Colonel Harris’ aerial reconnaissance during the first week on Peleliu
had convinced him that siege tactics would be required to clear the
multitude of mutually defended positions within Umurbrogol. As he had
earlier expressed himself in the presence of the corps and division
commanders visiting his regimental CP, Harris continued with his policy
to “be lavish with ammunition and stingy with ... men’s lives.” He
was in a strong command position to prepare support thoroughly before
ordering advances.
The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, relieved 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in
position on 5 October, but did nothing but reconnoiter positions where
heavier firepower could come into play. Engineer dozers were brought up
to prepare paths into the north ends of the box canyons, along which
LVT flamethrowers and tanks could later operate. A light artillery
battery was emplaced along the West Road to fire point-blank into the
west-facing cliffs at the north end of the Pocket, as were weapons
carriers and tanks later. Troublesome sections of certain cliffs were
literally demolished by direct fire, and the rubble dozed into a ramp
for tanks to climb toward better firing positions. Light mortars were
used extensively to strip vegetation from areas in which firing caves
were suspected, and planes loaded with napalm-filled belly tanks were
used to bomb suspected targets just south of the key Hill 140, which
2/5 had selected as its key objective.
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