CHAPTER VIII.

THE SOPHISTICAL ARTS USELESS.

But the art of sophistry, which the Greeks cultivated, is a fantastic

power, which makes false opinions like true by means of words. For

it produces rhetoric in order to persuasion, and disputation for

wrangling. These arts, therefore, if not conjoined with philosophy,

will be injurious to every one. For Plato openly called sophistry

“an evil art.” And Aristotle, following him, demonstrates it to be

a dishonest art, which abstracts in a specious manner the whole

business of wisdom, and professes a wisdom which it has not studied.

To speak briefly, as the beginning of rhetoric is the probable, and

an attempted proof[873] the process, and the end persuasion, so the

beginning of disputation is what is matter of opinion, and the process

a contest, and the end victory. For in the same manner, also, the

beginning of sophistry is the apparent, and the process twofold; one

of rhetoric, continuous and exhaustive; and the other of logic, and is

interrogatory. And its end is admiration. The dialectic in vogue in the

schools, on the other hand, is the exercise of a philosopher in matters

of opinion, for the sake of the faculty of disputation. But truth

is not in these at all. With reason, therefore, the noble apostle,

depreciating these superfluous arts occupied about words, says, “If

any man do not give heed to wholesome words, but is puffed up by a

kind of teaching, knowing nothing, but doting (νοσῶν) about questions

and strifes of words, whereof cometh contention, envy, railings, evil

surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, destitute of

the truth.”[874]

You see how he is moved against them, calling their art of logic--on

which, those to whom this garrulous mischievous art is dear,

whether Greeks or barbarians, plume themselves--a disease (νόσος).

Very beautifully, therefore, the tragic poet Euripides says in the

_Phœnissæ_,

“But a wrongful speech

Is diseased in itself, and needs skilful medicines.”[875]

For the saving Word is called “wholesome,” He being the truth; and what

is wholesome (healthful) remains ever deathless. But separation from

what is healthful and divine is impiety, and a deadly malady. These

are rapacious wolves hid in sheep-skins, men-stealers, and glozing

soul-seducers, stealing secretly, but proved to be robbers; striving by

fraud and force to catch us who are unsophisticated and have less power

of speech.

“Often a man, impeded through want of words, carries less weight

In expressing what is right, than the man of eloquence.

But now in fluent mouths the weightiest truths

They disguise, so that they do not seem what they ought to seem,”

says the tragedy. Such are these wranglers, whether they follow

the sects, or practise miserable dialectic arts. These are they

that “stretch the warp and weave nothing,” says the Scripture;[876]

prosecuting a bootless task, which the apostle has called “cunning

craftiness of men, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.”[877] “For

there are,” he says, “many unruly and vain talkers and deceivers.”[878]

Wherefore it was not said to all, “Ye are the salt of the earth.”[879]

For there are some even of the hearers of the word who are like the

fishes of the sea, which, reared from their birth in brine, yet need

salt to dress them for food. Accordingly I wholly approve of the

tragedy, when it says:

“O son, false words can be well spoken,

And truth may be vanquished by beauty of words.

But this is not what is most correct, but nature and what is right;

He who practises eloquence is indeed wise,

But I consider deeds always better than words.”

We must not, then, aspire to please the multitude. For we do not

practise what will please them, but what we know is remote from their

disposition. “Let us not be desirous of vainglory,” says the apostle,

“provoking one another, envying one another.”[880]

Thus the truth-loving Plato says, as if divinely inspired, “Since I am

such as to obey nothing but the word, which, after reflection, appears

to me the best.”[881]

Accordingly he charges those who credit opinions without intelligence

and knowledge, with abandoning right and sound reason unwarrantably,

and believing him who is a partner in falsehood. For to cheat one’s

self of the truth is bad; but to speak the truth, and to hold as our

opinions positive realities, is good.

Men are deprived of what is good unwillingly. Nevertheless they are

deprived either by being deceived or beguiled, or by being compelled

and not believing. He who believes not, has already made himself a

willing captive; and he who changes his persuasion is cozened, while

he forgets that time imperceptibly takes away some things, and reason

others. And after an opinion has been entertained, pain and anguish,

and on the other hand contentiousness and anger, compel. Above all,

men are beguiled who are either bewitched by pleasure or terrified by

fear. And all these are voluntary changes, but by none of these will

knowledge ever be attained.

The writings of Clement of Alexandria, Vol. 1 (of 2) · 第 8 / 29 章