which he has liberally permitted us to

transcribe.

JOHN RANDOLPH TO GALLATIN.

BIZARRE, 14th October, 1804. 29th Ind.

On my return from Fredericksburg after a racing campaign, I was very

agreeably accosted by your truly welcome letter; to thank you for which,

and not because I have anything (stable news excepted) to communicate, I

now take up the pen. It is some satisfaction to me, who have been

pestered with inquiries that I could not answer on the subject of public

affairs, to find that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Lord of

the Treasury is in as comfortable a state of ignorance as myself. Pope

says of governments, that is best which is best administered. What idea,

then, could he have of a government which was not administered at all?

The longer I live, the more do I incline to somebody's opinion, that

there is in the affairs of this world a mechanism of which the very

agents themselves are ignorant, and which, of course, they can neither

calculate nor control. As much free will as you please in everything

else, but in politics I must ever be a necessitarian. And this

comfortable doctrine saves me a deal of trouble and many a twinge of

conscience for my heedless indolence. I therefore leave Major Jackson

and his Ex. of Casa Yrujo to give each other the lie in Anglo-American

or Castilian fashions, just as it suits them, and when people resort to

me for intelligence, instead of playing the owl and putting on a face of

solemn nonsense, I very fairly tell them with perfect nonchalance that I

know nothing of the matter,--from which, if they have any discernment,

they may infer that I care as little about it,--and then change the

subject as quickly as I can to horses, dogs, the plough, or some other

upon which I feel myself competent to converse. In short, I like

originality too well to be a second-hand politician when I can help it.

It is enough to live upon the broken victuals and be tricked out in the

cast-off finery of you first-rate statesmen all the winter. When I cross

the Potomac, I leave behind me all the scraps, shreds, and patches of

politics which I collect during the session, and put on the plain

homespun, or (as we say) the "Virginia cloth," of a planter, which is

clean, whole, and comfortable, even if it be homely. Nevertheless, I

have patriotism enough left to congratulate you on the fulness of the

public purse, and cannot help wishing that its situation could be

concealed from our Sangrados in politics, with whom depletion is the

order of the day. On the subject of a navy you know my opinion concurs

with yours. I really feel ashamed for my country, that, whilst she is

hectoring before the petty corsairs of the coast of Barbary, she should

truckle to the great pirate of the German Ocean; and I would freely vote

a naval force that should blow the Cambrian and Leander out of water.

Indeed, I wish Barron's squadron had been employed on that service. I am

perfectly aware of the importance of peace to us, particularly with

Great Britain, but I know it to be equally necessary to her; and, in

short, if we have any honor as a nation to lose, which is problematical,

I am unwilling to surrender it.

On the subject of Louisiana you are also apprised that my sentiments

coincide with your own; and it is principally because of that

coincidence that I rely upon their correctness. But as we have the

misfortune to differ from that great political luminary, Mr. Matthew

Lyon, on this as well as on most other points, I doubt whether we shall

not be overpowered. If Spain be "fallen from her old Castilian _faith_,

_candor_, and _dignity_" it must be allowed that we have been judicious

in our choice of a minister to negotiate with her; and Louisiana, it

being presumable, partaking something of the character which

distinguished her late sovereign when she acquired that territory, the

selection of a _pompous nothing_ for a governor will be admitted to have

been happy. At least, if the appointment be not defensible upon this

principle, I am at a loss to discover any other tenable point. In answer

to your question I would advise the printing of ... thousand copies of

Tom Paine's answer to their remonstrance and transmitting them by as

many thousand troops, who can speak a language perfectly intelligible to

the people of Louisiana, whatever that of their governor may be. It is,

to be sure, a little awkward, except in addresses and answers where

each party is previously well apprised of what the other has to say,

that whilst the eyes and ears of the admiring Louisianians are filled

with the majestic person and sonorous periods of their chief magistrate,

their understandings should be utterly vacant. If, however, they were

aware that, even if they understood English, it might be no better, they

would perhaps be more reconciled to their situation. You really must

send something better than this mere ape of greatness to those

Hispano-Gaulo. He would make a portly figure delivering to "my lords and

gentlemen" a speech which Pitt had previously taught him; but we want an

_automaton_, and a _puppet_ will not supply his place.

Pray look to the "ways and means" of entertainment for man and horse

against the assembling of our annual mob. Here we have no bilious

fevers, and although I shall enjoy your geographical treat I shall

require more substantial food.

Because I had nothing to say, I have prattled through four pages; like a

quondam fellow-laborer of ours, who seemed to speak not to express his

ideas, but to gain time to acquire some.

* * * * *

The general election of November, 1804, proved the strength of the

Administration in a more emphatic manner than even its friends had

counted upon. Mr. Jefferson received an almost unanimous electoral vote.

In Pennsylvania, however, there was little satisfaction over the result;

the schism there became more and more serious, and on the 16th October,

1804, Mr. Dallas could only write to Mr. Gallatin: "Thank Heaven, our

election is over! The violence of Duane has produced a fatal division.

He seems determined to destroy the Republican standing and usefulness of

every man who does not bend to his will. He has attacked me as the

author of an address which I never saw till it was in the press. He

menaces the governor. You have already felt his lash. And I think there

is reason for Mr. Jefferson himself to apprehend that the spirit of

Callender survives."

[Sidenote: 1805.]

Again Congress came together, and for the fourth time the President was

able to draw a picture of the political situation which had few shadows

and broad light. For the fourth time Mr. Gallatin sent in a report which

announced a steadily increasing revenue, if not a reduced expenditure.

He had not yet made use of his authority to borrow the additional

$1,750,000 of the Louisiana purchase, and hoped for a surplus that would

render this loan unnecessary. For the coming year he estimated an

expenditure of $11,540,000, and a revenue of $11,750,000.

The usual reaction which follows general elections followed that of

1804, and the Administration escaped attack in the following session of

1804-05, which was chiefly devoted to the trial of Judge Chase. Whether

Mr. Gallatin had anything to do with influencing the result of this

trial is unknown. A curious mystery has always hung and probably always

will hang over the share which Mr. Jefferson's Administration had in

affecting the decision of the Senate by which Judge Chase was acquitted.

Probably, however, the schism which was taking place in Pennsylvania on

this same point of impeachments had an immediate effect on the party at

Washington and cooled its eagerness for conviction. Perhaps Mr.

Gallatin's feelings may be partly reflected in a letter from his friend

Mr. Dallas, who was now acting as counsel for the impeached Pennsylvania

judges. This letter, it will be noticed, was written while the trial of

Judge Chase was going on, and only a few days before Mr. Dallas was

called to Washington to give his testimony before the Senate.

A. J. DALLAS TO GALLATIN.

LANCASTER, 16th January, 1805.

MY DEAR SIR,--I thank you for your friendly letter, but I regret that it

expresses a depression on public business which I have long felt. It is

obvious to me that unless our Administration take decisive measures to

discountenance the factious spirit that has appeared, unless some

principle of political cohesion can be introduced into our public

councils as well as at our elections, and unless men of character and

talents can be drawn from professional and private pursuits into the

legislative bodies of our governments, federal and State, the empire of

Republicanism will moulder into anarchy, and the labor and hope of our

lives will terminate in disappointment and wretchedness. Perhaps the

crisis is arrived when some attempt should be made to rally the genuine

Republicans round the standard of reason, order, and law. At present we

are the slaves of men whose passions are the origin and whose interests

are the object of all their actions,--I mean your Duanes, Cheethams,

Leibs, &c. They have the press in their power, and, though we may have

virtue to assert the liberty of the press, it is too plain that we have

not spirit enough to resist the tyranny of the printers. We will talk of

this matter when we meet.

... The argument on our impeachment will close to-day, and the decision

will probably be given to-morrow or Monday. The Aurora man has been here

during the trial, with all his audacity, intrigue, and malevolence. I

think, however, he will fail. A cause more deserving of success than

that of the judges never was discussed, and I am confident that there

will be an acquittal....

* * * * *

The letter in which Mr. Gallatin expressed his depression is lost, but

there was more than one cause to justify it. However annoying the

condition of Pennsylvania politics might be, the greatest actual danger

to be feared from it was that it might spread into national politics and

find leaders in Congress. The conduct of John Randolph already suggested

an alliance between him and Duane that might paralyze the Administration

and ruin the Republican party. This alliance was foreshadowed not only

by the fact that Randolph led the impeachment of Judge Chase in the

spirit of Duane, but also by another still more extravagant display of

Randolph's temper which touched Mr. Gallatin personally. When the public

lands came under Mr. Gallatin's direction in 1801, he had been obliged

to disentangle the State of Georgia, as well as he could, from a

complication which she had herself created. One element in this tangle

consisted in the corrupt sale by Georgia of certain lands, and her

subsequent annulling these sales on the ground of her own corruption.

The purchasers pressed their claims, and Mr. Gallatin with his

fellow-commissioners, Madison and Lincoln, recommended a compromise by

which five million acres were to be reserved in order to make a

reasonable compensation for all claims, these as well as others; a

proposition which was embodied by Congress in a law. To carry this

compromise into effect was the work of ten years, during which time the

subject was incessantly before Congress. When it came up in January,

1805, John Randolph astounded the House by a series of speeches violent

beyond all precedent, outrageously and vindictively slanderous, and

fatal to the harmony of the party and to all effective legislation. With

the malignity of a bully he attacked Gideon Granger, the

Postmaster-General, who could not answer him, and he only met his match

in Matthew Lyon, whose old experience now, to the delight of the

Federalists, enabled him to meet Randolph with a torrent of personal

abuse, and to tell him that he was a jackal and a madman with the face

of a monkey. All this was doubtless vexatious enough to Mr. Gallatin,

who knew well that it boded no good to the Administration; but Randolph

could not even stop here. He made a very serious reflection upon Mr.

Gallatin himself and the report of the commissioners. "When I first read

their report," said he, "I was filled with unutterable astonishment;

finding men in whom I had and still have the highest confidence,

recommend a measure which all the facts and all the reasons which they

had collected opposed and unequivocally condemned." This speech was made

on February 3, 1805, and the course taken by Randolph was warmly

applauded by Duane.

Mr. Gallatin remained impassive and his relations with Randolph were

undisturbed. Randolph himself either had no clear idea what he was

doing, or was indifferent to its consequences. One of his letters to Mr.

Gallatin, written in October, 1805, is so judicial in its tone and

expresses such proper sentiments about divisions in the party as to

appear quite out of keeping with its writer and to suggest

dissimulation, which was not at all in his character. But on one point

the two men had strong sympathies: their concurrence of opinion on the

management of the navy was a bond of union.

The summer of 1805 brought matters to a crisis. Duane and his friends

set up an opposition candidate to Governor McKean in the person of Simon

Snyder, Speaker of the House, and carried the bulk of the party with

them. Mr. Dallas and the conservative element were obliged to depend

upon Federalist aid in order to carry the election of McKean. Mr.

Jefferson and the Administration refrained from interference, and the

result was to isolate Mr. Gallatin and to deprive him of that support in

his own State, without which the position of a public man must always be

precarious. The elements of future trouble were gathering into alarming

consistency and needed only some national crisis to concentrate all

their force against Mr. Gallatin.

A. J. DALLAS TO GALLATIN.

4th April, 1805.

... The political part of your letter corresponds precisely with the

ideas I entertain and have uniformly inculcated on the subject. The

Aurora perverts everything, however, that can be said or done. The

Legislature adjourns to-day. You have read the report; but I fear it

will be followed by some wild, irregular step after the adjournment,

aimed against the Governor as well as the Constitution. The evil of the

day has obviously proceeded from the neglect of Dr. Leib's official

pretensions; and Duane's assertions that he possesses the confidence and

acts at the instance of the President will buoy him up on the surface

for some time longer. While he has influence, the State, the United

States, will never enjoy quiet. I hope therefore, and there is every

reason to expect, that his present machinations will be exposed and

defeated as a prelude to his fall....

JOHN RANDOLPH TO GALLATIN.

BIZARRE, June 28, 1805.

... I do not understand your manoeuvres at headquarters, nor should I

be surprised to see the Navy Department abolished, or, in more

appropriate phrase, swept by the board, at the next session of Congress.

The nation has had the most conclusive proof that a _head_ is no

necessary appendage to the establishment....

GALLATIN TO BADOLLET.

WASHINGTON, 25th October, 1805.

... Whilst the Republicans opposed the Federalists the necessity of

union induced a general sacrifice of private views and personal

objects; and the opposition was generally grounded on the purest motives

and conducted in the most honorable manner. Complete success has

awakened all those passions which only slumbered. In Pennsylvania

particularly the thirst for offices, too much encouraged by Governor

McKean's first measures, created a schism in Philadelphia as early as

1802. Leib, ambitious, avaricious, envious, and disappointed, blew up

the flame, and watched the first opportunity to make _his_ cause a

general one. The vanity, the nepotism, and the indiscretion of Governor

McKean afforded the opportunity. Want of mutual forbearance amongst the

best intentioned and most respectable Republicans has completed the

schism. Duane, intoxicated by the persuasion that he alone had

overthrown Federalism, thought himself neither sufficiently rewarded nor

respected, and, possessed of an engine which gives him an irresistible

control over public opinion, he easily gained the victory for his

friends. I call it victory, for the number of Republicans who have

opposed him rather than supported McKean does not exceed one-fourth, or

at most one-third, of the whole; and McKean owes his re-election to the

Federalists. What will be the consequence I cannot even conjecture. My

ardent wishes are for mutual forgiveness and a reunion of the Republican

interest; but I hardly think it probable. McKean and Duane will be both

implacable and immovable, and the acts of the first and the continued

proscriptions of the last will most probably and unfortunately defeat

every attempt to reconcile. Yet I do not foresee any permanent evil

beyond what arises from perpetual agitation and from that party spirit

which encourages personal hatred; but the intolerance and persecution

which we abhorred in Federalism will be pursued by the prevailing party

till the people, who do not love injustice, once more put it down.

JOHN RANDOLPH TO GALLATIN.

BIZARRE, October 25, 1805.

DEAR SIR,--Your very acceptable letter reached me this morning, and I

hasten to return you my thanks for it and to answer your very friendly

inquiries after my health. It is much better than it has been for some

months; so much so that I propose braving another winter at Washington.

I do assure you, however, that I look forward to the ensuing session of

Congress with no very pleasant feelings. To say nothing of the

disadvantages of the place, natural as well as acquired, I anticipate a

plentiful harvest of bickering and blunders; of which, however, I hope

to be a quiet, if not an unconcerned, spectator.

It is a great comfort to me to find that we entirely agree as to the

causes of disunion in Pennsylvania. I have no interest in their local

squabbles, except so far as they may affect the Union at large. In that

point of view I have regretted the divisions of the Republican party in

that great and leading State, well knowing that whichever side

prevailed, Federalism must thereby acquire a formidable accession of

strength. It now remains to be seen whether there is temper and good

sense enough left among them to heal their animosities, or whether, as

to Pennsylvania at present and speedily throughout the Union, we must

acknowledge the humiliating position of our adversaries, "that the

Republicans do not possess virtue and understanding enough to administer

the government." Perhaps the reconciliation which I speak of is more to

be desired than hoped. Wiser heads and those better acquainted with the

particular circumstances of the case than mine must determine whether

this is to be effected by an act of mutual amnesty and oblivion, or by

expelling in the first instance the rogues on both sides. That such

there are is self-evident; though who they are is a much more difficult

question. Unconnected as I am in that quarter, yourself excepted, it

appears from what I can gather that there has been no want of

indiscretion, intemperance, and rashness on either side. If the

vanquished party have exceeded in these, it has been amply

counterbalanced by dereliction of principle in the victors. I speak of

chieftains. As to the body of the people, their intentions are always

good, _since it can never be their interest to do wrong_. Whilst you in

Pennsylvania have been tearing each other to pieces about a governor, we

in Virginia, who can hardly find any one to accept our throne of the

Mahrattas, have been quietly taking the goods the gods have provided us;

enjoying the sports of the turf and the field. Which has the better

bargain, think you?

... I regret exceedingly Mr. Jefferson's resolution to retire, and

almost as much the premature annunciation of that determination. It

almost precludes a revision of his purpose, to say nothing of the

intrigues which it will set on foot. If I were sure that Monroe would

succeed him, my regret would be very much diminished. Here, you see, the

Virginian breaks out; but, like the Prussian cadet, "I must request you

not to make this known to the Secretary of the Treasury."

A. J. DALLAS TO GALLATIN.

21st December, 1805.

MY DEAR SIR,--In perfect confidence I tell you that Governor McK. has

pressed me to accept the office of chief justice. This I have

peremptorily declined. But I believe he means to appoint the present

Attorney-General to that office; and I am again pressed to say whether I

will accept the commission of Attorney-General. It is an office more

lucrative, less troublesome, and infinitely less responsible than the

one I hold. There are considerations, however, that make me pause. I am

disgusted with the fluctuation of our politics, with the emptiness of

party friendships, and with the influence of desperate and violent men

upon our popular and legislative movements in the State business. I had

determined never to think of State dependence. At this time, too, when

the thunders of the Aurora are daily rolling over my head; when it is

publicly asserted that I have lost the personal and political confidence

of the Administration; a resignation would be perverted into a

dismissal, and my succession to the office of Attorney-General would

increase the clamors against Governor McKean. In this dilemma I repose

myself on your friendship for information and advice. I do not want

either office, but I am shocked at the idea of incurring the least

disgrace under the sanction of an Administration which has had all my

attachment and all my services. Tell me, therefore, what I ought to do

by the return of the post. I do not wish you to enter into any detail of

the grounds of your opinion, but let the opinion be explicit, and, if

you please, let it be the result of a consultation with our friend

Robert Smith.

* * * * *

Meanwhile, the fate of the Administration became every day more visibly

involved in the management of foreign affairs. Mr. Jefferson's theory,

that the belligerents would not make him swallow so much as they had

forced down the throats of his predecessors, was rapidly becoming more

than questionable. England blockaded our ports and impressed our seamen;

Spain refused to carry out her pledges of indemnification for illegal

seizures of our ships, insisted upon limiting our Louisiana purchase to

a mere strip of territory on the west bank of the Mississippi, and was

supported by France in doing so. Mr. Jefferson was at this time

impressed with the idea that he could balance one belligerent against

another and could force Spain to recede by throwing himself into the

arms of England.

Under these circumstances, on the 7th August, 1805, he called upon the

members of his Cabinet for their written opinions on the course to be

pursued towards Spain. Mr. Gallatin's reply, dated September 12,[66] is

a very interesting paper, covering the whole ground of discussion, and

composed in a spirit of judicial fairness towards Spain very unusual in

American state papers. Acting on his invariable theory of American

interests, he dissuaded from war, and urged continued negotiation even

if it only resulted in postponing a rupture. To gain time was with him

to gain everything; after the year 1809 the redemption of debt would

have gone so far that $3,500,000 would be annually available, out of the

$8,000,000 fund, for other purposes; adding the savings and preparations

of these three years and the intermediate growth of the country, there

was no difficulty in showing the importance of preserving peace. But

perhaps the most curious part of this paper is that in which Mr.

Gallatin accepts the doctrine of a navy; after explaining that he could

count on a probable annual surplus of $2,000,000, he went on to deal

with its application:

"It is probable that the greater part of that surplus will be applied to

the formation of a navy; and if Congress shall decide in favor of that

measure, I would suggest that the mode best calculated, in my opinion,

to effect it, and so impress other nations that we are in earnest about

it, would be a distinct Act enacted for that sole purpose, appropriating

for a fixed number of years (or for as many years as would be sufficient

to build a determinate number of ships of the line) a fixed sum of

money, say one million of dollars annually, ... the money to be

exclusively applied to the building of ships of the line, for there

would still be a sufficient surplus to add immediately a few frigates to

our navy.... Whether the creation of an efficient navy may not, by

encouraging wars and drawing us in the usual vortex of expenses and

foreign relations, be the cause of greater evils than those it is

intended to prevent, is not the question which I mean to discuss. This

is to be decided by the representatives of the nation, and although I

have been desirous that the measure might at least be postponed, I have

had no doubt for a long time that the United States would ultimately

have a navy. It is certain that, so long as we have none, we must

perpetually be liable to injuries and insults, particularly from the

belligerent powers when there is a war in Europe; and in deciding for or

against the measure Congress will fairly decide the question, whether

they think it more for the interest of the United States to preserve a

pacific and temporizing system, and to tolerate those injuries and

insults to a great extent, than to be prepared, like the great European

nations, to repel every injury by the sword."

This seems to have been sound Federalist doctrine so far as it went.

Time and the growth of natural resources were gradually bringing Mr.

Gallatin to a point not much behind the last Administration; had the

Navy been in the hands of a stronger man it is not unlikely that the

appropriation offered by Mr. Gallatin might now have been carried

through Congress, but even in making the proposition Mr. Gallatin showed

his sense of Mr. Robert Smith's capacity by insisting that the money

should be placed in the hands of commissioners. To judge from John

Randolph's expressions, he was at this time of the same opinion with Mr.

Gallatin, both in regard to the navy and its Secretary.

But Mr. Jefferson's views, never heartily turned towards strong

measures, soon changed. On the 23d October, 1805, he wrote to Mr.

Gallatin that there was no longer any occasion for a hasty decision the

European war was certain to continue. "We may make another effort for a

peaceable accommodation with Spain without the danger of being left

alone to cope with both France and Spain." And he closed by propounding

an entirely new proposition: "Our question now is in what way to give

Spain another opportunity of arrangement. Is not Paris the place? France

the agent? The purchase of the Floridas the means?"

If there was anything in this rapid change of front on the part of Mr.

Jefferson that argued vacillation of mind, it still amounted to the

adoption of Mr. Gallatin's views, and he seems to have so regarded it.

Unfortunately, when Mr. Jefferson undertook to carry out his new policy

he attempted the difficult task of concealing it under the cover of the

old one; he wished, in other words, to combine the advantages of a war

policy with those of a peace policy, and to escape the consequences of

both, so far as risks were concerned. The success of the Louisiana

purchase, two years before, now led him to repeat the experiment; the

scheme in his mind was intended to be a close imitation of the course

which had resulted in obtaining Louisiana; Spain was partly to be

frightened, partly to be bribed, into the sale of Florida.

Mr. Gallatin's notes on the message of this year seem to indicate that

it showed in the original draft more inconsistency than in its ultimate

form. Mr. Jefferson spoke of war as probable, and recommended

preparation for it,--organization of the militia, gun-boats, and

land-batteries; he even gave a strong hint that he was ready to build

ships of the line; yet at the same time he recommended the abandonment

of the Mediterranean Fund which, as Mr. Gallatin pointed out, was

necessary to provide for the purchase of Florida on their own scheme, or

to impose upon Spain a sense of their being in earnest about war.[67]

After thorough revision the message was at last made to suit its double

purpose, and was sent in.

This, however, was only the beginning. The plan of operations was

intended to be an exact repetition of that which had been followed in

the Louisiana case,--a public message to be followed by a secret one,

public resolutions to be adopted by the House, and a confidential report

and appropriation. Mr. Gallatin advised this course as the one already

settled by precedent, and Mr. Jefferson set to work drafting the public

resolutions which were to be adopted by the House and to impose upon

Spain.

The President's first draft[68] met with little success; indeed, it was

open to ridicule, and both Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Joseph H. Nicholson

remonstrated. Mr. Jefferson accordingly made what he called a revised

edition;[69] but there was a serious difficulty in the task itself, as

Mr. Gallatin wrote on December 3, 1805, to Mr. Jefferson: "The apparent

difficulty in framing the resolutions arises from the attempt to blend

the three objects together. The same reasons which have induced the

President to send two distinct messages, render it necessary that the

public resolutions of Congress should be distinct from the private ones;

those which relate to the war-posture of the Spanish affairs, which are

intended to express the national sense on that subject, and to enable

the President to take the steps which appear immediately necessary on

the frontier, should not be mixed with those proceedings calculated only

to effect an accommodation."

There was, however, a more serious difficulty, on which Mr. Gallatin did

not dwell; the Administration was not in earnest. He had himself already

pointed out what should be done if war were really contemplated. Half a

dozen ships of the line, a few more frigates, and some regiments for the

regular army were the only measures which Spain would respect. It is

true that this policy would have been merely a repetition of that

pursued by the last Administration towards France, but that policy had

at least not been feeble. Mr. Jefferson should not have taken a "war

posture" unless he was ready to do so with vigor.

The confidential message was sent in on the 6th December, 1805, three

days after the annual message. Its object as understood by Mr. Gallatin

was "to inform Congress that France being disposed to favor an

arrangement, the present moment should not be lost, but that the means

must be supplied by Congress. It is also intended to say that in the

mean while, and in order to promote an arrangement, force should be

interposed to a certain degree.... To the tenor of the message itself I

have but one objection: that it does not explicitly declare the object

in view, and may hereafter be cavilled at as having induced Congress

into a mistaken opinion of that object. For although the latter end of

the third paragraph is expressed in comprehensive terms, yet the

omission of the word Florida may lead to error; nor does the message

convey the idea that in order to effect an accommodation a much larger

sum of money will probably be requisite than had been contemplated."

The President had now carried out his part of the project. Both the

public and secret messages were before the House; it remained for the

House to echo back the wishes of the Administration, and on this score

Mr. Jefferson seems to have felt no alarm, for he supposed himself to be

asking merely an exact repetition of action taken only two years before

in the Louisiana case. John Randolph had done then precisely what he was

expected to do now. Mr. Gallatin, on the 7th December, wrote a note to

Mr. Nicholson, and put the matter of the President's resolutions in his

hands. John Randolph called on the President the same day and made an

appointment with him for a conversation the next morning. He has himself

given an account of this interview. Full explanations were made to him,

and Mr. Jefferson seems to have told him with perfect frankness all the

views of the Administration. There was in fact, so far as Congress was

concerned, nothing to conceal.

"He then learned," according to his account published under the

signature of Decius, in the Richmond Enquirer, the following August,

"not without some surprise, that an appropriation of two millions was

wanted to purchase Florida. He told the President without reserve that

he would never agree to such a measure, because the money had not been

asked for in the message; that he could not consent to shift upon his

own shoulders or those of the House the proper responsibility of the

Executive; but that even if the money had been explicitly demanded he

should have been averse to granting it, because, after the total failure

of every attempt at negotiation, such a step would disgrace us

forever."

[Sidenote: 1806.]

This opposition of Mr. Randolph endangered the whole scheme. Mr.

Nicholson, who was second on the committee, was a close friend of

Randolph, and more or less influenced by him, while the other members

friendly to the Administration wanted the weight necessary to

overbalance the chairman. Nevertheless it was impossible to recede.

After waiting till the 21st December for Randolph to act, Mr. Nicholson

seems to have interposed and in a manner obliged him to meet the

committee. "As they were about to assemble," says Decius, "the chairman

(Randolph) was called aside by the Secretary of the Treasury, with whom

he retired, and who put into his hands a paper headed 'Provision for the

purchase of Florida.' As soon as he had cast his eyes on the title the

chairman declared that he would not vote a shilling. The Secretary

interrupted him by observing, with his characteristic caution, that he

did not mean to be understood as recommending the measure, but, if the

committee should deem it advisable, he had devised a plan for raising

the necessary supplies, as he had been requested or directed in that

case to do. The chairman expressed himself disgusted with the whole of

the proceeding, which he could not but consider as highly disingenuous."

Not until January 3, 1806, did the committee report, and then its report

provided only for a "war posture," and not for purchase. The House now

proceeded in secret session to debate the message, and then at last Mr.

Randolph flung his bomb into the midst of his friends and followers.

Seizing with considerable dexterity, but with extravagant violence, the

really weak point in Mr. Jefferson's message, he assailed the

Administration, or at least its foreign policy, with the fury of a

madman. The whole Administration phalanx was thrown into disorder and

embittered to exasperation; the whole effect proposed from the

negotiation was destroyed in advance; but the government was obliged to

go on, and at last its propositions, in spite of Randolph, were carried

through Congress.

Although the actual struggle took place in secret session, Randolph lost

no time in making his attack public, and it very soon became evident

that the true object of his hostility was Mr. Madison. On the 5th March,

in debating the non-importation policy, he began a violent assault by

asserting that he had asked the Administration, "What is the opinion of

the Cabinet?... My answer was (and from a Cabinet minister, too),

'_There is no longer any Cabinet_.'" On the 15th, he developed this

suggestion into a rhetorical panegyric upon Mr. Gallatin at the expense

of Mr. Madison; he told how certain despatches from Europe had arrived

at the State Department in December, and how Mr. Gallatin, in reply to

an inquiry, had told him at a later time that the contents of these

despatches had not yet been communicated to the Cabinet: "It was when I

discovered that the head of the second department under the government

did not know they were in existence, much less that his opinion on them

had not been consulted, that I declared what I repeat, that there is no

Cabinet. You have no Cabinet! What, the head of the Treasury

Department,--a vigorous and commanding statesman, a practical statesman,

the benefit of whose wisdom and experience the nation fondly believes it

always obtained before the great measures of the government are

taken,--unacquainted with and unconsulted on important despatches,--and

yet talk of a Cabinet! Not merely unconsulted, but ignorant of the

documents.... I have no hesitation in saying, _there is no Cabinet_,

when I see a man second to none for vigorous understanding and practical

good sense ousted from it."

The movement was an insidious one, calculated to sow distrust between

Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Madison; but to judge from the tone of Mr.

Randolph's letters, even as far back as June, 1803, it was an understood

fact with him and with Mr. Gallatin that the Administration wanted

cohesion and co-operation, and it appears clearly enough that at least

so far as the Navy Department was concerned, Mr. Gallatin made this a

subject of repeated remonstrance to the President himself, although he

never made complaint against Mr. Madison, and, as his correspondence

shows, he was fully in harmony with the foreign policy pursued.[70] That

he agreed with Randolph in considering the President too lax in

discipline seems certain.

Mr. Gallatin did what he could to correct the impression thus given,

and Randolph was obliged ultimately to withdraw his assertion, or at

least essentially to qualify it; but this seems to have irritated him

into making another similar attack on the 7th April, immediately after

withdrawing the former one: "I wish," said he, "the heads of departments

had seats on this floor. Were this the case, to one of them I would

immediately propound this question: Did you or did you not, in your

capacity of a public functionary, tell me, in my capacity of a public

functionary, that France would not suffer Spain to settle her

differences with us, that she wanted money, that we must give her money

or take a Spanish or French war?... I would put this question to another

head of department: Was or was not an application made to you for money

to be conveyed to Europe to carry on any species of diplomatic

negotiation there? I would listen to his answer, and if he put his hand

on his heart and like a man of honor said, No! I would believe him,

though it would require a great stretch of credulity. I would call into

my aid faith, not reason, and believe where I was not convinced."

At the moment this was said, Mr. Gallatin was on the floor of the House,

and Mr. Jackson, of Virginia, at once asked him whether it was true that

such an application was made. He replied that it was not, and explained

how the mistake arose. Mr. Jackson immediately took the floor and

repeated his words, characterizing the charge that Mr. Madison had

attempted to draw money out of the Treasury without the authority of

law, as "destitute of truth and foundation,--mark the expression; I say

it is destitute of truth," evidently courting a quarrel. He took care,

however, to relieve Mr. Gallatin of responsibility for these words,

while, in order to establish the fact of denial, he caused a resolution

of inquiry to be adopted by the House, which produced a categorical

reply from Mr. Gallatin, "that no 'application has been made to draw

money from the Treasury before an appropriation made by law for that

purpose.' The circumstances which may have produced an impression that

such an application had been made, being unconnected with any matter

pertaining to the duties of the office of Secretary of the Treasury, are

not presumed to come within the scope of the information required from

this Department by the House."

Meanwhile Mr. Gallatin had already taken measures to correct at its

source the error to which Mr. Randolph was giving currency.[71] It

appears that in explaining the wishes of the government to two New York

members, George Clinton, Jr., and Josiah Masters, Mr. Gallatin had found

them sceptical in regard to the propriety of the proposed action of

Congress, and, in order to convince them that the President and Cabinet

were in earnest and really anxious for the appropriation, he said that

so anxious were they as to have actually had a discussion in Cabinet,

before Congress met, whether they might not promise in the negotiation

to pay a sum down without waiting for action from Congress; so anxious

were they that Mr. Madison, although the bill was not yet fairly passed,

though certain to pass within less than a week, had already requested

Mr. Gallatin to buy exchange.[72] This conversation, repeated by Mr.

Masters, and coming to the ears of John Randolph, produced his solemn

inquiry meant to imply that Mr. Madison had approached Mr. Gallatin with

a proposition to take money illegally from the Treasury, and that Mr.

Gallatin had repelled the idea. What made this notion more absurd was

that the first proposition was not Mr. Madison's, but came from Mr.

Jefferson; only by jumbling the two facts together and recklessly

disregarding every means of better informing himself, had Randolph

succeeded in dragging Mr. Madison into the field at all.

[Sidenote: 1806]

This official denial and private correction of the story, afterwards

made public in the shape of a letter from the New York member to his

constituents, seem to be sufficient for the satisfaction of all parties.

Still, the innuendo of Randolph was compromising to Mr. Gallatin, and

was made the theme of long-continued attacks upon him. Five years

afterwards, when Mr. Madison was President and Gallatin was in sore need

of support, Mr. Jefferson wrote to William Wirt a letter warmly

defending him in this matter as in others. He said, in taking up one by

one the charges that Mr. Gallatin had been a party to Randolph's

opposition: "But the story of the two millions; Mr. Gallatin satisfied

us that this affirmation of J. R. was as unauthorized as the fact itself

was false. It resolves itself, therefore, into his inexplicit letter to

a committee of Congress. As to this, my own surmise was that Mr.

Gallatin might have used some hypothetical expression in conversing on

that subject, which J. R. made a positive one, and he being a duellist,

and Mr. Gallatin with a wife and children depending on him for their

daily subsistence, the latter might wish to avoid collision and insult

from such a man."

There are occasions when defence is worse than attack. If Mr. Jefferson

thought that his Secretary of the Treasury wanted the moral courage to

speak out at the risk of personal danger, there is no more to be said so

far as concerns Mr. Jefferson; but in regard to Mr. Gallatin the

suggestion seems to be completely set aside by two considerations: in

the first place, the question put by Randolph was not founded, nor even

alleged to be founded, on his own conversations with Mr. Gallatin,[73]

and therefore not he, but Mr. Masters alone, had the right to call Mr.

Gallatin to account; in the second place, Mr. Gallatin's letter was very

explicit on one point, and that to a duellist the essential one; it

flatly and categorically contradicted Randolph's charge, and there seems

to be no reason why Mr. Randolph might not have founded a challenge on

that contradiction as well as on any other had he felt that the occasion

warranted a duel.

The truth is that Mr. Randolph at this time might have fought as many

duels as there were days, had he wished to do so. Bitter as his tongue

was, there were men enough who were not afraid either of it or of his

pistols. Mr. Gallatin, on the other hand, was anxious that, if possible,

Randolph should not be outlawed. Until March, 1807, at all events, he

was chairman of the Ways and Means, and Mr. Gallatin's relations with

him must be maintained. More than this, there was absolutely no other

member on the Administration side of the House who had the capacity to

take the place of leader. Even in October, 1807, when Randolph was at

last dethroned, it was, as will be seen, much against Mr. Gallatin's

will, and, as he well knew, much to the risk of public interest and his

own comfort. He would rather have continued to tolerate Randolph than to

trust the leadership of the House in the hands of incompetent men.

Nevertheless, this conduct of Mr. Randolph necessarily broke up the

confidence existing between him and Mr. Gallatin, and although Randolph

was never one of Mr. Gallatin's declared enemies, but, on the contrary,

always spoke of him as "that great man,--for great let _me_ call

him,"[74] their intimacy ceased from this time. In July, 1807, Randolph

wrote to Joseph H. Nicholson: "I have no communication with the great

folks. Gallatin used formerly to write to me, but of late our

intercourse has dropped. I think it is more than two years since I was

in his house. How this has happened I can't tell, or rather I _can_, for

I have not been invited there." The loss was all the more serious to Mr.

Gallatin, because at this same moment Joseph H. Nicholson left the House

to accept a seat on the bench, and thus the two members on whom he had

most depended were beyond his reach. A corresponding loss of personal

influence was inevitable; but this was not all; the Aurora, while

shrewdly avoiding direct support of Randolph's defection, made use of

Randolph's assertions to charge Mr. Gallatin with what amounted to

treason against Mr. Jefferson, and at last Mr. Jefferson himself had to

interpose to reassure his Secretary of the Treasury in the following

letter:

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1806.

DEAR SIR,--You witnessed in the earlier part of the Administration the

malignant and long-continued efforts which the Federalists exerted in

their newspapers to produce misunderstanding between Mr. Madison and

myself. These failed completely. A like attempt was afterwards made

through other channels to effect a similar purpose between General

Dearborn and myself, but with no more success. The machinations of the

last session to put you at cross-questions with us all were so obvious

as to be seen at the first glance of every eye. In order to destroy one

member of the Administration, the whole were to be set to loggerheads to

destroy one another. I observe in the papers lately new attempts to

revive this stale artifice, and that they squint more directly towards

you and myself. I cannot, therefore, be satisfied till I declare to you

explicitly that my affection and confidence in you are nothing impaired,

and that they cannot be impaired by means so unworthy the notice of

candid and honorable minds. I make the declaration that no doubts or

jealousies, which often beget the facts they fear, may find a moment's

harbor in either of our minds. I have so much reliance on the superior

good sense and candor of all those associated with me as to be satisfied

they will not suffer either friend or foe to sow tares among us. Our

Administration now drawing towards a close, I have a sublime pleasure in

believing it will be distinguished as much by having placed itself above

all the passions which could disturb its harmony, as by the great

operations by which it will have advanced the well-being of the nation.

Accept my affectionate salutations and assurances of my constant and

unalterable respect and attachment.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, 13th October, 1806.

DEAR SIR,--In minds solely employed in honest efforts to promote the

welfare of a free people there is but little room left for the operation

of those passions which engender doubts and jealousies. That you

entertained none against me I had the most perfect conviction before I

received your note of yesterday. Of your candor and indulgence I have

experienced repeated proofs; the freedom with which my opinions have

been delivered has been always acceptable and approved, even when they

may have happened not precisely to coincide with your own view of the

subject and you have thought them erroneous. But I am not the less

sensible of your kindness in repeating at this juncture the expression

of your confidence. If amongst the authors of the animadversions to

which you allude there be any who believe that in my long and

confidential intercourse with Republican members of Congress, that

particularly in my free communications of facts and opinions to Mr.

Randolph, I have gone beyond what prudence might have suggested, the

occasion necessarily required, or my official situation strictly

permitted, those who are impressed with such belief must be allowed to

reprove the indiscretion, and may perhaps honestly suspect its motive.

For those having charged me with any equivocation, evasion, or the least

deviation from truth in any shape whatever, I cannot even frame an

apology. And, without cherishing resentment, I have not the charity to

ascribe to purity of intention the Philadelphia attacks, which indeed I

expect to see renewed with additional virulence and a total disregard

for truth. I am, however, but a secondary object, and you are not less

aware than myself that the next Presidential election lurks at the

bottom of those writings and of the Congressional dissensions. [To you

my wish may be expressed that whenever you shall be permitted to

withdraw, the choice may fall on Mr. Madison, as the most worthy and the

most capable. But I know that on that point, as well as on all others

which relate to elections, no Executive officer ought to interfere].[75]

Much more, however, do I lament the injury which the Republican cause

may receive from the divisions amongst its friends in so many different

quarters. Sacrificing the public good and their avowed principles to

personal views, to pride and resentment, they afford abundant matter of

triumph to our opponents; they discredit at all events, and may

ultimately ruin, the cause itself. But if we are unable to control the

conflicting passions and jarring interests which surround us, they will

not at least affect our conduct. The Administration has no path to

pursue but to continue their unremitted attention to the high duties

entrusted to their care, and to persevere in their efforts to preserve

peace abroad, and at home to improve and invigorate our republican

institutions. The most important object at present is to arrange on

equitable terms our differences with Spain. That point once

accomplished, your task shall have been satisfactorily completed, and

those you have associated in your labors will be amply rewarded by

sharing in the success of your Administration. From no other source can

any of them expect to derive any degree of reputation.

With sincere respect and grateful attachment.

GALLATIN TO MARIA NICHOLSON.

WASHINGTON. October 27, 1806.

... I had seen the piece in the "Enquirer" to which you allude before I

left New York. To be abused and misunderstood by political friends of

worth is not pleasant, but the great question in all those things is:

Did you perform your duty, and did you, as far as you were able, promote

the public good? For, worldly as you think me, rest assured that,

however I may prize public opinion, it is not there that I seek for a

reward. I suspect--but that is solely between ourselves--that some

friends of John Randolph, mortified at his conduct and still more at its

effect on his consequence, would wish to throw the blame of his excesses

on me; and that, on the other hand, a weak friend of the President has

felt hurt that my opinions had not in every particular coincided with

the President's. To those joint causes I ascribe the Virginia attack.

Mr. Jefferson, thinking that I might be hurt by it, wrote me the

enclosed letter.... It affords additional proof of the goodness of his

heart, and shows that he is much above all those little squabbles....

* * * * *

In order to follow out to its conclusion this long story of John

Randolph's schism, it has been necessary to leave the larger questions

of public interest far behind. Whatever misstatements of fact Randolph

may have made, his opinion on one point was indubitably correct: Mr.

Jefferson's Spanish policy in 1805-6 was feeble, and it was a failure.

It was feeble not because it proposed the purchase of Florida from

France or from Spain, but because it threatened war without backing its

threats by real force. The situation in regard to England was no better.

To the very serious questions of impressments, of the annual blockade of

New York, and of the lawless proceedings of the British ships of war,

was now added the settled determination on the part of England to stop

the prodigious increase of American commerce which threatened to ruin

the shipping interests of Great Britain. For this purpose an old rule of

the war of 1756 was revived, and the American shipping engaged in the

hitherto legal trade of carrying West India produce from the United

States to Europe was suddenly swept into British ports and condemned.

All the resistance that Mr. Madison could offer was a

pamphlet,--convincing enough as to the right, but not equally so as to

the power, of the United States. Congress, however, reinforced it by a

non-importation act, and Mr. Monroe and William Pinkney were appointed a

special commission to negotiate.

Meanwhile, the affairs of Mr. Gallatin's own Department had suffered no

check or misfortune. His report of December, 1805, showed that the

revenue had risen high above its highest previous mark, to $12,672,000,

which, with the produce of the Mediterranean Fund and of the land sales,

carried the receipts of the government nearly to $14,000,000. The

surplus in the Treasury, after meeting all the regular expenditures and

navy deficiencies, French claims, and the $1,750,000 of the Louisiana

purchase, for which a loan had been authorized, would still exceed one

million dollars on a reasonable estimate. The reduction of debt had

already reached that point at which Mr. Gallatin was obliged to pause

and impress upon Congress the idea that a new class of duties lay before

them; four years more of the application of his system would pay off all

the debt that was susceptible of immediate payment; the rest could be

redeemed only by purchase, or by waiting until the law permitted its

redemption. "Should circumstances render it eligible, a considerable

portion of the revenue now appropriated for that purpose [payment of

debt] may then, in conformity with existing provisions, be applied to

other objects."

The following year, 1806, was still more prosperous. The regular revenue

exceeded $13,000,000; the receipts altogether had reached the sum of

$14,500,000; the two millions appropriated for purchasing Florida had

been supplied out of surplus and sent abroad; the Tripolitan war was

over; a surplus of $4,000,000 was left in the Treasury; and only three

years remained before the day when some disposition must be made of the

excess of revenue.

So far as the mere financial arrangements for this event were concerned,

Mr. Gallatin took them himself in charge. He abandoned at once the salt

tax, which produced about $500,000, and he proposed to continue the

Mediterranean Fund only one year longer. At the same time he procured

the passage of an Act authorizing him to convert the unredeemed amount

of the old six per cent. deferred stock, representing a capital of about

$32,000,000, and the three per cents. (about $19,000,000), into a six

per cent. stock, redeemable at six months' notice. The inducements

offered to the holders are explained in Mr. Gallatin's letter of 20th

January, 1806,[76] to John Randolph, chairman of the Ways and Means

Committee.

[Sidenote: 1807.]

The greater measures of public policy which were to crown the edifice of

republican government, and to realize all those ideal benefits to

humanity which Mr. Jefferson and his friends aimed at, fell of necessity

and properly to the President's charge. Nowhere in all the long course

of Mr. Jefferson's great career did he appear to better advantage than

when in his message of 1806 he held out to the country and the world

that view of his ultimate hopes and aspirations for national

development, which was, as he then trusted, to be his last bequest to

mankind. Having now reached the moment when he must formally announce to

Congress that the great end of relieving the nation from debt was at

length within reach, and with it the duty of establishing true

republican government was fulfilled, he paused to ask what use was to be

made of the splendid future thus displayed before them. Should they do

away with the taxes? Should they apply them to the building up of armies

and navies? Both relief from taxation and the means of defence might be

sufficiently obtained without exhausting their resources, and still the

great interests of humanity might be secured. These great interests were

economical and moral; to supply the one, a system of internal

improvement should be created commensurate with the magnitude of the

country; "by these operations new channels of communication will be

opened between the States, the lines of separation will disappear, their

interests will be identified, and their union cemented by new and

indissoluble ties." To provide for the other, the higher education

should be placed among the objects of public care; "a public institution

can alone supply those sciences which, though rarely called for, are yet

necessary to complete the circle, all the parts of which contribute to

the improvement of the country and some of them to its preservation." A

national university and a national system of internal improvement were

an essential part, and indeed the realization and fruit, of the

republican theories which Mr. Jefferson and his associates put in

practice as their ideal of government.

In this path Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Gallatin went hand in hand. The

former, indeed, thought an amendment of the Constitution necessary in

order to bring these objects within the enumerated powers of the

government, while Mr. Gallatin, here, as in regard to the bank and the

Louisiana purchase, found no difficulty on that score; but Mr. Jefferson

looked forward to the adoption of such an amendment before the three

years' interval had elapsed, and in the mean while Mr. Gallatin was

actually putting his schemes into operation. The first report of the

commissioners appointed to lay out the Cumberland Road, from the Potomac

to the Ohio, was laid before Congress in January, 1807. A month later

Congress passed the act under which the coast survey was authorized, and

appropriated $50,000 to carry it into effect. A few weeks afterwards,

Senator Worthington, of Ohio, one of Mr. Gallatin's closest friends,

caused a resolution to be adopted directing the Secretary of the

Treasury to prepare and report to the Senate a general scheme of

internal improvement.

Few persons have now any conception of the magnitude of the scheme thus

originated. The university was but a trifle, which Mr. Gallatin was

ready to take upon his shoulders at once without waiting for other

resources than he already had. He seemed to have a passion for

organization. The land system, the sinking fund system, the Cumberland

Road, the coast survey, were all in his hands, and were, if not

exclusively yet essentially, organized by him. He now turned his

attention to the creation of a new scheme, in comparison with which all

the others were only fragments and playthings. His report on internal

improvements was sent in to the Senate on the 12th of April, 1808, after

a year's preparation. It presented a plan the mere outlines of which can

alone find place here.

According to this sketch, the projected improvements were classified

under the following heads:

I. Those parallel with the sea-coast, viz., canals cutting Cape Cod, New

Jersey, Delaware, and North Carolina, so as to make continuous inland

navigation along the coast to Cape Fear, at an estimated cost of

$3,000,000; and a great turnpike road from Maine to Georgia, at an

estimated cost of $4,800,000.

II. Those that were to run east and west, viz., improvement of the

navigation of four Atlantic rivers, the Susquehanna, the Potomac, the

James, and the Santee, and of four corresponding western rivers, the

Alleghany, the Monongahela, the Kanawha, and the Tennessee, to the

highest practicable points, at an estimated cost of $1,500,000; and the

connection of these highest points of navigation by four roads across

the Appalachian range, at an estimated cost of $2,800,000; and finally,

a canal at the falls of the Ohio, $300,000, and improvement of roads to

Detroit, St. Louis, and New Orleans, $200,000.

III. Those that were to run north and northwest to the lakes, viz., to

connect the Hudson River with Lake Champlain, $800,000; to connect the

Hudson River with Lake Ontario at Oswego by canal, $2,200,000; a canal

round Niagara Falls, $1,000,000.

IV. Local improvements, $3,400,000.

The entire estimated expense was $20,000,000; by an appropriation of

$2,000,000 a year the whole might be accomplished in ten years; by a

system of selling to private parties the stock thus created by the

government for turnpikes and canals, the fund might be made itself a

permanent resource for further improvements.

Naturally the improvements thus contemplated were so laid out as to

combine and satisfy local interests. The advantage which Mr. Gallatin

proposed to gain was that of combining these interests in advance, so

that they should co-operate in one great system instead of wasting the

public resources in isolated efforts. He wished to fix the policy of

government for at least ten years, and probably for an indefinite time,

on the whole subject of internal improvements, as he had already

succeeded in fixing it in regard to the payment of debt. By thus

establishing a complete national system to be executed by degrees, the

whole business of annual chaffering and log-rolling for local

appropriations in Congress, and all its consequent corruptions and

inconsistencies, were to be avoided.

Nor did Mr. Gallatin in making these propositions overlook the pressing

necessity of providing for the national defence. His anticipated surplus

exceeded five millions of dollars, and he intended that while two

millions were annually set aside for internal improvements, the other

three millions should be applied simultaneously for arsenals, magazines,

and fortifications, or, if desired, for building a navy, while even from

a military point of view the proposed roads and canals were as essential

as arms, forts, or ships to national defence. In one respect, however,

Mr. Gallatin differed rather widely from Mr. Jefferson, and this

difference of opinion concerned a cardinal point of the President's

policy. The famous gun-boat scheme, which seems to have been the

creation of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Robert Smith, took shape during the

winter, of 1806-7, in a special message, dated February 10, which

recommended the immediate building of two hundred gun-boats. When the

draft of this message was sent to Mr. Gallatin for his criticisms, he

wrote that he was "clearly of opinion" there was no necessity for

building so many of these vessels, and he urged that the seventy-three

already in course of construction were more than enough in a time of

peace. "Of all the species of force which war may require,--armies,

ships of war, fortifications, and gun-boats,--there is none which can be

obtained in a shorter notice than gun-boats, and none therefore that it

is less necessary to provide beforehand. I think that within sixty days,

perhaps half the time, each of the seaports of Boston, New York,

Philadelphia, and Baltimore might build and fit out thirty, and the

smaller ports together as many, especially if the timber was prepared

beforehand. But beyond that preparation I would not go, for exclusively

of the first expense of building and the interest of the capital thus

laid out, I apprehend that, notwithstanding the care which may be taken,

they will infallibly decay in a given number of years, and will be a

perpetual bill of costs for repairs and maintenance."[77]

Mr. Jefferson's reply to this argument will be found in his letter of

February 9, 1807, to Mr. Gallatin. When he fairly mounted a hobby-horse

he rode it over all opposition, and, of all hobby-horses, gun-boats

happened at this time to be his favorite. He insisted that the whole two

hundred must be built, for five reasons: 1. Because they could not be

built in two, or even in six months. 2. Because, in case of war, the

enemy would destroy them on the stocks in New York, Boston, Norfolk, or

any seaport. 3. "The first operation of war by an enterprising enemy

would be to sweep all our seaports of their vessels at least." 4. The

expense of their preservation would be nothing. 5. The expense of

construction would be less than supposed.[78]

Mr. Jefferson was a great man, and like other great men he occasionally

committed great follies, yet it may be doubted whether in the whole

course of his life he ever wrote anything much more absurd than this

letter. When war came, each of his three former reasons was shown to be

an error, and long before the war arrived, his two concluding reasons

were contradicted by facts. These letters were written in February,

1807. In June, 1809, barely two years later, the then Secretary of the

Navy, Paul Hamilton, reported that 176 gun-boats had been built, of

which 24 only were in actual service. The aggregate expense to that date

had been $1,700,000, or about $725,000 a year; while the reader will

remember that the whole navy expenditure for 1807 was $1,722,000, and in

1808 nearly $1,900,000, against the modest $650,000 which had been

agreed upon at the beginning of Mr. Jefferson's Administration. Any one

who is curious to see how far Mr. Gallatin's opinion as to the

"perpetual bill of costs for repairs" was correct, may refer to Paul

Hamilton's letter of June 6, 1809, to the Senate committee.[79] Had all

this expenditure improved the national defences, the waste of money

would have seemed less outrageous even to Mr. Gallatin, who was its

chief victim; but, as most naval officers expected, the gun-boats were

in some respects positively mischievous, in others of very little use,

and they were easily destroyed by the enemy whenever found. At the end

of the war such of them as were not already captured, burned, wrecked,

or decayed were quietly broken up or sold.[80]

Friends and enemies have long since agreed that Mr. Jefferson's

gun-boats were a grievous mistake. How decidedly Mr. Gallatin

remonstrated against the development given to this policy, may be seen

in the letter of which a portion has been quoted. He strongly urged that

no more gun-boats should be built till they were wanted, and he begged

Mr. Jefferson to let Congress decide whether they were wanted or not.

Mr. Jefferson did not take the advice, and, as usual, Mr. Gallatin was

the one to suffer for the mistakes of his chief; the gun-boats lasted

long enough to give him great trouble and to be one of the principal

means of bankrupting the Treasury even before the war; unfortunately, he

had exhausted his strength in complaints of the Navy Department; he had

spoken again and again in language which for him was without an example;

in the present instance he had Mr. Jefferson himself for his strongest

opponent, and there was nothing to be done but to submit.

With this exception, one merely of detail and judgment, Mr. Gallatin

seems to have cordially supported the comprehensive scheme which the

Administration of Mr. Jefferson pointed out to Congress as the goal of

its long pilgrimage. Six years of frugality and patience had, as it

conceived, fixed beyond question the republicanism of national

character, established a political system purely American, and sealed

this result by reducing the national debt until its ultimate extinction

was in full view. To fix the future course of the republican system thus

established was a matter of not less importance, was perhaps a matter

of much greater difficulty, than the task already accomplished. To make

one comprehensive, permanent provision for the moral and economical

development of the people, to mark out the path of progress with

precision and to enter upon it at least so far as to make subsequent

advance easy and certain, this was the highest statesmanship, the

broadest practical philanthropy. For this result Mr. Gallatin, in the

ripened wisdom of his full manhood, might fairly say that his life had

been well spent.

For a time he saw the prize within his grasps then almost in an instant

it was dashed away, and the whole fabric he had so laboriously

constructed fell in ruins before his eyes. That such a disaster should

have overwhelmed him at last was neither his fault nor that of Mr.

Jefferson; it was the result of forces which neither he nor any other

man or combination of men, neither his policy nor any other policy or

resource of human wisdom, could control. In the midst of the great crash

with which the whole structure of Mr. Jefferson's Administration toppled

over and broke to pieces in its last days, there is ample room to

criticise and condemn the theories on which he acted and the measures

which he used, but few critics would now be bold enough to say that any

policy or any measure could have prevented that disaster.