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The Citizen's Library of Economics, Politics, and
Sociology
UNDER THE GENERAL EDITORSHIP OF
RICHARD T. ELY, Ph.D, LL.D.
_Director of the School of Economics and Political Science; Professor of
Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin_
12mo. Half Leather. $1.25, net, each
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*Monopolies and Trusts*. By RICHARD T. ELY, Ph.D., LL.D.
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has appeared."--Professor JOHN R. COMMONS.
"By all odds the best written of Professor Ely's work."--Professor SIMON
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*Outlines of Economics*. By RICHARD T. ELY, Ph.D., LL.D., author of
"Monopolies and Trusts," etc.
*The Economics of Distribution*. By JOHN A. HOBSON, author of "The
Evolution of Modern Capitalism," etc.
*World Politics*. By PAUL S. REINSCH, Ph.D., LL.B., Assistant Professor
of Political Science, University of Wisconsin.
*Economic Crises*. By EDWARD D. JONES, Ph.D., Instructor in Economics
and Statistics, University of Wisconsin.
*Government in Switzerland*. By JOHN MARTIN VINCENT, Ph.D., Associate
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*Political Parties in the United States, 1846-1861*. By JESSE MACY,
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*Essays on the Monetary History of the United States*. By CHARLES J.
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*Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order*. By EDWARD
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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK
*In Preparation for Early Issue*
*DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS*
By JANE ADDAMS, Head of "Hull House," Chicago; joint author of
"Philanthropy and Social Progress." (_Now ready._)
Miss Addams' Settlement Work is known to all who are interested in
social amelioration and municipal conditions. As the title of her book
shows, it will be occupied with the reciprocal relations of ethical
progress and the growth of democratic thought, sentiment, and
institutions.
*CUSTOM AND COMPETITION*
By RICHARD T. ELY, LL.D., Professor of Political Economy and
Director of the School of Economics and Political Science in the
University of Wisconsin; President of the American Economic
Association; author of "Monopolies and Trusts," etc.
Topics treated under Custom include the Rent of Land and Custom;
Interest and Custom; The Remuneration of Personal Services and Custom;
Custom and Commerce.
Competition is first discussed with reference to the biological aspects
of the question, and the significance of subhuman competition is
confined and a careful classification of its various kinds is presented.
One of the main topics of the book is Competition as a Principle of
Distribution, and its treatment of the subject of price admirably
supplements the theoretical discussion in "Monopolies and Trusts."
*AMERICAN MUNICIPAL PROGRESS*
By CHARLES ZUEBLIN, B.D., Associate Professor of Sociology in the
University of Chicago.
This work takes up the problem of the so-called public utilities, public
schools, libraries, children's playgrounds, public baths, public
gymnasiums, etc. The discussion is from the standpoint of public welfare
and is based on repeated personal investigations in leading cities of
Europe, especially England and the United States.
*COLONIAL GOVERNMENT*
By PAUL S. REINSCH, Ph.D., LL.B., Professor of Political Science in
the University of Wisconsin; Author of "World Politics at the End of
the Nineteenth Century as Influenced by the Oriental Situation."
By the author of the "World Politics," which met so cordial a reception
from students of modern political history. The main divisions of the
book are: Motives and Methods of Colonization; Forms of Colonial
Government; Relations between the Mother Country and the Colonies;
Internal Government of the Colonies; The Special Colonial Problems of
the United States.
* * * * *
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK
THE CITIZEN'S LIBRARY
OF
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND SOCIOLOGY
EDITED BY
RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D., LL.D.
DIRECTOR OF THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN
* * * * *
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS
*THE CITIZEN'S LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND
SOCIOLOGY.*
12mo. Half leather. $1.25 _net_ each.
* * * * *
*MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS.*
BY RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D., LL.D.
*THE ECONOMICS OF DISTRIBUTION.*
BY JOHN A. HOBSON.
*WORLD POLITICS.*
BY PAUL S. REINSCH, PH.D., LL.B.
*ECONOMIC CRISES.*
BY EDWARD D. JONES, PH.D.
*OUTLINE OF ECONOMICS.*
BY RICHARD T. ELY.
*GOVERNMENT IN SWITZERLAND.*
BY JOHN MARTIN VINCENT, PH.D.
*ESSAYS IN THE MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.*
BY CHARLES J. BULLOCK, PH.D.
*SOCIAL CONTROL.*
BY EDWARD A. ROSS, PH.D.
*HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES.*
BY JESSE MACY, LL.D.
*MUNICIPAL ENGINEERING AND SANITATION.*
BY M.N. BAKER, PH.B.
*DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS.*
BY JANE ADDAMS.
*COLONIAL GOVERNMENT.*
BY PAUL S. REINSCH, PH.D., LL.B.
* * * * *
_IN PREPARATION._
*CUSTOM AND COMPETITION.*
BY RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D., LL.D.
*MUNICIPAL SOCIOLOGY.*
BY CHARLES ZUEBLIN.
* * * * *
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY,
66 FIFTH AVENUE.
_THE CITIZEN'S LIBRARY_
* * * * *
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS
BY
JANE ADDAMS
HULL-HOUSE, CHICAGO
_New York_
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.
1902
Set up and electrotyped March, 1902. Reprinted
June, September, 1902.
Norwood Press
J.S. Cushing & Co.--Berwick & Smith
Norwood Mass. U.S.A.
To: M.R.S.
PREFATORY NOTE
The following pages present the substance of a course of twelve lectures
on "Democracy and Social Ethics" which have been delivered at various
colleges and university extension centres.
In putting them into the form of a book, no attempt has been made to
change the somewhat informal style used in speaking. The "we" and "us"
which originally referred to the speaker and her audience are merely
extended to possible readers.
Acknowledgment for permission to reprint is extended to _The Atlantic
Monthly_, _The International Journal of Ethics_, _The American Journal
of Sociology_, and to _The Commons_.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I PAGE
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER II
CHARITABLE EFFORT 13
CHAPTER III
FILIAL RELATIONS 71
CHAPTER IV
HOUSEHOLD ADJUSTMENT 102
CHAPTER V
INDUSTRIAL AMELIORATION 137
CHAPTER VI
EDUCATIONAL METHODS 178
CHAPTER VII
POLITICAL REFORM 221
INDEX 279
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is well to remind ourselves, from time to time, that "Ethics" is but
another word for "righteousness," that for which many men and women of
every generation have hungered and thirsted, and without which life
becomes meaningless.
Certain forms of personal righteousness have become to a majority of the
community almost automatic. It is as easy for most of us to keep from
stealing our dinners as it is to digest them, and there is quite as much
voluntary morality involved in one process as in the other. To steal
would be for us to fall sadly below the standard of habit and
expectation which makes virtue easy. In the same way we have been
carefully reared to a sense of family obligation, to be kindly and
considerate to the members of our own households, and to feel
responsible for their well-being. As the rules of conduct have become
established in regard to our self-development and our families, so they
have been in regard to limited circles of friends. If the fulfilment of
these claims were all that a righteous life required, the hunger and
thirst would be stilled for many good men and women, and the clew of
right living would lie easily in their hands.
But we all know that each generation has its own test, the
contemporaneous and current standard by which alone it can adequately
judge of its own moral achievements, and that it may not legitimately
use a previous and less vigorous test. The advanced test must indeed
include that which has already been attained; but if it includes no
more, we shall fail to go forward, thinking complacently that we have
"arrived" when in reality we have not yet started.
To attain individual morality in an age demanding social morality, to
pride one's self on the results of personal effort when the time demands
social adjustment, is utterly to fail to apprehend the situation.
It is perhaps significant that a German critic has of late reminded us
that the one test which the most authoritative and dramatic portrayal of
the Day of Judgment offers, is the social test. The stern questions are
not in regard to personal and family relations, but did ye visit the
poor, the criminal, the sick, and did ye feed the hungry?
All about us are men and women who have become unhappy in regard to
their attitude toward the social order itself; toward the dreary round
of uninteresting work, the pleasures narrowed down to those of appetite,
the declining consciousness of brain power, and the lack of mental food
which characterizes the lot of the large proportion of their
fellow-citizens. These men and women have caught a moral challenge
raised by the exigencies of contemporaneous life; some are bewildered,
others who are denied the relief which sturdy action brings are even
seeking an escape, but all are increasingly anxious concerning their
actual relations to the basic organization of society.
The test which they would apply to their conduct is a social test. They
fail to be content with the fulfilment of their family and personal
obligations, and find themselves striving to respond to a new demand
involving a social obligation; they have become conscious of another
requirement, and the contribution they would make is toward a code of
social ethics. The conception of life which they hold has not yet
expressed itself in social changes or legal enactment, but rather in a
mental attitude of maladjustment, and in a sense of divergence between
their consciences and their conduct. They desire both a clearer
definition of the code of morality adapted to present day demands and a
part in its fulfilment, both a creed and a practice of social morality.
In the perplexity of this intricate situation at least one thing is
becoming clear: if the latter day moral ideal is in reality that of a
social morality, it is inevitable that those who desire it must be
brought in contact with the moral experiences of the many in order to
procure an adequate social motive.
These men and women have realized this and have disclosed the fact in
their eagerness for a wider acquaintance with and participation in the
life about them. They believe that experience gives the easy and
trustworthy impulse toward right action in the broad as well as in the
narrow relations. We may indeed imagine many of them saying: "Cast our
experiences in a larger mould if our lives are to be animated by the
larger social aims. We have met the obligations of our family life, not
because we had made resolutions to that end, but spontaneously, because
of a common fund of memories and affections, from which the obligation
naturally develops, and we see no other way in which to prepare
ourselves for the larger social duties." Such a demand is reasonable,
for by our daily experience we have discovered that we cannot
mechanically hold up a moral standard, then jump at it in rare moments
of exhilaration when we have the strength for it, but that even as the
ideal itself must be a rational development of life, so the strength to
attain it must be secured from interest in life itself. We slowly learn
that life consists of processes as well as results, and that failure may
come quite as easily from ignoring the adequacy of one's method as from
selfish or ignoble aims. We are thus brought to a conception of
Democracy not merely as a sentiment which desires the well-being of all
men, nor yet as a creed which believes in the essential dignity and
equality of all men, but as that which affords a rule of living as well
as a test of faith.
We are learning that a standard of social ethics is not attained by
travelling a sequestered byway, but by mixing on the thronged and common
road where all must turn out for one another, and at least see the size
of one another's burdens. To follow the path of social morality results
perforce in the temper if not the practice of the democratic spirit, for
it implies that diversified human experience and resultant sympathy
which are the foundation and guarantee of Democracy.
There are many indications that this conception of Democracy is growing
among us. We have come to have an enormous interest in human life as
such, accompanied by confidence in its essential soundness. We do not
believe that genuine experience can lead us astray any more than
scientific data can.
We realize, too, that social perspective and sanity of judgment come
only from contact with social experience; that such contact is the
surest corrective of opinions concerning the social order, and
concerning efforts, however humble, for its improvement. Indeed, it is a
consciousness of the illuminating and dynamic value of this wider and
more thorough human experience which explains in no small degree that
new curiosity regarding human life which has more of a moral basis than
an intellectual one.
The newspapers, in a frank reflection of popular demand, exhibit an
omniverous curiosity equally insistent upon the trivial and the
important. They are perhaps the most obvious manifestations of that
desire to know, that "What is this?" and "Why do you do that?" of the
child. The first dawn of the social consciousness takes this form, as
the dawning intelligence of the child takes the form of constant
question and insatiate curiosity.
Literature, too, portrays an equally absorbing though better adjusted
desire to know all kinds of life. The popular books are the novels,
dealing with life under all possible conditions, and they are widely
read not only because they are entertaining, but also because they in a
measure satisfy an unformulated belief that to see farther, to know all
sorts of men, in an indefinite way, is a preparation for better social
adjustment--for the remedying of social ills.
Doubtless one under the conviction of sin in regard to social ills finds
a vague consolation in reading about the lives of the poor, and derives
a sense of complicity in doing good. He likes to feel that he knows
about social wrongs even if he does not remedy them, and in a very
genuine sense there is a foundation for this belief.
Partly through this wide reading of human life, we find in ourselves a
new affinity for all men, which probably never existed in the world
before. Evil itself does not shock us as it once did, and we count only
that man merciful in whom we recognize an understanding of the criminal.
We have learned as common knowledge that much of the insensibility and
hardness of the world is due to the lack of imagination which prevents a
realization of the experiences of other people. Already there is a
conviction that we are under a moral obligation in choosing our
experiences, since the result of those experiences must ultimately
determine our understanding of life. We know instinctively that if we
grow contemptuous of our fellows, and consciously limit our intercourse
to certain kinds of people whom we have previously decided to respect,
we not only tremendously circumscribe our range of life, but limit the
scope of our ethics.
We can recall among the selfish people of our acquaintance at least one
common characteristic,--the conviction that they are different from
other men and women, that they need peculiar consideration because they
are more sensitive or more refined. Such people "refuse to be bound by
any relation save the personally luxurious ones of love and admiration,
or the identity of political opinion, or religious creed." We have
learned to recognize them as selfish, although we blame them not for the
will which chooses to be selfish, but for a narrowness of interest which
deliberately selects its experience within a limited sphere, and we say
that they illustrate the danger of concentrating the mind on narrow and
unprogressive issues.
We know, at last, that we can only discover truth by a rational and
democratic interest in life, and to give truth complete social
expression is the endeavor upon which we are entering. Thus the
identification with the common lot which is the essential idea of
Democracy becomes the source and expression of social ethics. It is as
though we thirsted to drink at the great wells of human experience,
because we knew that a daintier or less potent draught would not carry
us to the end of the journey, going forward as we must in the heat and
jostle of the crowd.
The six following chapters are studies of various types and groups who
are being impelled by the newer conception of Democracy to an acceptance
of social obligations involving in each instance a new line of conduct.
No attempt is made to reach a conclusion, nor to offer advice beyond the
assumption that the cure for the ills of Democracy is more Democracy,
but the quite unlooked-for result of the studies would seem to indicate
that while the strain and perplexity of the situation is felt most
keenly by the educated and self-conscious members of the community, the
tentative and actual attempts at adjustment are largely coming through
those who are simpler and less analytical.