+Introductory Note by the Editor+.
Little more requires to be said by way of introduction to the Notes
which are all that George Romanes was able to write of a work that was
to have been entitled _A Candid Examination of Religion_. What little
does require to be said must be by way of bridging the interval of
thought which exists between the Essays which have just preceded and the
Notes which represent more nearly his final phase of mind.
The most anti-theistic feature in the Essays is the stress laid in them
on the evidence which Nature supplies, or is supposed to supply,
antagonistic to the belief in the goodness of God.
On this mysterious and perplexing subject George Romanes appears to have
had more to say but did not live to say it[31]. We may notice however
that in 1889, in a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, on 'the
Evidence of Design in Nature[32],' he appears to allow more weight than
before to the argument that the method of physical development must be
judged in the light of its result. This paper was part of a _Symposium_.
Mr. S. Alexander has argued in a previous paper against the hypothesis
of 'design' in Nature on the ground that 'the fair order of Nature is
only acquired by a wholesale waste and sacrifice.' This argument was
developed by pointing to the obvious 'mal-adjustments,' 'aimless
destructions,' &c., which characterize the processes of Nature. But
these, Romanes replies, necessarily belong to the process considered as
one of 'natural selection.' The question is only: Is such a process _per
se_ incompatible with the hypothesis of design? And he replies in the
negative.
'"The fair order of Nature is only acquired by a wholesale waste and
sacrifice." Granted. But if the "wholesale waste and sacrifice," as
antecedent, leads to a "fair order of Nature" as its consequent, how can
it be said that the "wholesale waste and sacrifice" has been a failure?
Or how can it be said that, in point of fact, there _has_ been a waste,
or _has_ been a sacrifice? Clearly such things can only be said when
our point of view is restricted to the means (i.e. the wholesale
destruction of the less fit); not when we extend our view to what, even
within the limits of human observation, is unquestionably the _end_
(i.e. the causal result in an ever improving world of types). A
candidate who is plucked in a Civil Service examination because he
happens to be one of the less fitted to pass, is no doubt an instance of
failure so far as his own career is concerned; but it does not therefore
follow that the system of examination is a failure in its final end of
securing the best men for the Civil Service. And the fact that the
general outcome of all the individual failures in Nature is that of
securing what Mr. Alexander calls "the fair order of Nature," is
assuredly evidence that the _modus operandi_ has not been a failure in
relation to what, if there be any Design in Nature at all, must be
regarded as the higher purpose of such Design. Therefore, cases of
individual or otherwise relative failure cannot be quoted as evidence
against the hypothesis of there being such Design. The fact that the
general system of natural causation has for its eventual result "a fair
order of Nature," cannot of itself be a fact inimical to the hypothesis
of Design in Nature, even though it be true that such causation entails
the continual elimination of the less efficient types.
'To the best of my judgement, then, this argument from failure, random
trial, blind blundering, or in whatever other terminology the argument
may be presented, is only valid as against the theory of what Mr.
Alexander alludes to as a "Carpenter-God," i.e. that if there be Design
in Nature at all, it must everywhere be _special_ Design; so that the
evidence of it may as well be tested by any given minute fragment of
Nature--such as one individual organism or class of organisms--as by
having regard to the whole Cosmos. The evidence of Design in this sense
I fully allow has been totally destroyed by the proof of natural
selection. But such destruction has only brought into clearer relief the
much larger question that rises behind, viz. as before phrased, Is there
anything about the method of natural causation, considered as a whole,
that is inimical to the theory of Design in Nature, considered as a
whole?'
It is true that this argument does not bear directly upon the
_character_ of the God whose 'design' Nature exhibits: but indirectly it
does[33]. For instance, such an argument as that found above (on p. 79:
'we see a rabbit, &c.') seems to be only valid on the postulate here
described as that of the 'Carpenter-God.'
It is also probable that Romanes felt the difficulty arising from the
cruelty of nature less, as he was led to dwell more on humanity as the
most important part of nature, and perceived the function of suffering
in the economy of human life (pp. 142, 154): and also as he became more
impressed with the positive evidences for Christianity as at once the
religion of sorrow and the revelation of God as Love (pp. 163, ff.). The
Christian Faith supplies believers not only with an argument against
pessimism from general results, but also with such an insight into the
Divine character and method as enables them at least to bear hopefully
the awful perplexities which arise from the spectacle of individuals
suffering.
In the last year or two of his life he read very attentively a great
number of books on 'Christian Evidences,' from Pascal's _Pensées_
downwards, and studied carefully the appearance of 'plan' in the
Biblical Revelation considered as a whole. The _fact_ of this study
appears in fragmentary remarks, indices and references, which George
Romanes left behind him in note-books. The _results_ of it will not be
unapparent in the following Notes, which, I need to remind my readers,
are, in spite of their small bulk, the sole reason for the existence of
this volume.
In reading these I can hardly conceive any one not being possessed with
a profound regret that the author was not allowed to complete his work.
And it is only fair to ask every reader of the following pages to
remember that he is reading, in the main, incomplete notes and not
finished work. This will account for a great deal that may seem sketchy
and unsatisfactory in the treatment of different points, and also for
repetitions and traces of inconsistency. But I can hardly think any one
can read these notes to the end without agreeing with me that if I had
withheld them from publication, the world would have lost the witness of
a mind, both able and profoundly sincere, feeling after God and finding
Him.
C.G.
FOOTNOTES:
[31] See below p. 142, and note. I find also the following note of a
date subsequent to 1889. 'It is a fact that pessimism is illogical,
simply because we are inadequate judges of the world, and pessimism
would therefore be opposed to agnosticism. We may know that there is
something out of joint between the world and ourselves; but we cannot
know how far this is the fault of the world or of ourselves.'
[32] _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ (Williams & Norgate),
vol. i. no. 3, pp. 72, 73.
[33] I ought also to mention that Romanes on the Sunday before his death
expressed to me verbally his entire agreement with the argument of
Professor Knight's _Aspects of Theism_ (Macmillan, 1893); in which on
this subject see pp. 184-186, 'A larger good is evolved through the
winnowing process by which physical nature casts its weaker products
aside,' &c.
NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION.
BY METAPHYSICUS.
_Proposed Mottoes_.
'I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there
is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and
dimmed, is by this purified and re-illumined; and is more precious
far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen.
Now there are two classes of persons, one class who will agree with
you and will take your words as a revelation; another class who
have no understanding of them and to whom they will naturally be as
idle tales.
'And you had better decide at once with which of the two you are
arguing; or, perhaps, you will say with neither, and that your
chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at
the same time not grudging to either any benefit which they may
derive.'--PLATO.
'If we would reprove with success, and show another his mistake, we
must see from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is
generally true: and, admitting this truth, show him the side on
which it is false.'--PASCAL.
§ 1. INTRODUCTORY.
Many years ago I published in Messrs. Trübner's 'Philosophical Series,'
a short treatise entitled _A Candid Examination of Theism_ by
'Physicus.' Although the book made some stir at the time, and has since
exhibited a vitality never anticipated by its author, the secret of its
authorship has been well preserved[34]. This secret it is my intention,
if possible, still to preserve; but as it is desirable (on several
accounts which will become apparent in the following pages) to avow
identity of authorship, the present essay appears under the same
pseudonym[35] as its predecessor. The reason why the first essay
appeared anonymously is truthfully stated in the preface thereof, viz.
in order that the reasoning should be judged on its own merits, without
the bias which is apt to arise on the part of a reader from a knowledge
of the authority--or absence of authority--on the part of a writer. This
reason, in my opinion, still holds good as regards _A Candid Examination
of Theism_, and applies in equal measure to the present sequel in _A
Candid Examination of Religion_.
It will be shown that in many respects the negative conclusions reached
in the former essay have been greatly modified by the results of maturer
thought as now presented in the second. Therefore it seems desirable to
state at the outset that, as far as I am capable of judging, the
modifications in question have not been due in any measure to influence
from without. They appear to have been due exclusively to the results of
my own further thought, as briefly set out in the following pages, with
no indebtedness to private friends and but little to published
utterances in the form of books, &c. Nevertheless, no very original
ideas are here presented. Indeed, I suppose it would nowadays be
impossible to present any idea touching religion, which has not at some
time or another been presented previously. Still much may be done in the
furthering of one's thought by changing points of view, selecting and
arranging ideas already more or less familiar, so that they may be built
into new combinations; and this, I think, I have in no small degree
accomplished as regards the microcosm of my own mind. But I state this
much only for the sake of adding a confession that, as far as
introspection can carry one, it does not appear to me that the
modifications which my views have undergone since the publication of my
previous _Candid Examination_ are due so much to purely logical
processes of the intellect, as to the sub-conscious (and therefore more
or less unanalyzable) influences due to the ripening experience of life.
The extent to which this is true [i.e. the extent to which experience
modifies logic][36] is seldom, if ever, realized, although it is
practically exemplified every day by the sobering caution which
advancing age exercises upon the mind. Not so much by any above-board
play of syllogism as by some underhand cheating of consciousness, do the
accumulating experiences of life and of thought slowly enrich the
judgement. And this, one need hardly say, is especially true in such
regions of thought as present the most tenuous media for the progress of
thought by the comparatively clumsy means of syllogistic locomotion. For
the further we ascend from the solid ground of verification, the less
confidence should we place in our wings of speculation, while the more
do we find the practical wisdom of such intellectual caution, or
distrust of ratiocination, as can be given only by experience.
Therefore, most of all is this the case in those departments of thought
which are furthest from the region of our sensuous life--viz.
metaphysics and religion. And, as a matter of fact, it is just in these
departments of thought that we find the rashness of youth most amenable
to the discipline in question by the experience of age.
However, in spite of this confession, I have no doubt that even in the
matter of pure and conscious reason further thought has enabled me to
detect serious errors, or rather oversights, in the very foundations of
my _Candid Examination of Theism_. I still think, indeed, that from the
premises there laid down the conclusions result in due logical sequence,
so that, as a matter of mere ratiocination, I am not likely ever to
detect any serious flaws, especially as this has not been done by
anybody else during the many years of its existence. But I now clearly
perceive two wellnigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The first
was undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions, even when
derived from sound premises, in regions of such high abstraction. The
second was, in not being sufficiently careful in examining the
foundations of my criticism, i.e. the validity of its premises. I will
here briefly consider these two points separately.
As regards the first point, never was any one more arrogant in his
claims for pure reason than I was--more arrogant in spirit though not in
letter, this being due to contact with science; without ever considering
how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier
argument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physical
problem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his
other and higher faculties[37].
The second point is of still more importance, because so seldom, if
ever, recognized.
At the time of writing the _Candid Examination_ I perceived clearly how
the whole question of Theism from the side of reason turned on the
question as to the nature of natural causation. My theory of natural
causation obeyed the Law of Parsimony, resolving all into Being as such;
but, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether 'higher
causes' are not 'necessary' to account for spiritual facts--i.e. whether
the ultimate Being must not be at least as high as the intellectual and
spiritual nature of man, i.e. higher than anything merely physical or
mechanical. The supposition that it must does not violate the Law of
Parsimony.
Pure agnostics ought to investigate the religious consciousness of
Christians as a phenomenon which may possibly be what Christians
themselves believe it to be, i.e. of Divine origin. And this may be done
without entering into any question as to the objective validity of
Christian dogmas. The metaphysics of Christianity may be all false in
fact, and yet the spirit of Christianity may be true in substance--i.e.
it may be the highest 'good gift from above' as yet given to man.
My present object, then, like that of Socrates, is not to impart any
philosophical system, or even positive knowledge, but a frame of mind,
what I may term, pure agnosticism, as distinguished from what is
commonly so called.
FOOTNOTES:
[34] The first edition, which was published in 1878, was rapidly
exhausted, but, as my object in publishing was solely that of soliciting
criticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publishers not to
issue any further edition. The work has therefore been out of print for
many years.
[This 'arrangement' was however not actually made, or at least was
unknown to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner &
Co. Thus a new edition of the book was published in 1892, to the
author's surprise.--ED.]
[35] [Or rather it was intended that it should appear under the
pseudonym of 'Metaphysicus.'--ED.]
[36] [Words in square brackets have been added by me. But I have not
introduced the brackets when I have simply inserted single unimportant
words obviously necessary for the sense.--ED.]
[37] [See p. 29, quotation from Preface of 'Physicus.' The state of mind
expressed in the above Note is a return to the earlier frame of mind of
the Burney Essay, e.g. p. 20. That essay was full of the thought that
Christian evidences are very manifold and largely
'extra-scientific.'--ED.]
§ 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE.
[To understand George Romanes' mind close attention must be paid to the
following section. Also to the fact, not explicitly noticed by him, that
he uses the word 'reason' (see p. 112) in a sense closely resembling
that in which Mr. Kidd has recently used it in his _Social Evolution_.
He uses it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to _the process
of scientific ratiocination_. His main position is therefore this:
Scientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God.
But the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himself
by other means than that of scientific ratiocination. As religion is for
the whole man, so all human faculties may be required to seek after God
and find Him--emotions and experiences of an extra-'rational' kind. The
'pure agnostic' must be prepared to welcome evidence of all
sorts.--ED.]
It is desirable to be clear at the outset as to the meaning which I
shall throughout attach to certain terms and phrases.
_Theism._
It will frequently be said, 'on the theory of Theism,' 'supposing Theism
true,' &c. By such phrase my meaning will always be equivalent
to--'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approach
which the human mind can make to a true notion of the _ens realissimum_,
is that of an inconceivably magnified image of itself at its best.'
_Christianity._
Similarly, when it is said, 'supposing Christianity true,' what will be
meant is--'supposing for the sake of argument, that the Christian system
as a whole, from its earliest dawn in Judaism, to the phase of its
development at the present time, is the highest revelation of Himself
which a personal Deity has vouchsafed to mankind.' This I intend to
signify an attitude of pure agnosticism as regards any particular dogma
of Christianity--even that of the Incarnation.
Should it be said that by holding in suspense any distinctive dogma of
Christianity, I am not considering Christianity at all, I reply, Not so;
I am not writing a theological, but a philosophical treatise, and shall
consider Christianity merely as one of many religions, though, of
course, the latest, &c. Thus considered, Christianity takes its place as
the highest manifestation of evolution in this department of the human
mind; but I am not concerned even with so important an ecclesiastical
dogma as that of the Incarnation of God in Christ. As far as this
treatise has to go, that dogma may or may not be true. The important
question for us is, Has God spoken through the medium of our religious
instincts? And although this will necessarily involve the question
whether or how far in the case of Christianity there is objective
evidence of His having spoken by the mouth of holy men [of the Old
Testament] which have been since the world began, such will be the case
only because it is a question of objective evidence whether or how far
the religious instincts of these men, or this race of men, have been so
much superior to those of other men, or races of men, as to have enabled
them to predict future events of a religious character. And whether or
not in these latter days God has spoken by His own Son is not a question
for us, further than to investigate the higher class of religious
phenomena which unquestionably have been present in the advent and
person of Jesus. The question whether Jesus was the Son of God, is,
logically speaking, a question of ontology, which, _quâ_ pure agnostics,
we are logically forbidden to touch.
But elsewhere I ought to show that, from my point of view as to the
fundamental question being whether God has spoken at all through the
religious instincts of mankind, it may very well be that Christ was not
God, and yet that He gave the highest revelation of God. If the 'first
Man' was allegorical, why not the 'second'? It is, indeed, an historical
fact that the 'second Man' existed, but so likewise may the 'first.'
And, as regards the 'personal claims' of Christ, all that He said is not
incompatible with His having been Gabriel, and His Holy Ghost,
Michael[38]. Or He may have been a man deceived as to His own
personality, and yet the vehicle of highest inspiration.
_Religion._
By the term 'religion,' I shall mean any theory of personal agency in
the universe, belief in which is strong enough in any degree to
influence conduct. No term has been used more loosely of late years, or
in a greater variety of meanings. Of course anybody may use it in any
sense he pleases, provided he defines exactly in what sense he does so.
The above seems to be most in accordance with traditional usage.
_Agnosticism 'pure' and 'impure'._
The modern and highly convenient term 'Agnosticism,' is used in two very
different senses. By its originator, Professor Huxley, it was coined to
signify an attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that lies
beyond the sphere of sense-perception--a professed inability to found
valid belief on any other basis. It is in this its original sense--and
also, in my opinion, its only philosophically justifiable sense--that I
shall understand the term. But the other, and perhaps more popular sense
in which the word is now employed, is as the correlative of Mr. H.
Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable.
This latter term is philosophically erroneous, implying important
negative knowledge that if there be a God we know this much about
Him--that He _cannot_ reveal Himself to man[39]. _Pure_ agnosticism is
as defined by Huxley.
Of all the many scientific men whom I have known, the most pure in his
agnosticism--not only in profession but in spirit and conduct--was
Darwin. (What he says in his autobiography about Christianity[40] shows
no profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. His
mind was too purely inductive for this. But, on this very account, it is
the more remarkable that his rejection of Christianity was due, not to
any _a priori_ bias against the creed on grounds of reason as absurd,
but solely on the ground of an apparent moral objection _a
posteriori_[41].) Faraday and many other first-rate originators in
science were like Darwin.
As an illustration of impure agnosticism take Hume's _a priori_ argument
against miracles, leading on to the analogous case of the attitude of
scientific men towards modern spiritualism. Notwithstanding that they
have the close analogy of mesmerism as an object-lesson to warn them,
scientific men as a class are here quite as dogmatic as the straightest
sect of theologians. I may give examples which can cause no offence,
inasmuch as the men in question have themselves made the facts public,
viz. ---- refusing to go to [a famous spiritualist]; ---- refusing to
try ---- in thought-reading[42]. These men all _professed_ to be
agnostics at the very time when thus so egregiously violating their
philosophy by their conduct.
Of course I do not mean to say that, even to a pure agnostic, reason
should not be guided in part by antecedent presumption--e.g. in ordinary
life, the _prima facie_ case, motive, &c., counts for evidence in a
court of law--and where there is a strong antecedent improbability a
proportionately greater weight of evidence _a posteriori_ is needed to
counterbalance it: so that, e.g. better evidence would be needed to
convict the Archbishop of Canterbury than a vagabond of pocket-picking.
And so it is with speculative philosophy. But in both cases our only
guide is known analogy; therefore, the further we are removed from
possible experience--i.e. the more remote from experience the sphere
contemplated--the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions[43].
_Maximum_ remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphere
of the final mystery of things with which religion has to do; so that
here all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pure
agnosticism is our only rational attitude. In other words, here we
should all alike be pure agnostics as far as reason is concerned; and,
if any of us are to attain to any information, it can only be by means
of some super-added faculty of our minds. The questions as to whether
there are any such super-added faculties; if so, whether they ever
appear to have been acted upon from without; if they have, in what
manner they have; what is their report; how far they are trustworthy in
that report, and so on--these are the questions with which this treatise
is to be mainly concerned.
My own attitude may be here stated. I do not claim any [religious]
certainty of an intuitive kind myself; but am nevertheless able to
investigate the abstract logic of the matter. And, although this may
seem but barren dialectic, it may, I hope, be of practical service if it
secures a fair hearing to the reports given by the vast majority of
mankind who unquestionably believe them to emanate from some such
super-added faculties--numerous and diverse though their religions be.
Besides, in my youth I published an essay (the _Candid Examination_)
which excited a good deal of interest at the time, and has been long out
of print. In that treatise I have since come to see that I was wrong
touching what I constituted the basal argument for my negative
conclusion. Therefore I now feel it obligatory on me to publish the
following results of my maturer thought, from the same stand-point of
pure reason. Even though I have obtained no further light from the side
of intuition, I have from that of intellect. So that, if there be in
truth any such intuition, I occupy with regard to the organ of it the
same position as that of the blind lecturer on optics. But on this very
account I cannot be accused of partiality towards it.
It is generally assumed that when a man has clearly perceived
agnosticism to be the only legitimate attitude of reason to rest in with
regard to religion (as I will subsequently show that it is), he has
thereby finished with the matter; he can go no further. The main object
of this treatise is to show that such is by no means the case. He has
then only begun his enquiry into the grounds and justification of
religious belief. For reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is it
the only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of
truth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their
respective spheres even of everyday life; faith, trust, taste, &c., are
as needful in ascertaining truth as to character, beauty, &c., as is
reason. Indeed we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertaining
truth only where _causation_ is concerned; the appropriate organs for
its ascertainment where anything else is concerned belong to the moral
and spiritual region.
As Herbert Spencer says, 'men of science may be divided into two
classes, of which the one, well exemplified by Faraday, keeping their
religion and their science absolutely separate, are unperplexed by any
incongruities between them, and the other of which, occupying themselves
exclusively with the facts of science, never ask what implications they
have. Be it trilobite or be it double star, their thought about it is
much like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose[44].' Now, both
these classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt an
attitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice.
What, however, have we to say of the third class, which Spencer does
not mention, although it is, I think, the largest, viz. of those
scientific men who expressly abstain from drawing a line of division
between science and religion [and then judge of religion purely on the
principles and by the method of science[45]]?
There are two opposite casts of mind--the mechanical (scientific, &c.)
and the spiritual (artistic, religious, &c.). These may alternate even
in the same individual. An 'agnostic' has no hesitation--even though he
himself keenly experience the latter--that the former only is worthy of
trust. But a _pure_ agnostic must know better, as he will perceive that
there is nothing to choose between the two in point of trustworthiness.
Indeed, if choice has to be made the mystic might claim higher authority
for his direct intuitions.
Mr. Herbert Spencer has well said, in the opening section of his
Synthetic Philosophy, that wherever human thought appears to be
radically divided, [there must be truth on both sides and that the]
'reconciliation' of opposing views is to be found by emphasizing that
ultimate element of truth which on each side underlies manifold
differences. More than is generally supposed depends on points of view,
especially where first principles of a subject are in dispute. Opposite
sides of the same shield may present wholly different aspects[46].
Spencer alludes to this with special reference to the conflict between
science and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I also
allude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon the
subject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much further
than it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to the
extent of showing that religion arises from the recognition of
fundamental mystery--which it may be proved that science also recognizes
in all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little more
than a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i.e. ultimate
grounds of experience) are inexplicable, is a proposition which is
self-evident since the dawn of human thought. My aim is to carry the
'reconciliation' into much more detail and yet without quitting the
grounds of pure reason. I intend to take science and religion in their
present highly developed states as such, and show that on a systematic
examination of the latter by the methods of the former, the 'conflict'
between the two may be not merely 'reconciled' as regards the highest
generalities of each, but entirely abolished in all matters of detail
which can be regarded as of any great importance.
In any methodical enquiry the first object should be to ascertain the
fundamental principles with which the enquiry is concerned. In actual
research, however, it is by no means always the case that the enquirer
knows, or is able at first to ascertain what those principles are. In
fact, it is often only at the end of a research, that they are
discovered to be the fundamental principles. Such has been my own
experience with regard to the subject of the present enquiry. Although
all my thinking life has been concerned, off and on, in contemplating
the problem of our religious instincts, the sundry attempts which have
been made by mankind for securing their gratification, and the important
question as to their objective justification, it is only in advanced
years that I have clearly perceived wherein the first principles of such
a research must consist. And I doubt whether any one has hitherto
clearly defined this point. The principles in question are the nature of
causation and the nature of faith.
My objects then in this treatise are, mainly, three: 1st, to purify
agnosticism; 2nd, to consider more fully than heretofore, and from the
stand-point of pure agnosticism, the nature of natural causation, or,
more correctly, the relation of what we know on the subject of such
causation to the question of Theism; and, 3rd, again starting from the
same stand-point, to consider the religious consciousnesses of men as
phenomena of experience (i.e. as regarded by us from without), and
especially in their highest phase of development as exhibited in
Christianity.
FOOTNOTES:
[38] [I.e. supernatural but not strictly Divine Persons. Surely,
however, the proposition is not maintainable.--ED.]
[39] [This is another instance of recurrence to an earlier thought; see
Burney Essay, p. 25, and cf. _Mind and Motion and Monism_, p. 117, note
1.--ED.]
[40] _Life and Letters of Charles Darwin_, i. 308.
[41] [See further, p. 182.--ED.]
[42] [On the whole I have thought it best to omit the names.--ED.]
[43] [The MS. note here continues: 'Here introduce all that I say on the
subject in my Burney Prize.' I have not, however, introduced any
quotation into the text because (1) I think Romanes makes his meaning
plain in the text as it stands; (2) I cannot find in the essay in
question any exactly appropriate passage of reasonable length to quote.
The greater part of the essay is, however, directed to meet the
scientific objection to the doctrine that prayer is answered in the
physical region, by showing that this objection consists in an argument
from the known to the unknown, i.e. from the known sphere of invariable
physical laws to the unknown sphere of God's relation to all such laws;
and is, therefore, weak in proportion as the unknown sphere is remote
from possible experience of a scientific kind, and admits of an
indefinite number of possibilities, more or less conceivable to our
imagination, which would or might prevent the scientific argument from
having legitimate application to the question in hand.--ED.]
[44] _Fortnightly Review_, Feb. 1894.
[45] [Some such phrase is necessary to complete the sentence.--ED.]
[46] _First Principles_, Part I, ch. 1.
§ 3. CAUSALITY.
Only because we are so familiar with the great phenomenon of causality
do we take it for granted, and think that we reach an ultimate
explanation of anything when we have succeeded in finding the 'cause'
thereof: when, in point of fact, we have only succeeded in merging it in
the mystery of mysteries. I often wish we could have come into the
world, like the young of some other mammals, with all the powers of
intellect that we shall ever subsequently attain already developed, but
without any individual experience, and so without any of the blunting
effects of custom. Could we have done so, surely nothing in the world
would more acutely excite our intelligent astonishment than the one
universal fact of causation. That everything which happens should have a
cause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, so
that, no matter how complex the interaction of causes, the same
interaction should always produce the same result; that this rigidly
exact system of energizing should be found to present all the
appearances of universality and of eternity, so that, e.g., the motion
of the solar system in space is being determined by some causes beyond
human ken, and that we are indebted to billions of cellular unions, each
involving billions of separate causes, for our hereditary passage from
an invertebrate ancestry,--that such things should be, would surely
strike us as the most wonderful fact in this wonderful universe.
Now, although familiarity with this fact has made us forget its wonder
to the extent of virtually assuming that we know all about it,
philosophical enquiry shows that, besides empirically knowing it to be a
fact, we only know one other thing about it, viz.--that our knowledge of
it is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. No
result of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this[47].
If it were not for our own volitions, we should be ignorant of what we
can now not doubt, on pain of suicidal scepticism, to be the most
general fact of nature. Such, at least, seems to me by far the most
reasonable theory of our idea of causality, and is the one now most
generally entertained by philosophers of every school.
Now, to the plain man it will always seem that if our very notion of
causality is derived from our own volition--as our very notion of energy
is derived from our sense of effort in overcoming resistance by our
volition--presumably the truest notion we can form of that in which
causation objectively consists is the notion derived from that known
mode of existence which alone gives us the notion of causality at all.
Hence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the nature
of will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective.
Nor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepest
philosophical thinkers have arrived at substantially the same opinion,
e.g. Hegel, Schopenhauer. So that the direct and most natural
interpretation of causality in external nature which is drawn by
primitive thought in savages and young children, seems destined to
become also the ultimate deliverance of human thought in the highest
levels of its culture[48].
But, be this as it may, we are not concerned with any such questions of
abstract philosophical speculation. As pure agnostics they lie beyond
our sphere. Therefore, I allude to them only for the sake of showing
that there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankind
inimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of a
will objective to us. And we can plainly see that if such be the case,
and if that will be self-consistent, its operations, as revealed in
natural causation, must appear to us when considered _en bloc_ (or not
piece-meal as by savages), non-volitional, or mechanical.
Of all philosophical theories of causality the most repugnant to reason
must be those of Hume, Kant and Mill, which while differing from one
another agree in this--that they attribute the principle of causality to
a creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there is
anything objective in the relation of cause and effect--i.e. in the very
thing which all physical science is engaged in discovering in particular
cases of it.
The conflict of Science and Religion has always arisen from one common
ground of agreement, or fundamental postulate of both parties--without
which, indeed, it would plainly have been impossible that any conflict
could have arisen, inasmuch as there would then have been no field for
battle. Every thesis must rest on some hypothesis; therefore, in cases
where two or more rival theses rest on a common hypothesis, the disputes
must needs collapse so soon as the common hypothesis is proved
erroneous. And proportionably, in whatever degree the previously common
hypothesis is shown to be dubious, in that degree are the disputations
shown to be possibly unreal. Now, it is one of the main objects of this
treatise to show that the common hypothesis on which all the disputes
between Science and Religion have arisen, is highly dubious. And not
only so, but that quite apart from modern science all the difficulties
on the side of intellect (or reason) which religious belief has ever
encountered in the past, or can ever encounter in the future, whether
in the individual or the race, arise, and arise exclusively, from the
self-same ground of this highly dubious hypothesis.
The hypothesis, or fundamental postulate, in question is, _If there be a
personal God, He is not immediately concerned with natural causation_.
It is assumed that _qua_ 'first cause,' He can in no way be concerned
with 'second causes,' further than by having started them in the first
instance as a great machinery of 'natural causation,' working under
'general laws.' True the theory of Deism, which entertains more or less
expressly this hypothesis of 'Deus ex machina,' has during the present
century been more and more superseded by that of Theism, which
entertains also in some indefinable measure the doctrine of 'immanence';
as well as by that of Pantheism, which expressly holds this doctrine to
the exclusion _in toto_ of its rival. But Theism has never yet
entertained it sufficiently or up to the degree required by the pure
logic of the case, while Pantheism has but rarely considered the rival
doctrine of personality--or the possible union of immanence with
personality.[49]
Now it is the object of this book to go much further than any one has
hitherto gone in proving the possibility of this union. For I purpose to
show that, provided only we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, &c.,
and follow to its logical termination the guidance of pure reason, there
are no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (_A_) That if
there be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be
immanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediate
expression of His will. (_B_) That every available reason points to the
inference that He probably is so. (_C_) That if He is so, and if His
will is self-consistent, all natural causation must needs appear to us
'mechanical.' Therefore (_D_) that it is no argument against the divine
origin of a thing, event, &c., to prove it due to natural causation.
After having dealt briefly with (_A_), (_B_) and (_C_), I would show
that (_D_) is the most practically important of these four conclusions.
For the fundamental hypothesis which I began by mentioning is just the
opposite of this. Whether tacitly or expressly, it has always been
assumed by both sides in the controversy between Science and Religion,
that as soon as this that and the other phenomenon has been explained by
means of natural causation, it has thereupon ceased to be ascribable
[directly] to God. The distinction between the natural and the
supernatural has always been regarded by both sides as indisputably
sound, and this fundamental agreement as to ground of battle has
furnished the only possible condition to fighting. It has also furnished
the condition of all the past, and may possibly furnish the condition of
all the future, discomfitures of religion. True religion is indeed
learning her lesson that something is wrong in her method of fighting,
and many of her soldiers are now waking up to the fact that it is here
that her error lies--as in past times they woke up to see the error of
denying the movement of the earth, the antiquity of the earth, the
origin of species by evolution, &c. But no one, even of her captains and
generals, has so far followed up their advantage to its ultimate
consequences. And this is what I want to do. The logical advantage is
clearly on their side; and it is their own fault if they do not gain the
ultimate victory,--not only as against science, but as against
intellectual dogmatism in every form. This can be routed all along the
line. For science is only the organized study of natural causation, and
the experience of every human being, in so far as it leads to dogmatism
on purely intellectual grounds, does so on account of entertaining the
fundamental postulate in question. The influence of custom and want of
imagination is here very great. But the answer always should be to move
the ulterior question--what is the nature of natural causation?
Now I propose to push to its full logical conclusion the consequence of
this answer. For no one, even the most orthodox, has as yet learnt this
lesson of religion to anything like fullness. God is still grudged His
own universe, so to speak, as far and as often as He can possibly be. As
examples we may take the natural growth of Christianity out of previous
religions; the natural spread of it; the natural conversion of St. Paul,
or of anybody else. It is still assumed on both sides that there must
be something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order to
its being divine.
What else have science and religion ever had to fight about save on the
basis of this common hypothesis, and hence as to whether the causation
of such and such a phenomenon has been 'natural' or 'super-natural.' For
even the disputes as to science contradicting scripture, ultimately turn
on the assumption of inspiration (supposing it genuine) being
'super-natural' as to its causation. Once grant that it is 'natural' and
all possible ground of dispute is removed.
I can well understand why infidelity should make the basal assumption in
question, because its whole case must rest thereon. But surely it is
time for theists to abandon this assumption.
The assumed distinction between causation as natural and super-natural
no doubt began in superstition in prehistoric time, and throughout the
historical period has continued from a vague feeling that the action of
God must be mysterious, and hence that the province of religion must be
within the super-sensuous. Now, it is true enough that the finite cannot
comprehend the infinite, and hence the feeling in question is logically
sound. But under the influence of this feeling, men have always
committed the fallacy of concluding that if a phenomenon has been
explained in terms of natural causation, it has thereby been explained
_in toto_--forgetting that it has only been explained up to the point
where such causation is concerned, and that the real question of
ultimate causation has merely been thus postponed. And assuredly beyond
this point there is an infinitude of mystery sufficient to satisfy the
most exacting mystic. For even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimate
analysis all natural causation is inexplicable.
Logically regarded the advance of science, far from having weakened
religion, has immeasurably strengthened it. For it has proved the
uniformity of natural causation. The so-called natural sphere has
increased at the expense of the 'super-natural.' Unquestionably. But
although to lower grades of culture this always seems a fact inimical to
religion, we may now perceive it is quite the reverse, since it merely
goes to abolish the primitive or uncultured distinction in question.
It is indeed most extraordinary how long this distinction has held sway,
or how it is the ablest men of all generations have quietly assumed that
when once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we therefore
know all about it--or, as it were, have removed it from the sphere of
mystery altogether, when, in point of fact, we have only merged it in a
much greater mystery than ever.
But the answer to our astonishment how this distinction has managed to
survive so long lies in the extraordinary effect of custom, which here
seems to slay reason altogether; and the more a man busies himself with
natural causes (e.g. in scientific research) the greater does this
slavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable to
perceive the real state of the case--regarding any rational thinking
thereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical,' even in its
etymological sense as super-sensuous or beyond physical causation,
becomes a term of rational reproach. Obviously such a man has written
himself down, if not an ass, at all events a creature wholly incapable
of rationally treating any of the highest problems presented either by
nature or by man.
On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between
'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory
all causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw any
distinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate,' we can only
mean this as valid in relation to mankind--i.e. in relation to our
experience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pure
agnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any such
distinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart from
the theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the real
distinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between the
explicable and the inexplicable--meaning by those terms that which is
and that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within the
range of human observation. Or, in other words, the distinction is
really between the observable and the unobservable causal processes of
the universe.
Although science is essentially engaged in explaining, her work is
necessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation; beyond that
sphere (i.e. the sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words,
even if she were able to explain the natural causation of everything,
she would be unable to assign the ultimate _raison d'être_ of anything.
It is not my intention to write an essay on the nature of causality, or
even to attempt a survey of the sundry theories which have been
propounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt this
would be little less than to write a history of philosophy itself.
Nevertheless it is necessary for my purpose to make a few remarks
touching the main branches of thought upon the matter[50].
_The remarkable nature of the facts._ These are remarkable, since they
are common to all human experience. Everything that _happens_ has a
cause. The same happening has always the same cause--or the same
consequent the same antecedent. It is only familiarity with this great
fact that prevents universal wonder at it, for, notwithstanding all the
theories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. That the
same causes always produce the same effects is a proposition which
expresses a fundamental fact of our knowledge, but the knowledge of this
fact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact.
Doubtless, if it were not a fact, there could be no so-called 'Order of
Nature,' and consequently no science, no philosophy, or perhaps (if the
irregularity were sufficiently frequent) no possibility of human
experience. But although this is easy enough to show, it in no wise
tends to show why the same causes should always produce the same
effects.
So manifest is it that our knowledge of the fact in question is only
empirical, that some of our ablest thinkers, such as Hume and Mill, have
failed to perceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of looking
beyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation of
the fact itself. Therefore they give to the world the wholly vacuous, or
merely tautological theory of causation--viz. that of constancy of
sequence within human observation[51].
If it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizing
or materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodox
persons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to be
at least as susceptible of the opposite view--viz. that it is subsuming
the natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: and
a pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against
either of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matter
thus: in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter,
she ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing the
material, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing about
natural causation--even so much as its existence--but for our own
volitions.
_Free Will_[52].
Having read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Will
controversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logical
conclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:--
1. A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all,
should be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinction
between responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise he
cannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No one
questions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question
is touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal bulk of
literature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on both
sides failing to perceive this basal distinction. Even such able writers
as Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position.
2. The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused.
For however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant
foliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derives
from the former.
3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the
will, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering
their position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more
ultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can be
proved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically]
unanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation
_x_--an unknown quantity.
4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve
itself into this--is or is not the will determined by _x_? And, if this
seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the
fact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining--viz.
Is the will self-determining, or is it determined--i.e. _from without_?
5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the
sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And I
think the answer to this must be an unconditional negative.
6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will
entirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by
natural causation (_x_)? For the unknown quantity _x_ may very well
include _x'_, if by _x'_ we understand all the unknown ingredients of
personality.
7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any
possible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to
natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and
that it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught we
at present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required,
even though all its acts are due to _x_.
8. In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to
_x'_, i.e. all causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, many
systems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will
is of the nature of a First Cause. In support of which possibility it
may be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a _causa
causarum_ as regards _x_.
9. To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes--each
the _fons et origo_ of a new and never-ending stream of causality--the
cosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection of
the streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism[53].
10. Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted in
my essay on the 'World as an Eject[54].' But this, again, is merged in
the mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, and
seemingly ultimate, fact.
11. So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be--pure
agnosticism.
FOOTNOTES:
[47] [Here it was intended to insert further explanation 'showing that
mere observation of causality in external nature would not have yielded
idea of anything further than time and space relations.'--ED.]
[48] [This theory was suggested in the Burney Essay, p. 136, and
ridiculed in the _Candid Examination_; see above, p. 11. Romanes
intended at this point to consider at greater length his old views 'on
causation as due to being _qua_ being.'--ED.]
[49] See, however, Aubrey Moore in _Lux Mundi_, pp. 94-96, and Le Conte,
_Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought_, pp. 335, ff. [N.B. The
references not enclosed in brackets are the author's, not mine.--ED.]
[50] [Nothing more however was written than what follows
immediately.--ED.]
[51] [The author intended further to show the vacuity of this theory and
point out how Mill himself appears to perceive it by his introduction
after the term 'invariably' of the term 'unconditionally'; he refers
also to Martineau, _Study of Religion_, i. pp. 152, 3.--ED.]
[52] [Romanes' thoughts about Free Will are more lucidly expressed in an
essay published subsequently to these Notes in _Mind and Motion and
Monism_, pp. 129 ff.--ED.]
[53] [See above, p. 31.--ED.]
[54] _Contemporary Review_, July 1886. [But the 'ultimate difficulty'
referred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold dependent
human wills to the One Ultimate and All-embracing Will.--ED.]
§ 4. FAITH.
Faith in its religious sense is distinguished not only from opinion (or
belief founded on reason alone), in that it contains a spiritual
element: it is further distinguished from belief founded on the
affections, by needing an active co-operation of the will. Thus all
parts of the human mind have to be involved in faith--intellect,
emotions, will. We 'believe' in the theory of evolution on grounds of
reason alone; we 'believe' in the affection of our parents, children,
&c., almost (or it may be exclusively) on what I have called spiritual
grounds--i.e. on grounds of spiritual experience; for this we need no
exercise either of reason or of will. But no one can 'believe' in God,
or _a fortiori_ in Christ, without also a severe effort of will. This I
hold to be a matter of fact, whether or not there be a God or a Christ.
Observe will is to be distinguished from desire. It matters not what
psychologists may have to say upon this subject. Whether desire differs
from will in kind or only in degree--whether will is desire in action,
so to speak, and desire but incipient will--are questions with which we
need not trouble ourselves. For it is certain that there are agnostics
who would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give all
they possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion by
purchase--i.e. by one single act of will. But yet the desire is not
strong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make the
continual sacrifices which Christianity entails. Perhaps the hardest of
these sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect. At
least I am certain that this is so in my own case. I have been so long
accustomed to constitute my reason my sole judge of truth, that even
while reason itself tells me it is not unreasonable to expect that the
heart and the will should be required to join with reason in seeking God
(for religion is for the _whole_ man), I am too jealous of my reason to
exercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires. For
assuredly the strongest desire of my nature is to find that that nature
is not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself so
much as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance,
regarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough that
Christianity should have enjoined the _doing_ of the doctrine as a
necessary condition to ascertaining (i.e. 'believing') its truth. But
from another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost an
affront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'--just as to some
scientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them to
investigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even the
simplest act of will in regard to religion--that of prayer--has not been
performed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because it
has seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that much
as I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt.
To justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to be
essentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief of
them has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposing
that after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to have
satisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace,' or direct
illumination from God,--even then would not my reason turn round and
revenge herself upon me? For surely even then my habitual scepticism
would make me say to myself--'this is all very sublime and very
comforting; but what evidence have you to give me that the whole
business is anything more than self-delusion? The wish was probably
father to the thought, and you might much better have performed your
"act of will" by going in for a course of Indian hemp.' Of course a
Christian would answer to this that the internal light would not admit
of such doubt, any more than seeing the sun does--that God knows us well
enough to prevent that, &c., and also that it is unreasonable not to try
an experiment lest the result should prove too good to be credible, and
so on. And I do not dispute that the Christian would be justified in so
answering, but I only adduce the matter as an illustration of the
difficulty which is experienced in conforming to all the conditions of
attaining to Christian faith--even supposing it to be sound. Others have
doubtless other difficulties, but mine is chiefly, I think, that of an
undue regard to reason, as against heart and will--undue, I mean, if so
it be that Christianity is true, and the conditions to faith in it have
been of divine ordination.
This influence of will on belief, even in matters secular, is the more
pronounced the further removed these matters may be from demonstration
(as already remarked); but this is most of all the case where our
personal interests are affected--whether these be material or
intellectual, such as credit for consistency, &c. See, for example, how
closely, in the respects we are considering, political beliefs resemble
religious. Unless the points of difference are such that truth is
virtually demonstrable on one side, so that adhesion to the opposite is
due to _conscious_ sacrifice of integrity to expediency, we always find
that party-spectacles so colour the view as to leave reason at the mercy
of will, custom, interest, and all the other circumstances which
similarly operate on religious beliefs. It seems to make but little
difference in either case what level of general education, mental power,
special training, &c., is brought to bear upon the question under
judgement. From the Premier to the peasant we find the same difference
of opinion in politics as we do in religion. And in each case the
explanation is the same. Beliefs are so little dependent on reason alone
that in such regions of thought--i.e. where personal interests are
affected and the evidences of truth are not in their nature
demonstrable--it really seems as if reason ceases to be a judge of
evidence or guide to truth, and becomes a mere advocate of opinion
already formed on quite other grounds. Now these other grounds are, as
we have seen, mainly the accidents of habit or custom, wish being father
to the thought, &c.
Now this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all other
beliefs secular; but who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be
in the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of a
future life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility
of our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use not
only of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredients
of human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this most
important of all matters.
It is remarkable how even in politics it is the moral and spiritual
elements of character which lead to success in the long run, even more
than intellectual ability--supposing, of course, that the latter is not
below the somewhat high level of our Parliamentary assemblies.
As regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief,
one can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secular
interest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of
judgement that it is usually taken to be--so far, indeed, that, save in
matters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there is
no room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom,
prejudice, dislike, &c., to a degree that would astonish the most sober
philosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processes
whereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventually
determined[55].
As showing how little reason alone has to do with the determining of
religious belief, let us take the case of mathematicians. This I think
is the fairest case we can take, seeing that of all intellectual
pursuits that of mathematical research is the most exact, as well as the
most exclusive in its demand upon the powers of reason, and hence that,
as a class, the men who have achieved highest eminence in that pursuit
may be fairly taken as the fittest representatives of our species in
respect of the faculty of pure reason. Yet whenever they have turned
their exceptional powers in this respect upon the problems of religion,
how suggestively well balanced are their opposite conclusions--so much
so indeed that we can only conclude that reason counts for very little
in the complex of mental processes which here determine judgement.
Thus, if we look to the greatest mathematicians in the world's history,
we find Kepler and Newton as Christians; La Place, on the other hand, an
infidel. Or, coming to our own times, and confining our attention to the
principal seat of mathematical study:--when I was at Cambridge, there
was a galaxy of genius in that department emanating from that place such
as had never before been equalled. And the curious thing in our present
connexion is that all the most illustrious names were ranged on the side
of orthodoxy. Sir W. Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams,
Clerk-Maxwell, and Cayley--not to mention a number of lesser lights,
such as Routh, Todhunter, Ferrers, &c.--were all avowed Christians.
Clifford had only just moved at a bound from the extreme of asceticism
to that of infidelity--an individual instance which I deem of particular
interest in the present connexion, as showing the dominating influence
of a forcedly emotional character even on so powerful an intellectual
one, for the _rationality_ of the whole structure of Christian belief
cannot have so reversed its poles within a few months.
Now it would doubtless be easy to find elsewhere than in Cambridge
mathematicians of the first order who in our own generation are, or have
been, professedly anti-Christian in their beliefs,--although certainly
not so great an array of such extraordinary powers. But, be this as it
may, the case of Cambridge in my own time seems to me of itself enough
to prove that Christian belief is neither made nor marred by the highest
powers of reasoning, apart from other and still more potent factors.
_Faith and Superstition._
Whether or not Christianity is true, there is a great distinction
between these two things. For while the main ingredient of Christian
faith is the moral element, this has no part in superstition. In point
of fact, the only point of resemblance is that both present the mental
state called _belief_. It is on this account they are so often
confounded by anti-Christians, and even by non-Christians; the much more
important point of difference is not noted, viz. that belief in the one
case is purely intellectual, while in the other it is chiefly moral.
_Qua_ purely intellectual, belief may indicate nothing but sheer
credulity in absence of evidence; but where a moral basis is added, the
case is clearly different; for even if it appears to be sheer credulity
to an outsider, that may be because he does not take into account the
additional evidence supplied by the moral facts.
Faith and superstition are often confounded, or even identified. And,
unquestionably, they are identical up to a certain point--viz. they both
present the mental state of _belief_. All people can see this; but not
all people can see further, or define the _differentiae_. These are as
follows: First, supposing Christianity true, there is the spiritual
verification. Second, supposing Christianity false, there is still the
moral ingredient, which _ex hypothesi_ is absent in superstition. In
other words, both faith and superstition rest on an intellectual basis
(which may be pure credulity); but faith rests also on a moral, even if
not likewise on a spiritual. Even in human relations there is a wide
difference between 'belief' in a scientific theory and 'faith' in a
personal character. And the difference is in the latter comprising a
moral element.
'Faith-healing,' therefore, has no real point of resemblance with 'thy
faith hath saved thee' of the New Testament, unless we sink the personal
differences between a modern faith-healer and Jesus Christ as objects of
faith.
Belief is not exclusively founded on objective evidence appealing to
reason (opinion), but mainly on subjective evidence appealing to some
altogether different faculty (faith). Now, whether Christians are right
or wrong in what they believe, I hold it as certain as anything can be
that the distinction which I have just drawn, and which they all
implicitly draw for themselves, is logically valid. For no one is
entitled to deny the possibility of what may be termed an organ of
spiritual discernment. In fact to do so would be to vacate the position
of pure agnosticism _in toto_--and this even if there were no objective,
or strictly scientific, evidences in favour of such an organ, such as we
have in the lives of the saints, and, in a lower degree, in the
universality of the religious sentiment. Now, if there be such an organ,
it follows from preceding paragraphs, that not only will the main
evidences for Christianity be subjective, but that they ought to be so:
they ought to be so, I mean, on the Christian supposition of the object
of Christianity being moral probation, and 'faith' both the test and the
reward.
From this many practical considerations ensue. E.g. the duty of parents
to educate their children in what they _believe_ as distinguished from
what they _know_. This would be unjustifiable if faith were the same as
opinion. But it is fully justifiable if a man not only knows that he
believes (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or not
the Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organ
of cognition, provided he honestly believes such is the case, it would
be immoral in him not to proceed in accordance with what he thus
believes to be his knowledge. This obligation is recognized in education
in every other case. He is morally right even if mentally deluded.
Huxley, in _Lay Sermons_, says that faith has been proved a 'cardinal
sin' by science. Now, this is true enough of credulity, superstition,
&c., and science has done no end of good in developing our ideas of
method, evidence, &c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith'
is not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hell
science would have made of the world, if she had abolished the 'spirit
of faith' even in human relations. The fact is, Huxley falls into the
common error of identifying 'faith' with opinion.
Supposing Christianity true, it is very reasonable that faith in the
sense already explained should be constituted the test of divine
acceptance. If there be such a thing as Christ's winnowing fan, the
quality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adapted
cannot be conceived as anything other than this moral quality. No one
could suppose a revelation appealing to the mere intellect of man, since
acceptance would thus become a mere matter of prudence in subscribing to
a demonstration made by higher intellects.
It is also a matter of fact that if Christianity is truthful in
representing this world as a school of moral probation, we cannot
conceive a system better adapted to this end than is the world, or a
better schoolmaster than Christianity. This is proved not only by
general reasoning, but also by the work of Christianity in the world,
its adaptation to individual needs, &c. Consider also the extraordinary
diversity of human characters in respect both of morality and
spirituality though all are living in the same world. Out of the same
external material or environment such astonishingly diverse products
arise according to the use made of it. Even human suffering in its worst
forms can be welcome if justified by faith in such an object. 'Ills have
no weight, and tears no bitterness,' but are rather to be 'gloried
in[56].'
It is a further fact that only by means of this theory of probation is
it possible to give any meaning to the world, i.e. any _raison d'être_
of human existence.
Supposing Christianity true, every man must stand or fall by the results
of his own conduct, as developed through his own moral character. (This
could not be so if the test were intellectual ability.) Yet this does
not hinder that the exercise of will in the direction of religion should
need help in order to attain belief. Nor does it hinder that some men
should need more help and others less. Indeed, it may well be that some
men are intentionally precluded from receiving any help, so as not to
increase their responsibility, or receive but little, so as to
constitute intellectual difficulties a moral trial. But clearly, if such
things are so, we are inadequate judges.
It is a fact that we all feel the intellectual part of man to be
'higher' than the animal, whatever our theory of his origin. It is a
fact that we all feel the moral part of man to be 'higher' than the
intellectual, whatever our theory of either may be. It is also a fact
that we all similarly feel the spiritual to be 'higher' than the moral,
whatever our theory of religion may be. It is what we understand by
man's moral, and still more his spiritual, qualities that go to
constitute 'character.' And it is astonishing how in all walks of life
it is character that tells in the long run.
It is a fact that these distinctions are all well marked and universally
recognized--viz.
{Animality.
{Intellectuality.
Human {Morality.
{Spirituality.
Morality and spirituality are to be distinguished as two very different
things. A man may be highly moral in his conduct without being in any
degree spiritual in his nature, and, though to a lesser extent, vice
versa. And, objectively, we see the same distinction between morals and
religion. By spirituality I mean the religious temperament, whether or
not associated with any particular creed or dogma.
There is no doubt that intellectual pleasures are more satisfying and
enduring than sensual--or even sensuous. And, to those who have
experienced them, so it is with spiritual over intellectual, artistic,
&c. This is an objective fact, abundantly testified to by every one who
has had experience: and it seems to indicate that the spiritual nature
of man is the highest part of man--the [culminating] point of his being.
It is probably true, as Renan says in his posthumous work, that there
will always be materialists and spiritualists, inasmuch as it will
always be observable on the one hand that there is no thought without
brain, while, on the other hand, instincts of man will always aspire to
higher beliefs. But this is just what ought to be if religion is true,
and we are in a state of probation. And is it not probable that the
materialistic position (discredited even by philosophy) is due simply to
custom and want of imagination? Else why the inextinguishable instincts?
It is much more easy to disbelieve than to believe. This is obvious on
the side of reason, but it is also true on that of spirit, for to
disbelieve is in accordance with environment or custom, while to believe
necessitates a spiritual use of the imagination. For both these
reasons, very few unbelievers have any justification, either
intellectual or spiritual, for their own unbelief.
Unbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice, and never a
thing to be proud of.
'Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should
raise the dead?' Clearly no answer can be given by the pure agnostic.
But he will naturally say in reply, 'the question rather is, why should
it be thought credible with you that there is a God, or, if there is,
that he should raise the dead?' And I think the wise Christian will
answer, 'I believe in the resurrection of the dead, partly on grounds of
reason, partly on those of intuition, but chiefly on both combined; so
to speak, it is my whole character which accepts the whole system of
which the doctrine of personal immortality forms an essential part.' And
to this it may be fairly added that the Christian doctrine of the
resurrection of our bodily form cannot have been arrived at for the
purpose of meeting modern materialistic objections to the doctrine of
personal immortality; hence it is certainly a strange doctrine to have
been propounded at that time, together with its companion, and scarcely
less distinctive, doctrine of the vileness of the body. Why was it not
said that the 'soul' alone should survive as a disembodied 'spirit'? Or
if form were supposed necessary for man as distinguished from God, that
he was to be an angel? But, be this as it may, the doctrine of the
resurrection seems to have fully met beforehand the materialistic
objection to a future life, and so to have raised the ulterior question
with which this paragraph opens.