to include all its present activities, to say nothing of its future
possibilities. At the present time, the island is practically an extensive
but only partly cultivated farm, producing mainly sugar and tobacco, with
fruits and vegetables as a side line. The metal deposits supplement this,
with promise of becoming increasingly valuable. The forest resources,
commercially, are not great, although there are, and will continue to be,
sales of mahogany and other fine hardwoods. Local manufacturing is on a
comparatively limited scale. All cities and many towns have their artisans,
the bakers, tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, and others. Cigar making
is, of course, classed as a manufacturing enterprise, and so, for census
purposes, is the conversion of the juice of the sugar-cane into sugar.
A number of cities have breweries, ice factories, match factories, soap
works, and other establishments large or small. All these, however, are
incidental to the great industries of the soil, and the greater part of
Cuba's requirements in the line of mill and factory products is imported.
While little is done in the shipment of cattle or beef, Cuba is a natural
cattle country. Water and nutritious grasses are abundant, and there are
vast areas, now idle, that might well be utilized for stock-raising. There
are, of course, just as there are elsewhere, various difficulties to be
met, but they are met and overcome. There are insects and diseases, but
these are controlled by properly applied scientific methods. There is open
feeding throughout the entire year, so there is no need of barns or hay.
The local cattle industry makes possible the shipment of some $2,500,000
worth of hides and skins annually. Other lines of industry worthy of
mention, but not possible of detailed description here, include sponges,
tortoise shell, honey, wax, molasses, and henequen or sisal. All these
represent their individual thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars,
and their employment of scores or hundreds of wage-earners. Those who start
for Cuba with a notion that the Cubans are an idle and lazy people, will
do well to revise that notion. There is not the hustle that may be seen
further north, but the results of Cuban activity, measured in dollars or in
tons, fairly dispute the notion of any national indolence. When two and a
half million people produce what is produced in Cuba, somebody has to work.
XIV
_POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND COMMERCE_
The British colonists in America were in large measure self-governing. This
is notably true in their local affairs. The Spanish colonists were
governed almost absolutely by the mother-country. A United States official
publication reports that "all government control centred in the Council of
the Indies and the King, and local self government, which was developed at
an early stage in the English colonies, became practically impossible in
the Spanish colonies, no matter to what extent it may have existed in
theory. Special regulations, decrees, etc., modifying the application of
the laws to the colonies or promulgating new laws were frequent, and their
compilation in 1680 was published as Law of the Indies. This and the _Siete
Partidas_, on which they were largely based, comprised the code under which
the Spanish-American colonies were governed." There was a paper provision,
during the greater part of the time, for a municipal electorate, the
franchise being limited to a few of the largest tax-payers. In its
practical operation, the system was nullified by the power vested in the
appointed ruler. It was a highly effective centralized organization in
which no man held office, high or low, who was not a mere instrument in the
hands of the Governor-General. Under such an institution the Cubans had, of
course, absolutely no experience in self-government. The rulers made laws
and the people obeyed them; they imposed taxes and spent the money as they
saw fit; many of them enriched themselves and their personally appointed
official household throughout the island, at the expense of the tax-payers.
A competent observer has noted that such terms as "meeting,"
"mass-meeting," "self-government," and "home-rule," had no equivalent in
the Spanish language. The first of these terms, distorted into "_mitin_,"
is now in common use, and its origin is obvious. Of theories, ideals, and
intellectual conceptions, there was an abundance, but government based
on beautiful dreams does not succeed in this practical world. Denied
opportunity for free discussion of practical methods, the Cubans discussed
theories in lyceums. Under the military government of the United States,
from January 1, 1899, to May 20, 1902, there was freedom of speech and
freedom of organization. The Cubans began to hold "_mitins_," but visions
and beautiful theories characterized the addresses. Prior to the Ten Years'
War (1868-1878), there were organizations more or less political in their
nature, but the authorities were alert in preventing discussions of too
practical a character. In 1865, a number of influential Cubans organized
what has been somewhat inappropriately termed a "national party." It was
not at all a party in our use of that term. Its purpose was to suggest and
urge administrative and economic changes from the Cuban point of view. The
suggestions were ignored and, a few years later, revolution was adopted as
a means of emphasizing their importance. The result of the Ten Years' War
was an assortment of pledges of greater political and economic freedom.
Much was promised but little if anything was really granted. There was,
however, a relaxation of the earlier absolutism, and under that there
appeared a semblance of party organization, in the form of a Liberal party
and a Union Constitutional party. There was no special difference in what
might be called their platforms. Both focussed, in a somewhat general way,
the political aspirations and the economic desires of the Cuban people,
much the same aspirations and desires that had been manifested by
complaint, protest, and occasional outbreak, for fifty years. National
independence had no place in either. That came later, when an army in the
field declared that if Spain would not grant independence, the island would
be made so worthless a possession that Spain could not afford to hold it.
A few years after their organization, the Liberals became the Cuban party,
and so remained, and the Union Constitutionals became the Spanish party,
the party of the immediate administration. Later on, the Liberal party
became the Autonomist party, but Spain's concession of the demands of that
group came too late, forced, not by the Autonomists but by the party of the
Revolution that swept the island with fire and sword from Oriente to
Pinar del Rio. The Autonomists sought what their name indicates; the
Revolutionists demanded and secured national independence.
Shortly before the final dispersion of the Army of the Revolution,
there was organized a body with the imposing title of _La Asamblea de
Representantes del Ejercito Cubano_, or the Assembly of Representatives
of the Cuban Army. It was composed of leaders of the different military
divisions of that army, and included, as I recall it, thirty-one members.
This group made no little trouble in the early days of the American
occupation. It gathered in Havana, held meetings, declared itself the
duly chosen and representative agent of the Cuban people, and demanded
recognition as such by the American authorities. Some of its members even
asserted that it constituted a _de facto_ government, and held that the
Americans should turn the whole affair over to them and promptly sail away.
But their recognition was flatly refused by the authorities. At the time, I
supported the authorities in this refusal, but afterward I felt less sure
of the wisdom of the course. As a recognized body, it might have been
useful; rejected, it made no little trouble. Transfer of control to its
hands was quite out of the question, but recognition and co-operation
might have proved helpful. That the body had a considerable representative
quality, there is no doubt. Later, I found many of its members as members
of the Constitutional Convention, and, still later, many of them have
served in high official positions, as governors of provinces, members of
Congress, in cabinet and in diplomatic positions. I am inclined to regard
the group broadly, as the origin of the present much divided Liberal party
that has, from the beginning of definite party organization, included a
considerable numerical majority of the Cuban voters. In the first national
election, held December 31, 1901, this group, the military group, appeared
as the National party, supporting Tomas Estrada y Palma as its candidate.
Its opponent was called the Republican party. Realizing its overwhelming
defeat, the latter withdrew on the day of the election, alleging all manner
of fraud and unfairness on the part of the Nationals. It is useless to
follow in detail the history of Cuba's political parties since that time.
In the election of 1905, the former National party appeared as the Liberal
party, supporting José Miguel Gomez, while its opponents appeared as the
Moderate party, supporting Estrada Palma who, first elected on what he
declared to be a non-partisan basis, had definitely affiliated himself with
the so-called Moderates. The election was a game of political crookedness
on both sides, and the Liberals withdrew on election day. The result
was the revolution of 1906. The Liberals split into factions, not yet
harmonized, and the Moderate party became the Conservative party. By the
fusion of some of the Liberal groups, that party carried the election of
1908, held under American auspices. A renewal of internal disorders, a
quarrel among leaders, and much discontent with their administrative
methods, resulted in the defeat of the Liberals in the campaign of 1912
and in the election of General Mario Menocal, the head of the Conservative
ticket, and the present incumbent.
A fair presentation of political conditions in Cuba is exceedingly
difficult, or rather it is difficult so to present them that they will be
fairly understood. I have always regarded the establishment of the Cuban
Republic in 1902 as premature, though probably unavoidable. A few years of
experience with an autonomous government under American auspices, civil and
not military, as a prologue to full independence, might have been the wiser
course, but such a plan seemed impossible. The Cubans in the field had
forced from Spain concessions that were satisfactory to many. Whether they
could have forced more than that, without the physical assistance given
by the United States, is perhaps doubtful. The matter might have been
determined by the grant of the belligerent rights for which they repeatedly
appealed to the United States. At no time in the entire experience did they
ask for intervention. That came as the result of a combination of American
wrath and American sympathy, and more in the interest of the United States
than because of concern for the Cubans. But, their victory won and Spain
expelled, the triumphant Cubans naturally desired immediate enjoyment of
the fruits of victory. They desired to exercise the independence for which
they had fought. Many protests and not a few threats of trouble attended
even the brief period of American occupation. There was, moreover, an acute
political issue in the United States. The peace and order declared as the
purpose of American intervention had been established. The amendment to
the Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898, disclaimed "any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said
Island except for the pacification thereof," etc. The island was pacified.
The amendment asserted, further, the determination of the United States,
pacification having been accomplished, "to leave the government and control
of the island to its people." There was no pledge of any prolonged course
of education in principles and methods of self-government. Nor did such
education play any appreciable part in the experience of the American
military government. The work of the interventors had been done in
accordance with the specifications, and the Cubans were increasingly
restless under a control that many of them, with no little reason, declared
to be as autocratic as any ever exercised by Spain. Transfer and departure
seemed to be the politic if not the only course, and we transferred and
departed.
That these people, entirely without experience or training in
self-government, should make mistakes was quite as inevitable as it is that
a child in learning to walk will tumble down and bump its little nose. In
addition to the inevitable mistakes, there have been occasional instances
of deplorable misconduct on the part of individuals and of political
parties. For neither mistakes nor misconduct can we criticize or condemn
them without a similar criticism or condemnation of various experiences in
our own history. We should, at least, regard them with charity. There are,
moreover, incidents in the two experiences of American control of the
island that, at least, border on the unwise and the discreditable. The only
issue yet developed in Cuba is between good government and bad politics.
The first President started admirably along the line of the former, and
ended in a wretched tangle of the latter, though not at all by his own
choice or direction. Official pre-eminence and a "government job" make
quite the same appeal to the Cubans that they do to many thousands
of Americans. So do raids on the national treasury, and profitable
concessions. We see these motes in Cuban eyes somewhat more clearly than
we see the beams in our own eyes. A necessarily slow process of political
education is going on among the people, but in the meantime the
situation has afforded opportunity for exploitation by an assortment
of self-constituted political leaders who have adopted politics as a
profession and a means of livelihood. Cuba's gravest danger lies in the
political domination of men in this class. The present President, General
Mario Menocal, is not in that group. The office sought him; he did not seek
the office. Some of these self-constituted leaders have displayed a notable
aptitude for political organization, and it is largely by means of the
many little local organizations that the Cuban political game is played.
Although, I believe, somewhat less now than formerly, the little groups
follow and support individual leaders rather than parties or principles.
Parties and their minor divisions are known by the names of their leaders.
Thus, while both men are nominally of the same party, the Liberal, the
adherents of José Miguel Gomez, are known as Miguelistas, and the adherents
of Alfredo Zayas are known as Zayistas. Were either to announce himself
as a Conservative, or to start a new party and call it Reformist or
Progressive or any other title, he could count on being followed by most
of those who supported him as a Liberal. This is a condition that will, in
time, correct itself. What the Cuban really wants is what all people want,
an orderly, honest, and economical government, under which he may live in
peace and quiet, enjoying the fruits of his labor without paying an undue
share of the fruits to maintain his government. For that the Cuban people
took up arms against Spain. For a time they may be blinded by the idea of
mere political independence, but to that same issue they will yet return
by the route of the ballot-box. The game of politics for individual
preferment, or for personal profit, cannot long be successfully played
in Cuba, if I have rightly interpreted Cuban character and Cuban
characteristics.
"We, the delegates of the people of Cuba, having met in constitutional
convention for the purpose of preparing and adopting the fundamental law of
their organization as an independent and sovereign people, establishing a
government capable of fulfilling its international obligations, maintaining
public peace, ensuring liberty, justice, and promoting the general welfare,
do hereby agree upon and adopt the following constitution, invoking the
protection of the Almighty. Article I. The people of Cuba are hereby
constituted a sovereign and independent State and adopt a republican form
of government." Thus opens the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba.
I recall an intensely dramatic moment connected with the closing phrase of
the preamble. I have used a translation published by a distinguished Cuban.
That phrase, in the original, is "_invocando el favor de Dios_," perhaps
more exactly translated as "invoking the favor (or blessing) of God." When
the Constitution had been drafted and broadly approved, it was submitted
to the convention for suggestion of minor changes in verbiage. One of the
oldest and most distinguished members of the body proposed that this phrase
be left out. Another member, distinguished for his power as an orator and
for his cynicism, in a speech of considerable length set forth his opinion
that it made little difference whether it was included or excluded. There
was no benefit in its inclusion, and no advantage in excluding it. It would
hurt none and might please some to have it left in. Immediately across
the semi-circle of desks, and facing these two speakers, sat Señor Pedro
Llorente, a man of small stature, long, snow-white hair and beard, and a
nervous and alert manner. At times, his nervous energy made him almost
grotesque. At times, his absorbed earnestness made him, despite his
stature, a figure of commanding dignity. Through the preceding addresses he
waited with evident impatience. Obtaining recognition from the chairman,
he rose and stood with upraised hand his voice tremulous with emotion, to
protest against the proposed measure, declaring "as one not far from the
close of life, that the body there assembled did not represent an atheistic
people." The motion to strike out was lost, and the invocation remains.
The result of the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention is a
highly creditable instrument. It contains a well-devised Bill of Rights,
and makes all necessary provision for governmental organization and
conduct. One feature, however, seems open to criticism. In their desire to
avoid that form of centralized control, of which they had somewhat too much
under Spanish power, the new institution provides, perhaps, for too much
local government, for a too extensive provincial and municipal system. It
has already fallen down in some respects, and it has become necessary to
centralize certain functions, quite as it has become desirable in several
of our own matters. Cuba has, perhaps, an undue overload of officialdom,
somewhat too many public officers, and quite too many people on its
pay-rolls. The feature of Cuba's Constitution that is of greatest interest
and importance to the United States is what is known as the Platt
Amendment. The provision for a Constitutional Convention in Cuba was made
in what was known as Civil Order No. 301, issued by the Military Governor,
on July 25, 1900. It provided for an election of delegates to meet in
Havana on the first Monday in November, following. The convention was to
frame and adopt a Constitution and "as a part thereof, to provide for and
agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist
between that Government and the Government of Cuba," etc. Against this, the
Cubans protested vigorously. The United States had declared that "Cuba
is and of right ought to be free and independent." The Cubans held, very
properly, that definition of international relations had no fitting place
in a Constitution "as a part thereof." Their point was recognized and,
under date of November 5, Civil Order No. 310 was modified by Civil Order
No. 455. That was issued to the delegates at the time of their assembly.
It declared as follows: "It will be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a
Constitution for Cuba, and, when that has been done, to formulate what,
in your opinion, ought to be the relations between Cuba and the United
States." Taking this as their programme, the delegates proceeded to draft
a Constitution, leaving the matter of "relations" in abeyance for
consideration at the proper time. Yet, before its work was done, the
Convention was savagely criticized in the United States for its failure
to include in the Constitution what it had been authorized, and virtually
instructed, to leave out. The Constitution was completed on February 11,
1901, and was duly signed by the delegates, on February 21. A committee
was appointed, on February 11, to prepare and submit plans and proposals
regarding the matter of "relations." Prior to that, however, the matter had
been frequently but informally discussed by the delegates. Suggestions had
been made in the local press, and individual members of the Convention had
expressed their views with considerable freedom. Had the United States kept
its hands off at that time, a serious and critical situation, as well as
a sense of injustice that has not yet entirely died out, would have been
averted.
Before the Cubans had time to put their "opinion of what ought to be
the relations" between the two countries into definite form, there was
presented to them, in a manner as needless as it was tactless, a statement
of what the American authorities thought those relations should be. The
Cubans, who were faithfully observing their earlier instructions, were
deeply offended by this interference, and by the way in which the
interference came. The measures known as the Platt Amendment was submitted
to the United States Senate, as an amendment to the Army Appropriation
bill, on February 25, 1901 The Senate passed the bill, and the House
concurred A storm of indignant protest swept over the island The Cubans
believed, and not without reason, that the instrument abridged the
independence of which they had been assured by those who now sought to
limit that independence. Public opinion in the United States was divided.
Some approved and some denounced the proceeding in bitter terms. The
division was not at all on party lines. The situation in Cuba was entirely
changed. Instead of formulating an opinion in accordance with their earlier
instructions, the members of the Convention were confronted by a choice of
what they then regarded as evils, acceptance of unacceptable terms or an
indefinite continuance of a military government then no less unacceptable.
A commission was sent to Washington to urge changes and modifications. It
was given dinners, lunches, and receptions, but nothing more. At last the
Cubans shrugged their shoulders. The desire for an immediate withdrawal of
American authority, and for Cuban assumption of the reins of government,
outweighed the objection to the terms imposed. A Cuban leader said: "There
is no use in objecting to the inevitable. It is either annexation or a
Republic with the Amendment. I prefer the latter." After four months of
stubborn opposition, the Cubans yielded, by a vote of sixteen to eleven,
with four absentees.
In many ways, the Cuban Government is like our own. The President and
Vice-President are elected, through an electoral college, for a term of
four years. A "third term" is specifically prohibited by the Constitution.
Senators, four from each Province, are chosen, for a term of eight years,
by an electoral board. Elections for one half of the body occur every four
years. The House is chosen, by direct vote, for terms of four years, one
half being elected every two years. The Cabinet, selected and appointed by
the President, consists of eight Secretaries of Departments as follows:
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; State; Government; Treasury (_Hacienda_);
Public Instruction; Justice; Public Works; and Health and Charities. There
is a Supreme Court, and there are the usual minor courts. The Constitution
also makes provision for the organization and the powers of the Provincial
and Municipal Governments. To the Constitution, the Platt Amendment is
attached as an appendix, by treaty arrangement. As far as governmental
system is concerned, Cuba is fairly well equipped; a possible source of
danger is its over-equipment. Its laws permit, rather than require, an
overburden of officials, high and low. But Cuba's governmental problem
is essentially one of administration. Its particular obstacle in that
department is professional politics.