THE STILL NEUTRAL STATES WHOSE INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE DIRECTLY THREATENED
BY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE “HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF” SCHEME, AND
THEREFORE BY GERMANY’S CAPTURE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
I. The example of Portugal.
II. Holland.
III. Switzerland.
IV. The States of South America.
V. The United States.
Almost all the neutral States, though as yet they are hardly aware of
it, have a vital interest, not only in compelling Germany to abandon her
conquests in the East and in the West, but also in preventing her from
establishing her supremacy over Austria-Hungary by means of the war.
This latter aim is perfectly logical, since the German supremacy over
Central Europe would secure for the government of Berlin formidable means
of domination both by land and sea (see p. 106). One of the effects of
the colossal upheaval in the mutual relation of the forces of the States
involved, in view of the abnormal concentration of the sources of power
in German hands, would be that the independence of the neutral States
would inevitably be gravely imperilled. In this chapter we shall consider
the situation of countries still neutral, which would be particularly
affected by the achievement of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf.”
I.
The case of Portugal is typical, because here we have a small State
which, in the opinion of many, seemed for a long time as if it could keep
out of the conflict; whereas on the contrary the necessity of defending
itself against the German schemes for swallowing it up, compelled it at
last to plunge into the war.
Ever since the opening of hostilities in Europe, Portugal has been
the scene of German intrigues carried on with the greatest activity;
indeed, even before the outbreak of the European conflagration the
train had been laid as carefully in Portugal as elsewhere. Working
through reactionary centres, these intrigues ostensibly aimed at the
restoration to the throne of Emmanuel of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha-Bragança,
who had been dethroned, on October 5th, 1910, by the revolution which
gave birth to the Portuguese Republic. Afterwards, on the 4th of
September, 1913, he married the German princess Augustine-Victoria, of
Hohenzollern Sigmaringen. The German agents also brought influence to
bear on certain Portuguese anarchists in order, by every possible means,
to stir up trouble in the country which had been marked out for ruin
by the Pangerman plot of 1911. We have seen (p. 103) what Portuguese
colonies that plot had specially in view. Now in 1912 the government of
Berlin, eagerly and astutely plotting its European war on the assumption
that England would stand out of it, and that she might be lulled into
acquiescence by the bait of temporary colonial gains, availed itself of
the official negotiations with Lord Haldane to propose to the English
Cabinet that England and Germany should divide the Portuguese colonies in
Africa between them.
These colonies (the Azores, Madeira, Cape Verd, Princes Island, St.
Thomas, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique) shown on the accompanying map, are
of great importance to Portugal. With their two millions of square
kilometres, and their 8,300,000 inhabitants, they are the still
important relics of the once magnificent colonial empire of Portugal;
they are accordingly an essential base for Portuguese commerce, and
especially for a future commercial revival of Portugal, which the
government of Lisbon is naturally anxious to promote.
[Illustration: PORTUGAL AND COLONIAL PANGERMANISM.]
At the very commencement of hostilities in Europe, the Germans,
discounting their victory in Europe, invaded Angola, and it is only
lately that the Portuguese soldiers succeeded in driving them out. Thus
in point of fact a state of war has long existed between Portugal and
Germany, and it is Germany that took the offensive. Hence from the outset
the Portuguese government has had many excellent reasons for wishing well
to the cause of the Allies; and Portugal has effectively proved her good
will by all the means in her power.
By way of reprisals for the incessant German intrigues in Portugal
itself, and for the acts of war committed on her colonial territory by
the soldiers of William II., Portugal at last seized the numerous German
vessels which had been interned in her ports since the outbreak of the
European conflagration.
Germany replied in March, 1915, by an official declaration of war, which
in fact did nothing but legalize a state of things that had long existed
in consequence of the German aggression on Angola.
After this official rupture Portugal perfectly understood that, if she
wished to save her very existence, she must range herself completely on
the side of the Allies. On March 25th, 1916, the Portuguese Minister of
War issued an order to the army, in which he said:
“No one who has followed with patriotic anxiety the acts of Germany
ever since the conference of Berlin in 1885, can doubt that her victory
would involve the loss of our colonies, perhaps even of our nationality.
Therefore we must all impress it clearly on our minds, that the battles
now being fought in so many parts of the world touch us very closely;
that this war is our war, a war for our liberty, for our independence,
for the integrity of the territory of our native land, and that we should
wage it wherever our forces can strike the heaviest blow at the power of
Germany. The hatred of our barbarous foes, the Germans, should pervade
every heart, and that it may strike root and penetrate into the army,
it is necessary to explain to the soldiers the reasons of the war, to
enumerate the injuries that have been done us by the Germans, and to
set forth clearly the intentions and schemes which Germany cherishes in
regard to small nations, like Belgium, Serbia, and Portugal.”
This proclamation of the Portuguese Minister of War deserves to be
remembered, for it accurately expresses the general sentiments which will
be shared more and more by States still neutral, in proportion as they
understand more and more clearly that their future independence really
hangs on the total defeat of Germany.
II.
The following words give a summary of the views and the tactics adopted
by the Germans with regard to the Dutch in the Pangerman plan of 1895.
“When our brothers of the Low German race shall have got over their
almost childish fright at ‘annexation by the Prussians,’ they will
acknowledge that the admission of Holland into Great Germany is
advantageous to both parties. Moreover, in the bosom of Great Germany,
the Dutch would be able to preserve, to a reasonable extent, their own
particular characteristics.
“The Kingdom of the Low Countries, on entering into not only the German
Customs Union but also the Pangerman Confederation, with the retention
of all its rights, will cease to maintain an independent fleet, but
will organize an independent Army Corps, with privileges like those of
Bavaria, and also a colonial army. It will remain in possession of its
colonies, and might even undertake the administration of New Guinea and
of all the German colonies in the Pacific.
“The official language will remain Low German (Dutch) for the legislation
and the administration in State, School, and Church. High German will
not be employed except in matters that concern the Confederation.
Besides it is obvious that its use will spread rapidly, but voluntarily,
in commerce and the sciences.
[Illustration: THE NEUTRAL STATES OF EUROPE AND PANGERMANISM.]
“If the Rhine from its source to its mouth becomes a truly German river,
it will then be the Low German (or Dutch) commercial towns and seaports
near its mouth, which will chiefly benefit thereby.
“It will thus be seen that a singularly attractive prospect for the
economic and political future of the Low Countries, is being opened
up, if they will only consent to become members of the Pangerman
Confederation. God grant that our Low German cousins may at last abandon
that jealous regard for their independence as a separate State, which
we, the Germans of the Empire, also felt down to the years 1866 and
1870” (see _Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950_, p. 13,
Thormann und Goetsch, S.W. Bessel-Strasse 17, Berlin, 1895).
So it seems that twenty years ago the Germans trusted to moral suasion
to open the eyes of the Dutch to the intrinsic beauties of Pangermany.
The hope was built on the familiar fact that many Dutchmen, addicted,
like their ancestors for ages before them, to the profitable occupation
of foreign trade, devote their energies to the pursuit of gain, and have
very little time, and even less taste, for situations that call for
bellicose resolutions. The same turn of mind explains why ever since
the outbreak of war the Germans have easily found in Holland plenty of
enterprising firms, which have smuggled ample supplies of all sorts into
Germany and snapped their fingers at the blockade.
However, 1895 is a long time ago, and since then Pangerman ideas have
marched with the time. As we have seen (p. 103), the plan of 1911
provides for the “conveyance” of the Dutch colonies to Pangermany under
conditions which would not allow the Low Countries to cherish the least
illusion as to the ultimate preservation of their independence.
But the revelation of the German plans for the perpetration of burglary
and the appropriation of other people’s goods, has had its effect, and
even the Dutch, in spite of their intense desire not to be drawn into the
great war, are now forced to look hard facts in the face.
In truth, the moral situation of the Dutch is hard, for they are
pulled in opposite directions by sentiments which logically lead to
contradictory decisions. On the one side, historical memories and ancient
rivalries in the commerce of the sea still inspire them with a lively
dread of England; on the other side, they are constrained to admit that
the Pangerman peril has grown imminent for their country. It is plain,
in fact (see the map on p. 188) that if Germany were to tighten her grip
on Belgium, or if she emerged from the war much strengthened by the
establishment of her supremacy over Austria-Hungary, Holland would soon
inevitably be forced, even in time of peace, to acquiesce in vassalage to
her formidable neighbour, Pangermany.
The Dutch are all the more perplexed and irresolute, before they can
screw their courage up to the sticking point, because they are sometimes
disconcerted by the action of their government, which, as everybody
knows, is open to both direct and powerful German influences. The
situation is described as follows in a few paragraphs of the _Telegraaf_,
which earned for their author a series of prosecutions on the pretext
that they endangered the neutrality of the country:—
“For our part,” said the _Telegraaf_, “we shall not cease to oppose a
Government and its accomplice Press, who under the cloak of a ‘dignified
neutrality’ are pursuing a rash policy of exportation and provisioning
Germany with articles of prime necessity, thereby enabling that country
to continue the war, and betraying not only the interests of their own
country but also the cause of humanity” (quoted by _Le Temps_, 30th
March, 1916).
As for the general and dominant tone of Dutch public opinion, Mr.
Holdert, the editor of the _Telegraaf_, who is particularly well
qualified to form an opinion on the subject, sums up as follows:
“Every time an incident occurs that might lead Holland to take a grave
decision, before you venture to predict, remember that the people over
there do not want war. With us, business, money, gain, and all that sort
of thing, is considered extremely, supremely, infinitely important.
“To-day the majority of my fellow countrymen are rolling in money. Why
trouble about anything else?
“Yes, eighty per cent. of the population are in favour of the Allies.
France especially is loved, and she could ask but little of us which we
would not give. But that affection, though real, is so to speak, remote.
We quickly turn over the page which contains the news of the war” (see
_Le Journal_, 5th April, 1916).
Thus Dutch opinion seems stagnant, yet it moves, though very, very
slowly; for people are beginning to ask themselves whether, despite all
their efforts, all their intense desire for peace, this dreadful war can
end with the Dutch sword still in the scabbard.
No doubt the military measures taken by the Hague government have been
dictated purely with the intention of defending Dutch neutrality. But
facts such as the torpedoeing of the _Tubantia_ go far to add to the
number of those clearsighted and energetic patriots, who, like the
admirable and vigorous artist Raemaekers, acknowledge and proclaim that
for the sake of her honour as well as of her interest Holland is bound to
do all in her power to favour and hasten the victory of the Allies.
III.
The Pangerman aims with regard to Switzerland, as set forth in the plan
of 1895, are summed up as follows:—
“We may then leave Switzerland to choose, whether she shall enter the
German Customs Union and the Pangerman Confederation bringing all her
cantons or only the German ones with her, or whether she shall form
part of the German Empire on equal terms as a Federal State” (see
_Grossdeutschland um das Jahr 1950_, p. 17).
The Pangerman programme is, therefore, definitely directed against
Switzerland (see the map on p. 188), but Berlin has always flattered
itself with the hope of absorbing this little State, like Holland,
without resort to force, simply in the course of nature and as a
consequence of the defeat of the great European powers.
What is certain is that before the war the prestige of Germany in German
Switzerland was so great, and the organization of the German propaganda
in this part of Helvetia was so perfect, that all the excuses published
by the Berlin government to explain and justify the violation of Belgium
were swallowed without winking by the German Swiss.
But since then a slow change of sentiment has taken place. The enormous
annexations contemplated by Germany, the atrocious manner in which she
is waging the war, and, above all, the terrible horrors perpetrated
in Serbia, have at last convinced an increasing number of Swiss that
a victory for Germany would create a formidable danger for the whole
civilized world in general, and for the independence of Switzerland in
particular.
A gentleman at Zurich, whose position affords him ample opportunity for
forming a just appreciation of the state of affairs, gave me recently the
following concise statement of the real feeling in German Switzerland:
“The majority of the intellectuals, almost all of whom have studied in
Germany, and a part of the business men, are the only resolute champions
of Prussia. They would be quite willing to see Switzerland absorbed in
Pangermany. But the Swiss who hold that view are only a small minority.
In German Switzerland most of the manufacturers, almost all of whom have
suffered very heavily in recent years through the keenness of German
competition, desire a German defeat, which would be in harmony both with
their opinions as liberals and with their interests as manufacturers, by
relieving the strain of the present fierce competition in business. As
for the mass of the German Swiss—and that is the important point—they
are by no means in love with the Prussians, as people in France wrongly
imagine. They are before all things Swiss.”
The Swiss have resolved to defend their neutrality against the first of
their neighbours that shall violate their frontier. The Allies wish for
nothing more than that. They only desire that the Swiss should impress
this truth more and more clearly on their minds, that in presence of the
formidable Pangerman ambition the victory of the Allies is a condition
essential to the maintenance of the Helvetic Confederation.
IV.
The accompanying map summarizes and recalls the Pangerman claims to such
direct German protectorates in South America as were provided for by the
plan of 1911 (see p. 105).
It is important to observe that the German designs on South America
began just at the time when the European nations, acquiescing in the
Monroe doctrine, renounced all intentions of appropriating any part of
the New World. This renunciation took place about 1898, the date of
the war between Spain and America. That was the very moment when the
Pangermanists of Berlin conceived and prepared to execute the plan of
extending in the future the power of the Hohenzollerns to Cape Horn. This
fact, taken in conjunction with many others, serves to demonstrate the
spirit of conquest and aggression, the boundless ambition which animates
the Germany of William II.
The preparations for carrying out the Pangerman plans in South America
were, as everywhere else, conducted by the organizers of the movement
most methodically.
[Illustration: COLONIAL PANGERMANISM AND SOUTH AMERICA.]
Having thus settled on their plan of 1895, they proceeded to draw up
an actual register of all the Germans existing on the face of the
terrestrial globe, in order to pick out from them such as were likely to
prove the most serviceable tools in executing the Pangerman scheme. The
general results of this register of Germans all over the world are to be
found, in a concentrated form, in the _Pangerman Atlas_ of Paul Langhans,
published by Justus Perthes at Gotha in 1900.
So far as relates to South America, this document proves that there were
In Peru in 1890 2,000 Germans
In Paraguay in 1890 3,000 ”
In Colombia in 1890 3,000 ”
In Uruguay in 1897 5,000 ”
In Venezuela in 1894 5,000 ”
In Chili in 1895 15,000 ”
In Argentina in 1895 60,000 ”
In Brazil in 1890 400,000 ”
These Germans have been strongly inoculated, especially since 1900, by
the Pangerman Societies. They have been organized with particular care
in the countries which, like Argentina, and, above all, Brazil, were
intended to be the principal German protectorates in South America.
The German law, called Delbrück’s law, of July 22nd, 1913, dealing with
the nationality of the Empire and the nationality of the State, has
greatly favoured the Pangerman organization in America. Hence it is
needful to be acquainted with at least the substance of the Delbrück
law, since it formed the last stage, and a very significant one, in the
Pangerman organization all over the world before the outbreak of war.
The second part of article 25 of that law runs as follows:—“If any person
before acquiring nationality in a foreign State, shall have received the
written permission of a competent authority of his native State to retain
his nationality of that State, he shall not lose his nationality of the
said native State. The German consul shall be consulted before granting
the said permission.”
These words afford us a measure of the depth of German astuteness.
According to this provision, a German may become a naturalized subject
of a foreign State, but if he obtains a written permission from the
competent authorities of his native German State, _he continues, in
spite of this naturalization, to enjoy, for himself and his descendants,
all the rights of a German citizen and all the protection of the German
Empire_.
These provisions being contrary to all the general principles of
international law on the subject of nationality, a German citizen who
benefits by them will take very good care not to acquaint the foreign
State whose nationality he has acquired, with the highly peculiar
situation in which he stands. By this process Germany has been able to
have in every State agents devoted to her aggressive policy, without
these States being aware of the danger they run through this secret
service. In fact, these States had, to all appearance, to do only with
fellow countrymen whom they had no right to suspect. It was only after
many months of war, when their criminal action compelled them to take
off the mask, that the dangerous power of these Germans disguised as
foreigners appeared in all its formidable and insufferable dimensions.
This state of things explains why, during the first months of the war,
intoxicated by the powerful German propaganda, and ignorant of the
disasters with which Europe and still more themselves were threatened by
the Pangerman plot, the States of South America were unable to perceive
the peril at their door and to understand that they had a direct interest
in the issue of the European war. But now public opinion in these
countries is advancing steadily towards a complete apprehension of the
truth.
Peru and Chili, one after the other, are slipping through the meshes of
the German net.
In Argentina the movement in favour of the Allies is also growing
rapidly. But it is above all in Brazil, the southern part of which
is most particularly coveted by the Germans, that the progress of
enlightenment is especially interesting to watch. For a long time the
Germans have concentrated their colonial efforts particularly on three
Brazilian States, to wit, Parana (60,000 Germans), Santa Catarina
(170,000), and Rio Grande do Sul (220,000). In these rich provinces, the
Germans, preserving the language, the traditions, the prejudices of the
Fatherland, are almost absolute masters. Only 47,000 of them are openly
citizens of the German Empire; the rest, about 400,000, are apparently
Brazilian subjects, but in virtue of the Delbrück law a considerable
part of them have in reality remained or become once more liege-men of
William II. Moreover, the budget of the German Empire included a sum of
500,000 marks to be devoted to the establishment or the support of German
schools in Brazil. In 1912 Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of William
II., in the course of his cruise, landed at the port of Itajahy to pay
a visit to his fellow countrymen in Santa Catarina. Since the outbreak
of the European war the game of the Germans in Brazil has been gradually
revealed in its true colours, and it has been lately discovered that
the numerous Rifle Clubs were in fact societies for military drill and
dangerous enough to necessitate their disarmament.
In the rest of Brazil, outside the three provinces mentioned above, the
Germans are not numerous, but they fill most of the principal posts in
business houses and banks. In the first period of the war these Germans
founded Germanophile newspapers published in Portuguese, and thereby
prevented Brazil from getting accurate information as to the origin and
course of the conflict.
But despite this clever opposition, ever since the battle of the Marne
the cause of the Allies has been steadily gaining ground in Brazil. A
powerful impulse to the movement has been given by the action of Portugal
in taking up arms, for there are 600,000 Portuguese in Brazil.
Thus in South America the tide is clearly running in favour of the
Allies. A new stage will be reached when these States come clearly to
understand that in view of Pangerman colonial ambitions, which threaten
them personally, they have a direct interest in the complete victory of
the Allies, which alone can deliver them from the fear of the German
peril. They will then reach the same definite and sound conclusion at
which, as I shall show further on, the United States is logically bound
to arrive.
When that is so, it is possible, if not probable, that these South
American States, or at least the principal among them, will no longer be
satisfied to remain neutral. They will then acknowledge that a true view
of their own interest compels them to strike, with all their might, a
blow for the common freedom.
V.
President Wilson, by his note to Berlin of April 20th, 1916, concerning
submarine warfare, which had the character of an ultimatum, committed the
United States to a first act of intervention in the European war. The
fact that a consideration of their interests has compelled the Germans,
at least for the moment, to bow to the mandate of the United States,
seems to some people to have already closed the American intervention.
Those who hold this opinion may support it by reference to the speech
which President Wilson delivered to the Press Club at Washington, on May
18th, 1916: “There are two reasons,” said the President, “why the chief
desire of the Americans is for peace. One is that they love peace, _and
have nothing to do with the present quarrel_; the other is that they
believe that the parties to the quarrel have been forced to go to such
lengths that they can no longer keep within the limits of responsibility.
Why not let the storm go by, and then, when all is over, make up the
account?” (quoted by _Le Temps_, May 22nd, 1916).
The need for reserve, which his official position lays on President
Wilson, has evidently hindered him from disclosing his thoughts fully;
for, as we shall see immediately, it would be particularly dangerous
for the United States to imagine that they have nothing to do with the
present quarrel, and to wait for the end of it in order to make up the
account.
In reality, the true question for the United States goes far beyond that
of German piracy in submarine warfare. That question really involves
two quite distinct American interests; one of a moral, the other of a
material or political nature.
From the moral point of view the United States must consider the
barbarity with which Germany wages war, not only on the sea, but
everywhere. Not only does she constantly violate the laws of war between
belligerents, but also and above all the German authorities subject to
a frightful reign of terror all the civil anti-Germanic populations in
the territories now occupied by Pangermany from the North Sea to Bagdad.
The sufferings inflicted by the Germans on the Belgians, the Slavs of
Austria-Hungary, the Serbians, and the Armenians (whom they have caused
to be massacred wholesale) amount to millions of indescribable pangs, of
odious crimes, of atrocious martyrdoms. The Americans have intervened in
the submarine warfare in the name of humanity. Can they remain neutral
in face of this “ocean of crimes” committed by the Germans, without the
smallest excuse, over enormous stretches of territory?
From the point of view of defending their own material interests, it
is not certain that enough Americans even yet understand the magnitude
of the formidable problem which the European war compels them to face
and solve. It is quite natural that it should be so. In many circles
of France and England it is only quite lately that people have come
clearly to apprehend, as a whole, the real, the gigantic objects pursued
by Germany in the war. Hence it is not surprising that the enormity of
the German plot has not yet been grasped by the Americans of the United
States, whose ideas about Europe at the beginning of the conflict were
necessarily just as vague as the ideas of Europeans about the United
States.
[Illustration: DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN-BORN GERMANS IN THE UNITED
STATES.]
The accompanying map will enable the reader readily to appreciate the
basis of the real problem which the war presents to the United States. As
I have explained (p. 194), the Germans set themselves after 1895 to make
a regular register of all the Germans scattered over the whole world. Our
map is drawn up in accordance with the data of map 5 in the _Pangerman
Atlas_ of Paul Langhans, which gives the results of the register. The map
shows what proportion the Germans, who had been born in Germany and had
emigrated to the United States, bore to the American population about
the year 1890. We can see that the proportion was considerable, since at
some points (see the map) it amounted to 35%. Further, the general view
presented by the map enables us to observe that in the United States
the Germans have planted themselves by preference in the industrial and
commercial regions of the East and of the Great Lakes. We can therefore
understand what followed. Ever since 1900 the _Alldeutscher Verband_ or
Pangerman Union, in obedience to secret instructions from the official
authorities in Berlin, has laid itself out to select from this mass of
Germans in the United States all such as might best serve the cause of
Prussian militarism at any given moment, in the most diverse domains,
as soon as the European conflagrations should have broken out. Hence
for the last twenty years most of the ten to fifteen million Americans
of German origin have been organized. Little by little, in the midst of
the great American Republic, there has grown up a State within a State,
a State endowed with the most powerful means of influence. In point of
fact, among the German-Americans there are manufacturers, merchants,
and bankers of colossal fortunes, who control the lives of hundreds of
thousands of workmen or employees living in dependence upon them. The
German-Americans also own many newspapers and associations. They have
therefore been able to exert a considerable influence on the policy
of the United States, and even to secure the election to Congress of
members devoted to their interests. The Delbrück law (see p. 195) has
completed the German organization in the United States, by enabling an
influential party of German-Americans to preserve the appearance of
American citizens, while all the time they remain pledged heart and soul
to forward the Kaiser’s scheme of universal slavery.
As the total population of the United States is 100 millions, it is
easy to see what may be the power of 10 to 15 million German-Americans
systematically organized for a definite purpose, when these are opposed
to 90 million Americans who, never suspecting the Pangerman peril, have
taken no kind of special precaution against their fellow citizens of
German origin.
This very peculiar state of affairs explains the strange position
occupied by the United States since the outbreak of the European War.
From that time the German-Americans, in virtue of the immense means of
influence and of action which they had prepared beforehand, have carried
on a multifarious campaign, with extraordinary audacity in furtherance of
the German game. Thus the German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, and his
military attachés von Papen, Boy-Ed, etc., have aided and abetted in the
task of subverting the United States by a multitude of German-American
spies and agents.
During the first months of the war the German propaganda, carried on with
extraordinary activity, was easily able to deceive a considerable part
of American opinion as to the true origin of, and the responsibility
for, the carnage going on in Europe. Afterwards, when the war dragged
on, and the Allies placed considerable orders in the United States,
the understrappers of the professional German spies engaged in an
extraordinary series of outrages in order to terrorize the American
workmen employed in executing the orders of the Allies. The object of
these acts of violence, combined with the frivolous and interminable
discussions which Count Bernstorff carried on with the Government of
Washington, was first to induce the United States to issue an order
prohibiting the Allies from arming their merchant ships for the purpose
of self-defence against the German submarines; second, to persuade the
Americans that the blockade of Germany by England was maintained in a
manner contrary to the rules of international law; third, to slacken
or stop the production of munitions of war destined for the Allies;
and lastly, _supposing that the principal acquisitions contemplated by
Pangermany had been effected in Europe_, to induce President Wilson
to intervene in favour of peace under colour of putting an end to the
European butchery—an intervention which, if it took place, would have the
practical result of opening the negotiations for peace under conditions
eminently favourable to the German plans of annexation.
But at last the crimes of violence committed by the Germans in the United
States opened the eyes of the American people and roused them to anger.
We must understand that it was only gradually, and in spite of great
difficulties, that the real citizens of the United States, hemmed in by
the German organization as by a ring fence, were able to acquire true
notions as to the European war. This progress of American opinion was
further retarded by the circumstance that before the war, for various
reasons, the Allied countries unquestionably occupied a much lower place
in the esteem of the United States than Germany, which had gained for
herself very great prestige by her extraordinary activity in commerce,
industry, and science.
As to Russia, the Americans knew scarcely anything about it except the
hardships of which the Jews in that country complained. As many of
these people have emigrated to the United States, and there exercise
a great influence on the press, they have naturally fostered anything
but a sympathy for the Empire of the Tsars. The Irish-Americans devoted
themselves to the similar task of blackening England, from which the
United States had in days gone by to extort her independence. As to
France, the Americans, on the faith of superficial observations,
considered her to be in a state of hopeless decadence. The flagrant
atrocity of the prodigious German crimes committed in the United States;
on the high seas against neutral passengers; in Belgium against the
Belgians; in Serbia against the Serbians; in Armenia against the
Armenians; and, on the other hand, the magnificent resistance of the
Allies, these things have at last produced a revulsion of feeling. The
prejudices of the Americans against Russia and England have been to a
great extent mitigated, and the grand, the noble attitude of the people
of France, the tenacity and the heroism of her soldiers, have proved
that France is far indeed from decadent. To-day we may say, for it is
the truth, that France has won the deep and enthusiastic admiration of
all the really independent American citizens of the United States. This
progressive change of opinion has ranged the Americans more and more on
the side of the Allies.
But American opinion has still one stage to travel. It is this. The
American people must understand with the utmost clearness that the
victory of Germany would unquestionably mean the end of the independence
of the United States. Indeed, some Americans, more clearsighted than the
rest, have already travelled this last stage on the road to truth. In
March, 1916, Dr. Elliot, formerly President of Harvard University, and an
intimate friend, we are told, of President Wilson, declared in the _New
York Times_: “_The quickest, the best, the surest means for Americans to
defend themselves against a German invasion is to conclude with France
and England a permanent alliance, offensive and defensive, having for
its aim the maintenance of the freedom of the seas for the Allies, and
resistance to any maritime attack. It is time for all Americans to take
sides openly with the European peoples who for so many long months have
been standing up against the military despotism of Prussia._” (Quoted by
_Le Temps_, 15th March, 1916.)
Dr. Elliot has thus stated in terms as exact as they are complete the
real problem which the Americans have to solve. Clearly it reached far
beyond the controversies about the submarine warfare. It is not enough,
indeed, for the Americans to constitute themselves the champions of right
and justice against Teutonic barbarity; _they must understand that the
maintenance of the independence of the United States absolutely depends
on the complete victory of the Allies in Europe_. Already many Americans
come near to accepting this view. Thus at Carnegie Hall, New York, at the
end of May, 1916, Major Putnam, addressing 3000 members of the “Committee
of American Rights,” excited great enthusiasm by demanding that America
should at once take part in the war on the side of the Allies. His chief
argument was: “If Germany wins in this war, her next aggression will be
against our Republic.” (Quoted by _Le Temps_, May 22nd, 1916.)
But these clear ideas, involving immediate and decisive action, are as
yet shared only by a minority of Americans, better informed than the rest.
The progress of American opinion in general will be complete when from a
general view of the facts of the war, as these have occurred in America
as well as in Europe, the people shall logically infer the formidable
consequences which a German victory would entail on the United States.
That general view, which the great American Republic will probably
take in time, is as follows. It will necessarily be based on an exact
knowledge of the German plan for dealing with the United States, a plan,
by the way, which is of long standing.
In 1898, before Manilla, the German Rear-Admiral von Goetzen, a friend of
the Kaiser, said to the American Admiral Dewey: “In about fifteen years
my country will begin a great war.... Some months after we have done our
business in Europe we shall take New York and probably Washington, and we
shall keep them for a time. We do not intend to take any territory from
you, but only to put your country in its proper place with reference to
Germany. We shall extract one or two billions of dollars from New York
and other towns.” (See _Naval and Military Record_, quoted by _L’Echo
de Paris_, September 24th, 1915.) These words at the time were regarded
as mere gasconade. But now it is indisputable that even before 1898 the
Germans of Berlin had, by means of the processes described above (p.
200), been systematically laying the foundations of a State within the
United States, a State that has long been silently sapping the ground on
which stands the American Republic.
A multitude of recent and striking facts—pressure brought to bear on
politicians, monster strikes, plots and outrages against public order
executed by order of the official agents of the Kaiser, such as von
Papen, Boy-Ed, von Igel, &c—have abundantly demonstrated that the German
organization in America threatens the independence of the United States,
and is of a definitely criminal and treasonable character. A phrase in a
letter of Baron de Meysenburg, German consul at New Orleans, written on
December 4th, 1915, to von Papen, German military attaché at Washington,
who organized the principal outrages in the United States, proves that
in the minds of Germans behind the scenes the turn of the United States
was to come in due course. The latter was lately seized by the English:
“May the day of the settling of accounts come here also, and when that
day comes may our Government have found again that will of iron without
which no impression can be made on this country.” (Quoted by _Le Temps_,
January 17th, 1916.)
On the other hand the Americans cannot shut their eyes to the extreme
gravity of the recent Pangerman manœuvres in the States of South
America, particularly in Argentina and Brazil, which are regarded as
destined ultimately to become German protectorates; also in Nicaragua,
where the Kaiser’s agents have tried to get a concession of territory for
the construction of a canal to compete with the Panama canal. Lastly,
there is the undeniable fact, which brings the danger still nearer home,
that a few months ago Germany plotted the military invasion of Canada,
with the complicity of her subjects disguised as American citizens.
Common sense, therefore, tells us that, assuming that the Allies were
beaten in Europe, Germany would be the mistress of Canada, and would
practically dominate the United States. The extraordinary series of
formidable outrages which the German-Americans have already concocted and
executed on the soil of the great American Republic, is proof patent that
the existence of Pangermany would be incompatible with the independence
of the United States.
All that is more or less clearly understood in the United States; but
what American opinion still needs to be enlightened on is the immense
danger which the United States would incur through the formidable Berlin
trap called “the Drawn Game,” the most dangerous trick which the Germans
still keep up their sleeve. Seeing that many of the Allies do not yet
understand the enormous peril of a Germany yielding temporarily on the
East and on the West in order to make herself mistress once and for all
of Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, it is natural enough that the
Americans should not yet have fully “realized” the vast bearings of the
dodge called “the Drawn Game.”
The map on p. 101 enables the reader to see what would be the great
danger from the American point of view. As I have explained in Chapter V,
the pretended “Drawn Game” would enable Germany to carry out her scheme
of domination “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” and would thereby
secure for Berlin the means of laying hands successively on all the
important strategical points which command the seas of the whole world.
The consequence for the United States would be that with the keys of all
the seas in her hand, Germany would be able to prosecute her intrigues
on a much greater scale in South America, Canada, and therefore in the
United States.
It is deeply to be regretted that the very distinguished American Admiral
Mahan is no more. If I may judge by his powerful book, _The Interest
of America in Sea Power Present and Future_, the tenor of which was
admirably expounded by M. Jean Izoulet some time ago, I believe that I
am not going too far when I affirm that were Admiral Mahan now alive he
would, on a review of the whole situation, sketch as follows the line of
conduct which the government of Washington ought to follow with reference
to the European war. Admiral Mahan would doubtless tell his countrymen:
“At no price, under no pretext, should the United States suffer Germany
to execute her project from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, and that because
of the consequences which the achievement of that plan would entail on
sea power all over the world. As the only sure guarantee against the
accomplishment of that plan is to be found in Central Europe (see p.
129), the United States has a direct and first-hand interest in solving
the question of Austria-Hungary on the basis of nationalities, that
solution being over and above indispensable if the world is to see the
end of the Pangerman peril and of the great armaments.”
Hence, taking everything into account, we conclude that, apart from any
question of humanity and justice, the United States have an absolutely
vital interest, not only in a partial victory of the Allies in Europe,
but in their complete victory. It is desirable that this truth should be
admitted as soon as possible, for then the measures, which the Government
of Washington could not fail to take, would signally hasten the end of
the European carnage.
Plain good sense suffices to forecast what these measures would be.
It is as clear as daylight that the expedition to Mexico is a German
trap; hence the United States have every reason for awaiting the end
of the European war before committing themselves further in that
direction. On the other hand, _now that the Allies have gripped Germany
by the throat, the Government of Washington should avail itself of this
exceptional opportunity for carrying out with the utmost speed the
destruction of that criminal and parasitic organization which the Germans
have contrived to plant in the soil of the United States_. To arrest
the ringleaders who have been guilty of inciting to treason and crimes
against the common law, _whatever their social position or wealth may
be_; to suppress the associations which are nothing but agencies of the
Berlin government—these are tasks which the Americans have every motive
for accomplishing without delay.
Obviously, too, when the United States shall have wakened up to the
truth, they will acknowledge it to be at once their interest and
their duty to give the Allies all material succour, since nothing but
their complete victory over Germany can safeguard for the future the
independence of the United States.
In the financial sphere the United States can offer the Allies immense
facilities for raising loans, which would be particularly opportune.
Mr. Guthrie, Vice-President of the French-American Committee at New York,
has explained as follows the method, at once delicate and ingenious,
whereby the United States could and should, according to him, give their
financial support to France. “The historian Perkins,” says Mr. Guthrie,
“states that the expenses incurred by France in liberating America
amounted to 772 million dollars. Of this enormous outlay, which ruined
the Royal Treasury, not a stiver was ever repaid to France. She never
claimed it, and to-day she would proudly refuse to be repaid, reminding
us that, in the treaty of alliance of 6th February, 1778, she stipulated
that she should receive no indemnity for her help and her sacrifices....
The generosity of that treaty was unprecedented in the history of the
world.... Would it not be supremely just if the American people, a
hundred and thirty-four years after the battle of Yorktown, recognized
that service—I will not call it debt—by offering the French people
commercial credit to the amount of the principal, that is to say 772
million dollars, to be repaid at France’s convenience? It would be only
the equivalent of a contribution of seven and a half dollars from each
citizen of the United States, much less than the tax that was voluntarily
and cheerfully paid by the French people to help us in the eighteenth
century. Would it not be noble and glorious, honourable alike to head and
heart, if the great American bankers could have proclaimed to the world
that they had fixed the figure at 772 million dollars in gratitude for
the past?” (see _Revue du XVIII. siècle_, janvier-avril, 1916).
In the matter of munitions of war the United States might evidently
increase her production. Lastly, as has been said already, the United
States would be in a position to furnish the Allies with men, since
this unprecedented war requires such vast numbers of soldiers. But,
as we know, the United States have not got a large army, and it is
not certain that they either would or could rapidly improvise one. A
much simpler solution might enable the United States to furnish a very
considerable body of men to the Allies. This could be effected if the
Government of Washington were to grant leave to American citizens to
enlist as volunteers in the Allied armies, on such terms as might be
agreed upon. Not only would English-speaking Americans be glad to come
and fight the Teutonic barbarians, but—and this is a fact not generally
known—there are among American citizens millions of Slavs who emigrated
formerly from Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. These American Slavs are
ardent partisans of the Allies, and many a time in the last few months
these men, working in the American munition factories, have frustrated
the German attempts at outrages. Probably hundreds of thousands of
these Slavs would gladly come as volunteers to fight in Europe for the
liberation of Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, their native land, which
they quitted as exiles long ago to escape the German-Magyar yoke. We see
then that by such voluntary enlistments the United States could very soon
contribute troops for the conflict in Europe without laying on its own
shoulders the enormous burden of creating a great army.
Succours of these various sorts, furnished by America, would evidently
hasten the course of events. We may reasonably treat them as possible,
since it is certain that a German victory would put the independence of
the United States in jeopardy.
CONCLUSIONS.
WHAT HAS BEEN SET FORTH IN THE PRECEDING NINE CHAPTERS APPEARS TO JUSTIFY
THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS.
I.
_The temporary achievement of nine-tenths of the Pangerman plan in
accordance with the programme of 1911 serves to refute the lies
disseminated by the German propaganda as to the cause and authors of the
war._
The intellectual mobilization of Germany, as powerfully organized and
carried out as her military organization, has enabled her utterly to
deceive many neutrals in the world as to the responsibilities for the
outbreak and prolongation of the war. The Allies do not yet fully
understand how prejudicial to them this German propaganda has been, and
what dangers it still involves for the conduct of the struggle and the
conclusion of peace.
This German propaganda has been all the more successful because for
a very long time it encountered no serious opposition on the side of
the Allies. For they, ingenuously confident in the justice of their
cause, which seemed to them self-evident, have not attempted any real
intellectual mobilization. Only quite lately have the Allies begun to
organize the propaganda which must and ought to be carried on in foreign
countries; substantial progress may be anticipated in this direction.
Six main arguments have been employed to back the German propaganda.
1º. Germany has been forced to wage the war in order to resist a
coalition treacherously contrived by England. Therefore Germany, a
country of intellectual, scientific, and economic activity, obliged to
right for its existence, deserves the sympathies of the whole world.
2º. If the neutrals are seriously injured by the war and its prolongation
the responsibility rests on the Allies, who desire to destroy the German
people. The neutrals should therefore take common action and bring
pressure to bear on the Allies for the purpose of inducing them to
acquiesce in the German victory, thus ensuring the speedy restoration of
peace.
3º. To hasten this result the neutrals, and especially the United States,
ought to oppose the maritime blockade which England is maintaining,
under conditions the legitimacy of which, from the point of view of
international law, is open to question. By refusing to supply munitions
to the Allies, the United States would put an end to the butchery and
thus serve the cause of humanity.
4º. Germany is really conciliatory, she wants nothing but an equitable
peace. “We Germans,” declared Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 11th,
1915, “do not wish to set the peoples by the ears; on the contrary each
will bear his share in the peaceful labour of all and in the progress of
the nations.”
5º. The neutrals ought all the more to help Germany because she is
fighting to ensure for all the freedom of the seas, which at present
hateful England keeps in her own hands. The _Berliner Tageblatt_ (quoted
by _Le Matin_ of February 18th, 1916), did not scruple to assert that
the achievement by Germany of her favourite scheme “from Hamburg to the
Persian Gulf” would secure for all nations the freedom of the sea. “If
the economic mission of Germany,” said that journal, “is to guard the
freedom of the road which leads from the North Sea through Central Europe
to Asia Minor, and to render it more and more accessible, in the interest
of all who reside along the road in question, then it is a necessary
consequence of this our mission that we should have a vital interest in
the sea likewise, since the Continental road in Central Europe is merely
its continuation. Our interest requires that the sea shall be freed from
the supremacy of a single people, that it shall be open to all honest
competition.”
6º. The Allies pretended that they made war on Germany because we
violated the neutrality of Belgium. This cant only serves as a cloak for
their own hypocritical cupidity. It is not for the Allies to reproach
Germany, seeing that they have themselves violated the neutrality of
Greece.
To the Allies, who can have no doubt as to the premeditated character
of the German aggression, these main arguments, on which the German
propaganda rests, of course, are nothing more nor less than “colossal”
lies, as absurd as they are cynical. Nevertheless we must bear in mind
that repeated indefatigably under every form to Germanophile neutrals in
Europe or to neutrals in America and Asia, who naturally have but vague
ideas on the complex affairs of Europe, they have enabled the Germans
gravely to prejudice the cause of the Allies through the moral, economic,
and military effects which they have produced. Hence the Allies are
deeply concerned in frustrating the world-wide German propaganda with
all possible speed. Now that great object, as we shall see later on,
the Allied Governments could, if they chose, very quickly accomplish by
pointing to the temporary success of the Pangerman plot.
Pangermanism and the dangers which it involves for the future are now
well enough known in some neutral countries, but the knowledge is still
somewhat vague, it still lacks that clear definition and that sense of
imminent peril which arouse strong convictions and prompt actions. But
if the Pangerman plan of 1911, in all its definiteness and extent, has
been ignored down to a very recent date in the Allied countries, which
nevertheless above all others are interested in knowing it, we can easily
understand that this nefarious plot for enslaving the whole world has
not yet been fully apprehended by neutral nations. But the temporary
accomplishment of the Pangerman plan in Europe, to the enormous extent
of nine-tenths, furnishes the Allies with demonstrative arguments of the
utmost cogency, and thus puts it in their power speedily to counteract
the effect of the German lies all over the world, and to prove the danger
which Pangermanism creates for all civilized States.
To achieve this object it would be enough if the Allied propaganda, which
has begun to be organized, were to be co-ordinated and founded on a small
number of positive arguments drawn from the results already attained
by Pangermanism; for these results would reveal to everybody Germany’s
long premeditation, and therefore her responsibility and the scheme of
world-wide domination which she pursues.
This Allied propaganda ought to be firmly established by the practical
and indisputable proof afforded by the geographical superposition of the
1911 plan on the territories actually taken possession of by Germany in
the course of the war; thus compared, it will be seen that the plan and
its execution tally almost exactly.
[Illustration: RELATION BETWEEN THE PANGERMAN PLAN OF 1911 AND THE
PANGERMAN GAINS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.]
The accompanying map exhibits this incontestable truth in a graphic
form by showing the outlines of the actual German fortress compared
with the outlines contemplated by the 1911 plan. According to it the
German conquests were to have extended to 3,474,288 square kilometres,
in addition to Germany itself. But these conquests and seizures at the
beginning of 1916 were accomplished over an area of 3,035,572 square
kilometres. This geographical proof is confirmed by many manifestoes
which have appeared on the other side of the Rhine advocating a policy of
annexation. Amongst these may particularly be noted:—
1º. The famous memorial of May 20th, 1915, which the Imperial Chancellor
caused to be presented to himself by the most important associations of
Germany (see p. 17).
2º. Germany’s manifest desire to get possession successively of Riga,
Calais, Verdun, Belfort, and Salonika, in order to complete the plan of
1911 by holding the strategical points necessary for the preservation of
the territories over which she has cast her net.
3º. The declarations made in the Reichstag on April 5th, 1916, by the
Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, which lend the force of
demonstration to the geographical proof.
To any plain man these declarations appear to amount to an official
avowal of Germany’s intention to execute the Pangerman plan. The phrases
of the Imperial Chancellor leave no room for ambiguity.
“After the war Poland will no longer be the Poland out of which the
Russian usurers have been cleared.... No. Never again must Russia be able
to march her armies to the defenceless frontier of East Prussia, nay,
of West Prussia (_thunders of applause_). Just as little is it to be
supposed that in the West we shall give up the lands where our people’s
blood has flowed, unless we receive solid guarantees for the future. We
mean to create solid guarantees in order that Belgium should not become a
vassal State of England and France, that it should not be turned into an
outwork against Germany from the military as well as the economic point
of view.” (_Loud applause._) (Quoted by _Le Temps_, April 8th, 1916.)
The Imperial Chancellor could not assert more categorically the
territorial claims of Germany on the East and on the West. As for the
claims towards the South and South-East, consequent upon Germany’s
seizure of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Turkey, Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg made no allusion to them. His silence is intelligible.
In the first place, it was too much to expect that the Imperial
Chancellor should make a clean breast of the burglaries which Germany
has committed on the territories of her own Allies; in the second place,
Berlin affects to consider these forcible acquisitions to the South and
South-East as permanent and therefore beyond the reach of discussion.
Moreover, Deputy Spahn, leader of the Centre, who on April 5th, 1914, and
again on December 11th, 1915, took on himself to reply to the Chancellor
and to say outright what the exigencies of office obliged that gentleman
only to hint at, left no doubt as to Germany’s intentions with regard to
Central Europe. “We must,” said Herr Spahn, “bring about a lasting union
with Austria-Hungary. We must have at our command territories larger than
the German Empire. This war, which has been forced upon us, must secure
for us a position of world-wide power.” (See _Le Temps_, April 7th, 1916.)
Thus irrefragable proofs, both material and moral, combine to
demonstrate, beyond a shadow of doubt, that Germany made and continues to
wage the war for the purpose of carrying out the Pangerman plan which she
elaborated from 1895 to 1911.
II.
_Nine-tenths of the Pangerman plan of 1911 having been for the moment
achieved, the Allies can avail themselves of this fact as evidence to
counteract speedily and everywhere, the effects of the German propaganda,
and to prove to the civilized world the legitimacy and the necessity of
their military action against Prussianized Germany._
Starting from the practical proofs and the German declarations, both of
them indisputable, which we have just set forth, the propaganda of the
Allies should be able speedily to demonstrate to neutrals the absolute
falsehood of the German allegations. Hence it should prove that:
1º. Germany made the war, after very long premeditation, solely for the
sake of executing the Pangerman plan of 1895-1911, the aim of which is
to effect formidable conquests and to subject in Europe and Turkey 127
millions of non-Germans to the yoke of 77 millions of Germans (see p. 15).
2º. If the war is prolonged, it is only because Germany has not renounced
her plan of universal domination.
3º. In claiming to carry out her scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf,” Germany by no means aims at securing for the world that freedom
of the seas which, according to her, has been usurped by England; on the
contrary, the intention of the Berlin government is, by means of the
inevitable consequences of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme, to
get possession of all the strategical points necessary to ensure the
command of the sea all over the world (see p. 106).
4º. In virtue of these consequences, the accomplishment of the “Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf” scheme would directly threaten the independence of
all the civilized States in the world, especially of Japan, the States of
South America, and the United States.
5º. No comparison is possible between the violation of Belgian neutrality
by Germany and the Allies’ occupation of Salonika.
The Allies did not go to Greece to take possession of the country, as
the Germans did to Belgium. The Allies went to Greece to assist their
ally Serbia, which, moreover, was the ally of Greece, and to oppose the
spoliation of Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey, by Germany.
The treaties which give Turkey, France, England, and Russia the right
of protecting the Hellenic constitution, greatly endangered by German
influences at Athens, are sufficient to justify, on the ground of
international law, the presence of the Allies in Greece. But it is
necessary, further, to state clearly that they are there in virtue of a
still higher right, that of safeguarding the collective liberty of the
nations. A comparison will enable us to appreciate this point of view,
the statement of which is perhaps novel. According to the civil law,
private property is inviolable. But if any man, passing a garden which
the right of private property forbids him to enter, sees on the other
side of the garden a ruffian in the act of murdering a person for the
purpose of robbing him, he not only has a moral right, but is in duty
bound to cross the garden to help his fellow who is in danger of his
life. There is not a court of justice in the world that would blame the
worthy and courageous citizen for having violated the rights of private
property in succouring his fellow man. But the Allies went to Salonika
with exactly the same intention. They have passed through Greece in order
to seize by the throat the Pangerman ruffian who is violently robbing
Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey; who is destroying by millions
in these countries the Antigermanic civil populations; who, shrinking
from no crimes, however heinous, claims to lay hands on riches untold,
and to secure his illgotten gains by capturing the whole region from
Vienna to the Persian Gulf, which would furnish Germany with the means of
maintaining her world-wide dominion (see p. 106).
Now, as my readers have been able to see for themselves, there is, by
reason of the temporary success of the Pangerman plot, abundance of
unimpeachable arguments, numerical, geographical, ethnographical, in
support of these conclusions. These irrefragable arguments are therefore
calculated to make the greatest impression on neutrals, because they
are of a nature to appeal to their higher feelings and at the same
time to show how their own interests are jeopardized. If the Allied
propaganda is once co-ordinated and fortified by these arguments, set
forth methodically, the moral, economic, and military effects, which
the German propaganda has undoubtedly produced to the advantage of
Germany, would soon be annulled, and the Allies would justly reap similar
advantages, which would hasten the victory.
III.
_Henceforth the Allies and the neutral states must bear constantly in
mind not only Germany’s present gains on the East and on the West, but
also her Pangerman gains as a whole._
The accompanying map furnishes the justification of this conclusion. It
is obvious that the German gains on the West and the East, important
as they are, are relatively small by comparison with the enormous
seizures which Germany has effected at the expense of Austria-Hungary,
of half the Balkans, and of Turkey. We must fully understand that these
countries, especially Austria-Hungary, though they are allies of Germany,
are nevertheless as truly under the German heel as Belgium, Poland, or
the invaded departments of France. There is therefore good ground for
making no distinction between the Pangerman gains achieved by Germany
at the cost of her open enemies (France and Russia) and those which the
Government of Berlin has treacherously effected at the expense of her own
allies, like Austria-Hungary.
What the Allies and the neutral states have to consider is the Pangerman
gains taken as a whole, in order to discriminate those which are
calculated to upset the balance of power in the world, and consequently
to establish German supremacy.
[Illustration: THE PANGERMAN GAINS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.]
Now it is certain that if Germany were to give up her gains in the East
and the West, while maintaining her seizures in the South and South-East,
her power would at that moment be formidably increased as compared with
what it was before the war. That, therefore, would be an indisputable
and enormous victory for Pangermanism. The sketch map, inserted below,
represents this truth in a graphic form. From Berlin radiate the lines on
which are stretched the threads of that immense spider’s web which covers
the whole of the enormous Pangerman gains achieved by Germany in the
course of the war. These gains she has been able to effect by means of
1º. The very skilful political turn which she has adroitly given to her
military operations.
2º. The ignorance of the Pangerman plan among the Allies. The knowledge
of it would in fact have suggested to them from the very beginning of
the campaign the need of intervening through Salonika and the south of
Hungary, which would have destroyed the chief part of the German plan by
rendering impossible the junction of the Central Empires with Bulgaria
and Turkey.
IV.
_The temporary achievement, almost in its entirety, of the Pangerman
scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf,” proves that the complete
victory of the Allies is necessary for the freedom of the world._
As it is no longer possible to question either the reality or the
extent of the plan of universal domination pursued by the Germans, it
follows that all civilized States are undoubtedly concerned in the
defeat of Prussianized Germany, since a German victory would have a most
detrimental effect on their interests. Accordingly, the Neutral States
whose independence would be especially threatened by the accomplishment
of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” scheme, have a really vital interest
in the continuance of the war by the Allies till a complete victory
crowns their arms. Such a decisive victory is a necessity not only for
Europe, but for the whole world, since the achievement of the “Hamburg
to the Persian Gulf” scheme would have world-wide consequences (see p.
107). That victory should have for its main object to deliver the world
from the Pangerman peril, and therefore to prevent any future outbreak of
the intolerable ambition of the Hohenzollerns. The victory of the Allies
involves a pledge to destroy the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project,
which forms the indispensable but sufficient basis of the whole Pangerman
plan.
V.
_The plan of slavery pursued by Germany is now so manifest that neutrals
or Germanophile groups are henceforth morally responsible for their
sentiments before the civilized world._
The neutrals who, in the first part of the war, displayed sympathy for
Germany, were excusable because they were deceived; but now they are in
a different position. The facts are patent. It is no longer possible for
anyone to see in Prussianized Germany anything but a ferocious burglar
and assassin practising his trade of robbery and murder at the expense
of the whole commonwealth of nations. In the fine phrase of M. Paul
Hyacinthe Loyson, Can neutrals be neutral in the face of crime? Clearly
not. As the _Daily Telegraph_ said very justly: “_Those who refuse to
occupy a vacant seat at the Round Table of chivalry will have to render
an account at the judgment bar of Humanity._” As matters now stand, in
face of the crimes committed by the “miscreants of Central Europe”—the
phrase is that of the Dutchman M. Schroeder—neutrals cannot support
Germany in any way without rendering themselves her accomplices.
This truth is made so manifest by the course of events that already a
change is coming over two neutral countries, which had been thought
Germanophile. Spanish opinion, a part of which had long been deceived by
the German propaganda, is coming round more and more. Sweden, which the
pressure and the audacious temptations of Berlin all but plunged into
the strife, to the great benefit of Pangermany, is now anxious not to
separate her cause from that of civilization; her responsible leaders
have just proclaimed that Sweden will maintain a strict neutrality.
VI.
_The declarations of the Allies, the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to
the Persian Gulf” scheme, and the question of Austria-Hungary._
In receiving the French deputies in London, on April 11th, 1916, Mr.
Asquith declared: “I have said already in November that we would not
sheathe the sword till the military domination of Prussia has been
destroyed once and for all. In this struggle we are the champions not
only of the rights of treaties but of the independence and the free
development of the weaker countries.” (See _L’Œuvre_, April 12th, 1916.)
Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with a correspondent of the _Daily News_
of Chicago affirmed: “We and our Allies are fighting for a free Europe,
an Europe freed not only from the domination of one nation by another,
but also from a hectoring diplomacy, from the danger of war, etc. The
Allies cannot tolerate any peace which would leave the wrongs done by
this war unrighted. We desire a peace that will do justice to all.”
(Quoted by _Le Temps_, May 17th, 1916.)
M. Sazonoff, speaking in the name of Russia, said: “Our victory must
be absolute. The Allies will continue to fight till mankind is rid of
Prussianism.” (Quoted by _Le Temps_, February 27th, 1916.)
At Nancy, on May 13th, 1916, M. Poincaré declared: “France will not
surrender her sons to the danger of fresh aggressions. We do not wish the
Central Empires to offer us peace, we wish that they should ask it of us;
we will not submit to their conditions, we will impose ours on them; we
do not want a peace that would leave Imperial Germany free to begin the
war again and to hang a sword for ever over the head of Europe; we want a
peace which shall receive at the hands of Justice, restored to her own,
solid guarantees of permanence and stability. So long as that peace is
not assured to us, so long as our enemies shall not confess themselves
vanquished, we shall not cease to fight.” (Quoted by _Le Temps_, May
15th, 1916.)
On May 22nd, 1916, in replying to the members of the Russian Duma, M. A.
Briand, President of the French Council, similarly declared:—
“I have said, and I repeat, while rivers of blood are flowing, while our
soldiers are sacrificing their lives with such forgetfulness of self,
the word peace is a sacrilege, if it means that the aggressor will not
be punished, and if tomorrow Europe shall run the risk of being handed
over once more to the humours and the caprices of a military caste
bloated with pride and athirst for power. It would be a dishonour to the
Allies. What answer should we have to make if tomorrow, after having
concluded such a peace, our countries were again swept into the frenzy of
armaments? What would the generations to come say if we were to commit
such a folly, and if we let slip the opportunity which now presents
itself of establishing a lasting peace on a solid basis? Peace will
result from the victory of the Allies, it can result from nothing but our
victory.” (See _Le Temps_, May 24th, 1916.)
From all these declarations of the Allies two fundamental ideas stand
clearly out:—
Prussian militarism must be destroyed;
The nationalities of Europe must be liberated from the Prussian
yoke.
But, as we have proved, the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” scheme has two essential objects:—
A formidable extension of Prussian militarism, which would have
at its disposal an army of 15 to 21 million men (see p. 91);
The enslavement to Germany of all the non-German nationalities
lying between the south of Saxony and the Persian Gulf.
The objects of the war pursued by the Allies and those of the government
of William II. are therefore fundamentally opposed to each other. This
opposition has been by implication excellently stated by M. Marcel
Cachin, Socialist deputy, in an article which appeared in _L’Humanité_,
of May 9th, 1916, under the title “Central Europe.”
“The general plan of our enemies can be clearly defined. In case they
were victorious, they would establish in the heart of Europe a formidable
power under the supremacy of Germany, a power which, with the annexations
avowedly aimed at, would comprise more than 130 millions of inhabitants.
“It needs no big words to show the danger which the whole of Europe
would run were such a design executed. It would be an eternal menace
to our country. No one can for a moment doubt that so long as the
existing political systems of Germany and Austria endure, such a
monstrous combination would be a permanent danger against which we should
constantly be obliged to be on our guard. And as for the Slav populations
reduced again to slavery, as for the Czechs, the Poles, the Yougo-Slavs,
the Serbians, they would naturally think of nothing but of revenge in
order to escape from serfdom and recover their national rights, which had
been trampled under foot. Were such a brutal unification as is summed up
in _Mitteleuropa_ to be unfortunately accomplished by fire and sword, we
might talk of peace after the storm, but it would be talk in vain; it
would be war again, fatal war.”
There spoke sound sense. It is clear that to have done once for all with
Prussian militarism is the only way open to the Allies to procure a
reasonable guarantee that so atrocious a war shall never be waged again,
and that millions of men shall not once more be sacrificed to the Moloch
of Pangermanism. Hence the official declarations of the Allies, quoted
above, are not the product of blind obduracy, as the German propaganda
would make some neutrals believe. In view of the formidable plan of
universal domination which the Germans still cling to, the seeming
obduracy of the Allies is on their part the highest wisdom.
VII.
_The question of Austria-Hungary, being the crucial point of the whole
problem to be solved after the war, may become the common ground on
which all common efforts should be concentrated, not only by the present
Allies, but also by the still neutral States which are virtually
threatened by the accomplishment of the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf”
scheme._
It is probable that Prussian militarism would have been already
destroyed, or on the point of being so, if in the first part of the war
the leaders of the Allied countries had not committed the three capital
mistakes which to-day are generally acknowledged—the Balkan policy of
1915, the Dardanelles, the delay in sending reinforcements to Serbia.
It is evident that these three calamitous mistakes have entailed a
considerable prolongation of the struggle and allowed Germany to build up
the immense fortress which extends from Dunkirk on the north to Egypt on
the south, and from the south of Riga to Bagdad (see the map on p. 72).
In order to overthrow the mighty walls of this formidable fortress, the
Allies must consent to sacrifices much greater and more prolonged than
would have been necessary if the mistakes now generally acknowledged
had not been committed. These sacrifices the Allied peoples accept with
a devotion and heroism which will win the imperishable admiration of
posterity. But just because the faults committed have lengthened the
duration of the struggle, the leaders of the Allied countries are in
duty bound to do everything they can to accelerate a complete victory.
That victory would be considerably hastened by the accession of the
forces, whether economic or military, of the still neutral countries
which, though they are even yet not fully aware of it, would be directly
endangered by the success of the Pangerman plan.
I have shown on p. 219 how a systematic propaganda of the Allies, taking
as its text the temporary accomplishment of the Pangerman plot, might
speedily demonstrate to neutrals the falsehood of the German sophistries
by which they have been cajoled. The same propaganda should have for
its second object to convince these neutrals that they have as much to
gain as the Allies by the destruction of Prussian militarism and of
the “Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” project. If once this were clearly
demonstrated it would be both legitimate and possible to request of these
neutrals that they should contribute, in the measure of their power, to
the common task of saving the civilization of the world.
In order rapidly to secure practical results from a convincing
propaganda, it is necessary to define very clearly what in the vast
welter of the present struggle is the point of vital interest common to
all the States of the World. As I have shown in the course of this book,
what would provide Germany with the means of establishing her universal
dominion would be the accomplishment, whether direct, or indirect, of
her scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.” On the other hand, I
believe I have demonstrated that to prevent the accomplishment of that
scheme it is enough, but it is necessary, that the Latin and Slav peoples
of Austria-Hungary should be freed, once for all, from the yoke which
Germany has imposed on them through the opportunity given her by the
war. For if the majority of these peoples were to be combined as a State
in place of Austria-Hungary, probably in a federal form, there would
at once be set up in Central Europe an immovable barrier which would
ensure the world against any revival of Pangerman aggression (see the map
on p. 43). On the other hand, if the independence of the Slav peoples
of Austria-Hungary were not secured against Berlin, the extension of
Prussian militarism to the Balkans and Turkey would be inevitable; the
Allied peoples would have made all their unheard-of sacrifices in vain,
and the struggle against Prussianism would be bound to continue.
[Illustration: EUROPEAN STATES INTERESTED IN THE SOLUTION OF THE
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN QUESTION.]
From these considerations it follows that the question of
Austria-Hungary, just because its solution implies the downfall of the
“Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” castle-in-the-air, constitutes the crucial
point not only of the European problem, but of the whole problem which
the Pangerman plan of universal domination raises for all civilized
States. Consequently the solution of the question of Austria-Hungary, on
the basis of the principle of nationalities, forms the bond of common
interest not only between the belligerent Allies but also between all the
still neutral States of the world who are threatened in any degree by the
accomplishment of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
The annexed maps show clearly the States of the world for which the
solution of the question of Austria-Hungary has an interest greater or
less in degree but substantially identical.
It is clear that if Germany could keep her hold permanently on
Austria-Hungary, Russia would be constantly threatened. In consequence
of the extension of Prussian militarism which would result therefrom,
England would be forced to continue to maintain the formidable armaments
which she has accepted only as a temporary measure. As for France, no
restoration of Alsace-Lorraine could be lasting, if the vassal regiments
of Austria-Hungary should give the government of Berlin, after a brief
breathing-space, the power to wrench again from France the provinces
which had been temporarily ceded. Belgium would be threatened for the
same reason. As for Italy, German supremacy over Central Europe would
be the end of all Italian hopes on the Adriatic, and of all Italian
expansion over the Eastern Mediterranean. As for Serbia and Montenegro,
that dominion would be a sentence of death without appeal. For Portugal,
it would imply the loss of her territories beyond the sea in virtue of
the consequences which would follow the achievement of the plan “from
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
But countries still neutral, such as Greece, Roumania[6], Holland, and
Switzerland, at which the Pangerman musket is levelled point-blank,
ought also to be convinced that their most solid interests, in complete
harmony with their moral obligations to the cause of civilization, make
it their duty to lend the Allies all the support they can, whether it be
moral, economic, or military.
[Illustration: THE STATES OF ASIA AND AMERICA, INTERESTED IN THE SOLUTION
OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN QUESTION.]
The second map shows the group of States in Asia and America which,
menaced by the world-wide consequences of the “Hamburg to the Persian
Gulf” scheme, have also a high and direct interest in the solution of the
Austro-Hungarian question. Japan is already helping the Allies notably,
but her assistance might be still ampler, more effective and more direct.
The strictest view of her interest should compel her to enlarge the scope
of her succour, since nothing but the total defeat of Germany in Europe
can prevent Japan from witnessing a long series of disturbances fomented
at her expense in the Chinese Empire (see p. 98). As I have already
shown (p. 105) many States in South America are directly aimed at by the
Pangerman plan of 1911. But that plan can never be really formidable
for these States, unless Germany should one day have at her disposal the
powerful resources which would accrue to her from the accomplishment
of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.” Chili, Argentina,
Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia, Brazil, have all been the object
of preparatory Pangerman manœuvres. That warning ought to convince them
without delay that they have an undoubted interest in co-operating,
to some extent, in the common cause. They could do so, particularly
Argentina and Brazil, to good purpose in the economic sphere.
As for the United States, we have seen (p. 208) that the accomplishment
of the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf” would really jeopardize
their independence in the gravest manner. No doubt that point of view has
not yet been generally apprehended in the United States, but a propaganda
which could easily be carried on, since the arguments in its favour are
abundant, should serve to convince the Americans that in fighting on the
battlefields of Europe the Allied soldiers are really safeguarding the
future of the great American Republic. On the day when that conviction
becomes general, the Americans will not hesitate to lend the European
Allies such assistance of various sorts as must hasten the coming of
complete victory.
To recapitulate, a series of deductions, all based on acknowledged facts
and all easily verifiable, leads to the conclusion that the formidable
problem with which German aggression has confronted the civilized
world is summed up in the solution of the Austro-Hungarian question,
because that solution, which can be worked out without prejudice to the
legitimate interests of the German people (see Chapter VI § 111), is
the only means of putting an end to the Hohenzollern plan of universal
domination, founded on the scheme “from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.”
But when the question of Austria-Hungary shall have been solved, the
problems peculiar to each of the Allies will by way of corollary be
solved also. And in general, by securing the independence of the
non-German peoples of Central Europe—a measure the justice of which is
indisputable—we shall effectually protect the world as a whole against
any future eruption of the intolerable Pangerman ambition.
FOOTNOTES
[1] At that date the designation Austria was comprehensive of what we now
call Austria-Hungary.
[2] This passage was written before Yuan-Shi-Kai’s death. _Translator’s
Note._
[3] A French translation of this work, by M. Maurice Millioud, of
Lausanne, has been published by the firm of Payot.
[4] He has published an excellent pamphlet with the significant title,
_The Liquidation of Austria-Hungary_. Felix Alcan, Paris.
[5] Since this was said, Roumania has joined the Entente Powers in the
war. _Translator’s Note._
[6] This passage was written before Roumania joined the Allies in the
war. _Translator’s Note._
End of Project Gutenberg's The PanGerman Plot Unmasked, by André Chéradame