THE RAILWAYS.
The prosperity of the Argentine Republic would undoubtedly have been
impossible without the enormous investments made by British financial
houses in its railway development. For many years--in fact, until quite
recently--the influx of capital was welcomed and encouraged. Concessions
were lavished on anyone ready to take them up, and, far from irksome
conditions being imposed, valuable privileges were granted to the
_concessionnaires_. Moreover, the national and provincial governments
were only too eager to get rid of such lines as they themselves owned,
and invariably worked at a loss, and to transfer them to European
concerns. That the railways were financed from motives of promiscuous
philanthropy is improbable, but that the English financiers were almost
alone in their confidence in the future of the country is not only true,
but it is a truth which the most respected and able Argentines fully
realise. There exists, however, at the present moment a very powerful
feeling of opposition to the "Empresas," as they are called--the
"concerns" that practically control the country--and (so say their
opponents) exploit it entirely for their own ends. Apart from the fact
that a railway, in order to pay, must humour its traffic, and would be
attempting suicide were it really guilty of the exorbitant overcharging
and mismanagement of which some lines are accused, there is little or no
cause for these complaints. In a country where a mortgage on land pays
8 per cent. interest, and where other investments are expected to give
a proportionate return, the 7 per cent. of a railway dividend is far
from being excessive, especially when it is remembered that locusts and
drought may at any time absorb practically the whole year's profits of
a whole system.
The motive of this hostile spirit, or what may be behind it, is difficult
to discover. That jealousy of foreign--especially English--influence
exists in a certain section of the people is undoubted. But, considering
that the true Argentine population--supposing that such a thing exists
or could be defined--is very small compared with the foreign element,
and that of itself it is absolutely incapable of developing the country,
some other reason must exist to justify the position. But, discreditable
as such jealousy is to the people concerned, it is without doubt a very
powerful factor.
Fortunately, these opinions are not shared by the Government, nor,
probably by the people generally, who, although always complaining
of high freights, delay in transport, and all the other grievances
for which every railway under the sun is blamed, seem to dread the
alternative of Government control. The official members of the
Government are on the whole considered to be sincere, industrious men,
with a genuine desire to do their best. But Government management
invariably means peculation, among subordinates especially, and the
introduction of petty politics into business. It is from this element
that the opposition springs. Concessions requested by capitalists,
permission for extensions required by existing concerns, although of
undoubted advantage to the country and approved by Government, are
blocked in Congress. The tone and quality of Congress may be judged
from the fact that the only measure of any importance passed during a
whole session was that authorising an increase in the salaries of the
deputies. For weeks on end no meeting can be held, be the measures to be
discussed ever so important, because, from carelessness or deliberate
intention, sufficient members do not appear to form a quorum. Several
deputies, indeed, never sit from the beginning of the session to the
end. Thus, even if there is no opposition to a railway bill, it often
happens that it is as effectually blocked by the sheer slackness of
individual congressmen.
That the railways themselves are not blameless in every respect stands
to reason. And, although this is almost certainly not the origin of the
present obstruction to their demands, they would command a much greater
share of sympathy--after all, a considerable asset--if they would
realise their own faults.
Having had, and still having, a practical monopoly in their own
districts, the various companies have adopted a somewhat despotic
attitude towards new and outside enterprise, and, sometimes a disregard
for the requirements of their customers, as well as for the true needs
of the country. Railway affairs centre in River Plate House, and
any attempt on the part of outsiders to establish themselves in the
Argentine is viewed with great suspicion by the financial ring that
rules there. Concessions put forward have been blocked times out of
number by the influence which the ring could exert in Congress. If by
any chance--and this has been more frequent of late--the concessions
have been secured in spite of its opposition, every obstacle is placed
in the way of raising the requisite capital in London--opposition which
the ring is in a peculiar position to make effective. Only recently a
very sound project was floated with the greatest difficulty, even the
debentures failing to realise more than 90 per cent., because one of
the existing lines considered the proposal a trespass on its especial
preserves. Moreover, there seems to be every reason to anticipate the
rapid failure of the new line owing to the rate war which the existing
one will undoubtedly declare.
This apparent disregard of the needs or desires of their customers is,
perhaps, attributable partly to the unreasonable nature of the demand,
partly to an occasional pursuit of some pet theory of management,
but, in all probability, more largely to the division and conflict of
authority. The management is separated from its central board, not only
by the Atlantic, but by the local board sitting in Buenos Aires. And,
although on the home board there are men whose knowledge of the country
was intimate some years previously, their aspect of the working of
a railway naturally undergoes considerable modification upon their
transference from the executive to the directorate; while the local
board, who are often appointed merely to secure local support and
influence, are rather apt to exercise their power in a vexatious and
capricious manner--more to show their authority than to further the
interests of the railway. As regards the actual working of the lines, in
some cases complaints are made that too much confidence is placed in
the long-haul, long-train theory. There are only a few lines on which
there is any opportunity for or advantage in the very long train, the
agricultural districts centring round the various ports. Owing to the
lack of warehouse accommodation along the line, grain has often to be
loaded into the trains straight from the growers' carts, thus causing
endless delay when trains of immense length stand to be filled. It
often happens, too, if the harvest proves at all good, that, in spite
of Government orders, the rolling stock is quite inadequate for the
traffic, the result being that with the accumulation of work in the
docks, a crop is sometimes kept locally for a whole year before it
can be removed to a port.
Considerable inconvenience is caused, and will continue to be caused
for some time, by the congestion at the port of Buenos Aires. Control
there has been exercised by half a dozen different boards with no
central authority. The wharfage and warehouse accommodation are quite
inadequate, even if the great savings possible in time and space were
realised. And, lastly, although there is already sufficient confusion
with a one gauge system, there is an immediate prospect of the
introduction of two other gauges. The existing lines there are 5 ft.
6 in. But preparations are already being made for the continuation of
the Central Córdoba (metre gauge) into the port, and possibly of the
Entre Rios (4 ft. 8½ in.) extension as well.
The solution to the difficulty is at present very doubtful. Increased
accommodation to a limited extent is quite possible in Buenos Aires
itself, and with an immense outlay of capital an entirely new set of
docks might be constructed there--though this is highly improbable. The
more reasonable course would undoubtedly be to construct new ports or
develop existing ones elsewhere, a course that is already being adopted
by the Southern at Bahia Blanca, and the Entre Rios line at Ibicuy.
There is also a new project floated for the construction of a large
port in the Bay of Samborombon (also on the Southern system), but this
scheme does not meet with much approval in the country, while, for some
reason, the port of La Plata has never succeeded, in spite of every
encouragement. At some time a port will have to be constructed at Mar
del Plata, where the only rock foundation on the whole coast is to be
found. Mar del Plata is the Argentine Brighton, and any commercial
development there is certain of an unfavourable reception. But as sand
and mud are the only base from Santa Fé to Bahia Blanca--in some cases
there being not even firm sand--and as dredging is exceptionally
expensive, no other solution seems reasonable. On the Uruguay River,
and on the Eastern Bank of the Paraná, in the South of Entre Rios there
is deep water. But as this only affects the lines of that province and
of Corrientes it has no bearing on the general question of Argentine
transport.
As a last word, it must be remembered that the present boom in
the country is extremely recent. Argentine has developed in an
extraordinarily rapid manner, and some confusion is excusable. That the
railway and the country will realise and overcome their difficulties
there can be little doubt. And in any case the natural wealth of the
country is so great that in the end it will force a way out, in spite
of obstacles.
Statistics relating to railways will be found in Chapter VI.