We have seen in the Introduction that al_Thoughts on Religion

scientific facts are known by intuition and not by reason. No one can

deny this. Now, if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the nature

of a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles.

No one can dispute this. No one can therefore dispute the necessary

conclusion, that, if there be a God, He is knowable, (if knowable at

all) by intuition and not by reason.

Indeed a little thought is enough to show that from its very nature as

such, reason must be incapable of adjudicating on the subject, for it is

a process of inferring from the known to the unknown.

Or thus. It would be against reason itself to suppose that God, even if

He exists, can be known by reason; He must be known, if knowable at all,

by intuition[57].

Observe, although God might give an objective revelation of Himself,

e.g. as Christians believe He has, even this would not give knowledge

of Him save to those who believe the revelations genuine; and I doubt

whether it is logically possible for any form of objective revelation of

itself to compel belief in it. Assuredly one rising from the dead to

testify thereto would not, nor would letters of fire across the sky do

so. But, even if it were logically possible, we need not consider the

abstract possibility, seeing that, as a matter of fact, no such

demonstrative revelation has been given.

Hence, the only legitimate attitude of pure reason is pure agnosticism.

No one can deny this. But, it will be said, there is this vast

difference between our intuitive knowledge of all other first principles

and that alleged of the 'first of all first principles,' viz. that the

latter is confessedly _not_ known to all men. Now, assuredly, there is

here a vast difference. But so there ought to be, if we are here in a

state of probation, as before explained. And that we are in such a state

is not only the hypothesis of religion, but the sole rational

explanation as well as moral justification of our existence as rational

beings and moral agents[58].

It is not necessarily true, as J.S. Mill and all other agnostics think,

that even if internal intuition be of divine origin, the illumination

thus furnished can only be of evidential value to the individual subject

thereof. On the contrary, it may be studied objectively, even if not

experienced subjectively; and ought to be so studied by a pure agnostic

desirous of light from any quarter. Even if he does not know it as a

noumenon he can investigate it as a phenomenon. And, supposing it to be

of divine origin, as its subjects believe and he has no reason to doubt,

he may gain much evidence against its being a mere psychological

illusion from identical reports of it in all ages. Thus, if any large

section of the race were to see flames issuing from magnets, there would

be no doubt as to their objective reality.

The testimony given by Socrates to the occurrence in himself of an

internal Voice, having all the definiteness of an auditory

hallucination, has given rise to much speculation by subsequent

philosophers.

Many explanations are suggested, but if we remember the critical nature

of Socrates' own mind, the literal nature of his mode of teaching, and

the high authority which attaches to Plato's opinion on the subject, the

probability seems to incline towards the 'Demon' having been, in

Socrates' own consciousness, an actual auditory sensation. Be this

however as it may, I suppose there is no question that we may adopt this

view of the matter at least to the extent of classifying Socrates with

Luther, Pascal, &c., not to mention all the line of Hebrew and other

prophets, who agree in speaking of a Divine Voice.

If so, the further question arises whether we are to classify all these

with lunatics in whom the phenomena of auditory hallucination are

habitual.

Without doubt this hypothesis is most in accordance with the temper of

our age, partly because it obeys the law of parsimony, and partly

because it [negatives] _a priori_ the possibility of revelation.

But if we look at the matter from the point of view of pure agnosticism,

we are not entitled to adopt so rough and ready an interpretation.

Suppose then that not only Socrates and all great religious reformers

and founders of religious systems both before and after him were

similarly stricken with mental disease, but that similar phenomena had

occurred in the case of all scientific discoverers such as Galileo,

Newton, Darwin, &c.--supposing all these men to have declared that their

main ideas had been communicated by subjective sensations as of spoken

language, so that all the progress of the world's scientific thought had

resembled that of the world's religious thought, and had been attributed

by the promoters thereof to direct inspirations of this kind--would it

be possible to deny that the testimony thus afforded to the fact of

subjective revelation would have been overwhelming? Or could it any

longer have been maintained that supposing a revelation to be

communicated subjectively the fact thereof could only be of any

evidential value to the recipient himself? To this it will no doubt be

answered, 'No, but in the case supposed the evidence arises not from the

fact of their subjective intuition but from that of its objective

verification in the results of science.' Quite so; but this is exactly

the test appealed to by the Hebrew prophets--the test of true and lying

prophets being in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of their prophecies

and 'By their fruits ye shall know them.'

Therefore it is as absurd to say that the religious consciousness of

minds other than our own can be barred antecedently as evidence, as it

is to say that testimony to the miraculous is similarly barred. The pure

agnostic must always carefully avoid the 'high _priori_ road.' But, on

the other hand, he must be all the more assiduous in estimating fairly

the character, both as to quantity and quality, of evidence _a

posteriori_. Now this evidence in the present case is twofold, positive

and negative. It will be convenient to consider the negative first.

The negative evidence is furnished by the nature of man without God. It

is thoroughly miserable, as is well shown by Pascal, who has devoted the

whole of the first part of his treatise to this subject. I need not go

over the ground which he has already so well traversed.

Some men are not conscious of the cause of this misery: this, however,

does not prevent the fact of their being miserable. For the most part

they conceal the fact as well as possible from themselves, by occupying

their minds with society, sport, frivolity of all kinds, or, if

intellectually disposed, with science, art, literature, business, &c.

This however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know from

experience the intellectual distractions of scientific research,

philosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also well

aware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste,

in respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, &c., the

whole concoction is but as high confectionery to a starving man. He may

cheat himself for a time--especially if he be a strong man--into the

belief that he is nourishing himself by denying his natural appetite;

but soon finds he was made for some altogether different kind of food,

even though of much less tastefulness as far as the palate is concerned.

Some men indeed never acknowledge this articulately or distinctly even

to themselves, yet always show it plainly enough to others. Take, e.g.,

'that last infirmity of noble minds.' I suppose the most exalted and

least 'carnal' of worldly joys consists in the adequate recognition by

the world of high achievement by ourselves. Yet it is notorious that--

"It is by God decreed

Fame shall not satisfy the highest need."

It has been my lot to know not a few of the famous men of our

generation, and I have always observed that this is profoundly true.

Like all other 'moral' satisfactions, this soon palls by custom, and as

soon as one end of distinction is reached, another is pined for. There

is no finality to rest in, while disease and death are always standing

in the background. Custom may even blind men to their own misery, so far

as not to make them realize what is wanting; yet the want is there.

I take it then as unquestionably true that this whole negative side of

the subject proves a vacuum in the soul of man which nothing can fill

save faith in God.

Now take the positive side. Consider the happiness of religious--and

chiefly of the highest religious, i.e. Christian--belief. It is a matter

of fact that besides being most intense, it is most enduring, growing,

and never staled by custom. In short, according to the universal

testimony of those who have it, it differs from all other happiness not

only in degree but in kind. Those who have it can usually testify to

what they used to be without it. It has no relation to intellectual

status. It is a thing by itself and supreme.

So much for the individual. But positive evidence does not end here.

Look at the effects of Christian belief as exercised on human

society--1st, by individual Christians on the family, &c.; and, 2nd, by

the Christian Church on the world.

All this may lead on to an argument from the adaptation of Christianity

to human higher needs. All men must feel these needs more or less in

proportion as their higher natures, moral and spiritual, are developed.

Now Christianity is the only religion which is adapted to meet them,

and, according to those who are alone able to testify, does so most

abundantly. All these men, of every sect, nationality, &c., agree in

their account of their subjective experience; so as to this there can be

no question. The only question is as to whether they are all deceived.

PEU DE CHOSE.

'La vie est vaine:

Un peu d'amour,

Un peu de haine ...

Et puis--bon jour!

La vie est brève:

Un peu d'espoir,

Un peu de rêve ...

Et puis--bon soir!'

The above is a terse and true criticism of this life without hope of a

future one. Is it satisfactory? But Christian faith, as a matter of

fact, changes it entirely.

'The night has a thousand eyes,

And the day but one;

Yet the light of a whole world dies

With the setting sun.

The mind has a thousand eyes,

And the heart but one;

Yet the light of a whole life dies

When love is done.'

Love is known to be all this. How great, then, is Christianity, as being

the religion of love, and causing men to believe both in the cause of

love's supremacy and the infinity of God's love to man.

FOOTNOTES:

[55] Cf. Pascal, _Pensées_. 'For we must not mistake ourselves, we have

as much that is automatic in us as intellectual, and hence it comes that

the instrument by which persuasion is brought about is not demonstration

alone. How few things are demonstrated! Proofs can only convince the

mind; custom makes our strongest proofs and those which we hold most

firmly, it sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious intellect

after it.... It is then custom that makes so many men Christians, custom

that makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers, &c. Lastly, we must

resort to custom when once the mind has seen where truth is, in order to

slake our thirst and steep ourselves in that belief which escapes us at

every hour, for to have proofs always at hand were too onerous. We must

acquire a more easy belief, that of custom, which without violence,

without art, without argument, causes our assent and inclines all our

powers to this belief, so that our soul naturally falls into it....

'It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction if the

automaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both parts of us then

must be obliged to believe, the intellect by arguments which it is

enough to have admitted once in our lives, the automaton by custom, and

by not allowing it to incline in the contrary direction. _Inclina cor

meum Deus_.' See also Newman's _Grammar of Assent_, chap. vi. and

Church's _Human Life and its Conditions_, pp. 67-9.

[56] [The author has added, "For suffering in brutes see further on,"

but nothing further on the subject appears to have been written.--ED.]

[57] [In this connexion I may again notice that two days before his

death George Romanes expressed his cordial approval of Professor

Knight's _Aspects of Theism_--a work in which great stress is laid on

the argument from intuition in different forms.--ED.]

[58] On this subject see Pascal, _Pensées_ (Kegan Paul's trans.) p. 103.

§ 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY.

Christianity comes up for serious investigation in the present treatise,

because this _Examination of Religion_ [i.e. of the validity of the

religious consciousness] has to do with the evidences of Theism

presented by man, and not only by nature _minus_ man. Now of the

religious consciousness Christianity is unquestionably the highest

product.

When I wrote the preceding treatise [the _Candid Examination_], I did

not sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of _human_ nature, as

distinguished from physical nature, in any enquiry touching Theism. But

since then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the science

of comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the result

of clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of nature

as a whole whereby to investigate the theory of Theism. This I ought to

have anticipated on merely _a priori_ grounds, and no doubt should have

perceived, had I not been too much immersed in merely physical research.

Moreover, in those days, I took it for granted that Christianity was

played out, and never considered it at all as having any rational

bearing on the question of Theism. And, though this was doubtless

inexcusable, I still think that the rational standing of Christianity

has materially improved since then. For then it seemed that Christianity

was destined to succumb as a rational system before the double assault

of Darwin from without and the negative school of criticism from within.

Not only the book of organic nature, but likewise its own sacred

documents, seemed to be declaring against it. But now all this has been

very materially changed. We have all more or less grown to see that

Darwinism is like Copernicanism, &c., in this respect[59]; while the

outcome of the great textual battle[60] is impartially considered a

signal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science,

there was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for the

date of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for the

historical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels,

Acts and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence the

validity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind of

scepticism has been rendered obsolete, and for ever impossible; while

the certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purpose

of displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as well

as the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the first

century. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidences

of Christianity. It is most important that the expert investigator

should be exact, and, as in any other science, the lay public must take

on authority as trustworthy only what both sides are agreed upon. But,

as in any other science, experts are apt to lose sight of the importance

of the main results agreed upon, in their fighting over lesser points

still in dispute. Now it is enough for us that the Epistles to the

Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians, have been agreed upon as genuine,

and that the same is true of the Synoptics so far as concerns the main

doctrine of Christ Himself.

The extraordinary candour of Christ's biographers must not be

forgotten[61]. Notice also such sentences as 'but some doubted,' and (in

the account of Pentecost) 'these men are full of new wine[62].' Such

observations are wonderfully true to human nature; but no less

wonderfully opposed to any 'accretion' theory.

Observe, when we become honestly pure agnostics the whole scene changes

by the change in our point of view. We may then read the records

impartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent conviction

that they must be false. It is then an open question whether they are

not true as history.

There is so much to be said in objective evidence for Christianity that

were the central doctrines thus testified to anything short of

miraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges _a

priori_ of what a revelation should be. If our agnosticism be _pure_, we

have no right to pre-judge the case on _prima facie_ grounds.

One of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour of

Christianity is not sufficiently enforced by apologists. Indeed, I am

not aware that I have ever seen it mentioned. It is the absence from the

biography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth of

human knowledge--whether in natural science, ethics, political economy,

or elsewhere--has had to discount. This negative argument is really

almost as strong as is the positive one from what Christ did teach. For

when we consider what a large number of sayings are recorded of--or at

least attributed to--Him, it becomes most remarkable that in literal

truth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away in

the sense of becoming obsolete. 'Not even now could it be easy,' says

John Stuart Mill, 'even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation

of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than to

endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life[63].' Contrast

Jesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. Even

Plato, who, though some 400 years B.C. in point of time, was greatly in

advance of Him in respect of philosophic thought--not only because

Athens then presented the extraordinary phenomenon which it did of

genius in all directions never since equalled, but also because he,

following Socrates, was, so to speak, the greatest representative of

human reason in the direction of spirituality--even Plato, I say, is

nowhere in this respect as compared with Christ. Read the dialogues, and

see how enormous is the contrast with the Gospels in respect of errors

of all kinds--reaching even to absurdity in respect of reason, and to

sayings shocking to the moral sense. Yet this is confessedly the highest

level of human reason on the lines of spirituality, when unaided by

alleged revelation.

Two things may be said in reply. First, that the Jews (Rabbis) of

Christ's period had enunciated most of Christ's ethical sayings. But,

even so far as this is true, the sayings were confessedly extracted or

deduced from the Old Testament, and so _ex hypothesi_ due to original

inspiration. Again, it is not very far true, because, as _Ecce Homo_

says, the ethical sayings of Christ, even when anticipated by Rabbis and

the Old Testament, were _selected_ by Him.

It is a general, if not a universal, rule that those who reject

Christianity with contempt are those who care not for religion of any

kind. 'Depart from us' has always been the sentiment of such. On the

other hand, those in whom the religious sentiment is intact, but who

have rejected Christianity on intellectual grounds, still almost deify

Christ. These facts are remarkable.

If we estimate the greatness of a man by the influence which he has

exerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secular

point of view, that Christ is much the greatest man who has ever lived.

It is on all sides worth considering (blatant ignorance or base

vulgarity alone excepted) that the revolution effected by Christianity

in human life is immeasurable and unparalleled by any other movement in

history; though most nearly approached by that of the Jewish religion,

of which, however, it is a development, so that it may be regarded as of

a piece with it. If thus regarded, this whole system of religion is so

immeasurably in advance of all others, that it may fairly be said, if it

had not been for the Jews, the human race would not have had any

religion worth our serious attention as such. The whole of that side of

human nature would never have been developed in civilized life. And

although there are numberless individuals who are not conscious of its

development in themselves, yet even these have been influenced to an

enormous extent by the atmosphere of religion around them.

But not only is Christianity thus so immeasurably in advance of all

other religions. It is no less so of every other system of thought that

has ever been promulgated in regard to all that is moral and spiritual.

Whether it be true or false, it is certain that neither philosophy,

science, nor poetry has ever produced results in thought, conduct, or

beauty in any degree to be compared with it. This I think will be on all

hands allowed as regards conduct. As regards thought and beauty it may

be disputed. But, consider, what has all the science or all the

philosophy of the world done for the thought of mankind to be compared

with the one doctrine, 'God is love'? Whether or not true, conceive what

belief in it has been to thousands of millions of our race--i.e. its

influence on human thought, and thence on human conduct. Thus to admit

its incomparable influence in conduct is indirectly to admit it as

regards thought. Again, as regards beauty, the man who fails to see its

incomparable excellence in this respect merely shows his own deficiency

in the appreciation of all that is noblest in man. True or not true, the

entire Story of the Cross, from its commencement in prophetic aspiration

to its culmination in the Gospel, is by far the most magnificent

[presentation] in literature. And surely the fact of its having all been

lived does not detract from its poetic value. Nor does the fact of its

being capable of appropriation by the individual Christian of to-day as

still a vital religion detract from its sublimity. Only to a man wholly

destitute of spiritual perception can it be that Christianity should

fail to appear the greatest exhibition of the beautiful, the sublime,

and of all else that appeals to our spiritual nature, which has ever

been known upon our earth.

Yet this side of its adaptation is turned only towards men of highest

culture. The most remarkable thing about Christianity is its adaptation

to all sorts and conditions of men. Are you highly intellectual? There

is in its problems, historical and philosophical, such worlds of

material as you may spend your life upon with the same interminable

interest as is open to the students of natural science. Or are you but a

peasant in your parish church, with knowledge of little else than your

Bible? Still are you ...[64]

_Regeneration_.

How remarkable is the doctrine of Regeneration _per se_, as it is stated

in the New Testament[65], and how completely it fits in with the

non-demonstrative character of Revelation to reason alone, with the

hypothesis of moral probation, &c. Now this doctrine is one of the

distinctive notes of Christianity. That is, Christ foretold repeatedly

and distinctly--as did also His apostles after Him--that while those who

received the Holy Ghost, who came to the Father through faith in the

Son, who were born again of the Spirit, (and many other synonymous

phrases,) would be absolutely certain of Christian truth as it were by

direct vision or intuition, the carnally minded on the other hand would

not be affected by any amount of direct evidence, even though one rose

from the dead--as indeed Christ shortly afterwards did, with fulfilment

of this prediction. Thus scepticism may be taken by Christians as

corroborating Christianity.

By all means let us retain our independence of judgement; but this is

pre-eminently a matter in which pure agnostics must abstain from

arrogance and consider the facts impartially as unquestionable phenomena

of experience.

Shortly after the death of Christ, this phenomenon which had been

foretold by Him occurred, and appears to have done so for the first

time. It has certainly continued to manifest itself ever since, and has

been attributed by professed historians to that particular moment in

time called Pentecost, producing much popular excitement and a large

number of Christian believers.

But, whether or not we accept this account, it is unquestionable that

the apostles were filled with faith in the person and office of their

Master, which is enough to justify His doctrine of regeneration.

_Conversions._

St. Augustine after thirty years of age, and other Fathers, bear

testimony to a sudden, enduring and extraordinary change in themselves,

called _conversion_[66].

Now this experience has been repeated and testified to by countless

millions of civilized men and women in all nations and all degrees of

culture. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual,

though, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when sudden

and there is no symptom of mental aberration otherwise. But even as a

gradual growth in mature age, its evidential value is not less. (Cf.

Bunyan, &c.)

In all cases it is not a mere change of belief or opinion; this is by no

means the point; the point is that it is a modification of character,

more or less profound.

Seeing what a complex thing is character, this change therefore cannot

be simple. That it may all be due to so-called natural causes is no

evidence against its so-called supernatural source, unless we beg the

whole question of the Divine in Nature. To pure agnostics the evidence

from conversions and regeneration lies in the bulk of these

psychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with their

continuance ever since, their general similarity all over the world,

&c., &c.

_Christianity and Pain_.

Christianity, from its foundation in Judaism, has throughout been a

religion of sacrifice and sorrow. It has been a religion of blood and

tears, and yet of profoundest happiness to its votaries. The apparent

paradox is due to its depth, and to the union of these seemingly diverse

roots in Love. It has been throughout and growingly a religion--or

rather let us say _the_ religion--of Love, with these apparently

opposite qualities. Probably it is only those whose characters have been

deepened by experiences gained in this religion itself who are so much

as capable of intelligently resolving this paradox.

Fakirs hang on hooks, Pagans cut themselves and even their children,

sacrifice captives, &c., for the sake of propitiating diabolical

deities. The Jewish and Christian idea of sacrifice is doubtless a

survival of this idea of God by way of natural causation, yet this is no

evidence against the completed idea of the Godhead being [such as the

Christian belief represents it], for supposing the completed idea to be

true, the earlier ideals would have been due to the earlier

inspirations, in accordance with the developmental method of Revelation

hereafter to be discussed[67].

But Christianity, with its roots in Judaism, is, as I have said, _par

excellence_ the religion of sorrow, because it reaches to truer and

deeper levels of our spiritual nature, and therefore has capabilities

both of sorrow and joy which are presumably non-existent except in

civilized man. I mean the sorrows and the joys of a fully evolved

spiritual life--such as were attained wonderfully early, historically

speaking, in the case of the Jews, and are now universally diffused

throughout Christendom. In short, the sorrows and the joys in question

are those which arise from the fully developed consciousness of sin

against a God of Love, as distinguished from propitiation of malignant

spirits. These joys and sorrows are wholly spiritual, not merely

physical, and culminate in the cry,'Thou desirest no sacrifice.... The

sacrifice of God is a troubled spirit[68].'

I agree with Pascal[69] that there is virtually nothing to be gained by

being a theist as distinguished from a Christian. Unitarianism is only

an affair of the reason--a merely abstract theory of the mind, having

nothing to do with the heart, or the real needs of mankind. It is only

when it takes the New Testament, tears out a few of its leaves relating

to the divinity of Christ, and appropriates all the rest, that its

system becomes in any degree possible as a basis for personal religion.

If there is a Deity it seems to be in some indefinite degree more

probable that He should impart a Revelation than that He should not.

Women, as a class, are in all countries much more disposed to

Christianity than men. I think the scientific explanation of this is to

be found in the causes assigned in my essay on _Mental differences

between Men and Women_[70]. But, if Christianity be supposed true, there

would, of course, be a more ultimate explanation of a religious

kind--as in all other cases where causation is concerned. And, in that

case I have no doubt that the largest part of the explanation would

consist in the passions of women being less ardent than those of men,

and also much more kept under restraint by social conditions of life.

This applies not only to purity, but likewise to most of the other

psychological _differentiae_ between the sexes, such as ambition,

selfishness, pride of power, and so forth. In short, the whole ideal of

Christian ethics is of a feminine as distinguished from a masculine

type[71]. Now nothing is so inimical to Christian belief as un-Christian

conduct. This is especially the case as regards impurity; for whether

the fact be explained on religious or non-religious grounds, it has more

to do with unbelief than has the speculative reason. Consequently, woman

is, for all these reasons, the 'fitter' type for receiving and retaining

Christian belief.

Modern agnosticism is performing this great service to Christian faith;

it is silencing all rational scepticism of the _a priori_ kind. And this

it is bound to do more and more the purer it becomes. In every

generation it must henceforth become more and more recognized by

logical thinking, that all antecedent objections to Christianity founded

on reason alone are _ipso facto_ nugatory. Now, all the strongest

objections to Christianity have ever been those of the antecedent kind;

hence the effect of modern thinking is that of more and more diminishing

the purely speculative difficulties, such as that of the Incarnation,

&c. In other words the force of Butler's argument about our being

incompetent judges[72] is being more and more increased.

And the logical development of this lies in the view already stated

about natural causation. For, just as pure agnosticism must allow that

reason is incompetent to adjudicate _a priori_ for or against Christian

miracles, including the Incarnation, so it must further allow that, if

they ever took place, reason can have nothing to say against their being

all of one piece with causation in general. Hence, so far as reason is

concerned, pure agnosticism must allow that it is only the event which

can ultimately prove whether Christianity is true or false. 'If it be of

God we cannot overthrow it, lest haply we be found even to fight against

God.' But the individual cannot wait for this empirical determination.

What then is he to do? The unbiassed answer of pure agnosticism ought

reasonably to be, in the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try.' That

is, in this case, try the only experiment available--the experiment of

faith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verification

will come, not indeed mediately through any course of speculative

reason, but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faith

enough to make this venture honestly, will he be in a just position for

deciding the issue. Thus viewed it would seem that the experiment of

faith is not a 'fool's experiment'; but, on the contrary, so that there

is enough _prima facie_ evidence to arrest serious attention, such an

experimental trial would seem to be the rational duty of a pure

agnostic.

It is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than to

thinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. 'If any man will do

His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. John

vii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should be

allowed that, supposing Christianity to be 'of God,' it _ought_ to

appeal to the spiritual rather than to the rational side of our nature.

Even within the region of pure reason (or the '_prima facie_ case')

modern science, as directed on the New Testament criticism, has surely

done more for Christianity than against it. For, after half a century of

battle over the text by the best scholars, the dates of the Gospels have

been fixed within the first century, and at least four of St. Paul's

epistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this is

enough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to the

doubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles,

'inventions of priests,' &c., which was the most formidable kind of

criticism of all. There is no longer any question as to historical

facts, save the miraculous, which, however, are ruled out by negative

criticism on merely _a priori_ grounds. This remaining--and, _ex

hypothesi_, necessary--doubt is of very different importance from the

other.

Again, the Pauline epistles of proved authenticity are enough for all

that is wanted to show the belief of Christ's contemporaries.

These are facts of the first order of importance to have proved. Old

Testament criticism is as yet too immature to consider.

_Plan in Revelation_.

The views which I entertained on this subject when an undergraduate

[i.e. the ordinary orthodox views] were abandoned in presence of the

theory of Evolution--i.e. the theory of natural causation as probably

furnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena of

Judaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms of

ascertainable causes up to some certain point; which however in this

particular case cannot be determined within wide limits, so that the

history of Israel will always embody an element of 'mystery' much more

than any other history.

It was not until twenty-five years later that I saw clearly the full

implications of my present views on natural causation. As applied to

this particular case these views show that to a theist, at all events

(i.e. to any one who on independent grounds has accepted the theory of

Theism), it ought not to make much difference to the evidential value of

the Divine Plan of Revelation as exhibited in the Old and New

Testaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due to

so-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference,' for that it

ought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogous

case. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make no

logical difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested in

organic nature--it being only a question of _modus operandi_ whether all

pieces of organic machinery were produced suddenly or by degrees; the

evidence of design is equally there in either case. Now I have shown

elsewhere that this is wrong[73]. It may not make much difference to a

man who is already a theist, for then it is but a question of _modus_,

but it makes a great difference to the evidence of Theism.

So it is in evidence of plan in proof of a revelation. If there had been

no alleged revelation up to the present time, and if Christ were now to

appear suddenly in His first advent in all the power and glory which

Christians expect for His second, the proof of His revelation would be

demonstrative. So that, as a mere matter of evidence, a sudden

revelation might be much more convincing than a gradual one. But it

would be quite out of analogy with causation in nature[74]. Besides,

even a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be of

demonstrative value--as by making prophecies of historical events,

scientific discoveries, &c., so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, as

before shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and there

may well be good reasons why it should not. Now, if there are such

reasons (e.g. our state of probation), we can well see that the gradual

unfolding of a plan of revelation, from earliest dawn of history to the

end of the world ('I speak as a fool') is much preferable to a sudden

manifestation sufficiently late in the world's history to be

historically attested for all subsequent time. For

1st. Gradual evolution is in analogy with God's other work.

2nd. It does not leave Him without witness at any time during the

historical period.

3rd. It gives ample scope for persevering research at all

times--i.e. a moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to

some one _(ex hypothesi)_ unequivocally attested event in history.

The _appearance_ of plan in revelation is, in fact, certainly remarkable

enough to arrest serious attention.

If revelation has been of a progressive character, then it follows that

it must have been so, not only historically, but likewise

intellectually, morally, and spiritually. For thus only could it be

always adapted to the advancing conditions of the human race. This

reflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture on

account of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts,

unless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by criticism as

requisite to bring the statements or precepts into harmony with modern

advancement would have been as well adapted to the requirements of the

world at the date in question, as were the actual statements or precepts

before us.

Supposing Christianity true, it is certain that the revelation which it

conveys has been predetermined at least since the dawn of the historical

period. This is certain because the objective evidences of Christianity

as a revelation have their origin in that dawn. And these objective

evidences are throughout [evidence] of a scheme, in which the end can be

seen from the beginning. And the very methods whereby this scheme is

itself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) as

present remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadly

speaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &c., upon

mankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably have

been designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined with

moral and religious teaching throughout. The mere fact of it being so

largely incorporated with secular history renders the Christian religion

unique: so to speak, the world, throughout its entire historical period,

has been constituted the canvas on which this divine revelation has been

painted--and painted so gradually that not until the process had been

going on for a couple of thousand years was it possible to perceive the

subject thereof.

_Christian Dogmas_.

Whether or not Christ was Himself divine would make no difference so far

as the consideration of Christianity as the highest phase of evolution

is concerned, or from the purely secular [scientific] point of view.

From the religious point of view, or that touching the relation of God

to man, it would of course make a great difference; but the difference

belongs to the same region of thought as that which applies to all the

previous moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral to

the moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to be

due, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection or

what not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental to

the mental, &c., this passage may have been _ultimately_ due to divine

volition, and _must have been so due_ on the theory of Theism.

Therefore, I say, it makes no difference from a secular or scientific

point of view whether or not Christ was Himself divine; since, in either

case, the movement which He inaugurated was the proximate or phenomenal

cause of the observable results.

Thus, even the question of the divinity of Christ ultimately resolves

itself into the question of all questions--viz. is or is not mechanical

causation 'the outward and visible form of an inward and spiritual

grace'? Is it phenomenal or ontological; ultimate or derivative?

Similarly as regards the redemption. Whether or not Christ was really

divine, in as far as a belief in His divinity has been a necessary cause

of the moral and religious evolution which has resulted from His life on

earth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins';

that is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as an

abiding curse. Whether or not He has effected any corresponding change

of an objective character in the ontological sphere, again depends on

the 'question of questions' just stated.

_Reasonableness of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity._

Pure agnostics and those who search for God in Christianity should have

nothing to do with metaphysical theology. _That_ is a department of

enquiry which, _ex hypothesi_, is transcendental, and is only to be

considered after Christianity has been accepted. The doctrines of the

Incarnation and the Trinity seemed to me most absurd in my agnostic

days. But now, as a _pure_ agnostic, I see in them no rational

difficulty at all. As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons is

necessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. So

that at best there is here but one difficulty, since, duality being

postulated in the doctrine of the Incarnation, there is no further

difficulty for pure agnosticism in the doctrine of plurality. Now at one

time it seemed to me impossible that any proposition, verbally

intelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of the

doctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is wholly

irrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by

[purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to common

sense.' No doubt, utterly so; but so it _ought_ to be if true. Common

sense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but the

Incarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at

all events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to God

to become man.' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinary

man. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His life

prove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of view

for the sake of argument, the whole _raison d'être_ of mankind is bound

up in Him. Lastly, there are considerations _per contra_, rendering an

incarnation antecedently probable[75]. On antecedent grounds there

_must_ be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God,

&c., supposing a revelation to be made at all. Therefore their

occurrence in Christianity _is_ no proper objection to Christianity.

Why, again, stumble _a priori_ over the doctrine of the

Trinity--especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind

(i.e. reason), and spirit (i.e. moral, aesthetic, religious faculties)?

The unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct orders

of being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is as

unintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the alleged

triunity of God.

_Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil_.

These, all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hit

by the scientific proof of evolution (but are the _only_ dogmas which

can fairly be said to be so), and, as constituting the logical basis of

the whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily to

involve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But the

question is whether, after all, they have been destroyed for a pure

agnostic. In other words, whether my principles are not as applicable in

turning the flank of infidelity here as everywhere else.

First, as regards Adam and Eve, observe, to begin with, that long before

Darwin the story of man in Paradise was recognized by thoughtful

theologians as allegorical. Indeed, read with unprejudiced eyes, the

first chapters of Genesis ought always to have been seen to be a poem as

distinguished from a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken for

a history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. But

to pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so that

nowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merely

because it has been proved not to be a history--and this even though we

cannot see of what it is allegorical. For, supposing it inspired, it has

certainly done good service in the past and can do so likewise in the

present, by giving an allegorical, though not a literal, starting-point

for the Divine Plan of Redemption.

_The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion compared_.

It is often said that evolution of organic forms gives as good evidence

of design as would their special creation, inasmuch as all the facts of

adaptation, in which the evidence consists, are there in either case.

But here it is overlooked that the very question at issue is thus

begged. The question is, Are these facts of adaptation _per se_

sufficient evidence of design as their cause? But if it be allowed, as

it must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes the

facts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other facts

of nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on these

facts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation,

like all other facts, are only available as arguments for design when

it is assumed that all natural causation is of a mental character: which

assumption merely begs the question of design anywhere. Or, in other

words, on the supposition of their having been due to natural causes,

the facts of adaptation are only then available as _per se_ good

evidence of design, when it has already been assumed that, _qua_ due to

natural causes, they are due to design.

Natural religion resembles Revealed religion in this. Supposing both

divine, both have been arranged so that, as far as reason can lead us,

there is only enough evidence of design to arouse serious attention to

the question of it. In other words, as regards both, the attitude of

pure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that the

inadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has been

expressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of all

ages, although such recognition has become more general since Darwin. On

this point I may refer to Pascal especially[76], and many other

authors.) This is another striking analogy between Nature and

Revelation, supposing both to have emanated from the same author--i.e.

quite as much so as identity of developmental method in both.

_Supposing the hypothesis of design in both to be true_, it follows that

in both this hypothesis can be alike verified only by the organ of

immediate intuition--i.e. that other mode of human apprehension which is

supplementary to the rational. Here again we note the analogy. And if a

man has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (by

hypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesight

in searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on our

present hypothesis that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them who seek

Him diligently') he will find that his subjective evidence of God in

Nature and in Revelation will mutually corroborate one another--so

yielding additional evidence to his reason.

The teleology of Revelation supplements that of Nature, and so, to the

spiritually minded man, they logically and mutually corroborate one

another.

Paley's writings form an excellent illustration of the identity of the

teleological argument from Nature and from Revelation; though a very

imperfect illustration of the latter taken by itself, inasmuch as he

treats only of the New Testament, and even of that very

partially--ignoring all that went before Christ, and much of what

happened after the apostles. Yet Paley himself does not seem to have

observed the similarity of the argument, as developed in his _Natural

Theology_ and _Evidences of Christianity_ respectively. But no one has

developed the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in not

perceiving that this teleological argument, _per se_, is not in either

case enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paley

everywhere represents that such an appeal to reason alone ought to be

sufficient. He fails to see that if it were, there could be no room for

faith. In other words, he fails to recognize the spiritual organ in

man, and its complementary object, grace in God. So far he fails to be a

Christian. And, whether Theism and Christianity be true or false, it is

certain that the teleological argument alone _ought_ to result, not in

conviction, but in agnosticism.

The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a man

without a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done

by God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great;

the latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism--i.e. _nil_.

_Christian Demonology_[77].

It will be said, 'However you may seek to explain away _a priori_

objections to miracles on _a priori_ grounds, there remains the fact

that Christ accepted the current superstition in regard to diabolic

possession. Now the devils damn the doctrine. For you must choose the

horn of your dilemma, either the current theory was true or it was not.

If you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for all

similar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages,] and therefore

that the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works not

by faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseases

are so well described by the record, that there is no possibility of

mistaking them. Hence you must suppose that they were due to devils in

A.D. 30, and to nervous disorders in A.D. 1894. On the other hand, if

you choose the other horn, you must accept either the hypothesis of the

ignorance or that of the mendacity of Christ.'

The answer is, that either hypothesis may be accepted by Christianity.

For the sake of argument we may exclude the question whether the

acceptance of the devil theory by Christ was really historical, or

merely attributed to Him by His biographers after His death. If Christ

knew that the facts were not due to devils, He may also have known it

was best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle the

people with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He,

if He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case,

if He had denied the current theory, He would have been giving evidence

of scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture of

His time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordance

with His method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, has

nowhere proved His divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science.

The particular question of Christ and demonology is but part of a much

larger one.

_Darwin's Difficulty_[78].

The answer to Darwin's objection about so small a proportion of mankind

having ever heard of Christ, is manifold:--

1. Supposing Christianity true, it is the highest and final revelation;

i.e. the scheme of revelation has been developmental. Therefore, it

follows from the very method that the larger proportion of mankind

should never hear of Christ, i.e. all who live before His advent.

2. But these were not left 'without witness.' They all had their

religion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage of

development. Therefore 'the times of ignorance God winked at' (Acts

xvii. 30).

3. Moreover these men were not devoid of benefit from Christ, because it

is represented that He died for all men--i.e. but for Him [i.e. apart

from the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked at

the times of ignorance.' The efficacy of atonement is represented as

transcendental, and not dependent on the accident of hearing about the

Atoner.

4. It is remarkable that of all men Darwin should have been worsted by

this fallacious argument. For it has received its death-blow from the

theory of evolution: i.e. if it be true that evolution has been the

method of natural causation, and if it be true that the method of

natural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that the

lateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For it

is certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date without

having violated the method of evolution. Therefore, on the theory of

Theism, He _ought_ to have appeared when He did--i.e. at the earliest

possible moment in history.

So as to the suitability of the moment of Christ's appearance in other

respects. Even secular historians are agreed as to the suitability of

the combinations, and deduce the success of His system of morals and

religion from this fact. So with students of comparative religions.

FOOTNOTES:

[59] [I.e. a theory which comes at first as a shock to the current

teaching of Christianity, but is finally seen to be in no antagonism to

its necessary principles.--ED.]

[60] [I.e. the battle in regard to the Christian texts or

documents.--ED.]

[61] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, pp. 74 ff.

[62] Matt, xxviii. 17; Acts ii. 13.

[63] _Three Essays on Theism_, p. 255.

[64] [Note unfinished.--ED.]

[65] [George Romanes began to make a collection of N.T. texts bearing on

the subject.--ED.]

[66] See Pascal, _Pensées_, p. 245.

[67] [The notes on this subject were often too fragmentary for

publication.--ED.]

[68] Ps. li.

[69] _Pensées_, pp. 91-93.

[70] See _Nineteenth Century_, May 1887.

[71] [The essay mentioned above should be read in explanation of this

expression. George Romanes' meaning would be more accurately expressed,

I think, had he said: 'The ideal of Christian character holds in

prominence the elements which we regard as characteristically feminine,

e.g. development of affections, readiness of trust, love of service,

readiness to suffer, &c.'--ED.]

[72] See _Analogy_, part i. ch. 7; part ii. ch. 3, 4, &c.

[73] See Conclusion of _Darwin and After Darwin_, part I.

[74] I should somewhere show how much better a treatise Butler might

have written had he known about evolution as the general law of nature.

[75] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, lect. ii.

[76] _Pensées_, pp. 205 ff.

[77] [Romanes' line of argument in this note seems to me impossible to

maintain. The emphasis which Jesus Christ lays on diabolic agency is so

great that, if it is not a reality, He must be regarded either as

seriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual life, or

else as seriously misleading others. And in neither case could He be

even the perfect Prophet. I think I am justified in explaining my

disagreement with Romanes' argument at this point particularly.--ED.]

[78] [There is nothing in Darwin's _writings_ which seems to me to

justify Romanes in attributing this difficulty to him specially. But he

knew Darwin so intimately and reverenced him so profoundly that he is

not likely to have been in error on the subject.--ED.]

+Concluding Note by the Editor:--+

The intellectual attitude towards Christianity expressed in these notes

may be described as--(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of the

scientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the

spiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of its

intuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historical

and spiritual evidences of Christianity.

George Romanes came to recognize, as in these written notes so also in

conversation, that it was 'reasonable to be a Christian believer' before

the activity or habit of faith had been recovered. His life was cut

short very soon after this point was reached; but it will surprise no

one to learn that the writer of these 'Thoughts' returned before his

death to that full, deliberate communion with the Church of Jesus Christ

which he had for so many years been conscientiously compelled to forego.

In his case the 'pure in heart' was after a long period of darkness

allowed, in a measure before his death, to 'see God.'

_Fecisti nos ad te, Domine; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec

requiescat in te_.

OXFORD: HORACE HART

PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

We have seen in the Introduction that all first principles even of