_Many of the participants in the battle with a literary turn of mind
best compared the ridge areas of Peleliu with the description of
Dante’s “Inferno.” Here a flame thrower-mounted amphibian tractor spews
its deadly stream of napalm into a cave._]
This attack against Hill B, the stopper at the northern end of the
Pocket absorbed the 321st Infantry’s full attention through 26
September, as the 5th Marines was fighting in northern Peleliu. The 7th
Marines continued pressuring the Pocket from the south, and guarding it
on the west. With the 321st victory on the 26th, that unit’s mission
was expanded to press into the Pocket from the north. This it did,
while simultaneously clearing out the sporadically defended Kamilianlul
Ridge to its north. Its attack south from Hill B and adjacent ridges
made very limited progress, but permitted some consolidation of the
American hold along the north side of the Pocket, now 400 yards wide in
that zone. On 29 September, the 7th Marines was ordered to relieve the
Army unit in that northern sector.
To relieve 2/7 and 3/7 of their now largely static guard positions
along the west and southwest sectors of the Pocket, the division
stripped hundreds of non-infantry from combat support units (artillery,
engineer, pioneer), and formed them into two composite “infantillery”
units. Under 11th Marines’ Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Evans and 5th
Marines’ Major Harold T. A. Richmond, they were assigned to maintain
the static hold in the sectors earlier held by 2/7 and 3/7. They faced
the karst plateau between the West Road and the Pocket.
The 7th Marines’ flexibility restored by this relief, its 1st and 3d
Battalions relieved the 321st units on 29 September, along the north
edge of the Pocket. Then on the 30th, they pushed south, securing
improved control of Boyd Ridge and its southern extension, variously
called Hill 100, Pope’s Ridge, or Walt Ridge. The latter dominated the
East Road, but Japanese defenders remained in caves on the west side.
The 7th Marines’ partial hold on Pope Ridge gave limited control of
East Road, and thereby stabilized the east side of the Pocket. But the
U.S. hold over the area needed improvement.
On 3 October, reinforced by the attached 3/5 (back from Ngesebus), the
7th Regiment organized a four-battalion attack. The plan called for 1/7
and 3/7 to attack from the north, against Boyd Ridge and the smaller
ridges to its west, while 2/7 would attack Pope (Walt) Ridge from the
south. The attached 3/5 was ordered to make a diversionary attack from
the south into the Horseshoe canyon and its guardian Five Sisters
on its west. This regimental attack against the Pocket committed
four infantry “battalions,” all now closer to company than battalion
strength, against the heights near the southern end of the Pocket (Five
Sisters), and the ridges at the eastern shoulder of the Pocket (Pope
and Boyd Ridges). After heavy casualties, the attack succeeded, but the
Five Sisters (four of which 3/5 scaled) were untenable, and had to be
abandoned after their seizure.
The next day, 4 October, the 7th Marines with 3/5 still attached made
one more general attack--in the south, again to seize, then give up,
positions on the Five Sisters; in the north, to try to advance and
consolidate the positions there earlier seized.
In that 4 October action, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines’ push led to an
unexpectedly rapid advance which it pressed to get up onto Hill 120. It
was hoped that this would provide a good jump-off for the next day’s
operation against the next ridge to the west. However, Hill 120, as
with so many others in the Umurbrogol, was then under enemy crossfire
which made it completely untenable. The attacking company was withdrawn
with heavy casualties. Among these casualties was Captain James V.
“Jamo” Shanley, commanding Company L. His company was attacking
Ridge/Hill 120 when several of his men fell, wounded. Shanley dashed
forward under heavy fire, rescued two of the men and brought them to
safety behind a tank. He then rushed back to help a third, when a
mortar round landed immediately behind him, mortally wounding him. His
executive officer, Lieutenant Harold J. Collins ran out to rescue him,
only to fall by his side instantly killed by a Japanese antitank round.
For his heroism Captain Shanley was awarded a Gold Star (second) for
the Navy Cross he had earned at Cape Gloucester, New Britain. There,
his company was in the lead in seizing Hill 660, a key terrain feature
in the Borgen Bay area.
The 7th Marines had now been in the terrible Umurbrogol struggle for
two weeks. General Rupertus decided to relieve it, a course General
Geiger also suggested. Still determined to secure the Pocket with
Marines, General Rupertus turned to his only remaining Marine regiment,
the 5th.
Colonel Harris brought two firm concepts to this final effort for his
5th Marines. First, the attack would be from the north, an approach
which offered the greatest opportunity to chip off one terrain
compartment or one ridge at a time. His 1st Battalion positions
along the east side of the Pocket would be held statically, perhaps
incrementally adjusted or improved. No attacks would be launched from
the south, where the 3d Battalion was positioned in reserve.
[Illustration: UMURBROGOL POCKET