CHAPTER II

THE TREATY OF CAMPO FORMIO[2]

[Footnote 2: Authorities as before.]

Bonaparte and the Mediterranean -- France and the Orient --

Bonaparte's Grand Diplomacy -- Importance of Malta -- Course of

Negotiations with Austria -- Novel Tactics of the French

Plenipotentiary -- The Treaty of Campo Formio -- Results of

Fructidor -- Bonaparte's Interests Conflict with those of the

Directory -- Europe and the Peace.

Bonaparte was a child of the Mediterranean. The light of its sparkling

waters was ever in his eyes, and the fascination of its ancient

civilizations was never absent from his dreams of glory. His

proclamations ring with classic allusions, his festivals were arranged

with classic pomp. In infancy he had known of Genoa, the tyrant of his

island, as strong in the splendid commercial enterprises which

stretched eastward through the Levant, and beyond into the farther

Orient; in childhood he had fed his imagination on the histories of

Alexander the Great, and his conquest of Oriental empires; in youth he

had thought to find an open door for his ambition, when all others

seemed closed, by taking service with England to share the renown of

those who were building up her Eastern empire. Disappointed in this,

he appears to have turned with the same lack of success to Russia,

already England's rival on the continent of Asia. It is perfectly

comprehensible that throughout his early manhood his mind should have

occasionally reverted to the same ideals. The conqueror of Italy and

Austria might hope to realize them. Was he not master of the two

great maritime commonwealths which had once shared the mass of Eastern

trade between them? England's intrusion upon the Mediterranean basin

was a never-ceasing irritation to all the Latin powers. Her commercial

prosperity and her mastery of the seas increased the exasperation of

France, as threatening even her equality in their ancient rivalry.

From the days of the first crusade all Frenchmen had felt that

leadership in the reconstruction of Asia belonged to them by virtue of

preoccupation. Ardent republicans, moreover, still regarded France's

mission as incomplete even in the liberalizing of the Continent; and

the Department of Marine under the Directory stamped its paper with

the motto, "Liberty of the Seas." Imaginative forces, the

revolutionary system, and the national ambition all combined to create

ubiquitous enthusiasm for the conquest of the Mediterranean. To this

the temperament and training of Bonaparte were as the spark to the

tinder. It was with willing ears that the Directory heard his first

suggestions about the Venetian isles, and subsequently his plans for

the capture of Malta, which was to be followed by a death-blow to

England's supremacy in the Levant by the seizure of Egypt and the

dismemberment of Turkey.

As early as May fourteenth, 1797, a letter from the conqueror of Italy

informed the Directory what naval stores they might hope to secure in

the dismemberment of Venice; in the previous year similar estimates

had been made with regard to Genoa, Tuscany, and Naples. It was with a

Franco-Venetian fleet that Gentili established French administration

in the Ionian Isles, whose people, weary of Venetian tyranny, welcomed

him as a liberator. The more intelligent among them desired home rule

under French protection; the gratitude of the ignorant was shown in

the erection of rude shrines where lamps were kept alight before

pictures of Bonaparte. About the same time the discontented Greeks on

the mainland were given to understand that the great annihilator of

tyrants would gladly hear their cries. For months an extensive secret

correspondence was carried on between the French headquarters in Italy

and the disaffected in Turkey, wherever found. No fewer than three

rebellious pashas were ready to seek French assistance; and one of

them, he of Janina, had actually twelve thousand men in the field. The

archives of the French foreign office abound in careful studies by its

diplomatic agents of the revolutionary forces and elements in the

Ottoman empire. Ways and means to dissolve the ancient friendship

between France and the Porte were discussed; a political program,

based on the maltreatment of French merchants in the Levant and the

scandals of Mameluke administration in Egypt, was elaborated; and on

September thirteenth, 1797, the first formal proposition for the

seizure of that country was made by Bonaparte to Talleyrand, now

minister of foreign affairs. The government at Paris redoubled its

energies, and recruited its powers, for the object in view.

In fact, after Fructidor there is a ring in the words of Bonaparte's

letters, especially those to Talleyrand, which shows how risky it

would have been to neglect his unexpressed but evident wishes. The sum

of four hundred thousand dollars, sent from Italy in the previous year

for fitting out the fleet, had been used for another purpose, much to

the irritation of Bonaparte, whose language in regard to the

upbuilding of a sea power had been vigorous. At last, by his

contributions of material from Italy, and the efforts of the

administration at home, something had been accomplished. Admiral

Brueys was in the Adriatic with a force able, it was believed, to

meet even the English. By clever diplomacy the Spaniards and

Neapolitans had been set to neutralize each other. With time the

latter had grown bold, and were making extortionate demands. The

Directory offered to send five thousand French soldiers to reinforce

the Spanish army which was contending with Portugal, if an equal

number of the Spanish troops in Italy would mingle with the French

soldiers to conquer the Papal States. The latter would then be given

to the Duke of Parma, in return for his old duchy, which was to form

part of the new republic.

In this far-reaching design of Bonaparte's--a plan which comprehended

the whole basin of the Mediterranean, and which, by throwing French

troops into Spain, opened the way for further interference in that

peninsula--lies the germ of all his future dealing with the Castilian

monarchy. The focal point of the whole system, he had explained as

early as May, was the island of Malta, the citadel of the

Mediterranean. The grand master of the Knights was at the point of

death; the King of Naples claimed the island as an ancient appanage,

but a German was the most prominent of his order among the candidates

for the succession. Bonaparte's proposal was that the Maltese should

first be bribed to revolt, and that then the French or Spanish fleet

should seize Valetta, compel the election of a Spaniard, and thus

secure a bulwark in the heart of the Mediterranean against Turkey on

one side and England on the other.

Such were some of the summer's avocations; its real business was

supposed to be the conclusion of a peace with the empire. But Austria

was far from being exhausted, and her agents protracted the

negotiations while the Vienna government was recruiting its forces,

hoping all the time for a triumph of the royalist party in Paris.

Until after the eighteenth of Fructidor this was not entirely

distasteful to Bonaparte, in view of the desire of Carnot for peace on

the basis of the preliminaries. Nevertheless, a spirited comedy was

playing all the time, Bonaparte mystifying both Merveldt, one of the

Austrian plenipotentiaries, and Clarke, who had finally been admitted

to the negotiations as agent of the Directory, by outbursts of feigned

impatience, while, by pretended confidences, he coquetted with Gallo,

who, though the second Austrian plenipotentiary, was a Neapolitan,

minister from that kingdom to Vienna, and has by some been thought to

have been Bonaparte's own creature, and to have accepted his bribes.

Attempted bribery and counter-bribery, at any rate, there were; for

the conqueror himself received from Francis the offer of a

principality in the empire with not less than two hundred and fifty

thousand subjects, and an independent income. Had the German emperor

known the projects of his opponent he would have reviled himself as an

artless simpleton. In May it was agreed that the congress to determine

the territorial transfers within the Germanic body should sit, not at

Bern, but at Rastadt in Baden. But the demands of the conqueror in

amplification of the articles signed at Leoben were then so

extortionate that the Austrian minister for foreign affairs doubted

the good faith of his representatives, and recalled from Russia Count

Cobenzl, his most learned, accomplished, and skilful diplomatist, in

order to secure something like equality in the negotiations. This gave

a temporary pause to the proceedings, which dragged on without

significance until after Fructidor, when Barras wrote from Paris:

"Peace, peace, but an honorable and lasting one. No more of Carnot's

worthless suggestions."

When, therefore, the negotiations were again renewed in the first

days of September, Bonaparte earnestly longed for at least a temporary

peace. He arranged that the plenipotentiaries should meet at Udine,

not far from his military headquarters at Passariano, so that he might

secure the greatest possible advantage from the attitude of a

conqueror ready at a moment to resume hostilities. The Directory,

suspecting that Clarke had become too facile an instrument in the

hands of the ambitious soldier, chose this moment to recall him. For a

month the conflict of wits between the formal diplomatists and the

determined, unhampered French general was hot and furious. Even the

veteran Cobenzl, who did not arrive until September twenty-sixth, was

but a toy in Bonaparte's hands. More than once the latter had recourse

to his old tactics of barbaric rudeness, and once, toward the close,

he wilfully brought on a fit of anger, in which by accident he dashed

from its stand a porcelain tray, the gift of Catherine II to Cobenzl.

The legend ran that as he caught up his hat, he hissed out the words:

"In less than a month I shall have shattered your monarchy like this!"

and then flung out of the room, declaring that the truce was ended. In

fact, no one seems to have paid any attention to the crash at all.

Cobenzl wrote that Bonaparte behaved like a crazy man, and the French

officers had difficulty in soothing their general. Whether the nervous

attack were real or feigned no one can say: at subsequent crises in

diplomacy there recurred others, very similar. Both sides were anxious

to make the doubtful language of Leoben as elastic as possible--each,

naturally enough, for its own advantage. Proposition and

counter-proposition, rejoinder and surrejoinder, followed one another

through those weeks so pregnant of consequence to both sides. Twice it

appeared as if no conclusion could be reached, and as if a breach were

imminent. Once, marching orders for the invading army were actually

prepared and in part issued. But the season was inclement and to

Marmont his general confided a sense of uneasiness regarding

Augereau's appointment on the Rhine. Both parties realized that

neither could secure all they claimed without delay, or a possible

renewal of warfare. They determined, therefore, to brave their

respective governments, and entirely to disregard both Prussian and

German feeling as to the Rhine boundary. Finally a compromise was

made, and on the seventeenth of October at midnight, after a long

social reunion of the plenipotentiaries; in the dark, Bonaparte

telling ghost stories, and making the scene generally dramatic and

even theatrical, the treaty was engrossed and signed, being dated from

Campo Formio, a hamlet neutralized for the purpose. The negotiators

parted with the exchange of friendly greetings.

The terms were far more favorable to France than in all probability

Bonaparte had hoped to obtain. The Austrian Netherlands with the Rhine

frontier from Basel to Andernach were surrendered by the Emperor, and

in token of good faith the commanding fortress of Mainz was

immediately to be delivered into French hands. In return Bonaparte

ceded the Italian lands eastward from the Adige, by the head of the

Adriatic, to the frontiers of Dalmatia, including, of course, the city

of Venice. France kept the Ionian Islands and the Venetian factories

opposite on the mainland. All the Venetian territory to the west of

the Adige, together with Mantua, Modena, Lombardy, Massa-e-Carrara,

Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, was incorporated into the new

Cisalpine Republic; and Genoa, receiving from the Emperor the remnants

of his feudal rights in the surrounding country, was transformed into

the Ligurian Republic, with a constitution similar to that of the

Cisalpine. The various arrangements for the redistribution of German

lands necessary to compensate princes who must abandon territories on

the left bank of the Rhine were to be made by the congress to be held

at Rastadt. French plenipotentiaries, under Bonaparte's leadership,

were to be members of the congress; while Rastadt, as a border town,

and therefore more favorable to French interests than Bern, was to be

further neutralized by the departure of the Emperor's troops from all

German lands except his own hereditary dominions. When the news of

Campo Formio reached Vienna, the peace party was delighted, and the

populace broke out in a jubilee. But Thugut was not deceived. "Peace!

Peace!" said he. "Where is it? I cannot recognize it in this treaty."

In Paris the negotiations had produced some uneasiness. It is now

generally said that Fructidor was exclusively the work of Bonaparte:

or, rather, that the thirteenth of Vendemiaire was the work of Barras,

assisted by Bonaparte; that the eighteenth of Fructidor was the work

of Bonaparte, assisted by Barras. This is only a half-truth based on

an exaggerated estimate of the facts. While, on the whole, Bonaparte

was at the moment pleased with the results of this second political

stroke, there was much connected with it utterly repugnant to his

wishes. The so-called Fructidorians, among them Mme. de Stael and her

friends, were still favorable, in the main, to Bonaparte; but they

were thorough republicans, and considered the day as the victory, not

of a man, but of a cause. Later Bonaparte expressed sorrow that he had

taken any share in arranging it, for the cause and its few supporters

proved to be hostile. The wholesale proscription which followed the

success of the Directory and its friends destroyed their personal

popularity, strengthened the adherents of the monarchy, and weakened

the prestige of the army, which was the real support of the new

revolution. As far as the repression of conservative royalist and

moderate republican influence in the Directory and the chambers was

concerned, Bonaparte's interests were identical with those of Barras,

Rewbell, and the bigoted Larevelliere. He would gladly have ended

public agitation in a nation the majority of whom had become royalists

again. To this end, he would willingly have broken the presses of the

newspapers and have closed the Clichy club: he was anxious for any

extreme course necessary to preserve the revolutionary model in

government until, in his own phrase, "the pear was ripe" for him. The

events of Fructidor, on the one hand, confirmed the constitutionalists

in the policy of letting other countries alone, and at the same time

put an end to all enthusiasm for republican principles even in the

radical executive, necessarily substituting in its place the merest

self-interest. This new situation, though not inimical to Bonaparte's

interests, made the Fructidorians the most determined opponents of his

ambitions.

Almost immediately after the events of Fructidor the new Directory had

sent instructions to Passariano that Venice was to be preserved from

the hands of Austria. The removal of Clarke had followed. At once

began a war of words and a conflict of purposes. Bonaparte's

despatches depicted the situation of the Italian peoples in the

darkest light, so as to set forth their unfitness for independence,

while in every letter he dwelt on his own feeble and broken health as

a reason for his immediate recall. Meantime he was driving the

machinery of negotiation at its utmost speed and capacity. The

Directory finally took its stand on the determination that Italy must

be free as far eastward as the Isonzo, and the subtle Talleyrand

agreed to win or compel Bonaparte's acquiescence. The courier with

this ultimatum from Paris reached Passariano exactly twelve hours

after Monge and Berthier had carried the treaty of Campo Formio in the

opposite direction for the sanction of the directors. It was bitter,

indeed, for Barras and his colleagues to surrender, but the logic of

their position made resistance impossible. They approved the hateful

stipulations with what grace they could muster, and, the warfare on

the Continent being over, appointed Bonaparte to command what was

significantly entitled the Army of England, but without defining his

duties. Thirty thousand soldiers began their march from Milan to

Picardy on the English Channel. As for the now distracted Venetians,

they asked permission to continue the war against Austria on their own

account. Bonaparte imprisoned the deputies who presented the petition,

and Serurier delivered Venice into the Emperor's hands, after

destroying the arsenals and such vessels as were no longer useful for

war. Among these was the stately barge in which the officials of the

commonwealth had from immemorial times been wont to espouse the

Adriatic--the famous Bucentaur. Manin, the last doge of Venice, was

compelled to swear allegiance to Austria in the name of his

compatriots. With a broken heart he made ready for the ceremony, but

as he stepped forward at the appointed time to pronounce the fatal

words, his strength and his faculties gave way together. He fell

senseless at the feet of his foes, and died not long afterward.

The effect of Bonaparte's success in forcing such a peace upon Austria

was profound throughout Europe. The war party in Great Britain was

materially strengthened by the treatment which Malmesbury had

received. While the treaty made a pretense of upholding the integrity

of the empire as a principle, yet Prussia and all Germany knew that

that integrity was quickly to be violated. Paul I of Russia

remembered that as guarantor of the peace of Teschen, he too was

deeply concerned in that integrity, and displayed uneasiness. The

British had on October eleventh annihilated the Dutch fleet at

Camperdown: their sea power was again assured and with it the

replenishing of their treasury. These elements of the second coalition

have been repeatedly described, but for all that, events would have

been otherwise than they were, had there been anywhere in Europe a

statesman with moral and material power at his bidding, who could have

propagated a moderate, enlightened liberalism in the countries of the

north. As a sorry radicalism had full play for some years in France, a

blind reactionary conservatism prevailed among all the Teutonic

peoples. The struggle of two extremes made the chaos. England was

determined on war to destruction or exhaustion: France likewise. The

system of national assassinations and territorial compensations begun

in the partition of Poland was exemplified in the peace of Campo

Formio. Then it was three to one against a nation with neither

political nor military strength, and the decision was against

nationality. Hereafter it was to be all absolute Europe against a

nation with some political and immense military aptitudes. The

struggle was to last fifteen years and be decided this time for, not

against, nationality as a fact and a principle.

The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Vol. 2 (of 4) · 第 2 / 36 章