CHAPTER XIII.

_The General Method of Scepticism._

Since we have said that [Greek: ataraxia] follows the suspension 31

of judgment in regard to everything, it behooves us to

explain how the suspension of judgment takes place. Speaking in

general it takes place through placing things in opposition to

each other. We either place phenomena in opposition to

phenomena, or the intellectual in opposition to the

intellectual, or reciprocally. For example, we place 32

phenomena in opposition to phenomena when we say that this tower

appears round from a distance but square near by; the

intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, when to the one

who from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to

prove that a providence exists, we oppose the fact that

adversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil,

and that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is no

providence. The intellectual is placed in opposition to 33

phenomena, as when Anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow is

white, by saying that snow is frozen water, and, as water is

black, snow must also be black. Likewise we sometimes place the

present in opposition to the present, similarly to the

above-mentioned cases, and sometimes also the present in

opposition to the past or the future. As for example, when

someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say

to him, "Before the founder of the sect to which you belong 34

was born, the argument which you propose in accordance with it

had not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature,

so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also

exists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is

not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now

seems to be strong." In order to make it clearer to us what 35

we mean by these oppositions, I will proceed to give the Tropes

([Greek: tropoi]), through which the suspension of judgment is

produced, without asserting anything about their meaning or

their number, because they may be unsound, or there may be more

than I shall enumerate.

Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism · 第 13 / 34 章