FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY
SPARTA.
The peace or convention[1] which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an
incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true
character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply
which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one
to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians _medising_!”—“Nay (replied
the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) _laconising_.”[2]
[1] It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ
εἰρήνη—Isokrates, of αἱ συνθῆκαι.
Though we say, the peace _of_ Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ
ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it
with the genitive case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.
[2] Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23;
and his Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς
τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!...
Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.
These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly
true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between
Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan
Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express
ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s
purposes and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian
Xenophon.[3] While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no
other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally
framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity
of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing
that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.[4] This
addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations
which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced
by Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final
decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s name
from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the
adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia
had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means
of standing out, even if the supplementary article had been omitted.
Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a
certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger shares both
of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, that Athens,
as well as Thebes,[5] assented to the peace only under fear and
compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested
merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and
degradation.
[3] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.
[4] The restoration of these three islands forms the basis
of historical truth in the assertion of Isokrates, that the
Lacedæmonians were so subdued by the defeat of Knidus, as to come
and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας)
Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.); s. 83. But the
assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians
really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been
enfeebled and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before
(Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 3).
[5] Diodor. xiv, 111.
That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and
transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance.
It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was
ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece. Its
authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction from his
concluding threat, that he would make war against all recusants. It
was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along with Antalkidas),
read by him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled
Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to the
regal seal.[6] Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient
president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at
the hands of the Persian king, and which she now not only set the
example of sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even
avouched as guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing
to enforce it at the point of the sword against any recusant state,
whether party to it or not. Such was the convention which was now
inscribed on stone, and placed as a permanent record in the temples
of the Grecian cities;[7] nay, even in the common sanctuaries,—the
Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the great _foci_ and rallying points of
Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of a convention,
it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding from
the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less
than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to
all Pan-hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.[8]
Effacing altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world,
bound together and regulated by the self-acting forces and common
sympathies of its own members,—even the words of the convention
proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign power, and erected the
barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of Grecian differences; a
guardian[9] who cared for the peace of Greece more than the Greeks
themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it was tantamount to
that symbol of submission—the cession of earth and water—which had
been demanded a century before by the ancestor of Artaxerxes from the
ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand, which both Sparta
and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so cruelly, as to
put to death the heralds by whom it was brought,—stigmatizing the
Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying with it.[10]
Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than what
stood embodied in the inscription on that “colonna infame,” which
placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic
glories and ornaments at Olympia.[11]
[6] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος
παρεῖναι ~τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι~, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην
καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον,
~ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα~, ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ
γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·
Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς ~νομίζει δίκαιον~, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις
ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας
Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν
Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι
Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, ~τούτοις
ἐγὼ πολεμήσω~, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ
θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.
[7] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς
ἠνάγκασεν (the Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν
τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν
ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.
The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380
B.C., seven years afterwards) from which I here copy, is
the best evidence of the feelings with which an intelligent
and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty at the time;
when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time
to see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other
orations, though valuable and instructive, were published
later, and represent the feelings of after-time.
Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245
D), stigmatizes severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ
ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering Greeks to the foreigner,” and
asserts that the Athenians resolutely refused to sanction it.
This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting the peace of
Antalkidas.
[8] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν,
καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, ~προστάγματα καὶ οὐ
συνθήκας~ εἶναι, etc. (s. 213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς ~ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος
ὑβριζομένης~, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.
The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of
Xenophon (put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at
Sparta), respecting the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by
Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν ~Βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν~ αὐτονόμους τὰς
πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).
[9] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ
διαλύειν ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε
ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν,
ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;
The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus
(whether it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot
be certain—see Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position
taken by Artaxerxes in reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην
ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which implies the peremptory decision
of an official judge, analogous to another passage (139) of the
Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός (Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ
διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ
τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ ~τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε~, καὶ
τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν;
[10] Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν,
προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα.
[11] Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.
Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses
himself in terms of bitter and well-merited indignation of this
peace,—“if indeed (says he) we are to call this ignominy and
betrayal of Greece by the name of _peace_, which brought with it
as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta (he says) lost
her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been
lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.
It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate
Agesilaus from any share in the peace. From the narrative
(in Xenophon’s Hellenica, v. i, 33) of his conduct at
the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused it most
warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7)
takes credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was
true, from the year B.C. 396 to B.C. 394. But in B.C. 387,
at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, he had become
μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred
of Thebes.
See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing
the disgraceful position of the Greek cities at a later time
in calling in Philip of Macedon as arbiter; a passage not less
applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; and perhaps borrowed from
Theopompus.
Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate
events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her
own estimation even more than in that of others,[12]—had so lost
all Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an
obsequious minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for
political objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation
have appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to
Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to
Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series
of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention
of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.
[12] Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt
from Darius king of Persia about 500 B.C., had implored the aid
of Sparta (Herodot. v, 49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων
παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον
μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ~ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς
Ἑλλάδος~.
How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of
Antalkidas! and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus
himself if he could have heard of the latter event!
Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from
the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an
apology, little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not
unconscious of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads
that Sparta, when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought
not to be blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks
aid for her own preservation.[13] From the earliest commencement to
the seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys
were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized in
Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest reached
their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and contradicted
each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to understand
what they meant,[14] sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in the
seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking
for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an
Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens;
where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the
letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more
important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him,
with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the
Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes
Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated
by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an
importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do
not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able
to reach Susa.
[13] Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι
ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων ~καὶ βαρβάρων~, εἴ ποθέν τινα
~ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων~ δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (~ἀνεπίφθονον~ δὲ,
ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας
μόνον ~ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους~ προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), etc. Compare
also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.
[14] Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.
Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of
the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes
arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but
were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as
Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase
their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and that too
without any stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my
last volume.[15] She had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an
excuse and not as a justification—of self-defence against aggression
from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the
war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the
reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object
was something quite different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens.
Yet to accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but
of pure ambition, Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of
her Asiatic kinsmen; a price which Archidamus at the beginning of
the war would certainly never have endured the thoughts of paying,
notwithstanding the then formidable power of Athens. Here, too,
we find Athens following the example; and consenting, in hopes of
procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though the bargain was
never consummated. It is true that she was then contending for her
existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how much
the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both
the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the
battle of Ægospotami.[16]
[15] See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.
Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33,
p. 666) attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians
of his time, about this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by
Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior. Libertate, c. 13, p. 199,
where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by Athens with Persia in
449 B.C., in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, contracted
under the auspices of Sparta.
[16] This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii,
(Panathen.) s. 167-173. In this passage, however, he distributes
his blame too equally between Sparta and Athens, whereas the
blame belongs of right to the former, in far greater proportion.
Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the Great King,
and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also
carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point
of selfishness and subservience. Athens is guilty of following
the bad example of her rival, but to a less extent, and under
greater excuse on the plea of necessity.
Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting
the various acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest
of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους ~ὀψιμαθεῖς~ αὐτῶν
γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ~τὰ μὲν πρώτους, τὰ δὲ μόνους~,
ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which is much nearer the truth
than the passage before referred to.
After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would
doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have
passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely
new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position
and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to
gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious
speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic
Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against
Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became
unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to
protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they
were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely
from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian
world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand,
and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought
home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a
Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry
of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis,
takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of
aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play
against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in
playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she
had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself,
and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as
more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies
who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to
surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle
of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his
supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,[17] and Athenian aid
was still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving
the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render
themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we
may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger
necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might
employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse of
self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.
[17] Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.
But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than
in regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time
so powerful, even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the
allies at the Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held
together only by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive
against her, and would probably have been disunited by reasonable
offers on her part; nor would she have needed even to recall
Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated
in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of
the revived Long Walls and refortified Piræus, and springing at
once to the fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed
forty years before, was about to start into life; a fancy little
likely to be realized, since the very peculiar circumstances which
had created the first Athenian empire were now totally reversed.
Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first object with Sparta
was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put down all
partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce
universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in
order that there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting
herself, the strongest of all individual states. As a means to this
end, which was no less in the interest of Persia than in hers, she
outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King, betrayed to him
not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, but also the
general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner,—and
volunteered to _medise_ in order that the Persians might repay her by
_laconising_.[18] To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps,
who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their own,
Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed
at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce
the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon all her
countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and herself into
a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason
to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and destructive than
that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, for which the Theban
Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and that, too, by the Spartans
themselves.[19] Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and
was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;[20] foreboding but too
clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to
run.
[18] Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας
κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν
ἕξουσιν.
[19] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.
[20] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.
That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer
sent by the Athenians[21] to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B.C.,
refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation
to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship,—that sentiment
which had been during the two following generations the predominant
inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always
less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the former, overlaid by more
pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished.
Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding
up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from the smaller
states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere
to and defend it, when upheld.[22] But so soon as Sparta was seen to
solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint),
the proclamation under the king’s hand and seal brought down by
Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems
of Grecian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of
collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the
bosoms of individual patriots.
[21] Herodot. viii, 143.
The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys,
of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of
refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than
the answer itself.
But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the
Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read
in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the
Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the
temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).
[22] The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets
forth emphatically the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive
principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public
conduct,—as altogether different from the simple considerations
of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states
like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110).
Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities
of the convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by
superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally
enforced by her, for her own political ends.
Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about
the dissension of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful
effects.
If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and
warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that
though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was
at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to
each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct.
I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force
of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian
freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts,
it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it
robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign
assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under
certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian
political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great
preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the
convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although
we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various
individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried
into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil,
the present of a friend or of an enemy.
The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The
Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace,
sent down by the king,”[23] undertook the duty of execution; and
we shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely.
They did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the
honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek
mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good,
and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner,
and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political
interests and purposes. The promise made by the convention,
except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own power by
dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and
hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war, when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout
Greece, we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious
import; demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should
be left free, which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them
herself at the close of the war, had she not preferred to convert
it into a far harsher empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of
Antalkidas) there were no large body of subjects to be emancipated,
except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means
intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as well as
what was realized, even by the most specious item of this disgraceful
convention, was—“that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their
own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;”
a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,[24] in the debates
preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text
for Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of
Antalkidas and the battle of Leuktra.
[23] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.
Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο~ ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’
Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· ~προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ
βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης~ καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι
πράττοντες, etc.
[24] Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys)
ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους
ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν
κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι ~μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται~.
I have already mentioned that the first two applications of
the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were
to extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its
Argeian auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient
presidency of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an
object which they had long had at heart;[25] and by both, their
ascendency in Greece was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by
the new development of Persian force as well as partially bribed
by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of the
peace,—was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and
disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon
these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the
proceedings of the Persians.
[25] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.
Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and
Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince
named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his
expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have
much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation
which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with
Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual
aid in reconquering Egypt.[26] It was not merely these Greeks who
were exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various
Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of
whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except
Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of
Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes
came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet
and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus,
to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however,
having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing
else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with
all his children.[27] About 395 B.C., we find Nephereus king of
Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.[28]
Two years afterwards (392-390 B.C.), during the years immediately
succeeding the victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus
across the Ægean to Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed
with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts
to reconquer Egypt.[29] Having thus repulsed the Persians, the
Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390-380 B.C.,[30] sending aid
to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in spite of farther
efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native
kings in that country maintained their independence for about sixty
years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.
[26] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.
It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date
between 414-411 B.C.; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh,
Manetho und die Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and
Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.
M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places
the revolt rather earlier, about 414 B.C.; and Mr. Fynes Clinton
(Fasti Hellen. Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same
date.
[27] Diodor. xiv, 35.
This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above
cited, p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the
list of Manetho, under a different name. It is also possible,
however, that he may have been king over a part of Egypt,
contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.
[28] Diodor. xiv, 79.
[29] This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ
Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on
very probable grounds, principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv,
(Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.
[30] Diodor. xv, 2, 3.
But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities much
superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief attention
of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: Evagoras,
despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a
discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed
after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid for with
the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the contemporary
Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration and partiality,
even the trustworthy features of the picture are sufficiently
interesting.
Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the Teukridæ,
which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of
Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them,
from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer
Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian)
Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father Telamon,
and given commencement to the city of that name on the eastern
coast of Cyprus.[31] As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek and
Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very
different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities,
which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns
being all dependent upon one or other of them,—seven pass for
Hellenic, the two most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three
for Phœnician,—Paphos, Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however,
there was in each a mixture of Greek and Phœnician population, in
different proportions.[32] Each was ruled by its own separate prince
or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek immigrations (though their
exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have been later in date
than the Phœnician. At the time of the Ionic revolt (B.C. 496), the
preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable
intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly
crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished
through the aid of the Phœnicians[33] on the opposite continent. And
though doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450
B.C.) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with
the Persians, had prudently relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;[34]
so that the Grecian element in the former, receiving little
extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to the
Phœnician.
[31] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s.
21; Pausanias, ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.
The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of
Evagoras, seems to have related many legendary tales respecting
the Greek Gentes in Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon
himself as ultimately migrating to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed.
Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. Photium).
The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus.
See the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.
[32] Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the
Phœnicians (vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 _seq._), attempts to
establish the existence of an ancient population in Cyprus,
called Kitians; once extended over the island, and of which the
town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes them to have
been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the
Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus
he reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these
natives. He supposes the Kilikian population to have been in
early times Canaanitish also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166)
inclines to admit the same hypothesis as highly probable.
The sixth century B.C. (from 600 downwards) appears to have been
very unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe
pressure from the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the
Jews. During the same period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was
greatly extended, especially by the reign of the Phil-hellenic
Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. Much of the Grecian
immigration into Cyprus probably took place at this time; we know
of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to Soli, under the
assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 _seq._).
[33] Herodot. v, 109.
Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and
arms of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental
(vii, 90). The Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v,
113); as the Carthaginians did, before they learnt the art of
training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27).
[34] See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.
It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of
Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of
the Teukrid Gens,[35] were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician
exile who gained their confidence and made himself despot in their
place.[36] To insure his own sceptre, this usurper did everything
in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician population,
as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The same policy
was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but seems also
to have been imitated in several of the other towns; insomuch that
during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became sensibly
dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed; new
Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive
treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the
body which were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals;
while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were
rapidly on the decline.[37]
[35] One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the
Phœnician name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).
[36] We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v,
104-114, with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.
[37] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.
Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) ~τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην~, καὶ διὰ
τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας
ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.
Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ
χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι
βελτίστους οἵ ~τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι~
τυγχάνοιεν, etc.
This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the
oration of Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the
visit of the latter to Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν
Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ
μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα,
~οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος~ ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).
Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of
this narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor
do I myself see any, for this contradiction.
Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and
family at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De
Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 38).
Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of
the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an
early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of
winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among
Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician
despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian
named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.[38] The usurper,
mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon all
conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief,
tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to
Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile,
he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation,
stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by
enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any
firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but
determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission
by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in
his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this
enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment,
that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.[39]
[38] Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus
(xiv, 98) calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both
are correct, and that he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had
migrated from Salamis during the Athenian preponderance there.
There were Kitians, not natives of the town of Kition, but
belonging to the ancient population of the island, living in the
various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as
resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).
[39] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii,
(Nikokl.) s. 33; Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot.
Diodor. xiv, 98.
The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which
Isokrates does not specify.
The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras
unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to
princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still
farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.[40] His conduct fully
justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain
from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for the gratification
of personal appetite; abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian
despot to stamp his reign with letters of gold, and the more
remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible temperament
of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under due
control.[41] But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in
punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction
by which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.[42] His government
was at the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards
the multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own
personal supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out
his own line of policy, and kept watch over its execution.[43] He was
foremost in all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed
security, he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and
military force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went
on increasing.
[40] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.
[41] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
ἀγόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.
[42] Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς
τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, ~νομίμως δὲ τοὺς
ἐξαμαρτάνοντας~ κολάζων (s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν
πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα
τὴν νῆσον, ~ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα~ προήγαγεν, etc.; compare
s. 81.
These epithets, _lawful_ punishment, _mild_ dealing, etc., cannot
be fully understood except in contrast with the mutilations
alluded to by Lysias, in the passage cited in a note on page
16, above; also with exactly similar mutilations, mentioned by
Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders by Cyrus
the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν (says
Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς
ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.
[43] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.
The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless
be founded in truth, as the result shows.
Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and
in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last
fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in
this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with
which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary
sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing to be the great
naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot exactly make out the
date at which Evagoras began to reign, we may conclude it to have
been about 411 or 410 B.C. It seems to have been shortly after that
period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian;[44] moreover,
he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful,
when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B.C., after the battle of
Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and
other parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done
under the auspices of Solon,[45] a century and a half before. He
took especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts,
teaching, music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was
so successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint
or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and
sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again
predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns
of the island.
[44] Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.
[45] Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.
Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens
might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her
ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which
led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later
moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he
profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those
closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially
broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it
had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest
between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from
Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or
elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every
way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat
of Ægospotami (B.C. 405), all such out-settlers as then remained
were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that
moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in some other
locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian admiral
Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out of the
great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would present
a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, we learn
that numerous settlers of the best character, from different parts
of Greece, crowded to Salamis.[46] Many Athenian women, during the
years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed
the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find
husbands in that city;[47] while throughout the wide range of the
Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and
dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting.
The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On
what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the
conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.
[46] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or.
xix, (De Aristoph. Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.
[47] Isokrates, _l. c._ παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν
γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc.
For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying
times consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.
The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young
woman of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an
Athenian named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold
her to the despot of Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being
threatened with prosecution for this act before the Athenian
Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought her back to
Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, and
punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune
to escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261;
Tzetzes, Chiliad. vi, 367).
How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no
means of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the
Athenian maidens, who had no dowry at home, were provided for by
their relatives elsewhere. Probably Andokides took this young
woman out, under the engagement to find a Grecian husband for her
in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for his own profit
to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having so
sold her.
During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his
tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian
king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We
find him towards the year 390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely
with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Kitium in his own island,
and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps,
or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At
the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras had not only
paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian
fleet placed under Konon to act against the Lacedæmonians, himself
serving aboard.[48] It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates)
to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him
on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the
jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed.
Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting
by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously
began to manœuvre against him, and forced him into the war in
self-defence.[49] Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the
disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at
first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not
only worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities,
under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a
large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much
vigor as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover,
upon some of the Kilikian towns to declare against the Persians.[50]
He received powerful aid from Akoris, the native and independent
king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by
the Athenians.[51] Beginning apparently about 390 B.C., the war
against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the
Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice
did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his
long protection to Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the
battle of Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the
Persians her enemies.
[48] This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias,
given by Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).
Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot)
recounted the causes which brought about the war between the
Persian king and Evagoras.
[49] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον
(Evagoras) οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), ~ὥστε
μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ~, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ
ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ ~ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν~ (_i. e._ Evagoras).
[50] Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus,
Frag. 134, ed. Didot.
[51] Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem,
p. 479, s. 84.
The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a
war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force
against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the
extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction
with Sparta, the peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a
fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission.
It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be
abandoned;[52] the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as
belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and
reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could
pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by
Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.[53] But
the peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian
satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic
sea-board, and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not
only their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents
from these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian
force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by
constraint, neither well paid nor well used,[54] and therefore not
very efficient.
[52] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς
συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.
We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the
king of Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to
Athens, concluded by Perikles about 449 B.C., and called the
peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, neither a new demand on
the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on the part of the
Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.
[53] Diodor. xv, 2.
It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of
Hekatomnus for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).
About 380 B.C., Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely
dependent in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the
first opportunity (Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).
[54] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.
The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large
portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos
was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the
south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having previously
gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he
had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, nearly equal in
number to theirs; but after a hard-fought contest, in which he at
first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval
defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled the
Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.[55] Though
thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended
himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris
in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued
in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians
were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten years
after its commencement.[56] It cost them on the whole (if we may
believe Isokrates)[57] fifteen thousand talents in money, and such
severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions
of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession
of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave
to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be
literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily
refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized
as paid by “one king to another.” Rather than concede this point
of honor, he even broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to
defend himself to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had
been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between
the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus
of projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction
with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and thus
became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already wearied
out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant
the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging
the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the
other side.[58]
[55] Diodor. xv, 4.
[56] Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with
Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 77.
The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of
Kilikia was still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the
Panegyrical Oration. At that time, Evagoras had maintained
the contest six years, counting either from the peace of
Antalkidas (387 B.C.) or from his naval defeat about a year
or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite
clear from what point of commencement he reckons the six
years.
We know that the war between the king of Persia and
Evagoras had begun as early as 390 B.C., in which year
an Athenian fleet was sent to assist the latter (Xenoph.
Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus state
that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the
conclusion of it in 380 or 379 B.C., soon after the date
of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates. I dissent on
this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad
annos 387-376 B.C., and his Appendix, No. 12—where the
point is discussed). He supposes the war to have begun
after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have ended in 376
B.C. I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he
appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority
of Xenophon,—or at least only to evade the necessity
of contradicting him by resorting to an inconvenient
hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian
expeditions sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390
B.C., next in 388 B.C., as relating to “_hostile measures
before the war began_” (p. 280). To me it appears more
natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the
war.
[57] Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.
[58] Diodor. xv. 8, 9.
This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the
part of Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit
on the authority of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice
a morsel for a panegyrical discourse such as that of Isokrates,
that one cannot but think he would have inserted it had it come
to his knowledge. His silence causes great surprise—not without
some suspicion as to the truth of the story.
It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies,
and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince
of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war,
nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished
by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.[59]
His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who
would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His
children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as
with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing as
it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the
Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and
conflict, often with actual bloodshed.[60] But he omits to notice
the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping
with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which
the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the hero
throughout his life.[61] It was seemingly not very long after the
peace, that a Salaminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against
his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident,
before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight.
He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care
of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of
vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty of
the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most
distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis
against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to
the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her
chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his
hand.[62]
[59] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must
be more true of Evagoras than of Nikokles.
[60] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s.
138.
[61] Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.
[62] I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the
fragment of Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract
of that author by Photius (Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed.
Didot).
Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude
to the assassination of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these
authors conceive the story differently from Theopompus. Thus
Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and
became “despot of Salamis.” This appears to be a confusion of
Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the son of Evagoras, and
the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords the surest
proof that _he_ had no hand in the death of his father.
The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ
τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ
ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. So perplexing is the passage in its
literal sense, that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his
translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname or _sobriquet_
given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês. But this
supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that
Theopompus marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch,
by another word—Θρασυδαίου ~τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος~, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ
γένος, etc.
It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently
from Theopompus, and we have to choose between the two. I
prefer the version of the latter; which is more marked as well
as more intelligible, and which furnishes the explanation why
Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the most advanced of the sons,
being left in command of the besieged Salamis when Evagoras
quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his father,
but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the
representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man
of much energy. The position of this eunuch in the family of
Nikokreon seems to mark the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.
Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence,
remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and
forming a strong contrast in this respect with his contemporary
Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and
violence. Nikoklês, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after
him, and showed much regard, accompanied by munificent presents,
to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and
well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant
by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his
father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or
property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the
prosperity of the city.[63]
[63] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras)
s. 100; Or. xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the
assassination of Evagoras in 374 B.C.
We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting not
less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse
of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus,—to the
general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece.
For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in 479 B.C., the
Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic
coast. The satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all
the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted
permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was
carried so far as to raze the town altogether.[64] And thus these
cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the
worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule
of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs,—were now transferred
to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale
of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing
towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the
satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more
unrestrained, than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian
grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and
beautiful women as inmates of their harems.[65] What was taken
for their convenience admitted neither of recovery nor redress;
and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than many of the native
Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and seductive,—as
we may read in the history of that Phokæan lady, the companion of
Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic
Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came under
the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of
pain or torture,—maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks,
but also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.[66]
The difference between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this
point, has been just noticed; and doubtless the difference between
Greeks and Persians was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks
were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of
Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the
same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the
hands of the Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in
Cyprus,—and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of
Asia,—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.[67] These islands were now exposed
to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as
that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the
Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that
Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the
genius, the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first
organized, and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to
whom its extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks,
had destroyed the security even of the islanders.
[64] Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις
τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν,
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.
[65] See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.
[66] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.
Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ
ἐξαρκεῖ δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι
τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς
οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν.
[67] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190. How
immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the
continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also,
is seen in Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered
without resisting, to the first Cyrus, when he was master of
the continental towns, though he had no naval force (Herod. i,
143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the Spartans deemed
it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian
masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the
energy and organization of the Athenians proved that it was
possible to do so.
It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by
this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government
of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of
Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian
exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her
for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence
or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against
Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes
was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had
formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to
avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis,
as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He
was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense
miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all
sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans,
like Antalkidas, warned him[68] that his persevering hostility
would ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military
resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it
was too fully realized in the development of the great military
genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.
[68] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.
I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths
to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to
recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which
Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the
treaty, and attack them single-handed.[69] Their timely accession
balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a series
of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to the power
of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed autonomous
under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and interpreter, of
that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have, the right
of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent,
from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she
availed herself of this moment of change to organize in each of them
a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as
devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost
and garrison.[70] Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally
out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and the predominant
sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been favorable to
Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of Thebes. These
leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, intimidated, and
disqualified, under the new system, while those who had before been
an opposition minority would come forward with a bold and decided
policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the surrender of
the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather invite
than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a
security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as
well as against attacks from Thebes, and as a means of placing them
under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of
the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and
though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy,
from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet,
Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears to
have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable to
the Spartan alliance.[71] These two cities were strongly garrisoned
by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.[72]
[69] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.
[70] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι
καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city
of Tanagra, he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ
Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).
Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages,
explains the word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones
optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ
Laconico.” This is perfectly just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν
Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation. These words allude
to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades was
the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to
the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 B.C.; and who
remained masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by
a standing Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were
overthrown by the memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon
in 379 B.C. It is to this oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes,
devoted to Spartan interests and resting on Spartan support,—that
Xenophon compares the governments planted by Sparta, after the
peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. What he says,
of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at Thebes,
is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into the
acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might
themselves exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας
εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν
πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: compare v, 2,
36). This character—conveying a strong censure in the mouth
of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to all the governments
planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace of
Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she
established throughout her empire.
[71] Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.
[72] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or.
xiv, (Plataic.) s. 14. 15.
The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the
discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols
and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of
oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a
deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound
still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to
inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.
A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as
one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its brave and
faithful population, victims of an exposed position combined with
numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance
the capricious turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior
towards them. One hundred and twenty years before, the Platæans had
thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat her protection against
Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then declined the obligation
as too distant, and had recommended them to ally themselves with
Athens.[73] This recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish
to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, was complied with;
and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether from the Bœotian
confederacy, turned out both advantageous and honorable to her until
the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At that time, it suited
the policy of the Spartans to uphold and strengthen in every way
the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it was altogether
by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes was
reëstablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which
she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service
of Mardonius.[74] Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing
her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various
cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless suggested
by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time (460-445
B.C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic grounds; seeing that
Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted them all in
the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same again
if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a
time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of
Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole
Bœotian federation (except Platæa), was united under Thebes, in bitter
hostility against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any
declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt
to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war, king Archidamus,
at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter
town; which, after an heroic defence and a long blockade, at length
surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; yet not before one
half its brave defenders had forced their way out over the blockading
wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the Platæan old men, women,
and children, had been safely lodged before the siege. By a cruel
act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian warfare,
the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Platæan captives, two
hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Platæa
had been razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had
remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.[75] The surviving
Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians.
A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at Athens, and
when Skionê was recaptured in 420 B.C., that town (vacant by the
slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed over to the Platæans
as a residence.[76] Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they were obliged
at the close of the Peloponnesian war,[77] to return to Athens,
where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace
of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their
town and their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and
restore it.[78]
[73] Herodot. vi, 108.
[74] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.
[75] Thucyd. iii, 68.
[76] Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or.
xii, (Panathen.) s. 101.
[77] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.
[78] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.
Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which
the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either
to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the
autonomy of _existing_ towns,—or to repair previous injustice, since
the prior destruction had been the deliberate act of themselves, and
of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but simply as a step
conducive to the present political views of Sparta. And towards
this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the Thebans, not
only by wresting from them what had been, for about forty years,
a part of their territory and property; but also by establishing
upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter
enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional
station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the
newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced
a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, calculated to
prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards against Sparta.
As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no less ancient
and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we may probably
conclude that the restoration of the town was an act acceptable to
the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made of
it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to
Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during their residence at
Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,[79] who now, probably,
accompanied their husbands to the restored little town on the north
of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river Asôpus.
[79] Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.
Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such
as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian
war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the
sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically
sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost
of Spartan operations against Thebes.[80] They were a part of the
great revolution which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia;
whereby Thebes was degraded from the president of a federation into
an isolated autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had
been before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself
into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth[81]
in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in
as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted
to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans
should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of
Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from
themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how
irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy,
in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal
autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to
acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune
which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while
their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for
being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent
the reunion of Bœotia;[82] an object in which she was for a time
completely successful, and was even enabled, beyond her hopes, to
become possessed of Thebes itself,[83] through a party of traitors
within,—as will presently appear.
[80] See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which
is a pleading probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by
the Platæans (after the second destruction of their city),
and, doubtless, founded upon their own statements. The painful
dependence and compulsion under which they were held by Sparta,
is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31, 33, 48);
together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in
their town (s. 14).
[81] Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian
cities αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long
desired to do. Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from
Thebes, was insured to them,—but in no other sense.
[82] To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian
cities, and Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the
seizure of the Kadmeia by Sparta (387-382 B.C.)—compare
the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and that of the Theban
Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34). Ὑμᾶς
(the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’
ἓν εἴη, etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν,
πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν
ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ
Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.
[83] In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it
stated among the accusations against the Thebans, that during
this period (_i. e._ between the peace of Antalkidas and the
seizure of the Kadmeia) they became sworn in as members of the
Spartan alliance and as ready to act with Sparta conjointly
against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might also
admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the
Spartan army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not
see how it can be even partially true. If it had been true, I
think Xenophon could not have failed to mention it: all that he
does say, tends to contradict it.
In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand,
and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the
great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more
just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,[84] as well as by a
section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his
project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local despots or
oligarchies in the various cities,[85] and who contended that the
autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be left to
develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention on the part
of Sparta.[86]
[84] Diodor. xv. 29.
[85] How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus,
may be seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica
of Xenophon; whose narrative is both so partial, and so
ill-constructed, that the most instructive information is dropped
only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where we should
not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ
λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius)
ἀπεχθάνοιτο (Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again,
v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος) εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ
πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ
πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24-26.
[86] Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for
a short time; that the cities which had before been dependent
allies of Sparta were now emancipated and left to themselves;
that a reaction immediately ensued against those dekarchies
or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the cities in the
interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as
everywhere to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal
partisans of Spartan supremacy; and that the accumulated
complaints and sufferings of these exiles drove the Spartans,
after having “endured the peace like a heavy burthen” (ὥσπερ
βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and
to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the
government of their friends in all the various cities. In this
statement there is nothing intrinsically improbable. After what
we have heard of the dekarchies under Sparta, no extent of
violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor can we
doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice,
along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian
citizens were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both
after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I
believe that Diodorus is here mistaken, and that he has assigned
to the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas,
those reactionary violences which took place in many cities
about sixteen years subsequently, _after the battle of Leuktra_.
For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of
Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by
Sparta to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked;
which he would never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been
so, because it would have supplied a plausible apology for the
high-handed injustice of the Spartans, and would have thus lent
aid to the current of partiality which manifests itself in his
history.
Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they
had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an
early moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and
Corinth, to strain their authority over their allies beyond its
previous limits. Passing in review[87] the conduct of each during
the war, they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea.
Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity,
were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been
slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even
to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under
pretence of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in
time of war to the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting
their disaffected feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success
which she obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience
a reverse.[88] The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea,
denouncing all such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that
the walls of the city should be demolished, as the only security
for future penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they
despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for
the purpose of enforcing the sentence. They intrusted the command
to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the duty,
on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to
his father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset
Sparta during the early part of his reign.[89]