CHAPTER VIII_The Evidence in the Case A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia

THE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER

The Kaiser now appears upon the scene with a fatal result to the peace

of Europe. One fact in this controversy is too clear for dispute.

When peace proposals were still under consideration and some slight

progress had been made by the eleventh-hour consent of Austria on July

31 to discuss with Russia the merits of the Servian question, the

Kaiser--like Brennus with his _vae victis_--threw his sword into the

trembling scales and definitely turned the balance against the peace

of the world.

Was it a reluctant Caesar who thus crossed the Rubicon, at whose

fateful margin he had stood at other crises of his peaceful reign

without destroying that peace?

Our information is still too meager to justify a satisfactory answer

at this time. Not only are the premises in dispute, but the inferences

from admitted premises are too conflicting.

At the time the Austrian Archduke was murdered the Kaiser was in

Berlin, and he at once showed an intense interest in the event and in

all that it portended. It was officially announced that he planned to

attend the funeral in Vienna, but later the world was advised that he

had suffered a "chill," which would prevent such attendance. Perhaps

it was a diplomatic chill. He then left for Norway, where he remained

in the enjoyment of his annual holiday until the evening of July 26th,

when he suddenly returned to his Capitol.

Evidently his return was unexpected, for we learn from a telegram from

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, that,

the Emperor returned suddenly to-night and [the German]

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that the

Foreign Office _regrets this step which was taken on His

Majesty's own initiative_. They fear that His Majesty's

sudden return may cause speculation and excitement.

As the refusal of Austria to accept the Servian reply and its

severance of all diplomatic relations with that country had already

thrown the entire world into a state of feverish anxiety, it is

difficult to understand why the German Foreign Office should have felt

that the very natural return of the Kaiser to his Capitol at one of

the greatest crises in the history of his country and of the world

should be regarded as giving rise to "speculation and excitement,"

especially as the President of the French Republic was hastening back

to Paris.

The Under-Secretary of State's deprecation of the Kaiser's return

suggests the possibility that the German Foreign Office, which had

already made substantial progress in precipitating the crisis, did not

wish the Kaiser's return for fear that he might again exert, as in the

Moroccan crisis, his great influence in the interests of peace.

It felt that it had the matter well in hand, but never before did a

foreign office blunder so flagrantly and with such disastrous results.

From beginning to end every anticipation that the German Chancellor

had was falsified by events. This discreditable and blundering chapter

of German diplomacy is enough to make the bones of the sagacious

Bismarck turn in his grave.

As appears from Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated

July 26th, it was the confident belief of the German diplomats that

"Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia," and that

"France too was not at all in a position for facing the war."[58]

[Footnote 58: English _White Paper_, No. 32.]

When the full history of this imbroglio is written, it will probably

be found that the extensive labor troubles in St. Petersburg, the

military unpreparedness of Russia and France, and the political schism

in England, then verging to civil war, had deeply impressed both

Vienna and Berlin that the dual alliance could impose its will upon

Europe with reference to Servia without any serious risk of a European

war.

While for these reasons Germany and Austria may not have regarded such

a war or the intervention of England therein as probable, yet the dual

alliance recognized from the outset such a possibility. The

uncertainty as to the Kaiser's attitude with respect to such a war may

therefore explain the "regret," with which the German Foreign Office

witnessed his sudden and uninvited return.

On his return the diplomatic negotiations, which had commenced with an

_allegro con brio_, for a time changed under the baton of the Imperial

Conductor into a more peaceful _andante_, until the Kaiser made one of

his characteristically sudden changes of purpose and precipitated the

war by an arrogant ultimatum to Russia, which that country could not

possibly accept without a fatal sacrifice of its self-respect and

prestige as a nation.

If it be true--and the future may demonstrate it--that this war was

planned by Germany at least as far back as the Moroccan crisis, then

the Kaiser's responsibility for the commencement of the quarrel cannot

be doubted. It is inconceivable that the German Foreign Office could

pursue for three years the policy of precipitating a European war

without the knowledge and consent of the "Over War Lord."

When full data are accessible as to the importations by Germany in

advance of the war, as to its withdrawal of foreign credits and

placing of foreign loans, its sales of stocks by influential

investors, and its importations on the eve of the war of horses and

foodstuffs, a strong circumstantial case may be developed of a

deliberate purpose to retrieve the Moroccan fiasco by an audacious

_coup_ which would determine the mastery of Europe. The levy in 1913

of an extraordinary tax upon capital, which virtually confiscated the

earnings of the German people for military purposes, adds much support

to this contention. According to Giolitti, the former Italian Premier,

Austria sounded Italy in August, 1913, as to its willingness to

participate in a war against Servia.[59]

[Footnote 59: Giolitti Speech, Italian Chamber, Dec. 5, 1914.]

The inferences to be drawn from the Kaiser's personality are

somewhat conflicting. Like all self-centered and highly neurotic

personalities, his nature is essentially a dual one. This does not

mean that he is in any sense a hypocrite, for one of the engaging

features of his attractive personality has been the candor and

sincerity which have marked nearly all his public acts. He has shown

himself to be a man of opposite moods, and conflicting purposes,

having almost as many public poses as he has costumes, and a strong

desire to play as many varied _roles_ as possible on the stage of the

world. Like Bottom in the _Midsummer Night's Dream_, he would play

all parts from the "roaring lion" to the shrinking Thisbe.

The ruler who sent a sympathetic message to Kruger as an insult to

England is he who shortly thereafter gratuitously submitted to Queen

Victoria military plans for the subjugation of the Boers.

The ruler, who sent the _Panther_ to Agadir, later restrained his

country from declaring war against England, when Lloyd George threw

down the gauntlet in his Mansion House speech in the Moroccan crisis.

As preacher, the Kaiser exalted within sight of the Mount of Olives

the precepts of Christian humility, and yet advised his soldiers, on

their departure to China, to "take no prisoners and give no quarter."

The most affable and democratic monarch on occasion will in another

mood assume the outworn toggery of mediaeval absolutism. A democratic

business monarch, and as such the advance agent of German prosperity,

he yet shocks the common sense and awakens the ridicule of the world

by posing as a combination of Caesar and Mahomet.

The avowed champion of Christianity, who has preached with the fervor

of Peter the Hermit against the Yellow Race, he has nevertheless,

since this war began, instigated the Sultan of Turkey to proclaim in

the Moslem world a "holy war" against his Christian enemies.

Pacific and bellicose by turns the monarch, who throughout his whole

reign has hitherto kept the peace of the world, has yet on slight

pretext given utterance to the most warlike and incendiary statements.

How is it possible to draw any inference from such a personality, of

whom it could be said, as Sydney Smith once said of Lord John Russell,

that

there is nothing he would not undertake. I believe he would

perform an operation for stone, build St. Peter's, assume

(with or without ten minutes' notice) the command of the

Channel Fleet, and no one would discover from his manner

that the patient had died, that St. Peter's had tumbled

down, and that the Channel Fleet had been knocked to atoms.

We should therefore dismiss all inferences suggested by his complex

personality and should judge him by what he did from the time that he

suddenly arrived in Berlin on July 26th, until the issuance by his

direct order of the fatal ultimatum to Russia.

Before proceeding to analyze the very interesting and dramatic

correspondence, which passed between the rulers of Germany, England,

and Russia--doubly interesting because of the family relationship and

the unusual personal and cousinly intimacy of these dispatches--it is

well to inquire what the Kaiser could have done that would have

immediately avoided the crisis and saved the situation. So far as the

published record goes, he did not send a single telegram in the

interests of peace to his illustrious ally, the Emperor Francis

Joseph.

Let us suppose that he had sent the following:

I have just returned to Berlin and find Europe on the verge

of war. I sympathize entirely with you and your country in

its demands upon Servia. I agree with you that the Servian

reply is not satisfactory. In accordance with the

obligations of our alliance, I shall in any event support

with the full power of the German sword the cause of

Austria. Servia has by its reply admitted its responsibility

for the murder of the Archduke and has unreservedly accepted

certain of your demands, and as to others has agreed to

submit them either to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, or

to a concert of Powers. You will decide whether Austria is

satisfied to accept either of these suggestions, but as

England, France, and Russia have asked that time be granted

to consider a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the

difficulty, and as the questions reserved by Servia can be

used as the basis for further discussion without prejudice

to the rights of Austria, and as it is to the interest of

every country and the entire world that its peace should not

be broken unnecessarily, I shall be gratified if you can

agree that a reasonable time shall be granted as a matter of

courtesy to Russia, England, and France, in order that it

may be determined upon due consideration whether it is not

possible to preserve peace without sacrificing in any

respect the legitimate demands of Austria, which have my

full sympathy and support.

WILHELM.

Would the Austrian Emperor, himself a noble-minded and peace-loving

monarch, have refused this reasonable request? A little time, a little

patience and some forbearance for the rights of other States and the

youth of Europe need not have perished. Again, "the pity of it."

In its place the following correspondence took place between the

Kaiser on the one hand and the Czar and King George on the other. It

is so dramatic that it justifies quotation _in extenso_.

On the night of July 28th, the Kaiser sent the following dispatch to

the Czar:

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression

which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against

Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on

for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of which

Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit

which made the Servians murder their own King and his

consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will

agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all

other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all

those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall

suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty

encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of

public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has

joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use

my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a

frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope

confidently that You will support me in my efforts to

overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.[60]

[Footnote 60: German _White Paper_, No. 20. The Capitals to the

pronouns follow the original correspondence.]

This telegram rings true, and fairly suggests a pacific attitude on

the part of the Kaiser when he first took the helm on his return from

Norway. Its weakness lies in the fact that the record, as presented by

the German Government, does not disclose any communication which he

sent to his Austrian ally in the interests of peace. We have the

frequent assurances of the Kaiser to the Czar that he was exerting

all his influence to induce his ally to come to a satisfactory

understanding with Russia, _but neither over the signature of the

Kaiser nor over that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a

single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace_.

The Czar did not fail to appreciate this, and his reply to the Kaiser

rings quite as true and suggests the crux of the whole problem. It

reads:

I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious

moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war

has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the

indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that

very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised

upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which

will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European

war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship

to do all in Your power _to restrain Your ally from going

too far_.[61]

[Footnote 61: German _White Paper_, No. 21.]

Who can deny the force of the sentence thus italicized? It was Austria

which was the provocative factor. It was then bombarding Belgrade and

endeavoring to cross the Danube into Servia. It had declared war, and

brusquely refused even to discuss the question with Russia. It was

mobilizing its army, and making every effort to make a speedy

subjugation of Servia. If peace was to be preserved, the pressure must

begin with Austria. If any question remained for peace parleys, the

_status quo_ must be preserved. Russia could not permit Austria to

destroy Servia first and then discuss its justice.

Thereupon the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar as follows:

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for

the conservation of peace. However I cannot--as I told You

in my first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary

as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from

experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are

merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to

be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that

the promises of Servia are effectively translated into

deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation

of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no

territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore

of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to

remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing

Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I

believe that a direct understanding is possible and

desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an

understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my

Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort.

Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be

construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a

calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would

undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your appeal to

my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.[62]

[Footnote 62: German _White Paper_, No. 22. See note, _post._, p.

189.]

The Kaiser's fatal error lies in the concluding paragraph of this

telegram, in claiming that Russia should not take any military

measures pending the Kaiser's mediation, _although Austria should be

left free not merely to make such preparations against Russia, but to

pursue its aggressive war then already commenced against Servia_. If

the belligerents were expected to desist from military preparations,

should not the obligation be reciprocal?

Later that night the Kaiser again telegraphed the Czar:

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of

Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a

mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram.

Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only

a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case

according to Your advice and that of Your Government,

mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator,

with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner

and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is

threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of

decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have to bear the

responsibility for war or peace.[63]

[Footnote 63: German _White Paper_, No. 23.]

To which the Czar replied as follows:

I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending

to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser)

with instructions. The military measures now taking form

were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of

defense against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all

my heart that these measures will not influence in any

manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very

highly. _We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that

an understanding can be arrived at with us._[64]

[Footnote 64: German _White Paper_, No. 23 A.]

Later the Czar again telegraphed the Kaiser:

I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the

hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is

technically impossible to discontinue our military

preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian

mobilization. It is far from us to want war. _As long as the

negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops

will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn

word thereon._ I confide with all my faith in the grace of

God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna

for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

What more could the Kaiser reasonably ask? Here was an assurance from

the ruler of a great nation, and his royal cousin, that on his "solemn

word" no provocative action would be taken by Russia "as long as

the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue" and this

notwithstanding the fact that Austria had flouted and ignored Russia,

had declared war against Servia and was then endeavoring to subjugate

it quickly by bombarding its capital and invading its territory with

superior forces.

It is true that the Czar did not order demobilization, and apart from

his unquestioned right to prepare for eventualities in the event of

the failure of the peace parleys, the Kaiser himself recognized in a

later telegram that in the case of Germany when mobilization had once

been started it could not be immediately arrested.

Simultaneously King George had telegraphed the Kaiser through Prince

Henry as follows:

Thanks for Your telegram; so pleased to hear of William's

efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed I am

earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a

European war should be averted. My Government is doing its

utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further

military preparations if Austria will consent to be

satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring

Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement

of her demands; other countries meanwhile suspending their

war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence

to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that

Germany and England are working together to prevent what

would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I

am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power

to preserve peace of Europe.[65]

[Footnote 65: Second German _White Paper_.]

The fairness of this proposal can hardly be disputed. It conceded to

Austria the right to occupy the capital of Servia and hold it as a

hostage for a satisfactory adjustment of her demands and even to

continue her military preparations, while all other nations, including

Russia, were to suspend their military preparations. As the Kaiser

precipitated the war because Russia would not cease its preparations

for eventualities, King George's proposal, upon which neither the

Kaiser nor his government ever acted, fully met his demands.

To this the Kaiser replied on July 31st:

Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with

My ideas and with the statements I got this night from

Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received

news from Chancellor that official notification has just

reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the

mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even

awaited the results of the mediation I am working at, and

left Me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take

measures for ensuring safety of My eastern frontiers where

strong Russian troops are already posted.[66]

[Footnote 66: Second German _White Paper_.]

On its face this reply seems not unreasonable, but it must not be

forgotten that Austria continued not only to bombard Belgrade but to

mobilize its armies against Russia as well as Servia. Russia agreed to

stop all military preparations, if Austria would consent to discuss

the Servian question with a view to peace. Austria until the eleventh

hour--when it was too late--refused even to discuss the Servian

question and never offered either to demobilize or to cease its attack

upon Servia. Germany upheld her in this unwarrantable course.

While in principle the Kaiser agreed with the King as to the method of

adjustment, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Kaiser

ever made any suggestion to his ally that it should stop its

operations against Servia after capturing Belgrade, and await the

adjustment of the questions through diplomatic channels.

Thereupon King George sent a brief telegram, stating that he had sent

an urgent telegram to the Czar urging this course. Later on July 31st

the Kaiser sent the following telegram to the Czar:

Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my

aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and

the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was

taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my

ally, Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already

communicated to You, my mediation has become almost

illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I

receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are

going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the

security of my country forces me to measures of defense. I

have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts

for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I

who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now

threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand

to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia

which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.

The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me

by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred

to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in

serious affliction, especially during its last war. _The

peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia

decides to discontinue those military preparations which

menace Germany and Austria-Hungary._

In this fair-spoken message we unhappily find no suggestion that

Austria would stop its mobilization, or its military operations

against Servia. The untenable position of the Kaiser, to which he

adhered with fatal consistency to the end, was that Austria should be

given the full right to mobilize against Russia as well as Servia, and

that his ally should even be permitted to press its aggressive

operations against Servia by taking possession of its capital and

holding it as a ransom. In the meantime Russia should not make any

military preparations, either to move effectually against Austria in

the event of the failure of negotiations, or even to defend itself.

The Kaiser's suggestion did not even carry with it the implication

that Germany would stop the military preparations that it was then

carrying on in feverish haste, so that the contention of the Kaiser,

however plausibly it was veiled in his telegram, was that _Germany and

Austria_ _should have full freedom to prepare for war against Russia,

while Russia was to tie its hands and await the outcome of further

parleys, with Austrian cannon bombarding Belgrade_.

In this correspondence the Kaiser displayed his recognized ability as

a writer and speaker, for in this rapid-fire exchange of telegrams the

Kaiser was easily the better controversialist.

He assumed the role of a disinterested party, who, at the request of a

litigant, agrees to become an impartial mediator. He was neither. The

Czar had not asked him to be a mediator, although in the later

telegrams the Russian monarch accepted that term. The Czar in his

first telegram had asked the Kaiser as a party to the quarrel "to

restrain your ally from going too far." The Kaiser, having adroitly

accepted a very different role, promptly shifts the responsibility

upon the Czar of embarrassing the so-called "mediation." This enabled

him to assume the attitude of "injured innocence" and very skillfully

he played that part.

This at least is clear that in this correspondence the Kaiser was

either guilty of insincerity or he betrayed a fatal incapacity to

grasp the essentials of the quarrel. I prefer the latter construction

of his conduct. Against the bellicose efforts of his Foreign Office

and his General Staff, I believe that for dynastic reasons he strove

for a time to adjust the difficulty, but his egomania and his

life-long habit of personal absolutism blinded him to the fact that he

was taking an untenable, indeed an impossible, position, in contending

that Russia should effectually tie its hands while Germany and Austria

should be left free to prepare for eventualities. Had there been a

breathing spell and the Kaiser had had more time for reflection,

possibly the unreasonableness of his contention would have suggested

itself, but he found on his sudden return from Norway that his

country, through the fatuous folly of its military party, was almost

irrevocably committed to war. Probably he did not dare to reverse

openly and formally its policy. His popularity had already suffered in

the Moroccan crisis. This consideration and the histrionic side to his

complex personality betrayed him into his untenable and fatal

position.

The Kaiser has hitherto been regarded as a man of exceptional ability.

Time and the issue of this war will tell. The verdict of history may

be to the contrary. The world for a time may easily confuse restless

energy and habitual meddling with real ability, but its final verdict

will go far deeper. Since the Kaiser dropped his sagacious pilot,

Germany's real position in the world has steadily weakened. Then it

was the first power in Europe with its rivals disunited. The Kaiser

has united his enemies with "hoops of steel," driven Russia and

England into a close alliance, forced Italy out of the Triple

Alliance, and as the only compensation for these disastrous results,

he has gained the doubtful cooperation of moribund Turkey, of which he

is likely to say before many months are over: "Who shall deliver me

from the body of this death?"

In the meantime, Germany was not idle in its preparations for

eventualities.

The Kaiser and his counsellors were already definitely planning for

the war, and were taking steps to alienate England from her Allies and

secure her neutrality. To insure this, the German Chancellor, having

visited the Kaiser at Potsdam, sent for the British Ambassador, and

made the following significant offer:

[67]I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His

Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

[Footnote 67: Sir E. Goschen.]

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European

conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to

Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his

continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to

make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He

said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the

main principle which governed British policy, that Great

Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed

in any conflict there might be. _That, however, was not the

object at which Germany aimed._ Provided that neutrality of

Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given

to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed

at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France,

should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and

he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in

that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency

said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the

integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was

ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she

would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France

what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in

Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would

be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been

Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were

aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he

trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that

understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a

general neutrality agreement between England and Germany,

though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to

discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in

the conflict which the present crisis might possibly

produce, would enable him to look forward to a realization

of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his

request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it

probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind

yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion

that you would desire to retain full liberty.[68]

[Footnote 68: English _White Paper_, No. 85.]

While the German Foreign Office was thus endeavoring to keep England

neutral, its army was on the move against France. This does not rest

upon vague allegation, but upon the detailed specifications in a

communication from the French Foreign Office, which the French

Ambassador in London submitted to Sir Edward Grey on July 31st. Its

significance is apparent when it is remembered that simultaneously

the Kaiser was invoking the Czar to demobilize his armies, and cease

military preparations.

The German army had its advance posts on our frontiers

yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to

our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance

of 10 kilometers from the frontier. The local population is

protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the

enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to

public opinion and to the British Government that in no case

will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th Corps from

Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and

Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg

side. The 15th Army Corps from Strassburg has closed up on

the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are

prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the

frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by

tens of thousands. This is the last stage before

mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single

reservist.

As you see, Germany has done it. _I would add that all my

information goes to show that the German preparations began

on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was

handed in._[69]

[Footnote 69: English _White Paper_, No. 105 "Austrian" obviously

means "Servian."]

In reply to the suggestion of the German Chancellor as to the

neutrality of England, Sir Edward Grey advised the English Ambassador

on July 30th, as follows:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the

Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to

neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while

French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as

Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the

colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is

unacceptable, for France, without further territory in

Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose

her position as a great Power, and become subordinate to

German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to

make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a

disgrace from which the good name of this country would

never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away

whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the

neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain

either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether

the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement

between England and Germany offered positive advantages

sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must

preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem

to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable

development of the present crisis as the Chancellor

contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and

add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good

relations between England and Germany is that they should

continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe;

if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of

Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_

improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's

Government will work in that way with all sincerity and

goodwill.

_And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be

preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own

endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which

Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that

no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her

or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or

separately._

This letter will give Sir Edward Grey lasting glory in the history of

civilization. Its chivalrous fairness to France needs no comment, but

its most significant feature is the concluding portion, in which the

English Foreign Minister suggested to Germany that if peace could be

preserved, England stood ready to join with Germany in an alliance

which would have insured all the great European nations against any

aggressive war on the part of either of them.

It was, in fact, the "United States of Europe" in embryo. It

was the one solution possible for these long-continued European

wars--essentially civil wars--namely an alliance by the six

great Powers,--a merger of the Triple Alliance and the Triple

Entente,--whereby any aggressive act on the part of any one of them

would be prevented by the others. What an infinite pity that the

imprudent act of the Kaiser, and the mad folly of his advisers

probably made a fair trial of this most hopeful plan for the

unification of Europe an impossibility for another century!

In order that Germany should have no excuse whatever to declare war on

account of Russia's preparations, the Russian Foreign Minister saw the

German Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 30th, _and then offered on

behalf of Russia to stop all military preparations_, provided that

Austria would simply recognize as an abstract principle that the

Servian question had assumed the character of a question of European

interest. As this proposal fully met the demands of the Kaiser with

respect to the cessation by Russia of military preparations, the

conversation as reported by the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg

to Sir Edward Grey on July 30th deserves quotation _in extenso_:

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs

this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had

told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were

willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be

respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might

be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian

vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had

become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in

Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of

Russian Government, that Germany was making military and

naval preparations against Russia--more particularly in the

direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for

Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down

on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof

to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German

Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up

and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of

which the following is a translation:

"_If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has

assumed character of question of European interest, declares

herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which

violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages

to stop all military preparations._"

Later in the day, at the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, the Russian

Foreign Minister still further modified in the interests of peace the

proposition upon which Russia was willing to cease all military

preparations.

If Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon

Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the

Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a

question of European interest, she admits that the great

Powers examine _the reparation which Servia could accord to

the Government of Austria-Hungary without injury to her

rights as a sovereign State_ and to her independence--Russia

undertakes to maintain her expectant attitude.

It will be noted that this formula implied that Servia owed some

reparation to Austria, and it did not bind Austria to accept the

judgment of the Powers as to the character of such reparation.

It simply conceded to the Powers the opportunity to "examine"--not

the original controversy between Austria and Servia--but what

reparation could be made without a compromise of sovereignty and

independence. Austria did not bind itself to do anything except to

stay the advance of her army into Servia, while Russia agreed to

desist from further preparations or mobilization.

Could the offer have been more liberal? In face of this assurance, how

can the Kaiser or Germany reasonably contend that it was the

mobilization of the Russian army which precipitated the war.

In the meantime Sir Edward Grey was working tirelessly to suggest some

peace formula, upon which the Powers could agree. His suggestions for

a conference of the four leading Powers of Europe, other than Russia

and Austria, had been negatived by Germany on the frivolous pretext

that such a conference was "too formal a method," quite ignoring the

fact that its very formality would have necessarily given a "cooling

time" to the would-be belligerents. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey urged

that,

_the German Government should suggest any method by which

the influence of the four Powers could be used together to

prevent war between Austria and Russia_. France agreed.

Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating

influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method

that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable_. In

fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any

method that Germany thought possible _if only Germany would

"press the button" in the interests of peace_.[70]

[Footnote 70: English _White Paper_, No. 84.]

Later in the day Sir Edward again repeated his suggestion to the

German Ambassador in London and urged that Germany should,

_propose some method_ by which the four Powers should be

able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed

out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of

mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military

operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise

a mediation would only drag on matters _and give Austria

time to crush Servia_. It was of course too late for all

military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a

short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in

Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But

even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into

existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the

occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from

Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending

an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The only reply that England received to this reiterated request that

Germany take the lead in suggesting some acceptable peace formula was

set forth in a dispatch from Sir E. Goschen from Berlin to Sir Edward

Grey:

I was informed last night that they (the German Foreign

Office) had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in

reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether

the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action,

_the [German] Secretary of State said that he felt that time

would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that

he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would

satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned._

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the

button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure

whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at

Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than

otherwise.[71]

[Footnote 71: See English _White Paper_, No. 84.]

The Court of Public Opinion unfortunately is not favored in the German

_White Paper_ with the text of its communication on this subject to

Vienna, nor is it given any specifications as to the manner in which

the German Chancellor "pressed the button."

What the world knows without documentary proof is that Austria

continued its military preparations and operations and that Russia

then ordered a general mobilization. The only assurance which Russia

received from Austria as a result of the alleged "pressing of the

button" is set forth in the following dispatch from the Russian

Ambassador at Vienna to Sazonof, dated July 31st:

In spite of the general mobilization I continue to exchange

views with Count Berchtold and his collaborators. All insist

on the absence of aggressive intentions on the part of

Austria against Russia and of ambitions of conquest in

regard to Servia, _but all equally insist on the necessity

for Austria of pursuing to the very end the action begun and

of giving to Servia a serious lesson which would constitute

a certain guarantee for the future_.

This was in effect a flat refusal of all mediatory or otherwise

pacific suggestions, for the right of Austria to crush Servia by

giving it "a serious lesson"--what such a lesson is let Louvain,

Liege, and Rheims witness!--was the crux of the whole question.

Concurrently Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that

Germany had declared that day the "_Kriegsgefahr_" and that the German

Chancellor had expressed the opinion that "all hope of a peaceful

solution of the crisis" was at an end. The British Ambassador then

asked the Chancellor,--

whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities

at Vienna to do something in the general interests to

reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue

discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night

he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and

that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian

Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the

Emperor this morning in the matter.[72]

[Footnote 72: English _White Paper_, No. 112.]

Here again the world is not favored with the text of the message, in

which the Chancellor "begged Austria to reply," nor with that of the

Austrian Foreign Minister's reply.

While these events were happening in Berlin and London, the Russian

Ambassador in Vienna advised Sazonof "that Austria has determined not

to yield to the intervention of the powers and that she is moving

troops against Russia as well as Servia."[73]

[Footnote 73: English _White Paper_, No. 113.]

Russia thereupon, on July 31, ordered a general mobilization of her

army.

Concurrently with these interviews, the English Ambassador in Vienna

had a conversation with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State and

called his attention to the fact that during the discussion

of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of

Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia,

and that a compromise between the views of Russia and

Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line.

Although he[74] spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not

regard the situation as desperate, _I could not get from him

any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present

case_. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the

Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above

conversation.[75]

[Footnote 74: The Austrian Under-Secretary of State.]

[Footnote 75: English _White Paper_, No. 118.]

Notwithstanding all these discouragements and rebuffs, Sir Edward

Grey, that unwearying friend of peace, still continued to make a last

attempt to preserve peace by instructing the British Ambassador in

Berlin to sound the German Foreign Office, as he would sound the

Russian Foreign Office,

whether it would be possible for the four disinterested

Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see

that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on

Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian

sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your

Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her

willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the

four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian

demands from going the length of impairing Servian

sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course

suspend further military operations or preparations.

He further instructed Sir Edward Goschen to advise the German Foreign

Office that he, Sir Edward Grey, had that morning proposed to the

German Ambassador in London,

_that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put

forward, which made it clear that Germany and Austria were

striving to preserve European peace_, and that Russia and

France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, _I would

support it at St. Petersburg and Paris_, and go the length

of saying that, if Russia and France would not accept it,

_his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with

the consequences_; that, otherwise, I told the German

Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn

in.[76]

[Footnote 76: English _White Paper_, No. 111.]

What, then, was the position when the last fatal step was taken? The

Czar had pledged his personal honor that no provocative action should

be taken by Russia, while peace parleys were in progress, and the

Russian Foreign Minister had agreed to cease all military

preparations, provided that Austria would recognize that the question

of Servia had become one of European interest, and that its

sovereignty would be respected.

On July 31st, Austria _for the first time_ in the negotiations agreed

to discuss with the Russian Government the merits of the Servian note.

Until this eleventh hour Austria had consistently contended that her

difficulty with Servia was her own question, in which Russia had no

right to intervene, and which it would not under any circumstances

even discuss with Russia. For this reason it had refused any time for

discussion, abruptly declared war against Servia, commenced its

military operations, and repeatedly declined to discuss even the few

questions left open in the Servian reply as a basis for further peace

parleys.

As recently as July 30th, the Austrian Government had declined or

refused any "direct exchange of views with the Russian Government."

But late on July 31st, a so-called "conversation" took place at Vienna

between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador, and as a result,

the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to "converse"

with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. This important

concession of Austria was conveyed to Sazonof by the Austrian

Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who expressed

the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of

the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by

expressing his satisfaction and said it was desirable that

the discussions should take place in London with the

participation of the Great Powers.

M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume

the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe

would be thankful to them. It would be very important that

Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her

military action on Servian territory.[77]

[Footnote 77: English _White Paper_, No. 133.]

_It is important to note that Austria's change of heart preceded by

some hours the Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia._ The former took place

some time during the day on July 31st. The latter was sent to St.

Petersburg on the midnight of that day. It must also be noted that

while Austria thus agreed at the eleventh hour to "discuss the

substance of the ultimatum," it did not offer to suspend military

preparations or operations and this obviously deprived the concession

of its chief value.[78]

[Footnote 78: _See_ Addendum, p. 191-2.]

The cause and purpose of Austria's partial reversal of its policy at

present writing can be only a matter of conjecture. When Austria

publishes its correspondence with Germany, we may know the truth.

Two theories are equally plausible:

Austria may have taken alarm at the steadfast purpose of Russia to

champion the cause of Servia with the sword. If so, its qualified

reversal of its bellicose attitude may have induced the war party at

Berlin to precipitate the war by the ultimatum to Russia. In that

event, Germany's mad policy of war at any cost is even more

iniquitous.[79]

[Footnote 79: _See_ Addendum, p. 190, _et seq._]

The supposition is equally plausible that Austria had been advised

from Berlin that that night Germany would end all efforts to preserve

the peace of Europe by an ultimatum to Russia, which would make war

inevitable. The case of Germany and Austria at the bar of the world

would be made morally stronger if, at the outbreak of hostilities, the

attitude of Austria had become more conciliatory. This would make more

plausible their contention that the mobilization of Russia and not

Austria's flat rejection of all peace overtures had precipitated the

conflict.

_This much is certain that the Kaiser, with full knowledge that

Austria had consented to renew its conferences with Russia_, and that

a ray of light had broken through the lowering war clouds, either on

his own initiative or yielding to the importunities of his military

camarilla, directed the issuance of the ultimatum to Russia and thus

blasted the last hope of peace.

On midnight of July 31st, the German Chancellor sent the following

telegram to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and

although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no

measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire

army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also.

By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the

safeguarding of the Empire, to announce that danger of war

threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization.

Mobilization, however, must follow _unless Russia ceases

within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and

Austria-Hungary_ and gives us definite assurance thereof.

Kindly communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour

of its communication to him.

At midnight the fateful message was delivered. As Sazonof reports the

interview:

At midnight the Ambassador of Germany declared to me, by

order of his Government, that if within twelve hours,

that is at midday of Saturday, we did not commence

demobilization, _not only in regard to Germany but also in

regard to Austria_, the German Government would be forced to

give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was

war the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that

we were very near it.

It will be noted by the italicized portion that Germany did not

restrict its demand that Russia cease its preparations against

Germany, but it should also desist from any preparations to defend

itself or assert its rights against Austria, although Austria had

made no offer to suspend either its preparations for war or recall its

general mobilization order.

The twelve hours elapsed and Russia, standing upon its dignity as a

sovereign nation of equal standing with Germany, declined to answer

this unreasonable and most arrogant demand, which under the

circumstances was equivalent to a declaration of war.

Simultaneously a like telegram was sent to the Ambassador at Paris,

requiring the French Government to state in eighteen hours whether it

would remain neutral in the event of a Russian-German war.

The reasons given for this double ultimatum are as disingenuous as the

whole course of German diplomacy in this matter. The statement that

Germany had pursued any mediatory negotiations was as untrue as its

statement that it had taken no measures for mobilization. Equally

disingenuous was the statement with respect to the _Kriegsgefahr_

(state of martial law), for when that was declared on July 31st,

the railroad, telegraph, and other similar public utilities were

immediately taken over by Germany and the movement of troops to the

frontier began.

After the fateful ultimatum had thus been given by Germany to Russia,

the British Ambassador, pursuant to the instructions of his home

office, saw the German Secretary of State on July 31st, and urged him

most earnestly to accept your [Sir Edward Grey's] proposal

and make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe

of a European war.

He [von Jagow] expressed himself very sympathetically toward

your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to

maintain peace _but said it was impossible for the Imperial

Government to consider any proposal until they had received

an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day_;

this communication, which he admitted had the form of an

ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the

Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would

immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and

Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at

once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even

more difficult for Russia to accept _by asking them to

demobilize in the south as well_. He replied that it was in

order to prevent Russia from saying that all her

mobilization was only directed against Austria.[80]

[Footnote 80: English _White Paper_, No. 121.]

The German Secretary of State also stated to Sir E. Goschen that both

the Emperor William and the German Foreign Office

had even up till last night been urging Austria to show

willingness to continue discussions, and telegraphic and

telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a

promising nature, but Russia's mobilization had spoiled

everything.

Here again it must be noted that the telegraphic communications from

Vienna have not yet been published by the Austrian Government, nor by

the German Foreign Office in its official defense.

Sir Edward Grey's last attempt to preserve peace was on August 1st,

when he telegraphed to Sir E. Goschen:

I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if

only a little respite in time can be gained before any great

power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness

of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of

Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to

the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia

originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and

Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that the German

Government may be able to make use of the Russian

communications referred to above in order to avoid tension.

His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any

act which may precipitate matters.[81]

[Footnote 81: English _White Paper_, No. 131.]

At that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia had already expired,

but the British Ambassador saw the German Secretary of State on August

1st, and, after submitting to him the substance of Sir Edward Grey's

telegram last quoted,

spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute

was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only

drawn in as Austria's ally. _If, therefore, Austria and

Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and

Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to

me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and

continue to work for a peaceful settlement._ Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to

discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and,

had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have

been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering

Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused

Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her

mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she

could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without

making war. _This was not the case with Germany. She had the

speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the

German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time

to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide

dominions _. The situation now was that, though the

Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the

specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had,

therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German

representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within

a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the

Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as

creating a state of war.[82]

[Footnote 82: English _White Paper_, No. 138.]

It will thus be seen that although Germany was urged to the very last

to await the result of the conferences, which had just commenced with

some slight promise of success between Austria and Russia, it

nevertheless elected to declare war against Russia and thus blast

beyond possible recall any possibility of peace. Its justification for

this course, as stated in the interview with the German Secretary of

State last quoted, was that it did not propose to forego its advantage

of speed as against the advantage of Russia's numerical superiority.

For this there might be some justification, if Russia had shown an

unyielding and bellicose attitude, but apart from the fact that

Russia had consistently worked in the interests of peace, Germany

had the express assurance of the Czar that no provocative action

would be taken while peace conferences continued. To disregard these

assurances and thus destroy the pacific efforts of other nations, in

order not to lose a tactical advantage, was the clearest disloyalty to

civilization. In any aspect, Germany could have fully kept its

advantage of speed by inducing its ally to suspend its aggressive

operations against Servia, for in that event Russia had expressly

obligated itself to suspend all military preparations.

As the final document in this shameful chapter of diplomacy, there

need only be added the telegram, sent by the German Chancellor to his

Ambassador at St. Petersburg on August 1, 1914, in which war was

declared by Germany against Russia on the ground that while Germany

and Austria should be left free to pursue their aggressive military

preparations, Russia should, on the peremptory demand of another

nation, cease the mobilization of its armies even for self-defense. It

reads:

The Imperial Government has endeavored from the opening of

the crisis to lead it to a pacific solution. In accordance

with a desire which had been expressed to him by His Majesty

the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany

in accord with England had applied himself to filling a

mediatory role with the Cabinets of Vienna and St.

Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result of

this, proceeded to the complete mobilization of her forces

on land and sea. As a consequence of this threatening

measure, motived by no military "_presage_" on the part of

Germany, the German Empire found itself in face of a grave

and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed

to safeguard herself against this peril it would have

compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany.

Consequently the German Government saw itself forced to

address to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all

the Russias, an insistence on the cessation of the said

military acts. Russia, having refused to accede to (not

having thought it should reply to), this demand, and having

manifested by this refusal (this attitude) that its action

was directed against Germany, I have the honor to make known

to your Excellency the following:

His Majesty the Emperor, My August Sovereign, in the name of

the Empire, taking up the challenge, considers himself in a

state of war with Russia.

The feverish haste with which this fatal step was taken, is shown by

the fact that the German Ambassador could not even wait to state

whether Russia had refused to answer or answered negatively. This

war--thus begun in such mad haste--is likely to be repented of at

leisure.

A few hours before this rash and most iniquitous declaration was made

the Czar made his last appeal for peace. With equal solemnity and

pathos he telegraphed the Kaiser:

_I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are

forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the

same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these

measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to

negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the

universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid

of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to

prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence

your urgent reply._

This touching and magnanimous message does infinite credit to the

Czar. Had the Kaiser been as pacific, had he been inspired by the same

enlightened spirit in the interests of peace, had he been as truly

mindful of the God of nations, whom the Czar thus invoked, it would

have been possible to prevent the "shedding of blood," which has now

swept away after only three months of war the very flower of the youth

of Europe.

To this the Kaiser replied:

I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to

Your Government the way through which _alone_ war may yet be

averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no

telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of

Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my

army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your

Government is the _sole_ way to avoid endless misery. Until

I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to

enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most

earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to

commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of

our frontiers.

In this is no spirit of compromise; only the repeated insistence of

the unreasonable and in its consequences iniquitous demand that Russia

should by demobilizing make itself "naked to its enemies," while

Germany and Austria, without making any real concession in the

direction of peace, should be permitted to arm both for offense and

defense.

There were practical reasons which made the Kaiser's demand

unreasonable. Mobilization is a highly developed and complicated piece

of governmental machinery, and even where transportation facilities

are of the best, as in Germany and France, the mobilization ordinarily

takes about two weeks to complete. In Russia, with limited means of

transportation, it was impossible to recall immediately a mobilization

order that had gone forward to the remotest corners of the great

Empire. The record shows that the Kaiser himself recognized this fact,

for in a telegram which he sent on August 1st to King George, with

respect to the possible neutralization of England, the Kaiser said:

I just received the communication from Your Government

offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great

Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under

these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking

France. _On technical grounds My mobilization, which had

already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against

two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be

countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so

late._ But if France offers Me neutrality which must be

guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course

refrain from attacking France and employ My troops

elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The

troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by

telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.[83]

[Footnote 83: No such offer had been made. The Kaiser's error was due

to a misunderstanding, which had arisen quite honestly between Sir

Edward Grey and the German Ambassador in London. King George promptly

corrected this misapprehension of the Kaiser.