E-text prepared by Charlene Taylor, Christine P. Travers, and the Project
Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from
page images generously made available by Internet Archive
(http://www.archive.org) and digitized by Google Books Library Project
(http://books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/library.html)
Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
file which includes the original illustrations.
See 29340-h.htm or 29340-h.zip:
(https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/29340/pg29340-images.html)
or
(https://www.gutenberg.org/files/29340/29340-h.zip)
Images of the original pages are available
through Internet Archive or Google books. See
http://www.archive.org/details/storygreatwar01ruhlgoog
or
http://books.google.com/books?id=PV4PAAAAYAAJ&oe=UTF-8
Transcriber's note:
Obvious printer's errors have been corrected. Hyphenation
and accentuation have been made consistent. All other
inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling
has been retained.
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
History of the European War from Official Sources
Complete Historical Records of Events to Date,
Illustrated with Drawings, Maps, and Photographs
Prefaced by
What the War Means to America
Major General Leonard Wood, U.S.A.
Naval Lessons of the War
Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S.N.
The World's War
Frederick Palmer
Theatres of the War's Campaigns
Frank H. Simonds
The War Correspondent
Arthur Ruhl
Edited by
Francis J. Reynolds
Former Reference Librarian of Congress
Allen L. Churchill
Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
Francis Trevelyan Miller
Editor in Chieft, Photographic History of the Civil War
P. F. Collier & Son Company
New York
[Illustration: _Kaiser Wilhelm II, German Emperor, inspecting
Austro-Hungarian troops on the East Galician front, New Year's Day,
1916. At the Kaiser's left is General Count von Bothmer_]
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Champagne . Artois . Grodno
Fall of Nish . Caucasus
Mesopotamia . Development
of Air Strategy . United
States and the War
VOLUME IV
P . F . Collier & Son . New York
Copyright 1916
By P. F. Collier & Son
CONTENTS
PART I.--WAR IN SYRIA AND EGYPT
CHAPTER Page
I. Renewed Turkish Attempts 9
PART II.--WAR IN THE AIR
II. Raids of the Airmen 16
III. Zeppelins Attack London--Battles in the Air 29
IV. Venice Attacked--Other Raids 34
PART III.--THE WESTERN FRONT
V. Summary of First Year's Operations 39
VI. Fighting in Artois and the Vosges 46
VII. Political Crisis in France--Aeroplane Warfare--Fierce
Combats in the Vosges--Preparations for Allied
Offense 52
VIII. The Great Champagne Offensive 61
IX. The British Front in Artois 81
X. The Battle of Loos 90
XI. The Cavell Case--Accident to King George 98
XII. Operations in Champagne And Artois--Preparations for
Winter Campaign 104
XIII. Events in the Winter Campaign 117
XIV. The Battle of Verdun--The German Attack 131
PART IV.--THE WAR AT SEA
XV. Naval Situation at the Beginning of the Second
Year--Submarine Exploits 143
XVI. The Sinking of the Arabic--British Submarine Successes 150
XVII. Cruise of the Moewe--Loss of British Battleships 156
XVIII. Continuation of War on Merchant Shipping--Italian
and Russian Naval Movements--Sinking of La
Provence 165
PART V.--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT
XIX. Summary of First Year's Operations 174
XX. The Fall of the Niemen and Nareff Fortresses 178
XXI. The Conquest of Grodno and Vilna 185
XXII. The Capture of Brest-Litovsk 193
XXIII. The Struggle in East Galicia and Volhynia and the
Capture of Pinsk 200
XXIV. In the Pripet Marshes 209
XXV. Fighting on the Dvina and in the Dvina-Vilna Sector 212
XXVI. Winter Battles on the Styr and Strypa Rivers 223
XXVII. On the Tracks of the Russian Retreat 229
XXVIII. Sidelights on the Russian Retreat and German
Advance 240
XXIX. Winter on the Eastern Front 250
PART VI.--THE BALKANS
XXX. Battle Clouds Gather Again 255
XXXI. The Invasion Begins 263
XXXII. Bulgaria Enters the War 269
XXXIII. The Teutonic Invasion Rolls on 273
XXXIV. The Fall of Nish--Defense of Babuna Pass 282
XXXV. Bulgarian Advance--Serbian Resistance 290
XXXVI. End of German Operations--Flight of Serb People--Greece 300
XXXVII. Allies Withdraw into Greece--Attitude of Greek
Government 308
XXXVIII. Bulgarian Attacks--Allies Concentrate at Saloniki 316
XXXIX. Italian Movements in Albania--Conquest of Montenegro 327
XL. Conditions in Serbia, Greece, and Rumania 339
PART VII.--THE DARDANELLES AND RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN
XLI. Conditions in Gallipoli--Attack at Suvla Bay 344
PART VIII.--AGGRESSIVE TURKISH CAMPAIGN AT DARDANELLES
XLII. Sari Bair--Partial Withdrawal of Allies 353
XLIII. Aggressive Turkish Movements--Opinion in England--Change
in Command 357
XLIV. Abandonment of Dardanelles--Armenian Atrocities 369
XLV. Campaign in Caucasus--Fall of Erzerum 380
PART IX.--ITALY IN THE WAR
XLVI. Review OF Preceding Operations--Italian Movements 393
XLVII. Italy's Relations to the Other Warring Nations 399
XLVIII. Problems of Strategy 404
XLIX. Move Against Germany 410
L. Renewed Attacks--Italy's Situation At the Beginning
of March, 1916 413
PART X.--CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
LI. Operations Against Bagdad and Around the Tigris 419
LII. Advance Toward Bagdad--Battle of Kut-el-Amara 426
LIII. Battle of Ctesiphon 437
LIV. Stand at Kut-el-Amara--Attempts at Relief 444
PART XI.--THE WAR IN THE AIR
LV. Development of the Strategy and Tactics of Air
Fighting 454
LVI. Zeppelin Raids--Attacks on German Arms Factories--German
Over-Sea Raids 459
LVII. Attacks on London--Bombardment of Italian Ports--Aeroplane
as Commerce Destroyer 466
LVIII. Air Fighting on all Fronts--Losses 473
PART XII.--THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS
LIX. Sinking of the Arabic--Another Crisis--Germany's
Defense and Concessions 480
LX. Issue with Austria-Hungary Over the Ancona--Surrender
to American Demands 490
LXI. The Lusitania Deadlock--Agreement Blocked by Armed
Merchantmen Issue--Crisis in Congress 496
LXII. Developments of Pro-German Propaganda--Munitions
Crusade Defended--New Aspects of American Policy 505
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Kaiser Wilhelm Inspecting His Troops _Frontispiece_
Opposite Page
Zigzag Trenches in the Champagne 62
German Infantry Storming a Hill 94
General Joffre and General Petain 142
Austrian Infantry in Russia 238
Constructing a Bridge Over the Danube 270
British Hydroplane on Guard at Saloniki 318
Aeroplane Guns on Turntable 462
Firing a Torpedo from the Deck of a Destroyer 494
LIST OF MAPS
Page
Middle Europe--The German Vision of an Empire from the Baltic
to the Persian Gulf (_Colored Map_) _Front Insert_
Champagne District, The 63
Battle in Champagne, September, 1915, Detail Map of 69
Artois Region, September, 1915, The French Gains in 86
Battle at Loos, The 95
Verdun, The Forts at 134
Verdun, Fighting at, up to March 1, 1916 141
Verdun (_Colored Map_) _Opposite_ 142
Kiel Canal 167
Russia, The Battle Front in, January 1, 1916 228
Balkan (Serbian) Operations, General Map of 262
German-Austro-Bulgar Campaign Against Serbia, The Beginning
of the 268
Retreat of Serbians 304
Saloniki, The Allies at 324
Montenegro, The Austrian Campaign in 335
Dardanelles, Operations at the 368
Turkish Empire, The 381
Turkey in Armenia, The Russian Advance on 390
Bagdad Railroad, The 420
Russian Advance Through Persia, The 438
Mesopotamia, The British Campaign in 451
PART I--WAR IN SYRIA AND EGYPT
CHAPTER I
RENEWED TURKISH ATTEMPTS
The leaders of the Turkish troops had been hard at work arousing the
fanaticism of the Turkish soldiery against the British foe before the
next day's battle began. It is due these noisy "Holy Warriors" that
sentries of the Fifth Egyptian Field Battery were warned of the near
presence of the enemy.
The Indian troops now took the offensive, supported by the warships
and mountain and field artillery. The Serapeum garrison, consisting of
Ninety-second Punjabis and Rajputs, now cleared its front of the enemy
who had been stopped three-quarters of a mile away. A counterattack
made by the Sixty-second Punjabis of the Tussum garrison drove the
Turks back. Two battalions of the Turkish Twenty-eighth Regiment now
joined the fight, but the British artillery threw them into disorder,
and by 3 p. m. of February 3, 1915, the Moslems were in retreat,
leaving behind them a rear guard of a few hundred men hidden in the
gaps among the brush along the eastern bank.
The warships on Lake Timsah had been in action since morning, and the
sand hills near Ismailia were at first crowded by civilians and
soldiers eager to witness the fight, until the Turkish guns to the
east and southeast of the Ferry post drove them in cover.
About 11 a. m. an old unprotected Indian Marine transport, H. M. S.
_Hardinge_, was struck by two 6-inch shells. One carried away the
funnel and the other burst inboard doing much damage. Two of the crew
were killed and nine wounded. George Carew, the pilot, lost a leg, but
continued on duty and helped to bring the injured vessel into
Ismailia. The French coast guard battleship _Requin_ came now under
the Turkish fire, but her 10.8-inch guns soon silenced the enemy's
batteries.
The morning of February 3, 1915, the Turks advanced on the Ismailia
Ferry, then held by Sikhs, Punjabi Rifles, a battery of Indian
mountain artillery and Australian engineers, digging shelter pits as
they moved forward, covered by two field batteries. Their advance was
stopped by the British guns when they had come within 1,000 yards of
the outpost line. During the afternoon the Turks kept up some
desultory firing that was ineffective; they also engaged in some
reconnoitering of British positions during the dark night that
followed, but when morning broke they had all disappeared.
Meanwhile, at El Kantara the struggle had reached much the same
conclusion. The Indian troops had repelled an advance from the south,
in which two Turkish regiments, the Eightieth and Eighty-first of the
Twenty-seventh Division, were engaged. H.M.S. _Swiftsure_, which had
taken the place of the disabled _Hardinge_, aided by Indian and
Territorial artillery, did effective work in covering the British
positions. The nature of the ground here was so marshy that in places
the Turks sank to their waists in muddy ooze, and foredoomed their
attack to failure. Again it was demonstrated that they are poor
strategists and fail to make careful observations of the terrain
before advancing to attack. At El Ferdan, where some Turks made a
demonstration with a battery about this time, there were no losses,
though the gunboat _Clio_ was hit several times. At El Kantara, where
a part of General Cox's brigade of Gurkhas, Sikhs, and Punjabis were
engaged, there were thirty casualties.
Between Tussum and Serapeum there was some sniping during the late
afternoon of February 3 from the east bank of the canal, during which
a British sailor was killed on H.M.S. _Swiftsure_. The desultory
firing continued during the night and through the early morning of
February 4. A deplorable incident occurred this day in which a brave
British officer and several of his men were the victims of Turkish
treachery. Several hundred Turks had been discovered by half a
battalion of Ninety-second Punjabis sent out from Serapeum. In the
encounter that followed, some of the Turks held up their hands as a
sign of surrender, while others continued to fire. Captain Cochran of
the Ninety-second company, who was advancing with his men to take the
surrender, was killed. A few of his soldiers also fell, and some
others were wounded. The British took a prompt and complete revenge
for the loss of these men. After being reenforced by Indian troops
they overpowered the enemy in a hand-to-hand struggle, in which a
Turkish officer was killed by a British officer in a sword combat. The
Turks had lost in this brisk engagement about 120 killed and wounded,
and 6 officers and 25 men were captured with 3 Maxim guns.
The Turkish attempts at Suez on February 2, 1915, were insignificant,
and did not cost the British the loss of a single man. By nightfall,
just as their compatriots had done along other parts of the canal, the
Turks fled in the direction of Nakhl, Djebel, Habeite, and Katia. On
the afternoon of the 4th, when the fighting between Serapeum and
Tussum was concluded, Indian cavalry and various patrols captured some
men and war materials. At Ismailia preparations were under way to
pursue the retreating Turks across the canal. This plan, for some
reason, was subsequently abandoned.
During these various fights along the canal, the British had lost 115
killed and wounded, a small number considering the character of the
ground and the very numerous attacks and skirmishes. Nine hundred
Turks were buried or found drowned in the canal, 650 were taken
prisoners, while it is estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 must
have been wounded. The brunt of the struggle fell on the Indian
troops, who, in general, fought with great bravery. There were some
Australian and Egyptian troops engaged who proved themselves valuable
auxiliaries.
In these engagements along the canal the Syrian Moslems displayed even
greater bravery than the Turks, who were not lacking in intrepidity,
though they showed poor judgment. They had much to learn in the way of
taking cover, and would often blindly advance over difficult ground
that placed them at a disadvantage.
Djemal Pasha had evidently counted on an Egyptian rising, and perhaps
a mutiny of the Indian Moslem troops, but he showed that he entirely
misjudged their sentiments, as they displayed great bitterness toward
the Turks during the fighting, and attacked them in a thoroughly
vindictive spirit. If Djemal had not counted on help from these
quarters he would probably not have attempted to break through the
British positions covering a ninety-mile front with such a small
force. It was estimated that he had about 25,000 men, but not more
than half of these were brought into action at any given point where
they might have achieved some success. The Turks had burned up some
war material and left a few deserters behind them, but they had
retreated in good order, and the British commanders had reason to
believe that they should soon be heard from again, and that a main
attack was contemplated.
On February 6, 1915, British aeroplane observers discovered that the
Turks in front of the Tussum-Deversoir section had gathered at Djebel,
Habeite, and were strongly reenforced. It appeared that Djemal was now
preparing to attack in force. The British were quite ready for them,
having been reenforced on February 3 and 4 by the Seventh and Eighth
Australian battalions, a squadron of the Duke of Lancaster's Own
Yeomanry, and the Herts, and Second County of London Yeomanry. But the
British hopes of a decisive engagement were blighted by the general
retirement of the Turkish army with their reenforcements.
They crossed the desert successfully, thanks to the organizing skill
of Kress von Kressenstein and Roshan Bey, and set off for the Turkish
base at Beersheba, spreading the news along the road that they had won
a victory and would soon return to Egypt and achieve another, this by
way of keeping the Syrians reassured that success was on the Moslem
side.
In January, 1915, the commander of Turkish troops at Fort Nakhl,
hearing that the Government quarantine station at Tor was undefended,
sent a body of men under two German officers to occupy the place. The
raiders found on their arrival at Tor that about 200 Egyptian soldiers
were in occupation and waited there until they received
reenforcements, which brought their force up to 400 men. For the time
they occupied a small village about five miles north of Tor,
occasionally firing a shot at long range and sending arrogant messages
to the Egyptians. On February 11 a detachment of Ghurkas embarked
secretly from Suez, and advancing over the hills in the rear of the
Turks, surprised their position on the following morning. In the
encounter that followed the Turks were annihilated. Sixty lay dead on
the field, and over a hundred, including a Turkish officer, were made
prisoners. On the British side one Ghurka was killed and another
wounded. It was a disappointment that the German officers and a few
men had left the camp some days before for Abu Zenaima on the coast,
where there was a British-owned manganese mine, which the raiders
damaged as best they could, and then stealing some camels, departed
for the fort at Nakhl.
The failure of the Turks to win any success at that canal, and their
subsequent retreat, had a discouraging influence on the Bedouin
levies, who had joined Djemal Pasha and Hilmi Bey, and they now chose
the first opportunity to vanish with the new rifles that had been
given to them.
For a month the Turks did nothing but keep the British troops occupied
by petty raids and feint attacks, which were worrisome, but better
than utter stagnation.
On March 22, 1915, a Turkish column with guns and cavalry appeared
near the canal near El Kubri, and their advance guard of about 400
encountered a patrol of nine men under Havildar Subha Singh of the
Fifty-sixth Punjab Rifles. The Havildar retired fighting courageously,
holding the enemy back until he had got his men to safety, with a loss
of two killed and three wounded. The Havildar, who was badly wounded
himself, received the Indian Order of Merit and was promoted to
Jemadar. He had inflicted on the enemy a loss of twelve men and
fifteen wounded.
On March 23, 1915, General Sir G. J. Younghusband set out to attack
the Turks who had been under the command of Colonel van Trommer, but
owing to delays they had had time to retreat toward Nakhl. In the
pursuit that followed, their rear guard lost about forty men and some
were taken prisoners. There were about a dozen British casualties.
On April 29, 1915, a raiding party with Maxims attacked a detachment
of Bikanir Camel Corps and Egyptian sappers near Bir Mahadet, which
resulted in the wounding of a British officer, and five killed and
three wounded among the Egyptians and Bikaniris. A punitive expedition
sent out to attack the raiders marched through the night to Bir
Mahadet only to find that the Turks had fled. The British aeroplane
soon after "spotted" the enemy near a well six miles north. The
Patiala cavalry, who were leading, came up with the Turkish rear guard
in the afternoon and charged. The Turks stampeded, except for a small
group of Turkish soldiers led by a plucky Albanian officer, who held
their ground and attacked from the flank the advancing British
officers and Patiala cavalry. Two British officers and a native
officer were killed or badly wounded in the subsequent charge. The
Albanian, who had displayed such courage, proved to be a son of Djemal
Pasha. He fell with seven lance thrusts, none of which however proved
fatal, while all his men were killed or captured. The British had four
or five times as many men as the escaping enemy, but they did not
pursue.
In June, 1915, Colonel von Laufer and a mixed force attempted a feeble
raid on the canal near El Kantara, but were driven off with some loss
by the Yeomanry, who had done effective work in keeping the enemy away
from the British lines. A mine having been found near the canal about
this time, the Porte informed the neutral powers that the canal must
be closed to navigation owing to the arbitrary conduct of the British
in Egypt. But the Turks were not in a position to carry out their
threats, owing to the vigorous attack on the Dardanelles. Troops were
hurried from Syria to Constantinople, and by June 6 less than 25,000
Turkish troops remained in central and southern Syria and the Sinai
Peninsula. At Nakhl and El Arish there were left about 7,000 veteran
desert fighters, but the British air scouts kept a watchful eye on the
desert roads, and used bombs with such effect that the Turks were
kept in a constant state of apprehension by their attacks.
At Sharkieh, the eastern province of the Delta, there had been some
uneasiness when the Turks made their unsuccessful strikes at the
canal, but the population gave no trouble. At Alexandria and Cairo
some few fanatics and ignorant people of the lower classes displayed
some opposition to the Government. The sultan was fired on April 8,
1915, by a degenerate, Mohammed Khalil, a haberdasher of Masoura, the
bullet missing the victim by only a few inches. Khalil was tried by
court-martial and executed April 24. The attempt on Sultan Hussein's
life had the effect of making him friends from among the disaffected
in the higher classes who found it wise policy to express their horror
of the attempted crime, and to proclaim their allegiance to the
Government. On April 9 the sultan received a popular ovation while on
his way to the mosque.
As a base for the allied Mediterranean expeditionary force, and as a
training ground for Australian, Indian, and British troops, Egypt in
1915 was of the utmost military importance to the British Empire. From
the great camps around Cairo and the canal, forces could be dispatched
for service in Europe, Mesopotamia, and at the Dardanelles, while
fresh contingents of soldiers were constantly arriving to take their
places.
On July 5, 1915, a body of Turks and Arabs from Yemen in southwest
Arabia made a threatening demonstration against Aden, the "Gibraltar
of the East," on the Strait of Perim at the entrance to the Red Sea.
They were equipped with some field guns and light artillery, and
crossing the Aden hinterland near Lahej, forced the British to retire
on Aden.
On July 29, 1915, Sheikh Othman, which had been abandoned by the
British on their retreat on the 5th, was again occupied by them, and
the Turks and Arabs were expelled. The British troops drove the enemy
for five miles across the country, causing some casualties, when the
Turks and their allies scattered and disappeared.
PART II--WAR IN THE AIR
CHAPTER II
RAIDS OF THE AIRMEN
The war in the air developed into a reign of terror during the second
half of the first year of the world catastrophe. While the armies on
the land were locked in terrific conflict, and the navies were
sweeping the seas, the huge ships of the air were hovering over cities
with a desperate resolve to win on all sides. By degrees the pilots of
the various nations learned to work in squadrons. The tactics of the
air began to be developed and opposing aerial fleets maneuvered much
as did the warships. Long raids by fifty or more machines were
reported, tons of bombs being released upon cities hundreds of miles
from the battle line.
The German ambition to shell London was realized, and the east coast
of England grew accustomed to raids. The spirit of the British never
faltered. Perhaps it was best typified in the admonition of a Yarmouth
minister following a disastrous Zeppelin visit, who said: "It is our
privilege, we who live on the east coast, to be on the firing line,
and we should steel ourselves to face the position with brave hearts."
Casualties grew in all quarters. French cities were the greatest
sufferers, although French airmen performed prodigies of valor in
defending the capital and in attacks upon German defensive positions.
But the stealthy Zeppelin took heavy toll on many occasions. It was
shown that there was no really adequate defense against sudden attack
from the air. Constant watchfulness and patrolling machines might be
eluded at night and death rained upon the sleeping city beneath.
The spring of 1915 found the air service of every army primed for a
dash. The cold months were spent in repairing, reorganizing and
extending aerial squadrons. Everything awaited the advent of good
weather conditions.
During February, 1915, the hand of tragedy fell upon the German air
service. Two Zeppelins and another large aircraft were wrecked within
a couple of days.
In a storm over the North Sea on February 16, 1915, a Zeppelin fought
heroically. Contrary air currents compelled the Zeppelin commander to
maneuver over a wide zone in an effort to reach land. Caught in the
gale the big dirigible was at the mercy of the elements. Snow, sleet,
and fog enveloped it and added to its peril. The craft caught in the
February storm, fought a losing battle for twenty-four hours and
finally made a landing on Fanoe Island, in Danish territory. The
officers and men were interned, several of whom were suffering from
exposure in an acute form and nearly all of them with frostbitten
hands and feet.
Another Zeppelin was lost in this same February storm. It is presumed
that the two started on a raiding trip against England and were caught
in the storm before reaching their destination. Details of the second
Zeppelin's fate never have been told. It fell into the sea, where
parts of the wreckage were found by Dutch fishermen. All on board lost
their lives. The third airship wrecked that month was of another type
than the Zeppelin. It foundered off the west coast of Jutland and four
of its crew were killed. The others escaped, but the airship was a
total loss.
This trio of accidents shocked the German official world to its depths
and had a chilling effect upon the aerial branch of its military
organization for some weeks. The Zeppelins remained at home until the
return of better weather. England, for a time, was practically freed
from the new menace.
It was not accident alone, nor an adverse fortune, which caused the
loss of the three airships. The position of the British Isles, on the
edge of the Atlantic, enabled British weather forecasters to tell with
almost unfailing exactness when a storm was to be expected. The French
also had an excellent service in this direction. Realizing that bad
weather was the worst foe of the Zeppelin, aside from its own inherent
clumsiness, the two governments agreed to suppress publication of
weather reports, thereby keeping from the Germans information of a
vital character. The German Government maintained a skilled weather
department, but the geographical location of the country is such that
its forecasters could not foretell with the same accuracy the
conditions on the Atlantic. The shrewd step of the French and British
therefore resulted in the destruction of three dirigibles in a single
month, a much higher average than all the efforts of land guns and
aviators had been able to achieve.
February, 1915, was a bleak, drear month. Aviators of all the armies
made daily scouting trips, but wasted little time in attacking each
other. Few raids of importance took place on any of the fronts. But
British airmen descended upon German positions in Belgium on several
occasions. Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Blankenberghe received their
attention in a half dozen visits between February 5 and 20.
On February 16, 1915, a large fleet of aeroplanes, mostly British,
swept along the Flanders coast, attacking defensive positions wherever
sighted. At the same time, French airmen shelled the aeroplane center
at Ghistelles, preventing the Germans from sending a squadron against
the other flotilla.
Paris, Dunkirk, and Calais glimpsed an occasional enemy aeroplane, but
they were bent on watching troop movements and only a few stray bombs
were dropped. The inactivity of the armies, burrowed in their winter
quarters, was reflected in the air.
It was announced by the French Foreign Office that from the beginning
of hostilities up to February 1, 1915, French aircraft had made 10,000
reconnaissances, covering a total of more than 1,250,000 miles. This
represented 18,000 hours spent in the air.
Antwerp, which had surrendered to the Germans, was visited by British
flyers on March 7, 1915. They bombarded the submarine plant at
Hoboken, a suburb. The plant at this point had been quickly developed
by the conquerors and the harbor served as a refuge for many undersea
boats. Numerous attacks on ships off the Dutch mainland persuaded the
British authorities that a blow at Hoboken would be a telling stroke
against German submarines, and so the event proved. Several craft were
sunk or badly damaged. Bombs set fire to the submarine works and much
havoc was wrought among the material stored there. A number of
employees were injured. The Antwerp populace cheered the airmen on
their trip across the city and back to the British lines, for which a
fine was imposed upon the city.
During March, 1915, there was some activity in the East, where
Zeppelins shelled Warsaw in Poland, killing fifty persons and causing
many fires. One of the raiders was brought down on March 18, and her
crew captured. The Russian service suffered losses, Berlin announcing
the capture of six aeroplanes in a single week. One of these was of
the Sikorsky type, a giant battle plane carrying a half dozen men.
Shortly after one o'clock on the morning of March 21, 1915, two
Zeppelins appeared above Paris. Four of the raiders started from the
German lines originally, but two were forced to turn back. They were
first seen above Compiegne, north of which the German lines came
nearest to Paris. The news was flashed ahead. The French airmen rose
to meet them. Two of the Zeppelins eluded the patrol. Their coming was
expected and when they approached the city searchlights picked them up
and kept the raiders in view as they maneuvered above the French
capital. The French defenders and the Zeppelin commanders met in a
bold battle in the air. The Zeppelins kept up a running fight with
pursuing aeroplanes while dropping bombs. They sailed across Mt.
Valerien, one of the most powerful Paris forts, dropping missiles
which did little harm. A searchlight from the Eiffel Tower kept them
in full view. They were forced to move rapidly. Finally they swung in
a big arc toward Versailles, and then turned suddenly and sailed for
the heart of the city. Twenty-five bombs were dropped. Eight persons
were struck and a number of fires started.
The Parisians flocked to the streets and watched the strange combat
with rapt interest. Although the raiders had come before, the
spectacle had not lost its fascination. Even though the authorities
issued strict orders and troops tried to drive the throngs indoors,
Parisians persisted in risking life and limb to see the Zeppelins
battle in the night skies. Upon this occasion the battle aloft lasted
until after four o'clock in the morning, or more than three hours.
On the same night, March 21, 1915, three bombs were thrown upon
Villers-Cotterets, fifteen miles southwest of Soissons. There was
small damage and no casualties. But the two raids emphasized that a
few weeks more would see intensive resumption of war in the air.
French aviators shelled Bazincourt, Briey, Brimont, and Vailly on
March 22, 1915. At Briey, the station was damaged and the railway line
cut, two of the birdmen descending to within a few hundred yards of
the track. Enemy batteries at Brimont suffered damage. The next day a
German machine was shot down near Colmar, in Alsace, and its two
occupants captured.
With the return of spring, 1915, came renewed activity among airmen on
all fronts. The first day of April was marked by the loss of two
German machines, one near Soissons and the other near Rheims. The
first fell a victim to gunfire, both occupants being killed. The
second, an Albatross model, was discovered prowling above Rheims.
French pilots immediately gave chase and after a circuitous flight
back and forth across the city, compelled the enemy machine to land.
The pilot and observer were overpowered before they had time to set it
afire, the usual procedure when captured.
A typical day of this season with the birdmen of France was April 2,
1915. A War Office report of that day tells of forty-three
reconnoitering flights and twenty others for the purpose of attacking
enemy positions or ascertaining the direction of gunfire. Bombs were
dropped upon the hangars and aviation camp at Habsheim. The munition
factories at Dietweiler, and the railway station in Walheim. The
station at Bensdorf and the barracks at the same place were shelled
from the air. Much damage was done.
Seven French aeroplanes flew over the Woevre region on this day,
penetrating as far as Vigneulles, where the aerial observers
discovered barracks covered with heavy corrugated iron. The machines
descended in long spirals and dropped a number of bombs, setting the
barracks afire. Troops were seen rushing in all directions from the
burning structures.
The aviation camp at Coucu-le-Chateau, north of Soissons, and the
station at Comines, Belgium, were under fire from the air. In
Champagne a quantity of shells were unloosed upon the station at
Somme-Py and Dontrein, near Eacille and St. Etienne-sur-Suippe enemy
bivouacs were bombarded. Other bivouacs at Basancourt and Pont
Faverger were struck by arrows dropped from the skies.
These numerous raids and reconnaissances were repeated every day at
many points. German airmen were not less active than those of the
Allies. Neither side allowed a fine day to pass without watching the
enemy from the air and striking him at such places and times as they
could.
Early on the morning of April 13, 1915, a Zeppelin was discovered
surveying allied gun positions near Ypres, in Belgium. The batteries
immediately opened fire and several shells found their target, judging
from the heavy list which the airship developed. It was seen to be in
serious trouble as it made its escape. Amsterdam reported the
following day that the craft fell near Thielt, a complete wreck. What
became of the crew never was learned.
The raids on England were now resumed. On April 13, 1915, a Zeppelin
visited Newcastle-on-Tyne and several near-by towns. Newcastle, a
great naval station and manufacturing city, had been the objective of
previous air attacks that brought forth little result. The Zeppelin
commander, who directed the bombardment of the thirteenth, was well
informed and proceeded straight to the arsenal and naval workshops.
More than a dozen bombs fell. Strangely enough none of these caused
material loss, and there were no casualties. Dwellings were set afire
in other quarters of the city. The stir that followed brought England
to the realization that better weather was dawning and with it an
imminent peril. Efforts were redoubled to ward off aerial raiders.
A flotilla of Zeppelins shelled Blyth, Wallsend, and South Shields, on
the northeastern coast of England on the night of April 14, 1915. This
attack was directed primarily at the industrial and shipping centers
of Tyneside. Berlin claimed a distinct success, but the British denied
that extensive harm had been done.
French airmen drove home an attack on April 15, 1915, that had
important results. The station at Saint-Quentin was shelled from the
air and upward of 150 freight cars and extensive freight sheds
destroyed. Some of the cars contained benzol, the explosion of which
spread burning liquid in every direction. Adjacent buildings were
consumed by the spreading fire and it seemed that Saint-Quentin itself
might go. Twenty-four German soldiers were killed and the fire burned
from four o'clock in the afternoon until six the next morning, the
explosion of shells being frequently heard. These facts were
communicated to the French by spies and prisoners and thus written
into the war's record.
Lowestoft and Maldon, only thirty miles from London, were the mark of
bombs on the morning of April 16, 1915. The raiders arrived at
Lowestoft about midnight and released three bombs, one of which killed
two horses. A half hour later they appeared over Maldon, where six
bombs were dropped. Several fires broke out. There was a panic when
searchlights revealed one of the raiders still hovering above the
city. But he apparently was merely bent on learning the extent of his
success, as he passed on to Hebridge, two miles away, where a building
was fired by a bursting shell.
Another German squadron of six craft was sighted at Ipswich,
approaching from the direction of the channel. A few fires in Ipswich
and two persons hurt at Southwold were the only evidences of the
visit. This raid was made significant by the fact that the squadron
paid small attention to towns in its route, proceeding to Henham Hall,
residence of the Countess Stradbroke, near Southwold. It then was used
as a hospital for wounded soldiers. A half dozen bombs fell in close
proximity to the main building, but fortunately none of them struck
their mark.
The evening of that day, April 26, 1915, the third raid on England in
less than twenty-four hours took place. Canterbury, Sittingbourne, and
Faversham were shelled, all three towns being within thirty miles of
London. British machines drove the invaders off. About half past one
of the next morning a Zeppelin dropped seven bombs in the
neighborhood of Colchester. It was evident from these frequent
visitations that the German authorities were bent on reaching London
itself. Nearly every raid brought the enemy craft nearer. The gain of
almost a mile was made on each raid. The Germans were wary and
evidently suspected that London's air defenses were adequate. The
small towns which they shelled were of no importance whatever from a
military standpoint, and such casualties as resulted were
insignificant as compared to the death roll that London might be
expected to yield.
A French squadron engaged in a raid of some consequence on April 16,
1915. Leopoldshoehe, east of Rurigue, fell a victim. Workshops, where
shells were made, came in for a heavy aerial bombardment. Fire started
which swept away several buildings. Equipment and supplies were
smashed. Other bombs dropped on a powder magazine at Rothwell caused a
second fire. The electric plant at Maixienes-les-Metz, ten miles north
of Metz, which supplied the city with light and power, was rendered
useless. Munition plants and the station in Metz itself suffered, and
three German aeroplanes guarding the city were compelled to land under
the guns of the fortress when the French squadron turned about. This
dash was a profitable one for the French and showed a new organization
that promised well for the future. Just how many machines took part
was not learned, but there probably were forty or fifty. North of
Ypres French gunners brought down a German aeroplane which fell behind
the enemy's trenches, ablaze from end to end.
The Germans took similar toll. Several of their flyers shelled Amiens
on April 17, 1915, dropping bombs which killed or wounded ten persons
in the vicinity of the cathedral. The invaders sailed up in the night
and descended to a point just above the city before dropping the first
bomb. They were off in a couple of minutes, before pursuing machines
could engage them.
All of these raids were more or less effective. At the time they
attracted wide attention, but as the war wore on the world became
accustomed to aerial attacks. The total of lives lost and the
destruction caused never will be accurately known.
On April 21, 1915, came news of another trip to Warsaw by Zeppelins, a
dozen persons being killed. Bombs fell in the center of the city and
the post-office building was struck. A resumption of activity in that
quarter was productive of raids, clashes in the air and Zeppelin
alarms, such as were common in the western theatre, but on a lesser
scale, as the Russians and Austrians possessed only a limited air
equipment and the Germans were compelled to concentrate the bulk of
their machines elsewhere.
In the southern war zone the aerial operations recommenced with April,
1915. The Austrians made several more or less futile attacks on
Venice. Italian cities, especially Venice, Verona, and others near the
border removed many of their art works to safe places, including
stained-glass windows from cathedrals, canvases, and statuary. The
base of the Campanile, Venice, and other historic edifices were
protected with thousands of sandbags. The famous horses brought from
Constantinople were taken down. This denuding process robbed the
ancient seat of Venetian power of its many splendors, but assured
their preservation and future restoration.
The Austrian bombs started numerous fires, tore up a few streets, and
caused some casualties. In turn, the Italians dashed across the
Austrian lines and attacked supply bases, railway stations, and other
vantage points in the same way that the Allies were harrowing the
Germans on the western front. In this work the Italians made use to
some extent of their dirigibles, a type smaller than the Zeppelin but
highly efficient.
Thirty persons were killed or wounded in Calais on April 26, 1915,
when a Zeppelin succeeded in reaching a point above one of the thickly
populated sections of the city. The raid took place before midnight.
The visitor was quickly driven away by a French machine, but not until
the damage had been done. An orphanage was among the buildings struck,
many of the victims being children. A fleet of aeroplanes visited
Amiens at about the same hour, their efforts being directed to the
bombardment of ammunition depots near that city. The invaders were
driven off with small results to show for their work.
In a raid on April 28, 1915, upon Friedrichshafen, so often the mark
of airmen, several airship sheds and a Zeppelin were damaged. A nearly
simultaneous bombardment of Leopoldshoehe, Loerrach, and the station at
Haltinge resulted in the destruction of train sheds and two
locomotives. Forty-two members of the Landsturm were killed or wounded
at Loerrach and two aeroplanes put out of commission, service being cut
on the railway line. This was the official French version. Geneva gave
a different and more vivid account. According to the Swiss, the French
airmen visited Friedrichshafen twice within thirty-six hours,
destroying five airships, setting fire to several buildings, and
causing at least $1,000,000 damage. The report said that they returned
by way of Metz, dropping arrows and bombs, and wrecking the station at
Loerrach.
The east coast of England was the victim of an air raid on April 30,
1915. Hostile aircraft were sighted over Ipswich, about sixty-five
miles from London, shortly after midnight. The alarm was spread
westward, whence the craft were bound. Five bombs fell upon Ipswich,
but no one was killed. A few dwellings and commercial buildings were
struck, fires starting which the local department soon controlled.
Only a few minutes after the machines shelled Ipswich, they were seen
to approach Bury St. Edmunds, fourteen miles to the northwest of
Ipswich. Three bombs failed to produce casualties, but fires were
started. Little damage resulted.
On the first day of May, 1915, announcement was made in Paris that
experiments conducted at Issy les Molineaux over several months had
brought about successful tests in firing a three-inch gun from an
aeroplane. This had never been accomplished before, and had seemed a
well-nigh impossible task. An entirely new piece was developed, firing
a shell of about the same size as the regular 75-millimeter field gun.
It was made lighter by half, with an effective range of 2,500 meters,
considerably less than the standard gun.
French skill in designing weapons, always a trait of the race, was
evidenced here. The heavy steel breechblock of the seventy-five was
replaced by a wooden block. When fired the explosion of the powder
charge automatically blew the wooden breechblock backward, thus
neutralizing the shock. But owing to the open breech much of the
powder's driving force was lost. Nothing to equal the new arm had
there been up to that time. The wooden breechblock completely did away
with the heavy hydraulic recoil cylinders which were one of the
distinguishing features of the seventy-five. These cylinders were
esteemed by many authorities to be the finest in the world, absorbing
maximum shock with a minimum of effort.
The coming of this new gun marked a big step forward in aerial war and
gave the French machines so equipped a decided advantage. Its effect
was to make the German flyers more wary, avoiding combat except when
impossible to avoid the issue. But its use was confined to the larger
machines as a rule, particularly the Voisin biplane, the machine gun
being favored by many airmen because of its lightness and the ease
with which it could be handled.
The beginning of May, 1915, found aerial warfare in full progress again.
The British defense squadrons showed somewhat better generalship and it
was not until the tenth of the month that Zeppelins obtained any
appreciable advantage in that quarter. But two of the raiders evaded the
patrols on the night of May 10, 1915, and dropped bombs upon
Westcliff-on-Sea, near Southend, at the mouth of the Thames, a bare
twenty-five miles from London. There were no fatalities, but a man and
his wife were badly burned when their home caught fire from a bursting
bomb. At Leigh, near Southend, several shops were burned. It was
reported that four Zeppelins had been seen at Leigh, whereas
Westcliff-on-Sea saw but two. If the larger number were correct it would
indicate that the Germans were becoming more determined to reach London.
One feature of the raid at Westcliff-on-Sea was that of sixty bombs
dropped only a few struck in the town. Most of them fell on the beach
and the sand neutralized any effects that the missiles might have had.
The Bull and George Hotel at Ramsgate was completely wrecked by bombs
which struck it on the night of May 17, 1915. An instance of the
vagaries of explosives was furnished by this raid. One of the bombs
which struck the hotel penetrated the roof and fell upon a bed on
which a woman was sleeping. It wrecked the room and tore a great hole
in the floor through which the bed and occupant fell to the cellar.
The sleeper was badly hurt and the bed practically uninjured. Fires
started by other bombs in Ramsgate soon were extinguished.
Advices from Rotterdam stated that during this raid a Zeppelin fell
into the Gierlesche Woods, Belgium, two men being hurt. The cause of
the airship's plight was unknown, but the damage made it necessary
that the frame be taken apart and sent to Germany for repairs.
One of the oddest combats of the war was staged on this day--May 17,
1915. A Zeppelin, flying from the direction of the English coast, was
sighted in the channel by a French torpedo boat. The craft was at a
comparatively low altitude and furnished an excellent mark. Only a few
shots had been fired when it was seen to be in distress. The Zeppelin
made several frantic efforts to rise, then fell into the sea within
four miles of Gravelines. It sank before aid could be given the crew.
May 17, 1915, was a bad day for Zeppelins. One of the dirigibles
supposed to have attacked Ramsgate early that morning was discovered
off Nieuport, Belgium, by a squadron of eight British naval machines
which had made a sortie from Dunkirk. They surrounded the enemy craft
and three of the pilots succeeded in approaching close to the
Zeppelin. Four bombs were dropped upon the airship from a height of
200 feet. A column of smoke arose. The Zeppelin looked as though it
would fall for a moment, but righted itself and mounted to an altitude
of some 11,000 feet, finally eluding its pursuers.
Two Zeppelins and two Taubes were caught by daylight after a
frustrated raid upon Calais on May 18, 1915. They were fired upon from
many points. A battery at Gris Nez succeeded in hitting one of the
dirigibles. The other craft of the flotilla stood by their injured
fellow as long as they dared, but made off after a few minutes, as
French machines were closing in from all sides. The injured Zeppelin
dropped on the beach near Fort Mardick, about two miles from Dunkirk.
Forty men aboard were taken prisoners, including several officers.
Two women in Southend, England, met death on May 27, 1915, when
Zeppelins visited that city. A child was badly injured. The lighting
plant and several industrial establishments suffered damage. Repeated
attacks on Southend had resulted in the installation of searchlights
and the detailing of more aviators to guard its citizens. Neither
availed to prevent the loss of life, but they did succeed in driving
away the raiders after their first appearance.
Of all the raids carried out during the spring and summer of 1915, one
of the most important was that upon Ludwigshafen, in Bavaria. Here the
laboratories of the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik were located. This
plant was said to produce two-thirds of the nitrates used in the
production of ammunition for the German armies. Since the start of the
war it had been the object of several attacks, none of which had
noteworthy results.
But on the morning of May 26, 1915, eighteen French aeroplanes started
at daybreak from a border stronghold and headed straight for
Ludwigshafen. They had a supply of gasoline to last seven hours and
rose to a height of 6,500 feet in order to escape detection. In this
they did not succeed, but ran into several lively cannonades before
reaching their destination. Once there, they circled above the big
chemical works, dropping bomb after bomb. More than a ton of
explosives were hurled upon the buildings in a quarter of an hour.
Columns of smoke rose from the burning structures. Loud explosions
issued from the smokestacks, sounding like the report of heavy guns.
Workmen fled in all directions and the whole plant soon was wrapped in
flames. The airmen lingered about for a short time, watching the
results of their work. It became evident that the plant would be a
total loss, and the flames spread to near-by buildings, for a time
threatening a good part of the city.
Swiss reports of a few days later said that upward of a hundred
workmen lost their lives, that scores were hurt and the property loss
ran well into the millions. The blow was severe, the heaviest up to
that time which German industries, far from the battle front, had
sustained. It revealed a new chapter of war in the air to communities
which would be snugly secure under any other condition. On the return
trip, ill fortune overtook the French flotilla. The machine of its
commander found it necessary to make a landing. Chief of Squadron, De
Goys, and Adjutant Bunau-Varilla were captured. They burned their
aeroplane before being taken prisoners.
CHAPTER III
ZEPPELINS ATTACK LONDON--BATTLES IN THE AIR
England's insularity disappeared on the night of May 31, 1915. The
isolation by sea which had kept her immune from attack since the days
of the Normans failed to save London from the Zeppelin. After ten
months of war the British capital looked upon its dead for the first
time. Four children, one woman, and one man were killed. An old apple
woman died of fright. There were numerous fires, only three of which
assumed serious proportions and these were extinguished by the fire
department after a few hours.
London's initial glimpse of a Zeppelin was obtained about 11.30 p. m.,
when the theatre section was filled with homeward bound throngs. The
lights attracted the raiders to this district, where a half dozen
bombs were dropped. No sooner had the first of the missiles fallen
than antiaircraft guns began to open a bombardment from many
directions. Searchlights mounted at advantageous points threw their
narrow pencils of light into the skies. The people in different
sections of the city caught a fleeting glance of a huge airship that
floated sullenly along, like some bird of prey from out of the past--a
new pterodactyl that instead of seizing its victims dropped death upon
them.
One shell fell in Trafalgar Square. The Zeppelins passed over the
Houses of Parliament, Westminster, and other famous buildings, but
apparently did not have their location well in mind as these noted
monuments escaped harm.
But the Zeppelins had come. And they left scars which greeted
Londoners the following morning to prove that the raid was not a bad
dream which would disappear with the morning mists. In addition to the
four persons killed, seventy others were injured, some of whom
suffered the loss of limbs and other injuries that incapacitated them.
Immediately there was a cry for revenge. Some of the newspapers
advocated reprisals upon German cities. This the government refused to
do and steadfastly adhered to a policy of war upon fortified places
and armed men alone. Rioting took place in many districts where
Germans were numerous. Shops and homes were looted. Every German who
appeared in the streets, or any person who looked like one, was liable
to attack. A number of aliens were badly handled. The public declared
a spontaneous boycott upon every person having a name that seemed to
be of German origin. There was a united movement to obtain some
reparation for the Zeppelin raids. But the results were only trifling
and the indignation died down with the passing days, British calmness
soon succeeding the excitement of a moment.
Italian frontier towns became the goal of Austrian airmen on June 1,
1915. A half dozen persons were killed or injured and there was some
property damaged. With warm weather and good flying conditions raids
were in order every day.
On June 3, 1915, British aviators made a successful attack upon German
airship sheds at Evere, Belgium. The same day French machines
bombarded the headquarters of the crown prince in the Argonne, with
what results never was definitely established, although there were
reports that several high officers had been killed.
It was made known in London on June 3, 1915, that Great Britain and
Germany had agreed to a plan for the protection of public buildings
from air raids. According to this agreement hospitals, churches,
museums, and similar buildings were to have large white crosses marked
upon their roofs. Both governments pledged themselves to respect these
crosses. Much importance was attached to the idea at the time, but
its effects were disappointing. The marks either were not readily
perceivable from an aeroplane or the pilots did not trouble themselves
too much about the crosses. Public buildings continued to suffer.
On the night of June 4, 1915, German dirigibles attacked towns at the
mouth of the Humber, the port and shipping of Hardwich, in England.
There were some casualties and considerable property loss, but the
British Government would not make public the extent of the damage as
the places attacked were of naval importance. Calais, on the French
coast was raided the next day by two German airmen. There was one
casualty. England's east coast was visited by Zeppelins on the night
of June 6, 1915, twenty-four persons being killed and forty hurt.
There was much damage, all details of which were suppressed.
Just after the break of day on June 7, 1915, a British monoplane was
returning from a scouting trip over Belgium. At the same hour a
Zeppelin flew homeward from the English coast. The two met between
Ghent and Brussels. Four persons had been killed and forty injured
during the night at Yarmouth and other near-by towns on the East
channel coast. Raids had been frequent of late and the British pilot
sensed the fact that this Zeppelin was one of the dreaded visitors. He
was several miles away when the big aircraft hove into view. Uncertain
for a few minutes how to proceed, he rose until he was two thousand
feet above the Zeppelin. His maneuver was not appreciated at first, or
the Zeppelin crew did not see him. There was no attempt either to flee
or give battle.
But as the monoplane drew nearer it was sighted and a combat followed
such as never was seen before. Sub-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, a
young Canadian who had not reached twenty-one years of age, matched
his pygmy machine against the great aerial dreadnought. The fight
started at a height of 6,000 feet. Lieutenant Warneford released his
first bomb when about 1,000 feet above the Zeppelin. He saw it strike
the airbag and disappear, followed by a puff of smoke. Because of the
sectional arrangement this did not disable the airship. The
Lieutenant circled off and again approached the Zeppelin. Every gun
was trained upon him that could be brought to bear. The wings of his
machine were shattered many times, but he kept on fighting. When once
more above the enemy craft, he released another bomb. It also struck
the Zeppelin, but appeared to glance off.
The antagonists resorted to every conceivable ruse, one to escape, the
other to bring down its quarry. All efforts of the Zeppelin commander
to reach the height of his antagonist were defeated. His lone enemy
kept above him. The battle varied from an altitude of 6,000 to 10,000
feet. Three other bombs struck the airship, and each time there was
the telltale wisp of smoke.
The Zeppelin was mortally injured. Her commander turned to earth for
refuge. Seeing this, Lieutenant Warneford came nearer. He had but one
bomb left. Descending to within a few hundred feet of the airship,
while its machine guns played upon him, he released this remaining
bomb. It struck the Zeppelin amidship. There was a flash, a roar, and
a great burst of smoke as the vanquished craft exploded and plunged
nose downward. The rush of air caused by the explosion upset the
equilibrium of the victorious machine, which dropped toward the ground
and turned completely over before its pilot could regain control. The
presence of mind which he showed at this juncture, was one of the most
remarkable features of this remarkable conflict.
The young Canadian pilot righted his machine in time to see the
Zeppelin end its career. Like a flaming comet it fell upon the convent
of Le Grand Beguinage de Sainte Elizabeth, located in Mont Saint
Amand, a suburb of Ghent. This convent was used as an orphanage. The
burning airship set fire to several buildings, causing the death of
two sisters and two children. The twenty-eight men aboard were killed.
Accounts from Amsterdam a day or two later gave a vivid description of
the charred remnants of the machine, the burned convent buildings, and
the victims all piled together.
Lieutenant Warneford saw the Zeppelin fall and knew that its raiding
days were over. Then he discovered that his own machine was in
trouble. In another moment he realized the impossibility of returning
to the British lines, and was compelled to volplane toward earth,
cutting off his driving power. Descending in a soft field, he found
that his motor was out of order. Thirty precious minutes were spent
repairing the damage. It took him as long again to get his machine
started, a task not often accomplished by one man. But he sailed
serenely home and brought the news of his strange victory.
Within twenty-four hours Lieutenant Warneford was the hero of the
world. His name and achievement had been flashed to the four corners
of the earth. Every newspaper rang with acclaim for the boyish aviator
who had shown that one man of skill and daring was a match for the
huge Zeppelin. It was the old story of David and Goliath, of the Roman
youth who bested the Gaul, of Drake's improvised fleet against the
Armada. The lieutenant was called to London and presented with the
Victoria Cross by King George, who thanked him in the name of the
British Empire for adding another laurel to the long list of its
honors. A day or two later President Poincare received him in Paris
and pinned the Legion of Honor cross upon his breast.
But this same week saw the climax of this war romance--a tragic ending
to a war epic. Lieutenant Warneford was practicing with a new French
machine at Versailles. He either lost control or the motor failed him.
It dropped to earth, killing the pilot and an American newspaper
correspondent who was in the observer's seat. This sudden end to a
career so brilliant, the cutting off of a future so promising, cast a
pall over the minds of both the French and British airmen. The body of
Lieutenant Warneford lay in state at the French capital and afterward
in London, where every honor was shown his memory.
CHAPTER IV
VENICE ATTACKED--OTHER RAIDS
British airmen visited Ghent on June 8, 1915, where several ammunition
depots were fired. The railway station was hit and a number of German
troops in a train standing there killed or hurt.
On June 9, 1915, Venice was shelled by Austrian aviators, bombs
falling near St. Mark's and setting a number of fires. There were no
casualties as far as known.
An Italian airship squadron raided Pola, the principal Austrian naval
base, on June 14, 1915. Pola has one of the best harbors on the
Adriatic and is an exceptionally strong position. It was from there
that Austrian warships and aircraft made their attacks upon Italian
and other allied shipping. The city had a big arsenal and
miscellaneous war plants. The arsenal was struck by some of the bombs
dropped during this raid, shipping in the harbor was bombarded, and
one warship badly damaged. This was perhaps the most valuable
accomplishment of the Italian air service in offensive actions up to
that time. Contrary to what might be expected from the Latin
temperament, Italy had confined herself to the use of aircraft for
scouting purposes almost exclusively. The campaign in Tripoli had
taught her their value, and she had not shown a disposition to bombard
Austrian cities in reply to attacks upon her own people.
The visit of the Zeppelins to London had aroused not only the ire of
Britain, but that of her French allies. It was decided to take
reprisals. Forty-five French machines left the eastern border during
the night of June 15, 1915, and set their journey toward Karlsruhe.
Some of the craft were large battle planes; all of them had speed and
carrying capacity. Approaching Karlsruhe they at first were taken for
German machines, by reason of the location of Karlsruhe far from the
front.
The squadron divided and approached the city from a half dozen
different directions, dripping bombs as they came. One of the largest
chemical plants in Germany was set afire and burned to the ground.
Both wings of the Margrave's Palace were struck and one of them
practically ruined. In the opposite wing, which escaped with only
slight damage, the Queen of Sweden, who is a German by birth, was
sleeping. She was said to have missed death only by a few inches.
Other titled persons in the palace had narrow escapes. A collection of
art works was ruined. Despite the fire of antiaircraft guns the French
machines hovered above the city and dropped bombs at will, again
proving that there was no sufficient protection against air attacks
except by flotillas of equal force.
Within a half hour flames started in many sections of the city. The
chemical and other plants were burned. Karlsruhe's citizens were made
to realize the losses which German airmen had inflicted upon the
noncombatants of other countries. According to the best advices 112
persons were killed and upward of 300 wounded. The maximum number
admitted by the Germans to have been injured was 19 killed and 14
wounded. But persons arriving in Geneva, for weeks after the raid,
told of the wholesale destruction and large casualties. The victims
were buried with honors, and the German Government issued a statement
deploring the "senseless" attack. This was one of the few raids made
by aviators of the allied powers in which the lives of noncombatants
were lost. That it was a warning and not an adopted policy is
indicated by the fact that it was not followed up with other raids.
Zeppelins were seen off the east coast of England about midnight on
June 16, 1915. They left in their wake one of the longest casualty
lists resulting from aerial raids upon England up to that time. South
Shields was the principal sufferer. Sixteen persons were killed and
forty injured. The Zeppelins devoted their attention to the big
Armstrong works principally. Guns and munitions of almost every
description were being made there, and the raid was planned to wreck
the establishment. This attempt was partially successful, but the
buildings destroyed soon were replaced and operations at the plant
never ceased. The extent of the damage was kept secret, but the number
of victims again caused indignation throughout the British Empire.
One result of this raid was a demand in the House of Commons on June
24, 1915, that the public be informed as to defense measures against
air raids. The Government had evaded the question at every
opportunity, and up to that time kept discussion of the subject down
to the minimum. But on this occasion the Commons were not to be easily
disposed of, and insisted upon an answer. This was promised for a
future day, but Home Secretary Brace announced that 24 men, 21 women,
and 11 children had died as a result of attacks from the air since the
war began. He said that 86 men, 35 women, and 17 children had been
wounded. Of these a percentage died later. The secretary intimated
that the Government was keeping a record of every pound's worth of
damage and every person injured, with the expectation of making
Germany reimburse.
The South Shields attack led to further expansion of the air service
and redoubled measures to check the raiders. It seems likely that not
a few aircraft have been captured about which the British Government
made no report. What the motives for this secrecy are it would be hard
to decide. But a guess may be hazarded that, as in the case of certain
submarine crews, it is intended to charge some aviators and Zeppelin
crews with murder after the war is over, and try them by due process
of law. For a time the Government kept a number of men taken from
submarines, known to have caused the loss of noncombatant lives, in
close confinement. Germany retaliated upon army officers, and the
British were compelled to retire from their position. It has been
hinted that in the case of the Zeppelin raiders she had quietly locked
up a number of them without announcing her purpose to the world.
The closing days of June, 1915, brought two raids on Paris. Taubes in
one instance, and Zeppelins in another were held up by the air patrol
and driven back, a few bombs being dropped on Saint Cloud. The work of
the Paris defense forces was notably good during the summer of 1915,
countless incursions being halted before the capital was reached.
What may have been intended as a raid equal to the Cuxhaven attack was
attempted on July 4, 1915, but was foiled by the watchfulness of the
Germans. Cruisers and destroyers approached German positions on an
unnamed bay of the North Sea, and a squadron of British seaplanes rose
from the vessels. German airmen promptly went aloft and drove off the
invaders. The set-to took place near the island of Terschelling off
the Netherlands. When convinced that the Germans were fully ready to
meet them the British turned back and put out to the open sea. It was
intimated from Berlin that a considerable naval force had been engaged
on the British side. There was a good deal of mystery about the
incident.
Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the British flying men
during July, 1915, as concerns actual fighting, was the destruction of
three Taubes at the mouth of the Thames. The invaders were sighted
while still at sea and the word wirelessed ahead. Four British
machines mounted to give battle, and after a stirring contest above
the city brought down two of the Taubes. They were hit in midair, and
one of them caught fire. The burning machine dropping headlong to
earth furnished a spectacle that the watchers are not likely to
forget. The third Taube was winged after a long flight seaward and
sank beneath the waves, carrying down both occupants. This contest
took place July 20, 1915, and followed several visits to England by
Zeppelins, none of which had important results.
On July 21, 1915, French aviators made three conspicuous raids. A
squadron of six machines descended upon Colmar in Alsace, dropping
ninety-one shells upon the passenger and freight stations. Both broke
into flames, and the former was almost wholly destroyed, tying up
traffic on the line, the object of all attacks upon railroad stations,
except at such times as troops were concentrated there or trains were
standing on the tracks ready to load or unload soldiers.
The second raid of this day was especially interesting, because a
dirigible and not an aeroplane was employed, the French seldom using
the big craft so much favored by the Germans. Vigneulles and the
Hatton Chattel in the St. Mihiel salient were the objectives of the
dirigible. A munition depot and the Vigneulles station were shelled
successfully. The third air attack was made upon Challerange, near
Vouziers, by four French aeroplanes. Forty-eight bombs were dropped on
the station there, a junction point and one of the German lesser
supply bases. The damage was reported to have halted reenforcements
for a position near-by where the French took a trench section on this
same day. Accepting the report as true, it exemplifies the unison of
army units striving for the same purpose by remarkably different
methods and weapons.
The French kept busy during this month of July, 1915, with raids upon
Metz and intermediate positions. Metz is the first objective of what
the French hope will be a march to the Rhine, and since the start of
the war the Germans there have had no rest.
On July 28, 1915, Nancy was visited by a flock of Zeppelins and a
number of bombs dropped which did considerable damage in that
war-scarred city. Eleven or twelve persons were killed.
During the night of July 29-30, 1915, a French aviator shelled a plant
in Dornach, Alsace, where asphyxiating gas was being made. Several of
his bombs went home and a tremendous explosion took place that almost
wrecked the machine. But the driver returned safely. An air squadron
also visited Freiburg, so often the target of airmen, and released
bombs upon the railway station.
French airmen were extremely active on July 29, 1915. One flotilla
bombarded the railroad between Ypres and Roulers, near Passchendaele,
tearing up the track for several hundred yards. German bivouacs in the
region of Longueval, west of Combles, also were shelled from the air,
and German organizations on the Brimont Hill, near Rheims, served as
targets for French birdmen. A military station on the railway at
Chattel was shelled, and the station at Burthecourt in Lorraine
damaged. Forty-five French machines dropped 103 bombs on munition
factories and adjoining buildings at Pechelbronn, near Wissemburg.
PART III--THE WESTERN FRONT
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS
The first anniversary of the war on the western front fell on August
2, 1915. It was on Tuesday, July 28, of the previous year that Count
Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, had pressed the
button in "the powder magazine of Europe"--the Balkans--by declaring
war on Serbia.
For two days the world looked on in breathless, wondering suspense.
Then, like a series of titanic thunderbolts hurled in quick
succession, mighty events shaped themselves with a violence and a
rapidity that staggered the imagination.
On July 31, 1914, "a state of war" was proclaimed in Germany; the next
day (August 1) that country declared war on Russia; on August 2, 1914,
Germany delivered her ultimatum to Belgium and invaded both France and
Luxemburg, following up these acts with a declaration of war against
France on the 3d of the same month.
Before the sun had risen and set again there came the climax to that
most sensational week: Great Britain had thrown her weight into the
scales against the Teutonic Powers. This occurred on August 4, 1914,
the same day that the German frontier force under General von Emmich
came into contact with the Belgian pickets before Liege.
After thirty-six hours of fighting the southern forts were captured
and the city fell into German hands on August 7, 1914. It was not
until the 15th, however, that General Leman, the Belgian commander,
was conquered in his last stronghold, the northern fort of Loncin.
When that fell, the railway system of the Belgian plains lay open to
the invaders. Leman's determined stand had delayed the German advance
for at least a week, and afforded an extremely valuable respite for
the unprepared French and British armies.
The first drafts of the British Expeditionary Force landed in France
on August 16, 1914. On August 7, 1914, a French brigade from Belfort
had crossed the frontier into Alsace and taken the towns of Altkirch
and Muelhausen, which, however, they were unable to hold for more than
three days. Between August 7 and August 15, 1914, large bodies of
German cavalry with infantry supports crossed the Meuse between Liege
and the Dutch frontier, acting as a screen for the main advance. The
Belgian army, concentrated on the Dyle, scored some successes against
the Germans at Haelen, Tirlemont, and Engherzee on the 12th and 13th,
but after the fall of Fort Loncin the German advance guards fell back
and the main German right under Von Kluck advanced toward Brussels. On
the 19th the Belgians began to withdraw to the fortress of Antwerp.
Brussels fell to the Germans on the 20th. Von Kluck turned toward the
Sambre and Von Buelow advanced along the Meuse to Namur. On the
opposite bank (the right) of the Meuse the Saxon army of Von Hausen
moved against Namur and Dinant, while farther south the German Crown
Prince and the Duke of Wuerttemberg pushed their forces toward the
French frontier. Meanwhile, General de Castelnau, commanding the
French right, had seized most of the passes of the Vosges, overrun
upper Alsace almost to the Rhine, and had reached Saarburg on the
Metz-Strassburg railway. On August 20, 1914, the Germans attacked
Namur, captured it on the 23d, and demolished the last forts on the
24th. This unexpected event placed the Allies in an extremely critical
situation, which led to serious reverses. The British force on the
left was in danger of being enveloped in Von Kluck's wheeling
movement; the fall of Namur had turned the flank of the Fourth and
Fifth French armies; the latter was defeated by Von Buelow at Charleroi
on the 22d; the pressure exerted by the armies of the Duke of
Wuerttemberg and the crown prince also contributed to render inevitable
an immediate retirement of the allied right and center. The French
army that had invaded Lorraine--a grave strategical blunder--had also
come to grief. The Bavarians from Metz had broken its left wing on the
20th and driven it back over the frontier. De Castelnau was fighting
desperately for Nancy on a long front from Pont-a-Mousson down to St.
Die. On the 24th the British line fell back to the vicinity of
Maubeuge, where Von Kluck attempted to close it in. Sir John French
frustrated the plan by further retiring to a line running through Le
Cateau and Landrecies, August 25, 1914. After a violent holding battle
during two days the whole British front had fallen back to St. Quentin
and the upper valley of the Oise.
It was General Joffre's plan to retreat to a position south of the
Marne, where his reserves would be available, a movement which was
successfully carried out by all parts of the allied line during the
following week. By September 5, 1914, this line extended from the
southeast of Paris, along the southern tributaries of the Marne,
across the Champagne to a point south of Verdun. Beyond that, De
Castelnau was still holding the heights in front of Nancy. The
powerful German advance had forced the Allies back some hundred and
thirty miles, almost to the shelter of the Paris fortifications. It
seemed only a matter of hours to the fall of Paris when General Joffre
began his counteroffensive on September 6, 1914. Attempting to pierce
and envelop the allied left center, Von Kluck marched across the front
of the British to strike at the Fifth French Army commanded by General
d'Esperey, who had replaced Lanrezac after the Charleroi defeat. But
the turn of the tide was at hand. The Sixth French Army from Paris,
under General Manoury, fiercely attacked Von Kluck's rear guards on
the Ourcq; Sir John French drove against the right of the main German
advance; the Fifth and Ninth French armies held the front of Von Kluck
and Von Buelow; the Fourth French Army south of Vitry resisted the
piercing movement of the Duke of Wuerttemberg, and the Third French
Army (General Sarrail) checked the crown prince at Verdun, while De
Castelnau at Nancy entered upon the final stage of the battle of
Lorraine. The first great German offensive had failed in its purpose.
By September 12, 1914, the whole German front was retreating
northward. The Aisne plateau, where the Germans came to a halt, is
considered one of the strongest defensive positions in Europe, and
General Joffre soon realized that it could not be taken by direct
assault. He therefore attempted to envelop the German right and
extended his left wing--with a new army--up the valley of the Oise.
Some desperate German counterattacks were met at Rheims and south of
Verdun, but they achieved small success beyond creating a sharp
salient in their line at St. Mihiel, where the invaders managed to
cross the Meuse, General Sarrail defended Verdun with a field army in
a wide circle of intrenchments, with the result that the crown prince
was unable to bring the great howitzers within range of the fortress,
and his army suffered a severe defeat in the Argonne.
The allied stand on the Marne and the resultant battle not only
checked the German avalanche and saved Paris, but dislocated the
fundamental principle of the whole German plan of campaign--to crush
France speedily with one mighty blow and then deal with Russia.
On September 3, 1914, the Russians had already captured Lemberg--two
days before the allied retreat from Mons came to a sudden halt on the
Marne. On that same day, too, the French Government had been removed
from Paris to Bordeaux in anticipation of the worst. Having secured
the capital against immediate danger, General Joffre now began to
extend his line for a great enveloping movement against the German
right. He placed the new Tenth Army under Maud'huy north of De
Castelnau's force, reaching almost to the Belgian frontier. The small
British army under Sir John French moved north of that, and the new
Eighth French Army, under General d'Urbal, was intended to fill the
gap to the Channel. With remarkable flexibility the Germans initiated
the movement with their right as fast as the French extended their
left, and the whole strategy of both sides developed into a feverish
race for the northern shore. Before General d'Urbal could reach his
appointed sector, however, that "gap" had been filled by the remnants
of the Belgian army, liberated after the fall of Antwerp on October
9, 1914. By a narrow margin the Allies had won the race, but were
unable to carry out the intended offensive. Desperate conflicts raged
for a month, but they succeeded in holding the gate to the Channel
ports. The first battle of Ypres-Armentieres opened on October 11,
1914, when the Germans attacked simultaneously at Ypres, Armentieres,
Arras, and La Bassee. As a victory at either of the two last-named
places would have amply sufficed for the German purpose, this fourfold
attack appears to be a rather curious division of energy. The passages
at Arras and La Bassee were held by General Maud'huy and General
Smith-Dorrien respectively. The former defended his position for the
first three weeks in October when the German attacks weakened; the
latter, with the British Second Corps, had reached the farthest point
in the La Bassee position by October 19, 1914. Violent fighting
occurred round this sector during the latter part of October, and,
though compelled to yield ground occasionally, the British force
prevented any serious German advance. In the early stage of the
struggle the Belgian army and a brigade of French marines held the
Yser line. A British squadron, operating from the Channel, broke the
attack of the German right, and during the last week of October the
Belgians held the middle crossings, with the assistance of part of the
French Eighth Army. All immediate danger was removed from this section
by October 31, 1914, after the Belgians had flooded the country and
driven the Wuerttembergers back at Ramscapelle.
Returning to Ypres, we have stated that the Germans attacked four
different points in this region, on October 11, 1914. By the 20th,
however, it became apparent that their main objective was the Ypres
salient--neither the best nor the easiest route to the sea. What,
then, was the motive underlying this particular phase of the German
strategic plan? It would be pure presumption--taking that word at its
worst meaning--to criticize the deep, long-headed calculations of the
German war staff. A reason--and a good reason--there must have been.
What the historian cannot explain he may, perhaps, be permitted to
speculate upon in order to arrive at some working hypothesis. Hence,
would it be considered an extravagant flight of fancy to assume that
the German decision was influenced by the very simple fact that the
British Expeditionary Force was concentrated in and around Ypres?
Skillful stage management is useful even in the grim drama of war, and
the defeat or elimination of the British forces in the first great
battle of the war would indeed have produced a most sensational effect
with almost incalculable results. Be that as it may, the first battle
of Ypres has already been accorded its position in the British
calendar as "the greatest fight in the history of our army." There is
yet another distinction that battle can claim: it was the first mighty
collision between Anglo-Saxon and Teuton in the history of mankind.
They had fought shoulder to shoulder in the past--never face to face.
French troops also took part in the battle; they consisted of
territorials, some cavalry, and Dubois's Ninth Corps; but the heaviest
blows were delivered with whole-hearted force and energy upon the
British line. This remarkable fight lasted nearly a month. During its
progress the Allies withstood some half a million German troops with a
force that never exceeded 150,000 in number.
Before the last thunderous echoes of Ypres had melted away in space,
dreary winter spread its mantle over the combatants with impartial
severity. During the next three months the opposing forces settled
down and heavily intrenched themselves and then began that warfare at
present familiar to the world, resembling huge siege operations. The
Allies were fighting for time--the Germans against it. The allied
commanders aimed at wearing down the man-power of the enemy by a
series of indecisive actions in which his losses should be
disproportionally greater than their own.
The most important events of the winter campaign were the fight near
La Bassee in December, 1914, where the British Indian Corps
distinguished itself; the fighting at Givenchy in January and
February, 1915; the battle at Soissons in January, 1915, where the
French lost some ground; the long struggle in northern Champagne
during February and March, 1915, where the French first made use of
artillery on a grand scale; and some considerable actions in the
neighborhood of Pont-a-Mousson and the southeast valleys of the
Vosges.
In March, 1915, the Allies began what has been described as a
tentative offensive. Between March 10 and March 12, 1915, the British
advanced about a mile on a front of three miles at Neuve Chapelle, but
the aim of the operations, which were directed against Lille, could
not be achieved. Early in April the French carried the heights of Les
Eparges, which commanded the main communications of the Woevre, an
action that led to a general belief that the Allies' summer offensive
would be aimed at Metz. But the plan--if it ever was entertained--was
abandoned toward the end of April, 1915, when the critical situation
of the Russians in Galicia made it imperative to create a diversion in
another area, where the effects would be more quickly felt. Before the
French attack could mature, however, the second battle of Ypres was
developing.
The Germans began shelling Ypres on April 20, 1915, to prevent
reenforcements from entering the salient, and in the evening of April
22, 1915, they made their first attack with poisonous gas. A French
division lying between the canal and the Pilken road had the first
experience of this new horror added to the methods of warfare. Much
has been written in condemnation of employing poisonous gas, and the
practice has been widely discussed from the "moral" and "humane" point
of view. The Germans claim that the French used it first--a contention
not supported by evidence. "On the general moral question," says Mr.
John Buchan, the well-known English writer on military subjects, "it
is foolish to dogmatize." He points out that all war is barbarous in
essence, and that a man who died in torture from the effects of poison
gas might have suffered equal agony from a shrapnel wound. Hence he
draws the conclusion that the German innovation, if not particularly
more barbarous than other weapons, was at least impolitic, since its
employment raised a storm of indignation and exasperated the feelings
of Germany's enemies. Be that as it may, the poison clouds proved very
effective at Ypres during April and May, 1915. The French line was
driven in and the left brigade of the Canadians on their right was
forced back in a sharp angle. For the first five days the northern
side of the salient was steadily pressed in by gas and artillery
attacks. This, the second battle of Ypres, ended about May 24, 1915;
it had lasted practically as long as the first battle, though the
fighting had been less continuous. The Germans were meanwhile striving
desperately to force a decision in Galicia and Poland, simultaneously
fighting a long-range holding battle in the west with fewer men and
more guns.
On May 10, 1915, began the great attack by the French in the Artois,
aimed at securing Lens and the communications of the Scheldt valley.
After violent artillery-fire preparations, the French center south of
Carency was pushed forward a distance of three miles. In a few days
they took the towns of Albain, Carency, Neuville St. Vaast, and most
of Souchez, besides the whole plateau of Lorette. But the Germans had
prepared a number of fortins, which had to be captured before any
general advance could be made. This mode of warfare enables a
numerically inferior force well supplied with ammunition to resist for
a considerable time the most resolute attacks. The French army was
still engaged in this operation when the first anniversary of the war
dawned. The situation at the moment is summarized in a French official
communique as follows: "There has been no great change on the western
front for many months. Great battles have been fought, the casualties
have been heavy on both sides, but territorial gains have been
insignificant."
CHAPTER VI
FIGHTING IN ARTOIS AND THE VOSGES
On the first of August, 1915, the situation on the western front was
as follows: The position of the Belgian troops has been described; the
British held the line from the north of Ypres to the south of La
Bassee. The Germans had closed in to some extent round Ypres during
the two big battles, and the trenches now ran in a semicircle about
the city at a distance of from two and one-half to three miles. The
line turned south at St. Eloi, skirted the west of the Messines ridge,
turned east again at Ploegstreet Wood, and south to the east of
Armentieres. Hence the trenches extended southwestward to Neuve
Chapelle and Festhubert to La Bassee. The remainder of the front--down
to the Swiss frontier--was defended by the French, along by Lille,
Rheims, and the fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort.
After the battles of May and June, 1915, in Artois, activity on the
western front became concentrated in the Vosges, where the French by a
series of comparatively successful engagements had managed to secure
possession of more favorable positions and to retain them in spite of
incessant and violent counterattacks. The supreme object of the allied
commanders at this stage was to wear down their opponents through vain
and costly counteroffensives, and to absorb the German local resources
in that sector. It had been decided by the Allies to begin a fresh
offensive on the western front in August, 1915, but owing to
incomplete preparations, the attempt was of necessity postponed till
the third week in September. It was extremely urgent that some
determined move should be made as speedily as possible; the Russians
were suffering defeat and disaster in the east, and were already
retreating from Warsaw in the first days of August, 1915. The British
and the French meanwhile could do little more than engage in local
actions until their arrangements for offensive operations on a vast
scale should be completed. On the other side, the Germans were also
busily making preparations to provide against every possibility in
case of retreat. New lines of defenses were constructed across
Belgium; formidable complex trenches guarded by barbed-wire
entanglements; concrete bases for heavy guns connected by railways;
and a large fortified station was erected. These preparations rendered
possible a very rapid transportation of troops and munitions to
Brabant and Antwerp.
The fighting on the western front during August, 1915, may be
described as a fierce, continuous battle, a lively seesaw of capturing
and recapturing positions, followed at regular intervals by the
publication of the most contradictory "official" reports from the
German, French, and British headquarters. Many of them gave
diametrically opposite accounts of the same events. In the first week
of the month the Germans made furious attacks against the French
positions at Lingekopf and Barrenkopf. All through the Argonne forest
the combatants pelted each other with bombs, hand grenades, and other
newly invented missiles. Several determined attempts were made by the
Germans to recapture the positions lost at Schratzmannele and
Reichsackerkopf, but the French artillery fire proved too strong.
Soissons was again bombarded; desperate night attacks were delivered
around Souchez, on the plateau of Quennevieres, and in the valley of
the Aisne; local engagements were fought in Belgium and along parts of
the British front; trenches were mined and shattered, while aeroplanes
scattered bombs and fought thrilling duels in the air. The Belgians
were forced partly to evacuate their advanced positions over the river
Yser, near Hernisse, south of Dixmude. In the Argonne the Germans, by
a strong infantry charge, penetrated the first line of the French
trenches, but were unable to hold their ground.
On August 9, 1915, a squadron of thirty-two large French aeroplanes
carrying explosives, and accompanied by a number of lighter machines
to act as scouts, set out to bombard the important mining and
manufacturing town of Saarbruecken, on the river Saar, in Rhenish
Prussia. This was where the first engagement in the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870 was fought. Owing to mist and heavy clouds, only
twenty-eight of the aeroplanes succeeded in locating the town, where
they dropped one hundred and sixty bombs of large caliber. A number of
German aviators ascended as soon as the flotilla's arrival had been
signaled, and a lively skirmish ensued between them and the French
scouts. The results and casualties of the raid have not leaked out.
The German General Staff was evidently not unacquainted with the fact
that the Allies had a big "drive" in contemplation. Most of the
fighting had been forced by the Germans with ever-increasing violence
and energy. Toward the middle of August, 1915, their attacks became
fiercer still. After a deadly bombardment that literally flattened the
countryside, and in which shells of all calibers as well as
asphyxiating gas bombs were hurled against the French positions
between the Binarville-Vienne-le-Chateau road and the Houyette ravine
in the Argonne, the German infantry dashed from their trenches in
great numbers and close formation and charged across the intervening
ground. So furious was the onslaught that the French were driven well
back out of their shattered defenses. Within a few hours strong
reenforcements hurried to the spot enabled the French to deliver a
counterattack and recover some of the lost ground. Simultaneously, the
Germans attempted to storm the French position in the neighborhood of
La Fontaine-aux-Charmes, but with less success. During the last week
of July and the first half of August, 1915, large bodies of German
troops were detached from the armies operating on the eastern front
and poured into France and Flanders. Different estimates fix the
numbers at from 140,000 to 200,000.
On August 18, 1915, violent fighting broke out in the region north of
Arras, in the course of which the French took an important field
position. In a desperate bayonet charge the following night the
Germans vainly endeavored to recover the ground. The French also
captured a trench in a long battle spread over a wide section of the
Alsatian front. In the Artois they seized the junction of the
highroads between Bethune and Arras and between Ablain and Angres.
North of Carleul they held the Germans in check against a heavy
artillery, infantry, and bomb attack, but were driven out of some
trenches they had previously won on Lingekopf. By the 20th the Germans
had regained some of the trenches on the Ablain-Angres road, but lost
them again in a French bayonet charge two days later. French aviators
bombarded the railway stations at Lens, Henin-Lietard and Loos, in the
Department of Pas de Calais. Arras, the scene of some of the severest
conflicts in the war, was subjected to another prolonged bombardment
by the heavy German artillery. Thus the pendulum swung to and fro; the
main strength of Germany and Austria-Hungary was strenuously being
exerted in the Polish salient, while on the western front the Germans
also conducted a harassing and exhausting defensive. Meanwhile the
Allies were gradually completing their preparations for the great coup
from which so much was expected.
On August 31, 1915, the science of aviation lost one of its most
daring and brilliant exponents by the death of Alphonse Pegoud. No man
before him ever took such liberties with the law of gravitation or
performed such dare-devil pranks at dizzy altitudes up in the sky. He
was the first to demonstrate the possibility of "looping the loop"
thousands of feet from the earth; many have done the trick since, but
for the pioneer it was a pure gamble with almost certain death. Even
into the serious business of war Pegoud carried his freak aeronautics,
though it must be added that his remarkable skill in that direction
had enabled him to escape from many a perilous situation. A few days
before he fell Pegoud carried out a flight of 186 miles over German
territory. He returned unscathed, while the planes of his machine were
riddled with bullet holes. On the occasion of decorating Pegoud with
the Military Medal in March, 1915, the French Minister for War said:
"Time and again he has pursued the enemy's aeroplanes successfully. On
one day he brought down a monoplane and a biplane and compelled
another biplane to land while he was all the time within range of
fire." The following two of his innumerable thrilling exploits deserve
to be recorded: "At one time Pegoud caught sight of a German
ammunition depot and dropped nine bombs on it. The air concussion was
so great from the explosion of the ammunition that his machine was all
but wrecked, and he regained his equilibrium only after performing
more than exhibition acrobatics. On another occasion, having located a
captive German balloon, he ascended to a great height behind the
clouds and then literally fell out of the sky toward his target. At a
distance of only fifty yards he dropped a bomb which struck the
balloon squarely. The vibration waves caused his aeroplane to bounce
about like a toy boat on a rough pond. But Pegoud still carried his
good luck and, managing to steady the craft, sailed away amid a hail
of German bullets."[1]
[Footnote 1: New York "Sun."]
Of all the fighting on the western front during the month of August,
1915, the main interest attaches to that carried on in the struggle for
the important mountain peaks in the Vosges which dominated German
positions in the Alsatian valleys and plain. According to the French
official reports, these operations resulted in the capture of the peaks
named Lingekopf, Schratzmannele and Barrenkopf. The German official
statement of September 2, 1915, however, claimed that the first and last
of these had been recaptured. The French preparations for the attack on
Lingekopf included the building of a mountain road eight miles long with
communication trenches extending even farther, and also the construction
of innumerable camps, sheds, ammunition and repair depots, as well as
ambulance stations. The mountain road proved to be a triumph of
engineering, as more than a hundred tons of war material passed over it
daily without a single breakdown. The slopes which had to be stormed
were thickly wooded, which greatly facilitated their defense, while the
main French approach trenches were exposed to a double enfilade fire,
rendering their use impossible in daytime. Between Schratzmannele and
Barrenkopf there was a German blockhouse with cement walls ten feet
thick. This was surrounded with barbed-wire entanglements and
chevaux-de-frise. The French delivered their first attack on July 20,
1915. After a violent bombardment of ten hours, chasseur battalions
stormed the German positions, capturing the Linge summit to the left and
the Barren to the right. The Germans, however, firmly retained their
hold on Schratzmannele. They caught the exposed French flanks with a
stream of machine-gun fire and forced the chasseurs to retire to
sheltered positions lower down the slopes. Two days later the French
made another attack, and for quite a month, judging from the
contradictory "official" reports, these peaks changed hands about twice
a week. The French claim that they obtained "complete possession" on
August 22, 1915, and that "the enemy, who had employed seven brigades
against us, had to accept defeat." The German version, on the other
hand, ran: "The battle line of Lingekopf-Barrenkopf thus passed again
into our possession. All counterattacks have been repulsed."
CHAPTER VII
POLITICAL CRISIS IN FRANCE--AEROPLANE WARFARE--FIERCE COMBATS IN THE
VOSGES--PREPARATIONS FOR ALLIED OFFENSE
It was also during the month of August, 1915, that the political horizon
in France was temporarily overcast by one of those peculiar "crises"
which seem to happen chiefly in countries enjoying the most liberal
institutions and the greatest freedom of speech and press. On the 6th it
was announced from Paris that the Government had decided to replace
General H. J. E. Gouraud, Commander of the French Expeditionary Force at
the Dardanelles, by General Sarrail, who had been designated Commander
in Chief of the Army in the Orient. That Gouraud would have to be
relieved of his command was painfully obvious, for that gallant officer
had been struck by a shell while visiting a base hospital on July 8,
hopelessly shattering his right arm, which had to be amputated. As,
however, the French military contingent in the ill-starred Gallipoli
adventure was but a small affair, the appointment of General Sarrail to
the command thereof could only be regarded as the reverse of a
promotion. In the first great German offensive toward Paris it was
General Sarrail who had successfully defended the fortress of Verdun
against the attacks of the German Crown Prince. Gradually the story came
out that the general was the victim of a political intrigue--a plot to
displace him as well as M. Millerand, the Minister for War. An
acrimonious discussion developed in the French Chamber on August 14,
1915, in which some of the members nearly came to blows. The political
truce, arranged between the conflicting parties at the beginning of the
war, hung in the balance. Faithful to the old tradition that the duty of
the Opposition is to oppose anything and everything, the
Radical-Socialists and the Socialist party were loud in their
denunciation of the conduct of the war, and desired to allocate
responsibility for the military failures of the previous year. A number
of high officers had already been "retired" in connection with those
failures, which were serious enough. But the charge alleged against
Sarrail was that he had omitted to supply his men adequately with
antipoison gas masks. In one of the German attacks in which gas was
used, Sarrail's front was pierced and a thousand men were forced to
surrender. Some accounts gave the number as 5,000. For this the general
was at first suspended, and then offered the other command, which he
refused on the ground that if he was guilty he deserved punishment; if
not, he was entitled to reinstatement. The real motive underlying the
prosecution, however, was generally believed to have been one of a
purely political nature. Sarrail, a "Republican," as opposed to a
"Reactionary," which latter signifies a conservative in politics and,
frequently also, a professed churchman--in short, General Sarrail had
attracted the animosity of both the clerical and radical parties. When,
finally, the Government promised to increase the Dardanelles force to
80,000 men, he accepted the appointment.
The first week in September, 1915, saw considerable artillery activity
along the whole front. Except in the Vosges, where French and German
bayonets clashed on mountain peaks and in underground tunnels,
infantry action had been suspended for nearly two weeks. Heavy
bombardments had been maintained by both sides--those of the Allies
being especially deliberate and persistent. As a fireman would sway
the nozzle of his streaming hose from side to side, so the Allies
poured a continuous, sweeping torrent of shot and shell over the
German positions in certain well-defined zones along the line. It
began from the extreme left on the Belgian front, thence swung into
the region of Souchez, then around Arras, farther on along the Aisne,
particularly at the two extremities of the Aisne plateau, turned to
the right in Champagne, spread to the Argonne, next in the Woevre and
finally in Lorraine. Beneath the cyclone and out of sight trench
mortar actions were fought, mining operations carried on, bombs and
hand grenades thrown.
On September 1, 1915, four German aeroplanes had dropped bombs on the
open town of Luneville, killing many civilians. As a measure of
reprisal forty French aeroplanes returned the compliment by making
another air raid on Saarbruecken, where they bombarded the station,
factories, and military establishments. A squadron of thirty or forty
vessels of the British Fleet bombarded the whole of the Belgian coast
in German possession as far as Ostend. French artillery stationed in
the vicinity of Nieuport cooperated to shell the German coast
batteries at Westende. In retaliation for the bombardment of the open
towns of St. Die and Gerardmer by German aeroplanes, a French
aeroplane squadron assailed the railroad and military establishments
of Freiburg in Breisgau. Aerial operations had by this time become a
powerful auxiliary to the combatants on each side. The aeroplane
attained a definite position as a weapon even in trench and field
warfare. Machines hovered over the lines every day, reconnoitering and
dropping bombs on positions, stores, transports, moving troops,
trenches, and munition depots. Bombardment by aeroplane was, in fact,
quite as serious and formidable a business as any artillery attack.
The bombs carried by these machines were exactly of the same caliber
as those used by heavy guns. Constant practice afforded by daily
opportunities had enormously increased the skill of the aviators, many
of whom could hit a small house from high altitudes without much
trouble. Duels and pitched battles in the air were of daily occurrence
on the western front. As soon as an "enemy flyer" hove in sight on
either side of the lines, locally attached aviators rose and attacked
the intruder. This, the most "modern" method of fighting, has produced
a crop of thrilling incidents and stirring examples of bravery
exhibited by the German, French, and British flying men. A code of
what might be called "aerial chivalry" has spontaneously grown up
among the flying fraternity. Two pretty incidents will suffice to
demonstrate: A German aviator had been attacked and brought to earth
by a French airman. The German was killed in the contest. In the dead
man's pocket was found a diary of his adventures in the war, and other
happenings, from day to day. It was written in conversational style
addressed throughout to his wife, together with a letter to her of the
same day's date. The next morning a French aeroplane flew over the
German line. Descending to within a few hundred yards of the ground,
despite the hail of bullets that whistled around him, the aviator
dropped a neatly wrapped parcel, rose suddenly to a great height and
was gone. That parcel contained all the dead German aviator's private
property, his papers, medals, etc., with a note of sympathy from the
victor. A few days after the death of Pegoud, who was killed in midair
before he fell, a German aviator flew at great height over an Alsatian
commune on the old frontier and dropped a wreath bearing the
inscription: "In memory of Pegoud, who died a hero's death, from his
adversary."
The French method of aerial maneuvering is interesting as well as
effective. Their air squadrons operate in the following manner: ten
machines rise 6,000 feet along the enemy's line; ten others rise 9,000
feet. If an enemy machine attempts to pass the Frenchmen attack
simultaneously from above and below, while, if necessary, two other
machines come to their aid. Thus the intruder is always at a
disadvantage. On several occasions the Germans attempted to fly across
the French lines in force, but always with disastrous consequences.
When the French set out in squadrons to make a raid or bombard a
position they pursue the same tactics and achieve very important
results.
Early in September, 1915, General Joffre paid a visit to Rome, was
received in audience by King Victor Emmanuel, and decorated with the
highest Italian military distinction--the Grand Cross of the Military
Order of Savoy--as proof of his majesty's esteem for the French army.
General Joffre afterward made a tour of the Italian battle front and
conferred with General Cadorna.
About September 8, 1915, the Germans recommenced to attack in the
Argonne, where the German Crown Prince had failed to break the French
line in June and July. After a violent artillery preparation,
including the use of a large number of asphyxiating shells, two
infantry divisions were flung against the French. The Germans rushed
the first-line trenches at several points. Strong attacks were
launched against them and prevented any further advance.
French and British airmen raided the aviation sheds at Ostend; another
air squadron dropped sixty shells on the aviation ground at Saint
Medard and on the railway station at Dieuze, in Lorraine, twenty-five
miles northeast of Nancy. A bombardment of Zeebrugge by the British
fleet caused much damage, the Germans losing forty dead and some
hundred wounded. Here the submarine port, with two submersibles and
two guns on the harbor wall were destroyed, while the central airship
shed, containing at the time two dirigibles, was also severely
damaged. The semaphore tower was shot to pieces and some sluices
crippled. Perhaps the most exciting incident at this period was the
great allied air raid on the Forest of Houlthulst, about halfway
between Ypres and Dixmude. The forest was quite sheltered from the
ravages of the allied guns, and had been converted into a regular
garrison district, with comfortable barracks full of soldiers,
provision stores, and large munition depots. The whole camp was
brilliantly illuminated with electric light.
At ten o'clock on the night of September 9, 1915, sixty French,
British and Belgian aeroplanes started out in clear moonlight.
Immediately the aerial flotilla had announced its approach by the
well-known buzzing of sixty industrious propellers, the whole
neighborhood was plunged in sudden darkness. The moon, however,
supplied the necessary light to guide the sky raiders to their goal.
Besides, French flyers had already photographed the region in broad
daylight, so that the situation of the main buildings was thoroughly
known to all the pilots. It is stated that four tons of high
explosives and incendiary bombs were scattered with deadly effect;
some of the aircraft whose stock became exhausted flew back to their
base, landed, refilled, and returned to the scene of action--two and
three times. The greatest consternation naturally prevailed among the
soldiers below, running in panic-stricken groups to escape from the
blasting shower let loose over their heads. Indescribable confusion
prevailed; frequent explosions were heard as some aerial missile found
a piled-up accumulation of its own kind. By 11.30, an hour and a half
after the squadron had set sail, the entire forest and the buildings
it contained were in flames. The next morning a German aeroplane,
"adorned with sixteen Iron Crosses," was forced to descend near Calais
owing to engine trouble and was captured by the French.
By way of reprisals for the continued attacks on Luneville and
Compiegne by German aviators, a squadron of French aeroplanes flew
over the German town of Trier (Treves) on September 13, 1915, and
deposited one hundred bombs. After returning to the base and taking on
board further supplies, they set out again in the afternoon and
dropped fifty-eight shells on the station of Dommary Baroncourt. Other
aeros bombarded the railway stations at Donaueschingen on the Danube
and at Marbach, where movements of troops had been reported. Activity
grew in intensity all along the front. Artillery fighting on the Yser,
the north and south of Arras, in the sectors of Neuville, Roclincourt
and Mailly. To the north of the Oise the French artillery carried out
a destructive fire on the German defenses and the works of
Beuvraignes. Infantry attacks occurred in front of Andrechy. On the
canal from the Aisne to the Marne the French bombarded the trenches,
batteries and cantonments of the Germans in the environs of Sapigneul
and of Neuville, near Berry-au-Bac. Grenade engagements took place
near the Bethune-Arras road and north of Souchez. South of the Somme,
before Fay, there were constant and stubborn mine duels, while fierce
bombardments in the sectors of Armancourt (southwest of Compiegne),
Beuvraignes (south of Roye), as well as on the plateau of.
Quennevieres (northeast of Compiegne) and Nouvron (northwest of
Soissons), continued uninterruptedly. In Champagne and in the Argonne
also, long range artillery fighting rent the air.
On the Lorraine front, in the environs of Embermenil, Leintrey, and
Ancerviller, near Luneville, the German trenches and works were
subjected to heavy fire. Poison shells and liquid fire played an
important part in the furious fighting that was gradually developing
in the Vosges, and assisted the Germans to gain some initial
successes. On the Lingekopf-Barrenkopf front the French were driven
out of a first-line trench on the Schratzmannele, but they recovered
most of the ground by a counterattack. Similarly on the summit of the
Hartmannsweilerkopf, where the Germans had also obtained a footing in
the French trenches, they were subsequently ejected again. These
trenches had been captured with the aid of blazing liquids. Our first
knowledge of this "blazing liquid" (outside of Germany) was derived
from a document which fell into French hands early in the war. It was
Note 32 of the Second Army, dated October 16, 1914, at St. Quentin. In
it were published the following instructions under the heading of
"Arms at the disposal of Pioneers (Sappers) for fighting at close
quarters":
"The flame projectors (Flammenwerfer), which are very similar to
portable fire extinguishers, are worked by specially trained pioneers
and throw a liquid which at once catches fire spontaneously. The jet
of fire has an effective range of 30 meters. The effect is immediate
and deadly, and the great heat developed forces the enemy back a long
way. As they burn from one and a half to two minutes, and can be
stopped whenever necessary, short and isolated jets of flame are
advisable, so that one charge is sufficient to spray several
objectives. Flame projectors will be mainly employed in street and
house-to-house fighting, and will be kept in readiness at the place
from which an attack starts."
There is no doubt that some engines of this nature were employed by
the Germans during August and September, 1914, to destroy portions of
the towns and villages destroyed by them. One captured apparatus,
actually examined, comprised a portable reservoir for holding the
inflammable liquid and the means of spraying it. The former, which is
carried strapped on to a man's back, is a steel cylinder containing
oil and compressed air in separate chambers. The latter consists of a
suitable length of metal pipe fitted with universal joints and a
nozzle capable of rotation in any direction. When a valve is turned
on, the air pressure forces the oil out of the nozzle in a fine spray
for a distance of over twenty yards. The oil is ignited automatically
at the nozzle and continues to issue in a sheet of flame until the air
pressure falls too low or the oil is exhausted. The heat given out is
terrific in its intensity. A similar method employed by the German
troops consists of a liquid substance which is squirted into the
trenches. Bombs are then thrown which on explosion ignite the fluid.
Yet another sort of projectile took the form of an incendiary bomb or
shell which was discharged noiselessly, possibly from a catapult. It
bursts on impact, tearing a hole and burning a circle of ground about
eight feet in diameter.
By the middle of the month, September, 1915, the liveliest activity
obtained everywhere in the west--each side apparently doing its utmost
to harass the other. Nothing of a definite nature was achieved by
either. The Germans were merely sitting tight along most of the line
while taking the offensive only in those sectors where they had reason
to believe the Allies would attempt to strike the great blow. The
Allies, on the other hand, endeavored to weaken their opponents as
much as possible in order to create an easier passage for the great
"drive" they contemplated. The innumerable engagements about this time
throughout the western theatre of the war form a bewildering conflict
of unconnected and minor battles and skirmishes. When, years hence,
the "official" histories are written and published, the student may be
able to read the riddle and trace some thread of continuity and
intention through the labyrinth of these operations. For the present
they must be regarded as mere incidents in the overture leading to a
great battle. The actions were described from day to day with some
detail by the Allies, and as "unimportant attempts" by the German
official communiques. The latter generally consisted of few words that
gave little or no indication of what had happened, and frequently
wound up with the phrase: "There was no change on the front." The
following translation may be given as a typical example; "The French
attempted an attack but were repulsed by our fire. An enemy aeroplane
was shot down. We successfully attacked in the Argonne. The situation
is unchanged."
On September 18, 1915, the British fleet again bombarded the German
defenses on the Belgian coast, in conjunction with the British
artillery in the Nieuport district. Unabated fighting raged along the
whole front, and it was all summed up in the German official
communique of September 20, 1915, with commendable brevity:
"The hostile vessels which unsuccessfully bombarded Westende and
Middelkerke, southwest of Ostend, withdrew before our fire. Several
hits were observed. Along the land front there were no important
events."
Nevertheless, important events were shaping themselves about this
time. German artillery attacks increased in violence against the
British front. Aeroplanes were particularly busy observing all moves
on the board. In Champagne the Germans kept the French occupied with
heavy shells and "lachrymatory projectiles." These projectiles have
been described as "tearful and wonderful engines of war." They are
ordinary hand grenades with a charge that rips open the grenade and
liberates a liquid chemical. When that happens, the effect of the
fumes brings water to the eyes of the men in such quantities that they
are quite unable to defend themselves in the event of an attack.
Shooting is entirely out of the question. The stinging sensation
produced in the eyes is not pleasant, but it is not painful, and the
effect wears off in a few minutes. The troops humorously refer to
these grenades as "onions."
On September 21, 1915, a party of French airmen carried out the most
daring of the many raids on German towns and positions they had
hitherto accomplished. An aero squadron flew to Stuttgart, which is
about 140 miles due east from Nancy, and dropped thirty shells on the
palace of the King of Wuerttemberg and the railway station of the town.
They were fired at from many points, but safely completed their double
journey of nearly 300 miles. Before this exploit, which was undertaken
as a reprisal, the longest distances traveled by raiding squadrons of
French aeroplanes were those to the Friedrichshafen Zeppelin
factories on June 28, 1915, involving a double journey of 240 miles
from Belfort; and to the explosives factory at Ludwigshafen, on the
Rhine, which represented a distance of 230 miles from Nancy and back.
The Berlin official report thus describes the event:
"At 8.15 this morning enemy airmen with German marks on their aeros
attacked Stuttgart and dropped several bombs on the town, killing four
persons and wounding a number of soldiers and civilians. The material
damage was quite unimportant."
CHAPTER VIII
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE
The day fixed for the opening of the Allies' long-projected offensive
dawned on September 22, 1915. Gigantic preparations had been in the
making. Large drafts of fresh British troops had been poured into
France, which enabled Sir John French to take over the defense of a
portion of the lines hitherto held by General Joffre's men. Defensive
organizations had been improved all round; immense supplies of
munitions had been accumulated; units had been carefully regrouped and
new ones created; all that skill, foresight and arduous toil could
accomplish had been attained. The spirit of the human fighting
material was all that could be desired. In order not to interrupt the
course of the narrative later, we insert here the interesting general
order that the French commander in chief issued to his troops on
September 23, 1915, when it was read to the regiments by their
officers:
"_Soldiers of the Republic:_
"After months of waiting, which have enabled us to increase our forces
and our resources, while the adversary has been using up his own, the
hour has come to attack and conquer and to add fresh glorious pages
to those of the Marne and Flanders, the Vosges and Arras.
"Behind the whirlwind of iron and fire let loose, thanks to the
factories of France, where your brothers have, night and day, worked
for us, you will proceed to the attack, all together, on the whole
front, in close union with the armies of our allies.
"Your _elan_ will be irresistible. It will carry you at a bound up to
the batteries of the adversary, beyond the fortified lines which he
has placed before you.
"You will give him neither pause nor rest until victory has been
achieved.
"Set to with all your might for the deliverance of the soil of la
Patrie, for the triumph of justice and liberty.
"J. JOFFRE."
The general outlines of the plan of campaign may be briefly described:
The British were to deliver a main attack on the German trenches
between Lens and La Bassee, in close cooperation with the French on
their immediate right in Artois, and to hold the enemy by secondary
attacks and demonstrations on the rest of the (British) front, about
eighty miles. The French, for their part, took in hand the two
principal operations--to batter through in Artois and to exert their
mightiest efforts in Champagne.
[Illustration: Zigzag trenches in Champagne. The strip on which the
armies are clinched varies in width and winds over dunes, marshes,
woods and mountains.]
To a proper understanding of a campaign or a battle, some knowledge of
the topographical conditions is essential. The chief scene in the
act--where the grand attack falls--is the beautiful vineyard region of
Champagne. Here the German front is the same as they established and
fortified it after the Battle of the Marne. It rests on the west side
on the Massif de Moronvillers; to the east it stretches as far as the
Argonne. It was intended to cover the railroad from Challerange to
Bazancourt, a line indispensable for the concentration movements of
the German troops. The offensive front, which extends from Auberive to
the east of Ville-sur-Tourbe, presents a varied aspect. From east to
west may be seen, firstly, a glacis or sloping bank about five miles
wide and covered with little woods. The road from Saint-Hilaire to
Saint-Souplet, with the Baraque de l'Epine de Vedegrange, marks
approximately its axis.
[Illustration: The Champagne District.]
(2) The hollow, in which lies the pretty village of Souain and where
the first German line follows its edge. The road from Souain to
Pomme-Py describes the radius of this semicircle. The farm of Navarin
stands on the top of the hills two miles north of Souain.
(3) To the north of Perthes, a comparatively tranquil region of
uniform aspect, forming between the wooded hills of the Trou Bricot
and those of the Butte du Mesnil a passage two miles wide, barred by
several lines of trenches and ending at a series of heights--the Butte
de Souain, Hills 195 and 201 and the Butte de Tahure, surmounted by
the second German line.
(4) To the north of Mesnil, a very strong position, bastioned on the
west by two twin heights (Mamelle Nord and Trapeze), on the east by
the Butte du Mesnil. The German trenches form a powerful curtain
between these two bastions, behind which a thickly wooded undulating
region extends as far as Tahure.
(5) To the north of Beausejour, a bare terrain easily traversable,
with a gentle rise in the direction of Ripon to the farms of Maisons
de Champagne.
(6) To the north of Massiges, hills numbered 191 and 199, describing
on the map the figure of a hand, very strongly fortified and forming
the eastern flank of the whole German line. This table-land slopes
down gently in the direction of Ville-sur-Tourbe.
As to the German defenses, the French were intimately acquainted with
every detail. They had maps showing every defensive work, trench,
alley of communication, and clump of trees in the landscape. Each of
these features had been given a special name or number preceded by a
certain letter, according to the sector of attack wherein it was
situated. These details had been laboriously collected by aviators and
spies, and applied with minute precision.
On the morning of September 22, 1915, the French accelerated their
long-sustained bombardment of the German positions with intense fury,
continuing day and night without a break until the 25th. The direct
object of this preparatory cannonade was to destroy the wire
entanglements, bury the defenders in their dugouts, raze the trenches,
smash the embrasures, and stop up the alleys of communication. The
range included not only the first trench line, but also the supporting
trench and the second position, though the last was so far distant as
to make accurate observation difficult. The heavy long-range guns
shelled the headquarters, the cantonments and the railroad stations.
They speedily demolished the permanent way, thereby stopping all
traffic in reenforcements, munitions and commissariat. From letters
and notes afterwards found upon German prisoners who came out alive
from that inferno, one may gather an approximate idea of what the
bombardment was like:
"September 23.
"The French artillery fired without intermission from the morning of
the 21st to the evening of the 23rd, and we all took refuge in our
dugouts. On the evening of the 22d we were to have gone to get some
food, but the French continued to fire on our trenches. In the evening
we had heavy losses, and we had nothing to eat."
"September 24.
"For the last two days the French have been firing like mad. To-day,
for instance, a dugout has been destroyed. There were sixteen men in
it. Not one of them managed to save his skin. They are all dead.
Besides that, a number of individual men have been killed and there
are a great mass of wounded. The artillery fires almost as rapidly as
the infantry. A mist of smoke hangs over the whole battle front, so
that it is impossible to see anything. Men are dropping like flies.
The trenches are no longer anything but a mound of ruins."
"September 24.
"A rain of shells is pouring down upon us. The kitchen and everything
that is sent to us is bombarded at night. The field kitchens no longer
come to us. Oh, if only the end were near! That is the cry everyone is
repeating."
"September 25.
"I have received no news, and probably shall not receive any for some
days. The whole postal service has been stopped; all places have been
bombarded to such an extent that no human being could stand against
it. The railway line is so seriously damaged that the train service
for some time has been completely stopped. We have been for three days
in the first line; during those three days the French have fired so
heavily that our trenches are no longer visible."
"September 25.
"We have passed through some terrible hours. It was as though the
whole world were in a state of collapse. We have had heavy losses. One
company of 250 men had sixty killed last night. A neighboring battery
had sixteen killed yesterday. The following instance will show you the
frightful destructiveness of the French shells: A dugout five meters
deep, surrounded by two meters fifty centimeters of earth and two
thicknesses of heavy timber, was broken like a match."
Report made on September 24, 1915, in the morning, by the captain
commanding the Third Company of the 135th Regiment of Reserves:
"The French are firing on us with great bombs and machine guns. We
must have reenforcements at once. Many men are no longer fit for
anything. It is not that they are wounded, but they are Landsturmers.
Moreover the wastage is greater than the losses announced. Send
rations immediately; no food has reached us to-day. Urgently want
illuminating cartridges and hand grenades. Is the hospital corps never
coming to fetch the wounded? I urgently beg for reenforcements; the
men are dying from fatigue and want of sleep. I have no news of the
battalion."
The time fixed for all the attacks on the Champagne front was 9.15 a.
m., September 25, 1915. Just before the assault General Joffre issued
the following brief order:
"The offensive will be carried on without truce and without respite.
"Remember the Marne--Victory or death."
Punctual to the moment the troops climbed out of their trenches with
the aid of steps or scaling ladders and drew up in line before making
a rush at the German trenches. The operation was rapidly effected. The
German position was at an average distance of 220 yards; at the word
of command the troops broke into a steady trot and covered that ground
without any serious loss. The honor of the first assault was granted
to the dare-devil Colonial Corps, men hardened in the building up of
France's African Empire, and to the Moroccan troops, famous for fierce
and obstinate fighting. The men tore across the ground to the assault,
led by their commander, General Marchand, of Fashoda fame, who left
the army at the age of forty-four but volunteered immediately on the
outbreak of the war, and was given command of the Colonial Brigade.
General Marchand fell in the charge with a dangerous shell wound in
the abdomen. The men dashed on to the German trench line, stirring the
rain-drenched, chalky soil to foam beneath their feet. Under the
leadership of General Baratier, Marchand's right-hand man in his
colonial conquests, the French Colonial Cavalry played an important
part in the charge. This was the first time for many months that
cavalry really came into action on the western front. They lost
heavily, but their activities probably explain the great number of
prisoners captured in so short a time.
At nearly every point the Germans were taken completely by surprise,
for their defensive fire was not opened until after the flowing tide
of the invaders had passed by. This was due neither to lack of courage
nor of vigilance, but to the demoralizing effect on the nerves of the
defenders by the terrific cannonade, which in all such cases induces a
sort of helpless apathy.
The French actually penetrated into the first German trench over the
whole attacking front at one rush; after that their progress met with
fiercer resistance and varying checks. While certain units continued
their advance with remarkable rapidity, others encountered machine
guns still in action and either stopped or advanced with extreme
difficulty. Some centers of the German resistance maintained their
position for several hours; some even for days. A line showing the
different stages of the French advance in Champagne would assume a
curiously winding shape, and would reveal on one hand the defensive
power of an adversary resolved to hold his ground at all costs, and
on the other the mathematically successful continuity of the French
efforts in this hand-to-hand struggle.
The Battle of Champagne must be considered in the light of a series of
assaults, executed at the same moment, in parallel or convergent
directions and having for their object either the capture or the
hemming in of the first German position, the units being instructed to
re-form in a continuous line before the second position. In order to
follow the development clearly, the terrain must be divided into
several sectors, in each of which the operations, although closely
coordinated, assumed, as a consequence either of the nature of the
ground or of the peculiarities of the German defenses, a different
character. The unity of the action was nevertheless insured by the
simultaneity of the rush, which carried all the troops beyond the
first position, past the batteries, to the defenses established by the
Germans on the heights to the south of Py. At the two extremities of
the French attacking front, where the advance was subjected to
converging fires and to counterattacks on the flanks, the offensive
practically failed--or at least made no progress. The fighting that
took place in Auberive and round about Servon was marked by several
heroic features, but it led to no further result than to hold and
immobilize the German forces on the wings while the attack was
progressing in the center.
[Illustration: Detail Map of Battle in Champagne, September, 1915.]
In accordance with the proposed arrangement of divisions into sectors,
we will take as Number--
(1) The sector of the Epine de Vedegrange: Here the first German line
was established at the base of a wide glacis covered with clumps of
trees, and formed a series of salients running into each other. At
certain points it ran along the edge of the woods where the
supplementary defenses were completed by abatis. The position as a
whole between Auberive and Souain described a vast triangle. To the
west of the road from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet, the troops
traversed the first German line and rushed forward for a distance of
about 1,200 yards as far as a supporting trench, in front of which
they were stopped by wire entanglements. A counterattack debouching
from the west and supported by the artillery of Moronvillers caused a
slight retirement of the French left. The troops on the right, on
the contrary, held their gains and succeeded on the following days in
increasing and extending them, remaining in touch with the units which
were attacking on the east of the road. The latter had succeeded in a
brilliant manner in overcoming the difficulties that faced them. The
German position which they captured, with its triple and quadruple
lines of trenches, its small forts armed with machine guns, its woods
adapted for the defensive purpose in view, constituted one of the most
complete schemes of defense on the Champagne front and afforded cover
to a numerous artillery concealed in the woods of the glacis. On this
front, about three miles wide, the attack on September 25, 1915,
achieved a mixed success. The troops on the left, after having
penetrated into the first trench, had their progress arrested by
machine guns. On the right, however, in spite of obstacles presented
by four successive trenches, each of which was covered by a network of
wire entanglements and was concealed in the woods, where the French
artillery had difficulty in reaching them, the attacking troops gained
about one and one-half miles, took 700 prisoners and captured seven
guns.
The advance here recommenced on September 27, 1915. The left took
possession of the woods lining the road from Saint-Hilaire to
Saint-Souplet as far as the Epine de Vedegrange. Along the whole
extent of the wooded heights as far as the western side of the hollow
at Souain the success was identical. Notwithstanding the losses they
sustained and the fatigue involved in the incessant fighting, the
troops pushed forward, leaving behind them only a sufficient force to
clear the woods of isolated groups of Germans still remaining there.
Between four and six in the afternoon they arrived immediately in
front of the second German position. On the same day they penetrated
this position at two points, and captured a trench over a thousand
yards wide, called the "Parallel of the Epine de Vedegrange," which
was duplicated almost throughout by another trench (the parallel of
the wood of Chevron). A little farther east the French also penetrated
the German trench to a depth of about 450 yards. But it was impossible
to take advantage of this breach owing to a concentration of the
heavy German artillery, a rapidly continued defense of the surrounding
woods, and the fire of machine guns which could not be approached.
These guns were planted in the trenches on the right and left of the
entry and exit of the breach. The results attained by the French in
this sector alone amounted to fifteen square miles of territory
organized for defenses throughout nearly the whole of its extent. On
September 28, 1915, they also took over 3,000 prisoners and forty-four
cannon.
(2) Sector of Souain: The German lines round about Souain described a
wide curve. Close to the French trenches, to the west at the Mill and
to the east at the wood of Sabot, they swerved to the extent of about
a mile to the north of the village and of the source of the Ain.
When the offensive was decided upon it was necessary, in order to
extend the French lines forward to striking distance, to undertake
sapping operations in parallel lines, and at times to make dashes by
night over the intervening ground. The men working underground got
into communication with the trenches by digging alleys of
communication. Under the eyes and the fire of the Germans this
difficult undertaking was carried out with very slight loss. These
parallel lines approached to within a distance of 150 yards of the
German trenches. The assault was made in three different directions:
on the west in the direction of Hills 167 and 174; in the center along
a line running parallel with the road from Souain to Pomme-Py, in the
direction of the farm of Navarin; on the east in the direction of the
woods intersected by the road from Souain to Tahure, and in the
direction of the Butte de Souain. The advance was extremely rapid--on
the left over 2,000 yards in less than an hour, in the center over
3,000 yards in forty-five minutes. At 10 a. m. the French had reached
the farm of Navarin. Toward the east the forward march was more
difficult. Some German machine guns stood their ground in the wood of
Sabot and enormously strengthened the German resistance. This defense
was eventually overcome by surrounding them. Arriving at the wooded
region in that part where it is intersected by the road mentioned
above, the assailants joined up on the 27th with those of their
comrades who were attacking to the north of Perthes. They left behind
them here, also, only sufficient men to clear the woods of stragglers.
Parlementaires were sent to the Germans, who received them with a
volley of rifle shots and endeavored to escape during the night. The
majority were killed and the survivors surrendered. Several batteries
and a large quantity of war material remained to the French. On the
28th, along the entire length of the sector, they were immediately in
front of the second German line.
(3) Sector of Perthes: Between Souain and Perthes stretches a wooded
region in which heavy fighting had already taken place in February and
March. At that time the French had contrived to take possession of the
German defenses of the wood of Sabot on the eastern extremity of this
region. They had also made some progress to the northwest of Perthes,
on the summit of Hill 200. But between these two positions the Germans
had retained a strong system of trenches forming a salient almost
triangular in shape, which the French nicknamed "la Poche" (the
Pocket). During the whole year a war of mining had been going on, and
the region, which was broken up by concave constructions and
intersected in all directions by trenches and alleys of communication,
constituted an attacking ground all the more difficult because to the
north of la Poche the rather thickly-wooded Trou Bricot, the edges of
which had been put in a state of defense, obstructed a rapid advance.
This wooded region extends over a width of more than a mile. The
arrangements made for the attack contemplated, after the capture of la
Poche, the surrounding of the woods of the Trou Bricot. The junction
was to be made at the road from Souain to Tahure, with the troops
assigned for the attack on the eastern border of the hollow at Souain.
The ground to the east of the Trou Bricot was less difficult. Open and
comparatively flat it was defended on the north of Perthes by a triple
line of trenches distant 100 yards from each other. At a distance of
1,000 to 1,200 yards a supporting trench, called the "York trench,"
was almost unique in its entire construction. The open country beyond
stretched for a distance of two and one-half miles up to the second
German position (Hill 195, Butte de Tahure). The principal effort was
directed against this passage, the left flank of attack being secured
by a subsidiary action confined to the capture of la Poche.
At 9 a. m. the French artillery directed their fire successively
against the first-line trenches and the supporting trenches. The
attack took place in perfect order. The infantry were already swarming
into the German trenches when the German artillery opened its
defensive fire. The French counterbatteries hampered the German pieces
and the reserves in the rear suffered little from their fire. At 9.45
a. m. the two columns which were attacking the extremities of the
salient of la Poche joined hands. The position was surrounded. Those
Germans who remained alive inside it surrendered. At the same time a
battalion was setting foot in the defenses of the southern edges of
the wood of Trou Bricot. The battalion that followed, marching to the
outside of the eastern edges, executed with perfect regularity a "left
turn" and came and formed up alongside the communication alleys as far
as the supporting trench. At the same moment, in the open country to
the north of Perthes, the French troops surmounted the three
first-line trenches and, preceded by artillery, made a quick march to
the York trench and occupied it almost without striking a blow.
Farther to the east, along the road from Perthes to Tahure, the French
advance encountered greater difficulties. Some centers of the German
resistance could not be overcome. A sheltered machine gun continued
its fire. An infantry officer, with a petty officer of artillery,
succeeded in getting a gun into action at a distance of over 300 yards
from the machine gun and firing at it at close quarters. Of the troops
that were advancing to the north of Perthes, some made for the eastern
border of the wood of Bricot, where they penetrated into the camps,
ousting the defenders and surprising several officers in bed. Late in
the afternoon a French regiment had reached the road from Souain to
Tahure. Other units were marching straight toward the north, clearing
out the little woods on the way. They there captured batteries of
which the artillerymen were "riveted to their guns by means of
bayonets." The same work of clearance was meanwhile being performed in
the woods extending east of the road from Perthes to Souain and
Tahure, where batteries were charged and captured while in action. At
this spot a regiment covered three miles in two hours and captured ten
guns. From midday onward the rate of progress slackened, the bad
weather making it impossible for the French artillery to see what was
going on, and rendering the joining up movements extremely difficult.
From the Buttes de Souain and Tahure the Germans directed converging
fires on the French, who were advancing there along very open ground.
Nevertheless, they continued their advance as far as the slopes of
Hill 193 and the Butte de Tahure and there dug themselves in.
The night passed without any German counterattack. In the darkness the
French artillery brought forward their heavy pieces and several field
batteries which had arrived immediately after the attack beyond the
York trench. At dawn the reconstituted regiments made another forward
rush which enabled them to establish themselves in immediate contact
with the second German position from the Butte de Souain to the Butte
de Tahure, and even to seize several advanced posts in the
neighborhood. But on the lower slopes some of the wire entanglements
remained intact; a successful assault on them would have been possible
only after a fresh artillery preparation. Up to October 6, 1915, the
troops remained where they were, digging trenches and organizing a
defensive system which had to be constructed all over again on ground
devastated by German fire.
(4) Sector of Le Mesnil: It was to the north of Le Mesnil that the
French encountered the greatest German resistance. In the course of
the engagements of the preceding winter the French had succeeded in
securing a foothold on top of the hill numbered 196. The Germans
remained a little to the east, in the "Ravin des Cuisines" (Ravine of
the Kitchens). This the French now took by assault, but could get no
farther. The German trenches, constructed on the northern slopes of
Hill 196, were so concealed from field observation that it was
difficult for the artillery to reach them. They were furthermore
flanked on one side by the twin heights of the Mamelles, and on the
other by the Butte du Mesnil. Some French units managed to penetrate
into the trenches to the eastward on the 25th, but a counterattack and
flank fires dislodged them again. To the west they did not capture the
northern Mamelle till the night of October 1-2, 1915, thereby
surrounding the trapeze works that surmounted the southern Mamelle.
(5) Sector of Beausejour: The French attacks launched north of
Beausejour met with more conspicuous success. Throwing themselves on
the first German lines the swarming invaders rapidly captured the
defense works in the woods of Fer de Lance and Demi-Lune, and
afterwards all the works known as the Bastion. Certain units won the
top of Maisons de Champagne in one rush and darted past several
batteries, killing the gunners as they served their pieces. The same
movement took them across the intricate region of the mine "funnels"
of Beausejour up to the wood intersected by the road to Maisons de
Champagne. There they encountered German artillerymen in the act of
unlimbering their guns. They killed the drivers and the horses; the
survivors surrendered.
Farther westward the left wing of the attacking force advanced with
greater difficulty, being hampered by the small forts and covered
works with which the trenches were everywhere protected. At this
moment the cavalry unexpectedly came to the support of the infantry.
Two squadrons of hussars galloped against the German batteries north
of Maisons de Champagne in the teeth of a fierce artillery fire. They
nevertheless reached that part of the lines where the Germans still
held their ground. Machine guns rattled against the cavalry, dropping
many of their horses. The hussars dismounted and, with drawn sabers,
made a rush for the trenches. Favored by this diversion the infantry
simultaneously resumed their forward movement. The German resistance
broke down, and more than 600 were taken prisoners. Later in the day
of the 25th some German counterattacks were made from the direction of
Ripon, but failed to drive the French from the Maisons de Champagne
summit. During the next few days a desperate struggle ensued north of
the summit in the vicinity of a defensive work called the "Ouvrage de
la Defaite," which the French took by storm, lost it again, then
recovered it, and finally were driven out by a severe bombardment.
(6) Sector of Massiges: The safety of the French troops which had
advanced to the wood and the Maisons de Champagne was assured by the
capture of the heights of Massiges. This sharply undulating upland
(199 on the north and 191 on the south) formed a German stronghold
that was believed to be impregnable. From the top they commanded the
French positions in several directions. The two first attacking
parties marched out in columns at 9.15 a. m., preceded by
field-artillery fire. In fifteen minutes they had reached the summit.
Then their difficulties began. In the face of a withering rifle and
machine-gun fire they could proceed but slowly along the summits by
the communication alleys, blasting their way through with hand
grenades, and supported by the artillery, which was constantly kept
informed of their movements by means of flag signals. The Germans
surrendered in large numbers as the grenadiers advanced. The French
formed an uninterrupted, ever-lengthening chain of grenade-bearers in
the communication alleys, just as buckets of water were passed from
hand to hand at fires in former times. This chain started from
Massiges and each fresh arrival of grenades at the other end was
accompanied by a further advance.
The fight continued in this manner from September 25, 1915, to October
3, 1915, with fierce perseverance against stubborn opposition. The
Germans poured a continuous stream of reenforcements into the section
and offered a resistance that has rarely been equaled for obstinacy
and courage. According to French reports, they stood up to be shot
down--the machine-gun men at their guns, the grenadiers on their
grenade chests. Every attempt at counterattacking failed them. Having
the heights of Massiges in their possession enabled the French to
extend their gains toward Ville-sur-Tourbe, while taking in flank
those trenches they had failed to capture by a frontal attack. The
loss of these heights seemed to have particularly disturbed the German
General Staff. It was at first denied in the official reports, and
then explained that the ground had been abandoned owing to artillery
fire, whereas the French Headquarters Staff claimed that they had
captured the ground mainly by hand-grenade fighting at close quarters.
The Battle of Champagne presents a number of curious aspects. How came
the Germans to be so overwhelmingly surprised? Beyond all doubt, they
expected a great French offensive. In the orders of the day issued by
General von Ditfurth on August 15, 1915--five weeks before the French
attack began--we read, "The possibility of a great French offensive
must be considered." General von Fleck was rather late: on September
26, 1915, when the French had already taken nearly the whole
first-line trenches, he expressed the opinion that "The French Higher
Command appears to be disposed to make another desperate effort." What
is tolerably certain is that the German General Staff did not foresee
the strength of the blow nor suspect the vigor with which it would be
delivered. Even the command on the battle field itself apparently
failed to recognize what was happening before their eyes. Inside the
shelters of the second line two German officers were placidly enjoying
the delights of morning in bed, when they were disturbed by noises
which it was beyond their wits to account for. The door of their
little house was rudely thrust open and excited voices said rude
things in French. Then bayonets made their appearance, and soldiers,
hot and breathing hard after their steeplechase across the German
trenches, pulled the officers from their beds with scant respect,
informing them briefly that they were prisoners. This was the first
intimation which the stupefied officers received that the enemy had
broken through their lines.
They seemed to have had an excessive confidence in the strength of
their first line, and the interruption of telephonic communications
had prevented their being informed of the rapid French advance. Then
as to the disposition and employment of reserves: Here it looks as
though that perfect organization and semi-infallible precision which
characterize the German army had, for the nonce, gone awry in the
Champagne conflict. In order to make up for the insufficiency of the
local reserves the German military authorities had to put in line not
only the important units which they held at their disposal behind the
front (Tenth Corps brought back from Russia), but the local reserves
from other sectors (Soissons, Argonne, the Woevre, Alsace), which were
dispatched to Champagne one battalion after another, and even in
groups of double companies. Ill provided with food and munitions, the
reenforcements were pushed to battle on an unknown terrain without
indication as to the direction they had to take and without their
junction with neighboring units having been arranged. Through the
haste with which the reserves were thrown under the fire of the French
artillery and infantry--already in possession of the positions--the
German losses must have been increased enormously. A letter taken from
a soldier of the 118th Regiment may be cited as corroborative
evidence: "We were put in a motor car and proceeded at a headlong pace
to Tahure, by way of Vouziers. Two hours' rest in the open air with
rain falling, and then we had a six hours' march to take up our
positions. On our way we were greeted by the fire of the enemy shells,
so that, for instance, out of 280 men of the second company only 224
arrived safe and sound inside the trenches. These trenches, freshly
dug, were barely thirty-five to fifty centimeters (12 to 17 in.) deep.
Continually surrounded by mines and bursting shells, we had to remain
in them and do the best we could with them for 118 hours without
getting anything hot to eat. Hell itself could not be more terrible.
To-day, at about 12 noon, 600 men, fresh troops, joined the regiment.
In five days we had lost as many and more."
The disorder in which the reenforcements were engaged appears strongly
from this fact: On only that part of the front included between
Maisons de Champagne and Hill 189 there were on October 2, 1915, no
fewer than thirty-two different battalions belonging to twenty-one
different regiments. During the days following the French rush
through the first line, the Germans seemed to have but one idea, to
strengthen their second line to stem the advance. Their counterattacks
were concentrated on a comparatively unimportant part of the battle
front in certain places, the loss of which appeared to them to be
particularly dangerous. Therefore on the heights of Massiges the
German military authorities hurled in succession isolated battalions
of the 123d, 124th and 120th regiments; of the Thirtieth Regular
Regiment and of the Second Regiment Ersatz Reserve (Sixteenth Corps),
which were in turn decimated, for these counterattacks, hastily and
crudely prepared, all ended in sanguinary failures. It was not the men
who failed their leaders, for they fought like tigers when reasonable
opportunities were offered them.
That strong offensive capacity of the Germans seemed also, on the
occasion, to have broken down. General von Ditfurth's order of the day
bears witness to this: "It seemed to me that the infantry at certain
points was confining its action to a mere defensive.... I cannot
protest too strongly against such an idea, which necessarily results
in destroying the spirit of offensive in our own troops and in
arousing and strengthening in the mind of the enemy a feeling of his
superiority. The enemy is left full liberty of action and our action
is subjected to the will of the enemy."
It is of course impossible to estimate precisely what the German
losses were. There are certain known details, however, which may serve
to indicate their extent. One underofficer declared that he was the
only man remaining out of his company. A soldier of the third
battalion of the 123d Regiment, engaged on the 26th, stated that his
regiment was withdrawn from the front after only two days' fighting
because its losses were too great. The 118th Regiment relieved the
158th Regiment in the trenches after it had been reduced to fifteen or
twenty men per company. Certain units disappeared completely, as for
instance the Twenty-seventh Reserve Regiment and the Fifty-second
Regular Regiment, which, by the evening of the 25th, had left in
French hands the first 13 officers and 933 men, and the other 21
officers and 927 men. Certain figures may help to arrive at the total
losses. At the beginning of September, 1915, the German strength on
the Champagne front amounted to seventy battalions. In anticipation of
a French attack they brought there, before the 25th, another
twenty-nine battalions, making a total of ninety-nine battalions.
Reckoning the corresponding artillery and pioneer formations, this
would represent 115,000 men directly engaged. The losses due to the
artillery preparation and the first attacks were such that from
September 25 to October 15, 1915, the German General Staff was
compelled to renew its effectives almost in their entirety by sending
out ninety-three fresh battalions. It is assumed that the units
engaged on September 25-26, 1915, suffered losses amounting to from
sixty to eighty per cent (even more for certain corps which had
entirely disappeared). The new units brought into line for the
counterattacks, and subjected in connection with these to an incessant
bombardment, lost fifty per cent of their effectives, if not more.
Hence it would be hardly overstating the case to set down 140,000 men
as the sum of the German losses in Champagne. It must also be taken
into account that of this number the proportion of slightly wounded
men able to recuperate quickly and return to the front was, in the
case of the Germans, very much below the average proportion of other
engagements, for they were unable to collect their wounded. Thus
nearly the whole of the troops defending the first position fell into
French hands.
After recounting the losses of one side, let us turn to analyze the
gains of the other. The French had penetrated the German lines on a
front of over fifteen miles, and to a depth of two and a half miles in
some places, between Auberive and Ville-sur-Tourbe. The territorial
gains may be thus summarized: The troops of the Republic had scaled
the whole of the glacis of the Epine de Vedegrange; they occupied the
ridge of the hollow at Souain; debouched in the opening to the north
of Perthes to the slopes of Hill 195 and as far as the Butte de
Tahure; carried the western bastions of the curtain of le Mesnil;
advanced as far as Maisons de Champagne and took by assault the "hand"
of Massiges. The territory they had reconquered from the invaders
represented an area of about forty square kilometers. On and from
October 7, 1915, they beat back the furious efforts of the Germans to
regain the lost ground. Nevertheless, in spite of the utmost
resolution on the part of commanders, and of valor on the part of the
French troops, the Germans were not completely overthrown, and the
annihilating results expected from the action of the mass of troops
and guns employed were not attained. It was a victory, but an
indecisive one.
On October 5, 1915, General Joffre issued the following manifesto from
Grand Headquarters:
"The Commander in Chief addresses to the troops under his orders the
expression of his profound satisfaction at the results obtained up to
the present day by the attacks. Twenty-five thousand prisoners, three
hundred and fifty guns, a quantity of material which it has not yet
been possible to gauge, are the trophies of a victory the echo of
which throughout Europe indicates its importance.
"The sacrifices willingly made have not been in vain. All have been
able to take part in the common task. The present is a sure guarantee
to us of the future.
"The Commander in Chief is proud to command the finest troops France
has ever known."
CHAPTER IX
THE BRITISH FRONT IN ARTOIS
Ever since August 16, 1915, a persistent and almost continuous
bombardment of the German lines had been carried out by the French
and, to a less extent, by the British and Belgian artillery. The
allied gunners appear to have distributed their favors quite
impartially. There was nothing in the action taken to direct attention
to one sector more than to another. The Vosges, the Meurthe and
Moselle, Lorraine and the Woevre, the Argonne, Champagne, the Aisne,
the Somme, the Arras sector, Ypres and the Yser, and the Belgian coast
where the British navy had joined in, all were subjected to a heavy,
deliberate and effective fire from guns of all calibers. As in
Champagne, the rate of fire quickened up on September 22, 1915. Great
concentrations of guns had been made at various points, and enormous
quantities of shells had been collected in readiness for the attack.
But the artillery preparation which immediately preceded that attack
in the west was of a most terrific description. Shortly after midnight
and in the early hours of Saturday morning, September 25, 1915, the
German positions were treated to a bombardment that had rarely been
equaled in violence. From the Yser Canal down to the end of the French
line the Allies' guns took up the note, and soon the whole of the
allied line was thundering and reechoing with the infernal racket. The
German lines became smothered in dust and smoke, their parapets simply
melted away, their barbed-wire entanglements disappeared. Those
sleeping thirty or forty miles away were awakened in the night by the
dull rumbling. The whole atmosphere was choked with the noise, and so
it continued throughout the day with hardly an interval. As if in
anticipation of the coming onslaught the German artillery had also
raised the key of its fire to a higher pitch several days before.
Simultaneously with the attack in Champagne, Sir John French assumed
the offensive on the British front. The main British attack was
directed in the neighborhood of Lens, against Prince Rupprecht of
Bavaria. While the French troops were rushing the German first line in
Champagne, the British troops executed a precisely similar movement
south of La Bassee Canal to the east of Grenay and Vermelles. With the
first rush they captured the German trenches on a front of five miles,
penetrating the lines in some places to a distance of 4,000 yards.
They conquered the western outskirts of Hulluch, the village of Loos,
with the mining works around it, and Hill 70. They lost the quarries
northwest of Hulluch again, but retook them on the following day.
Other attacks were made north of the La Bassee Canal, which drew
strong German reserves toward these points of the lines, where hard
fighting occurred throughout the day with fluctuating success. The
British also made another attack on Hooge on either side of the Menin
road. The assault north of the road yielded the Bellewaarde Farm and
ridge, but the Germans subsequently recaptured this part. South of the
road the attack gained about 600 yards of German trench. The British
took 2,600 prisoners, eighteen guns and thirty machine guns in the
first day. The Fourth British Army Corps, under Sir Henry Rawlinson,
had thus taken Loos and overrun Hill 70, a mile to the east, and even
penetrated to Cite St. Auguste. The Fifth Corps, under Sir Hubert
Gough, on the left, had stormed the quarries, taken Cite St. Elie, and
occupied a portion of the village of Haisnes. But the First Army, in
its attack, had not kept adequate reserves on hand; and those at first
at the disposal of the general in chief, which had to serve the whole
front and to be kept in hand in case of unexpected events, came up too
late to enable the British to hold and consolidate all the ground they
had won. The Ypres-Arras sector had been more formidably fortified
than any other portion of the German front. It is an extremely thickly
populated neighborhood, and the terrain is full of difficulties. It
could not be expected that an advance here, at least from the outset,
could be as rapid as that in Champagne. Whereas in the latter it was a
fight for rivers, ridges and woods, in the close country north of
Arras the struggle raged in and around villages, houses, and for some
particular trench that had to be taken before the French and British
could enter the great plain that stretches down to Lille. Every house
along that part had been converted into a fortress. When the
superstructure had been blown to pieces by shell fire, pioneers
burrowed thirty or fifty feet below the cellars and thus held on to
the position.
To the right of the British in Artois, the French infantry attack was
directed toward the forest of Hache. Only eighty or ninety yards
separated the French from the German trenches, and the French
infantry, which attained its objective in a few minutes, found the
trenches a mass of ruins and almost deserted, and the Germans
retreating into the wood. The first wave of attackers followed in
pursuit, but they reached the second line of trenches, situated in the
middle of the wood, without meeting any Germans in considerable force.
They pushed on to the eastern edge of the wood, but the Germans again
put up no defense, and their third-line trenches, on the fringe of the
wood, were likewise taken. Then came a halt in the advance. The German
commander pulled his men together and, with the reserves which had
come up in the meantime, launched a counterattack against the French,
who had quickly established themselves in their newly captured
positions. Heavy shells, high explosives and shrapnel were raining in
the trenches occupied by the French, and but for the new steel helmets
which had recently been supplied, the casualties would have been
enormous. One man's helmet was split clean across the crown by a shell
splinter, but the man escaped with merely a scratch. The Germans came
on in close formations, hurling grenades as they marched. The
atmosphere of the wood became almost insupportable with the smoke.
Finally, the French hurled a veritable torrent of grenades, which
drove the Germans back and compelled them to withdraw across the River
Souchez. Boise Hache was entirely won.
The British attack between La Bassee and Lens and the French attack on
the Souchez side were admirably coordinated, and were directed mainly
to assist the French to gain the heights west of Vimy, which were the
unattained object of their efforts during May and June. By September
27, 1915, the French had all Souchez in their hands, and were
advancing upon Givenchy. The capture of the Vimy heights was an item
of the highest importance, for to the eastward of them all the ground
was commanded by their fire, and the chances were that the Germans
would fall back on Douai and on the line of the Lille-Douai Canal,
once they were pushed off the high ground. In the Argonne the German
Crown Prince carried out desperate attacks against the French
first-line trenches at La Fille Morte and Bolante. These the French
repulsed with heavy losses to the Germans, whose dead lay piled in
heaps in front of the positions.
One result of the British attack was the hurried recall of the active
Corps of Prussian Guards from the eastern front--an important relief
to the hard-pressed Russians. This famous corps was at the time split
up into three groups; the active corps was with Mackensen in Galicia
and in the advance upon Brest-Litovsk. It was transferred to the Dvina
after the fall of Brest, and had since been engaged before Dvinsk. The
Reserve Guard Corps was in the central group of the German armies, and
the other, the Third Division, was still in Galicia. The British and
the Prussian Guards had made each other's acquaintance in the Battle
of Ypres.
[Illustration: The French Gains in the Artois Region, September,
1915.]
At the end of the month Haisnes, on the northern flank of the new
British line, was still for the greater part in German possession; on
the right flank the British were across the Lens-La Bassee road. The
British had captured not only the first position of their enemy, but
also a second or supporting line which ran west of Loos. They were now
up against the third line. Sir John French reported having taken so
far over 3,000 prisoners, twenty-one guns, and forty machine guns. The
French in Artois had taken a matter of 15,000 prisoners and a number
of guns. After obstinate day and night fighting they had reached Hill
140, the culminating point of the crests of Vimy, and the orchards to
the south. The crown prince still plugged away on this front with
heavy artillery and aerial torpedoes. Columns of flames began to issue
from his trenches on September 27, 1915--the inflammable liquid
appeared to be a composition of tar and petrol--and the smoke and
flames, carried by the wind blowing from the German trenches, soon
reached the French line and made the atmosphere intolerably hot and
suffocating for the French troops. Then suddenly out of the thick
fumes began to appear German infantry with fixed bayonets, sent
forward to the attack. They were literally mown down by the fire from
the French machine guns and rifles, but the wave of attackers seemed
unending, and by dint of overwhelming numbers it poured into the
French trenches. A terrible hand-to-hand fight then ensued in an
atmosphere so thick that it was difficult to distinguish friend from
foe. These clouds were not poisonous, for the Germans had themselves
to fight in them; they were let loose to cover the infantry charge.
The French were compelled to retire, which they did, contesting every
foot of ground. Meanwhile, reenforcements had arrived and these were
at once thrown into the fighting line. The French, however, were soon
brought to a halt. Asphyxiating and lachrymatory bombs, which emitted
bluish smoke as they exploded, began to fall in their midst. Spurred
on by their leaders the men dashed on, passing through yet another of
these barriers of smoke until they came to grips with the attackers,
who were now coming on like a torrent, in close formation, shouting
wildly. Altogether, the scene was one that vividly brings to the
imagination the truth of Sherman's dictum that "war is hell." A mad
potpourri of dimly visible forms, struggling like demons, shooting,
stabbing, hacking and roaring in an infernal caldron of tar, poison,
sulphur, tears and blood. Truly a worthy theme for another Dante and a
Gustave Dore. For some time it looked as if the French would be
crumpled up, but reserves were steadily streaming in, and eventually
the attackers began to waver and fall back. The French 75-millimeter
Creusots came into play again, and after a battle that lasted in all
twenty-four hours, the Germans were driven back to their own trenches.
In the morning of October 2, 1915, the Germans made a demonstration in
front of the Belgian trenches at Dixmude, consisting of a bombardment
and a violent discharge of bombs. On one small section alone 400 bombs
were dropped. The German infantry broke into the Belgian trenches, but
were dislodged again in a few minutes.
The position which the British had captured was exceptionally strong,
consisting of a double line, including some large redoubts and a
network of trenches and bomb-proof shelters. Dugouts were constructed
at short intervals all along the line, some of them being large caves
thirty feet below the ground. The French capture of Souchez was an
event of considerable importance, for the German High Command had
issued orders for this section to hold on to the last, that it was to
be retained at all costs. The road to the Douai plain was to be barred
to the French, who had to be held back behind the advanced works of
the Artois plateau. In May, 1915, the problem was to prevent the
French setting foot on the summits of Notre Dame de Lorette and of the
Topart Mill. The Germans sacrificed many thousands of men with this
object, but the French nevertheless made themselves masters of the
heights which the Germans considered of capital importance, and
dislodged them from Carency and Ablain-St. Nazaire. There remained
only one stage to cover--the Souchez Valley--to reach the last crest
which dominated the whole country to the east, and beyond which the
ground is flat. This task had been accomplished during the last few
days of September and the beginning of October. Souchez and its
advanced bastion, the Chateau Carleul, had been made into a formidable
fortification by the changing of the course of the Carency streams.
The Germans had transformed the marshy ground to the southeast of this
front into a perfect swamp, which was regarded as impassable. The
German batteries posted at Angres were able to enfilade the valley on
the north. From behind the crest of Hill 119 to Hill 140, which were
covered with trenches connected by a network of communication
trenches, many batteries were engaged against the French in the
district of Notre Dame de Lorette, Ablain-St. Nazaire and Carency. To
the north of Souchez the German trenches were still clinging to the
Notre Dame de Lorette slope.
The attack of September 25, 1915, was to overcome all these obstacles.
The artillery preparation, which lasted five days, was so skillfully
handled that, even before it was finished, many German deserters came
into the French lines declaring that they had had enough. The infantry
attack was delivered at noon on September 25, 1915, and with one rush
the French troops reached the objectives which had been marked out for
them--the chateau and grounds of Carleul and the islet south of
Souchez. Meanwhile, other detachments carried the cemetery and forced
their way to the first slopes of Hill 119. On the left the French
troops advanced down the slopes of Notre Dame de Lorette and made a
dash at the Hache Wood, the western outskirts of which they reached
twenty minutes after the attack began. The capture of the wood has
already been described. The French attack on the right, being held up
by machine-gun fire, could not be maintained in the cemetery, and it
was decided to approach Souchez by the main road so that they might
pour in their forces on the east, while, to the north, the French
force that had bitten its way into the Hache Wood was to continue its
advance. This maneuver decided the day. The Germans, who were in
danger of being cut off in Souchez, abandoned their positions, and
those who had retaken the cemetery, being in the same perilous
circumstances, regained by their communication trenches their second
line on the slopes of Hill 119. Thus fell Souchez to the French in two
days. The allied offensive was a short and sharp affair, skillfully
planned and bravely executed, but disappointing in result. At the
great price of 50,000 casualties the British had overthrown the
Germans on a front of five miles, and in some places to a depth of
4,000 yards, and had captured many prisoners and guns; but they had
not definitely broken the German lines. At a heavy cost the Allies on
the western front had captured about 160 German guns and disposed of
150,000 Germans, including some 27,000 prisoners, and the result of
their efforts was to shake the Germans in the west very severely and
to call back to France many troops from the eastern front. That the
blow was regarded by the kaiser as a serious one was shown by an Order
of the Day in which he declared that every important success obtained
by the Allies on the western front "will be considered as due to the
culpable negligence of the German commanders, who will lay themselves
open to being punished for incompetence." But if the Allies' successes
were due to hard fighting and brilliant dash, the fact that they did
not break right through the enemy's lines is an eloquent testimony to
the wonderful strength of the German resistance. The marvel was that
any were left alive in the first line after the preliminary
bombardment to face the bayonets and grenades of the attackers. In a
report from German General Headquarters, dated September 29, 1915, Max
Osborn, special correspondent of the "Vossische Zeitung," described
how the French artillery swept the hinterland of the German positions
in Champagne and then concentrated upon these. "The violence of the
fire then reached its zenith. Hitherto it had been a raging, searching
fire; now it became a mad drumming, beyond all power of imagination.
It is impossible to convey any idea of the savagery of this
bombardment. Never has this old planet heard such an uproar. An
officer who had witnessed during the summer the horrors of Arras, of
Souchez, and of the Lorette Heights, told me that those were not in
any way to be compared with the present, beyond all conception,
appalling artillery onslaught. Day and night for fifty hours, at some
points for seventy hours, the guns vomited destruction and murder
against the Germans, the German trenches and against the German
batteries. Strongly built trenches were covered in and ground to
powder; their edges and platforms were shorn off and converted into
dust heaps; men were buried, crushed, and inevitably suffocated--but
the survivors stood fast." A German soldier told how, in the fierce
hand-to-hand fighting which followed, a Frenchman and a German flew at
each other's throat, and how they fell, both pierced by the same
bullet, still locked in each other's grip. And so, too, they were
buried. Courage is not the monopoly of any race or nation.
CHAPTER X
THE BATTLE OF LOOS
At 5.50 a. m. on September 25, 1915, a dense, heavy cloud arose slowly
from the earth--a whitish, yellowish, all-enveloping cloud that rolled
slowly toward the German trenches--a little too much to the north.
Thousands of German bullets whistled through that cloud, but it passed
on, unheeding. The attack began at 6.30.
A Scottish division had been ordered to take Loos and Hill 70. It
therefore played the first role in the battle, since it was on Loos,
of which Hill 70 is the gateway, that the efforts of all converged
from the north as well as the south. Brigade "X" of the Scottish
division was to execute an enveloping movement to the north around
Loos and to carry Hill 70 by storm. Brigade "Y" meanwhile was to
attack the Loos front, Brigade "Z" remaining in reserve. By 7.05 a. m.
the whole of the first line was captured. The second line, covering
Loos, was carried with the same ease. The Germans, taken by surprise,
were fleeing toward Loos, where they put up a stern rear-guard fight,
and toward Lens, which was strongly fortified.
After the capture of the second line in front of Loos, "X" and "Y"
Brigades separated, "Y" surrounding the village with two battalions,
while the rest captured the village and cleaned it up. It was stiff
street fighting, the Germans being hidden away in all sorts of corners
with plenty of machine guns. The Scots made a quick job of it, not
stopping for trifles. It is related that a sergeant, to whom two
Germans had surrendered, pulled a few pieces of string from his
pocket, tied their hands together, and passed them to the rear with
the request, "Please forward." Brigade "X" had meanwhile thrown its
enveloping net around Loos without meeting much resistance. The
British had reached the top of Hill 70 by nine o'clock. The climb was
a hard and rough accomplishment, with the right flank under
mitrailleuse fire from Loos, and with the left exposed to fire from
Pit 14A; but it was accomplished far too quickly. Serious disasters
frequently occur in war through tardiness; in this case a possible
great victory was missed through being too quick and arriving too
early. When the brigadier got up to Loos he saw his men vanishing in
the distance. A strong German redoubt, over the other side of the hill
crest, was not even defended. The brigade crossed the Lens-La Bassee
road, which runs along the height, carried the third German line on
the opposite slope, and at 9.20 it was outside St. Auguste.
Unfortunately for the British, the corps commander, who arrived at
this moment with his staff in hot haste, was unable to get his unit in
hand again. Overflowing with offensive ardor, he had thrown his men
forward with a most impetuous movement, and they got out of hand. The
brigade turned at right angles and got into the suburbs of Lens. It
seemed as though the gates of the northern plain were about to be
smashed in. Then the great danger appeared. There was still no great
converging movement from the south, where a British division and
French troops were engaged. Touch was also lost to the north. The
neighboring division in this direction was held up until the afternoon
by wire entanglements. The left flank of the brigade was at the mercy
of a German counterattack, but the Germans did not launch it, for they
had not the men. What they did, however, was to concentrate on the
brigade a murderous fire from Loos in the south, Lens in the east, St.
Auguste in the north, and Pit 14A and two or three neighboring houses
in the west. They were even seen hastily installing machine guns along
the railway embankment northeast of Lens.
Shattered by fire, uncertain of its direction, shaken by the very
quickness of its previous advance, the brigade hesitated, sowed the
ground with its dead, and retired in good order on Hill 70, where it
intrenched slightly below the redoubt abandoned by the Germans during
the attack and which was now reoccupied by them. As a matter of fact,
the screening gas clouds hindered rather than helped the attack. The
Scottish division was exhausted, but if fresh troops had come up and a
fresh attack had been delivered against the Germans, who were
gathering all their men in the Douai region, the German front would
undoubtedly have been pierced like cardboard. Brigade "X" had made a
path, and if only reenforcements had arrived without delay the path
would have become a highroad--would have become the whole of Douai
plain. Not until nightfall were the reserves forthcoming. It is
evident that, in this first day, advantage was not taken of the
results achieved.
Though long-range fighting was incessantly kept up around Loos,
nothing of importance happened till October 8, 1915, when the Germans,
after an intense bombardment with shells of all calibers, launched a
violent attack on Loos and made desperate efforts to recapture their
lost positions. The main efforts were directed against the chalk pit
north of Hill 70, and between Hulluch and the Hohenzollern redoubt. In
the chalk pit attack, the Germans assembled behind some woods which
lay from 300 to 500 yards from the British trenches. Between these
woods and the British line the attacking force was mown down by
combined rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, not a man getting
within forty yards of the trenches.
Farther to the south, between Hulluch and the quarries, the attack was
also repelled, the British securing a German trench west of Cite St.
Elie. The Germans did succeed in penetrating the British front in the
southern communication trench of the Hohenzollern redoubt, but were
shortly after expelled again by British bombers.
British flying men played an important part in the Battle of Loos and
in the preparations that preceded it. Troops and guns had to be moved
at night so that the German aeroplanes might not note the
concentration. Hence it was decided that British aeros should warn off
the German flyers by day. They probably outnumbered the German
machines by eight to one. As the attack proceeded a flock of
aeroplanes was cutting circles and dipping and turning over the battle
field as if in an exhibition of airmanship. They appeared to be
disconnected from the battle, but no participants were more busy or
intent than they. All the panorama of action was beneath them; they
alone could really "see" the battle if they chose. But each aviator
stole only passing glimpses of the whole, for each one was intent on
his part, which was to keep watch of whether the shells of the battery
to which he reported were on the target or not. To distinguish whose
shell-burst was whose in the midst of that cloud of dust and smoke
over the German positions seemed as difficult as to separate the spout
of steam of one pipe from another when a hundred were making a wall of
vapor. Yet so skilled is the well-trained airman that he can tell at a
glance. It is not difficult to spot shells when only a few batteries
are firing, but when perhaps a hundred guns are dropping shells on a
half-mile front of trench, a highly trained eye is required.
Occasionally a plane was observed to sweep down like a hawk that had
located a fish in the water. At all hazards that intrepid aviator was
going to identify the shell-bursts of the batteries which he
represented. The enemy might have him in rifle range, but they were
too busy trying to hold up the British infantry to fire at him. Other
aeroplanes were dropping shells on railway trains and bridges, to
hinder the Germans, once they had learned where the force of the
attack was to be exerted, from rushing reenforcements to the spot. For
that kind of work, as for all reconnaissances, the aviators like
low-lying clouds. They slip down out of these to have a look around
and drop a bomb--thus killing two birds with one stone--and then rise
to cover before the enemy can bring his antiaircraft guns to bear.
[Illustration: German infantry storming a hill in the Argonne. The men
bend low for safety, though pressing eagerly forward toward the
enemy's lines.]
A German description of the Battle of Loos says that during the
preliminary gas attack the British artillery was hurling gas bombs
upon the Germans. The latter coughed and held their ground as long as
they could, but many fell, unable to resist the fumes. In the midst of
all this the Germans were preparing for the expected infantry attack.
Finally the British appeared, emerging suddenly as if from nowhere,
behind a cloud of gas, and wearing masks. They came on in thick lines
and storming columns. The first line of the attackers were quickly
shot down by the hail of rifle and machine-gun bullets that rained
upon them from the shattered German trenches. The dead and wounded
soon lay like a wall before the German position. The second and third
lines of the British suffered the same fate. It was estimated that the
number of British killed before this German division alone amounted to
8,000 to 10,000. The fourth line of attackers, however, finally
succeeded in overrunning the decimated front line of Germans, who
stood by their guns to the very last; those of them who had not fallen
were made prisoners. Not one of them returned to tell what happened in
this terrific fighting. The British are stated to have attacked in an
old-fashioned, out-of-date manner that made the German staff officers
stare in open-mouthed wonder. "Eight ranks of infantry, mounted
artillery, cavalry in the background--that was too much! A veritable
battle plan of a past age, the product of a mind in its dotage, and
half a century behind the times! Splendidly, with admirable courage,
the English troops came forward to the attack. They were young, wore
no decorations; they carried out with blind courage what their senile
commanders ordered--and this in a period of mortars, machine guns
and the telephone. Their behavior was splendid, but all the more
pitiable was the breakdown of their attack."
[Illustration: The Battle at Loos.]
Connected with the Battle of Loos there was one little person who
deserves a chapter in history--all to herself--and that is Mlle.
Emilienne Moreau, a young French girl who lived--and probably still
lives--with her parents in the storm-battered village of Loos. She was
seventeen years of age at the time she became famous, and was studying
to be a school-teacher. She was "mentioned in dispatches" in the
French Official Journal in these terms:
"On September 25, 1915, when the British troops entered the village of
Loos, she organized a first-aid station in her house and worked day
and night to bring in the wounded, to whom she gave all assistance,
while refusing to accept any reward. Armed with a revolver she went
out and succeeded in overcoming two German soldiers who, hidden in a
near-by house, were firing at the first-aid station."
This, however, was not a complete list of the exploits of la petite
Moreau. She shot two Germans when their bayonets were very close to
her, and later, snatching some hand bombs from a British grenadier's
stock, she accounted for three more who were busy at the same
occupation. Furthermore, "when the British line was wavering under the
most terrible cyclone of shells ever let loose upon earth, Emilienne
Moreau sprang forward with a bit of tricolored bunting in her hand and
the glorious words of the 'Marseillaise' on her lips, and by her
fearless example averted a retreat that might have meant disaster
along the whole front. Only the men who were in that fight can fully
understand why Sir Douglas Haig was right in christening her the Joan
of Arc of Loos."
A more mature French Amazon is Madame Louise Arnaud, the widow of an
officer killed in the war. She commanded a corps of French and Belgian
women who were permitted by the War Minister to don uniforms. The
corps was intended for general service at the front, one-third of them
being combatants, all able to ride, shoot and swim.
After the great allied offensive in the west had spent its force--or
rather the force of its initial momentum--quite an interesting battle
broke out, this time on paper. It consisted on the one side of an
attempt to estimate the results of success and to attach to them the
highest possible value. The energy of the other side was devoted to
belittling these results and proclaiming the alleged futility of the
venture. Thus, King George telegraphed to Sir John French on September
30, 1915:
"I heartily congratulate you and all ranks of my army under your
command upon the success which has attended their gallant efforts
since the commencement of the combined attack."
Lord Kitchener sent this message:
"My warmest congratulations to you and all serving under you on the
substantial success you have achieved...."
In his report of October 3, 1915, General French stated that "The
enemy has suffered heavy losses, particularly in the many
counterattacks by which he has vainly endeavored to wrest back the
captured positions, but which have all been gallantly repulsed by our
troops.... I feel the utmost confidence and assurance that the same
glorious spirit which has been so marked a feature throughout the
first phase of this great battle will continue until our efforts are
crowned by final and complete victory."
The following sentence is culled from the French official report on
the fighting in Champagne:
"... Germans surrendered in groups, even though not surrounded, so
tired were they of the fight, and so depressed by hunger and convinced
of our determination to continue our effort to the end...."
Rather contradictory in tone and substance were the German dispatches:
"The German General Staff recently invited a number of newspaper men
from neutral countries--the United States, South America, Holland, and
Rumania--to inspect the fighting line in the west during time of
battle.... They are thus enabled to verify the reports from the German
headquarters concerning this greatest and most fearful battle fought
on the western front since the beginning of the war. They are,
accordingly, in a position to state that exaggerated statements are
made in the reports from French headquarters, and to confirm the facts
that the Germans were outnumbered several times by the French; that
the French suffered terrific and unheard-of losses, in spite of
several days of artillery preparation; that the French attacks failed
altogether, as none of them attained the expected result, and that the
encircling movement of General Joffre is without tangible result."
"The world presently shall see the pompously advertised grand
offensive broken by the iron will of our people in arms.... They are
welcome to try it again if they like." "French and English storming
columns in unbroken succession roll up against the iron wall
constituted by our heroic troops. As all hostile attacks have hitherto
been repulsed with gigantic losses, particularly for the English, the
whole result of the enemy's attack, lasting for days, is merely a
denting in of our front in two places...." Who shall decide when
doctors disagree?
CHAPTER XI
THE CAVELL CASE--ACCIDENT TO KING GEORGE
On October 15, 1915, the United States Ambassador in London informed
the British Foreign Office that Miss Edith Cavell, lately the head of
a large training school for nurses in Brussels, had been executed by
the German military authorities of that city after sentence of death
had been passed on her. It was understood that the charge against Miss
Cavell was that she had harbored fugitive British and French soldiers
and Belgians of military age, and had assisted them to escape from
Belgium in order to join the colors. Miss Cavell was the daughter of a
Church of England clergyman, and was trained as a nurse at the London
Hospital. On the opening of the Ecole Beige d'Infirmieres Diplomees,
Brussels, in 1907, she was appointed matron of the school. She went
there with a view to introduce into Belgium British methods of
nursing and of training nurses. Those who knew Miss Cavell were
impressed by her strength of character and unflinching devotion. She
could have returned to England in September, 1914, shortly after the
outbreak of the war, when seventy English nurses were able to leave
Belgium through the influence of the United States Minister, but she
chose to remain at her post. The "execution," which was accompanied by
several unpleasant features, raised a great outcry of public
indignation not only throughout the British Empire, but also in most
neutral countries. That indignation rose to a still higher pitch when,
on October 22, 1915, the report on the case, by Mr. Brand Whitlock,
United States Minister in Belgium, was published in the press. From
the report it appeared, what the world had hitherto been ignorant of,
that Mr. Whitlock had made the most strenuous efforts to save the
unfortunate lady from death. His humanitarian labors in that direction
were strongly seconded by the Spanish Minister in Brussels.
Miss Cavell's mother, a widow, residing at Norwich, received the
following letter of sympathy from the king and queen:
"Buckingham Palace,
"October 23, 1915.
"Dear Madam:
"By command of the King and Queen I write to assure you that the
hearts of their Majesties go out to you in your bitter sorrow, and to
express their horror at the appalling deed which has robbed you of
your child. Men and women throughout the civilized world, while
sympathizing with you, are moved with admiration and awe at her faith
and courage in death.
"Believe me, dear Madam,
"Yours very truly,
"STAMFORDHAM."
The report described how Mr. Hugh S. Gibson, the Secretary of the
American Legation, sought out the German Governor, Baron von der
Lancken, late at night before the execution, and, with the Spanish
Minister pleaded with him and the other German officers for the
Englishwoman's life. There was a reference to an apparent lack of
good faith on the part of the German authorities in failing to keep
their promise to inform the American Minister fully of the trial and
sentence. Mr. Whitlock's final appeal was a note sent to Von Lancken
late on the night of October 11, 1915, which read as follows:
"My dear Baron: I am too sick to present my request myself, but I
appeal to your generosity of heart to support it and save from death
this unhappy woman. Have pity on her.
"Yours truly,
"BRAND WHITLOCK."
The next day Mr. Whitlock telegraphed to our Ambassador in London:
"Miss Cavell sentenced yesterday and executed at 2 o'clock this
morning, despite our best efforts, continued until the last moment."
The sentence had been confirmed and the execution ordered to be
carried out by General von Bissing, the German Governor General of
Belgium.
The British press drew an apposite parallel between the summary
execution of Miss Cavell in Belgium and the course taken in England in
the case of Mrs. Louise Herbert, a German, and the wife of an English
curate in Darlington. She had been sentenced to six months'
imprisonment as a spy. According to English criminal law every
condemned person is entitled to appeal against the sentence inflicted.
Mrs. Herbert availed herself of this indisputable right, and her
appeal was heard at Durham on October 20, 1915--eight days after the
execution of Miss Cavell. The female spy admitted that she had sought
information regarding munitions and intended to send this information
to Germany. She also admitted that she had corresponded with Germany
through friends in Switzerland. Here, according to military law, was a
certain case for the death sentence, which would undoubtedly have been
carried out in the Tower had the accused been a man. It must be borne
in mind that the Court of Appeals in England has the power to increase
a sentence as well as to reduce or quash it altogether. Astonished by
her frank answers, the judge remarked: "This woman has a
conscience--she wishes to answer truthfully and deserves credit for
that. At the same time, she is dangerous." He then gave judgment that
the sentence of six months' imprisonment should stand. No charge of
espionage was preferred against Miss Cavell. She was refused the
advocate Mr. Whitlock offered to provide her with, and the details of
the secret trial have not been made public.
Whatever may be the right or the wrong of the case, it is reasonably
safe to apply to it the famous dictum of Fouche on Napoleon's
execution of the Duc d'Enghien: "It is worse than a crime; it is a
blunder." It certainly had the effect of still further embittering the
enemies of Germany. Perhaps no incident of the great world war will be
more indelibly imprinted on the British mind than this. Many thousands
of young Englishmen who had hitherto held back rushed to join the
colors. "Edith Cavell Recruiting Meetings" were held all over the
United Kingdom. A great national memorial service was held in St.
Paul's Cathedral in London, where representatives of the king and
queen, statesmen, the nobility and thousands of officers and soldiers
attended. The Dowager Queen Alexandra, who is the patron of the great
institution now in course of erection and known as the "Queen
Alexandra Nurses' Training School," expressed the desire that her name
should give place to that of Miss Cavell, and that the institution
shall be called "The Edith Cavell Nurses' Training School."
Within a month of her death it had been decided to erect a statue to
the memory of Miss Cavell in Trafalgar Square. Sir George Frampton,
R.A., President of the Royal Society of British Sculptors, undertook
to execute the statue without charge.
The most permanent memorial of the death of Nurse Cavell will be a
snow-clad peak in the Rocky Mountains, which the Canadian Government
has decided to name "Mount Cavell." It is situated fifteen miles south
of Jasper, on the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, near the border of
Alberta, at the junction of the Whirlpool and Athabasca Rivers, and
has a height of more than 11,000 feet.
A curious sequel followed the execution of Miss Cavell. Nearly three
months later, on January 6, 1916, a young Belgian was found shot dead
in Schaerbeek, a suburb of Brussels. The German authorities took the
matter in hand for investigation, but in the meantime General von
Bissing fined the city of Brussels 500,000 marks and the suburb of
Schaerbeek 50,000 marks on the plea that the murder had been committed
with a revolver, the Germans having ordered that all arms should be
surrendered at the town hall. But there was more in this affair than
an ordinary crime. The "Echo Belge," published in Amsterdam since the
German occupation of Belgium, revealed that the punitive action by the
German authorities was prompted by something other than an
infringement of the regulations. The body found was that of a certain
Niels de Rode, and he it was who denounced Miss Cavell and also
betrayed several Belgians--his own countrymen--who were trying to
cross the frontier to join the army. The "Echo Belge" asserted that De
Rode was executed by Belgian patriots to avenge the betrayal of Miss
Cavell. The anger of the German authorities was explained by the loss
of their informer.
On October 22, 1915, London was officially informed that "The king is
in France, where he has gone to visit his army. His majesty also hopes
to see some of the allied troops." This was not the king's first visit
to the battle line, and, as before, his departure from England and
arrival on the Continent had been kept a secret until he had reached
his destination. The king traveled by automobile from Havre to various
parts of the British and French lines, "somewhere in France,"
inspecting troops and visiting hospitals. The royal tour was brought
to a premature close on the morning of the 28th owing to an
unfortunate accident. The king had just finished the second of two
reviews of troops representing corps of the First Army when his horse,
frightened by the cheers of the men, reared and fell, and his majesty
was severely bruised. Twice the horse (a mare) reared up when the
soldiers burst suddenly into cheers at only a few yards' distance. The
first time the mare came down again on her forefeet, but the second
time she fell over and, in falling, rolled slightly on to the king's
leg. The announcement of the king's mishap came with dramatic
suddenness to the assembled officers and troops. The troops of the
corps which he had first inspected could hear from where they stood
the cheers of their comrades about a mile away, which told them that
the second review was over, and that the king would pass down the road
fronting them in a few minutes. The orders to raise their caps and
cheer were shouted to the men by the company officers, and then the
whole corps, with bayoneted rifles at the slope, advanced in brigade
order across the huge fallow field in which they had been drawn up to
within thirty yards or so of the road. In a few minutes a covered
green automobile was seen tearing down the road at full speed, and as
it drew up opposite the center of the corps the cheering began to
spread all along the line. In the enthusiasm of the moment the
majority did not notice that the car was not flying the royal
standard, and even when an officer, with the pink and white brassard
of an Army Corps Staff, jumped out of the car and began to shout hasty
instructions few realized their mistake and his words were carried
away down the tempestuous wind that raged at the time. Then the
officer hurried here and there calling out that the king had met with
an accident and that there was to be no cheering. A few of those in
the center caught his words, but the news had not spread to more than
a fraction of the whole body before the king's car drove past. A
curious spectacle now presented itself. Along one portion of the front
the men stood silently at attention, while their comrades on either
side of them, and yet other troops farther away down the road, were
raising their caps on their bayonets and cheering with true British
lustiness. Some could catch a glimpse of the king as his car dashed
swiftly by. He was sitting half-bent in the corner of the vehicle, and
his face wore a faint smile of acknowledgment. The king's injuries
proved to be worse than was at first supposed, necessitating his
removal to London on a stretcher.
CHAPTER XII
OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE AND ARTOIS--PREPARATIONS FOR WINTER CAMPAIGN
By the middle of October operations on the western front centralized
almost entirely in the Champagne and Artois districts, where the
Germans, fully appreciating the menace to their lines created by the
results of the allied offensive, sought by continuous violent
counterattacks to recover the territory from which they had been
dislodged and to prevent the Allies from consolidating and
strengthening their gains. Their attacks in the Artois fell chiefly
between Hulluch and Hill 70, and southeast of Givenchy, against the
heights of Petit Vimy. The Germans succeeded in retaking small
sections of first-line trenches, but lost some of their new trenches
in return. Whereas the Allies held practically all they had gained,
the Germans were considerably the losers by the transaction. The
British attempted to continue their offensive by driving between Loos
and Hulluch, the most important and at the same time the most
dangerous section on the British front. By steadily forging ahead
southeast of Loos toward Hill 70, the British were driving a wedge
into the German line and creating a perilous salient around the town
of Angres as the center. To obviate the danger from counterattacks
against the sides of the salient, the British endeavored to flatten
out the point of the wedge by capturing more ground north of Hill 70
toward Hulluch. To some extent the plan succeeded; they advanced east
of the Lens-La Bassee road for about 500 yards, an apparently
insignificant profit, but it had the effect of strengthening the
British position.
Uninterrupted fighting in Champagne had made little difference to
either side, save that the French had managed to straighten out their
line somewhat, though they were by no means nearer to their desired
goal--the Challerange-Bazancourt railway. If that could be taken, the
Germans facing them would be cut off from the crown prince's army
operating in the Argonne. Bulgaria had meanwhile entered the conflict
and started the finishing campaign of Serbia with the assistance of
her Teutonic allies.
Between October 19 and October 24, 1915, the Germans made eight
distinct attacks in the Souchez sector in Artois, attempting to loosen
the French grip on Hill 140. In this venture the First Bavarian Army
Corps was practically wiped out by terrible losses. Each attack was
reported to have been repulsed. Commenting on the same event, the
German report said that "... enemy advances were repulsed. Detachments
which penetrated our positions were immediately driven back." Both
sides of the battle line now settled down to the same round of seesaw
battles of the preceding midsummer; attacks and counterattacks;
trenches captured and recaptured; here a hundred yards won, there a
hundred yards lost. After almost every one of these events the three
headquarters issued statements to the effect that "the enemy was
repelled with heavy losses," or that some place or other had been
"recaptured by our troops." On October 24, 1915, the French in
Champagne made some important progress. In front of their (the French)
position the Germans occupied a very strongly organized salient which
had resisted all previous attacks. In its southwestern part, on the
northern slopes of Hill 196, at a point one and a quarter miles to the
north of Mesnil-les-Hurlus, this salient included a valuable strategic
position called La Courtine (The Curtain), which the French took after
some severe fighting. La Courtine extended for a distance of 1,200
yards with an average depth of 250 yards, and embracing three or four
lines of trenches connected up with underground tunnels and the
customary communication trenches, all of which had been thoroughly
prepared for defense. In spite of the excellence of these works and
the ferocious resistance of the German soldiers, the French succeeded
in taking this position by storm after preparatory artillery fire. On
the same day that this was announced, the Berlin report put it thus:
"In Champagne the French attacked near Tahure and against our salient
north of Le Mesnil, after a strong preparation with their artillery.
Near Tahure their attack was not carried out to its completion,
having been stopped by our fire. Late in the afternoon stubborn
fighting was in progress on the salient north of Le Mesnil. North and
east of this salient an attack was repulsed with severe French
losses."
The following two interesting reports were issued on October 27, 1915:
_Paris_
After having exploded in the neighborhood of the road from Arras to
Lille ... a series of powerful mines which destroyed the German
intrenchments ... our troops immediately occupied the excavations.
They installed themselves there, notwithstanding a very violent
bombardment and several counterattacks by the enemy, who suffered
serious losses. We captured about 30 prisoners.
_Berlin_
After the explosion of a French mine on the Lille-Arras road an
unimportant engagement developed, which went in our favor.
An important event happened in France on October 28, 1915, when the
Viviani Cabinet resigned, much to the general surprise of the nation.
The result of the change of government was that M. Aristide Briand,
one of the aggressive and militant members of the Socialist party,
succeeded as Premier and Foreign Secretary, M. de Freycinet became
Vice President of the Council, and General Gallieni Minister for War.
It was not a "political crisis," but a union of the parties--a
coalition, such as the British Government had already adopted. The
change implied a distribution of responsibility among the leading men
of all parties, a useful measure to stifle criticism and insure
unanimity of purpose. M. Viviani reentered the new Cabinet as Minister
of Justice. For the first time in the history of the French Republic a
coalition ministry of all the opposing factions was formed.
Some stir and much speculation was caused when General Joffre visited
London at the end of October and held another conference with Lord
Kitchener. It was generally understood that some scheme for central
military control was being promoted, to render quicker decisions and
coordinate action possible. It was obvious that matters of vital
interest had brought the French Generalissimo to London. Shortly
before his departure it leaked out that the British Government had for
some time contemplated the creation of a new General Staff composed of
experts to supervise the prosecution of the war, and it was believed,
perhaps with justification, that General Joffre had come to give his
opinion on the matter. On November 17, 1915, the first meeting of the
Anglo-French War Council was held in Paris. The British members in
attendance were the Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur James Balfour, First
Lord of the Admiralty; Mr. David Lloyd-George, Minister of Munitions,
and Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The
French participants were Premier Briand, General Gallieni, Admiral
Lacaze, Minister of Marine, and General Joffre.
At the beginning of November a temporary lull had set in on parts of
the western front, and the center of interest was for the time shifted
to the Balkans. The French and British seemed unable to continue their
offensive operations and were, for the most part, confined to their
trenches and such territory as they had wrested from the Germans
during September and early October. On October 30, 1915, the Germans
had again begun a series of determined offensives in Artois and
Champagne. They met with considerable success in the initial stages,
for on the morning of the 31st they had gained about 1,200 yards of
the French trenches near Neuville-St. Vaast and on the summit of the
Butte de Tahure, capturing 1,500 French soldiers. The struggle for the
Neuville trenches continued for days, during which the positions
changed hands at short intervals.
In Champagne the Germans, after a fresh artillery preparation, with
the employment of suffocating shells of large caliber, renewed their
attacks in the region to the north of Le Mesnil. They delivered four
successive assaults in the course of the day--the first at 6 a. m. on
the extreme east of La Courtine; the second at noon against Tahure;
the third at 2 p. m. to the south of the village, and the fourth at 4
p. m. against the ridges to the northeast. The French artillery,
however, checked their progress and compelled them to retire to their
trenches, leaving 356 unwounded prisoners with the French. Beyond
occasional artillery duels in the Dixmude-Ypres district, nothing of
importance happened on the Belgian front.
In the middle of November hard fighting was resumed on the Artois
front in the region of the Labyrinth, north of Arras, and continued
day and night, conducted chiefly with hand grenades. Artillery actions
raged in the Argonne forest, near Soissons, Berry-au-Bac, and on the
Belgian front. German activity in the Arras-Armentieres sector was
regarded as prognosticating a big attack. While the Germans collected
men and munitions at one spot, the French and British, adopting
worrying tactics, suddenly descended and harassed them in another. A
successful little enterprise was carried out by a small party of
British troops during the night of November 16-17, 1915, with a loss
of one man killed and one wounded, just north of the river Douave,
southwest of Messines. They forced an entrance into the German front
trench after bayoneting thirty of the occupants. The party returned
with twelve German prisoners. About November 19-20, 1915, the heavy
artillery of the Allies battered the German trenches west of Ypres,
while their warships were shelling the coast fortifications at
Westende.
Between November 20 and 25, 1915, the British employed their time in
bombarding the German positions in several places, destroying wire
entanglements and parapets. The Germans made but little reply,
contenting themselves with holding tight to their trenches. They were
more active north of Loos, Ploegstreet, and east of Ypres. On the
evening of the 22d the Germans made a heavy bombing attack on a mine
crater held by the British south of the Bethune-La Bassee road, with
apparently inconclusive results. Constant mining operations were
resorted to by both sides, the British exploding one and occupying the
crater on the aforesaid road, and the Germans performing a similar
feat south of Cuinchy, severely damaging some British trenches. They
also exploded mines near Carnoy and Givenchy. A British aeroplane
squadron of twenty-three machines bombarded a German hut encampment at
Achiet le Grand, northeast of Albert. A single German aero ascended to
engage the attackers and deposited sundry bombs in the neighborhood of
Bray. In the Argonne forest artillery activity was more pronounced,
and a German ammunition depot in the Fille Morte region was destroyed.
A big fall of snow somewhat restricted operations in the Vosges,
especially in the region of the Fecht and Thur Rivers. On the Belgian
line a rather violent bombardment occurred in front of St. Heewege. To
the north of Dixmude and the cast of St. Jacques Capelle a retaliatory
fire was kept up for two days. The subjugated Belgians raised a voice
of protest against the German method of raising the war levies imposed
upon the country. They complained that, whereas Belgium had faithfully
carried out her share of the arrangement, the German Government was
indebted to the Belgians a matter of $12,000,000 for supplies that had
not been paid for. Nearly $100,000,000 had been exacted in tribute by
Germany from the occupied provinces of Belgium up to November 10,
1915, since which date the German Governor General had issued orders
for a monthly war tax of 40,000,000 francs ($8,000,000) until further
notice. Calculating that the Belgians in the occupied territory
numbered 6,000,000, this fresh levy meant that every man, woman, and
child would have to pay about $1.35 into the German war treasury every
month. This new levy order issued by Baron von Bissing differed in
some important particulars from the one issued a year previously. No
limit was referred to upon the expiration of which the tax should
cease; in the former order the period of a year was mentioned. Another
new clause was to the effect that the German Administration should
have the right to demand the payment in German money at the customary
rate in Brussels of 80 marks to 100 francs. This device probably aimed
at raising the rate of the mark abroad. That nine Belgian provinces
had hitherto been able regularly to pay these large monthly
installments was due to the fact that the provincial authorities
secured large support from the Societe Generale de Belgique, which
bank expressed its readiness, on certain conditions, to lend money to
the provinces and make payments for them, these transactions, of
course, taking place under the supervision of the German authorities.
On the other hand, the Societe Generale was granted by the Germans the
exclusive right to issue bank notes, which had hitherto been the
privilege of the Belgian National Bank.
The uninterrupted and intense activity along the front with grenades,
mines and heavy guns can be only vaguely described or even understood
from the brief chronicles of the official bulletins. This underground
warfare, to which only dry references are occasionally made, was
carried on steadily by day and by night. The mines, exploding at
irregular intervals along the lines, gave place to singular incidents
which rarely reached the public. Near Arras, in Artois, where sappers
largely displaced infantry, was related the story of two French
sappers, Mauduit and Cadoret, who were both decorated with the
Military Medal. The story of how they won this distinction is worth
repeating:
They had dug their way under and beyond German trenches when the
explosion of a German mine between the lines cut their gallery,
leaving them imprisoned in a space eight feet long. This happened at
ten in the morning. They determined to dig toward the surface and
encouraged each other by singing Breton songs in low tones while they
worked. The air became foul and they were almost suffocated. Their
candles went out and left them to burrow in absolute darkness. After
hours of intense labor the appearance of a glowworm told them that
they were near the surface. Then a fissure of the earth opened and
admitted a welcome draft of fresh air. The miners pushed out into the
clear starlight. Within arm's length they beheld the loophole of a
German trench and could hear German voices. The thought seems not to
have occurred to them to give themselves up, as they could easily have
done. Instead, they drew back and began to dig in another direction,
enduring still longer the distress which they had already undergone so
long without food or drink. After digging another day they came out
in the crater of a mine. The night was again clear and it was
impossible for them to show themselves without being shot by one side
or the other. So they decided to hold out for another night. They lay
inside the crater exposed to shells, bombs, and grenades from both
sides, eating roots and drinking rain water. On the third night
Mauduit crept near the edge of the crater and got near an advance
sentinel, one of those pushed out at night beyond the lines to protect
against surprise. Cadoret, exhausted, lost his balance and fell back
into the crater. Under the German fire Mauduit went back and helped
his companion out. Both crawled along the ground until they fell into
the French trenches.
Attacks by French aeroplanes upon the German lines were the main
features of the day's fighting for November 28, 1915. They damaged the
aviation hangars near Muelhausen, in Alsace, and brought down two
German machines. The Germans exploded a mine in front of the French
works near the Labyrinth, north of Arras, and succeeded in occupying
the crater.
Near the end of November the sleet, snow and winds abated and a dry
frost accompanied by clear skies set in. Immediately a perfect
epidemic of aerial activity broke out. French, German, British, and
Belgian aeroplanes scoured the heavens in all directions, seeking
information and adventure. Even the restless artillery seemed inspired
with still greater energy. German ordnance belched its thunder around
Aveling, Loos, Neuve Chapelle, Armentieres, and Ypres, eliciting
vigorous responses from the opposite sides. Aviators fought in the air
and brought each other crashing to earth in mutilated heaps of flesh,
framework and blazing machinery. No fewer than fifteen of these
engagements were recorded in one day. And yet, despite all the bustle
and excitement, the usually conflicting reports agreed that there was
nothing particular to report. Each sector appeared to be conducting a
local campaign on its own account.
The Switzerland correspondent of the since defunct London "Standard"
quoted, on November 30, 1915, from a remarkable article by Dr. Heinz
Pothoff, a former member of the Reichstag:
"Can any one doubt that the German General Staff will hesitate to
employ extreme measures if Germany is ever on the verge of real
starvation? If necessary, we must expel all the inhabitants from the
territories which our armies have occupied, and drive them into the
enemy's lines; if necessary, we must kill the hundreds of thousands of
prisoners who are now consuming our supplies. That would be frightful,
but would be inevitable if there were no other way of holding out."
On the last day of November a bill was introduced in the French
Chamber of Deputies by General Gallieni calling to the colors for
training the 400,000 youths of the class of 1917, who in the ordinary
course of events would not have been called out for another two years.
The war minister explained that it was not the intention of the
Government to send the new class, composed of boys of 18 and 19, to
the front at once, but to provide for their instruction and training
during the winter for active service in the spring, when, "in concert
with our allies, our reenforcements and our armaments will permit us
to make the decisive effort." The bill was passed.
A British squadron bombarded the German fortifications on the Belgian
coast, from Zeebrugge to Ostend, for two hours on November 30, 1915.
The weather suddenly changed on the entire western front. Rain, mist,
and thaw imposed a check on the operations, which simmered down to
artillery bombardments at isolated points. For the next three months
the combatants settled down to the exciting monotony of a winter
campaign, making themselves as comfortable as possible, strengthening
their positions, keeping a sharp eye on the enemy opposite, and
generally preparing for the spring drive. Great offensive and
concerted movements can only be carried out after long and deliberate
preparations. The Allies had shot their bolt, with only partial
success, and considerable time would have to elapse before another
advance on a big scale could be undertaken. Hence the winter campaign
developed into a series of desultory skirmishes and battles, as either
side found an opportunity to inflict some local damage on the other.
For the Allies it was part of the "war of attrition," or General
Joffre's "nibbling process."
The Germans had gone through a bitter experience in Champagne; with
characteristic skill and energy they set to work improving their
defenses. At intervals of approximately 500 yards behind their second
line they constructed underground strongholds known as "starfish
defenses," which cannot be detected from the surface: About thirty
feet below the ground is a dugout of generous dimensions, in which are
stored machine guns, rifles, and other weapons. Leading from this
underground chamber to the surface are five or six tunnels, jutting
out in different directions, so that their outlets form half a dozen
points in a circle with a diameter of perhaps 100 yards. In each of
the tunnels was laid a narrow-gauge railway to allow the machine guns
to be speedily brought to the surface. At the mouth of the tunnels
were two gun platforms on either side, and the mouth itself was
concealed by being covered over with earth or grass. The defenses were
also mined, and the mines could be exploded from any one of the
various outlets. On several occasions when the French endeavored to
press home their advantage they found themselves enfiladed by machine
guns raised to the surface by troops who had taken up their places in
the underground strongholds at the first menace to the second line.
When one of the outlets was captured, machine guns would appear at
another; while, if the French troops attempted to rush the stronghold,
the Germans took refuge in the other passages, and met them as they
appeared.
On the French and British side also, underground defense works were of
a most scientific and elaborate character. Trench warfare has become
an art. Away from the seat of war the importance of the loss or the
gain of a trench is measured by yards. If you are in trenches on the
plain, where the water is a few feet below the surface, and all the
area has been used as a cockpit, you would wonder how any trench can
be held. If, on the other hand, you were snugly installed in a deep
trench on a chalk slope, you would wonder how any trench can be lost.
Any real picture of what a trench is like cannot be drawn or imagined
by a sensitive people. It is, of course, a graveyard--of Germans and
British and French. Miners and other workers in the soil drive their
tunnel or trench into inconceivable strata. They come upon populous
German dugouts, corked by some explosion perhaps a year ago. They are
stopped far below ground by a layer of barbed wire, proved by its
superior thickness to be German. Every yard they penetrate is what
gardeners call "moved soil." It is of the nature of a fresh mole heap
or ants' nest, so crumbled and worked that all its original
consistency has been undone. A good deal of it doubtless has been
tossed fifty feet in the air on the geyser of a mine or shell
explosion. It is full of little bits of burnt sacking, the debris of
sandbags. Weapons and bits of weapons and pieces of human bodies are
scattered through it like plums. The so-called trench may be no more
than a yoked line of shell holes converted with dainty toil and loss
to a more perpendicular angle. And the tangled pattern of craters is
itself pocked with the smaller dents of bombs. There are three grades
of holes--great mine craters that look like an earth convulsion
themselves, pitted with shell holes, which in turn are dimpled by
bombs. Imagine a place like the Ypres salient, a graveyard maze under
the visitation of 8,000 shells falling from three widely separate
angles, and some slight idea may be formed of nearly two years' life
in the trenches. It is an endless struggle for some geographical
feature: a hill, a mound, a river, or for a barn or a house. At Ypres,
indeed, the German and British lines have passed through different
sides of the same stable at the same time. The competition for a hill
or bluff is such that in many cases, as at Hill 60, the desired spot,
as well as the intervening houses and even woods, have been wiped out
of existence before the rival forces.
On November 2, 1915, the British Premier announced in the House of
Commons that there were then nearly a million British soldiers in
Belgium and France; that Canada had sent 96,000 men to the front, and
that the Germans had not gained any ground in the west since April of
that year. He furthermore stated that the British Government was
resolved to "stick at nothing" in carrying out its determination to
carry the war to a successful conclusion. In addition to the troops
mentioned above, the Australian Commonwealth had contributed 92,000
men to date; New Zealand 25,000; South Africa, after a brilliant
campaign in which the Germans in Southwest Africa were subdued, had
sent 6,500; and Newfoundland, Great Britain's oldest colony, 1,600.
Contingents were also sent from Ceylon, the Fiji Islands, and other
outlying parts of the empire. The premier said that since the
beginning of the war the admiralty had transported 2,500,000 troops,
300,000 sick and wounded, 2,500,000 tons of stores and munitions, and
800,000 horses. The loss of life in the transportation of these troops
was stated to be less than one-tenth of one per cent.
On December 2, 1915, General Joffre was appointed commander in chief
of all the French armies, excepting those in North Africa, including
Morocco, and dependent ministry colonies. The appointment was made on
the recommendation of General Gallieni, the War Minister, who, in a
report to President Poincare, said:
"By the decree of October 28, 1913, the Government, charged with the
vital interests of the country, alone has the right to decide on the
military policy. If the struggle extend to several frontiers, it alone
must decide which is the principal adversary against whom the majority
of the forces shall be directed. It consequently alone controls the
means of action and resources of all kinds, and puts them at the
disposal of the general commander in chief of the different theatres
of operations.
"The experience gained, however, from the present operations, which
are distributed over several fronts, proves that unity of direction,
indispensable to the conduct of the war, can only be assured by the
presence at the head of all of our armies of a single chief,
responsible for the military operations proper."
General Joffre's new appointment possesses a historic interest, for it
created him the first real general in chief since the days of
Napoleon, independent entirely of the national ruler as well as of the
minister for war and any war council.
In the beginning of December, 1915, Field Marshal Sir John French was
relieved at his own instance and appointed to the command of the home
forces. He was given a viscountcy in recognition of his long and
brilliant service in the army.
From the landing of the British Expeditionary Force in France, Sir
John French had commanded it on the Franco-Belgian frontier along a
front that grew from thirty-two miles to nearly seventy in one year,
while the troops under his command had grown in numbers from less than
sixty thousand to well over a million. The son of a naval officer,
John Denton French began his career as a midshipman in the navy, but
gave that up after a three years' trial and joined the army in 1874.
General French was essentially a cavalry commander, and as such he
distinguished himself in the South African War of 1899-1902. His
conduct in the European War has been the subject of some criticism.
The time is not yet ripe to form a just estimate of his achievements
and failures. Nothing succeeds like success, and nothing is easier
than to criticize a military commander who fails to realize the high
expectations of his countrymen. Whatever may be the verdict of history
for or against General French, it will certainly acknowledge that he
did great things with his "contemptible little army." The figure of
Viscount French of Ypres will stand out in bold relief when the inner
history of Mons, the Marne, Neuve Chapelle, Ypres, and Loos is
definitively written. The present generation may not be permitted to
read it, for even to-day, after a hundred years, military experts are
still divided over the mistakes of the great Napoleon.
The command in chief of the British army now devolved upon General Sir
Douglas Haig, who, though a "born aristocrat," had nevertheless taken
his trade of soldiering very seriously. He had served with distinction
in India and South Africa. During the retreat from Mons General Haig
performed marvels of leadership. By skillful maneuvering he extricated
his men at Le Cateau in the most critical moment of the retreat. He
led in the attack on the Aisne, and is also credited with chief
responsibility for the clever movement of the British army from the
Aisne to Ypres. In his dispatch on the battle of Ypres Field Marshal
French highly praised the valuable assistance he had derived from
General Haig. It was said that during the fierce battle of Ypres, "at
one time or another every corps and division commander in the lot
lost hope--except Haig. He was a rock all through."
On December 2, 1915. Mr. Asquith announced in the House of Commons
that Great Britain's total losses in killed, wounded, and missing
since the war began amounted to 510,230.
The figures for the western front were: Killed, 4,620 officers and
69,272 men; wounded, 9,754 officers and 240,283 men; missing, 1,584
officers and 54,446 men; grand total of casualties, 379,959.
CHAPTER XIII
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN
It is well-nigh impossible to give a connected story of the
innumerable and far-flung operations of the winter campaign. It
resolves itself into a mere list of dates and a brief description of
what happened on those dates. At this short distance of time even the
descriptive details are by no means altogether reliable, owing to the
contradictory reports that announced them. During the first week in
December, 1915, the Germans concentrated strong reenforcements and an
immense amount of artillery with the object of striking a blow at the
allied line in Flanders and Artois. In Champagne they captured about
800 feet of an advanced trench near Auberive. The French admitted the
loss, but claimed that they had reoccupied a large part of the ground
originally yielded.
Floods in the Yser region compelled the Germans to abandon many of
their advanced trenches, and two of their ammunition depots were blown
up. Near Berry-au-Bac they destroyed a French trench with its
occupants and blew up some mines that the French had almost completed.
Artillery engagements in Artois became more pronounced, especially
around Givenchy. On the 8th sixteen British aeroplanes bombed a German
stores depot at Miraumont, in the Somme district, and the aerodrome at
Hervilly. The attack was carried out in a high westerly wind, which
made flying difficult. All machines returned safely after inflicting
much damage on both objectives. A British cargo boat having run
aground off the Belgian coast, three German hydroaeroplanes attempted
to sink her with bombs. Several of the allied aeroplanes, one of them
French, set out from the land and drove the German flyers away after
an exciting fight. Deep snow in the Vosges Mountains prevented
operations beyond artillery action.
On December 16, 1915, in the course of his demand in the Chamber of
Deputies that the Chamber grant three months' credit on the budget
account, the French Minister of Finance, M. Ribot, said that while the
war expenditure at the beginning of the conflict was 1,500,000,000
francs ($300,000,000) a month, it had risen to 2,100,000,000 francs
($420,000,000). "At the beginning of hostilities financial
considerations took a secondary place. We did not think the war would
last seventeen months, and now no one can foresee when it will end."
Artillery activity of more than usual intensity at a number of points
marked the 17th, 18th and 19th of December, 1915. To the east of Ypres
French and British batteries bombarded the German trenches from which
suffocating gas was directed toward the British line. No infantry
attacks followed. By December 22, 1915, the French had gained the
summit of Hartmannsweilerkopf, a dominating peak in southern Alsace,
overlooking the roads leading to the Rhine. For eight months they had
fought for the position, and thousands of lives were sacrificed by the
attackers and the defenders. The Germans succeeded in recovering part
of the ground next day. The French took 1,300 prisoners in the
capture, and the Germans claimed 1,553 prisoners in the recapture.
Fighting continued around the spot for months.
Christmas passed with no break in the hostilities and no material
change in the situation on the western front. The year 1915 closed, in
a military sense, less favorably for the Allies than it began. Only a
few square miles had been reconquered in the west at a heavy
sacrifice; Italy had made little progress; the Dardanelles expedition
had proved a failure; the British had not reached Bagdad nor attained
their aim in Greece; while Russia had lost nearly all Galicia, with
Poland and Courland as well, and the Serbian army had been practically
eliminated. On the other hand, the Allies had maintained supremacy on
the seas, had captured all but one of the German colonies, and still
held all German sea-borne trade in a vise of steel. Not one of the
armies of the Allies other than that of Serbia had been struck down;
each of them was hard at work raising new armies and developing the
supply of munitions. The spirit of all the warring peoples, without
exception, appeared to be that of a grim, unbending determination.
Germany, with a large proportion of her able-bodied manhood disposed
of and her trade with the outer world cut off, was perhaps in greater
straits than a superficial examination of her military successes
showed. The care with which the Germans economized their supplies of
men, and made the fullest possible use in the field of men who were
not physically fit for actual military service, was illustrated by the
creation of some new formations called Armierungsbattalionen. These
battalions, of which, it was said, no full description would be
published before the end of the war, consisted of all sorts of men
with slight physical defects, underofficers and noncommissioned
officers who were either too old for service or had been invalided.
Their duty was to relieve the soldiers of as much work as possible.
They were employed in roadmaking and in transporting munitions and
supplies in difficult country--for example, in the Vosges Mountains.
Most of these men--and there were many thousands of them--wore
uniforms, but carried no arms.
It is rather an ironical commentary on "our present advanced state of
culture," as Carlyle put it, that the birthday of the Man of
Sorrows--the period of "peace on earth and good will toward all
men"--was celebrated even amid the raucous crash and murderous turmoil
of the battle field. Preparations had long been in the making for the
event. In the homes of France, Germany, and Great Britain millions and
millions of parcels were carefully packed full of little luxuries,
comforts, tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes, and addressed to some loved
one "at the front." Newspapers collected subscriptions and busy
societies were also formed for the same purpose, so that there was
hardly a single combatant who did not receive some token of
remembrance from home.
On the occasion of the New Year the kaiser addressed the following
order to his army and navy:
"Comrades:--One year of severe fighting has elapsed. Whenever a
superior number of enemies tried to rush our lines they failed before
your loyalty and bravery. Every place where I sent you into battle you
gained glorious victories. Thankfully we remember to-day above all our
brethren who joyfully gave their blood in order to gain security for
our beloved ones at home and imperishable glory for the Fatherland.
What they began we shall accomplish with God's gracious help.
"In impotent madness our enemies from west and east, from north and
south, still strive to deprive us of all that makes life worth living.
The hope of conquering us in fair fighting they have buried long ago.
On the weight of their masses, on the starvation of our entire people,
on the influence of their campaign of calumny, which is as mischievous
as malicious, they believe they can still reckon. Their plans will not
succeed. Their hopes will be miserably disappointed in the presence of
the spirit of determination which imperturbably unites the army and
those at home.
"With a will to do one's duty for the Fatherland to the last breath,
and a determination to secure victory, we enter the new year with God
for the protection of the Fatherland and for Germany's greatness."
About the same time Count Zeppelin delivered a speech at Duesseldorf.
The local newspapers reported him as saying: "Speaking for myself and
expressing the view of your Imperial Master, the war will not last two
years. The next few months will see German arms march rapidly from
triumph to triumph, and the final destruction of our enemies will be
swift and sudden. Our Zeppelin fleets will play an important part in
future operations and will demonstrate more than ever their power as a
factor in modern warfare."
The opening of the year 1916 found Great Britain in the throes of a
momentous controversy over the question of adopting conscription. In
the west the Franco-British armies hugged the belief that their lines
were impregnable to attack. An offensive on the part of the Germans
was certainly expected, but where and when it would materialize none
could foretell, though the French command had a shrewd suspicion. It
was purely a matter of deduction that the Germans, having so far
failed to break a passage through the circle of steel that encompassed
them on the east and the west, would be forced to concentrate their
hopes on an offensive on the western front. They had carefully taken
into consideration the Battle of Champagne. They admitted that the
French had opened a breach in their line, and they would probably
argue that the imperfect results of the operations were due only to
the inability of their enemies to exploit the first advantage that
they had gained. They appear to have decided to copy the French
example, but to apply to it the German touch of thoroughness. The
French, they might argue, fired so many shells on a front of so many
miles and destroyed our trenches; we will fire so many more shells on
a narrower front, so that we can be certain there will be no obstacle
to the advance of our infantry. The French had not enough men to carry
their initial success to its conclusion, consequently we will mass a
very large number of men behind the attack. With this object
undoubtedly in view, the Germans indulged in a succession of feints up
and down the whole frontier, feeling and probing the line at all
points. This procedure cost them thousands of men, but it probably did
not deceive the strategists on the other side. All that remained
indeterminable to the French Staff was the precise date and locality.
A general survey of the front for the first days of January, 1916,
reveals activity all round. In Belgium there was artillery fighting
over the front of the Yser and along the front at Yperlee, and a
similar duel between Germans and Belgians near Mercken. In front of
the British first-line trenches the Germans sprang mines, but did not
trouble to take possession of the craters. The British sprang some
mines near La Poisselu and bombarded the German trenches north of
Fromelles and east of Ypres, the Germans responding vigorously.
The British also attempted a night attack near Frelinghien, northeast
of Armentieres, which failed in its purpose. German troops cracked a
mine at Hulluch and captured a French trench at Hartmannsweilerkopf
with 200 prisoners. The French heavy artillery in Champagne directed a
strong fire against some huts occupied by Germans in the forest of
Malmaison. A German attack with hand grenades in the vicinity of the
Tahure road did little harm. Between the Arve and the Oise artillery
exchanges were in continual progress; between Soissons and Rheims a
series of mine explosions; and in the Vosges the French artillery
roared in the vicinity of Muehlbach. A German long-range gun fired
about ten shots at Nancy and its environments, killing two civilians
and wounding seven others.
In the north, again, we find the German artillery making a big
demonstration on the front east of Ypres and northeast of Loos; the
British destroying the outskirts of Andechy in the region of Roye.
French and Belgian guns batter the Germans stationed to the east of
St. George and shell other groups about Boesinghe and Steenstraete.
South of the Somme the German first-line trenches near Dompierre are
receiving artillery attention, and a supply train south of Chaulnes is
shattered. In Champagne the Tahure skirmish goes on, while in the
Vosges an artillery duel of great intensity rends the air in the
Hirzstein sector.
Along the Yser front the Belgians are shelled in the rear of their
lines, and a German barracks is being bombarded. On the southern part
of the British front bomb attacks are being carried out. With all this
sporadic and disconnected expenditure of life, energy and ammunition
little damage is done, and the losses and gains on either side are
equally unimportant. The Germans are tapping against the wall, looking
for weak spots. By the 5th, however, when General Joffre's New Year's
message appears, in which he tells his armies that the enemy is
weakening, that enemy suddenly grows more active and energetic. German
artillery fire increased in violence throughout Flanders, Artois,
Champagne, and the Vosges. They launched infantry attacks against the
French between Hill 193 and the Butte de Tahure. North of Arras the
French bombarded German troops in the suburbs of Roye; in the Vosges
they shelled German works in the region of Balschwiller, and
demolished some trenches and a munitions depot northwest of Altkirch.
British aeroplanes dropped bombs on the aerodrome at Douai, and a
German aviator dropped a few on Boulogne. The German War Office
statement briefly announced that "fighting with artillery and mines at
several points on the Franco-Belgian front is reported." The next few
days are almost a blank; hardly anything leaks out; but things are
happening all the same.
To the south of Hartmannsweilerkopf, after a series of fruitless
attacks, followed by a severe bombardment, the Germans succeeded in
recovering the trenches which they had lost to the French on December
31, 1915. Besides that, they also captured 20 officers, 1,083
chasseurs, and 15 machine guns. This move compelled the French troops
occupying the summit of Hirzstein to evacuate their position.
Artillery incessantly thundered in Flanders, Champagne, Artois, the
Vosges, and on the British lines at Hulluch and Armentieres. By
January 10, 1916, it looked as though the Germans intended to retrieve
the misfortunes of Champagne. An assault by the kaiser's troops under
General von Einem was made on a five-mile front east of Tahure, with
the center about at Maisons de Champagne Farm, close to the Butte de
Mesnil. At this point the French had held well to the ground won
during the previous September. On the 9th the German artillery opened
fire with great violence, using suffocating shells, and this was
followed by four concentric infantry attacks on that front during the
day and night. The French fire checked the offensive, but at two
points the Germans managed to reach the first French lines. The battle
raged for three days, during which the Germans took a French
observation post, several hundred yards of trenches, 423 prisoners,
seven machine guns, and eight mine throwers. The French counterattack
broke down, though it was claimed that they had recovered the ground.
At Massiges the Germans attacked on almost as large a scale as the
French had done the previous autumn. The German bombardment increased
steadily in intensity, and during the last twelve hours 400,000 shells
were stated to have fallen on the eight-mile front from La Courtine to
the western slopes of the "Hand" of Massiges. The infantry were thrown
forward on the 10th. The first attack was launched on the hill forming
the western finger of Massiges, whence the French fire broke their
ranks and drove them back. Foiled in this direction, the next attack
was delivered against the five-mile front. Some 40,000 men took part
in the charge. But the powerful French "seventy-fives" tore ghastly
lanes in their ranks, and few lived to reach the wire entanglements.
Crawling through the holes made by the bombardment, they captured 300
yards of trenches. A portion of this the French regained. The British
lost four aeroplanes on January 12-13, 1916. Two German aviators
accounted for one each, and the other two were brought down by
gunfire.
The Prussian Prime Minister, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, who is also
Imperial Chancellor, opened the new session of the Prussian Diet on
January 13, 1916. In reading the speech from the throne, he said: "As
our enemies forced the war upon us, they must also bear the guilt of
the responsibility if the nations of Europe continue to inflict wounds
upon one another."
By the 13th the German offensive in Champagne had collapsed.
Operations in the west resumed for the time a normal state of
activity, in which artillery duels were the main features. In the
middle of January the British opened fire on the French town of Lille,
near the Belgian border and inside the German lines. According to
German authority, the damage done was negligible. Little of import
happened till January 23, 1916, when two squadrons of French
aeroplanes, comprising twenty-four machines, bombarded the railway
station and barracks at Metz. They dropped 130 shells. The aeros were
escorted by two protecting squadrons, the pilots of which during the
trip engaged in ten combats with giant Fokkers and aviatiks. The
French machines were severely cannonaded along the whole of their
course, but returned undamaged, except one only, which was obliged to
make a landing southeast of Metz. On the 24th the Germans made another
strong feint, this time in Belgium, that had all the appearance of the
expected attack in force. They began by bombarding the French lines
near Nieuport, but the infantry charge that was to have followed was
smothered in the German trenches, before the men could make a start.
Another German attack north of Arras was held up by French rifle fire.
The chief result of the offensive seems to have been the destruction
of Nieuport cathedral.
Toward the end of January, 1916, activity became more and more
intensified all along the western front in every sector except that in
which the Germans were preparing for the big coup--Verdun. It will be
simpler to review the disconnected operations by following them
separately in the different districts where they occurred. It will be
observed that in practically every case the Germans assumed the
offensive. In Alsace the French batteries exploded a German munitions
depot on the outskirts of Orbey, southeast of Bonhomme. In the region
of Sondernach, south of Muenster, the Germans captured and occupied a
French listening post, from which they were expelled by
counterattacks. On February 13, 1916, they attempted an infantry
attack, which was halted by French artillery fire. The Germans gained
300 feet of trenches on the 14th. The French took the ground back
again, but were unable to hold it. On the 18th the Germans, after the
usual artillery preparation, directed an infantry attack against the
French position to the north of Largitson, where they penetrated into
the trenches and remained there for some hours until a counterattack
expelled them. In Lorraine, constant artillery duels raged in the
sectors of Reillon and the forest of Parroy. In the Argonne, French
mine operations destroyed the German trenches over a short distance
near Hill 285, northeast of La Chalade. On February 12, 1916, the
French shattered some enemy mine works.
Increased artillery firing at many points in Flanders and northern
France first gave the Allies the impression that the Germans were
planning a new offensive on a large scale against their left wing, in
an attempt to blast a passage through to Calais and Dunkirk. By
February 7, 1916, the Allies were thoroughly awake to the possibility
of a big blow impending somewhere in the west. The sweep through
Serbia had released several hundred thousand men for service
elsewhere. For a month the Germans had been hammering and probing at
Loos, Givenchy, Armentieres, and other points with the evident object
of finding a weak spot. Along the Neuville-Givenchy road especially
the Germans made no fewer than twenty-five determined attacks between
the 1st and 17th of February, 1916. Their later attacks developed more
to the north, near Lievin, where heavy trench fighting occurred, with
no important results either way.
At the beginning of February, 1916, the 525-mile battle front in the
west was held on one side by about 1,250,000 Germans--an average of
2,500 to the mile--as against quite 2,000,000 French, about 1,000,000
British, and 50,000 Belgians. But this superiority in numbers on the
allied side was neutralized by the strength of the German defense
works plus artillery. None of the Allies' undertakings had, so far,
been carried out to its logical--or intended--conclusion. Whether this
was due to weakness, infirmity of purpose or lack of coordination,
remains to be told some future day. By the middle of the month it
became apparent, from their expenditure of men and munitions, that the
German General Staff were determined to make up for their past losses
and to recapture at least some of the ground taken from them by the
Allies. It seems hardly credible that all these fierce attacks were
mere feints to withdraw attention from their objective--Verdun. They
had no reason to fear a French offensive in the immediate future. For
one thing the condition of the ground was still too unfavorable. The
French at this stage occupied practically the entire semicircle from
Hill 70 to the town of Thelus, excepting a portion between Givenchy
and Petit Vimy. Hill 140, the predominant feature in the district, was
almost all in French hands. The line between La Folie and the junction
of the Neuville-St. Vaast road covered the Labyrinth, which the
French had won in the summer of 1915, and it was here that the main
force of the German attacks was launched. The French positions on the
heights commanded every other position that the Germans could possibly
take within the semicircle, and naturally gave the former an immense
advantage for their next offensive.
In Artois the Germans exploded several mines on January 26, 1916, in
the neighborhood of the road from La Folie, northeast of Neuville-St.
Vaast, and occupied the craters made. Violent cannonading kept up in
the whole of this sector. By the 28th the Germans had captured three
successive lines of French trenches and held them against eight
counterattacks. After exploding mines the Germans made an attack on
both sides of the road between Vimy and Neuville and stormed French
positions between 500 and 600 yards long. They captured fifty-three
men, a machine gun, and three mine throwers. On the 28th they directed
infantry attacks against various points and gained more trenches.
Following up their advantage the Germans stormed and captured the
village of Frise, on the south bank of the Somme.
While this struggle was in progress, a terrific fight was raging north
of Arras. The real objective of the attack appears to have been an
advance south of Frise in the direction of Dompierre, but this effort
met with little success. The French at once set to work to recover the
only ground that was of any real importance. The troops in the section
opened a series of counterattacks, and in a very short time the French
grenadiers had gained the upper hand again. The capture of Frise
brought the Germans into a cul-de-sac, for their advance was still
barred by the Somme Canal, behind which there lay a deep marsh.
Maneuvers were quite impossible here, hence the village could not
serve as a base for any further operations. The German gains were
nevertheless considerable, for they took about 3,800 yards of trenches
and nearly 1,300 prisoners, including several British. Spirited mine
fighting marked the first three days of February, 1916. In the
neighborhood of the road from Lille the French artillery fire caused
explosions among the German batteries in the region of Vimy. Between
February 8-9, 1916, the German infantry stormed the first-line French
positions over a stretch of more than 800 yards, capturing 100
prisoners and five machine guns. Small sections of these trenches were
retaken and held.
The German report stated that the French "were unable to reconquer any
part of their lost positions." Five German attacks were made on Hill
140 on February 11, 1916, all but one being repulsed by the intense
fire of the French artillery and infantry. Stubborn fighting,
accompanied by heavy losses, raged about the 14th, by which time the
French had regained a few more trenches. The steady underground
advance of the French sappers drove the Germans back upon their last
bastion, commanding the central plain.
The French trenches gradually crept up the slopes of the hill until
the German commander, the Bavarian Crown Prince, realized that the
next assault was likely to be irresistible and to involve the
abandonment of Lille, Lens, Douai, and the entire front at this point.
A mine explosion west of Hill 140 made a crater fifty yards across. A
steeplechase dash across the open from both sides--French and Germans
met in the crater--a fierce struggle for its possession followed, and
the French won the hole. A furious bombardment from a score of
quick-firing mortars hidden behind La Folie Hill battered the earth
out of shape, and when the Germans occupied the terrain where the
French trenches had been, the "seventy-fives" played such havoc among
them that they were forced to relinquish their hold. To the south of
Frise the Germans were preparing an attack, but were prevented from
carrying it out by French and British barrier fires.
On the British front the artillery was hardly less active than in
Artois. On one section, according to a German report, the British
fired 1,700 shrapnel shells, 700 high explosive shells, and about the
same number of bombs within twenty-four hours. On January 27, 1916,
the Germans attempted an infantry attack on a salient northeast of
Loos, but were held back. A British night attack on the German
trenches near Messines, Flanders, was likewise repulsed. In the
morning of February 12, 1916, the Germans broke into the British
trenches near Pilkellen, but were pushed out by bombing parties. There
was much mining activity about Hulluch and north of the Ypres-Comines
Canal. At the latter place some desperate underground fighting
occurred between sappers. On the 14th the Germans were again engaged
in serious operations in the La Bassee region, where they exploded
seven mines on the British front.
By February 15, 1916, the British first-line trenches on a 600 to 800
yards' front fell to the Germans in assaults on the Ypres salient,
carried by a bayonet charge after artillery preparation. Most of the
defenders were killed and forty prisoners taken. The assaults extended
over a front of more than two miles. The trench now captured by the
Germans had frequently changed hands during the past twelve months,
and for that reason was facetiously called "the international trench."
The brunt of the fighting here fell upon the Canadians, who were
withdrawn from the trench owing to the furious bombardment, and
sheltered in the second-line trench. The German infantry consequently
met with no opposition at the former, but when they approached the
latter the Canadians opened a murderous fire with rifles and machine
guns, dropping their enemies in hundreds. A few, however, managed to
reach the trenches, when the Canadians sprang out and charged with
bayonets, rushed the Germans back to and across the first-line
trenches again, which were then reoccupied. It was the Canadian First
Division that had blocked the German path to Calais in the spring of
1915 almost at the same point.
Activity on the west front on the 18th was largely confined to the
Ypres district. British troops attempted to recapture their positions
to the south of Ypres, simultaneously bombarding the German trenches
to the north of the Comines Canal. By February 20, 1916, as a result
of the continuous fighting north of Ypres, the British had lost on the
Yser Canal what the German official report described as a position 350
meters long, and the British statement as "an unimportant advanced
post." The Germans took some prisoners and repelled several day and
night attacks by the British to recover the ground.
In Champagne, uninterrupted artillery actions continued apparently
without much advantage to either side. The German works north of
Souain were particularly visited. On February 5, 1916, the French
bombarded the German works on the plateau of Navarin, wrecking
trenches and blowing up several munition depots. Some reservoirs of
suffocating gas were also demolished, releasing the poisonous fumes,
which the wind blew back across the German lines. On the 13th the
French were able to report a further success northeast of the Butte du
Mesnil, where they took some 300 yards of German trenches. A
counterattack by night was also repulsed, the Germans losing
sixty-five prisoners. They succeeded, though, in penetrating a small
salient of the French line between the road from Navarin and that of
the St. Souplet. They also captured, on the 12th, some sections of
advanced trenches between Tahure and Somme-Py, gaining more than 700
yards of front.
In the Vosges a similar series of local engagements occupied the
combatants. Artillery exchanges played the chief part in the
operations. Three big shells from a German long-range gun fell in the
fortress town of Belfort and its environs on February 8, 1916. The
French replied by bombarding the German cantonments at Stosswier,
northwest of Muenster, Hirtzbach, south of Altkirch, and the military
establishments at Dornach, near Muehlhausen. On the 11th ten more heavy
shells fell about Belfort. North of Wissembach, east of St. Die, a
German infantry charge met with a withering fire and was stopped
before it reached the first line.
While all the fighting just described was in progress, matters were
comparatively on a peace footing in the Argonne Forest. The French and
Germans engaged in mine operations, smashing up inconsiderable pieces
of each other's trenches and mine works. But it was here that affairs
of great historic import, perhaps the mightiest event of the war, were
in the making.
In an interview given to the editor of the "Secolo" of Milan, at the
end of January, 1916, Mr. Lloyd-George, the British Minister of
Munitions, said: "We woke up slowly to it, but I am now perfectly
satisfied with what we are doing. We have now 2,500 factories,
employing 1,500,000 men and 250,000 women. By spring we shall have
turned out an immense amount of munitions. We shall have for the first
time in the war more than the enemy. Our superiority in men and
munitions will be unquestioned, and I think that the war for us is
just beginning. We have 3,000,000 men under arms; by spring we shall
have a million more.... Our victory must be a real and final victory.
You must not think of a deadlock. One must crack the nut before one
gets at the kernel. It may take a long time, but you must hear the
crack. The pressure on the enemy is becoming greater. They are
spreading their frontier temporarily, but becoming weaker in a
military sense. Make no mistake about it; Great Britain is determined
to fight this war to a finish. We may make mistakes, but we do not
give in. It was the obstinacy of Great Britain that wore down Napoleon
after twenty years of warfare. Her allies broke away one by one, but
Great Britain kept on. Our allies on this occasion are just as solid
and determined as we are."
CHAPTER XIV
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN--THE GERMAN ATTACK
Toward the close of 1915 the German General Staff decided on a vast
onslaught on the French front that would so crush and cripple the
fighting forces of France that they would cease to count as an
important factor in the war. A great action was also necessary owing
to the external and internal situation of the German Empire. The time
was ripe for staging a spectacular victory that would astonish the
world, intimidate Greece and Rumania, and stiffen the weakening hold
that Germany had on Turkey and Bulgaria.
The German General Staff knew that Russia was arming several hundred
thousand new troops, that Great Britain had reenforced her armies on
the Continent, that the Allies were amply supplied with guns and
shells, and that in the spring they would undertake an offensive on a
large scale that would go far toward ending the war. In order to
anticipate this threatened onslaught the German staff decided to
strike, hoping to gain a victory before the Allies were entirely
ready.
Having arrived at this decision, the next problem was to select the
battle field, and Verdun was decided upon. At first this choice
created general astonishment, for the capture of Verdun would only
mean the gaining of a certain number of square miles of territory. But
the German staff believed that the capture of the ancient fortress of
Verdun would have a powerful effect on public opinion at home and
abroad. As a military operation they were confident that such a
victory might have a decisive effect on the future of the war. It was
hoped that the French army, already weakened, would receive a crushing
blow from which it could never recover. An intelligent German prisoner
explained the German point of view: "Verdun sticks into our side like
a dagger, though sheathed. With that weapon threatening our vitals,
how can we think of rushing on France elsewhere? If we had done so,
the Verdun dagger might have stabbed us in the back as well as in the
side."
In order to sustain the German people's faith in the Hohenzollern
dynasty there was urgent necessity that the crown prince should gain a
success. The capture of Verdun would reestablish his somewhat
tarnished military reputation and might force an exhausted France to
sue for peace.
The loss of Verdun and its girdle of forts would have made the
situation of the defenders very difficult, they would find it a
serious problem to hold back the German hosts while organizing a new
line of defense from St. Mihiel to Ste. Menehould. Moreover as the
German lines formed a semicircle around the French position at Verdun
an immense number of guns could be massed against a small area.
In the matter of railway facilities the Germans had every advantage.
They possessed fourteen strategic lines, while the French had only one
ordinary double line, which was in easy range of the German guns
south of Vauquois, and a narrow gauge from Verdun to Bar-le-Duc. This
terrible handicap was in time overcome by the French, who brought to
perfection a system of motor transport by road that enabled them at a
moment's notice to bring up men, ammunition, and supplies to the
defense of Verdun.
The French positions around the fortress had not greatly changed since
the closing months of 1914, when the French carried the village of
Brabant and Haumont Wood and occupied the southeast corner of
Consenvoye Wood. Two formidable natural barriers had been secured by
the Germans: Forges Wood on the left, a long crest east and west
confronting the French lines and bisected its full length by a ravine.
Protected from French fire from the south, it afforded an excellent
artillery position, while the trees served as a screen against aerial
observation. The position also commanded a clear view of the French
left at Brabant. To attack Forges Wood it would be necessary to
advance over an open space entirely bare of any natural protection. On
the right of the French positions the Germans occupied a strong post
on a sort of island that overlooked the Woevre plain and having on one
side a steep cliff.
The possession of these two strong positions by the Germans exposed
the French flanks to artillery fire from every direction. It was
impossible that the French line, bent into a salient in front of
Haumont and Caures Wood, could hold out if the Germans massed a great
number of guns against it.
When the struggle in the Verdun sector began the French left was
resting on the centers of Brabant, Consenvoye, Haumont, and Caures
Wood, their first position. The second was marked by a line passing
through Samogneux, Hill 344, and Mormont Farm.
The French center included the Bois de la Ville, Herbebois, and Ornes,
with the woods of Beaumont, La Wavrille, Les Fosses, Le Chaume, and
Les Caurieres as the second position.
[Illustration: The Forts At Verdun.]
The French right included Maucourt, Mogeville, the Haytes-Charrieres
Wood, and Fromezey, with a second position covering Bezonvaux,
Grand-Chena, and Dieppe. Back of these positions the line of forts
was distinguished by the village of Bras, Douaumont, Hardaumont, the
fort of Vaux, La Lauree, and Eix. Between this line of forts and the
second position an intermediate position on the reverse side of the
slope had been begun from Douaumont to Louvemont, on the Poivre and
Talou Hills, but at the time of the opening assault the work had not
made much progress.
The Germans prepared for the offensive with the most exhaustive
labors, and as far as it was humanly possible left nothing to chance.
Roads were made through the woods and up the slopes, firm foundations
were laid down, and the heavy guns were dragged to elevated positions.
As the result of these weeks of herculean toil there were massed
against the selected sector over a thousand guns brought from every
quarter--Serbia, Russia, and the west front. The proportion of heavy
guns was much larger than had ever been employed in preparing attacks
of this kind.
Toward the close of December, 1915, the Germans received strong
reenforcements, the first to arrive being three divisions which had
fought in the campaign against Serbia. From other fronts also they
flowed in, and the two corps which had held the Vauquois-Etain sector
was increased to seven. Some of the finest German troops were included
in these armies, such as the Third Brandenburg Corps and the Fifteenth
Corps. It was evident that the Germans counted on the battle of Verdun
to decide the fighting in France, for just before the offensive began
General Daimling addressed his troops in these words: "In this _last_
offensive against France I hope that the Fifteenth Corps will
distinguish itself as it has ever done by its courage and its
fortitude."
Starting from the north of Varennes the German order of battle on the
day of attack was as follows: On the extreme right were the Seventh
Reserve Corps, comprising the Second Landwehr Division, the Eleventh
Reserve Division (later relieved by the Twenty-second Reserve
Division), and the Twelfth Reserve Division in the order given.
Northeast of Verdun, and facing the French lines, were the Fourteenth
Division and the Seventh Reserve Corps, with the Eleventh Bavarian
Reserve Division in support. To the left of these armies was a central
force, comprising the Eighteenth Corps, the Third Corps, the Fifteenth
Corps, and the Bavarian Ersatz Division in the order named.
It was estimated by a competent French military authority that the
Germans had under arms in this sector up to the 16th of March a grand
total of 440,000 men, of which 320,000 were infantry. When the battle
opened, the Germans were at least three times as strong in numbers as
their opponent.
Before the date fixed for the great offensive the Germans undertook
many local attacks on the French front with a view to deceiving their
antagonists as to their real objective. In Artois, Champagne, and the
Argonne Forest there was some strenuous mine fighting, and at Frise in
Santerre the Germans gained some ground only to lose it a little
later.
A bombarding squadron of Zeppelins which the Germans sent out along
the Verdun front to cut railway communications fared badly. The French
antiaircraft guns brought down a number of Fokkers and a Zeppelin in
flames at Revigny, but the raiders succeeded in cutting the Ste.
Menehould line, leaving only a narrow-gauge road to supply Verdun.
At 4.15 in the morning of February 21, 1916, the great battle began,
the German guns deluging the sector with shells of every caliber that
smashed and tore the French positions and surroundings until the very
face of nature was distorted. French trench shelters vanished and in
Caures Wood and La Ville Wood men were buried in the dugouts or blown
to fragments. Telephone lines having been cut, communication could
only be maintained by runners. News of the great destruction wrought
by the German guns, far from depressing the French fighting units, had
a stimulating effect. The French front lines crumbled away under the
deluge of fire, but their occupants still clung tenaciously to the
debris that remained. The German guns were everywhere, and it was
useless for French aerial observers to indicate any special batteries
for bombardment. The Germans had the greater number of guns and the
heavier, but the French artillery was better served on the whole, and
there was less reckless expenditure of ammunition. As an illustration
of the brilliant work of the French artillery, an eyewitness has
described the defense of a position southeast of Haumont Wood. Here
one battery was divided into flanking guns in three positions--one to
the southeast of Haumont Wood, a second to the south, and a third to
the north of Samogneux. The two other batteries were to the south of
Hill 312; there was also a supporting battery of six 90-mm. guns. In
response to the German attack the French replied with a curtain of
fire, but, unchecked by the fearful loss of life, they began to swarm
in from all sides.
"They reached Caures Wood by the crests between Haumont Wood and
Caures Wood itself, and advanced like a flood on our positions. The
section which attempted to hold them back adjusted its range to their
rate of progress and mowed them down wave after wave. Swept by the
storm of shells, the Germans continued to advance and some succeeded
in making their way around to the rear of the guns. The French by this
time had come to the end of their ammunition, but they did not lose
their head, and, destroying their pieces, retreated, bringing a
wounded sergeant major along with them."
A battery of 90's on the Haumont knoll was forced to stop firing.
Pierrard, an adjutant whose battery had ceased to exist, was
dispatched by the commander to help.
"Pierrard collected his companions and attached himself to the
battery, which opened fire again with tremendous effect. Those guns
were in action under him for forty-eight hours, during which he kept
up constant communication with the group commander, the burden of his
song being an incessant demand for ammunition for this truly epic duel
with the Germans.
"Unfortunately it was impossible to get supplies up. The Germans were
so near that Pierrard and his men used their rifles against them;
then, finding the position untenable, they blew up their guns and
retired." It was during this retreat that the gallant Pierrard was
killed.
The indomitable courage of the French gunners in this great battle is
described in another instance by a French officer who was present:
"A certain battery was being terribly shelled. A 305-mm. shell burst
and killed the captain, the adjutant, a sergeant major and five
gunners. Do you think that the others stopped? Not at all; they took
off their coats and, working in their shirt sleeves, increased their
efforts to intensify the curtain of fire and to avenge their leaders
and comrades."
The defense of Caures Wood by Lieutenant Colonel Driant's chasseurs
was one of the most brilliant and dramatic incidents in the battle of
Verdun. The deluge of German shells had destroyed the deepest French
dugouts, and before noon their stronghold had been smashed in, burying
an officer and fourteen men beneath the debris. The bombardment
continued until the French defenders were left without a single
shelter worthy of the name. When the Germans began to attack Haumont,
their front-line skirmishers, to create confusion, wore caps that
imitated the French, and were also provided with Red Cross brassards.
The attempted deception was soon discovered, and the Germans were
forced to pay heavily for the trick. In spite of great losses the
Germans continued to advance, succeeded in gaining a foothold in the
French first-line trenches, and held on. Throughout the night there
were many counterattacks and constant grenade fighting, but the French
maintained their positions.
On the second day of the assault the Germans resumed their terrific
bombardment. Trenches were obliterated, and portions of the forest
were swept away. About noon a large body of German troops attacked
French positions in Caures Wood, trying to turn their flanks from two
sides, Haumont and La Ville Wood. The French fought with desperate
energy, but the Germans had one gun that raked their chief position,
and the iron ring of the enemy gradually contracted. To attempt to
defend the position longer in the face of such conditions would mean
death or captivity and reluctantly the French commanding officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Driant, gave the order to retire. Driant waited to
see the last of his men through the wood. He was never heard of again.
The retiring column, leaving the shelter of the wood, encountered
heavy machine-gun fire, and, greatly depleted in numbers, finally
gained the first line of the second position at Beaumont.
No attempt was made by the Germans to advance on the Woevre front. In
the territory of Soumazannes, La Ville Wood, and Herbebois the French
firmly maintained the supporting line.
The tactics pursued by the Germans during the first days of the battle
of Verdun were ably considered and not lacking in thoroughness. Their
favorite method was to break into defensive sectors with heavy
artillery, and then completely surround them by barrage fire. After
the destructive work of the guns they sent forward a scouting party of
a dozen or fifteen men to report on the extent of the damage.
Following them came bombers and pioneers, and then a strong body of
infantry. Theoretically, this system had merit, but it did not always
work out as perfectly as the German strategists had planned. Their
artillery fire often failed to win the ground and make it safe for
their infantry to advance and occupy it. The French artillery
endeavored to isolate the attacks, should they succeed in reaching the
French lines, and their fearless infantry by vigorous counterattacks
prevented the Germans from making any important advance.
The fighting for Haumont was continued on February 22, 1916. The
strong resistance the French had offered to the furious attacks of the
German infantry may be called a failure. But they succeeded in holding
back the Germans until their reserves had time to reach the scene and
prepare a new defensive line.
Early in the morning of the 22d the Germans had increased their
bombardment. Shells of the largest caliber fell, uprooting trees and
demolishing houses.
When the Germans attacked Consenvoye Wood with flame projectors and
advanced toward the western edge of Haumont Wood, the French could not
move out of the village, so dense was the curtain of fire around them.
Braving this blasting storm, troops of the Haumont garrison occupied
the half-ruined works on both sides and in front of the place, while
the southern exit was held by some reserves that had reached the
scene.
Haumont and the ravine to the south were flooded with German shells of
the largest caliber. Early in the afternoon they were falling at the
rate of twenty a minute. The French held on undismayed. The village
crumbled into a mass of debris. The principal French defense, a
redoubt of concrete, was smashed, and some eighty men were buried in
the ruins. A number of machine guns were also lost, and the ammunition
dump was destroyed.
About 5 o'clock in the evening a German battalion attacked Haumont,
advancing in three columns. The remnant of French troops manned the
trenches. The few remaining machine guns were brought into action and,
being well served, wrought havoc in the enemy's ranks, but the deadly
advance continued, regardless of the heavy losses incurred.
The French then assembled every survivor in some trenches southeast of
Haumont, and with three machine guns continued the fight. But the
Germans had the advantage of numbers. They penetrated to the center of
the village, and finally surrounded the French battalion headquarters.
After premises were fired by means of flame projectors, the French
colonel and his staff, facing capture or death, were fortunate in
escaping through the German machine-gun barrage without a single
casualty. They had been forced to evacuate Haumont, but their
sustained and splendid defense of the place was one of the bravest
deeds that marked the Homeric struggle at Verdun.
At the close of the day the French still held the greater part of
Herbebois and Wavrille, but La Ville Wood was in the hands of the
enemy. The French line now ran by Hill 240, the Mormont Farm, and the
intermediate position of Samogneux-Brabant. Their defensive works and
trenches having been destroyed or made useless, the French had no
cover. Fighting must now be carried on in the open. Often the French
artillery fired at point-blank range regardless of their own
sacrifices so long as they could mow down the enemy.
[Illustration: Fighting at Verdun up to March 1, 1916.]
Brabant was evacuated by the French during the night of February 22,
1916. At Samogneux, owing to the intensity of the German fire, they
remained on the defensive. Several counterattacks to the east were
carried out which greatly improved the French positions.
In the Wavrille sector the French had succeeded during the night in
connecting their new line with the Herbebois sector, though
incessantly bombarded. Wavrille Wood and Hill 351 must be protected,
for their capture would enable the Germans to sweep the Beaumont-Hill
344 line.
After repeated attacks the Germans captured Wavrille Wood, where they
were kept hemmed in by the French barrage and unable to proceed.
Fighting in the Herbebois sector had raged throughout the day, and
during the night the French were forced to withdraw.
When February 24, 1916, dawned the French line ran by Beaumont, the
northern edge of the Bois des Fosses, and covered La Chaume Wood. The
Germans continued to bombard the Woevre front, but did not attempt to
attack as the French artillery held them to their trenches.
During the day the Germans, who had been hemmed in at Samogneux, after
repeated struggles to debouch from that place, succeeded when night
came in capturing Hill 304.
From the southern edge of Caures Wood the Germans slowly advanced
through the heavily timbered ravines up the slopes of Anglemont Hill.
On the side of Fosses Wood they bombarded French positions all the
morning of February 24, 1916. East of Rappe Wood and to the north of
Wavrille Wood they assembled strong forces. Two French battalions
succeeded in carrying part of the wood, and were then held up by
machine-gun fire. Fosses Wood and Beaumont were deluged by German
shells of every caliber. An infantry attack gave the Germans the
southern edge of Wavrille Wood, where the French clung tenaciously.
Fosses Wood, then Beaumont, were captured, then La Chaume Wood. The
French situation had become serious. At 2.20 in the afternoon a large
force of Germans advanced between Louvemont and Hill 347, and though
the French made desperate efforts to stay the advancing waves, Les
Chambrettes, Beaumont, and Fosses and Caures Woods were occupied by
the enemy.
[Illustration: General Joffre conferring with General Petain near
Verdun, where General Petain's forces meet the assaults of the armies
of the Crown Prince in the battle for the fortress.]
PART IV--THE WAR AT SEA
CHAPTER XV
NAVAL SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR--SUBMARINE
EXPLOITS
Naval events such as the world had never known were believed to be
impending at the beginning of the war's second year. With the land
forces of the belligerents in a fierce deadlock, it seemed that a
decision must come upon the sea. Assuredly the Allies were willing,
and Germany had accomplished things in her shipyards that for sheer
determination and efficiency developed to the last degree, were
comparable to her finest deeds of arms. None doubted that she longed
with a grim hope for such a meeting. Helgoland and the newly enlarged
Kiel Canal were hives where an intensive industry kept every man and
vessel fit. And the navy grew while it waited.
It was not the work of a day, though, nor of a generation, to match
the sea power that Great Britain had spent centuries in building. Try
as she would, strain men, ordnance plants, and shipyards to the
breaking point, Germany could not catch up with her great rival. The
first half of the new year saw no matching of the grand fleets. It did
produce a few gallant combats, and was marked by a melancholy
succession of German submarine attacks on defenseless craft. The
sacrifice of lives among neutrals and the Allies cast a pall upon the
world.
Naval losses up to August 1, 1915, had been considerable on both sides
without crippling any one of the belligerents. No sooner was a
warship sunk than there were two to replace it. Every country engaged
took effective steps to preserve such maritime power as it had, and
Great Britain worked harder than any of the others, for her existence
depended upon it.
The first year of the conflict cost England thirty-two fighting craft,
great and small. France lost thirteen, Russia five, Japan three, a
total of fifty-three. The combined tonnage was 297,178. To
counterbalance this Germany lost sixty-seven war vessels, Turkey five
and Austria four, the seventy-six ships having an aggregate tonnage of
206,100. The difference of 91,078 gross tons in favor of Germany and
her partners in war was offset by the number of fast German cruisers
which fell victims to the Allies, and by the numerical inferiority of
the Central Powers' combined fleets.
On August 1, 1915, the naval situation was identical with that of
August 1, 1914. Great Britain, aided materially by France, and her
other allies, in a lesser degree, stood ready to do battle with the
Teuton sea forces whenever opportunity offered. She had won every
important engagement with the exception of the clash off the coast of
Chile, and could look calmly forward, despite the gnawing of German
submarines at her commerce. With every gun and man primed for the
fight, with the greatest collection of armed vessels ever known lying
at ports, merely awaiting the word, she felt supremely ready.
The lives of 1,550 persons were lost during the first year of the war
through the sinking of merchant ships, nearly all of which were
torpedoed. This applied to vessels of the Allies alone, twenty-two
persons having been lost with neutral ships. The total of tonnage
destroyed between February 18, 1915, when the German edict against
commercial vessels went into effect, and August 1, 1915, was 450,000
tons, including 152 steamships of more than 500 tons each. This was
the heaviest loss ever inflicted on the shipping of the world by any
war. But it did not seriously cripple the commerce of either France or
England, Germany's two major opponents. Their vessels continued to
sail the seven seas, bringing the products of every land to their aid,
while Germany and her allies were effectually cut off from practically
all resources except their own. Switzerland and Sweden were the main
dependence of Germany for contraband, and the activities of the former
were considerably restricted when the Entente Allies really settled
down to a blockade of Germany. Austria and impoverished Turkey had no
friends to draw upon, but must fight their battles alone except for
such assistance as Germany could lend, which did not extend beyond the
actual material of war--guns, shells and bullets.
The submarine was Germany's best weapon. She outmatched the Allies on
land, but in such a small degree that her most brilliant effort could
not win a decisive victory. Meanwhile her opponents grew stronger in
an economic way, while the situation in Germany became more strained.
By issuing a constantly increasing volume of bank notes against an
almost stationary gold reserve she depreciated the value of her mark
at home and abroad. In the face of this tangled situation her
submarines rendered incalculable aid, destroying and menacing allied
commerce. Without them Germany would have been helpless upon the sea,
would have ceased to exist as a maritime power. Her first-line ships
lay securely in their harbors, unable to venture forth and match the
longer-ranged, heavier-gunned vessels of the British, ably
supplemented by the French fleet.
Just how many submarines Germany possessed at the beginning of the war
cannot be stated. The number probably was in the neighborhood of
fifty. That she has lost many of these vessels and built even a larger
number is certain. As the conflict grew older Great Britain in
particular learned a method of combating them. It was estimated that
on August 1, 1915, she had 2,300 small craft specially fitted for
running down submarines. Private yachts, trawlers, power boats,
destroyers, and torpedo boats hunted night and day for the elusive
undersea boats of her enemy. The pleasure and fishing craft which had
been impressed into service were equipped with all sorts of guns, some
of them very old ones, but thoroughly capable of sinking a submarine.
These vessels patrolled the British coast with a zeal that cost
Germany dear. Some authorities believed that up to August 1, 1915,
upward of fifty German submarines had been sunk and more than a dozen
captured. The numbers probably are excessive, but if they had disposed
of even twenty-five undersea boats the effort was a distinct success.
In addition to this means of defense Great Britain embarked upon
another undertaking that truly was gigantic in its extent and the
difficulties imposed. She stretched wire nets for many miles under the
surface of the waters washing her shores. The regular channel routes
were thus guarded. Once within such a net there was no escape for the
submarine. The wire meshes fouled their propellers or became entwined
around the vessels in a way that rendered them helpless. The commander
must either come to the surface and surrender or end the career of
himself and crew beneath the waves. A number of submarines were
brought to the surface with their crews dead by their own hands.
Others were captured, and it is said that about twenty of these
vessels have been commissioned in the British navy.
The hazardous character of the work in which the submarine engaged and
the success of British defensive measures undoubtedly made it
difficult for Germany to man her new undersea craft. Special training
is essential for both crew and officers, and men of particularly
robust constitution are required. There have been reports that men
assigned to the German submarines regarded their selection as a
practical death warrant. Despite the fine courage of German sailors as
evidenced in this war, word filtered through the censorship that it
was becoming difficult for Germany to secure men for her submarines.
But the venturesome spirit of many German submarine commanders knew no
bounds. Previous to the period under consideration at least one
submarine had made its way from a German base to the Dardanelles,
establishing a record for craft of this sort that had seemed
impossible up to that time. During August other submarines made the
same trip without any untoward event. The Allies knew full well that
reenforcements were being sent to the Mediterranean, but seemed unable
to prevent the plan's success. This inability was to result in serious
losses to both the allied navies and their merchant shipping.
The first event during the month of August, 1915, that bore any naval
significance was the sinking of the British destroyer _Lynx_ on August
9, 1915, in the North Sea. She struck a mine and foundered within a
few minutes. Four officers and twenty-two men out of a complement in
the neighborhood of 100 were saved. The vicinity had been swept only a
day or two before for mines and it was believed that a German undersea
boat had strewn new mines which caused the loss.
Another British war vessel was sunk the next day. The auxiliary
cruiser _India_ fell prey to a submarine while entering the roads at
Restfjord, Sweden, on the steamship lane between England and
Archangel, Russia's northernmost port. Eighty of the crew, estimated
at more than 300 men, were saved by Swedish craft. The attack came
without warning and furnished another illustration of the submarine's
deadly effectiveness under certain conditions. The _India_, a
Peninsular and Oriental liner before the war, was well known to many
travelers. Built in 1896, she had a registry of 7,900 tons, and was in
the eastern service for a number of years.
After many months of idleness a clash came in the North Sea on August
12, 1915. The _Ramsay_, a small patrol vessel, met and engaged the
German auxiliary _Meteor_. Although outmatched, the British ship
closed with her foe and kept up the fight for an hour. The cannonade
attracted a flotilla of cruisers, which came up too late to save the
_Ramsay_, but which did succeed in cutting off the _Meteor_.
Four officers and thirty-nine members of the crew were picked up by
the Germans when their antagonist went down and these, together with
the crew of the _Meteor_, took to the German's boats when her
commander saw that escape was impossible. He blew up his ship and by a
combination of pluck, good seamanship, and a favorable fortune managed
to elude the cordon of British cruisers, reaching the German shore
with his prisoners. The total crew of the _Ramsay_ was slightly more
than 100 men.
Two successful attacks in four days on British war vessels, and the
loss of a third by a mine, stirred official circles, and demand was
made in the papers that redoubled precautions be taken. It was
believed that the adventure of the _Meteor_ into hostile waters
heralded further activity by the German fleet, but the days passed
without incident, and the British naval forces settled down to the old
routine of watching and waiting.
While these events were transpiring in the North Sea the British had
not been idle elsewhere. From the beginning of operations in the
Dardanelles attempts had been made to penetrate the Bosphorus and sink
one of the Turk's capital ships. A number of sailing vessels and one
or two transports had been sunk by British submarines in that sea, but
efforts to locate the larger warships of the enemy failed until August
9, 1915. On that day the _Kheyr-ed Din Barbarossa_, a battleship of
9,900 tons and a complement of 600 men, was sent to the bottom. The
attack took place within the Golden Horn, at Constantinople, and the
event spread consternation in the Turkish capital. It was the first
time on record that a hostile warship had penetrated the land-locked
waters of the Ottoman city, so favored by nature that attack had
seemed impossible there.
The _Barbarossa_, although an ancient ship as war vessels are rated,
carried four 12-inch guns and was a formidable fighting craft, having
been overhauled by German engineers about a year before the war
started. Along with the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, which took refuge at
Constantinople on the outbreak of hostilities, and were "sold" to
Turkey, she constituted the Turk's chief naval arm.
News of the feat was received with enthusiasm in England, coming as
the initial achievement of the sort by a British submarine. It helped
salve the wounds to British pride, made by repeated disasters through
the medium of German undersea boats. The event was one of the few
bright episodes from an Ally standpoint in the campaign to capture
Constantinople, and was taken to mean that a new tide had set in for
the attackers. It did serve to clear the Sea of Marmora of Turkish
shipping, and supplies for the beleaguered forces at the tip of
Gallipoli Peninsula were henceforth carried by a single track railway
or transport. It also inspired a healthy respect among the Turks for
enemy submarines.
A few days later, August 16, 1915, another German submarine was to set
a new record. Early in the morning of that day the towns of
Whitehaven, Parton, and Harrington, on the western coast of England,
were aroused in succession by the boom of guns and the falling of
shells in their streets. It was believed for a few frenzied moments
that the German fleet had come. But merely one lone submarine had made
the attack. This was enough to cause considerable alarm, particularly
when it was seen that a gas plant at Whitehaven had caught fire. There
were other fires in the same town and at Harrington, none of which did
much damage.
Once more the undersea boat of the enemy had scored. Not since 1778
had the towns smelled hostile powder. In that year John Paul Jones
surprised the guards at Whitehaven during the night, spiked the guns
of its defenses, and prepared to burn a number of ships at anchor
there. The arrival of reenforcements frustrated this plan and the
American seamen were recalled to their vessels. Whitehaven never
forgot, and now it has a new chapter in its martial record.
The Turks were soon to have their revenge for the loss of the
_Barbarossa_ through the medium of a German submarine which, after
more than a year of war, accomplished one of the cherished plans of
the Germans--the sinking of a British troop ship. On August 17, 1915,
the _Royal Edward_, registering 11,117 tons, was hit and sunk in the
Aegean Sea. There were thirty-two officers and 1,350 troops aboard, in
addition to 220 officers and men of the ship's company. One thousand
were lost.
The blow was a hard one, coming after the efforts of the British navy
to protect the country's fighting men. It emphasized the new activity
by German submarines in the Mediterranean. No one believed for a
moment that Austria had ventured upon such an extensive campaign as
recent events pointed to. In addition to the one German submarine
known to have reached the Dardanelles via Gibraltar, it had been
reported that others were being brought overland to Pola and the parts
assembled there.
A good deal of mystery surrounds an engagement off the west coast of
Jutland on this same August 17th. Berlin announced that a fight began
at 2 o'clock in the afternoon between five German torpedo boats and a
light British cruiser and eight destroyers. It was alleged that the
cruiser and one destroyer foundered, without any loss to the German
force.
The British Admiralty was vague in its report of the encounter, saying
that the British ships were mine-sweepers, of which one failed to
return. Like many other incidents of the war at sea, the real facts
cannot now be established. But there is no doubt that a clash did take
place, and the German report was the more circumstantial.
CHAPTER XVI
THE SINKING OF THE ARABIC--BRITISH SUBMARINE SUCCESSES
While the diplomats were laboring with questions arising from the loss
of the _Lusitania_, at a moment when tension between the United States
and Germany was acute, came the sinking of the _Arabic_, on August 19,
1915, with the death of two Americans and thirty-odd British citizens
out of 391 persons aboard. The attack took place near Fastnet Light,
not far distant from the spot where the _Lusitania_ was sunk. Like the
latter ship the _Arabic_ was struck without warning, two torpedoes
penetrating her side. She was a vessel of 15,801 tons and, although in
service for a number of years, was rated as one of the first-class
Atlantic liners. Previous to the attack she had been chased on several
occasions by undersea craft, but had always managed to elude them.
The outcry that followed this event in the United States gave the
situation as regarded Germany a graver aspect than before. She had
been warned that this country would hold her to strict accountability
for the lives of its citizens. Berlin, asked if a submarine sank the
vessel, followed by immediate disclaimers of any belligerent intent.
It was alleged that a German submarine had been in the act of
attacking another British vessel when the _Arabic_ hove into view and
attempted to ram the submarine. In defense the latter's captain sank
the liner, Berlin explained.
This theory was not in the least acceptable to the United States.
Captain Finch of the _Arabic_ and other persons aboard had seen the
attack on the second ship, and the _Arabic_ attempted to flee but was
overhauled and torpedoed. The facts were attested to by such a number
of persons that there could be little doubt of their correctness. But
despite this and Germany's oft-repeated assurances of respect for
American lives, nothing of a positive character was done by the United
States. Negotiations dragged out to a wearisome length and the
submarines continued to take their almost daily toll from neutrals and
belligerents alike.
The British submarine _E-7_ was sunk by a Turkish land battery in the
Sea of Marmora on September 4, 1915, thirty-two men being lost. She
was the first undersea boat of the Allies to meet that fate in the
Dardanelles operations.
The combination of care and luck that had kept British transports
inviolate for more than a year, which ended with the sinking of the
_Royal Edward_, was to be reversed during the coming months when
German submarines inflicted heavy losses on this class of ships. The
Mediterranean proved to be the grave of several thousand men lost in
this manner. The _Ramazan_, of 3,477 tons, bringing native troops from
India, was torpedoed and sunk on September 19, 1915, in the Aegean Sea.
Out of about 1,000 men on board some 300 were landed at Malta. The
levy which she had aboard consisted of Sikhs and Gurkhas. The sea was
new to these men, drawn from interior provinces, and they had embarked
upon their first voyage with all the misgivings which usually
accompany that experience. The panic among them when the _Ramazan_ was
hit may well be imagined. Hints of it crept into the British press,
but it was said that after a few wild minutes the officers got their
men in hand and all died together with true British fortitude.
One of the few announcements made by Germany concerning lost
submarines was given out on September 27, 1915, whether for diplomatic
reasons or otherwise it would be difficult to say. The _U-27_, it was
said, had not been heard from since August 10, 1915, and was deemed to
have been sunk or captured. Berlin concluded with the observation that
the _U-27_ might have been destroyed after sinking the _Arabic_,
inasmuch as none of her commanders had reported the torpedoing of the
liner up to that date. It was Germany's plea at the time that she knew
nothing officially of the _Arabic's_ loss. The disappearance of the
_U-27_, a new and fast submarine having seventeen knots speed on the
surface, therefore, was a matter of diplomatic importance. The puzzle
never was answered.
For some unexplained reason Great Britain never resorted to submarine
attacks upon German shipping in the Baltic Sea until the fall of 1915.
While her own vessels were being sunk she spared those of her enemy,
either because the navy had not been prepared to undertake an
expedition into the Baltic, or because it had been looked upon as a
small issue in the face of graver problems. This situation was changed
by the German threat against Riga, Russia's important Baltic port,
following the fall of Libau and the progress of German troops in
Courland within cannon range almost of Riga.
It was determined to send a squadron of submarines into the Baltic as
a means of assisting Russia and for the purpose of stopping supplies
being sent to Germany from Sweden. Commanders of the undersea boats
were specifically directed to see that all passengers and crews were
taken off merchant ships before they were sunk. These orders were
carried out in detail, not a single noncombatant having lost his life
as a result of the operations that ensued.
The _E-13_, with several other submarines, was bound for the Baltic
when she ran aground. This was in Danish waters off the island of
Saltholm, between Copenhagen and Malmoe. She struck early in the
morning and all efforts to gain open water failed. At five a. m. a
Danish torpedo boat appeared and informed the commander that
twenty-four hours would be given him to leave the three-mile zone.
Shortly afterward a German destroyer came up and remained close by
until two additional Danish torpedo boats reached the scene. The
German withdrew, but reappeared about nine o'clock, accompanied by a
second destroyer. The three Danish boats were close at hand, but
neither they nor the British crew had an inkling of what was to
follow.
One of the German destroyers hoisted a signal, but this was pulled
down so quickly that the _E-13's_ commander failed to read it. The
German then fired a torpedo at the helpless craft, which struck the
bottom near by without doing any damage. This was followed with a
broadside from every gun that could be brought to bear.
Realizing that escape was impossible the British commander gave orders
to abandon the ship and blow her up. When such of his men as were
still on their feet tumbled over the side, the Germans turned machine
guns and shrapnel upon them. A dozen men were killed or wounded before
a Danish boat of the trio on hand steamed into the line of fire and
stopped the slaughter. Both of the German destroyers retired.
This attack inflamed England from end to end. It was pointed out how
British sailormen so frequently had risked their lives to rescue
Germans in distress, and demand was made for reprisals. No direct
steps were taken toward that end, but the German navy soon was to
suffer losses from the companion boats of the _E-13_, which had
reached the Baltic safely.
Hard on the heels of the _E-13_ incident came formal complaint from
Germany that the British had pushed overboard survivors from a German
submarine sunk by a trawler. Men aboard the transport _Narcosian_ gave
the first news of this affair on reaching New Orleans after a trip
from England. They said that while the _U-27_ was parleying with the
_Narcosian_, preparatory to sinking her, an armed trawler came to
their aid and rammed the _U-27_, which sunk almost at once. Several of
the German sailors swam to the trawler and climbed over her sides.
They were thrown back and drowned, according to the _Narcosian_ crew's
testimony.
Representations upon this subject were made to Washington by the
German authorities, without any expectation that the United States
would take action, but merely to serve as a record and basis for
future action. The German press cried for revenge, and it was not long
until the Government itself talked broadly of similar treatment for
British prisoners. Great Britain suggested that a board of American
naval officers hear evidence in the case and render a decision,
providing that Germany would defend charges of a similar character.
From fighting, the two principal combatants had fallen to quarreling.
Germany refused the challenge and nothing came of the matter.
A large German torpedo boat was run down and cut in two by a German
ferryboat on October 15, 1915, not far from Trelleborg, Sweden. Both
vessels were running with all lights out when the accident took place.
Five men were saved and forty drowned.
The first fruits of the undertaking to clear the Baltic of German
shipping and interfere with the operations against Riga was the
sinking on October 24, 1915, of the _Prinz Adalbert_, an armored
cruiser of 8,858 tons. Of 575 men aboard less than 100 were saved. She
was the first big German warship to be blown up by a torpedo. True,
the _Bluecher_ was so disposed of during the Dogger Bank fight,
mentioned in another volume, but she already had been disabled.
The submarine that ended the _Prinz Adalbert's_ career never was
identified, but she did her work well. Berlin announced that two
torpedoes struck the cruiser, both taking effect, and that she sunk in
a few minutes. The attack was made near Libau, according to the German
statement.
The British cruiser _Argyll_ stranded off the Scottish coast on
October 28, 1915, and broke up a few days later. The mishap occurred
during a storm, and all of her crew were rescued by other vessels. She
was of 10,850 tons burden, and carried a heavy armament. This same day
the _Hythe_, an auxiliary vessel, was sunk in a collision near
Gallipoli Peninsula, with a loss of twenty lives.
Turkish gunners destroyed the French submarine _Turquoise_ in the
Dardanelles on November 1, 1915. Her crew of thirty odd men were
killed or drowned. The incident took place at the narrowest point of
the passage into the Sea of Marmora.
November proved to be a bad month for the kaiser's naval forces.
During the first week the _U-8_ was lost in the North Sea. Berlin
reported that the vessel had stranded. Whether this version was
correct cannot be learned, the British policy of concealing submarine
captures, in order to befog Berlin, cutting off information from that
source.
This month also cost the British several ships. Torpedo boat _No. 96_
collided with another vessel near Gibraltar on November 2, 1915, and
sank before all of her crew could escape, eleven men being drowned.
The fifth of the month witnessed a successful attack by an enemy
submarine upon the armed merchantman _Tara_ of the British navy. She
was a vessel of 6,322 tons and carried from four to five hundred men,
of whom thirty-four lost their lives. The sinking of the _Tara_,
coupled with numerous attacks on merchant ships, proved that the
undersea fleet of Germany in the Mediterranean was becoming
formidable. Then began a painstaking search of the many small islands
off the Greek, Italian, and Turkish coasts for submarine bases.
Several were discovered and destroyed. A number of submarines also
were caught or sunk in the Mediterranean.
The _Undine_, a German cruiser having 2,636 tons registry, and a crew
of 275 men, was torpedoed in the Baltic November 7, 1915. She had been
convoying a fleet of merchant ships coming from Sweden when a British
submarine cut short her days. Nearly all of the crew were lost.
Germany now began to feel the pinch of undersea warfare. Sweden, most
friendly of neutral powers on the European continent, and a source of
endless supplies, was almost isolated from the Baltic side by the half
dozen British submarines in that sea. Unlike the British, the Germans
deemed it better to keep their vessels in port than risk destruction,
even in the face of conditions that approached starvation for the
poor. The string of vessels that had been bringing native Swedish
products to Germany, and others from the United States and elsewhere,
transshipped by the Swedes, were kept idle.
Search for the submarines that imperiled their last water link with
the outside world went zealously on. A number of small, fast patrol
boats and cruisers were assigned to the task. Thus it was that the
_Frauenlob_, a cruiser of 2,672 tons and some 300 men, came within the
range of a British submarine off the Baltic coast of Sweden on
November 7, 1915. She blew up and plunged to the bottom after a single
torpedo had been fired. Practically every man aboard was lost.
As may be well imagined these achievements of her own undersea boats
filled England with pride. It was almost a joy, except for the loss of
life, to see Germany suffer at a business in which she had caused such
distress to others. And the Empire was suffering acutely from the
suspension of connections with Sweden, as evidenced by the greater
haste to run down the elusive submarines that dogged her navy. More
vessels were assigned to the hunt. Every mile of shore line within the
German reach was searched for a possible base and the vessels in the
hunt kept a lookout on all sides for the telltale periscope.
The British lost another destroyer on November 9, 1915, during a storm
in the Mediterranean, a half dozen men being saved. And the Turks
accounted for a submarine on the 13th, when the _E-20_ was sunk by
land fire in the Sea of Marmora. Although Turkish craft had been
compelled to forego trips in those waters they proved to be most
unfriendly for allied submarines. With experience on the part of the
Turks came less respect for the undersea boats, a number of which were
hit by land batteries during the operations there.
Naval operations continued in this way without notable incident until
December 18, 1915. Then the cruiser _Bremen_ joined the other German
war vessels that had been sunk in the Baltic search. She registered
2,672 tons, and had about 300 men aboard. The attack took place near
the Swedish coast, and created such a sensation that the Swedes became
convinced the British had a submarine rendezvous on their shores, and
took a hand in the hunt. No evidence of a base could be found.
By this time German shipping had practically disappeared from the
Baltic and it never reappeared. The British tactics fully served
their purpose in this direction. And the few submarines rendered
effective aid in the defense of Riga, helping the Russians stem what
promised to be a dangerous onslaught. It would not be too much to say
that the arrival of the little fleet of undersea boats was a turning
point in the German drive along the Baltic, which overwhelmed Libau.
The Russian line stiffened before Riga with the aid of the navy and
the submarines. Riga was saved, perhaps Petrograd, which it guarded.
There was a considerable loss of life on December 28, 1915, when the
_Ville de la Ciotat_, a French channel steamer, became the mark of a
torpedo. Seventy-nine of her passengers and crew were drowned, the
survivors suffering severely from bad weather in open boats before
they reached land. A number of them afterward died of pneumonia.
The final tragedy of the year at sea took place on December 30, 1915,
shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon at a point 300 miles
northwest of Alexandria, Egypt, where the Peninsular and Oriental
liner _Persia_ was torpedoed. Like so many ships that had gone before
she sank immediately. Out of 241 passengers aboard only fifty-nine
were saved, while ninety-four men in a crew of 159 reached shore. This
aroused some criticism, but there was no evidence to show that the
crew had taken advantage of those intrusted to their protection.
No one saw the submarine that sank the _Persia_. She undoubtedly was
torpedoed, as it was scarcely reasonable that a stray mine had floated
to such an unfrequented spot. One American citizen, Robert Ney
McNeely, appointed consul to Aden, Egypt, lost his life. He was en
route to his post at the time and the United States Government found
itself facing another serious situation. Here was an American
official, bound on official business, killed by a friendly nation.
There the problem became more complex. It could not be proved to whom
the submarine belonged that attacked the ship; it could not even be
shown that she had been torpedoed. Germany flatly denied any hand in
the affair and Austria, after delay for reports from her submarines
commanders, likewise disclaimed responsibility. Official Washington
turned inquiring eyes upon Turkey. There were hints in the German
press that a Turkish boat torpedoed the vessel. Both Germany and
Austria had pledged themselves to respect the lives of noncombatants,
but Turkey, having never sank a passenger ship, was bound by no such
pledge. It even was hinted that Bulgaria might be the nation to blame.
She had entered hostilities on the side of the Teutonic Powers, and
was said to have at least one or two submarines.
Amid this welter of excuses, explanations and possibilities the United
States Government floundered for several weeks. Then it gave up the
problem and ruled that Mr. McNeely should have asked for a warship if
he wanted to reach Aden and there was no other way to go. The _Persia_
had several 4.7-inch guns aboard, which compromised her in the view of
Washington.
According to the British Admiralty thirty-nine unarmed steamships and
one trawler flying the Union Jack were sunk without warning by
submarines up to the end of 1915. Thirteen neutral steamships and one
sailing vessel were listed under the same heading. Of these, the
_Gulflight_ and _Nebraskan_ were American. The Norwegians lost four
steamships and the sailing craft, the Swedes four, the Danes one, the
Greeks one, and the Portuguese one. It was stated that several vessels
believed to have been sunk by submarines, where proof was lacking, had
not been taken into account.
Although this compilation included the _Lusitania_, the _Arabic_, and
other big vessels on which many lives were lost, the list seems of
small consequence in view of later raids upon allied and neutral
shipping by the German undersea boats. It was destined to reach an
ominous length in the succeeding months.
CHAPTER XVII
CRUISE OF THE MOEWE--LOSS OF BRITISH BATTLESHIPS
The cruise of the _Moewe_ stands out as one of the heroic, almost
Homeric achievements of the war. She left Bremerhaven on December 20,
1915, according to one of her officers who afterward reached the
United States, and calmly threaded her way through the meshes of the
British navy's North Sea net. After leaving the shelter of home
waters, with the Swedish colors painted on her hull, the _Moewe_
boldly turned her nose down the Channel. She answered the signals of
several British cruisers and on one occasion at least was saluted in
turn. Having a powerful wireless apparatus aboard, her commander,
Count zu Dohna-Schlobitten, a captain-lieutenant in the Imperial navy,
was able to keep up with the movements of British patrol vessels.
Several intercepted messages told of a strange white liner that
refused to answer questions. This was the _Moewe_, and before passing
into the Atlantic she had changed her coat to black. She was sighted
by probably a dozen British warships before reaching the North
Atlantic. By refusing to heed the signals of distant vessels, which
she had a good chance of outdistancing in a race, and showing every
courtesy to those close at hand, the raider made her escape.
The _Moewe_ had about three hundred men aboard. They were a picked
crew, and her commander a man of daring. Within a period of less than
three months he sunk fifteen merchant ships, captured the _Appam_ and
sent her to Norfolk, Va., then returned home with 199 prisoners and
$250,000 in gold bars. And he may have been responsible for the loss
of the British battleship _King Edward VII_, of 16,500 tons, which
struck a mine in the North Sea on January 9, 1916. It is certain that
the _Moewe_ left a chain of mines behind her on the outward voyage,
some of which undoubtedly caused loss to allied shipping.
Once past the British Channel fleet, the _Moewe_ struck for the
steamship lane off the Moroccan, Spanish, and Portuguese coasts. There
she was comparatively safe from pursuit, and so skillfully were her
operations carried on that it was many weeks before the fact became
known that a raider actually was abroad. But one by one overdue
steamships failed to reach their ports and suspicion grew. Either the
_Karlsruhe_ had returned to life as a plague upon allied shipping, an
able successor appeared, or a flotilla of giant submarines was at
large that could cruise almost any distance. Several vessels brought
tales to England of being chased by a phantom ship near the African
coast. But such stories had been repeated so many times without any
foundation that the British admiralty was in a quandary. To overlook
no clue, a flotilla of cruisers swept the seas under suspicion. They
came back empty handed.
At dawn, February 1, 1916, a big steamship passed into Hampton Roads,
disregarding pilots and the signals of other craft. She hove to at an
isolated spot and waited for daylight. When the skies cleared the
German naval flag was seen floating at her prow. Newport News could
scarce believe the report. Then the city remembered the
_Kronprinzessin Cecile_ and the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, both of
which had stolen in under cover of night from a raiding career.
But this was no raider. It was the _Appam_, a raider's victim. She had
sailed across the Atlantic from a point on the South African route,
held prisoner thirty-three days by a prize crew of twenty-two men and
one officer, Lieutenant Hans Berg, of the Imperial German Naval
Reserve. Aboard the _Appam_ were 156 officers and men, 116 of her own
passengers, 138 survivors of destroyed vessels, and twenty Germans who
had been en route to a prison camp in England when rescued. This large
company was cowed by the lieutenant's threat to shoot the first man
who made a hostile move, or to blow up the vessel with bombs if he saw
defeat was certain. And, like a good stage director, he pointed
significantly to rifles, bayonets, and bombs.
There were several notables among the prisoners, including Sir Edward
Merewether, Governor of Sierra Leone, and his wife. They were
homeward bound from his African post for a vacation when the _Moewe_
took the _Appam_. All of the persons aboard, save the Germans, were
released and the ship interned. Then followed a long wrangle as to the
status of the vessel, Germany claiming the right of asylum for a prize
by the terms of an old Prussian treaty with the United States. Great
Britain protested this claim and demanded that the ship be released.
Without actually affirming one or denying the other, the United States
allowed the _Appam_ to remain in German hands, enjoying the same
privileges as other interned ships.
The _Appam_ was a rich prize indeed. Having a registry of 7,781 tons,
she was a modern vessel throughout, having been employed for several
years in the trade between South Africa and England. She was worth
$1,000,000 stripped, while her cargo sold for $700,000. The $250,000
in gold bars which subsequently went into the Berlin strong box also
came from the _Appam_--a round $2,000,000. Altogether it was a very
good day's work for the _Moewe_.
Not till the _Appam_ arrived in the Virginia harbor was it positively
known that a raider had eluded the allied navies. The search that
followed was conducted on a broader scale and with more minute care
than any similar hunt of the war, but to no avail. On February 20,
1916, the _Westburn_, a British vessel of 3,300 tons, put into Santa
Cruz de Teneriffe, a Spanish port. She, too, had a German captor
aboard. One officer and six men brought in 206 prisoners from one
Belgian and six British ships. Having landed all of those on board the
German lieutenant in command asked for permission to anchor at a
different point, and, this being granted, steamed beyond the
three-mile limit, where the _Westburn_ was blown up. Long use of sea
water in her boilers caused the explosion, her commander said. He was
arrested along with his half dozen men, then paroled. It was the
fortune of war. Once more the Germans had won, the British lost.
Again word was passed that the _Moewe_ must be found. The British
public took her feats much to heart. They rivaled the finest
accomplishments of British sailormen in the days when privateers went
forth to destroy French commerce. But the _Moewe_ never was caught. On
the morning of March 5, 1916, she put into Wilhelmshaven with 4
officers, 29 marines and sailors, and 165 men of enemy crews as her
prisoners. And the gold bars were secure in the captain's safe.
Immediately a fervor of enthusiasm ran through Germany. The _Moewe_
was back after a trip of many thousand miles, with prisoners and
bullion aboard. She had sunk fifteen allied vessels--thirteen British,
one Belgian, and one French--with an aggregate tonnage of nearly
60,000. This had been accomplished in the face of her enemies'
combined sea power. The _Moewe_ first sailed through the blockade and
then came home again by the long way round. She skirted the whole of
Iceland to reach Wilhelmshaven safely, making a perilous voyage into
Arctic waters at the worst season of the year. All this and more the
German papers recounted with pardonable pride. It was said that
Germany had flung the gauntlet in the British face and escaped
unscathed.
Count zu Dohna-Schlobitten had the honor paid him of a visit from the
kaiser aboard his ship, where he received the Iron Cross. Wilhelm was
much pleased, as may be imagined, and the example of the count was
held up to the German navy as an illustration of what daring could
achieve.
The _Moewe's_ exploits evidently were part of a concerted plan.
Whether the raider actually sunk all of the vessels accredited to her
is a question that probably never will be answered. The evidence tends
to show that it was Germany's aim to create a fleet of auxiliaries in
the mid-Atlantic. It seems likely that the naval board in Berlin
conceived the idea of having a number of their interned vessels break
for the sea on a stated day and meet at a common rendezvous, or
undertake raiding upon their own account.
Whatever the plan, it was carried out in part. Two German liners
escaped from South American ports on February 12, 1916, and never were
heard from again, so far as the records go. They were the _Bahrenfeld_
and the _Turpin_. As the identity of the _Moewe_ already had been
established and allied warships were scouring the seven seas for her,
it appears plausible that the _Bahrenfeld_ and _Turpin_ both assumed
the same title, and that one or other of the vessels was taken to be
the original _Moewe_ by persons on ships which they sunk. Or one or
both may have been run down and the fact kept secret.
The _Bahrenfeld_ and _Turpin_ commanders were wily men. They told the
authorities at Buenos Aires, where the first named had sought asylum,
and Puenta Arenas, Chile, where the second was interned, that the
machinery of their ships was suffering from disuse, and requested
permission for a day's run in the neighboring waters that the engines
might have exercise. This was granted, and they quietly put to sea.
That was the last seen of them by the South American folk. But the
port officials at Rio de Janeiro were suspicious when the _Asuncion_
tried the same ruse. As she began to edge beyond bounds a shot across
her bow cut short the plan.
Both the _Bahrenfeld_ and the _Turpin_ were built in England, the
former having a registry of 2,357 tons, and the latter 3,301 tons.
The first day of the new year was marked by the explosion of the
British armored cruiser _Natal_ in an east-coast port. Three hundred
men of a crew numbering 700 were killed, the others escaping because
they had shore leave. Not a man on board lived to tell how the
explosion came. It was one of a mysterious chain that had shaken even
British nerves in the early days of the war when a half dozen warcraft
were blown up in home ports. The explosions were, in every instance,
extremely violent, literally blowing the vessels to bits. Several of
them were affirmed to have been accidental by the British admiralty,
which rendered that verdict upon the _Natal_, but these official
explanations never were convincing.
The _Natal_, a vessel of 3,600 tons, had but recently returned from
sea service and was in good condition throughout. The explosion that
rent her apart came in the quiet of the evening when the men either
were sleeping or preparing for supper. Suddenly there was a crash, and
the _Natal_ was no more. Such of her hull and superstructure as had
not been scattered in every direction sank beneath the surface of the
water.
Just nine days later the _King Edward VII_, a pre-dreadnought of
16,500 tons, collided with a mine in the North Sea and soon foundered.
She was a second-line ship of heavy battery and carried a crew of 777
men, all of whom were taken off before the big craft sunk. This was
one of the few instances in which there was no loss of life from mine
or torpedo explosions. The accident occurred at a time when the _King
Edward VII_ was accompanied by a number of other vessels, or most of
the men aboard probably would have been drowned. On a warship, even
more than a passenger vessel, it is impossible to carry enough boats
for all. The price of defeat in a naval action inevitably is death.
For this reason there was general thanksgiving in England that the
crew of the battleship had been saved, even though the ship was lost.
During the month of January, 1916, three British sailing vessels and
ten steamships were sunk by enemy warships, with a respective tonnage
of 153 and 31,481. Four hundred and ten lives were lost. Three
steamships struck mines and foundered in the same month, having a
tonnage of 3,357. Two persons died in the trio of accidents.
The _Amiral Charner_, an old but serviceable French armored cruiser of
4,680 tons, was torpedoed in the Mediterranean near Syria on February
8, 1916. She went down within a few minutes, although about a hundred
men managed to reach the lifeboats and rafts. The weather was bitterly
cold, and only one survivor lived to bring the news. He was picked up
on a raft with fourteen dead companions and told an incoherent story
that bore little relation to the truth. But it was only too easy to
guess what had happened.
During the early period of the war the French navy escaped the heavy
blows that fell upon the British, partly because Germany concentrated
on her larger antagonist's navy, and partly due to the fact that the
British ships were nearly all engaged in the Atlantic, while the
French confined themselves more especially to the Mediterranean. With
the opening of operations at the Dardanelles and the coming of German
submarines the losses of the French sea forces began to grow rapidly.
But they held the Mediterranean against all attacks.
The _Arethusa_, which torpedoed the _Bluecher_ after she had been put
out of action by the _Lion_ in that famous fight, collided with a mine
near the east coast of England on February 14, 1916. She went down
with a loss of ten men, neighboring vessels doing notable rescue work.
The _Arethusa_ was a cruiser of 3,600 tons and had taken an active
part in all of the work that fell to the British fleet. She was one of
the pet ships of the navy, having a reputation for speed and luck that
made her name familiar to readers the world over. A half dozen brushes
with the enemy had found her well up in the fighting line, and she was
said by sailormen to have a charmed existence, never having been hit.
But she sunk quickly after striking the mine. The passing of so
gallant a ship was one of the chief developments of the month in its
naval history.
The Peninsular and Oriental liner _Maloja_ was blown up in the Channel
on February 28, 1916, supposedly by a mine. The loss of life was
large, 147 persons being drowned.
CHAPTER XVIII
CONTINUATION OF WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING--ITALIAN AND RUSSIAN NAVAL
MOVEMENTS--SINKING OF LA PROVENCE
Throughout the months of January and February, 1916 while negotiations
between Germany and the United States were in a critical stage, the
submarine war on merchant shipping continued with little abatement.
Seeing that her armies could thwart the Allies' offensive efforts, but
were unable to crush any one of the larger powers, Germany turned
longing eyes to the sea. There was much talk of risking a major
engagement. The kaiser's naval advisers worked feverishly with figures
and plans. An echo of this scarce suppressed excitement crept into the
German press, and was duly noted in London and Paris.
One of the principal German journals came out with a frank discussion
of the elements involved and the chances of success. It was said that
three possibilities lay open. The first contemplated an attack upon
the Allies' flank in Flanders, made from the sea, to coordinate with a
drive on land. Another section of the fleet would try to hold off the
British until the action was over or, failing that, combine forces
with the first squadron and stake the Empire's fortune on the result
of a general battle.
The second plan provided for a dash to sea with the purpose of running
the blockade and effecting a junction with the Austrians in the
Mediterranean, to be followed by an attack upon the Suez Canal. A land
attack was to take place at the same time. The third scheme called for
minor raids on exposed points by the two fleets and relentless
submarine activities.
This estimate was not far short of the actual plans before the German
naval authorities. Their realization of the pressing need for action,
the tightening blockade, and the desperate possibilities of defeat,
made them a trifle unwary. News was flashed abroad many times that
revealed this state of mind. For instance, on February 20, 1916, it
was announced that cooperative action at sea had been settled upon in
accord with the proposals of Archduke Charles Stephen and Prince Henry
of Prussia, the kaiser's brother. Such information, whether genuine or
not, could only make the Allies redouble their watch.
Early in February, 1916, it was established that 70,000 naval
reservists had been gathered at Kiel and Helgoland ready for duty on
auxiliary vessels and cruisers of newly-formed squadrons. Many facts
that pointed to Germany's resolution in the face of odds never reached
America. The Ally censors kept Germany's secret well. But the whole
world expected that a big engagement would be fought any day. The
intervening hours, almost the minutes, might be counted.
[Illustration: Kiel Canal.]
Then Germany changed her mind. She gave notice that after March 1,
1916, a new submarine campaign would be launched. Certain concessions
were granted to the demands of the United States, but it was proposed
to consider many vessels as warcraft that other nations regarded as
merchant ships. It was agreed that warning should be given passenger
vessels unless they made an offensive move. This broad ruling gave
Germany a free hand, at least from her own standpoint.
The new campaign was widely advertised, a succession of brusque
threats and veiled insinuations leading up to a fine climax of
publicity. The tactics were those of diplomacy and the drama, with the
world for an audience.
But the campaign failed to accomplish what had been claimed for it.
The number of vessels lost did not materially increase, nor did allied
shipping halt. No matter what efforts Germany has made the ports of
her enemies never have closed--have in reality been far busier than
before the war. And the British navy's nets and traps, and her
thousands of patrol boats made the submarine commanders' task ever
more difficult. Within a few weeks after the latest German policy was
in effect the Allies could again breathe easy. Casualties at sea
continued, but there was no general destruction as had been promised.
The principal achievement of Italy's navy in the war has been the
protection of her coast line. Indisputably she has dominated the
Adriatic, bottling up the Austrian fleet at Pola. Not a single
engagement, worthy the name, has been fought in that narrow strip of
water, only forty-five miles wide at its southern extremity, ninety at
the northern end and 110 at the widest point. Across this limited
space Italy has transported about 200,000 troops, with the loss of but
two transports, the _Mari Chiaro_ and the _Umberto_, both of which
were small. A good part of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies were
carried to places where they might recuperate, and a considerable
force of her own troops landed on the coast of Albania. This was
accomplished in defiance of Austria's numerous submarines, which never
have achieved anything like the success of the German undersea craft.
After Italy's entrance into the war Austrian squadrons of light
cruisers and destroyers shelled several coast cities. But these
attacks soon ceased and all of the 500 miles of Italy's Adriatic
shore, dented as it is with small harbors and flanked by many islands,
has been strangely immune from enemy depredations. This is a tribute
to the Italian navy that cannot be easily explained. The Italian
censorship, stricter than that of any other belligerent power, has let
through almost nothing about her naval activities. The Austrians
simply have refused to fight, preferring to keep their warcraft safe
in the harbor at Pola rather than risk the fortune of battle.
During the period under review in this volume the Italians lay and
waited for their foe as they had done for weary months. Nothing
happened. A few merchant ships, sailing vessels for the most part,
were torpedoed, but there was no attempt by the Austrians to sink
enemy warships. Italy kept up her vigil and the Austrians dozed in
their strong harbor at Pola.
When Bulgaria cast her lot with Germany the Russian Black Sea fleet
shelled Dedeagatch and other Bulgarian coast cities, damaging
fortifications, destroying shipping in the harbors and causing a few
casualties among troops and citizens. These demonstrations were taken
to herald a landing of soldiers on the Bulgar coast, but this expected
event never developed. Russia, having abundant troubles in other
quarters, has been in no position to undertake an invasion of her
newest foe's territory.
While allied vessels were pounding the forts at the Dardanelles it was
reported several times that the Russians would cooperate in a grand
assault, endeavoring to reduce the Black Sea defenses of the Ottoman
capital. The fortifications there were shelled a few times and various
cities on the Asiatic shore of the Turks have been bombarded. But all
of this work was desultory, having no special purpose and
accomplishing little. Turkish shipping was driven from the Black Sea
in the early days of the war, although a few transports and supply
vessels have made the hazardous trip to Trebizond and other Turkish
ports. The Russian fleet has taken heavy toll among such craft and to
all purposes pinned the Turk to his side of the sea, while enjoying
all of its privileges.
The successful operations of the Russian Caucasian army in the first
months of 1916 and the movement down the Black Sea coast was aided by
the fleet, which brought supplies across the sea to newly won points
and prepared the way for an attack upon Trebizond. That city is of
considerable importance, being a military base and having a number of
industries. It was a busy port before the war began and would be a
valuable rallying point for future operations against Constantinople.
All signs indicated a Russian offensive with Trebizond as its
immediate objective. The harbor's fortifications already had been
damaged by the Russian fire, and the fleet undoubtedly could cooperate
in any attack upon the city.
The Turkish navy, like the Austrian, kept to home waters. Scarcely a
month passed that engagements were not reported between the _Goeben_
and _Breslau_ with vessels of the enemy. Many of these were
circumstantial, one of which recounted a long range fight between the
_Goeben_ and Russian warships, in which the _Goeben_ was said to have
been severely damaged. According to subsequent reports a great hole in
her hull was patched with cement, armor plate being unavailable in
Constantinople.
Losses inflicted upon British shipping up to the end of February,
1916, were slightly under 4 per cent of the vessels flying the British
flag, and a shade more than 6 per cent in point of tonnage. The loss
of the other Allies, on a basis of tonnage, was as follows: France, 7
per cent; Russia, 5 per cent; and Italy, 4-1/2 per cent.
How heavy the hand of war has fallen upon neutrals may be judged from
a comparison of sea casualties. Italy lost twenty-one steamers with a
gross tonnage of 70,000 in the period before the reader, while Norway,
a neutral, lost fifty steamers having an aggregate tonnage of 96,000,
more than 25 per cent larger. Total allied shipping losses numbered
481 steamships having a tonnage of 1,621,000, and fifty-seven sailing
vessels, with a tonnage of 47,000. One hundred and forty-six neutral
craft were sunk, whose tonnage reached 293,375, while sailing vessels
to the number of forty-two, with a tonnage of 24,001, were lost.
Germany's methods cost innocent bystanders among the nations almost
one-fifth of the damage done to her foes' commercial fleets.
Inclusive of trawlers, 980 merchant craft had been sunk by the end of
February, of which 726 were vessels of good size. It was destruction
upon a scale never seen before, an economic pressure that made former
wars seem mere tournaments. And Germany's most desperate attempts
failed to accomplish her end--the halting of allied commerce. Although
it was mathematically certain that a percentage of the ships sailing
every day would be torpedoed, the world's trade went on in the usual
channels.
There was a brighter side to the situation. "After more than a year of
war," says a British admiralty statement, "the steam shipping of Great
Britain increased eighty-eight vessels and 344,000 tons. France at the
end of 1915 was only short nine steamers and 12,500 tons of the
previous year's total. Italy and Russia both show an increase in
tonnage.
"It is therefore clear that the shortage of tonnage is due not to the
action of submarines, but to the great requirements of the military
and naval forces. The latest published statement of these show that
they are demanding 3,100 vessels."
Another turn was given to the controversy over sea laws during the
first quarter of 1916 by the arming of many British and a considerable
proportion of Italian passenger vessels. Earlier in the war a few
British ships came into New York harbor with guns aboard, but they
were forced to abandon the plan because of American protests. The
second attempt was different and so were the circumstances. Germany
had shown a disregard for the helplessness of passenger craft that did
not permit of forcible objection to the adoption of defensive methods
by such vessels. The Italians, in particular, displayed a resolute
spirit. Diplomatic hints had no weight at Rome and one after another
the Italian liners came into New York with trim three-inch pieces fore
and aft. They had a most suggestive look and were manned by crews
trained in the navy. Not since the days of open piracy had armed
merchant ships been seen in American waters. Their presence recalled
the time when every ship that sailed was prepared to fight or run as
necessity might dictate.
Germany flatly refused to consider merchantmen with guns aboard as
anything but warships, and gave notice that she would sink them
without warning. Once more the relations of Germany and the United
States reached a point that bordered on an open break. Although this
never quite happened, the United States temporizing and the kaiser's
agents granting just enough to prevent a rupture, the situation was
exceedingly delicate. American contentions ultimately were met by the
promise that armed craft would not be attacked unless they made an
offensive move. This left things as they had been before. There was no
world court to decide what an offensive move meant, nor to enforce a
decision.
The White Star line announced in the closing week of February, 1916,
that passenger service between the United States and England would be
discontinued until further notice. This meant that all of the
company's ships had been requisitioned for the carrying of munitions.
It betokened a more intensive preparation for the prosecution of the
war by England and her Allies. It also pointed to the swelling tide of
supplies flowing from America.
France was to sustain the supreme affliction of the war at sea on
February 26, 1916. _La Provence_ was sunk that day. She had sailed
from Marseilles with 3,500 soldiers and a crew of 500 men, bound for
Saloniki. A torpedo sent her to the bottom, along with 3,300 of those
on board, representing the greatest tragedy of the sea in history. The
attack took place in the Mediterranean and the big liner plunged
beneath the waves in less than fifteen minutes after she had been
struck.
Few vessels enjoyed such fame as the _La Provence_. Built in 1905, she
broke the transatlantic record on her first trip across, defeating the
new _Deutschland_ of the Hamburg-American line in a spectacular dash
that brought her from Havre to New York hours ahead of the best
previous record. With a registry of 19,000 tons and engines generating
30,000 horsepower she was a ship of exceptional grace. Not until the
_Lusitania_ came into service did the _La Provence_ surrender her
distinction of being the fastest vessel afloat, and strangely enough
both she and the _Lusitania_ were to fall victims of German
submarines.
When the torpedo that cost so many lives exploded within the hull of
the _La Provence_, killing a good part of the engineroom crew, it was
seen that only a few of her large company could escape. Lifeboats,
rafts, and the makeshift straws to safety that could be seized upon in
emergency accommodated a bare 700 and odd men. The troops gathered on
the upper decks and sang the "Marseillaise" as the great hull settled
in the water. Officers embraced their men, some indulged in a last
whiff of tobacco, others prayed for the folks at home. Commandant
Vesco stood on the bridge and directed the launching of the few boats
that got away. Then, as the vessel came even with the waves, he tossed
his cap overboard and cried: "Adieu, my boys." As one man they
answered:
"Vive la France."
PART V--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT
CHAPTER XIX
SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS
After the last days of that fateful July, 1914, had passed, bringing
mobilization in Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Russia, and the outbreak
of war between the former two countries, the dance of death was on. On
August 1, 1914, Germany ordered the general mobilization of its
armies, and on the same day declared war against Russia. Within a few
days the first Russian advance into East Prussia began under the
leadership of Grand Duke Nicholas, who, by a special order of the
czar, had been made commander in chief of all Russian forces on August
3, 1914. Germany, fully occupied with its advance into Belgium and
France, offered hardly any resistance, and its forces, consisting
almost exclusively of the few army corps permanently stationed along
its eastern border and reenforced only by local reserves, advanced
only in a few places, and there only for short distances, into Russian
territory.
On August 5, 1914, Austria-Hungary, too, declared war against Russia,
and the next day brought immediately engagements along the frontier of
the two countries, which, however, did not develop seriously for some
time. The Russian advance into East Prussia had reached Marggrabova by
the 15th, and from then on proceeded fairly rapidly during the
following week. Memel, Tilsit, Insterburg, Koenigsberg, and
Allenstein--to name only a few of the more important cities of East
Prussia--were either threatened with occupation by the Russian forces
or had actually been occupied by them. The entire Mazurian Lake
district in the southeast of the Prusso-Russian border region was
overrun with Russian troops. But about August 22, 1914, Germany awoke
to the danger of the Russian invasion. General von Hindenburg was put
in command in the east, and in the battle of Tannenberg, which lasted
from August 22 to 27, 1914, inflicted a disastrous defeat on the
Russian armies, capturing tens of thousands of its soldiers and
driving as many more to their deaths in the swamp lands of the
Mazurian Lakes. Not only did this end for the time the Russian
invasion of Germany, but the latter country's armies followed the
retreating enemy a considerable distance into his own territory.
But although such important points as Lodz and Radomsk were occupied
during the last days of August and the first days of September, the
German advance into South Poland quickly collapsed. In the meantime
the Russians had successfully invaded Galicia, and by September 3,
1914, the Austro-Hungarians evacuated Lemberg. In the north, too, the
Russian forces had resumed the offensive and once more were invading
East Prussia. But they were again beaten back by Von Hindenburg on
September 10-11, 1914, and, four days later, on September 15, 1914,
suffered another serious defeat in the Mazurian Lakes. The Galician
invasion, however, was meeting with great success. By September 16,
1914, the important Austrian fortress of Przemysl--sixty miles west of
Lemberg--had been reached and its siege begun. By September 26, 1914,
the Russians had reached the Carpathian Mountains and were flooding
the fertile plains of the Bukowina, threatening an imminent invasion
of Hungary itself.
The first week of October, 1914, brought a third invasion of East
Prussia which, however, did not extend as far as the two preceding it,
and which was partly repulsed before October was ended. In the
meantime Austria had called upon Germany for immediate help in
Galicia, and by October 2, 1914, strong German-Austrian forces had
entered Poland in order to reduce the Russian pressure on Galicia,
reaching the Upper Vistula on October 11, 1914, and advancing against
Poland's capital, Warsaw. On the same day the siege of Przemysl was
lifted, after a Russian attempt to take it by storm had been
successfully beaten off a few days earlier. Throughout the balance of
October, 1914, the heaviest kind of fighting took place in Galicia and
the Bukowina. In the latter district the Austro-Hungarian troops were
successful, and on October 22, 1914, reoccupied Czernovitz in the
northeastern part of the province.
By November 7, 1914, the Russians were back again in East Prussia, but
encountered determined resistance and suffered a series of defeats.
However, although they were repulsed in many places, they succeeded in
retaining a foothold in many others. At the same time very strong
Russian forces had advanced from Novo Georgievsk across the Vistula
toward the Prussian provinces of Posen and Silesia. In the face of
these the Austro-Hungarian-German forces immediately gave up their
attempted advance against Warsaw and retreated beyond their own
borders into Upper Silesia and West Galicia. By the middle of November
an extensive Russian offensive was under way along the entire front.
Nowhere, however, did it meet with anything but passing success. In
East Prussia and in North Poland the Germans won battle after battle
and steadily advanced against Lodz. About November 22, 1914, it looked
as if the tide was going to turn in favor of the Russian arms. One
German army group seemed completely surrounded to the northeast of
Lodz. But, although losing a large part of its effectiveness, it
managed to break through the Russian ring and to connect again with
the other German forces by November 26, 1914. At the same time heavy
fighting occurred around Cracow and in the Bukowina where the Russians
again occupied Czernovitz on November 27, 1914.
Lodz fell on December 6, 1914. On the 7th the Russians were again
repulsed in the Mazurian Lakes region. Throughout that month and
January, 1915, very severe fighting took place in the Carpathian
Mountains, and by the end of January, 1915, the Austro-Hungarian
forces were in possession of all the passes, but had not been able to
drive the Russians from the north side of the mountains. In the
meanwhile the Russians were pressing their attacks against East
Prussia with renewed vigor and greatly augmented forces, and by
February 7, 1915, had again advanced to the Mazurian Lakes. In a
battle lasting nine days, Von Hindenburg once more defeated the
Russian army and drove it back into North Poland, inflicting very
heavy losses. At the end of another week, February 24, 1915, the
Russians had been driven out of the Bukowina.
Von Hindenburg had followed up his new success at the Mazurian Lakes
with a drive into North Poland, undoubtedly with the object of
invading Courland. Hardly had it gotten under way when the Galician
fortress of Przemysl was forced to surrender on March 22, 1915. This
not only gained for the Russians a large booty in prisoners,
munitions, and equipment, but also released the great army that had
been besieging the fortress. It was thrown immediately against the
Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia, who were driven back again rapidly
into the Carpathian Mountains. Again Austria appealed to Germany for
help. General von Mackensen was sent to the rescue with an army made
up largely from troops taken from Von Hindenburg's forces. Thereby the
latter again was forced to stop further operations in the north. Von
Mackensen's combined Austro-Hungarian-German armies had an immense
supply of guns and munitions, both of which were beginning to run
short in the Russian army. With these they blasted away Russian line
after line, driving the Russians finally almost completely out of
Galicia, after retaking Przemysl on June 3, 1915, and Lemberg on June
24, 1915.
In the north, in the meantime, the Germans had received reenforcements
filling the gap that Von Mackensen's Galician operations had caused.
With these they invaded Courland while other forces landed on the Gulf
of Riga. With these two groups they pushed south and soon connected
with Von Hindenburg's army before Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw. The
latter had been there practically ever since early in January, 1915,
when after the fall of Lodz it had gradually advanced against Poland's
capital, but was held within seven miles of it along the Bzura and
Rawka Rivers, where many bloody engagements were fought.
At the same time that these two groups formed a junction Von Mackensen
came up with his forces from the south, taking Zamost and Lublin and
investing Ivangorod. Immediately the drive for Warsaw began from all
sides. Pultusk, on the Nareff, fell on July 25, 1915, and on July 30,
1915, the Russians began the evacuation of Warsaw and retreated toward
a very strongly fortified line that had been prepared and ran from
Kovno south through Grodno and Brest-Litovsk.
CHAPTER XX
THE FALL OF THE NIEMEN AND NAREFF FORTRESSES
The 5th of August, 1915, was a fateful day for the Russian armies. The
fall of Warsaw, on that date, was confirmed by the occupation of
Poland's ancient capital by German forces under the command of Prince
Leopold of Bavaria, brother of King Ludwig III of Bavaria and
son-in-law of Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary. This in
itself would have been a severe setback to the Russian arms. But the
consequences which this event was bound to have were of even greater
importance.
In an earlier part of this work we heard at some length of the
arrangement of Russia's girdle of fortresses which--to repeat only the
most important--stretched from Kovno in the north through Oliha,
Grodno, Ossovetz, Lomza, Osholenka, and Novo Georgievsk to powerful
Warsaw and from there to the south and east to Ivangorod and
Brest-Litovsk. These permanent fortifications were supported by strong
natural barriers or obstacles in the form of rivers. The Niemen, Bobr,
Nareff, Vistula and Bug, with their interminable windings, made more
difficult to cross in some places by extensive swamp lands, had,
together with the fortified places, offered ideal means for strong
defense. Again and again, throughout the first thirteen months of the
war, German and Austrian troops had driven the Russian forces back to
these defensive lines--but no farther. Behind this shelter the
Russians were able to recuperate from the severest reverses and,
thanks to a very extensive and comparatively scientific network of
railways, reserves and reenforcements could be brought up from
interior points until armies which apparently had been beaten to a
standstill emerged again, stronger than ever in number and equipment,
to undertake a new offensive against the German masses.
Just previous to the fall of Warsaw the eastern front, roughly
speaking, was formed by the two sides of an equilateral triangle, with
the northern side starting from a point on the Gulf of Riga, about
forty miles northwest of Riga, and with the southern side starting
from Chotin on the River Dniester in Russian Bessarabia, very close to
the point where that Russian province touches Rumania and Galicia. The
apex was at Warsaw. When this apex caved in with the withdrawal of the
Russians, it followed logically that something had to happen to the
two lines that met there. That the Russians retreated from Warsaw on
account of some insurmountable difficulties which made the further
holding of this most important center impossible, is quite clear. It
has been established by now, almost beyond all doubt, that this step
became necessary because of insufficient munitions. But whether this
is so or not, it still remained true that whatever caused their
retreat from Warsaw would exert a similar influence on their capacity
to hold their second line of permanent fortifications. And events
immediately following the fall of Warsaw proved this contention.
Backward and backward fell the Russian lines during the following
weeks until by the end of October, 1915, the two sides of the
erstwhile triangle had disappeared entirely, and the Russian front was
found now along the base of the triangle stretching from Riga through
Friedrichstadt, through a point somewhat west of Dvinsk, thence almost
due south, skirting Pinsk slightly to the east, and again running
south in front of Rovno, entering Galicia at a point about halfway
between Zlochoff and Tarnopol, and following, slightly to the west,
the River Sereth to a point on the Dniester only a few miles west from
where it had ended in August, 1915.
How immense a loss this involved for the Russians can be easily seen
by a glance at a map. The territory that fell into German hands
exceeded 50,000 square miles, with millions of inhabitants, containing
some of the most valuable railway lines from a strategic point of
view, and including besides Warsaw such important places as Mitau,
Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk, Ivangorod, Cholm,
Kovel, Pinsk. Though the Russians destroyed many of the railways,
drove off men and cattle alike, and moved vast quantities of supplies,
equipment, and valuables of all kinds, the time and the facilities at
their disposal were so insufficient that the victorious German armies
were bound to find still untold quantities of all these. The outbreak
of winter, it is true, finally halted the German advance, the force of
which gradually would have spent itself anyhow on account of the
ever-lengthening lines of communication with its bases. In spite of
this, however, it is next to miraculous that the Russians were at all
able to form a new line and to withdraw beyond this line, after all,
the largest part of their forces. This accomplishment was only a
renewed proof of the remarkable ability of the Russian leaders at
least along one line--the orderly withdrawal of immense masses. It
also showed once more the wonderful resiliency of the Russian armies
and the immense advantages which are to be derived from a practically
inexhaustible supply of men.
Almost as remarkable as the compactness and efficiency of the Russian
retreat was the swiftness and insistency of the German advance.
Throughout the German offensive leading up to and following the fall
of Warsaw the German armies in the north and center of the eastern
front cooperated closely with the Austrian forces in the south. This
must be borne in mind as well as the fact that for this entire
campaign the General Staffs of the Central Powers had conceived one
plan, according to which all their armies proceeded. This frequently
necessitated the halting of the advance on one or more points in order
to enable some other army at some other point to overcome obstacles
which had proved more difficult. Considering the immense extent of the
eastern front--which from considerably over 700 miles at the
beginning of August, 1915, gradually shortened to about 600 miles by
the end of October, 1915--it is little short of marvelous that the
German-Austrian offensive should at no time have lost its cohesion. In
order to get a clearer perspective of the somewhat complicated
operations of a large number of separate army units, we will divide
the entire eastern front into three sections and follow separately the
operations of each.
In the north--from the Gulf of Riga to Novo Georgievsk--Marshal von
Hindenburg was in command. Under him there were four armies, each
under a German general: that under Von Buelow in the extreme north;
that under Von Eichhorn to the south of the former and facing the
Niemen River and the fortress of Kovno; the two other armies under Von
Scholtz and Von Gallwitz--the latter the farthest south--were to
attack the Nareff-Bobr line between Novo Georgievsk and Lomza.
The central group was under the command of Field Marshal Prince
Leopold of Bavaria and was reenforced by another army under General
von Woyrsch, which previous to the fall of Warsaw had been fighting
more independently somewhat to the south and, a day before the fall of
Warsaw, had forced the strong fortress of Ivangorod on August 4, 1915.
The southern group was originally exclusively Austro-Hungarian. But
during the early summer of 1915 a German army under General von
Mackensen had been sent into Galicia to cooperate with the Austrian
forces in freeing Przemysl and Lemberg after they had assisted in
throwing back the left wing of the Russian forces then fighting in
Galicia and in forcing them to relinquish their hold on the mountain
passes of the Carpathians. This problem having been solved, these
mixed Austro-Hungarian-German forces were rearranged and reenforced,
and, under the command of Von Mackensen, were to attack the retreating
Russians around Brest-Litovsk. The left wing of this group was under
the command of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. To the southeast of this
entire group was another army under the Austrian General
Pflanzer-Baltin, which in the early summer (1915) had driven the
Russians out of the Bukowina.
On August 8, 1915, the attack on Kovno was begun. At the same time the
German forces advanced against Lomza and still farther south advanced
nearer and nearer to the Warsaw-Bialystok-Vilna-Petrograd railroad,
their main objective for the present. All these advances found serious
opposition at the hands of the Russians, who successfully attempted to
hold up the enemy everywhere in order to insure the safety of their
retreating armies. On August 10, 1915, the Russians attempted an
unsuccessful sortie from Kovno. Farther south, as far as Lomza, the
Russian forces continued their retreat, fighting continuous rear-guard
actions for the purpose of delaying the hard-pressing enemy, who,
however, gradually came closer and closer to the Nareff-Bobr line. Of
course the losses on both sides throughout this continuous fighting
were severe. The Russians lost thousands of men by capture, for
although they succeeded in withdrawing, practically intact, the
principal parts of their armies before the Germans could come up in
strong enough numbers to risk attacks, smaller detachments here and
there lost contact with the main body and fell in the hands of the
Germans and Austrians, so that there passed hardly a day when the
official reports did not contain some claims about a few thousand men
having been captured.
South of the Niemen the Russians attacked Von Eichhorn's army along
the Dvina River, but were thrown back with severe losses. On August
11, 1915, Von Scholtz's group occupied the bridgehead at Vilna, which
had been stubbornly defended until the Russian retreat had progressed
far enough to make its further possession unessential. The same forces
succeeded in crossing the Gac River, south of the Nareff, capturing
during three days' fighting almost 5,000 men. Von Gallwitz with his
army stormed on the same day Zambroff and then pressed on through
Andrzejow toward the east. South of the Nareff, toward the Bug and
Brest-Litovsk, the fighting continued throughout the following days.
Wherever possible the Russians resisted, and every little stream was
used by them to its utmost possibilities in delaying the advance of
the enemy. On August 13, 1915, a strongly fortified position in the
Forest of Dominikanka fell into German hands. On the same day an
outlying fortified position north of Novo Georgievsk had to surrender
and other forces fighting between the Nareff and Bug reached the Slina
and Nurzets Rivers. The latter was crossed late on August 15, 1915,
after the most severe kind of fighting.
Kovno's garrison attempted on that day another unsuccessful sortie,
resulting in the capture of 100 men and in slight gains on the part of
the besieging forces. The latter success was also repeated before Novo
Georgievsk. By this time the general retreat, and the ever-increasing
pressure on the part of the advancing enemy made itself felt even in
the most northern part of the Russian line. There, as well as in the
farthest south of the line, the least changes took place. But on
August 15, 1915, German troops attacked the Russians near Kupishky, at
the point where the original Russian front turned toward the
southwest, and threw them back successfully in a northeasterly
direction, capturing at the same time some 2,000 officers and men.
August 17, 1915, marks the beginning of the end for Kovno and Novo
Georgievsk. On that day both of these fortresses lost some of their
outlying forts, and before Kovno alone 4,500 Russians and over 200
guns fell into the hands of the Germans. During the night of August
18, 1915, Kovno fell, after having been defended most valiantly
against the ever-repeated attacks on the part of the Germans under
General von Eichhorn. It was one of the strongest Russian fortresses,
with eleven outlying forts on both sides of the Niemen, commanding
this river at the point where it turns from its northerly course
toward the west and defending the approach to Vilna from the west.
Over 400 guns and vast quantities of supplies and equipment as well as
about 4,000 officers and men made up the booty. On the same day
additional forts of Novo Georgievsk fell, although the fortress itself
still held out. The fall of Kovno, expected and discounted as it
undoubtedly was by the Russians, was a serious blow. It now became
absolutely necessary to withdraw all their forces in that sector
beyond the Niemen, in order to avoid their being cut off by German
columns advancing from Kovno to the south along the east bank of the
Niemen. This need found expression in the immediate withdrawal of the
Russians from the line Kalvarya-Suvalki. For the Germans an additional
advantage arose in their ability to establish contact between Von
Hindenburg's forces in Poland and Von Buelow's army in Courland and
thereby remove all possibility of having the latter's right wing
enveloped.
As if the fall of Kovno had given a new impetus to the Germans, their
attacks on Novo Georgievsk were now renewed with redoubled vigor. On
August 20, 1915, this last of the important strongholds of the
Niemen-Nareff-Vistula line fell, although the less important
fortresses of Olita, Grodno, and Ossovetz were still in Russian hands.
There, too, large numbers of men and guns and immense amounts of
equipment and supplies were the rewards of the victor. It is said that
the total number of men taken before and in Novo Georgievsk aggregated
85,000, while the number of guns exceeded 700. While the town was
still burning from the final bombardment--in which some of the famous
Austrian mortars of heavy caliber participated--the German Emperor,
accompanied by Field Marshal von Hindenburg, General von Falkenhayn,
Chief of the German General Staff, General von Beseler and many other
high officers, entered this latest conquest of his victorious armies,
over which he later held a review.
The continued retreat of the Russian army and the menacing and
ever-increasing pressure of the advancing Germans, of course, could
have only one result on the fate of the few positions which were still
held by the Russians by now west of the Vilna-Grodno-Bialystok line.
Unless they were willing to risk the loss of large numbers of troops
by having their lines of retreat cut off, it became necessary to
withdraw as many as their means of transportation and their efforts to
delay the Germans permitted. As a result the fortified town of
Ossovetz on the Bobr was evacuated and occupied by the Germans on
August 23, 1915. A few miles south, beyond the Nareff, Tykotsyn
suffered the same fate. In the latter instance the Russians lost over
1,200 men and 70 machine guns. Still farther south, near Bielsk,
Russian resistance was not any more successful. East of Kovno the
German advance was not as successful; at least the Russians were able
in that region to delay the enemy to a greater extent, although the
delay had to be bought dearly. But considering the short distance at
which Vilna was located and the great importance of that city as a
railroad center for the safe withdrawal of the Russian main forces,
any effort that promised success was well worth even heavy losses.
Throughout the following days the forces of the northern group pressed
on relentlessly to the east and south, delayed here and there, but
succeeding in forcing back the Russian troops step by step.
CHAPTER XXI
THE CONQUEST OF GRODNO AND VILNA
With the fall of Olita, Bialystok, and Brest-Litovsk, which took place
on August 25-26, 1915, and is described in more detail in another
chapter, the northern group under Von Hindenburg immediately increased
its activities. In Courland, south of Mitau, near Bausk, heavy
fighting took place, and the Russian lines, which had held their own
throughout the entire retreat of the Russian armies in Poland, began
to give way. At one other point the Russians had fought back
inevitable retreat with special stubbornness, and that was due west of
Grodno, in the neighborhood of Augustovo, which had seen such
desperate fighting during and following the Russian invasion of East
Prussia. But there, too, now the Germans began to make headway and
were advancing against the Niemen and the last Russian stronghold on
it, Grodno.
At about the same time that considerable activity developed at the
utmost southern end of the line in eastern Galicia, operations of
equal extent and of great importance took place at the extreme
northern end, in the vicinity of Riga. On August 30, 1915, parts of
Von Hindenburg's northern group, under General von Beseler, reached
positions south of Friedrichstadt on the Dvina. Other troops under
General von Eichhorn advanced to the northeast of Olita in the
direction of Vilna, while still other forces farther south stormed the
city of Lipsk, less than twenty miles west of Grodno, after having
forced a crossing over the Vidra River, a tributary of the Sukelka.
The fighting around Friedrichstadt continued throughout the last days
of August, 1915. To the south of the Niemen the advance against the
Grodno-Vilna railway continued without cessation. Whatever troops were
not engaged in pursuing the retreating Russian forces were now being
concentrated on the approaching attack against the last Russian
fortress in Poland--Grodno. To the south of it, by August 31, 1915,
they had reached Kuznitsa, on the Bialystok-Grodno railway. The
investment of Grodno may be said to have begun with that day. It was
then that the first reports came that heavy artillery had been brought
up by the Germans and was throwing its devastating shells into the
fortress from the western front. Little hope was left to the Russians
for a successful resistance. For whenever these heavy guns had been
brought into play before, they had blasted their way to the desired
goal, no matter how strong or modern had been the defenses of steel
and cement.
For the withdrawal of the Russians from Grodno there were available
two railroads, one running north to Vilna and another running at first
southeast to Mosty, and there dividing into two branches by both of
which finally in a roundabout way either Minsk or Kieff could be
reached. The Germans, of course, were eager to cut off these lines of
retreat. The latter road was threatened by the forces approaching
Grodno from the south. Before they reached it, however, troops from
Von Hindenburg's group on September 1, 1915, cut the Grodno-Vilna
railroad at Czarnoko. On the same day some of the western outer forts
of Grodno fell, Fort No. 4 being stormed by North German Landwehr
regiments and Fort No. 4a by other troops from Baden. In both cases
the Russians resisted valiantly, with numerically so inferior
garrisons that the Germans could report the capture of only 650
Russians. After the fall of these two fortified works the balance of
the advanced western forts of Grodno were evacuated by the Russians.
This, indeed, was the beginning of the end for the last great Russian
fortress. On September 2, 1915, Grodno was taken by Von Hindenburg's
army after a crossing over the Niemen had been forced. The Russians,
however, again had managed to escape with their armies. The entire
lack in the official German announcement of any reference to the
Russian garrison of Grodno suggests that there was no garrison left by
the time the Germans took the fortress. In spite of this fact,
however, the Germans of course continued to capture Russians in fairly
large quantities for, naturally, numerous detachments lost contact
with the main body during the retreat.
With the fall of Grodno the next objective of the German troops became
Vilna. Indeed, on the very day of Grodno's occupation, German cavalry
reached the northwest and western region immediately adjoining Vilna,
in spite of the most determined Russian resistance. These, of course,
were troops that had not participated in the drive against Grodno, but
during that time had been fighting the Russians farther to the north,
and now that Grodno was no longer to be feared, started a drive of
their own against Vilna. Vilna is second in importance among Polish
cities only to Warsaw itself. By September 8, 1915, detachments of
General von Eichhorn's army had reached Troki, hardly more than ten
miles west of Vilna.
The Russian front had now been pushed back everywhere over a wide
extent, which varied from about twenty miles in the extreme southeast
and about fifty miles in the regions east of Grodno and Kovno, and to
the north of this territory to almost 200 miles in the center east of
Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. Of the great Russian fortresses of the first
and second line, built as a protection against German and
Austro-Hungarian advances, none remained in the hands of the Russians.
It was true that the main body of the Russian armies had succeeded in
extricating itself from this disaster and withdrawing to the east to
form there a new line. But it was also true that this retreat of the
Russian army had cost dearly in men, material, and, last but not
least, temporarily, the morale of the troops themselves. For a
considerable period of time during the retreat rumors were heard of
changes in the leadership of the Russian armies. These rumors gained
strength when it was announced that General Soukhomlinoff had resigned
as minister of war and that some of the commanding generals of the
different individual army groups had been replaced by others. In view
of these changes it did not come as a surprise when on September 7,
1915, it was announced that the czar himself had taken over the
supreme command of all his armies, which up to that time had been from
the beginning of the war in the hands of his uncle, Grand Duke
Nicholas.
The announcement reached the outside world first in the form of the
following telegram from the czar to President Poincare of France:
"In placing myself to-day at the head of my valiant armies I have in
my heart, M. President, the most sincere wishes for the greatness of
France and the victory of her glorious army.
"NICHOLAS."
This was followed on September 8, 1915, by the publication of the
official communication by which the czar relieved the grand duke from
his command and appointed him viceroy of the Caucasus and commander in
chief of the Russian army in the Caucasus. It read as follows:
"At the beginning of the war I was unavoidably prevented from
following the inclination of my soul to put myself at the head of the
army. That was why I intrusted you with the commandership in chief of
all the land and sea forces.
"Under the eyes of all Russia Your Imperial Highness has given proof
during the war of a steadfast bravery which has caused a feeling of
profound confidence and called forth the sincere good wishes of all
who followed your operations through the inevitable vicissitudes of
war.
"My duty to my country, which has been intrusted to me by God, compels
me to-day, when the enemy has penetrated into the interior of the
empire, to take supreme command of the active forces, and to share
with the army the fatigue of war, and to safeguard with it Russian
soil from attempts of the enemy. The ways of Providence are
inscrutable, but my duty and my desire determine me in my resolution
for the good of the state.
"The invasion of the enemy on the western front, which necessitates
the greatest possible concentration of civil and military authorities
as well as the unification of command in the field, has turned our
attention from the southern front. At this moment I recognize the
necessity of your assistance and counsels on the southern front, and I
appoint you viceroy of the Caucasus and commander in chief of the
valiant Caucasian army.
"I express to Your Imperial Highness my profound gratitude, and that
of the country for your labors during the war.
"NICHOLAS."
The grand duke addressed his former armies before departing to his new
sphere of activity as follows:
"Valiant Army and Fleet: To-day your august supreme chief, His Majesty
the Emperor, places himself at your head; I bow before your heroism of
more than a year, and express to you my cordial, warm, and sincere
appreciation.
"I believe steadfastly that because the emperor himself, to whom you
have taken your oath, conducts you, you will display achievements
hitherto unknown. I believe that God from this day will accord to His
elect His all-powerful aid, and will bring to him victory.
"NICHOLAS,
"General Aide de Camp."
Another of the small southern tributaries of the Niemen which offered
excellent opportunities for resistance of which the Russians promptly
availed themselves, was the Zelvianka River, which joins the Niemen
just west of Mosty. The fighting which went on there for a few days
was almost exclusively in the form of rear-guard actions, and was
typical of a great deal of the fighting during the Russian retreat.
Whenever the Germans advanced far enough and in large enough numbers
to endanger the retreating armies, the latter would speed up as much
as possible until they reached one of the many small rivers with which
that entire region abounds. There sufficiently large forces to delay
the advance, at least for a day or two, would be left behind to use
the natural possibilities of defense offered by the waterway to the
best possible advantage, while the main body of the army would move
on, to repeat this operation at the next opportunity. In most
instances these practices held up the German and Austrian advance just
exactly in the manner in which it had been designed that it should.
Furthermore, the Russians would not give way until they had inflicted
the greatest possible losses on their enemies, and in that respect
they were frequently quite successful. For first of all many of these
rivers have either densely wooded or very swampy banks which lend
themselves admirably for defense to as brave a fighting body as the
Russian army, and which proved exceedingly treacherous to the
attacker; and in the second place the Russians, of course, had the
advantage that they were fighting on their own soil, while the Germans
were in a strange and often hostile country. In spite of this,
however, the German advance, taken all in all, could not be denied,
and in practically every one of the cases just described, the final
outcome was in a very short time defeat for the Russians and a
successful crossing of the watery obstacle by the Germans. This was
true also at the banks of the Zelvianka, where the Germans on
September 9, 1915, stormed successfully the heights near Pieski,
capturing 1,400 Russians. This success was followed up by further
gains on the next day, September 10, 1915, that again yielded a few
thousand prisoners. A few days later the crossing was forced and the
Germans began to attack the Russians behind the next Niemen tributary,
the Shara.
Farther to the north especially heavy fighting occurred for a few days
around Skidel, a little town just north of the Niemen on the
Grodno-Mosty railroad, and it was not until September 11, 1915, that
the Germans succeeded in storming it. On the same day German
aeroplanes attacked the important railroad junction at Lida on the
Kovno-Vilna railway, and also Vileika on the railway running parallel
to and east of the Warsaw-Vilna-Dvinsk-Petrograd railroad. In a way
this signified the opening of the German offensive against Vilna.
Concurrent with it the fighting on the Dvina between Friedrichstadt
and Jacobstadt waxed more furious. Farther south the Germans advanced
toward Rakishki on the Kupishki-Dvinsk railroad and between that road
and the River Vilia they even reached at some points the Vilna-Dvinsk
railroad. Without any lull the battle raged now all along the line
from the Dvina to Vilna, and from Vilna to the Niemen. South of this
river the attack of the Germans was directed against the Russian front
behind the Shara River. By September 14, 1915, Von Hindenburg stood
before Dvinsk with one part of his army group. The other parts were
rapidly pushing in an easterly direction from Olita and Grodno with
the object of attacking Vilna from the south, but they encountered
determined resistance, especially in the region to the east of Grodno.
With undiminished vigor, however, the Germans continued their advance
against Dvinsk and Vilna. To the south of the former city they pushed
beyond the Vilna-Petrograd railway, taking Vidsky, just north of the
Disna River, in the early morning hours of September 16, 1915.
At that time the fall of both Vilna and Dvinsk seemed to be
inevitable. On September 18, 1915, the Germans reported continuous
progress in their attacks on Dvinsk. On the same day they broke
through the Russian front between Vilna and the Niemen in numerous
places, capturing over 5,000 men and 16 machine guns. Of railroad
lines available to facilitate an eventual Russian retreat from Vilna,
the northern route to Petrograd by way of Dvinsk had been in German
hands for some days. The southern route by way of Lida to Kovno was
imminently threatened at many points. The only other railroad on the
eventual line of retreat to the southeast by way of Minsk was likewise
threatened both from the south and north. Vilna taken, the Germans
immediately bent all their energies to the task of pursuing the
retreating Russians.
On September 18, 1915, Vilna fell into the hands of General von
Eichhorn's army. With it the Russians lost one of the most important
cities of their western provinces. Vilna is one of the oldest Russian
towns, its history dating back as far as 1128. It is the capital of a
government of the same name. In the Middle Ages it was the capital of
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but became a Russian possession as a
result of the partition of Poland in 1795. Of its population of more
than a quarter million almost one-half are Jews. Possessing an ancient
Roman Catholic cathedral, it is the seat of a bishop of that church,
as well as of a Greek archbishop.
On the same day on which Vilna's fall was reported, part of Von
Hindenburg's army, its left wing, was reported at Vornjany, Smorgon,
and Molodechno, all places east of Vilna, the last about eighty miles
on the Vilna-Minsk railway. In vain did the Russians try to pierce
this line, which, by the very nature of the advance, must have been
exceedingly thin. It not only held, but managed to force the Russians
to continue their retreat, and during this process captured large
numbers of them. General von Eichhorn's army, the actual conquerors of
Vilna, and Von Hindenburg's center reached Osmiana, thirty miles
southeast of Vilna, on September 20, 1915. The right wing, on the same
day, had pushed on to the east of Lida and to a point just west of
Novogrudok. By September 21, 1915, the crossing of the Gavia River, a
northern tributary of the Niemen, was forced north and south of
Subolniki, and on September 22, 1915, the Russian front extending from
Osmiana to Subolniki and Novogrudok was forced to retreat a one day's
march, ten miles, taking new positions on a line: Soli (on the
Vilna-Minsk railroad)-Olshany-Traby-Ivie to a point slightly northeast
of Novogrudok. A German attempt to outflank the retreating Russians
from the north, made on September 23, 1915, at Vileika on the Vilia,
about ten miles north of the railway junction at Molodechno, failed.
During the next day the Germans again forced back the Russian front
eastward for about ten miles, or a one day's march. Along this new
front--Smorgon-Krevo-Vishneff-Sabresina-Mikolaieff, just southeast of
which latter place the historical Beresina joins the Niemen--the
Russians made a firm stand during the rest of September, 1915.
The German advance was stopped, which fact undoubtedly was partly due
to the renewed activity of the Franco-English forces on the west
front, as well as to the absolute necessity of giving a chance to
recuperate to the armies on the east front, which had been fighting
now incessantly for months. September 28, 1915, may be considered
approximately as the date at which the Battle of Vilna ended. After
that date fighting along the eastern front assumed the form of trench
warfare, except in the extreme northern section, and in Volhynia,
eastern Galicia. In the sector, bounded in the north by the Vilia, and
in the south by the Niemen, the Russian front was along a line running
through the towns of Smorgon, Krevo, Vishneff, Sabresina, Mikolaieff.
As a result of the Battle of Vilna and the Russian retreat following
it the Germans captured 70 officers, about 22,000 men, a large number
of cannon and machine guns, and a great quantity of equipment. Along
the entire eastern front the German forces captured men and equipment
during the month of September, 1915, as follows: 421 officers, 95,464
men, 37 cannon, 298 machine guns, and 1 aeroplane.
CHAPTER XXII
THE CAPTURE OF BREST-LITOVSK
The central group under Prince Leopold had hardly entered Warsaw
proper when it continued its advance in an easterly direction toward
Brest-Litovsk after having occupied Warsaw's eastern suburb, Praga. At
the same time other forces completed the investment of Novo
Georgievsk, covering the sector between the Nareff and the Vistula. By
August 10, 1915, the left wing of the central group had reached
Kaluszin and General von Woyrsch's army had become its right wing,
taking the Russian positions just west of Lukoff. On the same day
German aviators threw bombs both at Novo Georgievsk and
Brest-Litovsk. Under heavy fighting a crossing was forced over the
Muchavka and Lukoff was occupied on August 11, 1915.
One of the most awful consequences of the Russian retreat was the sad
plight in which the civil population of the stricken country found
itself. In the beginning of the retreat the Russians forced these poor
people to join in the retreat. This itself, of course, meant untold
hardships and frequently death. But as the advance of the Germans
became more furious and the retreat of the Russians more rapid, it
often happened that these unfortunate persons--irrespective of age,
sex or condition--were forced by their Russian masters to turn around
again and thus place themselves squarely between the two contending
forces.
With the fall of Lukoff an important railroad leading into
Brest-Litovsk had fallen into the hands of the invading enemy. Along
this line, which is part of the direct line Warsaw-Brest-Litovsk,
Austro-Hungarian forces now progressed rapidly in an easterly
direction and by August 14, 1915, had reached Miendzyrzets.
In spite of the heaviest kind of bombardment and of almost
uninterrupted infantry attacks on Kovno and Novo Georgievsk, both of
these fortresses still held out. By August 1, 1915, however, the
German lines had advanced far beyond these places and it became clear
that their next chief objective was Brest-Litovsk. Each one of the
three main army groups directed strong parts of their forces toward
this Russian stronghold. From the northwest detachments of Von
Hindenburg's group, coming from Lomza and Ostroff, had crossed in a
wide front the Warsaw-Bialystok section of the Warsaw-Vilna-Petrograd
railway. After taking Briansk they had forced the crossing of the
Nurzets, a tributary of the Bug, and the only natural barrier in front
of Brest-Litovsk from that direction. They were rapidly approaching
the Brest-Litovsk-Bialystok railway. The central group's
front--Lukoff-Siedlets-Sokoloff--had been pushed forward to Drohichin
on the Bug, only about forty-five miles to the northeast of the
fortress. Parts of Von Mackensen's southern group under the Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand had even reached Biala, less than twenty miles west
of Brest-Litovsk, and still other detachments from this group were
advancing along the eastern bank of the Bug. Three railroads leading
out of the fortress were still in the hands of the Russians--to
Bialystok to the north, to Pinsk and Minsk to the east, and to Kovel
and Kovno to the south. This continuous offensive against all the
Russian lines, of course, cost both sides dearly. The attackers,
however, seemed to have had the better end of it. The Russians,
according to official figures, lost almost 100,000 men by capture
alone during the first two weeks of August, 1915.
The German successes before Kovno and Novo Georgievsk had the result
of increasing the vigor of the drive against Brest-Litovsk. Those
detachments of Von Hindenburg's army group which had forced a crossing
of the Nareff between Bialystok and Lomza pushed on rapidly to the
south and threatened as early as August 18, 1915, the northern section
of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk railway. On the same day Prince
Leopold's forces reached the south bank of the Bug, north of Sarnaki.
Parts of Von Mackensen's army kept up its attack against the Russians
around Biala, forced them across the Bug and into the very forts of
Brest-Litovsk and at the same time began the bombardment of the
outlying forts with the heavy artillery that had been brought up.
Other parts, on that day, August 19, 1915, crossed the northern part
of the Cholm-Brest-Litovsk railway east of Vlodava. At the same time
Austrian forces under Field Marshal-Lieutenant von Arz and Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand cleared the left bank of the Bug, east of Janoff, and
thereby completed the investment of the fortress from the west.
Closer and closer the girdle was drawn. Every day the German advance
progressed. In the evening of August 19, 1915, Prince Leopold's forces
crossed the Bug at Melnik and began to threaten the fortress from the
northwest. Still closer to Brest-Litovsk Austrian troops belonging to
Von Mackensen's group crossed to the north bank of the Bug near
Janoff, while other parts of this group advanced from the south beyond
Vlodava and forced the Russians to withdraw from the east bank of the
Bug north of this town. On the Germans and Austrians pushed from all
directions except, of course, the east. By August 20, 1915, the lower
part of the Brest-Litovsk-Bialystok railway was crossed and the only
railway leading out of the fortress toward the east, which at Shabinka
separates into two branches, one to Minsk and another to Pinsk, seemed
threatened. The German-Austrian advance from the south that day
reached Pishicha, apparently directly toward the southern railroad
from the fortress to Kovel and from there to Kovno and Kieff.
From all sides now the circle around Brest-Litovsk was drawn closer.
The important railroad center at Kovel was taken on August 24, 1915,
and immediately the combined German and Austrian forces swung around
toward the north along both sides of the road leading to Kobryn, east
of the fortress and on the railroad to Pinsk. In the meantime heavy
artillery had been brought up and began the bombardment of the
fortress. During the night of August 25, 1915, the storming of the
forts began. Austrian troops under General von Arz took the three
forts on the western front, while a Brandenburg Reserve Corps attacked
from the northwest and penetrated into the central forts. The Russians
then evacuated the fortress. Its fall immediately imperiled the entire
Russian positions and resulted in a general retreat of all Russian
forces. The question for them now was no longer how long they were
able to delay the enemy, but how much they could save out of the
wreck. On the same day that saw the fall of Brest-Litovsk the Russians
lost Bialystok, and on the next day, August 16, 1915, they evacuated
the fortress of Olita on the Niemen, about halfway between Kovno and
Grodno; the latter, the last of Russia's proud string of western
fortresses of the first line, of course was now not only seriously
threatened but had become practically untenable.
In a way the victory at Brest-Litovsk was an empty one, for the Russians
apparently had decided that the fortress would become untenable before
long and had withdrawn from it in good time not only practically the
entire garrison but also whatever supplies or equipment they could
possibly transport, destroying most of what they were forced to leave
behind and blowing up many of the fortifications. The strategical value
of the victory was, of course, not influenced by this action. After the
fall of the fortress the combined forces of the Germans and Austrians
did not rest on their laurels. Without wasting any time they immediately
took up in all directions the pursuit of the retreating Russians. For a
short time the retreating Russian troops made a determined stand in the
neighborhood of Kamienietz-Litovsk, northeast of Brest-Litovsk, but
could not withstand the German pressure for long. A great deal of very
heavy and bloody fighting took place in this period, August 25 to August
31, 1915, in the dense forest south of Bialystok and east of Bielsk,
sometimes known as the Forest of Bialystok and sometimes as the Forest
of Bielovies, a little town at the end of a short branch railroad,
running east from Bielsk. The Upper Nareff flows through this forest and
much of the fighting was along its banks. Austrian troops, a few days
earlier, had reached Pushany, just north of the Brest-Litovsk-Minsk
railroad and from there pressed on in an easterly direction. By August
21, 1915, the Upper Nareff had been crossed after the hardest kind of
fighting on both sides, and the advance continued now toward Grozana. It
was not, however, until September 1, 1915, that these troops were able
to fight their way out of the forest. At the same time Von Mackensen's
troops were following the retreating Russians into the Pripet Marshes.
Other parts of this group which had advanced east from Brest-Litovsk
along the Minsk railroad reached the Jasiolda River, a tributary of the
Pripet, at a point near Bereza, while Austro-Hungarian troops forming
part of Von Mackensen's army advanced to east and south of Boloto and
Dubowoje. Further north, Prince Leopold's army was still fighting the
retreating Russians just north of Pushany, but on September 4, 1915,
finally fought its way out of the marshes which--outrunners of the vast
Pripet Marshes--are abundant in that region.
Back the Germans and Austrians forced their retreating enemy during
the following days, although the pursuit lost a little in force and
swiftness. For the troops which were engaged in these operations had
been steadily on the move practically ever since the attack on Warsaw
began. On September 6-7, 1915, the Russians again made a stand on a
wide front east and south of Grodno. This line stretched south from
the Niemen near Mosty to Volkovysk, then southeast to Rushana, thence
east of the Pushany Marshes across the Jasiolda River near Chenisk to
Drohichyn, on the Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk railroad. On the German and
Austrian side these engagements were fought by the armies of Prince
Leopold of Bavaria and Field Marshal von Mackensen. At the same time
troops belonging to Von Hindenburg's group attacked a newly formed
Russian line farther north which extended from Volkovysk in a
northwesterly direction to the village of Jeziory and the small lake
on which the latter is situated, just north of Grodno. Volkovysk
itself and the heights northeast of it were stormed by the Germans on
September 7, 1915, on which occasion again almost 3,000 Russians were
captured by the Germans.
During the next few days the left wing of this army group fought in
close cooperation with the right wing of Von Hindenburg's army along
the upper Zelvianka, a southern tributary of the Niemen. The rest of
Prince Leopold's army were making the Kobryn-Minsk railroad their
objective and were fighting on September 9, 10, and 11, 1915, for
possession of the station at Kossovo.
While Von Hindenburg's army group was occupied with the drive on Vilna
and Von Mackensen's forces advanced against Pinsk, Prince Leopold's
regiments, as we have learned, fought continuously in the sector
between the Niemen and the Jasiolda Rivers. The problem assigned to
them apparently was that of gaining the Vilna-Kovno railroad in order
to cut off the Russian retreat, and by the time Vilna fell, September
18, 1915, they had just succeeded in forcing a crossing over the Shara
River, which runs practically parallel to the Lida-Baranovitchy
section of the Vilna-Kovno railroad. In a way this gave them command
of that section; but they first had to cross the country between the
Shara and the railroad, over a width of about twenty miles. Although
they were reported on September 19, 1915, as participating in the
pursuit of the retreating Russians, they seem to have arrived just a
little too late to capture large numbers of them. In fact, not until
September 20, 1915, were they reported actually at Dvorzets, on the
Vilna-Kovno railway, while on that day the right wing of this army was
fighting west of Oshoff, which, indeed, is to the east of the
Brest-Litovsk-Minsk railway, but still a considerable distance (about
twenty-two miles) west of Moltshad, a little to the southeast of
Dvorzets; stormed Ostroff, and crossed the Oginski Canal at Telechany,
after first throwing the Russians across it. These operations netted
some 1,000 prisoners. September 22, 1915, brought their left wing
about ten miles farther east at Valeika, while farther south the
fighting continued in the same locality as on the previous day during
the following days. By September 23, 1915, the left wing again had
advanced about ten miles along the Servetsh River at Korelitchy, as
well as the Upper Shara, east of Baranovitchy and Ostroff. The Russian
resistance along this river was maintained during September 24, 1915,
although the Germans gained its eastern bank south of Lipsk.
Just as in the Vilna-Niemen sector to the north, the German advance in
the region bounded in the north by the Niemen and in the south by the
Jasiolda was halted during the last week of September, 1915. And the
line of positions which had been reached by the German forces was
maintained throughout the rest of the fall and the entire winter,
excepting a few minor changes. In a rough way, that front extended as
follows: Starting south of the junction of the Beresina with the
Niemen, it followed the course of the latter river through the town of
Labicha for about thirty miles in a southeasterly direction, then bent
slightly to the southwest at Korelitchy, passing to the west of
Tzirin, crossed the Brest-Litovsk-Minsk railway about halfway between
Baranovitchy and Snoff and about ten miles farther south the
Vilna-Kovno railway between Luchouitchy and Nieazvied, at which town
it again bent to the southwest, along the Shara River, passing east of
Lipsk, and then along the entire length of the Oginski Canal to its
junction with the Jasiolda, northwest of Pinsk. Along this line both
the Russians and Germans dug themselves in, and throughout the winter
a bitter trench warfare netted occasionally a few lines of trenches
to the Russians and at other times had the same results for the other
side, without, however, materially changing the position of either.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE STRUGGLE IN EAST GALICIA AND VOLHYNIA AND THE CAPTURE OF PINSK
The fall of Ivangorod and Warsaw was the signal for advance for which
the southern group under Von Mackensen had been waiting. General von
Woyrsch's forces pressed on between Garvolin and Ryki, northeast of
Ivangorod. Other forces threw the Russians back beyond the Vieprz and
gradually approached the line of the Bug River. Still farther south,
on the Dniester, Austrian troops, too, forced back the Russians step
by step. On August 11, 1915, Von Mackensen's troops attacked the
Russians, who were making a stand behind the Bystrzyka and the
Tysmienika. This hastened the Russian retreat to the east of the Bug.
Throughout the following days the story of the Russian retreat and the
German-Austrian advance changed little in its essential features. As
fast as roads permitted and as quickly as obstacles in their way could
be overcome, the forces of the Central Powers advanced. With equal
determination the Russian troops availed themselves of every possible,
and quite a few seemingly impossible, opportunities to delay this
advance. Every creek was made an excuse for making a stand, every
forest became a means of stalling the enemy, every railroad or country
road embankment had to yield its chance of putting a new obstacle into
the thorny path of the advancing invader. Whenever the latter seemed
to ease up for a moment, either to gain contact with his main forces
or to rest up after especially severe forced marches, the Russians
were on hand with an attack. But just as soon as the attack had been
made the Germans or Austrians or Hungarians, or all three together,
were ready to forget all about the temporary let-up and were prepared
to meet the attack. Then once more the pursuit would begin.
During the drive on Brest-Litovsk, covering practically all of August,
1915, after the fall of Warsaw, the operations of Von Mackensen's
southern group were so closely connected and intertwined with those of
the central group that they have found detailed consideration together
with the latter. During all this time the extreme right wing in
Eastern Galicia did comparatively little beyond preventing an advance
of the Russian forces at that point. With the fall of Brest-Litovsk,
however, and the beginning of the Russian retreat along the entire
front, activities in the southeastern end of the Russo-German-Austrian
theatre of war were renewed.
On August 28, 1915, German and Austro-Hungarian forces under Count
Bothmer broke through the Russian line along the Zlota-Lipa River,
both north and south of the Galician town of Brzezany, about fifty
miles southeast of Lemberg, and in spite of determined resistance and
repeated counterattacks drove the Russians some distance toward the
Russo-Galician border. At the same time other parts of Von Mackensen's
army successfully attacked the Russian line at Vladimir Volynsky, a
few miles east of the Upper Bug and somewhat north of the
Polish-Galician border. The combined attack resulted in a gradual
withdrawal of the entire Russian line as far as it was located in
Galicia, aggregating in length almost 160 miles. These operations
alone netted to the Austro-Germans about 10,000 Russian prisoners.
This attack came more or less unexpectedly, but in spite of that was
carried on most fiercely. By August 30, 1915, the right wing had
forced the Russians back to the river Strypa and was only a few miles
west of Tarnopol.
Farther north another army under the Austrian General
Boehm-Ermolli encountered determined resistance along the line
Zlochoff-Bialykamien-Radziviloff, where the Russians were supported by
very strongly fortified positions. Still farther north the attack
progressed in the direction of the strongly fortified town of Lutsk,
on the Styr River, less than fifty miles west of the fortress of
Rovno, in the Russian province of Volhynia. This fortress, together
with Dubno, farther south on the Ikwa, a tributary of the Styr, and
with Rovno itself formed a very powerful triangle of permanent
fortifications erected by Russia in very recent times. The purpose for
which they had been intended undoubtedly was twofold; first, to offer
an obstacle to any invasion of that section of the Russian Empire on
the part of Austro-Hungarian troops with Lemberg as a base, and
secondly, to act as a base for a possible Russian attack on Galicia.
In view of these facts, it was surprising that on August 31, 1915,
only three days after the resumption of actual fighting in Eastern
Galicia, the fall of Lutsk was announced. The very form of the
official Austrian announcement rather indicates that the Russians must
have evacuated Lutsk of their own accord, possibly after dismounting
and either withdrawing or destroying its guns. For the report states
that only one--the Fifty-fourth Infantry--regiment drove the Russians
by means of bayonet attacks out of their first-line trenches and then
followed them right into Lutsk. This, of course, could not have been
accomplished so quickly unless the Russians had already withdrawn at
that point as well as everywhere else. At the same time their line was
also pierced at Baldi and Kamuniec, which forced their withdrawal from
the entire western bank of the Styr. German troops, fighting under
General von Bothmer in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian army of
General Boehm-Ermolli, on the same day (August 31, 1915) stormed a
series of heights on the banks of the Strypa, north of Zboroff,
although they encountered there the most determined resistance on the
part of the Russian forces.
The immense losses in men, guns, and materials which the Russians
suffered throughout the month of August, 1915, in spite of their
genius for withdrawing huge bodies of men at the right moment, will be
seen from the following official statement published on September 1,
1915, by General Headquarters of the German armies. These figures do
not include the losses suffered by the Russian armies which in
Eastern Galicia were fighting against Austro-Hungarian troops.
"During the month of August the number of prisoners taken by German
troops in the eastern and southeastern theatres of war, and the
quantities of war materials captured during the same period, totaled
more than 2,000 officers and 269,800 men taken prisoners, and 2,000
cannon and 560 machine guns.
"Of these, 20,000 prisoners and 827 cannon were taken at Kovno. About
90,000 prisoners, including 15 generals and more than 1,000 other
officers, and 1,200 cannon and 150 machine guns were taken at Novo
Georgievsk. The counting up of the cannon and machine guns taken at
Novo Georgievsk has not yet been finished, however, while the count of
machine guns taken at Kovno has not yet begun. The figures quoted as
totals, therefore, will be considerably increased. The stocks of
ammunition, provisions, and oats in the two fortresses cannot be
estimated."
The fall of Lutsk had serious consequences for the Russians. With this
fortress gone the entire line south of it was endangered unless
promptly withdrawn. It was, therefore, not surprising that when on
September 1, 1915, the left wing of the Austro-German forces crossed
the Styr on a wide front north of Lutsk the entire Russian line down
from that point should give way. That, of course, meant the evacuation
of Galicia by the Russians. Brody, about halfway-between Lemberg and
Rovno on the railroad connecting these two cities, was taken by
Boehm-Ermolli's army on September 1, 1915, and these troops
immediately pushed on across the border. General von Bothmer's forces,
slightly to the south, kept up their advance from Zaloshe and Zboroff
in the direction of Tarnopol and the Sereth River. Still farther south
the third group under General Pflanzer-Baltin drove the Russians from
the heights on the east bank of the Lower Strypa. The general result
of all these operations was the withdrawal of the Russian front along
the Dniester between Zaleshchyki in the south and Buczacz in the
north, to a new line along the Sereth, starting at the latter's
junction with the Dniester. But there the Russians made a stand. The
hardest possible fighting took place on September 4, 1915, all along
the line in Galicia, Volhynia, and on the Bessarabian border. Much of
it was of the "hand-to-hand" kind, for both sides had thrown up
fortifications and dug trenches, which they took turns in storming and
defending.
One of the heaviest battles of this period took place on September 6,
1915, lasting into the early morning hours of the 7th, along a front
about twenty-five miles wide, with its center about at Radziviloff, a
little town just across the border of the Lemberg-Rovno railroad, a
few miles northeast of Brody. There the Russians had strongly
intrenched themselves. The fighting was most bitter, especially around
the castle of Podkamen, which Boehm-Ermolli's troops wrested from the
Russians only through repeated and most fierce infantry attacks and by
means of terribly bloody hand-to-hand fighting. However, finally the
Russians had to give way, leaving over 3,000 men in the hands of their
adversaries. Farther south the armies of Generals von Bothmer and
Pflanzer-Baltin, too, had to withstand continuous attacks of the
Russians and more or less fighting went on all along the southeastern
front as far down as Nova-Sielnitsa, a few miles southeast of
Czernovitz at the point where the borders of Rumania, Galicia, and
Bessarabia meet.
The result of the Austrian victory of September 7, 1915, near
Radziviloff was the further withdrawal on September 8, 1915, of the
Russian line, extending over fifty-five miles to the east bank of the
Ikwa River, a tributary of the Styr, on the west about thirty miles
northeast of Radziviloff on the Lemberg-Rovno railroad. This
withdrawal, of course, seriously threatened this fortress, which,
being on the west side of the Ikwa, was open to direct attack from the
west and south as soon as the Russians had been thrown back beyond the
Ikwa. And, indeed, the next day, September 9, 1915, brought the fall
of the city and fortress of Dubno. Austrian troops under General
Boehm-Ermolli took it by storm, while other detachments advanced to
the Upper Ikwa and beyond the town of Novo Alexinez. This was as
serious a loss to the Russians as it was a great gain for their
enemies. For Dubno commanded not only the valley of the Ikwa, but it
also blocked the very important railway and road that run from Lemberg
to Rovno.
Farther south along the Sereth the Russian lines had been greatly
strengthened by new troops brought up from the rear by means of the
railroad Kieff-Shmerinka-Proskuroff-Tarnopol. This enabled the
Russians to make determined attacks all along the river, which were
especially severe in the neighborhood of Trembovla. General von
Bothmer's German army at first successfully withstood these attacks in
spite of Russian superiority in numbers, but was finally forced to
withdraw from the west bank of the Sereth to the heights between that
river and the Strypa River, which are between 750 and 1,000 feet above
the sea level. But on September 9, 1915, the German forces advanced
again and threw the Russians along almost the entire line again beyond
the Sereth. Farther south on that river, near its junction with the
Dniester, Austrian regiments under General Benigni and Prince
Schoenburg stormed on the same day the Russian positions northwest of
Szuparka, capturing over 4,000 Russians.
While Von Mackensen's army was pushing its advance toward Pinsk, the
principal city in the Pripet Marsh region, along both sides of the
only railroad leading to it--the Brest-Litovsk-Kobryn-Pinsk-Gowel
railroad line--heavy fighting continued in Volhynia and East Galicia.
West of Kovno the Russians were thrown back of the Stubiel River on
September 9, 1915, by the Austrians. General von Bothmer's German
army, which formed the center of the forces in Volhynia and Galicia,
advanced from Zaloshe on the Sereth toward Zbaraz, a few miles
northeast of Tarnopol. Before the latter town, which the Russians
seemed to be determined to hold at any cost, new reenforcements had
appeared and opposed the advance of the Austro-German forces with the
utmost fierceness. In that sector they passed from the defensive to
the offensive, and with superior forces threw back the enemy again
from the Sereth to the heights on the east bank of the Strypa on
September 10, 1915. But with these heights at their back the German
line held and all Russian attacks broke down.
In spite of this they were renewed on September 11, 1915, with such
strength that small detachments succeeded in gaining a temporary
foothold in the enemy's trenches, where the bloodiest kind of
hand-to-hand fighting occurred. At that moment General von Bothmer
ordered an attack on both flanks of the Russians, who thereby were
forced to give up the advantage which they had so dearly bought.
However, this did not make the Russians lose heart. Again and again
they came on, and so fierce were their onslaughts that the
Austro-German line was finally withdrawn to the west bank of the
Strypa on September 13, 1915. To the north, along the Ikwa from Dubno
to the border, reenforcements were also brought up by the Russians and
succeeded in holding up any further advance on the part of the
Austrian troops. Especially hard fighting took place in the
neighborhood of Novo Alexinez, a little village just across the border
in Volhynia.
On September 15, 1915, Von Mackensen took Pinsk after having driven
the Russians out of practically all the territory between the Jasiolda
and Pripet Rivers. Considering that this city is, in a direct line,
more than 220 miles east of Warsaw, this accomplishment was little
short of marvelous, especially in view of the fact that the territory
surrounding Pinsk--the Pripet Marshes--offered immense difficulties.
However, the same difficulties were encountered by the retreating
Russians in even greater measure, because, while there is some solid
ground west of Pinsk, there is practically nothing but swamps to the
north, south, and east of the city, the direction in which the Russian
retreat necessarily had to proceed. It was thus possible for Von
Mackensen to report on September 17, 1915, the capture of 2,500
Russians south of Pinsk.
In the Volhynian and Galician theatre of war the struggle continued
without any abatement. Neither side, however, succeeded in gaining any
lasting and definite advantages. One day the Russians would throw
their enemies back across the Strypa, only to suffer themselves a like
fate on the next day in respect to the Sereth. More or less the same
conditions existed east of Lutsk and along the Ikwa, in both of which
regions the Russians continued their attempts to drive back the
Austro-Germans by repeated attacks.
After the conquest of Pinsk, Von Mackensen's army for a few days
continued its advance from that town in a northeasterly, easterly, and
southeasterly direction. But here, too, the advance stopped about
September 23, 1915, after some detachments which had crossed to the
north and northeast of Pinsk, over the Oginski Canal at Lahishyn, and
over the Jasiolda between its junction with the canal and the
Pinsk-Gomel railroad, had to be withdrawn on that date. In this
sector--from the Jasiolda to the Styr at Tchartorysk just south of the
Kovel-Kieff railway--the fighting assumed the form of trench warfare,
just as it did along the rest of the front south of the Vilia River.
The front there was along the Jasiolda from its junction with the
Oginski Canal, swung around Pinsk and east of it in a semicircle,
through the Pripet Marshes, crossed the Pripet River at Nobiet and
then continued in a southerly direction to Borana on the Styr, along
that river for a distance of about twenty miles, across the
Kovel-Kieff railroad at Rafalovka to Tchartorysk on the Styr.
Farther south the Russians gained some slight successes, and even
forced the Germans to retreat to the west bank of the Styr at Lutsk.
The fighting in that vicinity and along the Ikwa was very severe.
Especially was this true in the neighborhood of Novo Alexinez, where,
in very hilly country, the Russians launched attack after attack
against the Austro-German forces, without, however, being able to
dislodge them from their very strong positions. The battle raged
furiously on September 25, 1915, when some Russian detachments
succeeded in advancing a few miles to the southwest of Novo Alexinez
into the vicinity of Zaloshe. However, the Austrian resistance was so
strong that the Russians lost about 5,000 men. When on September 27,
1915, a German army under General von Linsingen had again forced its
way across the Styr at Lutsk and threatened to outflank the right wing
of the Russian forces, the latter finally gave way and retreated in
the direction of Kovno. A Russian attempt to break through the
Austro-German line, held by General von Bothmer's army, on the Strypa
west of Tarnopol, was made on October 2, 1915, but failed. The same
was true of attacks on the Ikwa west of Kremenet and north of Dubno
near Olyka, made on October 6, 1915. These were followed up on the
next day, October 7, 1915, with further attacks along the entire
Volhynian, East Galician, and Bessarabian front.
At that time this front extended as follows: Starting at Tchartorysk on
the Styr, a few miles south of the Kovel-Gomel railroad, it ran almost
straight south through Tsuman, crossed the Brest-Litovsk railroad a mile
or two north of Olyka, passed about fifteen miles west of Rovno to the
Rovno-Lemberg railroad, which it crossed a few miles east of Dubno, then
followed more or less the course of the Ikwa and passed through Novo
Alexinez. There it turned slightly to the west, crossed the Sereth about
ten miles farther south, passed through Jezierna on the Lemberg-Tarnopol
railroad and crossed the Strypa at the point where this river is cut by
the Brzezany-Tarnopol railroad, about fifteen miles west of the latter
city. Again bending somewhat, this time to the east, it continued
slightly to the west of the Strypa to a point on this river about
fifteen miles north of Buczacz, then followed the course of the Strypa
on both sides to this town, bent still more to the east, passing through
Pluste, about ten miles southeast of which it crossed the Sereth a few
miles north from its junction with the Dniester, coming finally to its
end at one of the innumerable bends in the Dniester, practically at the
Galician-Bessarabian border and about twenty miles northwest of the
fortress of Chotin. Although the amount of territory gained by the
Austro-Germans in the period beginning with the fall of Warsaw was
smaller in that section than in any other on the eastern front, it was
still of sufficient size to leave now in the hands of the Russians only
a very small part of Galicia, little more than forty miles wide at its
greatest width and barely eighty miles long at its greatest length.
CHAPTER XXIV
IN THE PRIPET MARSHES
A Great deal of the fighting after the fall of Brest-Litovsk, August
27, 1915, occurred in and near the extensive swamp lands surrounding
the city of Pinsk and located on both sides of the River Pripet. To
the Russians this part of the country is known as the Poliessie; its
official name is the Rokitno Marshes, after the little town of that
name situated slightly to the west, but it is usually spoken of as the
Pripet Marshes. Parts of this unhealthy and very difficult region are
located in five Russian governments: Mohileff, Kieff, Volhynia, Minsk,
and Grodno, and these swamps therefore are the border land of Poland,
Great Russia, and Little Russia. A comparatively small section of them
has been thoroughly explored and their exact limits have never been
determined. In the west and east the Rivers Bug and Dniester
respectively form a definite border, which is lacking in the south and
north, while to the northwest the famous Forest of Bielovies may be
considered its boundary. According to a very rough estimate the Pripet
Marshes are approximately one-half as large as the kingdom of Rumania;
only one river of importance runs through them, the Pripet, from
which, indeed, the marshes take their popular name. On both of its
sides the Pripet has a large number of tributaries, among which on the
right are: the Styr, the Gorin, the Usha, and on the left the Pina,
the Sluch, and the Ptych. A large number of small lakes are
distributed throughout the entire district. Quite a large number of
canals have been built, one of which connects the Pina with the Bug,
another the Beresina, of Napoleonic fame and a tributary of the
Dnieper, with the Ula and through the latter with the Dvina. In this
manner it is possible to reach the Baltic Sea by means of continuous
waterways from the Black Sea.
It is very difficult to conceive a clear picture of this region
without having actually seen it. In a way one may call it a gigantic
lake which away from its shores has been filled in with sand to a
small extent and to a larger extent has turned into swamps. It is
densely covered with rushes, and out of its waters, which are far from
clear, a multitude of stony islets rise up covered with dense
underbrush. Its center is surrounded by an even more dense seam of
pine forests. Its rivers and brooks are so slow that they can hardly
be distinguished from stagnant waters. The only town of any importance
within its limits is Pinsk on the Pina.
In a general way five railroad lines have been built through various
parts of the Pripet Marshes; the most important being a section of
the Rovno-Vilna railroad; two others of special importance to the
Russian retreat were the Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-Gomel and the
Ivangorod-Lublin-Cholm-Kovel-Kieff road. The Brest-Litovsk-Minsk
railroad also passes in its greatest part through the outlying
sections of the Pripet Marshes. The effect of these swamp lands on
the Russian retreat and the German advance, of course, was twofold:
it increased the difficulty of the Russian retreat, throwing at the
same time very serious obstacles in the way of the advancing
Germans.
To the southward, and in a region very similar in all its
characteristics, is the Volhynian triangle of fortresses: Lutsk,
Dubno, and Rovno. Here too, during the fighting around these three
places, the Russian and German armies had to contend with tremendous
difficulties, which were caused chiefly by the fact that this part of
the country, with the exception of a few sections, was almost
impassable. This fact, undoubtedly, was primarily responsible for the
decision of the Russian Government to locate these three powerful
fortresses at that particular point, because the very difficulties
which nature had provided became valuable aids to a strong defense
against an invasion of Russian territory by Austro-Hungarian troops
from the south.
The fortresses of Lutsk and Dubno date with their beginning as far
back as 1878, at which time they were built according to the plans of
the Russian General Todleben. A little later the fortifications of
Rovno were added to this group, and one of the strongest triangles of
Russia's fortifications was formed thereby. The sides of this triangle
measure thirty, twenty-five, and forty miles respectively. The
longest of these is the line between Lutsk and Rovno, with its back
toward the Pripet Marshes. Of the three fortresses Rovno is the most
important from a strategical point of view, for it defends the
junction of three of the most valuable railroads, the railway leading
from Lemberg into Volhynia, that running south from Vilna into
Galicia, and the railroad which by way of Berticheff indirectly
connects Kieff with both Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. The three
fortresses, therefore, acted as a wedge between the most southeastern
and the Polish zones of operations. They secured the connection of any
Russian forces in Poland with the interior of Russia, and made
possible the transfer of forces through the protection which they gave
to the various railroad lines necessary for such a transfer. On
account of the conditions of the surrounding territory it was
impossible for any attacking army to dispose of the fortresses by
investing them with part of their available forces while the balance
of them continued on their advance; for the only way to reach the
country in back of the three fortresses was by way of the fortresses
themselves, which meant, of course, that they would have to be taken
first before the advance could be continued. Furthermore, the
fortresses also acted as a barrier, protecting the approaches to
Kieff, enabling the undisturbed concentration of an army in that
protected zone while the enemy would be busily occupied in battering
his way through the fortress triangle. The latter were still more
strengthened by the Rivers Ikwa and Styr, which flow to the southwest
and north of them.
The fortifications of all these three points were not of particularly
recent origin, although they had been remodeled at various times since
their original creation. Lutsk, a city of some twenty thousand
inhabitants, is located on a small island of the Styr, and controls
the Kovel-Rovno section of the Brest-Litovsk-Berticheff railroad. Some
ten forts of various degrees of strength surrounded the central
fortifications, forming a girdle of forts with a circumference of
approximately ten miles. Dubno, southeast of Lutsk, a town of about
fifteen thousand inhabitants, is located in the valley of Ikwa on its
left bank, and protects the Brody-Zdolbitsa section of the
Lemberg-Rovno-Vilna railroad, with its branches to Kovel,
Brest-Litovsk, and to Kieff. The forts are not as numerous as at
Lutsk, but are more advantageously located and, therefore, proved more
difficult for the attacking Austro-Hungarian-German troops. Besides
the Styr and Ikwa Rivers this comparatively small sector offers other
natural advantages in the form of a number of smaller streams, the
defense of which is greatly assisted by the marshy condition of their
banks and the heavy growth of underbrush to be found there.
Rovno, the largest of the three cities, with about twenty thousand
inhabitants, was first fortified in 1887, and as a railroad junction
is even more important than either Lutsk or Dubno. Its fortifications
are built to serve as a fortified bridgehead. They amount to seven
forts of which five are located on the left bank of the Ustje and two
on the right. These forts were built in the form of a semicircle, at a
distance of four to six miles from the city itself and with a
circumference of approximately twenty-five miles. Originally this
group of fortresses undoubtedly was intended to act as a basis for a
Russian invasion of Galicia and Hungary rather than as a means of
defense against an invasion from these countries. And, indeed, in the
earlier part of the war, when the Russians forced their way into
Galicia and to the Carpathian Mountains, they fulfilled their purpose
with greater success than they were destined to achieve now as a means
of defense.
CHAPTER XXV
FIGHTING ON THE DVINA AND IN THE DVINA-VILNA SECTOR
At the time Warsaw fell, in the beginning of August, 1915, the eastern
front north of the Niemen extended as follows: Starting on the western
shore of the Gulf of Riga, at a point about twenty miles west of Riga
and about thirty miles northwest of Mitau it ran in a slightly curved
line in a southeasterly direction to the town of Posvol on the Musha
River, passing just west of Mitau and the River Aa, about ten miles
west of Bausk. From Posvol a salient with a diameter of about twenty
miles extended around Ponevesh on the Libau-Dvinsk railroad, with its
most eastern point a few miles west of Kupishki on the same railroad
line. From there the southern side of the salient passed through
Suboch and Rogoff to Keydany on the Nievraza, and along the banks of
that stream to its junction with the Niemen, about five miles west of
Kovno.
In a preceding chapter we have learned how this line was pushed back
by the Germans during and following the drive on Kovno and Vilna.
After Vilna's fall on September 18, 1915, the Germans had advanced
along the western shore of the Gulf of Riga to Dubbeln, about ten
miles west of Riga, at the Aa's delta. But, although the Germans
succeeded in crossing the Aa at Mitau and establishing their positions
to the east of that city, they were unable then, and in fact during
the following months, to approach closer to Riga at that point, so
that a salient was formed west of Riga, which at its widest point was
over twenty miles distant from this point. Just south of Mitau, the
south side of this salient bent almost straight to the east for a
distance of thirty miles until it reached Uexkuell on the Dvina, about
twenty miles southeast of Riga. From there the line followed almost
exactly the east bank of the Dvina, passing through the important
towns of Friedrichstadt and Jacobstadt, from where it bent due south,
gradually drawing away to the west of the Dvina River and passing west
and southwest of Dvinsk at a distance of about ten miles. All along
this line considerable fighting took place throughout September, 1915,
as has already been narrated.
During September 21-22, 1915, this fighting was especially severe west
and southwest of Dvinsk, where the Germans were making unsuccessfully
desperate efforts to break the Russian lines and get within striking
distance of Dvinsk. However, although they managed to maintain their
own lines against all Russian attacks and to gather in some 5,000
prisoners, they could not break the Russian defensive.
The Russian forces at this point were led by General Russky, among
whose commanders was Radko Dmitrieff, of Balkan War fame. Both of
these generals are to be counted among the greatest Russian leaders
and they were especially expert in everything that pertained to
fortresses and their defense. As wonderful as the German military
machine had proven itself, as severe as their often repeated
offensives were, as superior as their supply of artillery and
munitions was both in quality and quantity, Russky and Dmitrieff
proved a good match for them all. The possession of Dvinsk at that
particular moment would have meant an almost inestimable advantage to
the Germans, just as its loss would have been apt to mean the complete
rout of the Russians. For once the line broken to a sufficiently great
width at that point, all the Russian forces having their basis on
Petrograd, Smolensk, and Moscow might have been turned completely.
This supreme importance of Dvinsk was understood equally well by both
sides. On the part of the Germans this understanding resulted in
unceasing attacks by all available means and forces, while the
Russians on their part were prepared to defend their positions with a
stubbornness and determination unequaled by the case of any other
fortress with the possible exception of Riga and Rovno. The harder the
Germans drove their armies against Dvinsk the harder the Russians
fought to repulse them. The latter were greatly assisted in this by
the fact that strong reenforcements had been sent to this crucial
point from Petrograd and from other interior points. Still more
important was the beginning of considerable improvement in the Russian
supply of guns and shells. Even though, in that respect, Russky was
undoubtedly still far behind his German opponent, Von Hindenburg, yet
he was at that moment in a much better position than any other Russian
general. Dvinsk had to be held at all costs--the Russian General Staff
apparently had decided--and to Dvinsk, therefore, were sent all
available guns and munitions.
Originally the fortress of Dvinsk was far from being up to date or
particularly effective and imposing. It consisted of an old citadel
which, it is true, had been improved considerably; but even then its
outworks extended hardly farther than a mile beyond its own range. As
soon as General Russky assumed command he began feverishly to improve
these conditions. In this undertaking he was greatly assisted by the
nature of the countryside surrounding Dvinsk. Immediately to the
northwest, west, south, and southeast the River Dvina formed a strong
line of natural defense. Beyond that was a region thickly covered with
small and big lakes, which swung around Dvinsk as a center, in the
form of an immense three-quarters circle, starting to the south of the
Libau-Ponevesh-Dvinsk railroad and stopping just west of the
Dvinsk-Pskoff-Petrograd railroad. The diameter of this circle varies
from thirty miles to sixty. The ground between these lakes is swampy
in many places, difficult of approach, and comparatively easy to
defend even against superior forces, especially because most of it is
not entirely flat, but interspersed with hills and woodlands.
Throughout this entire district the Russians built a dense network of
trenches, and it was especially by means of these that the Germans
were repulsed not only successfully but with great losses to their
attacking forces. The more important of these earth fortifications
were built in a novel fashion. The main part of each had the form of a
crescent with its horns turned toward the enemy. Every attack from the
latter, in order to find a point big enough for an effective attack,
had to be frontal in nature; that means, it had to be directed against
the main part of the crescent-shaped trench. But, whenever such a
frontal attack would be executed and just as soon as the attackers
would be inside of the sides of the crescent, machine guns and rifle
fire from its two horns would hit them on both flanks and frequently
destroy them utterly. In order to make the Germans advance far enough
into the crescent, advanced trenches had been built in front of its
horns, which were connected with the main part of the crescent by
communicating trenches.
These advanced trenches were manned by comparatively small forces,
whose duty it was to offer a sufficiently strong resistance to draw a
fairly good-sized number of Germans. This purpose having been
accomplished the troops in the advanced trenches would give way and
retire by means of the communicating trenches into their main
positions. Again and again the Germans followed them into the
death-dealing hollow, to be decimated unmercifully in the manner
described above. At the same time Russian guns would open fire and
direct a sheet of shells toward the back of the attacker, thus cutting
off most effectively any reenforcements which might have made it
possible for the Germans to either storm the main trench or withdraw
at least that part of their attacking party which had not yet fallen
prey to Russian ingenuity. It is said that General Russky contrived to
throw out fortifications of this nature around Dvinsk in an immense
circle which had a diameter of twenty miles and with its circumference
formed a front of almost two hundred miles. Of course, this front was
not in the form of an unbroken line. There were any number of places
along it that could be occupied by the Germans practically at will.
But once there the next advance would invariably bring them face to
face with a new obstacle, kill hundreds of them, and frequently result
in the withdrawal of the remnant to its main line, from where another
advance would be attempted promptly on the next day.
One other feature of these fortifications contributed a great deal to
their becoming practically impregnable. The Russian engineering troops
saw to it that all these works were built as narrow as possible and
were dug as deep as the ground permitted. It was this fact which made
the German artillery fire so surprisingly ineffective at this point.
In spite of its unceasing fierceness the results it accomplished were
as nothing compared with the effort and expense it involved. For, of
course, no matter how brilliant the gunnery, how wonderful the cannon,
how devastating the shells, if the target at which they are aimed is
sufficiently far away and sufficiently small, the result will be
disappointing; and the Russians at Dvinsk saw to it that the Germans
experienced a long series of costly and heartbreaking disappointments
of that nature.
A Hungarian staff correspondent, who was with Von Hindenburg's army,
had this to say about the siege of Dvinsk, or rather about the attacks
on its outlying fortifications: "The German army could not make use
of its heavy artillery, for it proved quite useless, owing to the
extreme narrowness of the Russian trenches. In the lake district south
of Dvinsk the Russians made the utmost of their natural defenses, and
even the advanced trenches there were only occupied after very heavy
losses, and then retained under the most trying circumstances. In
taking Novo Alexandrovsk--a village about fifteen miles southwest of
Dvinsk on the Dvinsk-Kovno post road--the losses incurred on our part
were unprecedented in severity."
Another correspondent in writing to his paper, the "Vossische
Zeitung," describes the fortifications of Dvinsk as follows: "Every
rod of land is covered with permanent trenches, roofed securely
against shrapnel and shell fragments and connected with so-called 'fox
holes'--small shelters in which the garrisons are safe against the
heaviest shells. Sand trenches, skillfully laid out, so that they are
mutually outflanking, smother exploding projectiles. The flanking fire
of the machine guns often annihilates the assailants when they are
apparently successfully attacking. One company alone thus lost
fifty-one dead in one day. Between September 15 and October 26, 1915,
Dvinsk, in a way, was captured fifteen times, but it is still in
Russian hands. The bombardment has reduced the fortress in size
one-half without affecting in the least the strength of the
remainder."
South of Dvinsk, however, the Germans had been able to advance their
line slightly farther to the east. On September 27-28, 1915, and the
following days they were fighting on the shores of Lake Drysvidly,
about ten miles east of the Dvinsk-Vilna railroad, and at Postavy, ten
miles south of the Disna River, a southern tributary of the Dvina.
Again on October 1, 1915, the Russians attacked north of Postavy, as
well as south on the shores of Lakes Narotch and Vishneff, but without
success. Throughout the next day the fighting continued, although not
particularly severe. But on October 6, 1915, stronger Russian forces
were again thrown against the German lines. In the beginning they
gained ground at Koziany, on the Disna, and south on Lakes Drysvidly
and Vishneff, but the day's net results left the Germans in possession
of their old positions. Russian attacks in that region during October
7-8, 1915, suffered the same fate.
On the latter day the Germans made an attack in force south of Ilukst,
ten miles to the northwest of Dvinsk, and took the village of
Garbunovka, capturing over 1,000 Russians and some machine guns. On
the next day, October 9, 1915, the Russians attempted unsuccessfully
to regain these positions and were also defeated to the west of
Ilukst, north of the Ponevesh-Dvinsk railroad. On the 10th, attacks
west of Dvinsk and Vidzy, north of the Disna, had no better results.
Throughout the following week, October 10 to 17, 1915, the Russian
army continuously attacked along the entire line west and south of
Dvinsk. In some instances they succeeded in breaking temporarily and
for short distances through the German line. But in no case did this
lead to a lasting success and, in some instances even, the Germans
closed the line again so quickly that the Russian detachments who had
broken through were cut off from their main body and fell into the
hands of the Germans.
Both on October 22 and 23, 1915, the Russians launched strong attacks
near Sadeve, south of Kosiany, which were repulsed in both instances.
On the latter day the Germans again attacked northwest of Dvinsk, near
Ilukst, and captured some Russian positions as well as over 3,500 men
and twelve machine guns, maintaining their hold on the former in the
face of strong Russian counterattacks on October 24, 1915. Small
German detachments which had advanced toward the north of Ilukst on
that day, however, had to give way promptly to superior Russian
forces. In spite of this the Germans repeated the experiment on the
following day with stronger forces and at that time gained their
point. On October 26, 1915, the Germans broke through the Russian line
south of the Ponevesh-Dvinsk railroad, between the latter city and the
station of Abele, but had to give up part of the newly-gained
positions during the night only to regain it again the next morning. A
Russian attack against this position undertaken later on that day,
October 27, 1915, broke down under German artillery fire, before it
had fully developed.
In a similar way the most furious kind of fighting took place
throughout this period on the Riga salient. There, too, the Russians,
successfully held the Germans at a safe distance. In the second half
of October, 1915, when Von Hindenburg apparently had become convinced
that he would not succeed in taking Dvinsk before the coming of
winter, if at all, the German general began to shift the center of his
operations toward the north and massed large forces against Riga.
According to some reports as many as six army corps were concentrated
at that point. The country there, though different from that in the
vicinity of Dvinsk, was hardly less difficult for the Germans and
offered almost as many opportunities for natural defenses to the
Russians.
We have already described at the beginning of this chapter the exact
location of the salient that ran around Riga from Dubbeln on the Gulf
of Riga by way of Mitau to Uexkuell on the Dvina. The first sector of
it--Dubbeln-Mitau--was approximately twenty-five miles long, and the
second--Mitau-Uexkuell--about thirty miles. On its western and
northwestern side it was bounded to a great extent by the River Aa and
by the eastern half of Lake Babit. The latter is about ten miles long,
but only a little more than one mile in width and runs almost parallel
to part of the south shore of the Gulf of Riga, at a distance of about
three miles.
On its southern and southeastern sides the salient followed, for some
ten miles, first the post road and then the railroad from Mitau to
Kreutzburg on the Dvina--about fifty miles northwest of Dvinsk--and
then turned to the northeast for another twenty miles or so. On this
latter stretch it crossed two tributaries of the River Aa, the Eckau
and the Misse. Through the entire depth of the salient, in a
southwesterly direction from Riga, runs a section about twenty-five
miles long of the Riga-Mitau-Libau railroad, cutting it practically
into two equal parts. Another railroad connects Riga with Dubbeln and
still another with Uexkuell, so that the Russians had good railroad
communications to every point of the salient. The inside of the
latter, besides the rivers mentioned, contained some half dozen other
smaller waterways, tributaries of the Aa and Dvina, and was covered
almost entirely with dense forests. In the center of these there are
located extensive swamps known as the Tirul Marshes, and smaller
stretches of swamp lands are also found in various other sections of
these woods.
With the exception of the Mitau-Riga railroad there are only two means
of approaching Riga, a fairly good road that leads along Lake Babit
from the Aa to Riga, and another that runs from Gross Eckau on the
Eckau River through the woods by way of Kekkau to Riga and in its
northern part parallels the Dvina. The latter stream widens
considerably about ten or fifteen miles above Riga and forms many
small islands, the largest of which is Dalen Island, just to the north
of Kekkau. Separating it from the mainland is only a comparatively
narrow arm of the Dvina. The northern tip of the island is solid,
somewhat elevated ground, and commands the eastern main arm of the
Dvina as well as its eastern bank. If the Germans could gain this
island their chances of reaching Riga from the south would be many
times increased. An attack in that direction had nothing to fear from
a flanking movement on the part of the Russians, because the latter
would be prevented from getting at their advancing enemy either from
the west or northwest by the impassable Tirul Marshes.
On October 16, 1915, the Germans decided to attempt this maneuver and
made a rather unexpected attack east of Mitau and north of Eckau and
forced the Russians back of the Misse River, an eastern tributary of
the River Aa, near Basui, on which occasion they claimed to have
captured over 10,000 men. Some more ground was gained in that
neighborhood during the next three days.
Immediately the Russians retaliated by an equally unexpected naval
operation far to the north, at the western entrance to the Gulf of
Riga. A Russian fleet appeared there and bombarded the ports of
Domesnaes and Gipken. Detachments were landed. Although they destroyed
some of the fortifications that had been erected there by the Germans
and scattered the small forces which the Germans had there, they
withdrew within a few days. This operation had practically no
influence on the further developments along the balance of the front,
except that, threatening as it was for the time being to the German
rear, it resulted in a temporary reduction of the pressure that the
Germans were trying to exert from the south.
One other attempt to reach Riga before the coming of winter was made
toward the end of October. Apparently the German plan was to make a
triple attack on the Baltic fortress. From the south another drive was
made against Dalen Island. From the southwest the new offensive
started from Mitau in the direction of Olai along the Mitau-Riga
railroad, and from the west reenforcements that had been concentrated
at Tukum advanced on both sides of Lake Babit. However, this
offensive, too, was unsuccessful. Especially that started along the
north shore of Lake Babit proved costly to the Germans. There the
stretch of land between the gulf and the lake is nowhere more than
three miles wide, and in many places not that wide. Through its entire
length flows the Aa. It is only sparsely wooded. Comparatively small
Russian forces successfully opposed the advancing Germans, whose
narrow front was easily dominated and driven back by machine guns and
field artillery; from the gulf, too, Russian war vessels trained their
guns on the Germans, and the attack was quickly broken up with
considerable losses to the attackers and only small losses to the
defenders. Against these conditions the Germans seemed to be helpless.
They fell back along the north shore of Lake Babit and along the Aa
toward their base at Schlock. This, of course, necessitated a
simultaneous withdrawal of the German forces on the south shore of the
lake. The Russians immediately followed up their advantage, and by
November 6, 1915, the Germans had withdrawn all their forces from
along the north side of the Tirul Marshes. About that time the Germans
withdrew beyond the Aa to its west bank, and on November 8, 1915, the
Russians stormed the village of Kemmern, about five miles west of
Schlock. During the next two weeks, November 8 to 22, 1915, continuous
fighting took place to the north of the Schlock-Tukum railroad. This
resulted in the storming by the Russians of the villages of Anting and
Ragasem on the shores of Lake Kanger and the withdrawal of the
Germans beyond the west shore of this lake.
As early as the beginning of November weather conditions had made
fighting on a large scale impossible for a few weeks. Attacks and
counterattacks, such as we have just described, were still kept up in
front of Dvinsk and Riga, it is true, but they gradually lost in
extent and severity and brought practically no changes of any
importance. Along the rest of the front, down to the Vilia, the
fighting assumed, like everywhere else on the eastern front, the form
of trench warfare, interrupted occasionally by artillery duels of
considerable severity, doing, however, more damage to the landscape
than to the military forces. Aero attacks on a small scale, too, were
the order on both sides whenever opportunity and climatic conditions
permitted. This state of affairs continued throughout the months of
November and December, 1915, and January and February, 1916.
Throughout this period the Russo-German lines in the Dvina-Vilia
sector remained practically unchanged, although, of course, minor
readjustments took place here and there. In the north, along the Aa
and Dvina, and before Dvinsk, it was still in the same position that
has been described in the beginning of this chapter, except that it
had been pushed back from Dubbeln to Lake Kanger, Kemmern, and the
River Aa. At the point where it crossed the Vilna-Dvinsk railroad,
about ten miles southwest of Dvinsk, it bent still more to the
southeast, passed east of Lake Drysvidly, then about ten miles east of
Vidzy, crossed the Disna near Koziany, and reached its most easterly
point a few miles west of the village of Dunilovichy. From there it
bent back again in a westerly direction, but ran still toward the
south, about ten miles east of Lake Narotch, and at the same distance
to the west of the town of Vileika to the Vilia, just north of
Smorgon.
In spite of all the severe fighting before Dvinsk and Riga, neither of
these cities had yet been brought within the range of the majority of
the German guns, even though continuous local successes had been
gained on the part of the German troops. The losses which the latter
suffered cannot be stated definitely, because no official figures,
either Russian or German, are available. They must have been severe,
however. The net result of all the fighting in the region before
Dvinsk, which had then been in progress practically for fifty days,
therefore, was next to nothing for the Germans and hardly more for the
Russians. Neither had been able to gain any definite success over the
other. Throughout all this time the Germans not only made innumerable
infantry attacks, but also kept up an incessant artillery fire,
throwing as many as 100,000 shells a day against the Russian
positions. That they did not gain their point speaks well, not only
for the valor of the Russian army, but also for the ability of its
leader, General Russky.
CHAPTER XXVI
WINTER BATTLES ON THE STYR AND STRYPA RIVERS
As the autumn of 1915 drew to an end and winter approached, the
fighting along the eastern front changed from attacks over more or
less extensive spaces to trench warfare within very restricted
territory and to artillery duels. This change took place, as we have
already seen, as far as the front from the Vilia River down to the
southern limits of the Pripet Marshes was concerned, as early as the
end of September, 1915. Farther south, however, along the Styr and its
tributary, the Ikwa, and in the region through which the Strypa,
Sereth, and Dniester flow, in the Russian provinces of Volhynia and in
Austro-Hungarian East Galicia, the severest kind of fighting was kept
up much longer.
The preceding chapter carried us, as far as this territory was
concerned, up to October 7, 1915. On that day the Russians attacked
with all available forces of men and munitions along the entire
Volhynian, Galician, and Bessarabian front. One of the principal
points of contention was the little town of Tchartorysk on the Styr,
about five miles south of the Warsaw-Kovel-Kieff railroad. To the
northwest of it the Germans under General Linsingen began a
counterattack on October 7, 1915, and threw the Russians across the
Styr. A Russian counterattack, undertaken on the 8th with the object
of regaining their lost position, was frustrated by artillery fire. To
the north, just across the railroad at Rafalovka, attacks and
counterattacks followed each other as regularly as day and night. For
about two weeks a series of local engagements on this small front of
ten or fifteen miles took place with such short periods of rest that
one may well speak of them as the Battle of Tchartorysk. Neither side,
however, seemed to be able to gain any marked advantage.
About the 18th of October, 1915, the Russians succeeded, after
bringing up reenforcements, in driving a wedge into the Austro-German
line which they were able to maintain until October 21, 1915. On that
day the Austro-Germans, too, brought up reenforcements and started a
strong offensive movement. From three sides the small salient was
attacked near Okonsk, and after furious resistance it caved in.
Russian counterattacks to the north and south, undertaken in order to
relieve the pressure on the center, had no effect. The Russians were
forced to retreat, and left 15 officers, 3,600 men, 1 cannon, and 8
machine guns in the hands of their enemies. However, the Russians came
on again and again, and the battle continued for a number of days.
Step by step the Russian troops were forced back again toward the
Styr. Village after village was stormed by the combined Austro-German
forces. In many cases small villages changed hands three or four times
in as many days. Not a day passed without repeated attempts on the
part of both sides to break through the line. But though some of these
were successful, sometimes for the Russians and sometimes for their
adversaries, the gains were only temporary and local, and were usually
wiped out again before long. On November 16, 1915, however, the
Austro-German forces gained a decided victory over the Russians, who
were thrown back to the east bank of the Styr under very heavy losses.
By that time the winter weather had become too severe for extensive
operations, and comparative inactivity ruled along that part of the
front.
While the Battle of Tchartorysk was raging, engagements of varying
importance and extent, but all of great severity and costly to victor
and vanquished alike, took place at other parts of the Volhynian,
Galician, and Bessarabian front. Just south of Tchartorysk, near Kolki
on the Styr, Austrian troops gained additional territory on October 7,
1915. Still farther south at Olyka, west of Rovno, the Russians were
thrown back by a bayonet attack, carried out by two Austro-Hungarian
infantry regiments. On the Ikwa, northwest of Kremenets, a very bitter
struggle ensued for the village of Sopanov, which during one day,
October 7, 1915, changed hands not less than four times, but finally
remained in the possession of Austro-Hungarian forces west of
Tarnopol. Russian attacks gained temporary successes, which were lost
again when German and Austro-Hungarian reenforcements were brought to
their assistance. On October 8, 1915, these attacks were not only
repeated, but new attacks developed on the Strypa at Buczacz, Tluste,
and Burkanov, which, however, were all repulsed. During these two days
the Russians lost over 6,000 men on the Styr and Strypa Rivers. Again,
on October 9-10, 1915, the Russians attacked along these two waterways
and on the Ikwa. On the latter day four separate attacks were launched
at Burkanov alone. On the 14th another attempt was made to break
through the line west of Tarnopol. Then a period of comparative rest
set in for about a week.
But on October 20, 1915, a new Russian attack near Novo Alexinez, a
small border village, resulted in a slight gain, which, however, could
not be enlarged in spite of heroic efforts. An attack east of Zaloshe
on the Sereth was likewise without success. Both of these were
repeated on October 21-22, 1915, without better results. During the
next week the fighting was reduced considerably in volume and
severity, until on October 30, 1915, a new attack with replenished
forces against the Strypa line started the ball rolling once more. On
the same day a Russian aeroplane was brought down southeast of Lutsk.
According to official figures published by the General Staffs of the
German and Austro-Hungarian armies respectively, the Russian losses
during the month of October, 1915, amounted to 244 officers, 41,000
men, 23 cannon, and 80 machine guns, all captured by German forces,
and 142 officers, 26,000 men, 1 cannon, 44 machine guns, and 3
aeroplanes captured by the Austro-Hungarian troops. Corresponding
figures for the armies of the Central Powers are not available.
On the last day of October, 1915, renewed fighting broke out again on
the Strypa, near Sikniava, where the Russians had concentrated strong
forces. The Austrians met a strong attack with a prompt counterattack
and carried the day. As before, the fighting, once started at one
point on the Strypa, quickly spread. On November 2, 1915, the
engagement at Sikniava was continued, and a new attack developed near
Buczacz with the usual more or less negative result for both
sides--maintenance of all attacked positions without gain of new
territory. Another series of very bitter clashes occurred between
November 4-7, 1915, near the village of Sienkovce on the Strypa.
During the same period fighting went on also at many other points of
that small river, which by this time had seen the flow of almost as
much blood as water.
Southeast of the village of Visnyvtszyk on the Strypa seven separate
Russian attacks were launched within these four days. On the 7th a
strong attack was made also in the neighborhood of Dubno from the
direction of Rovno without gaining ground. Isolated attacks of varying
extent took place for a few more days. But by that time severe winter
weather restricted operations in this sector just as it had done along
the balance of the eastern front. Of course occasional attacks were
started whenever a lull in the snowstorms or a favorable change in
temperature made it possible. But, generally speaking, the Styr and
Strypa section now settled down to trench fighting, artillery duels,
and minor engagements between advanced outposts. The Russian losses
during the month of November, 1915, as far as they were inflicted by
Austro-Hungarian troops, totaled 78 officers, 12,000 men, and 32
machine guns.
Late in December, 1915, on the 24th, the Russians, disregarding
climatic conditions, once more began an extensive offensive movement
in East Galicia and on the Bessarabian border, with Czernovitz, the
capital of the Austro-Hungarian province of Bukowina, as its
apparent objective. It lasted until January 15, 1916, or
twenty-three days, interrupted only occasionally by a day or two of
slightly decreased activity. Its net result for the Russian army, in
spite of very heavy losses in killed, wounded, and captured, was
only the certainty of having inflicted fairly heavy losses on the
German and Austro-Hungarian troops opposing them. Territory they
could not gain, at least not to a large enough extent to be of any
influence on the further development of events. The severest
fighting during these operations took place near Toporoutz and
Rarawotse on the Bessarabian border. Much of it was at very close
range, and on many days the Russians made three and four, sometimes
even more, successive attacks against one and the same problem.
Especially bitter fighting occurred on January 11, 1916, when one
position was attacked five times during the day and a sixth time as
late as ten o'clock that night.
Coinciding with the Russian attempt to break once more through the
Austro-Hungarian line into the Bukowina, attacks were launched from
time to time at various places on the Dniester, Sereth, and Strypa,
especially in the vicinity of Buczacz. None of these, however, had any
effect, nor were other very occasional attacks west of Rovno and on
the Styr of more avail. During the three weeks of fighting the
Russians, according to official Austro-Hungarian figures, lost over
5,000 men by capture.
[Illustration: The Battle Front In Russia, January 1, 1916.]
After a few days' lull the Russian armies began another battle with
strong forces near Toporoutz and Bojan, east of Czernovitz, on January
18, 1916. The severity of the fighting increased on the next day,
January 19, 1916, and at the same time heavy artillery fire was
directed against many other points along the East Galician front.
Again the Russians suffered severe losses during their repeated
storming attacks against the strongly fortified positions of the
Austro-Hungarian troops. After two days' preparation, by means of
artillery fire, another attack was thrust against the Toporoutz
section on January 22, 1916, but when this, too, did not bring the
desired result the Russians apparently lost heart. For, from then on
for the balance of January, 1916, as well as through the entire month
of February, 1916, they made further attacks only at very rare
intervals, but otherwise restricted themselves to artillery duels and
trench fighting.
CHAPTER XXVII
ON THE TRACKS OF THE RUSSIAN RETREAT
In the preceding chapters we have followed, day by day, the military
events of the Russian retreat and of the German advance after the fall
of Warsaw and Ivangorod. With admiration we have heard of the deeds of
valor accomplished by the various armies of the three belligerents.
The endurance that they displayed, the hardships that they had to
bear, the losses that they suffered--both victor and conquered--have
given us a clearer idea what war means to the men that actually wage
it. Occasionally we have had glimpses of the devastation that it
brings to the country over the hills and valleys and over the plains
and forests of which it rages. Again and again we have been told of
the horrible suffering and utter ruin which was the share of the civic
population, rich and poor, young and old, man, woman, or child. But
these latter features are apt to be overshadowed by the more
sensational events of battle and siege, and in the excitement of these
we easily lose sight of the tremendous drama in which not trained
soldiers act the parts, but ordinary everyday beings, farmers and
merchants, working men and women, students and scholars, people of
every age, race, and condition, people just like we ourselves and like
those with whom we come in daily contact throughout our entire life.
And yet their numbers run into the tens of millions as compared with
the hundreds of thousands or perhaps four or five millions of
soldiers, and it is _their_ suffering--bared as it is of the glory and
excitement that usually lightens the life of the fighting man--that is
the quintessence of war's tragedy.
No one who has not been himself a participant or an actual observer of
these horrors can really and truly gauge their full extent or describe
them adequately. But a clear record of them is as much an essential
requirement of a war's history as a chronological narration of its
various events. In the following paragraphs will be found gathered
reliable reports based on the keen observation of men who in their
capacity as special correspondents of various newspapers had
opportunities to collect and observe facts at close range and the very
vicinity where they transpired. They come from various sources, but
chiefly from the narrative of a war correspondent published in the
Munich "Neueste Nachrichten," who was himself an eyewitness of what he
describes. Although they refer more especially to that part of Russia
that is situated between the Galician border and the fortress of
Brest-Litovsk--the region of the Bug River--they might have been
written equally well of any part or all of the eastern theatre of war,
for they are typical of what happened throughout that vast territory
that stretches from the eastern front as it stood at the time of
Warsaw's fall in the beginning of August, 1915, to that other line
that formed a new front, much farther to the east, when the German
advance into Russia came to an end in the latter part of October,
1915:
"The first anniversary of the war had just passed. Again summer was
upon us, like in those days of mobilization. The atmosphere was full
with memories of the beginning of the campaign. Out of Galicia an
endless column rolled to the north into Poland. The old picture: the
creaking road, overloaded with marching troops, with artillery lustily
rolling forward, with caravans of supply trains. Repeating itself a
thousandfold, the sum total of the mass deepened the impression and
made the idea of the 'supreme command of an army' appear like a fairy
tale. Supply wagon after supply wagon, mile after mile, in a long,
never-breaking chain!
"The greater the distance of the observer, the deeper becomes the
impression of the general impulse of advance, of the sameness of its
direction and motion. Can we see a difference as compared with earlier
times? Can we notice if the new class of soldiers are equal to the
older; if the horses are in the same good condition as before? All in
all, it is the same play, even if with new actors in its parts, which
was acted before us during the very first days of the war, never to be
forgotten: a variety of types, unified by the purpose that was common
to all.... Of course, the close observer will always be able to make
distinctions. To him all soldiers are not just soldiers. Through their
uniforms he will recognize the farmer, the artisan, the factory hand,
the slim young volunteer, the genial 'Landwehr' or 'Landsturm' man,
the teacher, schoolboy, student, clerk, and professional soldier.
"Before them stretches a new country. Broader plains, lower ranges of
hills than in Galicia. To the right and left, as far as the eye
reaches, fields, meadows, and swamps. Here and there, windmills.
Immense forests, different from those they knew at home: pines, oaks,
and birches, all mixed together, with some ash-trees and poplars, only
slightly cut down and low of growth. The retreating Russians have
tried everywhere to burn down forest and field, but have destroyed in
most places only narrow strips and small spots that look now like
islands: there the trees have been bared of their foliage in the
middle of the summer as if it were the early spring, and the pines are
red and brown like beech trees in the winter time. Every few miles
trenches and shelters had been cut into the landscape and ran across
field and forest, hills and valleys, masterpieces of their kind,
cunningly hidden, partly untouched. Alongside the road there were
many, many soldiers' graves, singly or sometimes combined into small
cemeteries. The Russians bury their dead with devotion. Double-armed
Greek crosses betray their burial places.... But not always did they
find time during their retreat. Occasionally a penetrating odor of
decay announces the fact that some of their dead had to be deprived
of burial. Then, very rarely only, indeed, one comes across black,
swollen corpses, so terribly gnawed and disfigured by millions of
small crawling animals, that all individuality, all humanity, has been
destroyed.
"The advance moves on for miles on curious roads. Are these still
roads? There is no foundation. Just cuts have been made into the
ground, which is sandy here and muddy there and again swampy. During
dry weather they take turns in being dusty like the desert, or hard as
stone or gently yielding; during rain they are without exception
unreliable, spiteful, dangerous. The burden of the uninterrupted
transport traffic escapes to the left and to the right farther and
farther into the edges of the fields, cutting off continuously new
widths of wheel tracks so that roadways are formed 150 to 300 feet
wide, which narrow down only at bridges or fords by sheer necessity.
All bridges, even those that have been spared by the Russians, have to
be solidly renewed and supported, for they had never been intended for
such demands. Across furrows and deeply cut wheel tracks, across loose
footbridges, through puddles that are more like ponds, and through
deep holes, motorcars--fast automobiles and gigantic motor
trucks--rush and rumble madly, from time to time helplessly sinking
down into the mud and mire till relays of horses and the force of the
next detachment pushing forward on its way rescues them and they are
off again."
"The road is lined with a sad seam of dead horses. Still other
cadavers poison the air and entice swarms of greedy crows. The
Russians have killed all cattle which they were unable to carry along
quickly enough or to eat upon the spot, and then left the carcasses on
or alongside the road: cattle, pigs, sheep have been shot down in this
fashion, so that the pursuer should find no other booty than ashes and
carrion.
"At some distance from the line of march there may be left some
untouched villages, sound, normal, human settlements. But one does not
see them. Wherever the fighting has been going on, we pass by debris
and ruins. Big villages have been burned from one end to the other
into empty rows of chimneys and blackened heaps of tumbled-down
houses.
"The churches alone sometimes have been shown some respect. As far as
they have not been riddled by shells or have not lost their roofs,
they are still standing, clean and almost supernatural with their
white or pink wooden walls, their shrilly blue or deep red domes, and
their shining gilt decorations. Everything else has gone up in flames
or has been shot to pieces.
"Out of the general wreckage a few utensils and pieces of furniture
stick out here and there: bent beds, crumpled-up sewing machines,
half-melted pans and pots. Sometimes it is even possible to form an
idea of the former appearance of a house from the design of its
blackened wall paper or from a few remnants of some other decorations.
Here and there small corners and nooks have been preserved as if by a
miracle, and, in some unaccountable way, have survived the ruin that
surrounds them on all sides: strips of a flower garden, or perhaps a
summer-house with a table in it and a cover and breakfast dishes on
the table.
"Up on a chimney, half of which has tumbled down, stands a stork, as
if he were meditating over the ruin wrought by human hands; suddenly
he pulls himself together, spreads out his wings with quick decision,
floats down into his familiar pond and forgets the raving of maddened
mankind in the enjoyment of a juicy frog. Through the labyrinth of a
fallen-down barn limps a big black cat, tousled and scratched, already
half-maddened from hunger, vicious like a wounded panther. Along what
had been once streets run packs of dogs gone wild, restlessly smelling
at dirt and corpses, growing bolder day by day until finally they have
to be shot down.
"Only few people can stand it on this God-forsaken stage of misery.
Occasionally a few thin Jews in their long coats walk across the ruins
of the market place, which look like a stage setting. On their
shoulders they carry in a bundle their few belongings, like pictures
of the Wandering Jew. Their families live for a short time from
whatever they can scratch together from the ruins or out of the
trampled-down fields. They cook and bake on one of the stoves standing
everywhere right out in the open road and offer their poor wares for
exhibition and sale on a few boards, a last effort to support life by
trade. In the case of the women, no matter what the nationality, it
always seems as if they had saved out of the horrible destruction only
their best and brightest clothes. At a distance their colors shine and
smile as if nothing at all had happened. But upon coming up closer,
one can easily see how little these unfortunate beings carry on their
poor backs.
"More than once we stand perplexed before the touching picture of a
short rest on the 'flight to Egypt.' A little family--is it the only
one that has remained behind when everybody else wandered away, or
have they already come back home because there was nothing better to
be found out in the world? In the garden of a plundered farmhouse they
have put up a poor imitation of a stable out of charred boards, and in
it they live more poorly than the poorest gypsies. Their lean cow has
been tied to a bush; among the trampled-down vegetables their equally
lean mule grazes. The mother squats on the ground, nursing a child,
while father and son are stirring up a heap of glowing ashes and
roasting a handful of potatoes that they have dug up somewhere.
"The return pilgrimage of the natives has already begun at an
extensive rate. The advancing Germans are met everywhere by long lines
of them, on foot and in wagons, carrying with them carefully and
lovingly the few remnants of their herds. What has been their
experience?
"One nice day the Cossacks had appeared at their farms and had told
them: 'Not a soul is allowed to remain here. The Germans are
approaching and the Germans will torture you all to death if they
catch you. Take with you whatever you can carry. Everything else must
be burned and destroyed, so that the Germans won't find anything that
they can use.' That was enough to make these poor, ignorant farmers
take leave of their homesteads. By the thousands they wandered off
quickly and without much hesitation. Some were driven away like so
much cattle, day by day farther into an uncertain future. Others were
carried in long columns of wagons to the nearest railroad and still
others were led orderly by their own mayors and village elders. In
the inland of the Empire they were to found for themselves new homes.
The czar was going to look after them. Russia is powerful and rich. It
will lure the Germans into its swamps so that they will drown there
miserably. It will draw them all the way to Moscow and there they will
experience the deadly fate of 1812. Just like Napoleon will the
Germans suffer this time. This patriotic hope, however, did not
compensate the farmers for their lost homes. It is true they get
enough to eat every day. At their resting places they are fed from
field kitchens supplied and equipped by the Russian army and
administered by civil committees. Hunger they did not need to suffer.
But for all that, their home-sickness will not down, and the dislike
of the continuous wandering, the aversion to strange places, the
loathing of the unorderly, irregular life of nomads strengthens their
determination to turn off their road at the first opportunity and to
seek the long way back to their village, in spite of the terrible
Germans.
"But in the meantime the world has been turned upside down, their
homes are unrecognizable; nothing, absolutely nothing, is as it used
to be. Wherever there is the smallest nook that has remained
inhabitable, some stranger has built a nest. The new authorities speak
German, rule German, and run things in a German way. The need to
protect themselves against epidemics, and political prudence, demand
that these homeless wanderers should not be permitted to wander around
any longer at will. Into cities they are not allowed to enter, or even
to pass through them. Out in the country, the field police watch them
carefully, for more and more frequently adventurous groups are
formed--states in a very small way and without any regard for anybody
else. Strong fellows with plenty of nerve use this rare opportunity,
make themselves leaders and dictators of these groups, organize new
communities, which they rule with a strong hand, make laws, inflict
punishments, and impose their will just as they please. That makes it
necessary for the German authorities to interfere promptly and to
bring order and authority to bear on these insecure conditions. The
population is registered and no one is allowed to immigrate or to
emigrate without the proper papers.
"Of course, there are also good, carefully tended main roads besides
the bad country paths, and some of them are even paved for miles. One
of these runs right straight from the south toward the Polish city of
Cholm. For miles one can see this road, which looks like a ribbon that
grows narrower and narrower all the time; in the background is a
forest, through and beyond which the road runs. At the farther end of
the forest, on the shoulders of a hill, are the white buildings of the
monastery of the Russian bishopric of Cholm. Only when one comes
within a few hundred steps of these buildings does one see the low,
long, stretched-out little town in line with the ridge of the hills
that drop away to the north....
"A little farther on, to the northwest of this little country town, is
the larger, rich city of Lublin. There all the advantages of
civilization are in evidence: street cars, electric lights, department
stores, coffee houses. But here, too, war, want, and misery have left
their impression on everything: old men, women, children in rags,
asking for shelter and stretching out their thin arms for bread. On
all the squares troops pass and cross each other, delaying the
traffic. There are Germans and Austro-Hungarians in long columns and
then again a long line of Russian prisoners of war, marching to work.
Among the well-dressed ladies and gentlemen only rarely some figures
remind one of the fact that this is Eastern Europe: tall, thin Jews in
their long caftans and Jewish women with their unnatural wigs; male
and female beggars there are in great numbers, and they are so hungry
looking and ragged, so deep-eyed and sickly, that one can hardly
manage to swallow one's food in their vicinity, if one happened to
have chosen a seat on the terrace of one of the hotels.
"A few days later Brest-Litovsk was taken. Behind the troops that
stormed the fortifications during the night and thus forced the fall
of the city, pressed from early morning great masses of the
Austro-Hungarian and German armies. They came on over all the roads:
infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineering troops, supply detachments,
and in between, impatiently puffing, the automobiles of the higher
staff officers, everybody eager to enter the big fortress and to get
hold of the big booty.
"But what a disappointment! From far off clouds of dust and smoke
announced the fate of this famous fortress. The bridges across the Bug
had all been destroyed, those of steel blown up and the wooden ones
burned. Only slowly separate small units managed to cross on temporary
narrow bridges to the citadel. Everything else crowded together on
both sides of the road and spread out into the fields, filling the
flat surrounding country as far as the eye could reach with one
single, immense, many colored war camp: groups of horses, field
kitchens, resting infantrymen, innumerable white backs of wagon after
wagon.
"Whoever managed to enter Brest-Litovsk saw for the first time a big
city devastated and ruined as pitilessly as formerly only villages had
been made to suffer. Hundreds and hundreds of houses, once human
habitations, now smashed down to their very foundations, or mangled so
as to have lost all meaning, ruins containing nothing but broken
stones and ashes and at the best here and there a stair banister,
suspended in midair. And all destruction had not been wrought as a
result of a long siege and its continuous assaults of gunfire and
shells. In one night, at the command of the Russian authorities, this
Russian city had been laid waste. Only about one-quarter of it had
remained entirely or partly habitable. Only in the citadel were there
left supplies of any great amount. There quite some quantities of
flour and canned food, weapons and munitions, war and railroad
equipment, had escaped the well-prepared explosion, and had been saved
only because there had not been enough time to complete the work of
destruction and to explode all the mines that had been laid. A happy
exception among this horrible riot of wholesale destruction was found
occasionally in the case of some few estates of the Polish nobility.
In some way they escaped here and there and were passed by without
suffering demolition and despoliation in spite of the fact that the
villages near which they were usually located were almost always
masses of smoking ruins. The manor houses of some of these estates
often became the temporary lodging of some division or even some army
corps staff. For they filled one of the chief requirements for such
headquarters: a sufficiency of many large, light rooms which permitted
to combine the necessary offices with the officers' quarters under the
same roof. Every high command needs a number of offices for its
various branches of service, in war as well as in peace. At that, war
demands a hundredfold measure of ready cooperation and punctual
working together. What happens from early in the morning, far into the
night and often throughout the night in these offices during the
course of a lively action on the battle field is nothing more or less
than administrative activity as it is known to us and practiced in
peace, but of a degree of activity, responsibility, and decision, of
an importance and variety as times of peace do not demand from an army
officer.
"Day and night numerous telegraphs and telephones, established often
by means of very skillful and exposed connections, receive reports,
communications, inquiries, and requests from the front and transmit
orders, instructions, decisions, and information to the front, and at
the same time maintain a similar service with superior headquarters.
The number of subjects which have to be watched continuously is
legion: movements of their own and the enemy's forces; changes in
their own and the opponent's positions; news and scouting service;
losses, reserves; lodging, provisioning, arming of the troops;
sanitation, prevention of epidemics, ambulances, hospitals; counting
and handling of booty and prisoners; military law, religious matters,
gifts; health and continuity of the supply of mounts; climate,
weather, condition of the water; condition of streets, bridges,
fortifications; means of intercourse and traffic of all kinds;
railways, mails, wagons, motors, pack animals; aeroplanes; telegraph
and wireless stations.
[Illustration: Austrian infantry resting during the Teutonic drive
into Russia. Some of the men carry the picks and shovels of sappers,
while others are provided with the steel-pointed staffs of
mountaineers.]
"And all these matters, within a certain group of the army, change
hourly, perhaps, and are continuously subject to unexpected
modifications; at the same time they depend in their outward relations
on events that happen in other adjoining army groups, on the
general military and political conditions, on the decisions and
interference of general headquarters. And if the staff quarters of two
or three army groups have to consult with each other about every
action and re-action before they make their various moves, unceasing
activity must be displayed by everyone in order to accomplish all that
each day demands. This activity which at one and the same time
actuates and reports, acts, observes, and accounts, requires the
possession of many manly virtues: the energy of strong nerves,
clearness, wisdom, knowledge, self-consciousness, and decision. Every
commander shares in it. But the greatest demands are made by it on the
few supreme commanders on whom depends the fate of millions.
"Thus the summer months quickly passed by. As they passed, the advance
continued. In spite of this, however, the crops were brought in from
the fields so recently conquered. And what was accomplished in this
direction will some day form a separate chapter in the economical
history of this war.
"Much of the crops, of course, had been destroyed. In many other cases
all the agricultural machines and implements had been carried off or
destroyed. And then there was a great lack of labor. What was there to
be done? Under the leadership of officers with agricultural experience
separate commissions were formed. They gathered up all the implements
and machines that could be found or could be repaired again and then
ordered by the hundred and thousand from the country in the rear what
they still lacked and soon battalions of war prisoners were busy
peacefully gathering in the wheat in the fields. Before long the
harvest had been completed. Threshers and threshing machines were put
to work. Wherever flour mills were in condition to allow of repairs,
mechanics were set to this task. And soon a steady stream of flour
poured forth that enabled the invaders to feed their armies, their
prisoners, and whatever part of the civil population had returned, to
a great extent from supplies raised and gathered in the occupied
region itself, a remarkable success gained from a combination of
German organization, Russian labor, and Polish versatility."
CHAPTER XXVIII
SIDELIGHTS ON THE RUSSIAN RETREAT AND GERMAN ADVANCE
The difficulties which the Austro-German troops encountered in
pursuing the withdrawing Russians were in many instances greatly
increased by the very strong field fortifications which the Russians
had thrown up everywhere to stem the advance of the enemy. How
effective these fortifications were may be readily understood from the
following description which is taken from the report of a special
correspondent of a south German newspaper who had an opportunity to
inspect these positions soon after they had been wrested from the
Russians:
"In fortifying this position the Russians had indeed created a
masterwork of modern field fortification. Deep, broad trenches had
been fitted so closely to the landscape that in most instances they
could be recognized as such only at very close distances. Almost all
these trenches had been covered with a fivefold layer of tree trunks,
on top of which there was to be found another layer of earth and over
that again a solid layer of sod. The wooden pillars which supported
this covering had in many places been fastened by means of wooden
plugs into strong tree trunks, which in turn had been deeply imbedded
in the bottom of the trench. Everywhere there were to be found
openings for one and sometimes even two or three sharpshooters or for
machine guns. Powerful shelters had been erected as a protection
against shrapnel. Everywhere the trenches had been located in such a
manner that one would outflank the other. In all the trenches there
were to be found shelters, many of which were spacious enough to allow
a whole company to retreat to them, and to these the Russians withdrew
whenever the German artillery fire was directed against the trenches.
These shelters were deep down below the ground; their entrances were
comparatively small and protected with manifold layers of railroad
rails. In front of these positions had been erected strong successive
lines of entanglements which consisted partly of barbed wire and
partly of strong abatis, formed of trees and their branches. In front
of one section of these trenches the Russians had cut down a piece of
woodland between 150 and 300 feet wide. They had then left the trees
on the ground wherever they happened to have fallen and covered the
entire space with a confusion of barbed-wire entanglements."
Another difficult problem which confronted both the Russians in their
retreat and the Germans in their advance was that of transportation,
especially in the region between the Vistula and the Bug Rivers. Not
only is the number of railroads in that territory very small, but
neither side had available a large enough number of railroad cars to
transport the large number of men and vast quantities of equipment
involved. This necessitated the creation of new means of
transportation. According to a correspondent of the Hungarian
newspaper "Az Est" the problem was solved by the Austro-German armies
in a remarkable way. In the first place the number of horses before
each wagon was increased. Where formerly two horses had been used,
four were employed now, and where four used to be considered
sufficient the number was increased to six. This resulted in an
unending line of giant transports drawn by teams of four and six
horses like they had never been seen before.
The work of these horses was greatly lightened by field railways. So
quickly were these built that they seemed to grow right out of the
ground. In some places industrial railways of this nature, already in
existence, were utilized. Both steam and horsepower were used on these
railways. Valleys were bridged over; gradients were reduced by every
available means. At regular distances pleasant little block houses
were to be found, which served as stations and guardhouses. The
condition of the roads did not permit the use of motor trucks to any
great extent, but wherever there was even a thread of possibility for
motor trucks to get through they were promptly called upon to assume a
leading part as a means of transportation. The immensity of the
problem may well be understood by the fact that approximately two
thousand automobiles of all kinds were employed by the German army of
the Bug River.
All of this could be moved quickly. Everything that was necessary to
make repairs was carried along. Supplies were heaped on motor trucks,
and the officers in charge of supplies and equipment lived in
automobiles which had been fitted up like rooms. The supply and
equipment departments had their own electric-lighting system and their
separate wireless. This vast establishment could be mobilized in
twenty-four hours, and its completeness, swiftness, efficiency, and
punctuality were not only a triumph of modern industry, but were among
the chief contributing causes for the Austro-German success in
overpowering obstacles and difficulties, and for the fact that
throughout the entire campaign in Russian Poland the troops never
suffered lack of provisions and munitions.
The Russian retreat brought untold misery to the civil population of
those parts of Russia which were affected by it. Especially true was
this of those sections in which the Russian authorities decreed that
the civil population had to become participants in the retreat and
leave their homes and goods to the mercy of the invaders. The terrible
suffering and misery resulting from these conditions will, perhaps,
become more vivid from the following details taken from some Russian
newspapers which will give an idea of the conditions: "In Moscow all
railroad stations are overcrowded with refugees. Most of these are
unable to leave the freight cars in which they had arrived because the
tortures of hunger and thirst which they had to suffer during their
trip had been too much for them. Thousands upon thousands of these
unfortunate beings had been struck down by sickness, and as far as the
capacity of the Moscow hospitals allowed had been cared for, while
still other thousands had to be satisfied with accommodations in the
open squares and streets of the city, while others were removed
farther east in order to reduce the overcrowded conditions of the
city. Every day some ten thousand refugees were sent east by way of
Smolensk, Orel, and Tula. Among these were many thousands of German
colonists who had formerly been residents of Cholm and Volhynia, but
had been removed from there by order of the Russian Government
previous to the Russian retreat. The fate of all these hundreds of
thousands of refugees by the time winter will have arrived will be
horrible. What, for instance, will happen to about thirty thousand
farmers from Galicia who were removed by force and now are located in
a concentration camp on the River Slucz with nothing over their heads
except the sky?"
From all parts of the Russian Empire involved in the German advance,
streams of these unfortunate victims of war were continuously flowing
toward the east. One of the chief reasons for the extensive misery
which they had to suffer was the fact that the Russian organization,
which even in times of peace does not work any too well, broke down
completely under this unexpected and unparalleled demand on its
resources. In spite of the fact that the larger number of these
refugees were driven east by the special and express command of the
Russian authorities, the latter had made no preparations to take care
of them nor did they seem to show much worry concerning their fate.
Even some of the high Government officials pointed out, to the
responsible Government departments that, as long as the Government had
driven these unfortunate human beings away from their own homesteads
without, in most cases, giving them time to gather in even their most
necessary belongings, it had become the Government's duty to provide
for them elsewhere in some fashion. If one considers that most of
these people were without any resources whatsoever, and that the
housing and feeding of such vast masses demanded the expenditure of
large sums of money, which apparently were not available, it will
easily be understood that all these men, women, and children of all
ages and conditions suffered not only untold inconveniences, but
actually the pangs of hunger and thirst, which in a great many
instances resulted in the outbreak of epidemics and in the decimation
of whole camps.
How a civilian observer was struck by some of the conditions in Poland
may be gleaned from a description in one of the German monthly
magazines rendered by an artist who accompanied one of the German
armies on its invasion of Poland: "Of course the first thing one
learns to know is the horrible condition of roads in Russia.... One of
the other main difficulties is the lack of cleanliness which results
in so many epidemics among the population. These two conditions
presented serious problems to the invading army; for, of course, it
became necessary to remove the difficulties arising from them as much
as possible....
"The water supply also is of the worst on the eastern front, and when
I wandered in the great summer heat through the trenches or drove by
the hour with wagon and horse through the sandy wastes of Poland, I
could not help but think of the many occasions when the fighting
armies, in spite of all fatigue and hardships, had to go without
drinking water of any kind whatsoever...."
One of the greatest successes which the Germans gained in the summer
of 1915 was the taking of the fortress of Kovno. Indeed it was the
fall of this Russian bulwark as much as anything else that
precipitated most of the Russian losses after the fall of Warsaw.
Considering the importance of Kovno the following report of a special
correspondent of the "Berliner Tageblatt," who was present during its
bombardment, will be of interest. He says:
"The bombardment had reached a strength which made one believe that he
was present at a concert in the lower regions. Guns of every variety
and caliber, up to the largest, had been concentrated here and
attempted to outroar each other. In unceasing activity the batteries
spit their devastating sheaths of fire against the Russian forts and
against the fortified positions which had been thrown up by the
Russians between the forts and which had been supplied by them with
very strong artillery. The latter did its best to keep up with the
efforts of the besieging army. Day by day the Russian guns began
firing against the German lines almost as soon as the German lines had
opened their fire and the combination swelled the noise to a terrible
height.
"Exactly at seven o'clock in the evening the German guns paused for a
while in order to permit their infantry to advance. This was an
almost daily occurrence and day by day the German lines drew nearer to
the Russian forts.
"Hardly had the fire of the German guns stopped when a furious
crackling of rifle fire would begin. The German lines had left their
trenches and were advancing against the Russian position from which
they received heavy fire. Machine guns, too, joined the uproar. It was
impossible to follow the infantry attack in detail, but its success
could be gleaned from the fact that the German gun fire, which
gradually was taken up again, had to be advanced in the direction of
the fortress."
This fortress of Kovno, for which the Germans were making such a
tremendous drive and which the Russians tried to hold with all the
resources at their command, occupies in respect to the Niemen line the
same position which the fortress of Lomza occupies in respect to the
Nareff line, only in a much greater measure. And, indeed, the city is
specially adapted by its entire location to act as protector of this
important river. Between steep banks, which rise as high as 200 feet,
the stream rushes along here, surrounding the city picturesquely with
its heights and protecting it at the same time from attack. There
Kovno is situated where the Vilia joins the Niemen, and only a short
distance down the latter the Nieviaza adds its waters, so that Kovno
forms a natural center of a number of extensive valleys which join
here. It is upon these natural conditions of its situation that the
unusual importance rests which Kovno has occupied for centuries in a
historical, economical, and military respect in the history of
Lithuania, Poland, and Russia.
Founded in the eleventh century, it belonged from 1384 to 1398 to the
Order of the German Knights, who made a military point of the first
order out of it. In 1400 the Grand Duke of Lithuania attacked and
captured the town. The height of its career was reached in 1581, when
it was raised to the center of the export trade and received a custom
house. The commerce of the city at that time reached annually the sum
of three million ducats, an immense amount for that period. The
Russian czars, therefore, attempted at various times to capture the
rich city, but it was not until the third partition of Poland in 1795
that Kovno became definitely a possession of the Russian Empire.
After that Kovno suffered many reverses. In 1806 a disastrous fire
broke out and destroyed three-fourths of the city, but in spite of
this disaster and others which followed, the city recovered and gained
a certain importance in a political way, when in 1842 it was made the
capital of the newly created government of Kovno. From then on the
trade of the city grew in bounds and leaps, and it became a center of
the trading to and from Prussia. Its industries, too, were developed
extensively. Seven fortifications are situated to the south of the
city, three more protect the road to Vilna, and one the bridge across
the Vilia.
During the series of engagements near Dvinsk, in the fall of 1915,
especially severe fighting occurred on the shores of Lake Sventen. The
colonel of a Russian regiment which participated in these engagements
gave the following vivid description to a staff correspondent of the
London "Times":
"We had to secure a lodgment on the promontory nicknamed by our men
the 'Dog's Tail.' My scouts crossed the lake at night, dug themselves
in and annoyed the enemy holding the brickyard, situated upon a slight
eminence at the northern part of the promontory. A Lettish officer
commanded the scouts and organized the whole landing. Being a native
of the place, he was able to take advantage of every latent resource
afforded by the country. Thus he managed to discover a small fleet of
boats, and added to them by constructing a number of rafts. During the
night our men gradually reenforced the scouts. On the following day we
rushed the brickyard. This gave us a larger foothold to deploy one of
our regiments, and storm what we called 'Bald Hill,' while another
regiment gave its attention to 'Red Hill,' to the southwest.
"Our advance was very slow. The Germans had a large number of Maxims,
three times as many as we had, also automatic rifles, and freely used
explosive bullets. But on our side we had our artillery massed in
several lines east of Sventen and Medum, including field and heavy
guns under good control, so that we could pour in direct or flanking
fire at will. Three days passed chiefly in artillery preparation for
our final attack. The infantry advanced slightly. Our artillery
observers were in the trenches correcting the fire of our guns. On
November 3, 1915, the enemy began to pour in a fierce flanking fire
from their guns west of Ilsen.
"When the scouts and supports moved from the 'Dog's Tail' promontory,
our neighboring corps began to advance also, and we finally extended
our right flank and gained direct contact. But all this time we were
suffering heavily from the enemy's Maxims on the heights.
"'Bald Hill' and 'Red Hill' were won on the third day. The enemy
counterattacked and retook the first named heights. Our position was
now a critical one. The waters of the lake in our rear cut off all
hope of immediate reenforcements or of eventual retreat. We had to
retake 'Bald Hill' at all costs, and we did it. My men were
tremendously encouraged by the hurricane fire kept up by our
artillery. Many of them had witnessed the terrible effects of the
German hurricane fire. For the first time they saw that our own
artillery was not only equal but even superior to anything the Germans
could do. Our gunners telephoned asking me when they should stop, so
that our men should not suffer from their fire. It seemed to me that
our shells were bursting perilously near, and I asked them to cease
fire. A half company then attacking 'Bald Hill' was immediately mown
down by the German machine guns. I at once signaled to the gunners
'keep on firing' and only when our skirmishers were within 250 paces
of the German trenches the hurricane was suspended and we went for the
Germans with the bayonet, but they did not wait."
Many of the successes gained--both by the Russians in their retreat
and by the Germans in their advance--were due to the effective work of
the aviation corps. Scouting and bomb dropping were daily occurrences.
A picturesque description of such a trip made by an aeroplane
"somewhere in Poland" is taken from "Motor" and gives a very clear
idea of the dangers to which pilot and observer are subjected at all
times as well as of the practical results of their work:
"The departure had been set for nine o'clock in the morning and, while
the pilot has already taken his place in the aeroplane and is trying
out his motor, his companion comes out of his tent. The latter wears a
wide brown leather coat, a storm cap is drawn deep down over his
forehead, a long shawl covers his throat and in order to protect
himself against the oil which the motor puffs out during the flight he
has covered his eyes with big spectacles. A sergeant with some
soldiers carry bombs to the aeroplane and pack them carefully next to
the seat of the observer. The latter takes his seat, the motor starts,
the propeller turns around quicker and quicker, and at last the pilot
waves his arm--the wedges are withdrawn from under the wheels. The
plane begins to roll along, lifts itself up from the ground and mounts
in elegant spirals higher and higher; smaller and smaller appear men
and houses; at last the aerostat shows 3,000 feet; the observer gives
a sign and the plane turns in the direction of the enemy. It is
comparatively easy to find the way: the railroad tracks which run
toward the lines of the enemy serve as a guide; the aeroplane follows
them above villages chopped into ruins by gunfire, whose houses look
like small toy boxes. Suddenly, dark lines appear which run toward the
west: trenches of the enemy which unroll themselves to the observer as
if they were on a map. And right away small white clouds arise, the
first greetings which the enemy fires toward the aeroplane, but under
which the latter rushes by descending quickly.
"At last the trench zone has been crossed; the country in back of it
appears to be strewn with pits and funnels caused by the explosion of
big caliber shells. Here and there destroyed villages are to be seen
from which dark pillars of smoke arise. Then the first roadway about
which information is to be gathered appears. Peacefully it lies in the
sunlight. Farther toward the west, however, the street becomes more
lively; but the black specks which move down there are only a few
automobiles which most likely carry some members of the general staff
of the enemy and offer nothing worth while observing. But a little
farther back a dark line and many small specks appear--detachments on
the march. The observer leans over his map, compares, looks down once
more, then marks the observation on his map and the time at which it
was made, and on goes the journey. In the streets of a larger place,
which is reached soon afterward, a crowd of people are observed; in
front of a church are standing at regular distances a number of
wagons, a short wagon in front and back of it shapes that look like a
frame--cannon. The observer continues to make marks on his map and at
the same time a sharp sound is heard at his side and in the upper
plane a slash appears. He waves his hand and the pilot sharply turns
to the left. The observer reaches for a bomb and holds it over the
edge of the aeroplane, drops it, and immediately afterward a flash
appears among the cannon and the crowd on the market place disperses
in wild flight. Another wave of the hand, another turn to the left,
another bomb. The result is satisfactory; at least one cannon has been
destroyed. But now it begins to become unpleasant; to the right and to
the left, in front and in back, small white clouds arise; down there
the bombardment has begun and it must make quite a loud noise which,
however, is drowned in the noise of the motor. The pilot stops the
motor and silently and gently the aeroplane descends into less
dangerous heights; then the motor again begins to work and the
aeroplane quickly turns its course toward the southwest following the
white band of the country road.
"Suddenly white wisps of smoke arise over the tree tops of a near-by
forest; again the observer makes some entries and, while the aeroplane
rushes furiously forward, marks down with his pencil one body of
troops after another. Above a freight station another stop is made; on
the platforms of its storehouses men rush along busily. Their work
will have to be disturbed: a motion of the hand, a pull on the motor
which starts the descent, a grasp for the third bomb--and a railway
guardhouse collapses into itself. The last bomb hits its mark even
better; it explodes right in the middle between two cars without,
however, hurting anybody; for the workmen have run away as quickly as
their feet will carry them; pillars of fire roar up high; gasoline or
coal oil supplies apparently have been hit. To determine this
definitely is impossible, for the aeroplane must rush on. After a
short time, its commission executed, it turns back toward the east;
the batteries which had been observed a short while ago and the lines
of trenches are again passed and at last the tents of the hangar come
into view; the cross, showing the place for landing, becomes visible;
the descent begins; the wheels touch the ground with a sharp jolt; the
observer jumps out of his seat and runs up to his commander to make
his report."
CHAPTER XXIX
WINTER ON THE EASTERN FRONT
By the end of November, 1915, winter had set in along the eastern
front. Especially along the northern part of the eastern line this
necessitated almost a complete stoppage of operations. For there the
weather becomes very severe. The ground freezes sometimes to a depth
of three and more feet, which, of course, makes it impossible to dig
trenches quickly. But just as soon as trench digging at short notice
became impossible operations had to cease. For whenever armies advance
over closely contested ground--as was the case all along the eastern
line--the advance by necessity is slow, possibly over only a few miles
every day. And every time the line is pushed forward, and trenches
previously occupied are left behind, it becomes necessary with each
step of the advance to dig new trenches unless the advanced line was
fortunate enough to be able to stop the day's work in the trenches of
the enemy, a possibility which, of course, did not offer itself any
too frequently. And even then a lot of digging was necessary, because
what was previously, during the enemy's occupation, the back of a
trench line now had to be turned into its front. All of this digging,
or at least most of it, had to be done quickly, in order to avoid the
loss of the newly gained positions by the success of hostile
counterattacks. But both sides alike found it impossible to dig
quickly, or, for that matter, in most cases to dig at all when the
ground was frozen solid. So both sides found themselves condemned to a
more or less continuous state of inactivity as far as all war
operations were concerned, excepting only artillery duels, mining,
aeroplane attacks, sniping from each other's trenches, and all those
other more or less insignificant operations that are usually called by
the generic term "trench warfare."
Although the Russians were acknowledged masters of trench digging and
of throwing up well-planned and efficiently defended field
fortifications of every kind, and also the great mass of their
soldiers were much more accustomed to severe winters than the German
forces, because a very much larger part of the Russian than of the
German Empire is subject to very low winter temperatures, still the
Germans, all in all, had the advantage over their adversaries under
these conditions. In the first place the percentage of mechanically
and scientifically trained men in the German army is far greater than
that in the Russian army, because the latter is recruited primarily
from an agricultural population, whereas the former draws its largest
numbers from an intensively industrial body. Furthermore, organization
within and without the army had been developed to a far higher degree
by the Germans than by their eastern neighbors. It is, therefore, not
at all surprising to hear of the marvelous preparations that the
Germans had made for the approaching winter, and inasmuch as most of
this information is gathered from Russian sources, there can be little
doubt of its correctness.
Down below in their trenches, covering the walls of their dugouts, the
Germans had erected light metal buildings. These had been manufactured
back in Germany in immense quantities in simple, standardized parts.
Easily shipped in a "knockdown" condition, they were just as easily
put up and put together, and all of them were fitted with heating
apparatus of some kind. Warm clothing of every kind and description
had either been manufactured at the Government's expense or had been
collected from private sources throughout the empire by appealing to
the nation at large by means of the newspapers. Although the
statement, frequently heard, that each man had a sleeping sack
undoubtedly was vastly exaggerated, vast quantities of these useful
articles had been distributed. Then, too, officers, from captains
down, gave their men detailed instructions and orders how to protect
themselves efficiently against severe cold, and how to treat promptly
and effectively any of the many ailments that are apt to afflict
people unused to very low temperatures in a rather moist region, from
frostbite down to colds.
From every possible line of human enterprise the Germans, according to
Russian reports, apparently tried to learn lessons which might become
applicable in these near-arctic conditions on the east front. Having
been taught by the previous winter's experience the impossibility of
trench digging, they promptly organized extensive mining detachments
among their engineering troops, augmenting the latter in great
quantities by soldiers from other branches of their general service
who, from their experiences in times of peace, had become particularly
adaptable to such work. These mining troops, later on in the winter,
were to creep forward under the protection of night's shadows and
blast with dynamite those trenches that were absolutely essential for
cover of advancing troops and that could not be dug in the frozen
ground with more simple tools. Long before this, however, while winter
had not yet shown its full severity, these troops were busily occupied
with the preparation of land mines, which were to act as substitutes
for barbed-wire entanglements when freezing snow, piling up many feet
high, rendered the latter useless. Previous experience, too, had
taught that, when such weather conditions arose, the immense
quantities of snow that fall in these regions not only completely
covered barbed-wire entanglements, but as repeated snowstorms
thickened the mass day by day, and sleet and thaw, caused by an
occasional hour's sunshine, hardened it, made it even possible for the
enemy's forces to advance securely on it in spite of, and on the very
top of, all barbed-wire obstacles.
Throughout the first winter of the war the Germans had also used ski
detachments. Most of these were employed in the mountainous regions of
the western front. But small troops had been sent to East Prussia and
had proven themselves very valuable there. Again and again Russian
troops, attempting operations on ground covered with two or three
days' snowfall, had sunk to their waists and chests into the snow and
had become easy prey to attacks made by German soldiers on skis. So
the Germans early in the fall, when certain parts of south Germany and
Austria, covered with high mountains, lend themselves admirably for
ski practice, had sent time after time detachments of carefully
selected infantry troops to these regions and had made ski experts out
of them. Sledges too--large and small--had been provided in
quantities, because they had proven their value as means of
transporting men and supplies where all other means had failed
absolutely.
With the approach of real winter all these comparatively new features
of warfare were put to use. Of course the Germans were by no means the
only ones to profit from past experience and from the modern advance
of the sciences and mechanical industries. But from all reports it is
clear that they outdid the Russians in inventiveness as well as in the
thoroughness and extent of their preparations.
"Jack Frost" also definitely stopped regular fighting. With its
arrival war at the eastern front deteriorated into more or less of a
guerrilla war. Instead of attempts to break through the line by miles,
both sides settled down to a bitter contest for choice pieces of
ground here and there. An exchange of a bit of high ground for a
nasty, damp trench in a bog was considered quite a victory. The
capture of a small supply train by a small detachment that had managed
to sneak through the line at some point unobserved or unoccupied,
because it apparently was impossible for occupation on account of the
nature of the ground, was as much talked about as only a victory in a
real engagement would have been two or three months ago. In a way,
both the Russian and German and Austro-Hungarian armies had a much
more severe time of it on the east front than the German and
Franco-English forces had at the west front. First of all, the latter
was located in much more civilized regions, cleaner, therefore, and
healthier. Then, too, the nature of the ground in the west was less
hard on the fighters, higher in most places, and, therefore, drier.
Furthermore, the western line was practically an unbroken line from
the English Channel down to the Swiss border. In the east, however,
marshes, lakes, and rivers made an unbroken line impossible. All along
the front there were innumerable gaps. Of course many of these were
gaps because no human being could find a foothold on them, and,
therefore, needed no watching. Others, however, while impossible for
occupation, were not equally impossible for passage, provided those
that attempted to pass were willing to take great risks. And there was
no lack of such on either side. So Russians, Germans, and
Austro-Hungarians had to be continuously on the jump to prevent such
raids of their lines which, though they might have been very small in
the beginning, might have had very serious consequences. These
conditions, therefore, made war on the east front for everybody
concerned truly a war of attrition, equally racking for nerves and
bodies.
Only one other event of importance occurred on the east front during
the winter of 1915-16. General Russky, commanding the Russian forces
fighting before Riga and Dvinsk and in the Dvina-Vilia sector, was
forced by illness to retire from his command. He was succeeded by
General Everth, who up to then had commanded the next adjoining army
group, from the Vilia down to the Pripet Marshes, and who now assumed
command over all the Russian forces from the Gulf of Riga to the
Pripet Marshes. Farther down the line General Ivanoff continued the
leadership that he had assumed after the German advance had come to a
standstill at the end of October.
Thus the winter passed. As we have learned in some of the preceding
chapters, operations were resumed in a small way at certain points
along the line from time to time. With the approach of the spring of
1916 these activities slightly increased in extent and severity. But
both sides, as long as frost continued, were satisfied with this state
of conditions and with never-ceasing preparations for new offensive
operations to begin as soon as nature would permit.
PART VI--THE BALKANS