THE CASE OF BELGIUM
The callous disregard by Germany of the rights of Belgium is one of
the most shocking exhibitions of political iniquity in the history of
the world.
That it has had its parallel in other and less civilized ages may be
freely admitted, but until German scientists, philosophers, educators,
and even doctors of divinity attempted to justify this wanton outrage,
it had been hoped that mankind had made some progress since the times
of Wallenstein and Tilly.
The verdict of Civilization in this respect will be little affected by
the ultimate result of the war, for even if Germany should emerge
from this titanic conflict as victor, and become, as it would then
undoubtedly become, the first power in the world, it would none the
less be a figure for the "time of scorn to point his slow unmoving
finger at." To the eulogists of Alexander the Great, Seneca was wont
to say, "Yes, but he murdered Callisthenes," and to the eulogists of
victorious Germany, if indeed it shall prove victorious, the wise and
just of all future ages will say, "Yes, but it devastated Belgium."
The fact that many distinguished and undoubtedly sincere partisans of
Germany have attempted to justify this atrocious rape, suggests a
problem of psychology rather than of logic or ethics. It strongly
illustrates a too familiar phenomenon that great intellectual and
moral astigmatism is generally incident to any passionate crisis in
human history. It shows how pitifully unstable the human intellect is
when a great man like Dr. Haeckel, a scholar and historian like Dr.
von Mach, or a doctor of divinity like Dr. Dryander, can be so warped
with the passions of the hour as to ignore the clearest considerations
of political morality.
At the outbreak of the present war Belgium had taken no part whatever
in the controversy and was apparently on friendly relations with all
the Powers. It had no interest whatever in the Servian question. A
thrifty, prosperous people, inhabiting the most densely populated
country of Europe, and resting secure in the solemn promises, not
merely of Germany, but of the leading European nations that its
neutrality should be respected, it calmly pursued the even tenor of
its way, and was as unmindful of the disaster, which was so suddenly
to befall it, as the people of Pompeii were on the morning of the
great eruption when they thronged the theatre in the pursuit of
pleasure and disregarded the ominous curling of the smoke from the
crater of Vesuvius.
On April 19, 1839, Belgium and Holland signed a treaty which provided
that "Belgium forms an independent state of perpetual neutrality." To
insure that neutrality, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and
Russia on the same date signed a treaty, by which it was provided that
these nations jointly "became the guarantors" of such "perpetual
neutrality."
In his recent article on the war, George Bernard Shaw, who is
inimitable as a farceur but not quite convincing as a jurist, says:
As all treaties are valid only _rebus sic stantibus_, and
the state of things which existed at the date of the Treaty
of London (1839) had changed so much since then ... that in
1870 Gladstone could not depend on it, and resorted to a
special temporary treaty not now in force, the technical
validity of the 1839 treaty is extremely doubtful.
Unfortunately for this contention, the Treaty of 1870, to which Mr.
Shaw refers, provided for its own expiration after twelve months and
then added:
And on the expiration of that time the independence and
neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting
parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as
heretofore on the 1st Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the
19th of April, 1839.
Much has been made by Mr. Shaw and others of an excerpt from a speech
of Mr. Gladstone in 1870. In that speech, Mr. Gladstone, as an
abstract proposition, declined to accept the broad statement that
under all circumstances the obligations of a treaty might continue,
but there is nothing to justify the belief that Mr. Gladstone in any
respect questioned either the value or the validity of the Treaty of
1839 with respect to Belgium.
Those who invoke the authority of Gladstone should remember that he
also said:
We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is
wider than that which we may have in the literal operation
of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question
whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country,
endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly
stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime
that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become
participators in the sin.
These words of the great statesman read as a prophecy.
While these treaties were simply declaratory of the rights, which
Belgium independently enjoyed as a sovereign nation, yet this
solemn guarantee of the great Powers of Europe was so effective that
even in 1870, when France and Germany were locked in vital conflict,
and the question arose whether Prussia would disregard her treaty
obligation, the Iron Chancellor, who ordinarily did not permit moral
considerations to warp his political policies, wrote to the Belgian
minister in Berlin on July 22, 1870:
In confirmation of my verbal assurance, I have the honor to
give in writing a declaration, which, in view of the
treaties in force, _is quite superfluous_, that the
Confederation of the North and its allies (Germany) will
respect the neutrality of Belgium on the understanding of
course that it is respected by the other belligerent.
At that time, Belgium had so fine a sense of honor, that although it
was not inconsistent with the principles of international law, yet in
order to discharge her obligations of neutrality in the spirit as well
as the letter, she restricted the clear legal right of her people to
supply arms and ammunition to the combatants, thus construing the
treaty to her own disadvantage.
It can be added to the credit of both France and Prussia that in
their great struggle of 1870-71, each scrupulously respected that
neutrality, and France carried out her obligations to such an extreme
that although Napoleon and his army could have at one time escaped
from Sedan into Belgium, and renewed the attack and possibly--although
not probably--saved France, if they had seen fit to violate that
neutrality, rather than break the word of France the Emperor Napoleon
and his army consented to the crowning humiliation of Sedan.
In the year 1911, in the course of a discussion in Belgium in respect
to the fortifications at Flushing, certain Dutch newspapers asserted
that in the event of a Franco-German war, the neutrality of Belgium
would be violated by Germany. It was then suggested that if a
declaration were made to the contrary in the Reichstag, that such a
declaration, "would be calculated to appease public opinion and to
calm its suspicions."
This situation was communicated to the present German Chancellor, von
Bethmann-Hollweg, who instructed the German Ambassador at Brussels to
assure the Belgian Foreign Minister,
that he was most appreciative of the sentiment which had
inspired our [Belgium's] action. _He declared that Germany
had no intention of violating our neutrality_, but he
considered that by making a declaration publicly, Germany
would weaken her military preparation with respect to
France, and being reassured in the northern quarter would
direct her forces to the eastern quarter.[84]
[Footnote 84: Belgian _Gray Book_, enclosure No. 12.]
Germany's recognition of the continuing obligation of this treaty was
also shown when the question of Belgium's neutrality was suggested at
a debate in the Reichstag on April 29, 1913. In the course of that
debate a member of the Social Democratic Party said:
In Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war is viewed
with apprehension, because it is feared that Germany will
not respect Belgian neutrality.[85]
[Footnote 85: _Idem._]
Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
replied: "The neutrality of Belgium is determined by
international conventions, and Germany is resolved to
respect these conventions."
This declaration did not satisfy another member of the
Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow observed that he had
nothing to add to the clear statement which he had uttered
with reference to the relations between Germany and Belgium.
In reply to further interrogations from a member of the
Social Democratic Party, Herr von Heeringen, Minister of
War, stated: "Belgium does not play any part in the
justification of the German scheme of military
reorganization; the scheme is justified by the position of
matters in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact
that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international
treaties."
A member of the same party, having again referred to
Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that his
declaration regarding Belgium was sufficiently clear.[86]
[Footnote 86: Belgian _Gray Book_, No. 12.]
On July 31, 1914, the Belgian Foreign Minister, in a conversation with
Herr von Below, the German Minister at Brussels, asked him whether he
knew of the assurance which, as above stated, had been given by von
Bethmann-Hollweg through the German Ambassador at Brussels to the
Government at Belgium in 1911, and Herr von Below replied that he did,
and added, "that he was certain that the sentiments to which
expression was given at that time had not changed."
Thus _on July 31, 1914_, Germany, through its accredited
representative at Brussels, repeated the assurances contained in the
treaty of 1839, as reaffirmed in 1870, and again reaffirmed in 1911
and 1913.
Germany's moral obligation had an additional express confirmation.
The second International Peace Conference was held at The Hague in
1907. There were present the representatives of forty-four nations,
thus making as near an approach to the poet's dream of the "federation
of the world" and the "parliament of man" as has yet been possible in
the slow progress of mankind.
That convention agreed upon a certain declaration of principles, and
among the signatures appended to the document was the representative
of His Majesty, the German Emperor.
They agreed upon certain principles of international morality, most
of them simply declaratory of the uncodified international law then
existing, and these were subsequently ratified by formal treaties of
the respective governments, including Germany, which were deposited in
the archives of The Hague. While this treaty _as an express covenant_
was not binding, unless all belligerents signed it, yet, it recognized
an existing _moral_ obligation. The Hague Peace Conference proceeded
to define the rights of neutral powers, and in so doing simply
reaffirmed the existing international law.
The pertinent parts of this great compact, with reference to the
sanctity of neutral territory, are as follows:
_CONVENTION V_
_CHAPTER I.--"THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS_"
ARTICLE I.
_The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable._
ARTICLE II.
_Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of
either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of
a neutral Power._
ARTICLE X.
_The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force,
attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a
hostile act._
Notwithstanding these assurances, it had been from time to time
intimated by German military writers, and notably by Bernhardi, that
Germany would, in the event of a future war, make a quick and possibly
a fatal blow at the heart of France by invading Belgium upon the first
declaration of hostilities, and it was probably these intimations that
led the Belgian Government on July 24, 1914, to consider:
Whether in the existing circumstances, it would not be
proper to address to the Powers, who had guaranteed
Belgium's independence and its neutrality, a communication
for the purpose of confirming to them its resolution to
carry out the international duties which are imposed upon
it by treaties in the event of war breaking out on the
Belgian frontiers.
Confiding in the good faith of France and Germany, the Belgian
Government concluded that any such declaration was premature.
On August 2, 1914, the war having already broken out, the Belgian
Foreign Minister took occasion to tell the German Ambassador that
France had reaffirmed its intention to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and Herr von Below, the German Ambassador, after thanking
Davignon for his information, added that up to the present he had not
been
instructed to make us any official communication, but we
were aware of his personal opinion respecting the security
with which we had the right to regard our eastern neighbors.
I [Davignon] replied at once that all we knew of the
intentions of the latter, intentions set forth in many
former interviews, did not allow us to doubt their
[Germany's] perfectly correct attitude toward Belgium.
It thus appears that as late as _August 2, 1914_, Germany had not
given to Belgium any intimation as to its intention, _and, what is
more important, it had not either on that day or previously made any
charge that Belgium had in any way violated its obligations of
neutrality, or that France had committed any overt act in violation
thereof_.
On July 31, 1914, England, not unreasonably apprehensive as to the
sincerity of Germany's oft-repeated protestations of good faith,
directed the English Ambassadors at Paris and Berlin to ask the
respective governments of those countries "whether each is prepared to
respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided it is violated by no other
Power."
This question was communicated by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian
Government, with the addition that he (Sir Edward Grey) asked that
"the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her
neutrality which I desire, and expect other Powers to uphold and
observe."
Pursuant to these instructions, the English Ambassador to Paris, on
the night of July 31, 1914, called upon Viviani, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and on the same night received a reply which is
reported by Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, as follows:
French Government is resolved to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other
Power violating that neutrality that France might find
herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of
her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been
given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of
it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister to
Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.[87]
[Footnote 87: English _White Paper_, No. 125.]
Confirming this, the French Minister at Brussels, on August 1st, made
to the Belgian Foreign Minister the following declaration:
I am authorized to declare that in the event of an
international conflict, the government of the Republic will,
as it has always declared, respect the neutrality of
Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected
by another Power, the French Government, in order to insure
its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude.[88]
[Footnote 88: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 15.]
On July 31, 1914, the English Ambassador at Berlin saw the German
Secretary of State, and submitted Sir Edward Grey's pointed
interrogation, and the only reply that was given was that "he must
consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly
answer," and the German Secretary of State very significantly added
that for strategic reasons it was "very doubtful whether they would
return any answer at all."
Goschen also submitted the matter to the German Chancellor, who also
evaded the question by stating that "Germany would in any case desire
to know the reply returned to you [the English Ambassador] by the
French Government."
That these were mere evasions the events on the following day
demonstrated.
On August 1st, Sir Edward Grey saw the German Ambassador in London,
and the following significant conversation took place:
I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the
German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium
was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of
Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could
see her way to give the same assurance as that which had
been given by France it would materially contribute to
relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if
there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one
combatant, while the other respected it, it would be
extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this
country. I said that we had been discussing this question at
a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this
I gave him a memorandum of it.
He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to
violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain
neutral.
I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still
free, and we were considering what our attitude should be.
All I could say was that our attitude would be determined
largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of
Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here.
I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality
on that condition alone.[89]
[Footnote 89: English _White Paper_, No. 123.]
On the following day, August 2d, the German Minister at Brussels
handed to the Belgian Foreign Office the following "highly
confidential" document. After stating that "the German Government has
received _reliable information_, according to which the French forces
intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur," and after
suggesting a "fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in
no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without
aid," the document adds:
It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to
forestall this attack of the enemy. The German Government
would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of
hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the
enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian
territory.[90]
[Footnote 90: Belgian _Gray Book_, No. 20.]
Some hours later, at 1.30 A.M. on August 3d, the German Minister
aroused the Belgian Secretary General for the Minister of Foreign
Affairs from his slumbers and,
asked to see Baron von der Elst. He told him that he was
instructed by his Government to inform us that French
dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a patrol of French
cavalry, violating international law, seeing that war was
not declared, had crossed the frontier.
The Secretary General asked Herr von Below where these
events had taken place; _in Germany, he was answered_. Baron
von der Elst observed that in that case he could not
understand the object of his communication. Herr von Below
said that these acts, contrary to international law, _were
of a nature to make one expect that other acts contrary to
international law would be perpetrated by France_.[91]
[Footnote 91: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 21.]
As to these last communications, it should be noted that the German
Government, neither then nor at any subsequent time, ever disclosed to
the world the "reliable information," which it claimed to have of the
intentions of the French Government, and the event shows beyond a
possibility of contradiction that at that time France was unprepared
to make any invasion of Belgium or even to defend its own
north-eastern frontier.
It should further be noted that the alleged aggressive acts of France,
which were made the excuse for the invasion of Belgium, according to
the statement of the German Ambassador himself, _did not take place in
Belgium but in Germany_.
On August 3d, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Belgium served upon the
German Ambassador at Brussels the following reply to the German
ultimatum, which, after quoting the substance of the German demand,
continued:
This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King's
Government.
The intentions which it attributed to France are in
contradiction with the express declarations which were made
to us on the 1st August in the name of the Government of the
Republic.
Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of
Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium
would fulfill all her international duties, and her army
would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.
The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870,
establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium
under the guarantee of the Powers, and particularly of the
Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.
Belgium has always been faithful to her international
obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of
loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain
her neutrality or to make it respected.
The attempt against her independence, with which the German
Government threatens her, would constitute a flagrant
violation of international law. No strategic interest
justifies the violation of that law.
_The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions
which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation
while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe._
Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than
eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses
to believe that her independence can be preserved only at
the expense of the violation of her neutrality.
If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has
firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any
attack upon her rights.
In the records of diplomacy there are few nobler documents than this.
Belgium then knew that she was facing possible annihilation. Every
material interest suggested acquiescence in the peremptory demands of
her powerful neighbor. In the belief that then so generally prevailed,
but which recent events have somewhat modified, the success of Germany
seemed probable, and if so, Belgium, by facilitating the triumph of
Germany, would be in a position to participate in the spoils of the
victory.
If Belgium had regarded her honor as lightly as Germany and felt that
the matter of self-preservation would excuse any moral dereliction,
she would have imitated the example of Luxemburg, also invaded, and
permitted free passage to the German army without essential loss of
her material prosperity, but with a fatal sacrifice to her national
honor.
Even under these conditions Belgium evidently entertained a hope that
Germany at the last moment would not, in view of its promises and the
protest of Belgium, commit this foul outrage.
The military attache of the French Government, being apprised of
Germany's virtual declaration of war, offered "the support of five
French army corps to the Belgian Government," and in reply Belgium,
still jealously regardful of her obligation of neutrality, replied:
We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for
offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances,
however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the
Powers. The Belgian Government will decide later on the
action which they think it necessary to take.
As in Caesar's time, the Belgae, of all the tribes of Gaul, are in truth
"the bravest."
Later in the evening, the King of Belgium met his Ministers, and the
offer of France was communicated to them, and again the Belgian
Government, still reposing some confidence in the Punic faith of
Prussia, decided not to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers, or to
avail itself of the offers of France.
On the following morning at 6 o'clock the German Minister handed this
formal declaration of war to the Belgian Government:
I have been instructed, and have the honor to inform your
Excellency, that in consequence of the Government of His
Majesty the King having declined the well-intentioned
proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the
latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry
out--if necessary by force of arms--the measures of security
which have been set forth as indispensable in view of the
French menaces.
Here again, no active violation of Belgium's neutrality by France is
alleged, only "French menaces."
The conjecture is plausible that in the case of the Prussian General
Staff, it was their "own hard dealings" which thus taught them to
"suspect the thoughts of others."
On that day the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier and
hostilities began.
On the same day, at the great session of the Reichstag, when the
Imperial Chancellor attempted to justify to the world the hostile acts
of Germany, and especially the invasion of Belgium, the pretended
defense was thus bluntly stated by the German Premier:
We are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no
law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are
already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the
dictates of international law._ It is true that the French
Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing
to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her
opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood
ready for invasion. _France could wait, but we could not
wait._ A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine
might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override
the _just protest_ of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments.
_The wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing_ we will
endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been
reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened,
and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have
one thought--how he is to hack his way through.
It will be noted that on this occasion, when above all other occasions
it was not only the duty, but to the highest interests of Germany, to
give to the world any substantial reason for violating the neutrality
of Belgium, the defense of Germany is rested upon the ground of
self-interest,--euphemistically called "necessity,"--_and upon none
other_.
While von Bethmann-Hollweg's statement does state that "France held
herself in readiness to invade Belgium," there was no intimation that
France had done so, or had any immediate intention of doing so. On the
contrary, it was added, "_France could wait, we (Germany) could not._"
If Belgium had forfeited its rights by undue favors to France or
England, _why did the Chancellor characterize its protest as "just"?_
How Germany fulfilled the promise of its Chancellor, to "make good"
the admitted wrong which it did Belgium, subsequent events have shown.
It may be questioned whether, since the Thirty Years' War, any country
has been subjected to such general devastating horrors. So little
effort has been taken by the conqueror to lessen the inevitable
suffering, that fines have been levied upon this impoverished people,
which would be oppressive even in a period of prosperity. It is
announced from Holland, as this book goes to press, that Germany has
imposed upon this war-desolated country a fine of $7,000,000 per month
and an especial fine of $75,000,000, for its "violation of
neutrality."
Were this episode not a tragedy, the sardonic humor, which caused the
German General Staff to impose this monstrous fine upon Belgium for
its "violation of neutrality," would have the tragi-comical aspects of
Bedlam. It recalls the fable of the wolf who complained that the lamb
was muddying the stream and when the lamb politely called the wolf's
attention to the fact that it stood lower down on the river side than
the wolf, the latter announced its intention to devour the lamb in
any event. Such is probably the intention of Prussia. If it prevail
Belgium as an independent State will cease to exist and it will be
mourned as Poland is. Like Poland, it may have a resurrection.
The war having thus commenced between Germany and Belgium, the brave
ruler of the latter country--"every inch a King"--addressed to the
King of England the following appeal:
Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship
and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of
England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just
given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic
intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the
integrity of Belgium.[92]
[Footnote 92: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 25.]
In reply to that appeal, which no chivalrous nation could have
disregarded, Sir Edward Grey immediately, on August 4th, advised the
British Ambassador in Berlin as follows:
We hear that Germany has addressed a note to Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government
will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of
arms, the measures considered indispensable.
We are also informed that Belgian territory has been
violated at Gemmenich.
In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany
declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as
France gave last week in reply to our request made
simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that
request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my
telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock
to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your
passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel
bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the
neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to
which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.[93]
[Footnote 93: English _White Paper_. No. 159.]
Thereupon Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, called
upon the Secretary of State and stated in the name of His Majesty's
Government that unless the Imperial Government
could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they
would proceed no further with their violation of the
Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been
instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial
Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take
all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium
and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much
a party as themselves.
Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could
give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier
in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered
it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should
advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written
summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had
mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's
Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in
view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily
ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that
their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the
time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer
must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to
demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7
o'clock....
I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor,
as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an
opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found
the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a
harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said
that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible
to a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in
war time had so often been disregarded--_just for a scrap of
paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred
nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with
her._ All his efforts in that direction had been rendered
useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which,
as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to
office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had
done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind
while he was fighting for his life against two assailants.
He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible
events that might happen. I protested strongly against that
statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von
Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons
it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance
through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, _so I
would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a
matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain
that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost
to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked_. That solemn
compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any
one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the
future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that
compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought
of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could
that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an
excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency
was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our
action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I
refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
argument....[94]
[Footnote 94: British _White Paper_, No. 160.]
Here again it is most significant, in view of the subsequent clumsily
framed defense by German apologists, to note that the German Secretary
of State, Herr von Jagow, and his superior, the German Chancellor, did
not pretend to suggest that the invasion of Belgium was due to any
overt act of France.
With even greater frankness von Jagow stated the real purpose, which
was, "to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way," and to
"avoid the more Southern route," which, "in view of the paucity of
roads and the strength of the fortresses," would have entailed "great
loss of time."
The damning conclusion as to the guilt of Germany, which irresistibly
follows from these admitted facts, is sought to be overborne by a
pamphlet entitled "_The Truth about Germany_," and subscribed to by a
number of distinguished Germans, who are in turn vouched for in
America by Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia College. He tells
us that they are the "salt of the earth," and "among the greatest
thinkers, moralists, and philanthropists of the age." To overbear the
doubter with the weight of such authority we are told that this
defense has the support of the great theologian, Harnack, the sound
and accomplished political scientist and economist, von Schmoller, the
distinguished philologian, von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian,
Lamprecht, the profound statesman, von Posadowsky, the brilliant
diplomatist, von Buelow, the great financier, von Gwinner, the great
promoter of trade and commerce, Ballin, the great inventor, Siemens,
the brilliant preacher of the Gospel, Dryander, and the indispensable
Director in the Ministry of Education, Schmidt. (The adjectives are
those of Professor Burgess.)
The average American, as indeed the average citizen of any country,
when his natural passions are not unduly aroused, is apt to take a
very prosaic and dispassionate view of such matters, and when he has
reached his conclusion based upon everyday, commonplace morality, he
is not apt to be shaken even by an imposing array of names, fortified
by an enthusiastic excess of grandiloquent adjectives. The aristocracy
of brains has no monopoly of truth, which is often best grasped by the
democracy of common sense.
The defense of these notable representatives of German thought seems
to be based upon the wholly unsupported assertion that "England and
France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium."
They say:
It would have been a crime against the German people if the
German General Staff had not anticipated this intention. The
inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual,
whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to
resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times
of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a
friendly neutrality, which would permit the unobstructed
passage of German troops through small portions of her
territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German
General Staff was obliged to force the passage in order to
avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most
unfavorable ground.
In other words, it seemed preferable to the German General Staff that
it should fight in France rather than in Germany, and for this reason
Belgium must be ruined.
Notwithstanding this and similar propositions, which are so abhorrent
in their political immorality, it is yet gravely suggested by Dr.
Dernberg and others that Bernhardi's philosophy does not reflect the
true thought of the Prussian ruling classes. Here are representative
theologians, economists, historians, statesmen, diplomatists,
financiers, inventors, and educators, who, in invoking the support of
the educated classes in the United States, deliberately subscribe to
a proposition at which even Machiavelli might have gagged.
We are further told that "the German troops, with their iron
discipline will respect the personal property and liberty of the
individual in Belgium just as they did in France in 1870," and these
scientists, philosophers, and doctors of divinity add that "Belgium
would have been wise, if it had permitted the passage of the German
troops," for the Belgian people "_would have fared well from the
business point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer
and paid well._"
To this defense we are led in the last analysis, that Belgium should
have preferred cash to her honor, just as the German General Staff
preferred dishonor to the sacrifice of an immediate military
advantage.
The possibilities of moral casuistry have been severely tested in the
attempt of these apologists for Germany to defend the forcible
invasion of Belgium.
The ethical question has been made quite unnecessarily to pivot upon
the express contractual obligations of England, Germany, and France
with respect to the neutrality of Belgium. The indictment of Germany
has been placed upon the sound but too narrow ground that by the
Treaty of 1839, and The Hague Convention of 1907, Germany had
obligated itself by a solemn pledge to respect the neutrality both
of Luxemburg and Belgium.
If, however, there had been no Hague Convention and no Treaty of 1839,
and if Germany, England, and France had never entered into reciprocal
obligations in the event of war to respect Belgium's neutrality,
nevertheless upon the broadest considerations of international law the
invasion without its consent would be without any justification
whatever.
It is a fundamental axiom of international law that each nation is the
sole and exclusive judge of the conditions under which it will permit
an alien to cross its frontiers. Its territory is _sacrosanct_. No
nation may invade the territory of another without its consent. To do
so by compulsion is an act of war. Each nation's land is its castle of
asylum and defense. This fundamental right of Belgium should not be
confused or obscured by balancing the subordinate equities between
France, Germany, and England with respect to their formal treaty
obligations.
Belgium's case has thus been weakened in the forum of public opinion
by too insistent reference to the special treaties. The right of
Belgium and of its citizens as individuals, to be secure in their
possessions rests upon the sure foundation of inalienable right and
is guarded by the immutable principle of moral law, "Thou shalt not
steal." It was well said by Alexander Hamilton:
The sacred rights of man are not to be searched for in old
parchments and musty records; they are written as with a
sunbeam in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of
Divinity itself and can never be erased by mortal power.
This truth can be illustrated by an imaginary instance. Let us suppose
that the armies of the Kaiser had made the progress which they so
confidently anticipated, and had not simply captured Paris, but had
also invaded England, and that, in an attempt to crush the British
Empire, the German General Staff planned an invasion of Canada. Let us
further suppose that Germany thereupon served upon the United States
such an arrogant demand as it made upon Belgium, requiring the United
States to permit it to land an army in New York, with the accompanying
assurance that neither its territory nor independence would be
injured, and that Germany would generously reimburse it for any
damage.
Let us further suppose--and it is not a very fanciful
supposition--that the United States would reply to the German demand
that under no circumstances should a German force be landed in New
York or its territory be used as a base of hostile operations against
Canada. To carry out the analogy in all its details, let us then
suppose that the German fleet should land an army in the city of New
York, arrest its Mayor, and check the first attempt of its outraged
inhabitants to defend the city by demolishing the Cathedral, the
Metropolitan Art Gallery, the City Hall and other structures, and
shooting down remorselessly large numbers of citizens, because a few
non-combatants had not accepted the invasion with due humility.
Although Germany had not entered into any treaty to respect the
territory of the United States, no one would seriously contend that
Germany would be justified in such an invasion.
The alleged invalidation of the treaty of 1839 being thus unimportant,
Dr. Dernberg and Professor von Mach fall back upon the only remaining
defense, that France had already violated the neutrality of Belgium
with the latter's consent. _Of this there is no evidence whatever._ We
have, on the contrary, the express assurance, which France gave on the
eve of the German invasion both to Belgium and England, that it would
not violate the rights of Belgium, and in addition we have the
significant fact that when Belgium was invaded, and it was vitally
necessary that the French Army should go with all possible speed to
its relief and thus stop the invasion and save France itself from
invasion, it was ten days before France could send any adequate
support. Unhappily it was then too late.
If it were true that France intended to invade Belgium, then of all
the blunders that the German Foreign Office has made, the greatest was
that it did not permit France to carry out this step, for it would
have palliated the action of Germany in meeting such violation by a
similar invasion, and it would thus have been an immeasurable gain for
Germany and a greater injury to France.
Germany's greatest weakness to-day is its moral isolation. It stands
condemned by the judgment of the civilized world. No physical power it
can exercise can compensate for this loss of moral power. Even success
will be too dearly bought at such a price. There are things which
succeed better than success. Truth is one of them.
Under the plea of necessity, which means Germany's desire to minimize
its losses of life, Germany has turned Belgium into a shambles,
trampled a peaceful nation under foot and almost crushed its soul
beneath the iron tread of its mighty armies.
Almost wounded unto death, and for a time prostrate under the heel of
the conqueror, the honor of Belgium shines unsullied by any selfish
interests, personal dishonor, or lack of courage.
It is claimed that there were officers of the French Army in Liege and
Namur before the war broke out. Neither names nor dates have been
given, and the allegation might be fairly dismissed because of the
very vagueness of the charge. But even if it were true, international
law does not forbid the officers of one nation serving with the armies
of another. German officers have for many years been thus employed in
Turkey and engaged in training and developing the Turkish Army, but no
one has ever contended that the employment by that country of German
military officers was a violation of neutrality, or gave rise to a
_casus belli_.
It is wholly probable that there were some German officers in Belgium
before the war commenced, and if not, there were certainly hundreds
of spies, of whose pernicious activities the Belgian people were to
learn later to their infinite sorrow, but because Germany employed an
elaborate system of espionage in Belgium, it could not justify France
in invading its territory without its permission.
To a lawyer, who has had experience in the judicial ascertainment of
truth, there is one consideration that justifies him in disposing
of all these vague allegations with respect to French activities in
Belgium on the eve of the war, and that is that Germany has not only
failed to give any testimony in support of the charges, _but it never
suggested this defense until the judgment of the civilized world had
branded it with an ineffaceable stain_.
Professor von Mach, a former educator of Harvard University and an
apologist for Germany, feels this poverty of evidence and has rather
naively suggested an adjournment of the case. He says:
Did French officers remain in Liege or in any other Belgian
fortress after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to
go through Belgium? Germany has officially made both claims.
The first can easily be substantiated by The Supreme Court
of Civilization by an investigation of the prisoners of war
taken in Belgium. Until an impartial investigation becomes
possible no further proof than the claim made by the German
Government can be produced.
As the French officers taken in Belgium are presumably in German
detention camps, it would seem that Germany should first substantiate
its defense by names, dates, and places, although even then the mere
capture of French officers in Belgium after the invasion had begun
does not necessarily indicate that they were in Belgium before the
invasion.
Dr. von Mach adds in the reply, which he made in the New York _Times_
to an article contributed by the writer to that journal:
_It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are
which Germany possesses, and which for military reasons it
has not yet been able to divulge...._ This is an important
question, and the answer must be left to The Supreme Court
of Civilization. The weight of the evidence would seem to
point to a justification of Germany. Yet no friend of
Germany can find fault with those who would wish to defer
a verdict until such time when Germany can present her
complete proof to the world, and this may be when the war is
over.
This naive suggestion, that the vital question of fact should be
postponed, and in the meantime judgment should be entered for Germany,
is refreshing in its novelty. Its only parallel was the contention of
the celebrated Dr. Cook, who contended that the world should accept
his claim as to the discovery of the North Pole and await the proofs
later.
Professor von Mach, in his book, "_What Germany Wants_," further
explains this dilatory defense and amplifies it in a manner that is
certainly unusual in an historian. He recognizes that the speech of
the German Chancellor in the Reichstag on August 4th, in which von
Bethmann-Hollweg admitted that the action of Germany in invading
Belgium was wrong and only justified it on the ground of
self-preservation, was a virtual plea of guilty by Prussia of the
crime, of which it stands indicted at the bar of the civilized world.
Germany's scholarly apologist, as _amicus curiae_, then suggests that
in criminal procedure, when a defendant pleads guilty, the Court often
refuses to accept his plea, enters a plea of not guilty for him, and
assigns counsel to defend the case. He therefore suggests that the
Chancellor's plea of guilty should be disregarded and the Court should
assign counsel.
One difficulty with the analogy is that courts do not ordinarily
refuse to accept a plea of guilty. On the contrary, they accept it
almost invariably, for why try the guilt of a man when he himself in
the most formal way acknowledges it?
The only instance in which a court does show such consideration to a
prisoner is when the defendant is both poor and ignorant. Then, and
only then, with a fine regard for human right, is the procedure
suggested by Prof. von Mach followed.
To this humiliating position, Professor von Mach as _amicus curiae_
consigns his great nation. For myself, as one who admires Germany and
believes it to be much greater and truer than its ruling caste or its
over-zealous apologists, I refuse to accept the justification of such
an absurd and degrading analogy.
The blunt acknowledgment of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag,
already quoted, is infinitely preferable to the disingenuous defenses
of Germany's ardent but sophistical apologists. Fully recognizing
the import of his words, von Bethmann-Hollweg, addressing the
representatives of the German nation, put aside with admirable candor
all these sophistical artifices and rested the defense of Germany upon
the single contention that Germany was beset by powerful enemies and
that it was a matter of necessity for her to perpetrate this "wrong"
and in this manner to "hack her way through."
This defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a
plea of "Guilty" at the bar of the world. It has one merit. It does
not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy.
After the civilized world had condemned the invasion of Belgium with
an unprecedented approach to unanimity, the German Chancellor rather
tardily discovered that public opinion was still a vital force in the
world and that the strategic results of the occupation of Belgium had
not compensated for the moral injury. For this reason he framed five
months after this crime against civilization a belated defense, which
proved so unconvincing that the Bernhardi plea of military necessity
is clearly preferable, as at least having the merit of candor.
After proclaiming to the world that the German Foreign Office had
discovered in Brussels certain secret documents, which disclosed the
fact that the neutrality of Belgium at the time of the invasion was a
sham and after the civilized world had refused to accept this bald and
unsupported assertion, as it had also refused to accept the spurious
evidence of a well-known Arctic explorer, the German Foreign Office in
December, 1914 published its alleged proofs.
The first purported to be a report of the Chief of the Belgian General
Staff to the Minister of War and reported his conversations in 1906
with a military attache of the British Legation in Brussels.
The second purported to be a report of similar conversations in 1912
between the same officials.
In an authorized statement, published on January 27, 1915, Sir Edward
Grey states that there is no record of either of these negotiations in
the English Foreign Office or the War Office; but this fact is not in
itself conclusive and as there is no evidence that the documents were
forged, their genuineness should be assumed in the absence of some
more specific denial.
The documents, however, do not appreciably advance the cause of
Germany, for they disclose on their face that the conversations were
not binding on the Governments of England or Belgium but were simply
an informal exchange of view between the officials, and what is far
more to the purpose, the whole of the first conversation of April 10,
1906, was expressly based upon the statement that "_the entry of the
English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our
neutrality by Germany_."
The second document also shows that the Belgian Chief of Staff
expressly stated that any invasion of Belgium by England, made to
repel a prior German invasion, could not take place without the
express consent of Belgium, to be given when the occasion arose, and
it is further evident that the statement of the English military
attache--clearly a subordinate official to define the foreign policy
of a great Empire--expressly predicated his assumption, that England
might disembark troops in Belgium, upon the statement that its object
would be to repel a German invasion of Belgian territory.
If it be asked why England and Belgium were thus in 1906 and 1912
considering the contingency of a German invasion of Belgium and the
method of effectually repelling it, the reply is obvious that such
invasion, in the event of a war between Germany and France, was a
commonplace of German military strategists. Of this purpose they made
little, if any, concealment. The construction by Germany of numerous
strategic railway lines on the Belgian frontier, which were out of
proportion to the economic necessity of the territory, gave to Europe
some indication of Germany's purpose and there could have been little
doubt as to such intention, if Germany had not, through its Foreign
Office, given, as previously shown, repeated and continuous assurances
to Belgium that such was not its intention.
The German Chancellor--whose stupendous blunders of speech and action
in this crisis will be the marvel of posterity--has further attempted
to correct his record by two equally disingenuous defenses. Speaking
to the Reichstag on December 2, 1914, he said:
When on the 4th of August I referred to the wrong which we
were doing in marching through Belgium, it was not yet known
for certain whether the Brussels Government in the hour of
need would not decide after all to spare the country and to
retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember that, after
the occupation of Liege, at the request of our army leaders
I repeated the offer to the Belgian Government. For military
reasons it was absolutely imperative that at the time, about
the 4th of August, the possibility for such a development
should be kept open. _Even then the guilt of the Belgian
Government was apparent from many a sign, although I had not
yet any positive documentary proofs at my disposal._
This is much too vague to excuse a great crime. The guilt of Belgium
is said to be "apparent from many a sign," but what these signs are
the Chancellor still fails to state. He admits that they were not
documentary in character. If the guilt of Belgium had been so apparent
to the Chancellor on August the 4th, when he made his confession of
wrong doing in the Reichstag, then it is incredible that he would have
made such an admission.
As to the overt acts of France, all that the Chancellor said in his
speech of December 2 was "that France's plan of campaign was known to
us and that it compelled us for reasons of self-preservation to march
through Belgium." But it is again significant that, speaking nearly
five months after his first public utterance on the subject and with a
full knowledge that the world had visited its destructive condemnation
upon Germany for its wanton attack upon Belgium, _the Chancellor can
still give no specific allegation of any overt act by France which
justified the invasion_. All that is suggested is a supposed "plan of
campaign."
Following this unconvincing and plainly disingenuous speech, the
Chancellor proceeded in an authorized newspaper interview on January
25, 1915 to state that his now famous--or infamous--remark about "the
scrap of paper" had been misunderstood.
After stating that he felt a painful "surprise to learn that my
phrase, 'a scrap of paper,' should have caused such an unfavorable
impression on the United States," he proceeds to explain that in his
now historic interview with the British Ambassador,
he (von Bethmann-Hollweg) had spoken of the treaty not as a
"scrap of paper" for Germany, but as an instrument which
had become obsolete through Belgium's forfeiture of its
neutrality and that Great Britain had quite other reasons
for entering into the war, compared with which the
neutrality treaty appeared to have only the value of a scrap
of paper.
Let the reader here pause to note the twofold character of this
defense.
It suggests that Germany's guaranty of Belgium's neutrality had become
for Germany "a scrap of paper" because of Belgium's alleged forfeiture
of its rights as a neutral nation, although at the time referred to
the German Chancellor had not only asked the permission of Belgium to
cross its territory but immediately before his interview with the
British Ambassador he had publicly testified in his speech in the
Reichstag to the justice of Belgium's protest.
The other and inconsistent suggestion is that, without respect to
Belgium's rights under the treaty of 1839, the violation of its
territory by Germany was not the cause of England's intervention; but
obviously this hardly explains the German Chancellor's contemptuous
reference to the long standing and oft repeated guaranty of Belgium's
neutrality as merely a "scrap of paper."
Having thus somewhat vaguely suggested a twofold defense, the
Chancellor, without impeaching the accuracy of Goschen's report of the
interview, then proceeded to state that the conversation in question
took place immediately after his speech in the Reichstag, in which, as
stated, he had admitted the justice of Belgium's protest against the
violation of its territory, and he adds that,
when I spoke, I already had _certain indications but no
absolute proof_ upon which to base a public accusation
that Belgium long before had abandoned its neutrality in
its relations with England. Nevertheless I took Germany's
responsibilities toward the neutral States so seriously that
I spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany.
If the German Chancellor is truthful in his statement that on August
the 4th, when he spoke in the Reichstag and an hour later had his
conversation with Goschen, he had "certain indications" that Belgium
had forfeited its rights as an independent nation by hostile acts,
then the German Chancellor took such a serious view of "Germany's
responsibilities" that, without any necessity or justification, he
indicted his country at the bar of the whole world of a flagrant
wrong. If he could not at that time justify the act of the German
General Staff, he should at least have been silent, but, according to
his incredible statement, although he had these "certain indications"
and thus _knew_ that Germany, in invading Belgium, was simply
attacking an already hostile country, he deliberately explains, not
only to his nation but to the whole world, that such invasion was a
wrong and had no justification in international law. How can any
reasonable man, whose eyes are not blinded with the passions of the
hour, accept this explanation?
It is even more remarkable that immediately following the session of
the Reichstag, when he had his interview with Goschen, the German
Chancellor never suggested in his own defense or that of his country,
that he had "certain indications," which justified the action that day
taken, although he then knew that, unless he could justify it, England
would immediately join the already powerful foes of Germany.
The reader need only reread Goschen's report of that interview
(_ante_, p. 214) to know how disingenuous this belated explanation
is. With the whole world ringing with the infamous phrase, the German
Chancellor, after five months of reflection, can only make this
pitiful defense. Its acceptance subjects even the most credulous to
a severe strain. It exhausts the limit of gullibility.
The defense wholly ignores the fact that the Chancellor had previously
sought to bribe England to condone in advance the invasion of Belgium
by Germany, and that Germany had also coerced Luxemburg into a passive
acquiescence in a similar invasion, and there is as yet no pretense
that Luxemburg had failed in its obligation of neutrality.
Should the judgment of the civilized world turn from the terrible fate
of Belgium and consider the wrong that was done to Luxemburg, then the
German Chancellor may, unless better advised, frame further maladroit
excuses with reference to that country.
All these explanations, as senseless as they are false, and savoring
more of the tone of a criminal court then that of an imperial
chancellery, should shock those who admire historic Germany. They are
unworthy of so great a nation. Bismarck would never have stooped to
such pitiful and transparent deception. The blunt candor of Maximilian
Harden, which we have already quoted on page 12, is infinitely
preferable and the position of Germany at the bar of the civilized
world will improve, when its maladroit Chancellor has the courage and
the candor to say, as Harden did, that all this was done because
Germany regarded it as for its vital interests and because "we willed
it."
Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of
barbarism; unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of
the rifle and the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind, after
uncounted centuries, has made no real advance in political morality
beyond that of the cave dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot
satisfy the "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." It is the
negation of all that civilization stands for.
Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of
any offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its
voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality
will "plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation
of its taking off."
It may be questioned whether, since the fall of Poland, Civilization
has been stirred to more profound pity and intense indignation than by
this wanton outrage. Pity, radiating to the utmost corners of the
world by the "sightless couriers of the air,"
"Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye
That tears shall drown the wind."
Was it also, as with Macbeth, a case of
"Vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself
And falls on the other"?
Time will tell.
Had Germany not invaded Belgium, it is an even chance that England
would not have intervened, at least at the beginning of the war.
Germany could have detached a relatively small part of its army to
defend its highly fortified Western frontier, and leaving France to
waste its strength on frontal attacks on that almost impregnable line
of defense, Germany with the bulk of its army and that of Austria
could have made a swift drive at Russia.
Is it not possible that that course would have yielded better results
than the fiasco, which followed the fruitless drive at Paris?
If Germany succeeds, it will claim that "nothing succeeds like
success," and to the disciples of Treitschke and Bernhardi this will
be a sufficing answer.
If it fail, posterity will be at a loss to determine which blundered
the worst, the German Foreign Office or its General Staff, its
diplomats or its generals.