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[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane Engraved by Langlois
GENERAL BONAPARTE
Drawn by Raffet.]
THE LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
BY
WILLIAM MILLIGAN SLOANE
PH.D., L.H.D., LL.D.
_Professor of History in Columbia University_
Revised and Enlarged
With Portraits
VOLUME II
NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1916
Copyright, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1910
BY
THE CENTURY CO.
_Published, October, 1910_
CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
I. Rescue of the Directory................................. 1
II. The Treaty of Campo Formio............................. 15
III. Bonaparte and Talleyrand............................... 26
IV. Commotions in European Politics........................ 36
V. The Expedition to Egypt................................ 46
VI. The Landing in Egypt................................... 55
VII. The Disaster at Acre................................... 65
VIII. Aboukir and the Great Desertion........................ 77
IX. "The Return of the Hero"............................... 86
X. Bonaparte Seizes His Opportunity...................... 100
XI. The Overthrow of the Directory........................ 111
XII. Bonaparte the First Consul............................ 121
XIII. Bonaparte Embodies the Revolution..................... 136
XIV. A Constitutional Despotism............................ 149
XV. Statesmanship and Strategy............................ 162
XVI. Marengo............................................... 174
XVII. The Peace of Luneville................................ 190
XVIII. The Pacification of Europe............................ 203
XIX. The Reorganization of France.......................... 213
XX. The Code and the University........................... 221
XXI. Steps Toward Monarchy................................. 229
XXII. The Life Consulate.................................... 239
XXIII. The Threshold of Monarchy............................. 250
XXIV. Expansion of the Revolutionary System................. 261
XXV. Tension Between England and France.................... 275
XXVI. France and England in Arms............................ 286
XXVII. Warnings To Royalists and Republicans................. 295
XXVIII. Declaration of the Empire............................. 314
XXIX. The Descent Into England.............................. 325
XXX. The Coronation of Napoleon I.......................... 339
XXXI. The Third Coalition................................... 354
XXXII. Trafalgar and Austerlitz.............................. 370
XXXIII. Napoleon, War Lord and Emperor........................ 393
XXXIV. The War With Russia................................... 413
XXXV. The Devastation of Prussia............................ 435
XXXVI. The Continental System................................ 446
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
General Bonaparte _Frontispiece_
Facing Page
Map of Egypt..................................................... 58
Napoleon--by Ingres.............................................. 78
Napoleon working by the glimmer of the lamp..................... 128
Map of the Marengo Campaigns.................................... 176
Two Maps of Marengo, 14th July, 1800........................ 183-184
Napoleon as First Consul........................................ 226
Napoleon Bonaparte, First Consul................................ 276
Napoleon as First Consul........................................ 326
Napoleon, First Consul--by Ingres............................... 376
Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul.............................. 426
LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
CHAPTER I
RESCUE OF THE DIRECTORY[1]
[Footnote 1: The authorities are as before: Vandal:
L'Avenement de Bonaparte; Aulard: Etudes et lecons sur la
Revolution Francaise; Paris pendant la reaction
thermidorienne et sous le Directoire, and Histoire Politique
de la Revolution Francaise; Sorel: L'Europe et la Revolution
Francaise, Vol. V; Bonaparte et le Directoire. Much can be
gleaned from the printed letters and despatches of this
period. Important sources are the Souvenirs du baron de
Barante; Memoires et correspondance de Lafayette; Fievee:
Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte; Correspondance de
Mallet du Pan; Memoires du roi Joseph; likewise the memoirs
of Madame de Chastenay, of Duport de Cheverny, of Marmont,
Marbot, Bourrienne, Carnot, Thiebault, Mathieu Dumas, and
above all the Correspondence of Napoleon himself. Further,
there are the collections of Bailleu, Stael-Holstein, Charles
de Constant, letters of Talleyrand to Napoleon (published by
Bertrand), of Jean Hardy, and Mme. Reinhard. The newspapers
of the day, such as L'Espiegle, Le Surveillant, Le
Publiciste, Le Propagateur, Gazette de France and Moniteur,
and the Journal des Hommes Libres, are accessible only in the
great libraries of London and Paris. The papers of
Cambaceres, Mortier, Barthelemy, Grouvelle, and Jourdan have
been found and used by the latest historians, but they are
not printed. The best bibliography of the period is a
considerable volume edited by Kirchelsen and published in
1902, 2d ed. 1908: that of Lumbroso is not yet completed.]
Deadlock between the French Executive and the Chambers --
Bonaparte's Attitude -- The Celebration of July Fourteenth at
Milan -- Plot of the French Royalists -- Attitude of Moreau and
Hoche -- Bonaparte to the Rescue -- The Eighteenth of Fructidor
-- Effects in Paris -- Bonaparte a European Personage -- His
Statesmanship in Italy -- The Ligurian Republic -- Sardinia,
Switzerland, and Great Britain -- Readiness of Italy for War --
Strength of Bonaparte's Armies.
[Sidenote: 1797]
The fine charter with which France had presumably closed the
revolutionary epoch, in order to live for the first time under a
constitutional government, was about to display its fatal weakness in
the production of a deadlock. This possibility had been clearly
foreseen by acute observers, since there was no provision for the
control of one arm of the government by the other, and in any working
system supreme control must reside somewhere. For fear of usurpation,
anarchy, and tyranny the constitution of the Directorate divided the
powers so completely that they could not work at all. The spring
elections of 1797 were the first held under this new constitution
without any restrictions, and the Jacobin majority in the legislature
disappeared. Barthelemy, the new director chosen to replace
Letourneur, was a moderate democrat with royalistic leanings, who,
like his predecessor, joined his fortunes with those of Carnot. The
Five Hundred, therefore, as well as the Ancients, now represented the
great majority of the French people, who hated Jacobinism, who were
opposed to any republican propaganda in foreign countries, and who,
more than anything else, wanted peace, in order to restore their
fortunes and to secure leisure for their amusements. An attack on the
executive policy which had been dictated by the three radical members
of the Directory, sometimes designated the triumvirate, at once began.
Nothing escaped: assaults were made on their attitude toward the
emigrants and the clergy, on their loss of the colonies, on their
financial failures, and, above all, on their conduct of foreign
affairs, which appeared to have as its aim the continuance of the war,
and the overthrow of monarchy throughout Europe. The leaders of the
majority in the two councils frequented a club in the Clichy quarter
of Paris, which was the center of royalist intrigue. Though no match
in ability for their opponents, these men were quite clever enough to
taunt the directors with their impotence to stop royalist agitations.
Internal affairs were desperate. Suicides from starvation were sadly
frequent among the officers of the navy, while their colleagues in the
Army of Italy were not only growing rich on plunder, but defiant as
well. The French commander in Italy had first made peace on his own
terms, and had then declared war without consulting the chambers, thus
not only annihilating friendly commonwealths, but evincing a contempt
for the constitution, for the duly elected representatives of the
people, and for the popular demand that there should be, not a
particular, but a general pacification. On June twenty-third, 1797, in
a memorable interpellation of the government by Dumorlard, all these
matters were thoroughly ventilated in the Five Hundred. Even
Pontecoulant, Bonaparte's former protector, joined in the demand for
an explanation. Paris and the country in general were left in a
ferment.
The disorders, murmurs, and menaces so rife in Paris had long given
food for thought to the proconsul at Montebello. He was meditating
upon constitutions and their values, while outwardly devoting himself
to fascinating his little court and its visitors. He rode, he danced,
he told weird tales at dusk, he played cards and cheated with merry
effrontery; in the intervals he slept long and deep, as at irregular
hours he worked titanically and efficiently. Was it to maintain the
chaos in Paris that he was conquering, administering, negotiating?
This he flatly asked of Miot de Melito and Melzi, as they narrate. The
directors were meditating a state stroke, and they well knew that
Bonaparte was less their man than they were his creatures. So they
chose a new ministry which included Talleyrand as minister of state
and Hoche as minister of war. The role to be played by the latter was
so evident that the plan was thwarted on a technicality, as will be
seen; and with Talleyrand, Bonaparte was soon to be, if he were not
already, in personal correspondence about forms of government.
Interested experts will note the various suggestions from the medieval
constitutions of Italian republics, which in some measure affected the
conceptions of these political theorists.
It was with reference to such conditions that the celebration, in
Milan, of July fourteenth was arranged. Each detail was nicely
calculated to strengthen the self-esteem of every soldier, to
intensify his military pride, and to prejudice him against the
conservatives who wanted peace only that they might restore the
monarchy. The soldiers of Bonaparte were in their own estimation the
soldiers of the same republic which survived in the triumvirate,
Barras, Rewbell, and Larevelliere; and it was a republican
constitution which was menaced by the illegal interference of the
legislature with the executive. In such a crisis it was easy to
confuse in the minds of plain men the love of military glory with the
enthusiasm for liberty. "Soldiers, I know that you are deeply moved by
the misfortune which threatens our country"--so ran the proclamation
of their idolized general. "But our country is in no real danger. The
men who have enabled her to triumph over united Europe are on hand.
Mountains separate us from France: you would surmount them with the
swiftness of the eagle, if it were needful, in order to maintain the
constitution, to defend liberty, to protect the government and the
republicans. Soldiers, the government guards the law of which it is
the depositary. If royalists show their heads, that moment is their
last. Dismiss your fears, and let us swear by the spirit of the
heroes who have fallen at our side in defense of liberty--let us swear
by our new banners: 'Never-ending war on the enemies of the republic,
and of the constitution of the year III.'"
This call had exactly the effect desired. From the divisions of the
army, and from the chief garrisons, came addresses declaring the
adhesion of the troops to the principles of the Revolution. As for the
reproaches heaped upon Bonaparte for the overthrow of Venice, he was
little concerned. To pacify the clamor, however, he invented and printed
a number of half-true explanations cleverly adapted to the charges
brought, but of a sardonic nature. The real bolt, the weapon destined to
crush his enemies, was one forged in that very city. On its fall, a
leading emigrant--the Comte d'Antraigues--had been captured. Treated
with the highest distinction by his captors, he was led to write a
confession of all that concerned the hitherto suspected, but unproved,
treachery of Pichegru two years before. From his refuge at Blankenburg,
in the Hartz Mountains, the pretender--Louis XVIII--had slowly and
painfully built up the party which has been mentioned, and from its
meeting-place was known as the Clichy faction; he had also bought
Pichegru's adhesion to his cause, and had laid the complicated train of
a plot whereby, when the fated and foreseen moment should arrive in
which the exasperated Directory would employ force with the legislative
councils, Pichegru, now president of the Five Hundred, was to appear in
his uniform as the conqueror of Holland, and, assuming the chief
command, turn the army, the chosen bulwark of the directors, against
them. The Paris royalists had talked and behaved so as to betray many
details regarding this ingenious scheme; but the possession of such
knowledge by the directors did not render the situation any less
menacing. To save themselves and the constitution, the radical members
felt that they must secure, and that speedily, a capable and devoted
general to command in Paris.
They had consulted Moreau, Hoche, and Bonaparte. Moreau showed little
zeal: the army on the Rhine, which he commanded and whose fortunes he
had retrieved by a signal victory, had not been paid; the men were
destitute, and, like their leader, sullen on account of their enforced
inaction. So unsympathetic and cold was the general's attitude toward
the Directory that although, as appears certain, he had in his
possession positive proof of Pichegru's desertion to the enemy, he
kept silence, and allowed matters to take their course. The brilliant
Hoche was willing to aid the directors. He had worked wonders in
quelling rebellion throughout the Vendee, had won the favor of the
soldiery, and in 1796 had made a gallant though futile expedition to
stir up sedition in Ireland. Having then been transferred to the banks
of the Rhine, he had gladly lent himself to execute a plan arranged by
Barras for bringing troops to Paris under the pretext of a scheme for
the complete transformation of the home and northern armies by a
change of stations for the various divisions. To this end the general
on July sixteenth had been nominated minister of war. It turned out,
however, that, being not yet thirty, he was too young under the
constitution, and could not be confirmed. Simultaneously the new
dispositions in the army began to excite suspicion; the entire plan
was discredited, and Hoche was so closely identified with it that he
became an object of distrust to the masses, and therefore unavailable.
There remained only Bonaparte or one of his lieutenants. His very
strength was a menace to the executive, and they felt the danger; but
a general they must have. Accordingly, bitter as the decision was,
they asked Bonaparte to send them such a commander as they needed--one
of his own men. Bonaparte was ready for the emergency; he had already
sent despatches to Paris promising a new remittance of six hundred
thousand dollars, the strongest French army in the field had been used
in a brilliant demonstration in favor of the Directory, and now most
opportunely the ambitious, blustering, and fearless Augereau asked
leave to depart for Paris on his private affairs. To him was entrusted
an enthusiastic address to the Directory from the army, which had been
prepared as part of the patriotic celebration. No better tool could
have been selected. On his arrival in Paris,--"sent," as he boasted,
"to kill the royalists,"--he was appointed to command the Army of the
Interior; and the confession of d'Antraigues having been communicated
to Barras a short time previously, through Bernadotte, the Directory
felt ready for the coming crisis. Again they owed everything to
Bonaparte; he was free to do as he chose in the further negotiations
with Austria, and in the rearrangement of Italy.
With such weapons in hand, the Directory was for the moment
invulnerable. But the royalist majority in the councils rushed madly
on their fate. Infuriated by the presence so near to Paris of the
soldiers brought in from the Army of the Sambre and the Meuse, they
put their own guard under a royalist commander, closed the
constitutional clubs which had been formed to offset that of Clichy,
and in an irregular meeting of September third a proposition of
General Willot to rise next day and destroy the government was
received with applause. That night Augereau put himself at the head of
about twelve thousand troops. With these he mounted guard throughout
the city, seized the legislative chambers, and thus ended the first
short constitutional regime of his country. The next morning, the
eighteenth of Fructidor, the radical triumvirate of the Directory had
entire control of the city and of the country. Of course all this was
done in the name of public safety. Carnot, who had been kept in
ignorance of Barras's dealings with Hoche, and had been reasoning with
Bonaparte by letter as if his correspondent were an honest patriot,
was rudely awakened from his illusion that others were as honest and
sincere as he, and, seeing too late the snare which had been spread,
took refuge in flight. Barthelemy was seized and imprisoned.
Two new radicals, Merlin and Francois de Neufchateau, were appointed to
the vacancies. Barbe-Marbois, the royalist president of the Ancients,
with eleven members of that body; Pichegru with forty-two deputies from
the Five Hundred, and one hundred and forty-eight other persons, mostly
journalists, were proscribed. All these, with the exception of a few who
escaped by flight, were sent to languish in the pestilential swamps of
Cayenne, where there was already a colony of transported priests.
Although the guillotine was not again erected, yet the eighteenth of
Fructidor brought in a revolutionary government, an administration
resting on force, though under the forms of the constitution. The
Fructidorians claimed to be strict constitutionalists, and posed as such
before the country. But facts were more convincing than their
professions. Their rallying-point was the Directory, and the Directory
having twice appealed to the army, the army was now its real support.
The liberty of the press was abolished, and martial law was proclaimed
wherever the executive thought best. Moreover, Bonaparte had shown the
way and furnished the general; he had taken another step toward his
eventual appearance as the ruler of the army, and through it of the
country. Such a forced relation led to mutual distrust, and finally to
hatred.
Augereau, who had fondly hoped to enter the Directory, was made
commander, in Moreau's place, of an army whose campaigns were over.
The premature death of Hoche about the same time quenched the only
military genius in France comparable to that of Bonaparte, and removed
a political rival as well. The Army of the Alps was then combined with
that of Italy, and with this simplification of the military machine he
who until peace was made would be virtually its mover could well say
to his enemies: "I speak in the name of eighty thousand men. The time
is past when scoundrelly lawyers and mere talkers can guillotine
soldiers." Napoleon, in his intimate conversations with Mme. de
Remusat, said that at this time he "became a personage in Europe. On
one side, by my orders of the day, I supported the revolutionary
system; on the other, I secretly dealt with the emigrants, permitting
them to cherish some hope. It is easy to deceive that party, for it
always sets out not from what actually is, but from what it wishes
there were. I received splendid offers in case I were willing to
follow the example of General Monk. The pretender himself wrote to me
in his halting, florid style. I conquered the Pope more completely by
keeping away from Rome than if I had burned his capital. At last I
became influential and strong."
With many men the success of the eighteenth of Fructidor would have
been glory enough for a single season. But the indomitable and
feverish energy of Bonaparte was not exhausted even by such minute
prevision as was needed for this; in fact, the political campaign was
only a considerable part of the summer's labor. While mastering
France, he was preparing to master Italy, and, after Italy, Europe.
Concurrently with the management of French politics went not only the
negotiations with the Emperor, but the completion of his contemplated
labors in Italy. Two constitutions were needed for new-born states,
the republics known thus far as the Transpadane and the Cispadane.
Neither was strong enough for their creator's purpose. By the
preparation of almost identical charters, based upon the French
constitution of the year III, the way for their union had already been
prepared. These papers were now most carefully elaborated; and not
only that, but an administrator for every post, from the highest to
the lowest, was, after a minute scrutiny of his character, selected
and then instructed according to his abilities. Most of these new
officials were men of integrity and high purpose; but nevertheless
they owed their appointment to the dictator, and were in consequence
his tools, conscious or unconscious. The combination of the two
temporary states into the Cisalpine Republic was thus made ready to be
recognized in the final treaty with Austria.
Then there was Genoa. Bonaparte had told the Directory in May that her
people were clamoring for liberty. She was destined by him for the
same fate which had overtaken Venice. The identical machinery was set
to work for a similar result. Faypoult, the diplomatic agent of
France, began his agitations very much as Lallemant had done, although
in comparison with his Venetian colleague he was but a bungler. The
democratic club of Genoa first demanded from the senate that
aristocracy should be abolished, and when their request was denied,
seized the arsenal and the harbor. The populace rose to the support of
the aristocracy, and temporarily triumphed. La Valette, Bonaparte's
adjutant, appeared in due time on the floor of the Genoese senate with
a peremptory message from his commander like that which in similar
dramatic circumstances Junot read to the patricians of Venice. The
intervention of the French, it said, was only to protect life and
property, while assuring their own communications with France. But
within twenty-four hours all political prisoners must be released, the
people disarmed, and the enemies of France surrendered; otherwise the
senators would answer with their lives. Thus menaced, the government
obeyed every command. Then Faypoult repeated his demand for the
substitution of a democratic constitution in place of the old one. The
senate felt how futile further opposition would be, but sent an
embassy to Montebello. The members were courteously received, and were
probably not greatly amazed to find Bonaparte already occupied with
the details of a constitution which was to reconstruct their
commonwealth under the name of the Ligurian Republic. It was soon
complete in all its parts, and with its adoption Genoa the Superb was
no more.
As for Sardinia, the constant agitation carried on by her radicals
kept the King in fear; and propositions from Bonaparte for an
alliance, which would increase his army by the full effective force of
the excellent Piedmontese troops, were favorably entertained. The
health of the Pope had become so feeble that his death could not long
be postponed. The opportunity was seized to display further respect
for his ecclesiastical power by requesting, on August third, a
reconciliation between the French government and the clergy for the
common advantage of State and Church. A quarrel between the Valtellina
and the Grisons gave the great man at Montebello his first chance to
intervene in Switzerland as an arbiter whose word was law, and thus to
begin the reconstruction of that country. In England, moreover, Leoben
had made a profound impression, and Pitt became more anxious than ever
for peace. In July Malmesbury reopened his negotiations, this time at
Lille. The proffered terms were far more favorable than before.
Belgium might be incorporated in France, and Holland made a
dependency, if the French would renounce their claim to the most
important among the Dutch colonies which England had conquered,
including the Cape of Good Hope. There was no good will on the part of
the French commissioners from the beginning, and the new ones who were
appointed after the eighteenth of Fructidor proved to be utterly
impracticable. The negotiations were marked by caviling over
unimportant trifles and a suspicious indifference on both sides to
really important concessions. Both parties, as later appeared, were
fully aware of the impending revolution at Paris: the British
plenipotentiary was confident in the restoration of royalty, the
French commission was equally sure that the radical triumvirate would
regain their mastery. Naturally it was a dispirited embassy which soon
returned to England, when not merely the facts but the meaning and
ultimate consequences of that revolution were known. Similar
conditions attended the negotiation of Caillard at Berlin with Panine
for a peace with Russia; only there, a treaty was signed. In it the
French republic renounced its right or privilege of propagandism, and
therefore the Directory after Fructidor rejected it. Throwing the
responsibility for the coming war on England and Russia, the
triumvirate without a moment's loss renewed its agitations in both
Holland and Prussia to "fructidorize" both and secure them as allies.
This insanity was merely the pendant of that with which they spurred
Bonaparte to activity in forcing Austria's prompt surrender,
withdrawing their agent from the negotiations and thus delivering
themselves and France more and more completely into his hands. The
process of "ripening the pear" for his enjoyment could not have been
more auspiciously inaugurated.
The season was for Bonaparte, as may well be supposed, just as busy on
the military as it had been on the political side. Day and night the
soldiers in the conquered Venetian lands wrought with ceaseless labor
until the whole territory was in perfect order as a base of military
operations. Not a single strategic point there or elsewhere was
overlooked. Even the little island of St. Peter in the Mediterranean
was taken from Piedmont, and garrisoned with two hundred men. It was
generally understood that war might break out at any moment. Every
contribution under treaty obligations was exacted to the utmost
farthing. As a single illustration of the French dealing, jewels and
gems estimated by the Pope as worth ten millions of francs were
accepted by the French experts at a valuation of five. Within the
previous twelve months Bonaparte had sent to Paris one million four
hundred thousand dollars, of which he destined four hundred thousand
for the outfit of a fleet. It was but a moiety of what he had raised.
During this summer, on the contrary, he kept everything: even the six
hundred thousand dollars promised to Barras were not paid. It is
therefore likely that he had in hand upward of six million dollars in
cash, and commissary stores to the extent of possibly a million more.
The size of his army is difficult to estimate. By the records of the
War Office he had in April one hundred and forty-one thousand two
hundred and twenty-three effectives, of whom one hundred and
twenty-one thousand four hundred and twenty were fit for service. On
September third he wrote to Carnot that he had seventy-five thousand
effective men, of whom fifteen thousand were in garrison; but a
fortnight later he admitted a total of eighty-three thousand eight
hundred, of whom he declared, however, that only forty-nine thousand
were effective. He likewise admitted that he had one thousand Italians
and two thousand Poles. No one can believe that these figures are of
the slightest value. Conservative estimates put his fighting force at
seventy thousand French soldiers ready for the field, and fifteen
thousand Piedmontese, Cisalpines, and Poles in like condition. The
French were by this time such veterans as Europe had seldom seen: the
others were of medium quality only; excepting, of course, the
Piedmontese, who were fine. Bonaparte's correspondence for the period
was intended to convey the idea that he was preparing to enforce the
terms of Leoben by another appeal to arms, if necessary. In fact,
Austria was well-nigh as active as he was, and he had need to be
ready. But subsequent events proved that all these preparations were
really for another end. An advantageous peace was to be made with
Austria, if possible, and Italy was to be properly garrisoned. But, on
the old principle, one member of the coalition having been quieted,
the other was to be humbled. The goal of his further ambition appears
for a time to have been nothing less than the destruction somewhere
and somehow of British power, and ultimately the conquest of Great
Britain herself.