BOOK III.

THE TREASURY. 1801-1813.

In governments, as in households, he who holds the purse holds the

power. The Treasury is the natural point of control to be occupied by

any statesman who aims at organization or reform, and conversely no

organization or reform is likely to succeed that does not begin with and

is not guided by the Treasury. The highest type of practical

statesmanship must always take this direction. Washington and Jefferson

doubtless stand pre-eminent as the representatives of what is best in

our national character or its aspirations, but Washington depended

mainly upon Hamilton, and without Gallatin Mr. Jefferson would have been

helpless. The mere financial duties of the Treasury, serious as they

are, were the least of the burdens these men had to carry; their keenest

anxieties were not connected most nearly with their own department, but

resulted from that effort to control the whole machinery and policy of

government which is necessarily forced upon the holder of the purse.

Possibly it may be said with truth that a majority of financial

ministers have not so understood their duties, but, on the other hand,

the ministers who composed this majority have hardly left great

reputations behind them. Perhaps, too, the very magnitude and

overshadowing influence of the Treasury have tended to rouse a certain

jealousy in the minds of successive Presidents, and have worked to dwarf

an authority legitimate in itself, but certainly dangerous to the

Executive head. Be this as it may, there are, to the present time, in

all American history only two examples of practical statesmanship which

can serve as perfect models, not perhaps in all respects for imitation,

but for study, to persons who wish to understand what practical

statesmanship has been under an American system. Public men in

considerable numbers and of high merit have run their careers in

national politics, but only two have had at once the breadth of mind to

grapple with the machine of government as a whole, and the authority

necessary to make it work efficiently for a given object; the practical

knowledge of affairs and of politics that enabled them to foresee every

movement; the long apprenticeship which had allowed them to educate and

discipline their parties; and finally, the good fortune to enjoy power

when government was still plastic and capable of receiving a new

impulse. The conditions of the highest practical statesmanship require

that its models should be financiers; the conditions of our history have

hitherto limited their appearance and activity to its earlier days.

The vigor and capacity of Hamilton's mind are seen at their best not in

his organization of the Treasury Department, which was a task within the

powers of a moderate intellect, nor yet in the essays which, under the

name of reports, instilled much sound knowledge, besides some that was

not so sound, into the minds of legislature and people; still less are

they shown in the arts of political management,--a field into which his

admirers can follow him only with regret and some sense of shame. The

true ground of Hamilton's great reputation is to be found in the mass

and variety of legislation and organization which characterized the

first Administration of Washington, and which were permeated and

controlled by Hamilton's spirit. That this work was not wholly his own

is of small consequence. Whoever did it was acting under his leadership,

was guided consciously or unconsciously by his influence, was inspired

by the activity which centred in his department, and sooner or later the

work was subject to his approval. The results--legislative and

administrative--were stupendous and can never be repeated. A government

is organized once for all, and until that of the United States fairly

goes to pieces no man can do more than alter or improve the work

accomplished by Hamilton and his party.

What Hamilton was to Washington, Gallatin was to Jefferson, with only

such difference as circumstances required. It is true that the powerful

influence of Mr. Madison entered largely into the plan of Jefferson's

Administration, uniting and modifying its other elements, and that this

was an influence the want of which was painfully felt by Washington and

caused his most serious difficulties; it is true, too, that Mr.

Jefferson reserved to himself a far more active initiative than had been

in Washington's character, and that Mr. Gallatin asserted his own

individuality much less conspicuously than was done by Mr. Hamilton; but

the parallel is nevertheless sufficiently exact to convey a true idea of

Mr. Gallatin's position. The government was in fact a triumvirate almost

as clearly defined as any triumvirate of Rome. During eight years the

country was governed by these three men,--Jefferson, Madison, and

Gallatin,--among whom Gallatin not only represented the whole political

influence of the great Middle States, not only held and effectively

wielded the power of the purse, but also was avowedly charged with the

task of carrying into effect the main principles on which the party had

sought and attained power.

In so far as Mr. Jefferson's Administration was a mere protest against

the conduct of his predecessor, the object desired was attained by the

election itself. In so far as it represented a change of system, its

positive characteristics were financial. The philanthropic or

humanitarian doctrines which had been the theme of Mr. Jefferson's

philosophy, and which, in a somewhat more tangible form, had been put

into shape by Mr. Gallatin in his great speech on foreign intercourse

and in his other writings, when reduced to their simplest elements

amount merely to this: that America, standing outside the political

movement of Europe, could afford to follow a political development of

her own; that she might safely disregard remote dangers; that her

armaments might be reduced to a point little above mere police

necessities; that she might rely on natural self-interest for her

foreign commerce; that she might depend on average common sense for her

internal prosperity and order; and that her capital was safest in the

hands of her own citizens. To establish these doctrines beyond the

chance of overthrow was to make democratic government a success, while

to defer the establishment of these doctrines was to incur the risk, if

not the certainty, of following the career of England in "debt,

corruption, and rottenness."

In this political scheme, whatever its merits or its originality,

everything was made to depend upon financial management, and, since the

temptation to borrow money was the great danger, payment of the debt was

the great dogma of the Democratic principle. "The discharge of the debt

is vital to the destinies of our government," wrote Mr. Jefferson to Mr.

Gallatin in October, 1809, when the latter was desperately struggling to

maintain his grasp on the Administration; "we shall never see another

President and Secretary of the Treasury _making all other objects

subordinate to this_." And Mr. Gallatin replied: "The reduction of the

debt was certainly the principal object in bringing me into office."

With the reduction of debt, by parity of reasoning, reduction of

taxation went hand in hand. On this subject Mr. Gallatin's own words at

the outset of his term of office give the clearest idea of his views. On

the 16th November, 1801, he wrote to Mr. Jefferson:

"If we cannot, with the probable amount of impost and sale of lands, pay

the debt at the rate proposed and support the establishments on the

proposed plans, one of three things must be done; either to continue the

internal taxes, or to reduce the expenditure still more, or to discharge

the debt with less rapidity. The last recourse to me is the most

objectionable, not only because I am firmly of opinion that if the

present Administration and Congress do not take the most effective

measures for that object, the debt will be entailed on us and the

ensuing generations, together with all the systems which support it and

which it supports, but also, any sinking fund operating in an increased

ratio as it progresses, a very small deduction from an appropriation for

that object would make a considerable difference in the ultimate term of

redemption which, provided we can in some shape manage the three per

cents, without redeeming them at their nominal value, I think may be

paid at fourteen or fifteen years.

"On the other hand, if this Administration shall not reduce taxes, they

never will be permanently reduced. To strike at the root of the evil and

avert the danger of increasing taxes, encroaching government,

temptations to offensive wars, &c., nothing can be more effectual than a

repeal of _all_ internal taxes; but let them all go and not one remain

on which sister taxes may be hereafter engrafted. I agree most fully

with you that pretended tax-preparations, treasure-preparations, and

army-preparations against contingent wars tend only to encourage wars.

If the United States shall unavoidably be drawn into a war, the people

will submit to any necessary tax, and the system of internal taxation

which then shall be thought best adapted to the then situation of the

country may be created instead of engrafted on the old or present plan.

If there shall be no real necessity for them, their abolition by this

Administration will most powerfully deter any other from reviving them."

To these purposes, in the words of Mr. Jefferson, all other objects were

made subordinate, and to carry these purposes into effect was the

peculiar task of Mr. Gallatin. No one else appears even to have been

thought of; no one else possessed any of the requisites for the place in

such a degree as made him even a possible rival. The whole political

situation dictated the selection of Mr. Gallatin for the Treasury as

distinctly as it did that of Mr. Jefferson for the Presidency.

But the condition on which alone the principles of the Republicans could

be carried out was that of peace. To use again Mr. Gallatin's own words,

written in 1835: "No nation can, any more than any individual, pay its

debts unless its annual receipts exceed its expenditures, and the two

necessary ingredients for that purpose, which are common to all nations,

are frugality and peace. The United States have enjoyed the last

blessing in a far greater degree than any of the great European powers.

And they have had another peculiar advantage, that of an unexampled

increase of population and corresponding wealth. We are indebted almost

exclusively for both to our geographical and internal situation, the

only share which any Administration or individual can claim being its

efforts to preserve peace and to check expenses either improper in

themselves or of subordinate importance to the payment of the public

debt. In that respect I may be entitled to some public credit, as nearly

the whole of my public life, from 1795, when I took my seat in Congress,

till 1812, when the war took place, was almost exclusively devoted with

entire singleness of purpose to those objects."[50]

To preserve peace, therefore, in order that the beneficent influence of

an enlightened internal policy might have free course, was the special

task of Mr. Madison. How much Mr. Gallatin's active counsel and

assistance had to do with the foreign policy of the government will be

seen in the narrative. Here, however, lay the danger, and here came the

ultimate shipwreck. It is obvious at the outset that the weak point of

what may be called the Jeffersonian system lay in its rigidity of rule.

That system was, it must be confessed, a system of doctrinaires, and had

the virtues and faults of _a priori_ reasoning. Far in advance, as it

was, of any other political effort of its time, and representing, as it

doubtless did, all that was most philanthropic and all that most boldly

appealed to the best instincts of mankind, it made too little allowance

for human passions and vices; it relied too absolutely on the power of

interest and reason as opposed to prejudice and habit; it proclaimed too

openly to the world that the sword was not one of its arguments, and

that peace was essential to its existence. When narrowed down to a

precise issue, and after eliminating from the problem the mere dogmas of

the extreme Hamiltonian Federalists, the real difference between Mr.

Jefferson and moderate Federalists like Rufus King, who represented

four-fifths of the Federal party, lay in the question how far a

government could safely disregard the use of force as an element in

politics. Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Gallatin maintained that every interest

should be subordinated to the necessity of fixing beyond peradventure

the cardinal principles of true republican government in the public

mind, and that after this was accomplished, a result to be marked by

extinction of the debt, the task of government would be changed and a

new class of duties would arise. Mr. King maintained that republican

principles would take care of themselves, and that the government could

only escape war and ruin by holding ever the drawn sword in its hand.

Mr. Gallatin, his eyes fixed on the country of his adoption, and

loathing the violence, the extravagance, and the corruption of Europe,

clung with what in a less calm mind would seem passionate vehemence to

the ideal he had formed of a great and pure society in the New World,

which was to offer to the human race the first example of man in his

best condition, free from all the evils which infected Europe, and

intent only on his own improvement. To realize this ideal might well,

even to men of a coarser fibre than Mr. Gallatin, compensate for many

insults and much wrong, borne with dignity and calm remonstrance. True,

Mr. Gallatin always looked forward to the time when the American people

might safely increase its armaments; but he well knew that, as the time

approached, the need would in all probability diminish: meanwhile, he

would gladly have turned his back on all the politics of Europe, and

have found compensation for foreign outrage in domestic prosperity. The

interests of the United States were too serious to be put to the hazard

of war; government must be ruled by principles; to which the Federalists

answered that government must be ruled by circumstances.

The moment when Mr. Jefferson assumed power was peculiarly favorable for

the trial of his experiment. Whatever the original faults and vices of

his party might have been, ten years of incessant schooling and

education had corrected many of its failings and supplied most of its

deficiencies. It was thoroughly trained, obedient, and settled in its

party doctrines. And while the new administration thus profited by the

experience of its adversity, it was still more happy in the inheritance

it received from its predecessor. Whatever faults the Federalists may

have committed, and no one now disputes that their faults and blunders

were many, they had at least the merit of success; their processes may

have been clumsy, their tempers were under decidedly too little control,

and their philosophy of government was both defective and inconsistent;

but it is an indisputable fact, for which they have a right to receive

full credit, that when they surrendered the government to Mr. Jefferson

in March, 1801, they surrendered it in excellent condition. The ground

was clear for Mr. Jefferson to build upon. Friendly relations had been

restored with France without offending England; for the first time since

the government existed there was not a serious difficulty in all our

foreign relations, the chronic question of impressment alone excepted;

the army and navy were already reduced to the lowest possible point; the

civil service had never been increased beyond very humble proportions;

the debt, it is true, had been somewhat increased, but in nothing like

proportion to the increase of population and wealth; and through all

their troubles the Federalists had so carefully managed taxation that

there was absolutely nothing for Mr. Gallatin to do, and he attempted

nothing, in regard to the tariff of impost duties, which were uniformly

moderate and unexceptionable, while even in regard to the excise and

other internal taxes he hesitated to interfere. This almost entire

absence of grievances to correct extended even to purely political

legislation. The alien and sedition laws expired by limitation before

the accession of Mr. Jefferson, and only the new organization of the

judiciary offered material for legislative attack. Add to all this that

Europe was again about to recover peace.

On the other hand, the difficulties with which Mr. Jefferson had to deal

were no greater than always must exist under any condition of party

politics. From the Federalists he had nothing to fear; they were divided

and helpless. The prejudices and discords of his own followers were his

only real danger, and principally the pressure for office which

threatened to blind the party to the higher importance of its

principles. In proportion as he could maintain some efficient barrier

against this and similar excesses and fix the attention of his followers

on points of high policy, his Administration could rise to the level of

purity which was undoubtedly his ideal. What influence was exerted by

Mr. Gallatin in this respect will be shown in the course of the

narrative.

The assertion that Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin were a triumvirate

which governed the country during eight years takes no account of the

other members of Mr. Jefferson's Cabinet, but in point of fact the other

members added little to its strength. The War Department was given to

General Dearborn, while Levi Lincoln became Attorney-General; both were

from Massachusetts, men of good character and fair though not

pre-eminent abilities. Mr. Gallatin described them very correctly in a

letter written at the time:

GALLATIN TO MARIA NICHOLSON.

CITY OF WASHINGTON, 12th March, 1801.

MY DEAR SISTER,--I think I am going to reform; for I feel a kind of

shame at having left your friendly letters so long unanswered. How it

happens that I often have and still now do apparently neglect, at least

in the epistolary way, those persons who are dearest to me, must be

unaccountable to you. I think it is owing to an indulgence of indolent

habits and to want of regularity in the distribution of my time. In both

a thorough reformation has become necessary, and as that necessity is

the result of new and arduous duties, I do not know myself, or I will

succeed in accomplishing it. You will easily understand that I allude to

the office to which I am to be appointed. This has been decided for some

time, and has been the cause of my remaining here a few days longer than

I expected or wished. To-morrow morning I leave this place, and expect

to return about the first day of May with my wife and family. Poor

Hannah has been and is so forlorn during my absence, and she meets with

so many difficulties in that western country, for which she is not fit

and which is not fit for her, that I will at least feel no reluctance in

leaving it. Yet were my wishes alone to be consulted I would have

preferred my former plan with all its difficulties, that of studying law

and removing to New York. As a political situation the place of

Secretary of the Treasury is doubtless more eligible and congenial to my

habits, but it is more laborious and responsible than any other, and the

same industry which will be necessary to fulfil its duties, applied to

another object, would at the end of two years have left me in the

possession of a profession which I might have exercised either in

Philadelphia or New York. But our plans are all liable to uncertainty,

and I must now cheerfully undertake that which had never been the object

of my ambition or wishes, though Hannah had always said that it should

be offered to me in case of a change of Administration.

... As to our new Administration, the appearances are favorable, but

storms must be expected. The party out of power had it so long, loved it

so well, struggled so hard to the very last to preserve it, that it

cannot be expected that the leaders will rest contented after their

defeat. They mean to rally and to improve every opportunity which our

errors, our faults, or events not under our control may afford them. As

to ourselves, Mr. Jefferson's and Mr. Madison's characters are well

known to you. General Dearborn is a man of strong sense, great

practical information on all the subjects connected with his Department,

and what is called a man of business. He is not, I believe, a scholar,

but I think he will make the best Secretary of War we [have] as yet had.

Mr. Lincoln is a good lawyer, a fine scholar, a man of great discretion

and sound judgment, and of the mildest and most amiable manners. He has

never, I should think from his manners, been out of his own State or

mixed much with the world except on business. Both are men of 1776,

sound and decided Republicans; both are men of the strictest integrity;

and both, but Mr. L. principally, have a great weight of character to

the Eastward with both parties. We have as yet no Secretary of the Navy,

nor do I know on whom the choice of the President may fall, if S. Smith

shall persist in refusing....

* * * * *

The Navy Department in a manner went begging. General Smith was strongly

pressed to take it, and did in fact perform its duties for several

weeks. Had he consented to accept the post he would have added to the

weight of the government, for General Smith was a man of force and

ability; but he persisted in refusing, and ultimately his brother,

Robert Smith, was appointed, an amiable and respectable person, but not

one of much weight except through his connections by blood or marriage.

The first act of the new Cabinet was to reach a general understanding in

regard to the objects of the Administration. These appear to have been

two only in number: reduction of debt and reduction of taxes, and the

relation to be preserved between them. On the 14th March, Mr. Gallatin

wrote a letter to Mr. Jefferson, discussing the subject at some

length;[51] immediately afterwards he set out for New Geneva to arrange

his affairs there and to bring his wife and family to Washington. His

sharp experience of repeated exclusion from office by legislative bodies

made him nervous in regard to confirmation by the Senate, and Mr.

Jefferson therefore postponed the appointment until after the Senate

had adjourned. These fears of factious opposition were natural enough,

but seem to have been unfounded. Samuel Dexter, the Secretary of the

Treasury under President Adams, consented to hold over until Mr.

Gallatin was ready. Mr. Stoddart, President Adams's Secretary of the

Navy, was equally courteous. If the story, told in some of Mr.

Jefferson's biographies, be true, that Mr. Marshall, while still acting

as Secretary of State, was turned out of his office by Mr. Lincoln,

under the orders of Mr. Jefferson, at midnight on the 3d of March,[52]

it must be confessed that, so far as courtesy was concerned, the

Federalists were decidedly better bred than their rivals. The new

Administration was in no way hampered or impeded by the old one, and Mr.

Gallatin himself was perhaps of the whole Administration the one who

suffered least from Federal attacks; henceforward his enemies came

principally from his own camp. This result was natural and inevitable;

it came from his own character, and was a simple consequence of his

principles; but, since this internal dissension forced itself at once on

the Administration and became to some extent its crucial test in the

matter of removals from office for party reasons, the whole story may

best be told here before proceeding with the higher subjects of state

policy.

Among Mr. Gallatin's papers is a sort of pamphlet in manuscript,

stitched together, and headed in ornamental letters: "CITIZEN =W. DUANE.="

It is endorsed in Mr. Gallatin's hand: "1801. Clerks in offices; given

by W. Duane." It contains a list of all the Department clerks, after the

following style:

Offices. Names. Remarks.

Secretary 1400 Jacob Wagner. Complete picaroon.

of State's 600 Steph. Pleasanton. Nothingarian.

Offices. 800 ---- Brent. Nincumpoop.

Some of Duane's remarks are still more pointed:

Offices. Names. Remarks.

1500 John Newman. Democratic executioner.

800 ---- Golding. Adamite.

600 Israel Loring. Assistant throat-cutter.

1000 Charles W. Goldsborough. } Damned Reps.

1000 Jeremiah Nicolls. }

1700 A. Bradley, Jr., A.P.M. }

1200 Robt. T. Howe. } Three execrable aristocrats.

800 Tunis Craven. }

1200 E. Jones. A notorious villain.

1200 David Sheldon. Wolcott's _dear nephew_.

1200 Jos. Dawson. Hell-hot.

The pressure for sweeping removals was very great. From the first, Mr.

Gallatin set his face against them, and although apparently yielding

adhesion to Mr. Jefferson's famous New Haven letter of July 12, in which

it was attempted to justify the principle and regulate the proportion of

removals, he urged Mr. Jefferson to authorize the issue of a circular to

collectors which would have practically made the New Haven letter a

nullity. On the 25th July he sent to the President a draft of this

circular:

CIRCULAR TO COLLECTORS.

The law having given to the collectors the appointment of a number of

inferior officers subject to my approbation, there is on that subject on

which we must act in concert, but one sentiment that I wish to

communicate; it is that the door of office be no longer shut against any

man merely on account of his political opinions, but that whether he

shall differ or not from those avowed either by you or by myself,

integrity and capacity suitable to the station be the only

qualifications that shall direct our choice.

Permit me, since I have touched this topic, to add that whilst freedom

of opinion and freedom of suffrage at public elections are considered by

the President as imprescriptible rights which, possessing as citizens,

you cannot have lost by becoming public officers, he will regard any

exercise of official influence to restrain or control the same rights

in others as injurious to that part of the public administration which

is confided to your care, and practically destructive of the fundamental

principles of a republican Constitution.

In his letter to Mr. Jefferson of the same date he said, "It is supposed

that there is no danger in avowing the sentiment that even at present,

so far as respects subordinate officers, talent and integrity are to be

the only qualifications for office. In the second paragraph, the idea

intended to be conveyed is that an electioneering collector is commonly

a bad officer as it relates to his official duties (which I do sincerely

believe to be true), and that the principle of a corrupting official

influence is rejected by the present Administration in its own support

and will not be forgiven when exercised against itself."

Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison thought this declaration premature, and

the circular was not issued. The time never came when they thought it

had reached maturity; nevertheless Mr. Jefferson wrote back: "I approve

so entirely of the two paragraphs on the participation of office and

electioneering activity that on the latter subject I proposed very early

to issue a proclamation, but was restrained by some particular

considerations; with respect to the former, we both thought it better to

be kept back till the New Haven remonstrance and answer have got into

possession of the public, and then that it should go further and require

an equilibrium to be first produced by exchanging one-half of their

subordinates, after which talents and worth alone to be inquired into in

the case of new vacancies."

Mr. Gallatin, however, soon returned to his remonstrances:

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

10th August, 1801.

... The answer to New Haven seems to have had a greater effect than had

been calculated upon. The Republicans hope for a greater number of

removals; the Federals also expect it. I have already received several

letters from Philadelphia applying for the offices of customs, upon the

ground that it is generally understood that the officers there are to be

removed.

There is no doubt that the Federal leaders are making a powerful effort

to rally their party on the same ground. Although some mistakes may have

been made as to the proper objects both of removal and appointment, it

does not appear that less than what has been done could have been done

without injustice to the Republicans.

But ought much more to be done? It is so important for the permanent

establishment of those republican principles of limitation of power and

public economy for which we have so successfully contended, that they

should rest on the broad basis of the people, and not on a fluctuating

party majority, that it would be better to displease many of our

political friends than to give an opportunity to the irreconcilable

enemies of a free government of inducing the mass of the Federal

citizens to make a common cause with them. The sooner we can stop the

ferment the better, and, at all events, it is not desirable that it

should affect the eastern and southern parts of the Union. I fear less

from the importunity of obtaining offices than from the arts of those

men whose political existence depends on that of party. Office-hunters

cannot have much influence; but the other class may easily persuade the

warmest of our friends that more ought to be done for them. Upon the

whole, although a few more changes may be necessary, I hope there will

be but a few. The number of removals is not great, but in importance

they are beyond their number. The supervisors of all the violent party

States embrace all the collectors. Add to that the intended change in

the post-office, and you have in fact every man in office out of the

seaports....

JEFFERSON TO GALLATIN.

MONTICELLO, August 14, 1801.

... The answer to New Haven does not work harder than I expected; it

gives mortal offence to the Monarchical Federalists who were mortally

offended before. I do not believe it is thought unreasonable by the

Republican Federalists. In one point the effect is not exactly what I

expected. It has given more expectation to the sweeping Republicans than

I think its terms justify; to the moderate and genuine Republicans it

seems to have given perfect satisfaction. I am satisfied it was

indispensably necessary in order to rally round one point all the shades

of Republicanism and Federalism, exclusive of the monarchical; and I am

in hopes it will do it. At any event, while we push the patience of our

friends to the utmost it will bear, in order that we may gather into the

same fold all the Republican Federalists possible, we must not even for

this object absolutely revolt our tried friends. It would be a poor

manoeuvre to exchange them for new converts....

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

17th August, 1801.

... You will find by the other letter that the Republicans expect a

change in Philadelphia; this expectation is owing partly to the removal

of the collector of New York and partly to the answer to New Haven,

which, as I mentioned before, has had a greater if not a better effect

than was expected.... Upon the whole ... it is much better to wait the

meeting of Congress. Dallas, who was here, agrees with me. Yet it must

be allowed that the warm Republicans will be displeased; it is the same

in New York in regard to Rogers, who though the most capable was the

most obnoxious to the zealous Republicans. Duane has been here, and I

have taken an opportunity of showing the impropriety of numerous

removals. He may think the reasons good, but his feelings will be at war

with any argument on the subject....

* * * * *

With regard to Duane, he was quite right. The course of Mr. Gallatin and

Mr. Dallas in resisting the sweeping removals urged by the Aurora

forfeited Duane's confidence. Perhaps Mr. Gallatin, who had yet to learn

something about the depths of human nature, expected that at least Duane

would give him the credit of honest intention; perhaps he thought the

Aurora itself might be disregarded if the public were satisfied;

possibly he foresaw all the consequences of making Duane an enemy, and

accepted them; certain it is that the party schisms in Pennsylvania

began here, and that in the long list of enmities which were at last to

coalesce for Mr. Gallatin's overthrow, this of Duane stands first in

importance and in date.

Years, however, were to pass before the full effects of this difference

showed themselves; meanwhile the removals were checked, and Duane

pacified at least in some degree, but it is a curious fact that the

cause which interposed the first obstacle to these wholesale removals

was another party schism, of which New York was the field and Aaron Burr

the victim; and in this case it appears that Mr. Gallatin favored

removal rather than otherwise, while it was Mr. Jefferson who, out of

distrust to Burr, maintained the Federal incumbent in office. The story

is curious and interesting.

The naval officer in New York was one Rogers, said to have been a Tory

of the Revolution. The candidate for his place was Matthew L. Davis,

Burr's right-hand man, and supported by Burr with all his energy. The

great mass of New York Republicans, outside of the Livingston and

Clinton interests, were attached to Burr and pressed Davis for office.

Commodore Nicholson was hot about it. "It is rumored," he wrote to

Gallatin on the 10th August, "that Mr. Harrison in the State government

and Mr. Rogers in the general one are to be continued. Should that be

the determination, a petition should go on to both governments pointing

out the consequences. I can with truth declare I have no doubt it will

bring the Republican interest in this city (if not the State) in the

minority; and as it applies to the President himself, I am of opinion

that he ought to be made acquainted with it. There is no truth more

confirmed in my mind of the badness of the policy than keeping their

political enemies in office to trample upon us; after which, if he

perseveres, I am bold to say if I live to see another election I shall

think it my duty to use my interest against his re-election." The

commodore was a great admirer of Burr, but a month later the commodore

himself, much against Mr. Gallatin's wishes, applied for and obtained

the post of loan-officer in New York, under a recommendation of De Witt

Clinton, and his mouth was henceforth closed. The share which Mr.

Gallatin took in the New York contest is shown in the following

letters:

BURR TO GALLATIN.

NEW YORK, June 8, 1801.

DEAR SIR,--I have seen with pain a paragraph in the Citizen of Friday

respecting removals from office. Pray tell the President,

notwithstanding any ebullitions of this kind, he may be confidently

assured that the great mass of Republicans in this State are determined

that he shall do things at his own time and in his own manner, and that

they will justify his measures without inquiring into his reasons. I

think you will not see any more paragraphs in the style of that referred

to....

BURR TO GALLATIN.

NEW YORK, June 23, 1801.

DEAR SIR,--...Strange reports are here in circulation respecting

secret machinations against Davis. The arrangement having been made

public by E. L., the character of Mr. D. is, in some measure, at stake

on the event. He has already waived a very lucrative employment in

expectation of this appointment. I am more and more confirmed in the

opinion that his talents for that office are superior to those of any

other person who can be thought of, and that his appointment will be the

most popular. The opposition to him, if any is made, must proceed from

improper motives, as no man dare openly avow an opinion hostile to the

measure. This thing has, in my opinion, gone too far to be now defeated.

Two men from the country, both very inferior to Mr. Davis in talents and

pretensions, are spoken of as candidates,--I hope not seriously thought

of. Any man from the country would be offensive,--either of these would

be absurd, and Davis is too important to be trifled with.

You say nothing of the sinking fund.

Affectionately yours.

If you will show to the President what of the above relates to the naval

office, you will save me the trouble of writing and him that of reading

a longer letter to him on the subject.

BURR TO GALLATIN.

NEW YORK, September 8, 1801.

DEAR SIR,--Mr. Davis is on his way to Monticello on the business too

often talked of and too long left in suspense. I was surprised to learn

from Mr. Jefferson that nothing had been said to him on this subject

since a meeting had with his ministers early in May. About that period I

wrote you a letter which I desired you to show him. Such requests are,

however, always an appeal to discretion. The matter is now arrived at a

crisis which calls for your opinion. This, I presume, you will give in

unqualified terms. In the letter you may write by Davis I beg you also

to inform Mr. J. of the characters of the gentlemen whose letters will

be shown you, and I do entreat that there may now be a determination of

some kind, for it has become a matter of too much speculation here why

R. is kept in and why D. is not appointed.

Bradley will resign in the course of this month; you will have due

notice. The next time you send a _verbal_ message on business, I will

thank you to commit it to writing.

God bless you!

* * * * *

Mr. D. has been goaded into this journey by the instances of an hundred

friends, of whom I am not one. Yet I have not opposed it, and am rather

gratified that he undertakes it.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1801.

DEAR SIR,--This will be handed by M. L. Davis, of New York, the

candidate for the naval office. I used my endeavors to prevent his

proceeding to Monticello, but he has left New York with that intention,

and is not easily diverted from his purpose. The reason he gives for his

anxiety is that, immediately after the adjournment of Congress, E.

Livingston and others mentioned to him that a positive arrangement was

made by the Administration by which he was to be appointed to that

office; that he was so perfectly confident, till some time in June,

that such was the fact as to refuse advantageous proposals of a

permanent establishment, and the general belief on that subject has

placed him in a very awkward situation in New York.

He presses me much, on the ground of my personal knowledge both of him

and of the local politics of New York, to give you my opinion in a

decided manner on that subject, which to him I declined, both because in

one respect it was not made up, and because my own opinion, even if

decided, neither ought nor would decide yours. The propriety of removing

Rogers remains with me the doubtful point; after Fish's removal and that

of others, they in New York seem to suppose that the removal of Rogers

is, on account of ante-revolutionary adherence to enemies, unavoidable;

the answer to New Haven appears to have left no doubt on their minds on

that subject, and I apprehend that the numerous removals already made by

you there, and the almost general sweep by their State government, have

only increased the anxiety and expectations of a total change. In

relation to Rogers himself, though he is a good officer, I would feel

but little regret at his being dismissed, because he has no claim

detached from having fulfilled his official duties, has made an

independent fortune by that office, and, having no personal popularity,

cannot lose us one friend nor make us one enemy. But I feel a great

reluctance in yielding to that general spirit of persecution, which, in

that State particularly, disgraces our cause and sinks us on a level

with our predecessors.

Whether policy must yield to principle by going further into those

removals than justice to our political friends and the public welfare

seem to require, is a question on which I do not feel myself at present

capable of deciding.

I have used the word "persecution," and I think with propriety, for the

council of appointments have extended their removals to almost every

auctioneer, and that not being a political office the two parties ought

certainly to have an equal chance in such appointments.

As to the other point, if Rogers shall be removed, I have no hesitation

in saying that I do not know a man whom I would prefer to Mr. Davis for

that office.

This may, however, be owing to my knowing him better than I do others

who may be equally well qualified. I believe Davis to be a man of

talent, particularly quickness and correctness, suited for the office,

of strict integrity, untainted reputation, and pure Republican

principles. Nor am I deterred from saying so far in his favor on account

of any personal connection with any other individuals; because I am

convinced that his political principles stand not on the frail basis of

persons, but are exclusively bottomed on conviction of their truth and

will ever govern his political conduct. So far as I think a prejudice

against him in that respect existed, I consider myself in justice to him

bound to declare as my sincere opinion. Farther I cannot go....

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, 14th September, 1801.

... This is, however, only a trifling _family_ controversy, and will not

be attended with any other effect abroad except giving some temporary

offence to Duane, Beckley, Israel, and some other very hot-headed but, I

believe, honest Republicans. This leads me to a more important subject.

Pennsylvania is, I think, fixed. Although we have there amongst our

friends several office-hunters, Republicanism rests there on principle

pretty generally, and it rests on the people at large, there not being

in the whole State a single individual whose influence could command

even now one county, or whose defection could lose us one hundred voters

at an election.

It is ardently to be wished that the situation of New York was as

favorable; but so much seems to depend in that State on certain

individuals, the influence of a few is so great, and the majority in the

city of New York, on which, unfortunately, the majority in the State

actually depends (that city making one-eighth of the whole), is so

artificial, that I much fear that we will eventually lose that State

before next election of President.

The most favorable event would certainly be the division of every State

into districts for the election of electors; with that single point and

only common sense in the Administration, Republicanism would be

established for one generation at least beyond controversy; but if not

attainable as a general constitutional provision, I think that our

friends, whilst they can, ought to introduce it immediately in New York.

Davis's visit to Monticello has led me to that conclusion by drawing my

attention to that subject.

There are also two points connected with this, on which I wish the

Republicans throughout the Union would make up their mind. Do they

eventually mean not to support Burr as your successor, when you shall

think fit to retire? Do they mean not to support him at next election

for Vice-President? These are serious questions, for although with

Pennsylvania and Maryland we can fear nothing so long as you will remain

the object of contention with the Federalists, yet the danger would be

great should any unfortunate event deprive the people of your services.

Where is the man we could support with any reasonable prospect of

success? Mr. Madison is the only one, and his being a Virginian would be

a considerable objection. But if, without thinking of events more

distant or merely contingent, we confine ourselves to the next election,

which is near enough, the embarrassment is not less, for even Mr.

Madison cannot on that occasion be supported with you, and it seems to

me that there are but two ways: either to support Burr once more or to

give only one vote for President, scattering our other votes for the

other person to be voted for. If we do the first, we run, on the one

hand, the risk of the Federal party making Burr President, and we seem,

on the other, to give him an additional pledge of being eventually

supported hereafter by the Republicans for that office. If we embrace

the last party, we not only lose the Vice-President, but pave the way

for the Federal successful candidate to that office to become President.

All this would be remedied by the amendment of distinguishing the votes

for the two offices, and by that of dividing the States into districts;

but, as it is extremely uncertain whether such amendments will succeed,

we must act on the ground of elections going on as heretofore. And here

I see the danger, but cannot discover the remedy. It is indeed but with

reluctance that I can ever think of the policy necessary to counteract

intrigues and personal views, and wiser men than myself must devise the

means. Yet had I felt the same diffidence, I mean total want of

confidence, which during the course of last winter I discovered in a

large majority of the Republicans towards Burr, I would have been wise

enough never to give my consent in favor of his being supported last

election as Vice-President. In this our party, those at least who never

could be reconciled to having him hereafter as President, have made a

capital fault, for which there was no necessity at the time, and which

has produced and will produce us much embarrassment. I need not add that

so far as your Administration can influence anything of that kind, it is

impossible for us to act correctly unless the ultimate object is

ascertained. Yet I do not believe that we can do much, for I dislike

much the idea of supporting a section of Republicans in New York and

mistrusting the great majority because that section is supposed to be

hostile to Burr and he is considered as the leader of that majority. A

great reason against such policy is that the reputed leaders of that

section, I mean the Livingstons generally, and some broken remnants of

the Clintonian party, who hate Burr (for Governor Clinton is out of

question and will not act), are so selfish and so uninfluential that

they never can obtain their great object, the State government, without

the assistance of what is called Burr's party, and will not hesitate a

moment to bargain for that object with him and his friends, granting in

exchange their support for anything he or they may want out of the

State. I do not include in that number the Chancellor nor Mr. Armstrong,

but the first is in that State only a name, and there is something which

will forever prevent the last having any direct influence with the

people. I said before that I was led to that train of ideas by Davis's

personal application, for, although in writing to you by him I said, as

I sincerely believe it, that he never would nor could be influenced by

B. or any other person to do an improper act or anything which could

hurt the general Republican principle, yet it is not to be doubted that,

after all that has been said on the subject, his refusal will by Burr be

considered as a declaration of war. The Federals have been busy on the

occasion. Tillotson also has said many things which might not have been

said with equal propriety, and I do not know that there is hardly a man

who meddles with politics in New York who does not believe that Davis's

rejection is owing to Burr's recommendation....

* * * * *

To all this Mr. Jefferson merely replied in a letter of 18th September,

written from Monticello: "Mr. Davis is now with me. He has not opened

himself. When he does, I shall inform him that nothing is decided, nor

can be till we get together at Washington."

The appointment was not made. Rogers was retained in office until May

10, 1803, when he was removed and Samuel Osgood appointed in his place.

Burr's last appeal is dated March 25, 1802, after the matter had been a

year in debate. It is actually pathetic:

BURR TO GALLATIN.

March 25.

DEAR SIR,--...As to Davis, it is a small, very small favor to ask a

_determination_. That "nothing is determined" is so commonplace that I

should prefer any other answer to this only _request_ which I have ever

made.

I shall be abroad this evening, which I mention lest you might meditate

a visit.

Yours.

These letters need no comment. Be the merits of the ultimate rupture

between Jefferson and Burr what they may, the position of Mr. Gallatin

is clear enough. He did not want that rupture. He had no affection for

the great New York families which were the alternative to Burr; he

regretted that deep-set distrust of the Vice-President which had always

existed among the Virginians; his own relations with Burr and his

friends were never otherwise than agreeable, and he could have no motive

for expelling them from the party and driving them to desperation. On

the other hand, Burr never included Mr. Gallatin in that exasperated

vindictiveness of feeling which he entertained towards Mr. Jefferson

himself and the southern Republicans; long afterwards, in conversation

with Etienne Dumont in London, he expressed the opinion that Gallatin

was the best head in the United States.[53] Yet, little as Mr. Gallatin

was inclined to join in the persecution of Burr, he could not be blind

to the fact that the large majority of Republicans felt no confidence in

him; and time showed that this distrust was deserved. Mr. Jefferson

followed quietly his own course of silent ostracism as regarded the

Vice-President, and retained Rogers in office, so far as can be seen,

solely to destroy Burr's influence, in the teeth of the reflection

curtly expressed by Commodore Nicholson in the concluding sentence of

the letter above quoted: "I would have Mr. Jefferson reflect, before I

conclude, what will be said of his conduct in displacing officers who

served in our revolution, and retaining a British tory, to say the least

of Rogers." Whatever may have been Mr. Gallatin's own wishes, further

intervention on his part was neither judicious nor likely to be

successful.

Under the influence of these jealousies, Burr was rapidly forced into

opposition, and New York politics became more than ever chaotic. Whether

the Administration ultimately derived any advantage from pulling down

Burr in order to set up George Clinton and General Armstrong is a matter

in regard to which the opinion of Mr. Madison in 1812 would be worth

knowing. The slight personal hold which Mr. Gallatin might have retained

upon New York through the agency of his old friend Edward Livingston,

who had received the appointment of district attorney, was destroyed in

1803 by Livingston's defalcation and removal to New Orleans. As these

events occurred, and as they were rapidly followed by the Pennsylvania

schism, in which Mr. Jefferson carefully balanced between the two

parties, Mr. Gallatin, more and more disgusted at the revelations of

moral depravity which forced themselves under his eyes, drew away from

local and personal politics as far as he could, and became to a

considerable degree isolated in regard to the two great States which he

represented in the Cabinet. Disregarding, perhaps, too much the

controversies which, however contemptible, necessarily involved his

political influence, he devoted his attention to the loftier interests

of national policy.

The summer and autumn of 1801 were consumed in mastering the details of

Treasury business, in filling appointments to office, and in settling

the scale of future expenditure in the different Departments. But when

the time came for the preparation of the President's message at the

meeting of Congress in December, Mr. Gallatin had not yet succeeded in

reaching a decision on the questions of the internal revenue and of the

debt. He had the support of the Cabinet on the main point, that payment

of the debt should take precedence of reduction in the taxes, but

reduction in the taxes was dependent on the amount of economy that could

be effected in the navy, and the Secretary of the Navy resisted with

considerable tenacity the disposition to reduce expenditures.

What Mr. Gallatin would have done with the navy, had he been left to

deal with it in his own way, nowhere appears. He had opposed its

construction, and would not have considered it a misfortune if Congress

had swept it away; but he seems never to have interfered with it, after

coming into office, further than to insist that the amount required for

its support should be fixed at the lowest sum deemed proper by the head

of that Department. In fact, Mr. Jefferson's Administration disappointed

both friends and enemies in its management of the navy. The furious

outcry which the Federalists raised against it on that account was quite

unjust. Considering the persistent opposition which the Republican party

had offered to the construction of the frigates, there can be no better

example of the real conservatism of this Administration than the care

which it took of the service, and even Mr. Gallatin, who honestly

believed that the money would be better employed in reducing debt,

grumbled not so much at the amount of the appropriations as at the want

of good management in its expenditure. He thought that more should have

been got for the money; but so far as the force was concerned, the last

Administration had itself fixed the amount of reduction, and the new one

only acted under that law, using the discretion given by it. That this

is not a mere partisan apology is proved by the effective condition of

our little navy in 1812; but the facts in regard to the subject are well

known and fully stated in the histories of that branch of the

service,--works in which there was no motive for political

misrepresentation.[54]

Mr. Jefferson was in the habit of communicating the draft of his annual

message to each head of department and requesting them to furnish him

with their comments in writing. On these occasions Mr. Gallatin's notes

were always elaborate and interesting. In his remarks in November, 1801,

on the first annual message he gave a rough sketch of the financial

situation, and at this time it appears that he hoped to cut down the

army and navy estimates to $930,000 and $670,000 respectively. His

financial scheme then stood as follows:

REVENUE. EXPENDITURE.

Impost, $9,500,000 Interest, &c., $7,200,000

Lands and postage, 300,000 Civil expend., 1,000,000

---------- Military " 980,000

$9,800,000 Naval " 670,000

-----------

$9,800,000

He calculated that the annual application of $7,200,000 to the payment

of interest and principal would pay off about thirty-eight millions of

the debt in eight years, and, fixing this as his standard, he proposed

to make the other departments content themselves with whatever they

could get as the difference between $7,200,000 and the revenue estimated

at $9,800,000. On these terms alone he would consent to part with the

internal revenue, which produced about $650,000.

This, however, seems to have been beyond his power. Few finance

ministers have ever pressed their economies with more perseverance or

authority than Mr. Gallatin, but he never succeeded in carrying on the

government with so much frugality as this, and the sketch seems to

indicate what the Administration would have liked to do, rather than

what it did. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury a month later

shows that he had been obliged to modify his plan. As officially

announced, it was as follows:

Revenue. Expenditure.

Impost, $9,500,000 Interest, &c., $7,100,000

Lands and postage, 45,000 Civil expend., 980,000

----------

$9,950,000 Military " 1,420,000

Internal revenue, 650,000 Naval " 1,100,000

---------- -----------

Total, $10,600,000 $10,600,000

The problem of repealing the internal taxes was therefore not yet

settled, and it is not very clear on the face of the estimates how it

would be possible to effect this object. Mr. Gallatin expected to do it

by economies in the military and naval establishments by which he should

save the necessary $650,000. It is worth while to look forward over his

administration and to see how far this expectation was justified, in

order to understand precisely what his methods were.

His first step, as already noticed, was to fix the rate at which the

debt should be discharged. This rate was ultimately represented by an

annual appropriation of $7,300,000, which at the end of eight years,

according to his first report, would pay off $32,289,000, and leave

$45,592,000 of the national debt, and within the year 1817 would

extinguish that debt entirely. This sum of $7,300,000 was therefore to

be set aside out of the revenue as the permanent provision for paying

the principal and interest of the debt.

Of the residue of income, which, without the internal taxes, was

estimated at about $2,700,000, the civil expenditure was to require one

million, the army and navy the remainder. But the tables of actual

expenditure show a very different result:

Civil. Military. Naval. Total.

1802 $1,462,928 $1,358,988 $915,561 $3,737,477

1803 1,841,634 944,957 1,215,230 4,001,821

1804 2,191,008 1,072,015 1,189,832 4,452,855

1805 3,768,597 991,135 1,597,500 6,357,232

1806 2,890,136 1,540,420 1,649,641 6,080,197

1807 1,697,896 1,564,610 1,722,064 4,984,570

1808 1,423,283 3,196,985 1,884,067 6,504,335

1809 1,195,803 3,761,108 2,427,758 7,384,669

1810 1,101,144 2,555,692 1,654,244 5,311,080

1811 1,367,290 2,259,746 1,965,566 5,592,602

----------- ----------- ----------- -----------

Total. $18,939,719 $19,245,656 $16,221,463 $54,406,838

From these figures it appears that Mr. Gallatin's proposed economies

were never realized, and that his results must have been attained by

other means. The average expenditure on the navy during these ten years

was $1,600,000 a year. Instead of establishments costing $2,700,000, the

average annual expenditure reached $5,400,000, or precisely double the

amount named. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding the frugality of Mr.

Gallatin and the complaints of parsimony made by the Federalists, it is

difficult to see how Mr. Jefferson's Administration was in essentials

more economical than its predecessors, and this seems to have been Mr.

Gallatin's own opinion at least so far as concerned the Navy Department.

On the 18th January, 1803, he wrote a long letter to Mr. Jefferson on

the navy estimates, closing with a strong remonstrance: "I cannot

discover any approach towards reform in that department, and I hope that

you will pardon my stating my opinion on that subject when you recollect

with what zeal and perseverance I opposed for a number of years, whilst

in Congress, similar loose demands for money. My opinions on that

subject have been confirmed since you have called me in the

Administration, and although I am sensible that in the opinion of many

wise and good men my ideas of expenditure are considered as too

contracted, I feel a strong confidence that on this particular point I

am right." Again, on the 20th May, 1805, he renewed his complaint: "It

is proper that I should state that the War Department has assisted us in

that respect [economy] much better than the Navy Department.... As I

know that there was an equal wish in both departments to aid in this

juncture, it must be concluded either that the War is better organized

than the Navy Department, or that naval business cannot be conducted on

reasonable terms. Whatever the cause may be, I dare predict that whilst

that state of things continues we will have no navy nor shall progress

towards having one. As a citizen of the United States it is an event

that I will not deprecate, but I think it due to the credit of your

Administration that, after so much has been expended on that account,

you should leave an increase of, rather than an impaired fleet. On this

subject, the expense of the navy greater than the object seemed to

require, and a merely nominal accountability, I have, for the sake of

preserving perfect harmony in your councils, however grating to my

feelings, been almost uniformly silent, and I beg that you will ascribe

what I now say to a sense of duty and to the grateful attachment I feel

for you."

Nevertheless, the internal duties were abolished as one of the first

acts of Mr. Jefferson's Administration, and at the same time Congress

adopted Mr. Gallatin's scheme of regulating the discharge of the public

debt. The truth appears to be that the repeal of these taxes was a party

necessity, and that under the pressure of that necessity both the

Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were induced to lower

their estimates to a point at which Mr. Gallatin would consent to part

with the tax. Mr. Gallatin never did officially recommend the repeal.

This measure was founded on a report of John Randolph for the Committee

of Ways and Means, and Mr. Randolph's recommendation rested on letters

of the War and Navy Secretaries promising an economy of $600,000 in

their combined departments. These economies never could be effected. The

resource which for the time carried Mr. Gallatin successfully over his

difficulties was simply the fact that he had taken the precaution to

estimate the revenue very low, and that there was uniformly a

considerable excess in the receipts over the previous estimate; but even

this good fortune was not enough to save Mr. Gallatin's plan from

failure. The war with Tripoli had already begun, and further economies

in the navy were out of the question. Government attempted for two years

to persevere in its scheme, but it soon became evident that, even with

the increased production of the import duties, the expense of that war

could not be met without recovering the income sacrificed by the repeal

of the internal taxes in 1802. Accordingly an addition of 2-1/2 per

cent, was imposed on all imported articles which paid duty _ad valorem_.

The result of the whole transaction, therefore, amounted only to a

shifting of the mode of collection, or, in other words, instead of

raising a million dollars from whiskey, stamps, &c., the million was

raised on articles of foreign produce or manufacture. This extra tax was

called the Mediterranean Fund, and was supposed to be a temporary

resource for the Tripolitan war.

The final adjustment of this difficulty, therefore, took a simple shape.

Mr. Gallatin obtained his fund of $7,300,000 for discharging principal

and interest of the debt. This was what he afterwards called his

"fundamental substantial measure," which was intended to affirm and fix

upon the government the principle of paying its debt and of thus

separating itself at once from the whole class of corruptions and

political theories which were considered as the accompaniment of debt

and which were at that time identified with English and monarchical

principles. To obtain the surplus necessary for maintaining this fund he

relied at first on frugality, and, finding that circumstances offered

too great a resistance in this direction, he resorted to taxation in the

most economical form he could devise. In regard to mere machinery he

made every effort to simplify rather than to complicate it. In his own

words: "As to the forms adopted for attaining that object [payment of

the debt], they are of a quite subordinate importance. Mr. Hamilton

adopted those which had been introduced in England by Mr. Pitt, the

apparatus of commissioners of the sinking fund, in whom were vested the

redeemed portions of the debt, which I considered as entirely useless,

but could not as Secretary of the Treasury attack in front, as they were

viewed as a check on that officer, and because, owing to the prejudices

of the time, the attempt would have been represented as impairing the

plan already adopted for the payment of the debt. I only tried to

simplify the forms, and this was the object of my letter [of March 31,

1802] to the Committee of Ways and Means. The injury which Mr. Pitt's

plan did was to divert the public attention from the only possible mode

of paying a debt, viz., a surplus of receipts over expenditures, and to

inspire the absurd belief that there was some mysterious property

attached to a sinking fund which would enable a nation to pay a debt

without the _sine qua non_ condition of a surplus.... But the only

injury done here by the provisions respecting the commissioners of the

sinking fund, and by certain specific appropriations connected with the

subject, was to render it more complex, and the accounts of the public

debt less perspicuous and intelligible. Substantially they did neither

good nor harm. The payments for the public debt and its redemption were

not in the slightest degree affected, either one way or the other, by

the existence of the commissioners of the sinking fund or by the repeal

of the laws in reference to them. The laws making permanent

appropriations were much more important. Even with respect to these it

is obvious that they must also have become nugatory whenever the

expenditure exceeded the income. Still they were undoubtedly useful by

their tendency to check the public expenses."

The letter on the management of the sinking fund, mentioned in the above

extract, will be found in the American State Papers[55] by readers who

care to study the details of American finance. These details have a very

subordinate importance; the essential points in Mr. Gallatin's history

are the rules he caused to be adopted in regard to the payment of the

debt, and the measures he took to secure revenue with which to make that

payment. The rule adopted at his instance secured the ultimate

extinction of the debt within the year 1817, provided he could maintain

the necessary surplus revenue. The story of Mr. Gallatin's career as

Secretary of the Treasury relates henceforward principally to the means

he used or wished to use in order to defend or recover this surplus, and

the interest of that career rests mainly in the obstructions which he

met and the defeat which he finally sustained.

Nevertheless, it would be very unjust to Mr. Gallatin to imagine that

his interest in the government was limited to payment of debt or to

details of financial management. He was no doubt a careful, economical,

and laborious financier, and this must be understood as the special

field of his duty, but he was also a man of large and active mind, and

his Department was charged with interests that were by no means

exclusively financial. One of these interests related to the public

lands.

[Sidenote: 1802.]

As has been already seen, the public land system was organized under the

previous Administrations, but it took shape and found its great

development in Mr. Gallatin's hands. When the Administration of Mr.

Jefferson came into power there were sixteen States in the Union, all of

them, except Kentucky and Tennessee, lying on or near the Atlantic

seaboard; at that time the Mississippi River bounded our territory to

the westward, and the 31st parallel, which is still the northern line of

portions of the States of Florida and Louisiana, was our southern

boundary until it met the Mississippi. The public lands lay therefore in

two great masses, divided by the States of Kentucky and Tenneesee; one

of these masses was north of the Ohio River, extending to the lakes, the

other west of Georgia, and both extended to the Mississippi. As yet the

Indian titles had been extinguished over comparatively small portions of

these territories, and in the process of managing her part of the lands

the State of Georgia had succeeded in creating an entanglement so

complicated as to defy all ordinary means of extrication. One of the

first duties thrown upon Mr. Gallatin was that of acting, together with

Mr. Madison and Mr. Lincoln, as commissioner on the part of the United

States, to effect a compromise with the State of Georgia in regard to

the boundary of that State and the settlement of the various claims

already existing under different titles. Mr. Gallatin assumed the

principal burden of the work, and the settlement effected by him closed

this fruitful source of annoyances, fixed the western boundary of

Georgia, and opened the way to the gradual development of the land

system in the Alabama region. This settlement was the work of two years,

but it was so deeply complicated with the famous Yazoo corruptions that

fully ten years passed before the subject ceased to disturb politics.

At the same time he took in hand the affairs of the North-Western

Territory. The more eastern portion of this vast domain had already a

population sufficient to entitle it to admission as a State, and the

subject came before Congress on the petition of its inhabitants. It was

referred to a select committee, of which Mr. William B. Giles was

chairman, and this committee in February, 1802, made a report based upon

and accompanied by a letter from Mr. Gallatin.[56] The only difficulty

presented in this case was that "of making some effectual provisions

which may secure to the United States the proceeds of the sales of the

western lands, so far at least as the same may be necessary to discharge

the public debt for which they are solemnly pledged." To secure this

result Mr. Gallatin proposed to insert in the act of admission a clause

to that effect, but in order to obtain its acceptance by the State

convention he suggested that an equivalent should be offered, which

consisted in the reservation of one section in each township for the

use of schools, in the grant of the Scioto salt springs, and in the

reservation of one-tenth of the net proceeds of the land, to be applied

to the building of roads from the Atlantic coast across Ohio. Congress

reduced this reservation one-half, so that one-twentieth instead of

one-tenth was reserved for roads; but, with this exception, all Mr.

Gallatin's ideas were embodied in a law passed on the 30th April, 1802,

under which Ohio entered the Union. This was the origin of the once

famous National Road, and the first step in the system of internal

improvements, of which more will be said hereafter.

The details of organization of the land system belong more properly to

the history of the new Territories and States than to a biography.[57]

They implied much labor and minute attention, but they are not

interesting, and they may be omitted here. There remains but one subject

which Mr. Gallatin had much at heart, and which he earnestly pressed

both upon the Administration and upon Congress. This was his old

legislative doctrine of specific appropriations, which he caused Mr.

Jefferson to introduce into his first message, and which he then seems

to have persuaded his friend Joseph H. Nicholson to take in charge as

the chairman of a special committee. At the request of this committee,

Mr. Gallatin made a statement at considerable length on the 1st March,

1802.[58] The burden of this document was that too much arbitrary power

had been left to the Secretary of the Treasury to put his own

construction on the appropriation laws, and that no proper check existed

over the War and Navy Departments; the remedies suggested were specific

appropriations and direct accountability of the War and Navy Departments

to the Treasury officers. Mr. Nicholson accordingly introduced a bill

for these purposes on April 8, 1802, but it was never debated, and it

went over as unfinished business. Probably the resistance of the Navy

Department prevented its adoption, for the letters of Mr. Gallatin to

Mr. Jefferson, quoted above, show how utterly Mr. Gallatin failed in

securing the exactness and accountability in that Department which he

had so persistently demanded. Nor was this all. Probably nothing was

farther from Mr. Gallatin's mind than to make of this effort a party

demonstration. He was quite in earnest and quite right in saying that

the practice had hitherto been loose and that it should be reformed, but

his interest lay not in attacking the late Administration so much as in

reforming his own. Unfortunately, the charge of loose practices under

the former Administrations, unavoidable though it was, and indubitably

correct, roused a storm of party feeling and even called out a pamphlet

from the late Secretary of the Treasury, Wolcott. Mr. Gallatin therefore

not only was charged with slandering the late Administration, but was

obliged to submit to see the very vices which he complained of in it

perpetuated in his own.

These were the great points of public policy on which Mr. Gallatin's

mind was engaged during his first year of office, and it is evident that

they were enough to absorb his entire attention. The mass of details to

be studied and of operations to be learned or watched completely weighed

him down, and caused him ever to look back upon this year as the most

laborious of his life. The mere recollection of this labor afterwards

made him shrink from the idea of returning to the Treasury when it was

again pressed upon him in later years: "To fill that office in the

manner I did, and as it ought to be filled, is a most laborious task and

labor of the most tedious kind. To fit myself for it, to be able to

understand thoroughly, to embrace and to control all its details, took

from me, during the two first years I held it, every hour of the day and

many of the night, and had nearly brought a pulmonary complaint."[59]

Fortunately, his mind was not, in these early days of power, greatly

agitated by anxieties or complications in public affairs. The whole

struggle which had tortured the two previous Administrations both abroad

and at home, the internecine contest between France and her enemies, was

for a time at an end; Mr. Madison had nothing on his hands but the

vexatious troubles with the Algerine powers, in regard to which there

was no serious difference of opinion in America; Congress was mainly

occupied with the repeal of the judiciary bill, a subject which did not

closely touch Mr. Gallatin's interests otherwise than as a measure of

economy; Mr. Jefferson's keenest anxieties, as shown in his

correspondence of this year, seem to have regarded the distribution of

offices and the management of party schisms. After the tempestuous

violence of the two last Administrations the country was glad of repose,

and its economical interests assumed almost exclusive importance for a

time.

It was at this period of his life that Gilbert Stuart painted the

portrait, an engraving of which faces the title-page of this volume.

Mrs. Gallatin always complained that her husband's features were

softened and enfeebled in this painting until their character was lost.

Softened though they be, enough is left to show the shape and the poise

of the head, the outlines of the features, and the expression of the

eyes. Set side by side with the heads of Jefferson and Madison, this

portrait suggests curious contrasts and analogies, but, looked at in

whatever light one will, there is in it a sense of repose, an absence of

nervous restlessness, mental or physical, unusual in American

politicians; and, unless Stuart's hand for once forgot its cunning, he

saw in Mr. Gallatin's face a capacity for abstraction and

self-absorption often, if not always, associated with very high mental

power; an habitual concentration within himself, which was liable to be

interpreted as a sense of personal superiority, however carefully

concealed or controlled, and a habit of judging men with judgments the

more absolute because very rarely expressed. The faculty of reticence is

stamped on the canvas, although the keen observation and the shrewd,

habitual caution, so marked in the long, prominent nose, are lost in the

feebleness of the mouth, which never existed in the original. Mr.

Gallatin lived to have two excellent portraits taken by the

daguerreotype process. Students of character will find amusement in

comparing these with Stuart's painting. Age had brought out in strong

relief the shrewd and slightly humorous expression of the mouth; the

most fluent and agreeable talker of his time was still the most

laborious analyzer and silent observer; the consciousness of personal

superiority was more strongly apparent than ever; but the man had lost

his control over events and his confidence in results; he had become a

critic, and, however genial and conscientious his criticism might be, he

had a deeper sense of isolation than fifty years before.

In person he was rather tall than short, about five feet nine or ten

inches high, with a compact figure, and a weight of about one hundred

and fifty pounds. His complexion was dark; his hair black; but when

Stuart painted him he was already decidedly bald. His eyes were hazel,

and, if one may judge from the painting, they were the best feature in

his face.

Of his social life, his private impressions, and his intimate

conversation with the persons most in his confidence at this time, not a

trace can now be recovered. Rarely separated from his wife and children,

except for short intervals in summer, he had no occasion to write

domestic letters, and his correspondence, even with Mr. Jefferson, was

for the most part engrossed by office-seeking and office-giving. After

some intermediate experiment he at last took a house on Capitol Hill,

where he remained through his whole term of office. When the British

army entered Washington in 1814, a shot fired from this house at their

general caused the troops to attack and destroy it, and even its site is

now lost, owing to the extension of the Capitol grounds on that side. It

stood north-east of the Capitol, on the Bladensburg Road, and its close

neighborhood to the Houses of Congress brought Mr. Gallatin into

intimate social relations with the members. The principal adherents of

the Administration in Congress were always on terms of intimacy in Mr.

Gallatin's house, and much of the confidential communication between Mr.

Jefferson and his party in the Legislature passed through this channel.

Nathaniel Macon, the Speaker; John Randolph, the leader of the House;

Joseph H. Nicholson, one of its most active members; Wilson Cary

Nicholas, Senator from Virginia; Abraham Baldwin, Senator from Georgia,

and numbers of less influential leaders, were constantly here, and Mr.

Gallatin's long service in Congress and his great influence there

continued for some years to operate in his favor. But the communication

was almost entirely oral, and hardly a trace of it has been preserved

either in the writings of Mr. Gallatin or in those of his

contemporaries. For several years the government worked smoothly; no man

appeared among the Republicans with either the disposition or the

courage to oppose Mr. Jefferson, and every moment of Mr. Gallatin's time

was absorbed in attention to the duties of his Department, on which the

principal weight of responsibility fell.

The adjournment of Congress on May 3, 1802, left the Administration at

leisure to carry on the business of government without interruption. Mr.

Gallatin immediately afterwards took his wife and family to New York,

where, as now became their custom, they passed the summer with Commodore

Nicholson, and where Mr. Gallatin himself was in the habit of joining

them during the unhealthy season of the Washington climate, when the

Administration usually broke up. "Grumble who will," wrote Mr.

Jefferson, "I will never pass those months on tidewater." Leaving his

wife in New York, Mr. Gallatin returned to his work at Washington. On

these journeys he usually stopped at Baltimore to visit the Nicholsons,

and at Philadelphia to see Mr. and Mrs. Dallas. The society of

Washington was small and intimate, but seems to have had no very strong

hold over him. He was much in the habit, when left alone there, of

dining informally with Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison. General Dearborn's

family was in close relations with his, and the Laws, who were now at

Mount Vernon, were leaders of fashionable society. But his residence at

Washington was saddened in the month of April of this year, by the loss

of an infant daughter, a misfortune followed in 1805 and 1808 by two

others almost precisely similar, which tended to throw a dark shadow

over the Washington life and to make society distasteful. His close

attention to business seems at this time to have affected his health,

and the absence of his family still more affected his spirits. He worked

persistently to get the business of his office into a condition that

would enable him to rejoin his wife for a time, and almost the only

glimpse of society his letters furnish is contained in the following

extract, which has a certain interest as characteristic of his political

feelings:

GALLATIN TO HIS WIFE.

WASHINGTON, 7th July, 1802.

... Monday all the city, ladies and gentlemen, dined in a tent near the

navy yard; we were about 150 in company. I suppose every one enjoyed it

as' his spirits permitted; to me it looked very sober and dull. Indeed,

dinners of a political cast cannot, in the present state of parties, be

very cheerful unless confined to one party. It is unfortunate, but it is

true. I had another cause which damped my spirits. We were in an

enclosure formed with sails stretched about six feet high, and some

marines were placed as sentries to prevent intrusion; for the

arrangements had been made by Burrows and Tingey. The very sight of a

bayonet to preserve order amongst citizens rouses my indignation, and

you may judge of my feelings when I tell you that one of the sentries

actually stabbed a mechanic who abused him because he had been ordered

away. The bayonet went six inches in his body and close to his heart. He

is not dead, but still in great danger, and the marine in jail. Such are

the effects of what is called discipline in times of peace. The

distribution of our little army to distant garrisons where hardly any

other inhabitant is to be found is the most eligible arrangement of that

perhaps necessary evil that can be contrived. But I never want to see

the face of one in our cities and intermixed with the people. The

mammoth cheese was cut on Monday; it is said to be good; I found it

detestable.

* * * * *

At length he succeeded in getting away, but was obliged to return in

August, and his letters became wails of despair, in which there was

always a little mingling of humor. The following is a specimen:

GALLATIN TO HIS WIFE.

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1802.

... As to myself I cannot complain, but yet am as low-spirited as

before; it will never do for me to keep house apart from you and in

this hateful place. I am told that even within five or six miles from

this place, and off the waters, intermittent and bilious complaints are

unknown.... I am good for nothing during your absence; the servants do

what they please; everything goes as it pleases. I smoke and sleep; mind

nothing,--neither chairs, bedstead, or house,--ten to one whether I will

call on Mrs. Carroll till your return. All those concerns you must mind.

I grow more indolent and unsociable every day. If I have not you, and

the children, and the sisters in a very short time, I cannot tell what

will become of me. I have not called on Mrs. Law, though she sent a

message to know when you and Maria were expected. How is Maria? as

prudish as ever? I wish she was in love. You do not perceive the

connection, perhaps, but I do. Tell her, ugly as I am, I love her

dearly, that is to say, as much as my apathy will permit.... I have been

so gloomy this summer that I mean to frolic all next winter with the

girls,--assemblies, dinners, card-parties, abroad and at home. You, my

dear, will stay home to nurse the children and entertain political

visitors....

24th August, 1802.

... Nothing but the hope of seeing you soon has kept in any degree my

spirits from sinking. Whether in the plains or over the hills, whether

in city or in retreat, I cannot live without you. It is trifling with

that share of happiness which Providence permits us to enjoy to be

forever again and again parted. I am now good for nothing but for you,

and good for nothing without you; you will say that anyhow I am not good

for much; that may be, but such as I am, you are mine, and you are my

comfort, my joy, and the darling of my soul. Now do not go and show this

to Maria; not that I am ashamed of it, for I glory in my love for you;

but she will think my expressing myself that way very foolish, and I am

afraid of her.

* * * * *

Early in October, 1802, they were again in Washington, and Mr. Gallatin

resumed work with more philosophy. The rest of the Cabinet gradually

assembled. When the time came for the Secretary of the Treasury to make

his annual report to Congress, he was able to say, as the result of his

first year's administration, that the revenue from import duties,

instead of $9,500,000 as he had estimated, had produced $12,280,000, a

sum which exceeded "by $1,200,000 the aggregate heretofore collected in

any one year, on account of both the import and the internal duties

repealed by an Act of last session." The report, however, was still

cautious in its estimates for the future; in the face of possible losses

in revenue, arising from peace in Europe, it adhered closely to last

year's estimates, and in the face of navy deficits for 1801 and 1802

still maintained $1,700,000 as the total appropriation for army and navy

combined. The receipts and expenditures were still to be $10,000,000,

and last year's excess was to be held as a protection against a possible

falling off in the revenue.

In his notes on the draft of Mr. Jefferson's annual message, Mr.

Gallatin's criticisms this year seem to express the satisfaction he

doubtless felt at the success they had met. Mr. Jefferson's weakest side

was his want of a sense of humor and his consequent blind exposure to

ridicule. Mr. Gallatin himself now and then ventured to indulge a little

of his own sense of humor at the cost of his chief, as, for instance,

when he criticised the first paragraph of this message as follows: "As

to style, I am a bad judge; but I do not like in the first paragraph the

idea of limiting the _quantum_ of thankfulness due to the Supreme Being,

and there is also, it seems, too much said of the Indians in the

enumerations of our blessings in the next sentence." But occasionally he

flatly opposed Mr. Jefferson's favorite schemes, and it is curious to

notice the results in some of these cases. This year, in regard to Mr.

Jefferson's famous recommendation of dry-docks at Washington, Mr.

Gallatin's note said: "I am _in toto_ against this recommendation, 1st,

because, so long as the Mediterranean war lasts, we will not have any

money to spare for the navy; and 2d, because, if dry-docks are

necessary, so long as we have six navy-yards, it seems to me that a

general recommendation would be sufficient, leaving the Legislature free

either to designate the place or to trust the Executive with the

selection." This was certainly travelling out of his own department into

the bounds of another, and Mr. Jefferson adhered to his dry-docks in

spite of Mr. Gallatin, who told him that the scheme would not command

thirty votes in Congress; and this turned out to be the case.

[Sidenote: 1801-1813.]

But the Mediterranean war was Mr. Gallatin's great annoyance at present.

His letters to Mr. Jefferson show how persistently he pressed his wish

for peace. In one, dated August 16, 1802, he said: "I sincerely wish you

could reconcile it to yourself to empower our negotiators to give, if

necessary for peace [with Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco], an annuity to

Tripoli. I consider it no greater disgrace to pay them than Algiers.

And, indeed, we share the dishonor of paying those barbarians with so

many nations as powerful and interested as ourselves, that, in our

present situation, I consider it a mere matter of calculation whether

the purchase of peace is not cheaper than the expense of a war, which

shall not even give us the free use of the Mediterranean trade.... Eight

years hence we shall, I trust, be able to assume a different tone; but

our exertions at present consume the seeds of our greatness and retard

to an indefinite time the epoch of our strength."

But the Tripolitan war and the difficulties with Morocco were soon

thrown into the shade by events of a much more serious kind, which

threatened to break down Mr. Gallatin's arrangements in a summary way.

In the course of the summer of 1802 it had become known that France, by

a secret treaty, had acquired Louisiana from Spain, and had determined

to take possession of that province. While our minister in Paris was

reporting the progress of the movements which were to place a French

army across the stream of the lower Mississippi, our government received

information in October that the Spanish intendant at New Orleans had

interdicted the right of deposit for merchantdise which had hitherto

been enjoyed there by our citizens. Kentucky and Tennessee were

exasperated at this step, and there was some danger that they might

begin a war on their own account. The Administration at once took

measures to guard against these perils, so far as was possible. A

confidential message was sent to the Senate on January 11, containing

the nomination of Mr. Monroe to act with Mr. Livingston, then minister

in Paris, as special commissioners for the purchase of the eastern bank

of the Mississippi. Another confidential message had been previously

sent to the House, which debated upon it in secret session. What passed

there is briefly mentioned by Mr. Gallatin in a note of the 3d

December, 1805: "A public resolution ... was moved by Randolph and

adopted by the House. A committee in the mean while brought in a

confidential report to support and justify the President in the purchase

he was going to attempt, and to this an appropriation law in general

terms was added."

After a few months of anxiety and silent preparation, the Administration

had the profound satisfaction to see this storm disappear as suddenly as

it had risen. The renewal of war between England and France led the

First Consul not to accept the American offer to purchase Louisiana from

the Mississippi to Pensacola, but to propose the sale of all Louisiana,

which then embraced the whole western bank of the Mississippi from its

source to the Gulf of Mexico. This idea was naturally accepted with

eagerness by the Administration, and even Mr. Gallatin seems to have

felt for once no hesitation about increasing the national debt, a

necessary consequence of the purchase.

[Sidenote: 1803.]

The session, however, did not pass away without producing an attack upon

Mr. Gallatin's management of the Treasury. This attack was not a very

serious one, nor is it one that either then or now could be made

interesting. The Federal party, which had created the United States

Bank, viewed with jealousy the course pursued by the Administration

towards that institution. Mr. Jefferson's letters, in fact, show a deep

and not very intelligent hostility to the bank. On the 7th October,

1802, he wrote to Mr. Gallatin that he should make a judicious

distribution of his favors among all the banks, since the stock of the

United States Bank was held largely by foreigners, and "were the Bank of

the United States to swallow up the others and monopolize the whole

banking business of the United States, which the demands we furnish them

with tend shortly to favor, we might, on a misunderstanding with a

foreign power, be immensely embarrassed by any disaffection in that

bank." On the 12th July, 1803, he renewed this proposition from another

stand-point: "I am decidedly in favor of making all the banks republican

by sharing deposits among them in proportion to the dispositions they

show. If the law now forbids it, we should not permit another session

of Congress to pass without amending it. It is material to the safety of

Republicanism to detach the mercantile interest from its enemies and

incorporate them into the body of its friends. A merchant is naturally a

Republican, and can be otherwise only from a vitiated state of

things."[60] Mr. Gallatin gently put aside these demonstrations of Mr.

Jefferson,[61] and administered his Department on business principles,

with as little regard to political influence as possible. He looked on

the bank as an instrument that could not be safely thrown away; without

it his financial operations would be much more slow, more costly, more

hazardous, and more troublesome than with it; indeed, he was quite aware

that its fall would necessarily be followed by much financial confusion,

and he had no mind to let such experiments in finance come between him

and his great administrative objects. He was, therefore, by necessity a

friend and protector of the bank.

The Federalists did not yet fully understand this fact, and they were

disturbed at learning that Mr. Gallatin had sold, on account of the

sinking fund, a certain number of bank shares in order to pay the Dutch

debt. The shares were purchased by Alexander Baring under very favorable

conditions, and the Federalists showed that they expected little from

their motion by making it only on the last day of the session. At the

same time Mr. Griswold, in an elaborate speech made on March 2, attacked

the accounts of the sinking fund.[62] The only result of these combined

attacks was to call out replies from the Administration speakers and a

long letter from Mr. Gallatin himself on the operations of the sinking

fund. This letter, replying to Mr. Griswold's attack, was written in

response to a resolution of the House, and was completed in time to be

presented, before the close of the session, on the night of the 3d

March. It appears to have met all Mr. Griswold's criticisms. At all

events, the attack seems to have made no impression, and in all

probability the Federalists themselves intended only to punish Mr.

Gallatin for the trouble he had so often in a similar manner inflicted

upon them.

The adjournment of Congress closed the second year of Mr. Jefferson's

Administration. With the exception of that Louisiana anxiety, which

another month was to clear away, these two years had been marked by

complete success. Never before had the country enjoyed so much peace,

contentment, and prosperity. Mr. Gallatin himself had in these two years

succeeded in making himself master of the situation; he was more

powerful and more indispensable than ever; his financial policy was

firmly established; his hold, both in Cabinet and in Congress, was

undisputed; every day brought his projects nearer to realization, and

every day relieved him from the absorbing labor which had made his first

two years of office so burdensome.

Nevertheless there was cause enough for anxiety. The approaching storm

in Europe, which was to shake Louisiana into the President's lap,

brought with it dangers in regard to which the experience of Washington

and John Adams would have been valuable to Mr. Jefferson had he only

been willing to profit by it; but, over-confident in the virtue of his

theories, he, as his correspondence shows, was firmly convinced that he

could balance himself between the two mighty powers which had dealt so

rudely with his predecessors, and it was a cardinal principle with the

Republican party that our foreign relations were endangered only by the

faults of Federalism, and were safe only in Republican hands. "I do not

believe," wrote Mr. Jefferson on July 11, 1803, "we shall have as much

to swallow from them as our predecessors had." "We think," he wrote on

the next day, "that peaceable means may be devised of keeping nations in

the path of justice towards us, by making justice their interest, and

injuries to react on themselves." This was the very point to be proved,

and on the result of this theoretical doctrine was to depend the fate of

Mr. Jefferson's Administration and of Mr. Gallatin's financial hopes.