The Protection of the President
In the 100 years since 1865 four Presidents of the United States
have been assassinated--Abraham Lincoln, James A. Garfield, William
McKinley, and John F. Kennedy. During this same period there were
three other attacks on the life of a President, a President-elect, and
a candidate for the Presidency, which narrowly failed: on Theodore
Roosevelt while campaigning in October of 1912; on President-elect
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when visiting Miami on February 15,
1933; and on President Harry S. Truman on November 1, 1950, when
his temporary residence, Blair House, was attacked by Puerto Rican
Nationalists.[C8-1] One out of every five Presidents since 1865 has
been assassinated; there have been attempts on the lives of one out of
every three.
Prompted by these dismaying statistics, the Commission has inquired
into the problems and methods of Presidential protection in effect at
the time of President Kennedy’s assassination. This study has led the
Commission to conclude that the public interest might be served by any
contribution it can make to the improvement of protective arrangements.
The Commission has not undertaken a comprehensive examination of all
facets of this subject; rather, it has devoted its time and resources
to those broader aspects of Presidential protection to which the events
of last November called attention.
In this part of its inquiry the Commission has had full access to
a major study of all phases of protective activities prepared by
the Secret Service for the Secretary of the Treasury following the
assassination. As a result of this study, the Secretary of the
Treasury has prepared a planning document dated August 27, 1964,
which recommends additional personnel and facilities to enable the
Secret Service to expand its protection capabilities. The Secretary
of the Treasury submitted this planning document on August 31, 1964,
to the Bureau of the Budget for review and approval. This planning
document has been made a part of the Commission’s published record; the
underlying staff and consultants’ reports reviewed by the Commission
have not, since a disclosure of such detailed information relating to
protective measures might undermine present methods of protecting the
President. However, all information considered by the Commission which
pertains to the protective function as it was carried out in Dallas has
been published as part of this report.
The protection of the President of the United States is an immensely
difficult and complex task. It is unlikely that measures can be devised
to eliminate entirely the multitude of diverse dangers that may arise,
particularly when the President is traveling in this country or abroad.
The protective task is further complicated by the reluctance of
Presidents to take security precautions which might interfere with the
performance of their duties, or their desire to have frequent and easy
access to the people. The adequacy of existing procedures can fairly
be assessed only after full consideration of the difficulty of the
protective assignment, with particular attention to the diverse roles
which the President is expected to fill. After reviewing this aspect
of the matter this chapter will set forth the Commission’s conclusions
regarding certain protective measures in force at the time of the
Dallas trip and propose recommendations for improvements.
THE NATURE OF THE PROTECTIVE ASSIGNMENT
The President is Head of State, Chief Executive, Commander in Chief,
and leader of a political party. As the ceremonial head of the
Government the President must discharge a wide range of public duties,
not only in Washington but throughout the land. In this role he
appears to the American people, in the words of William Howard Taft,
as “the personal embodiment and representative of their dignity and
majesty.”[C8-2] As Chief Executive, the President controls the exercise
of the vast, almost incalculable powers of the executive branch of the
Federal Government. As Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he must
maintain ultimate authority over the development and disposition of
our military power. Finally, in accordance with George Washington’s
maxim that Americans have a government “of accommodation as well as a
government of laws,”[C8-3] it is the President’s right and duty to be
the active leader of his party, as when he seeks to be reelected or to
maintain his party in power.
In all of these roles the President must go to the people. Exposure of
the President to public view through travel among the people of this
country is a great and historic tradition of American life. Desired
by both the President and the public, it is an indispensable means
of communication between the two. More often than not, Presidential
journeys have served more than one purpose at the same time:
ceremonial, administrative, political.
From George Washington to John F. Kennedy, such journeys have been
a normal part of the President’s activities. To promote nationwide
acceptance of his administration Washington made grand tours that
served also to excite interest in the Presidency.[C8-4] In recent
years, Presidential journeys have been frequent and extensive, partly
because of the greater speed and comfort of travel and partly because
of the greater demands made on the President. It is now possible for
Presidents to travel the length and breadth of a land far larger than
the United States in 1789 in less time than it took George Washington
to travel from New York to Mount Vernon or Thomas Jefferson from
Washington to Monticello. During his Presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt
made almost 400 journeys and traveled more than 350,000 miles.[C8-5]
Since 1945, Roosevelt’s successors have ranged the world, and their
foreign journeys have come to be accepted as normal rather than
extraordinary.
John F. Kennedy’s journey to Texas in November 1963 was in this
tradition. His friend and Special Assistant Kenneth O’Donnell, who
accompanied him on his last visit to Dallas, stated the President’s
views of his responsibilities with simplicity and clarity:
The President’s views of his responsibilities as President of
the United States were that he meet the people, that he go out
to their homes and see them, and allow them to see him, and
discuss, if possible, the views of the world as he sees it,
the problems of the country as he sees them. And he felt that
leaving Washington for the President of the United States was a
most necessary--not only for the people, but for the President
himself, that he expose himself to the actual basic problems
that were disturbing the American people. It helped him in his
job here, he was able to come back here with a fresh view of
many things. I think he felt very strongly that the President
ought to get out of Washington, and go meet the people on a
regular basis.[C8-6]
Whatever their purpose, Presidential journeys have greatly enlarged
and complicated the task of protecting the President. The Secret
Service and the Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies
which cooperate with it, have been confronted in recent years with
increasingly difficult problems, created by the greater exposure of the
President during his travels and the greater diversity of the audiences
he must face in a world torn by conflicting ideologies.
If the sole goal were to protect the life of the President, it could
be accomplished with reasonable assurance despite the multiple roles
he must play. But his very position as representative of the people
prevents him from effectively shielding himself from the people. He
cannot and will not take the precautions of a dictator or a sovereign.
Under our system, measures must be sought to afford security without
impeding the President’s performance of his many functions. The
protection of the President must be thorough but inconspicuous to
avoid even the suggestion of a garrison state. The rights of private
individuals must not be infringed. If the protective job is well done,
its performance will be evident only in the unexceptional fact of its
success. The men in charge of protecting the President, confronted
by complex problems and limited as they are in the measures they may
employ, must depend upon the utmost cooperation and understanding from
the public and the President.
The problem and the reasonable approach to its solution were ably
stated in a memorandum prepared by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover for the
President soon after the assassination:
The degree of security that can be afforded the President of
the United States is dependent to a considerable extent upon
the degree of contact with the general public desired by the
President. Absolute security is neither practical nor possible.
An approach to complete security would require the President to
operate in a sort of vacuum, isolated from the general public
and behind impregnable barriers. His travel would be in secret;
his public appearances would be behind bulletproof glass.
A more practical approach necessitates compromise. Any travel,
any contact with the general public, involves a calculated
risk on the part of the President and the men responsible for
his protection. Such risks can be lessened when the President
recognizes the security problem, has confidence in the
dedicated Secret Service men who are ready to lay down their
lives for him and accepts the necessary security precautions
which they recommend. Many Presidents have been understandably
impatient with the security precautions which many years
of experience dictate because these precautions reduce the
President’s privacy and the access to him of the people of
the country. Nevertheless the procedures and advice should be
accepted if the President wishes to have any security.[C8-7]
EVALUATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION AT THE TIME OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
The history of Presidential protection shows growing recognition over
the years that the job must be done by able, dedicated, thoroughly
professional personnel, using the best technical equipment that can
be devised.[C8-8] The assassination of President Kennedy demands an
examination of the protective measures employed to safeguard him and an
inquiry whether improvements can be made which will reduce the risk of
another such tragedy. This section considers first the means used to
locate potential sources of danger to the President in time to take
appropriate precautions. In this connection the information available
to Federal agencies about Lee Harvey Oswald is set out and the reasons
why this information was not furnished to the Secret Service appraised.
Second, the adequacy of other advance preparations for the security of
the President during his visit to Dallas, largely measures taken by
the Secret Service, is considered. Finally, the performance of those
charged with the immediate responsibility of protecting the President
on November 22 is reviewed.
Intelligence Functions Relating to Presidential Protection at the Time
of the Dallas Trip
A basic element of Presidential protection is the identification and
elimination of possible sources of danger to the President before the
danger becomes actual. The Secret Service has attempted to perform this
function through the activities of its Protective Research Section and
requests to other agencies, Federal and local, for useful information.
The Commission has concluded that at the time of the assassination the
arrangements relied upon by the Secret Service to perform this function
were seriously deficient.
_Adequacy of preventive intelligence operations of the Secret
Service._--The main job of the Protective Research Section (PRS) is to
collect, process, and evaluate information about persons or groups who
may be a danger to the President. In addition to this function, PRS is
responsible for such tasks as obtaining clearance of some categories of
White House employees and all tradesmen who service the White House,
the security processing of gifts sent to the President, and technical
inspections against covert listening devices.[C8-9] At the time of the
assassination PRS was a very small group, comprised of 12 specialists
and 3 clerks.[C8-10]
Many persons call themselves to the attention of PRS by attempting to
visit the President for bizarre reasons or by writing or in some other
way attempting to communicate with him in a threatening or abusive
manner or with undue persistence. Robert I. Bouck, special agent in
charge of PRS, estimated that most of the material received by his
office originated in this fashion or from the occasional investigations
initiated by the Secret Service, while the balance was furnished to PRS
by other Federal agencies, with primary source being the FBI.[C8-11]
The total volume of information received by PRS has risen steadily.
In 1943 PRS received approximately 9,000 items of information; in
1953 this had increased to more than 17,000 items; in 1963 the total
exceeded 32,000 items.[C8-12] Since many items may pertain to a
single case, these figures do not show the caseload. In the period
from November 1961 to November 1963, PRS received items in 8,709
cases.[C8-13]
Before the assassination of President Kennedy, PRS expressed its
interest in receiving information on suspects in very general terms.
For example, PRS instructed the White House mailroom, a source of much
PRS data, to refer all communications on identified existing cases
and, in addition, any communication “that in any way indicates anyone
may have possible intention of harming the President.”[C8-14] Slightly
more specific criteria were established for PRS personnel processing
White House mail referred by the White House mailroom, but again the
standards were very general.[C8-15] These instructions to PRS personnel
appear to be the only instance where an effort was made to reduce
the criteria to writing.[C8-16] When requested to provide a specific
statement of the standards employed by PRS in deciding what information
to seek and retain, the Secret Service responded:
The criteria in effect prior to November 22, 1963, for
determining whether to accept material for the PRS general
files were broad and flexible. All material is and was desired,
accepted, and filed if it indicated or tended to indicate
that the safety of the President is or might be in danger,
either at the present or in the future. * * * There are many
actions, situations, and incidents that may indicate such
potential danger. Some are specific, such as threats; danger
may be implied from others, such as membership or activity in
an organization which believes in assassination as a political
weapon. All material received by PRS was separately screened
and a determination made as to whether the information might
indicate possible harm to the President. If the material
was evaluated as indicating some potential danger to the
President--no matter how small--it was indexed in the general
PRS files under the name of the individual or group of
individuals to whom that material related.[C8-17]
The general files of PRS consist of folders on individuals, card
indexed by name. The files are manually maintained, without use of
any automatic data-processing techniques.[C8-18] At the time of the
assassination, the active PRS general files contained approximately
50,000 cases accumulated over a 20-year period,[C8-19] some of which
included more than one individual. A case file was established if the
information available suggested that the subject might be a danger
to the President. Many of these cases were not investigated by PRS.
The case file served merely as a repository for information until
enough had accumulated to warrant an investigation.[C8-20] During
the period November 1961 to November 1963, PRS investigated 34 newly
established or reactivated cases concerning residents of Texas.[C8-21]
Most of these cases involved persons who used threatening language
in communications to or about the President. An additional 115 cases
concerning Texas residents were established but not investigated.[C8-22]
When PRS learns of an individual whose conduct warrants scrutiny,
it requests an investigation by the closest Secret Service field
office,[C8-23] of which there are 65 throughout the country. If the
field office determines that the case should be subject to continuing
review, PRS establishes a file which requires a checkup at least every
6 months.[C8-24] This might involve a personal interview or interviews
with members of the person’s household.[C8-25] Wherever possible, the
Secret Service arranges for the family and friends of the individual,
and local law enforcement officials, to advise the field office if
the subject displays signs of increased danger or plans to leave his
home area. At the time of the assassination there were approximately
400 persons throughout the country who were subject to periodic
review.[C8-26]
If PRS concludes after investigation that an individual presents a
significant danger to the life of the President, his name is placed in
a “trip index file” which is maintained on a geographical field office
basis.[C8-27] At the time of the assassination the names of about 100
persons were in this index, all of whom were included in the group of
400 being reviewed regularly.[C8-28] PRS also maintains an album of
photographs and descriptions of about 12 to 15 individuals who are
regarded as clear risks to the President and who do not have a fixed
place of residence.[C8-29] Members of the White House detail of the
Secret Service have copies of this album.[C8-30]
Individuals who are regarded as dangerous to the President and who
are in penal or hospital custody are listed only in the general
files of PRS, but there is a system for the immediate notification
of the Secret Service by the confining institution when a subject is
released or escapes.[C8-31] PRS attempts to eliminate serious risks by
hospitalization or, where necessary, the prosecution of persons who
have committed an offense such as threatening the President.[C8-32]
In June 1964 PRS had arrangements to be notified about the release or
escape of approximately 1,000 persons.[C8-33]
In summary, at the time of the assassination PRS had received, over
a 20-year period, basic information on some 50,000 cases; it had
arrangements to be notified about release from confinement in roughly
1,000 cases; it had established periodic regular review of the status
of 400 individuals; it regarded approximately 100 of these 400 cases
as serious risks and 12 to 15 of these cases as highly dangerous
risks. Members of the White House detail were expected to familiarize
themselves with the descriptions and photographs of the highest risk
cases. The cases subject to periodic review and the 100 or so cases
in the higher risk category were filed on a geographic basis, and
could conveniently be reviewed by a Secret Service agent preparing
for a Presidential trip to a particular part of the country. These
were the files reviewed by PRS on November 8, 1963, at the request of
Special Agent Lawson, advance agent for President Kennedy’s trip to
Dallas.[C8-34] The general files of PRS were not indexed by geographic
location and were of little use in preparing for a Presidential visit
to a specific locality.
Secret Service requests to other agencies for intelligence information
were no more specific than the broad and general instructions to its
own agents and the White House mailroom. The head of PRS testified
that the Secret Service requested other agencies to provide “any and
all information that they may come in contact with that would indicate
danger to the President.”[C8-35] These requests were not communicated
in writing by the Secret Service; rather, the Service depended on the
personal liaison maintained by PRS with the headquarters of the Federal
intelligence agencies, particularly the FBI, and at the working level
with personnel of the field offices of the various agencies.[C8-36]
The Service frequently participated in the training programs of other
law enforcement agencies, and agents from other agencies attended the
regular Secret Service training schools. Presidential protection was an
important topic in these training programs.[C8-37]
In the absence of more specific instructions, other Federal
agencies interpreted the Secret Service’s informal requests to
relate principally to overt threats to harm the President or other
specific manifestations of hostility. For example, at the time of the
assassination, the FBI Handbook, which is in the possession of every
Bureau special agent, provided:
Threats against the President of the U.S., members of his
immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice-President
Investigation of threats against the President of the United
States, members of his immediate family, the President-Elect,
and the Vice-President is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the U.S. Secret Service. Any information indicating the
possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the
President, members of the immediate family of the President,
the President-Elect or the Vice-President must be referred
immediately by the most expeditious means of communication
to the nearest office of the U.S. Secret Service. Advise the
Bureau at the same time by teletype of the information so
furnished to the Secret Service and the fact that it has been
so disseminated. The above action should be taken without delay
in order to attempt to verify the information and no evaluation
of the information should be attempted. When the threat is
in the form of a written communication, give a copy to local
Secret Service and forward the original to the Bureau where
it will be made available to Secret Service headquarters in
Washington. The referral of the copy to local Secret Service
should not delay the immediate referral of the information by
the fastest available means of communication to Secret Service
locally.[C8-38]
The State Department advised the Secret Service of all crank and
threat letter mail or crank visitors and furnished reports concerning
any assassination or attempted assassination of a ruler or other
major official anywhere in the world.[C8-39] The several military
intelligence agencies reported crank mail and similar threats involving
the President.[C8-40] According to Special Agent in Charge Bouck, the
Secret Service had no standard procedure for the systematic review
of its requests for and receipt of information from other Federal
agencies.[C8-41]
The Commission believes that the facilities and procedures of the
Protective Research Section of the Secret Service prior to November
22, 1963, were inadequate. Its efforts appear to have been too largely
directed at the “crank” threat. Although the Service recognized that
its advance preventive measures must encompass more than these most
obvious dangers, it made little effort to identify factors in the
activities of an individual or an organized group, other than specific
threats, which suggested a source of danger against which timely
precautions could be taken. Except for its special “trip index” file of
400 names, none of the cases in the PRS general files was available for
systematic review on a geographic basis when the President planned a
particular trip.
As reported in chapter II, when the special file was reviewed on
November 8, it contained the names of no persons from the entire
Dallas-Fort Worth area, notwithstanding the fact that Ambassador
Stevenson had been abused by pickets in Dallas less than a month
before. Bouck explained the failure to try to identify the individuals
involved in the Stevenson incident after it occurred on the ground that
PRS required a more direct indication of a threat to the President, and
that there was no such indication until the President’s scheduled visit
to that area became known.[C8-42] Such an approach seriously undermines
the precautionary nature of PRS work; if the presence in Dallas of the
Stevenson pickets might have created a danger for the President on a
visit to that city, PRS should have investigated and been prepared to
guard against it.
Other agencies occasionally provided information to the Secret Service
concerning potentially dangerous political groups. This was done in the
case of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, for example, but only
after members of the group had resorted to political violence.[C8-43]
However, the vague requests for information which the Secret Service
made to Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies were not
well designed to elicit information from them about persons other than
those who were obvious threats to the President. The requests shifted
the responsibility for evaluating difficult cases from the Service,
the agency most responsible for performing that task, to the other
agencies. No specific guidance was provided. Although the CIA had on
file requests from the Treasury Department for information on the
counterfeiting of U.S. currency and certain smuggling matters,[C8-44]
it had no written specification of intelligence information collected
by CIA abroad which was desired by the Secret Service in advance of
Presidential trips outside the United States.
_Information known about Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the
assassination._--No information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald appeared
in PRS files before the President’s trip to Dallas. Oswald was known
to other Federal agencies with which the Secret Service maintained
intelligence liaison. The FBI had been interested in him, to some
degree at least, since the time of his defection in October 1959.
It had interviewed him twice shortly after his return to the United
States, again a year later at his request and was investigating
him at the time of the assassination. The Commission has taken the
testimony of Bureau agents who interviewed Oswald after his return
from the Soviet Union and prior to November 22, 1963, the agent
who was assigned his case at the time of the assassination, the
Director of the FBI, and the Assistant to the Director in charge
of all investigative activities under the Director and Associate
Director.[C8-45] In addition, the Director and Deputy Director for
Plans of the CIA testified concerning that Agency’s limited knowledge
of Oswald before the assassination.[C8-46] Finally, the Commission has
reviewed the complete files on Oswald, as they existed at the time of
the assassination, of the Department of State, the Office of Naval
Intelligence, the FBI, and the CIA. The information known to the FBI is
summarized below.
_From defection to return to Fort Worth._--The FBI opened a file
on Oswald in October 1959,[C8-47] when news reports appeared of
his defection to the Soviet Union.[C8-48] The file was opened
“for the purpose of correlating information inasmuch as he was
considered a possible security risk in the event he returned to this
country.”[C8-49] Oswald’s defection was also the occasion for the
opening of files by the Department of State, CIA, and the Office of
Naval Intelligence. Until April 1960, FBI activity consisted of placing
in Oswald’s file information regarding his relations with the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow and background data relating largely to his prior
military service, provided by other agencies. In April 1960, Mrs.
Marguerite Oswald and Robert Oswald were interviewed in the course of a
routine FBI investigation of transfers of small sums of money from Mrs.
Oswald to her son in Russia.[C8-50]
During the next 2 years the FBI continued to accumulate information,
and kept itself informed on Oswald’s status by periodic reviews of
State Department and Office of Naval Intelligence files. In this way,
it learned that when Oswald had arrived in the Soviet Union he had
attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship and applied for Soviet
citizenship, had described himself as a Marxist, had said he would
give the Soviet Union any useful information he had acquired as a
marine radar technician and had displayed an arrogant and aggressive
attitude at the U.S. Embassy; it learned also that Oswald had been
discharged from the Marine Corps Reserve as undesirable in August
1960.[C8-51] In June 1962, the Bureau was advised by the Department of
State of Oswald’s plan to return to the United States. The Bureau made
arrangements to be advised by immigration authorities of his return,
and instructed the Dallas office to interview him when he got back
to determine whether he had been recruited by a Soviet intelligence
service.[C8-52] Oswald’s file at the Department of State Passport
Office was reviewed in June 1962. It revealed his letter of January
30, 1962, to Secretary of the Navy Connally, in which he protested his
discharge and declared that he would use “all means” to correct it.
The file reflected the Department’s determination that Oswald had not
expatriated himself.[C8-53]
_From return to Fort Worth to move to New Orleans._--Oswald was first
interviewed by FBI Agents John W. Fain and B. Tom Carter on June 26,
1962, in Fort Worth.[C8-54] Agent Fain reported to headquarters that
Oswald was impatient and arrogant, and unwilling to answer questions
regarding his motive for going to the Soviet Union. Oswald “denied
that he had ever denounced his U.S. citizenship, and * * * that he had
ever applied for Soviet citizenship specifically.”[C8-55] Oswald was,
however, willing to discuss his contacts with Soviet authorities. He
denied having any involvement with Soviet intelligence agencies and
promised to advise the FBI if he heard from them.[C8-56]
Agent Fain was not satisfied by this interview and arranged to
see Oswald again on August 16, 1962.[C8-57] According to Fain’s
contemporaneous memorandum and his present recollection, while Oswald
remained somewhat evasive at this interview, he was not antagonistic
and seemed generally to be settling down.[C8-58] (Marina Oswald,
however, recalled that her husband was upset by this interview.)[C8-59]
Oswald again agreed to advise the FBI if he were approached under
suspicious circumstances; however, he deprecated the possibility of
this happening, particularly since his employment did not involve any
sensitive information.[C8-60] Having concluded that Oswald was not a
security risk or potentially dangerous or violent, Fain determined that
nothing further remained to be done at that time and recommended that
the case be placed in a closed status.[C8-61] This is an administrative
classification indicating that no further work has been scheduled. It
does not preclude the agent in charge of the case from reopening it if
he feels that further work should be done.[C8-62]
From August 1962 until March 1963, the FBI continued to accumulate
information regarding Oswald but engaged in no active investigation.
Agent Fain retired from the FBI in October 1962, and the closed
Oswald case was not reassigned.[C8-63] However, pursuant to a
regular Bureau practice of interviewing certain immigrants from Iron
Curtain countries, Fain had been assigned to see Marina Oswald at an
appropriate time.[C8-64] This assignment was given to Agent James
P. Hosty, Jr. of the Dallas office upon Fain’s retirement. In March
1963, while attempting to locate Marina Oswald, Agent Hosty was told
by Mrs. M. F. Tobias, a former landlady of the Oswalds at 602 Elsbeth
Street in Dallas, that other tenants had complained because Oswald was
drinking to excess and beating his wife.[C8-65] This information led
Hosty to review Oswald’s file, from which he learned that Oswald had
become a subscriber to the Worker, a Communist Party publication. Hosty
decided that the Lee Harvey Oswald case should be reopened because of
the alleged personal difficulties and the contact with the Worker, and
his recommendation was accepted.[C8-66] He decided, however, not to
interview Marina Oswald at that time, and merely determined that the
Oswalds were living at 214 Neely Street in Dallas.[C8-67]
On April 21, 1963, the FBI field office in New York was advised
that Oswald was in contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in
New York, and that he had written to the committee stating that he
had distributed its pamphlets on the streets of Dallas.[C8-68] This
information did not reach Agent Hosty in Dallas until June.[C8-69]
Hosty considered the information to be “stale” by that time, and did
not attempt to verify Oswald’s reported statement.[C8-70] Under a
general Bureau request to be on the alert for activities of the Fair
Play for Cuba Committee, Hosty had inquired earlier and found no
evidence that it was functioning in the Dallas area.[C8-71]
_In New Orleans._--In the middle of May of 1963, Agent Hosty checked
Oswald’s last known residence and found that he had moved.[C8-72]
Oswald was tentatively located in New Orleans in June, and Hosty asked
the New Orleans FBI office to determine Oswald’s address and what he
was doing.[C8-73] The New Orleans office investigated and located
Oswald, learning his address and former place of employment on August
5, 1963.[C8-74] A confidential informant advised the FBI that Oswald
was not known to be engaged in Communist Party activities in New
Orleans.[C8-75]
On June 24, Oswald applied in New Orleans for a passport, stating that
he planned to depart by ship for an extended tour of Western European
countries, the Soviet Union, Finland, and Poland. The Passport Office
of the Department of State in Washington had no listing for Oswald
requiring special treatment, and his application was approved on the
following day.[C8-76] The FBI had not asked to be informed of any
effort by Oswald to obtain a passport, as it might have under existing
procedures, and did not know of his application.[C8-77] According to
the Bureau,
We did not request the State Department to include Oswald
on a list which would have resulted in advising us of any
application for a passport inasmuch as the facts relating to
Oswald’s activities at that time did not warrant such action.
Our investigation of Oswald had disclosed no evidence that
Oswald was acting under the instructions or on behalf of any
foreign government or instrumentality thereof.[C8-78]
On August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested and jailed by the New Orleans
Police Department for disturbing the peace, in connection with a street
fight which broke out when he was accosted by anti-Castro Cubans while
distributing leaflets on behalf of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. On
the next day, he asked the New Orleans police to arrange for him to be
interviewed by the FBI. The police called the local FBI office and an
agent, John L. Quigley, was sent to the police station.[C8-79] Agent
Quigley did not know of Oswald’s prior FBI record when he interviewed
him, inasmuch as the police had not given Oswald’s name to the Bureau
when they called the office.[C8-80]
Quigley recalled that Oswald was receptive when questioned about his
general background but less than completely truthful or cooperative
when interrogated about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Quigley
testified:
When I began asking him specific details with respect to
his activities in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New
Orleans as to where meetings were held, who was involved, what
occurred, he was reticent to furnish information, reluctant and
actually as far as I was concerned, was completely evasive on
them.[C8-81]
In Quigley’s judgment, Oswald “was probably making a self-serving
statement in attempting to explain to me why he was distributing this
literature, and for no other reason, and when I got to questioning him
further then he felt that his purpose had been served and he wouldn’t
say anything further.”[C8-82]
During the interview Quigley obtained background information from
Oswald which was inconsistent with information already in the
Bureau’s possession. When Quigley returned to his office, he learned
that another Bureau agent, Milton R. Kaack, had been conducting a
background investigation of Oswald at the request of Agent Hosty
in Dallas. Quigley advised Kaack of his interview and gave him a
detailed memorandum.[C8-83] Kaack was aware of the facts known to the
FBI and recognized Oswald’s false statements.[C8-84] For example,
Oswald claimed that his wife’s maiden name was Prossa and that they
had been married in Fort Worth and lived there until coming to New
Orleans.[C8-85] He had told the New Orleans arresting officers that he
had been born in Cuba.[C8-86]
Several days later, the Bureau received additional evidence that Oswald
had lied to Agent Quigley. On August 22, it learned that Oswald had
appeared on a radio discussion program on August 21.[C8-87] William
Stuckey, who had appeared on the radio program with Oswald, told the
Bureau on August 30 that Oswald had told him that he had worked and
been married in the Soviet Union.[C8-88] Neither these discrepancies
nor the fact that Oswald had initiated the FBI interview was considered
sufficiently unusual to necessitate another interview.[C8-89] Alan H.
Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI, stated the Bureau’s
reasoning in this way:
Our interest in this man at this point was to determine whether
his activities constituted a threat to the internal security of
the country. It was apparent that he had made a self-serving
statement to Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in
our files as a part of the case, and if we determined that the
course of the investigation required us to clarify or face him
down with this information, we would do it at the appropriate
time.
In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling
us something that wasn’t true, and unless this required further
investigation at that time, we would handle it in due course,
in accord with the whole context of the investigation.[C8-90]
On August 21, 1963, Bureau headquarters instructed the New Orleans
and Dallas field offices to conduct an additional investigation of
Oswald in view of the activities which had led to his arrest.[C8-91]
FBI informants in the New Orleans area, familiar with pro-Castro or
Communist Party activity there, advised the Bureau that Oswald was
unknown in such circles.[C8-92]
_In Dallas._--In early September 1963 the FBI transferred the principal
responsibility for the Oswald case from the Dallas office to the
New Orleans office.[C8-93] Soon after, on October 1, 1963, the FBI
was advised by the rental agent for the Oswalds’ apartment in New
Orleans that they had moved again.[C8-94] According to the information
received by the Bureau they had vacated their apartment, and Marina
Oswald had departed with their child in a station wagon with Texas
registration.[C8-95] On October 3, Hosty reopened the case in Dallas
to assist the New Orleans office.[C8-96] He checked in Oswald’s old
neighborhood and throughout the Dallas-Fort Worth area but was unable
to locate Oswald.[C8-97]
The next word about Oswald’s location was a communication from the
CIA to the FBI on October 10, advising that an individual tentatively
identified as Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico City in early October of 1963.[C8-98] The Bureau had had no
earlier information suggesting that Oswald had left the United States.
The possible contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico intensified
the FBI’s interest in learning Oswald’s whereabouts.[C8-99] The FBI
representative in Mexico City arranged to follow up this information
with the CIA and to verify Oswald’s entry into Mexico.[C8-100] The CIA
message was sent also to the Department of State where it was reviewed
by personnel of the Passport Office, who knew from Oswald’s file that
he had sought and obtained a passport on June 25, 1963.[C8-101] The
Department of State did not advise either the CIA or the FBI of these
facts.[C8-102]
On October 25, the New Orleans office of the FBI learned that in
September Oswald had given a forwarding address of 2515 West Fifth
Street, Irving, Tex.[C8-103] After receiving this information on
October 29, Agent Hosty attempted to locate Oswald. On the same day
Hosty interviewed neighbors on Fifth Street and learned that the
address was that of Mrs. Ruth Paine.[C8-104] He conducted a limited
background investigation of the Paines, intending to interview Mrs.
Paine and ask her particularly about Oswald’s whereabouts.[C8-105]
Having determined that Mrs. Paine was a responsible and reliable
citizen, Hosty interviewed her on November 1. The interview lasted
about 20-25 minutes.[C8-106] In response to Hosty’s inquiries, Mrs.
Paine
* * * readily admitted that Mrs. Marina Oswald and Lee Oswald’s
two children were staying with her. She said that Lee Oswald
was living somewhere in Dallas. She didn’t know where. She said
it was in the Oak Cliff area but she didn’t have his address.
I asked her if she knew where he worked. After a moment’s
hesitation, she told me that he worked at the Texas School
Book Depository near the downtown area of Dallas. She didn’t
have the exact address, and it is my recollection that we went
to the phone book and looked it up, found it to be 411 Elm
Street.[C8-107]
Mrs. Paine told Hosty also that Oswald was living alone in Dallas
because she did not want him staying at her house, although she was
willing to let Oswald visit his wife and children.[C8-108] According to
Hosty, Mrs. Paine indicated that she thought she could find out where
Oswald was living and would let him know.[C8-109] At this point in the
interview, Hosty gave Mrs. Paine his name and office telephone number
on a piece of paper.[C8-110] At the end of the interview, Marina Oswald
came into the room. When he observed that she seemed “quite alarmed”
about the visit, Hosty assured her, through Mrs. Paine as interpreter,
that the FBI would not harm or harass her.[C8-111]
On November 4, Hosty telephoned the Texas School Book Depository and
learned that Oswald was working there and that he had given as his
address Mrs. Paine’s residence in Irving.[C8-112] Hosty took the
necessary steps to have the Dallas office of the FBI, rather than
the New Orleans office, reestablished as the office with principal
responsibility.[C8-113] On November 5, Hosty was traveling near Mrs.
Paine’s home and took the occasion to stop by to ask whether she had
any further information. Mrs. Paine had nothing to add to what she had
already told him, except that during a visit that past weekend, Oswald
had said that he was a “Trotskyite Communist,” and that she found
this and similar statements illogical and somewhat amusing.[C8-114]
On this occasion Hosty was at the Paine residence for only a few
minutes.[C8-115]
During neither interview did Hosty learn Oswald’s address or telephone
number in Dallas. Mrs. Paine testified that she learned Oswald’s
telephone number at the Beckley Street roominghouse in the middle
of October shortly after Oswald rented the room on October 14. As
discussed in chapter VI, she failed to report this to Agent Hosty
because she thought the FBI was in possession of a great deal of
information and certainly would find it very easy to learn where Oswald
was living.[C8-116]
Hosty did nothing further in connection with the Oswald case until
after the assassination. On November 1, 1963, he had received a
copy of the report of the New Orleans office which contained Agent
Quigley’s memorandum of the interview in the New Orleans jail on August
10,[C8-117] and realized immediately that Oswald had given false
biographic information.[C8-118] Hosty knew that he would eventually
have to investigate this, and “was quite interested in determining the
nature of his contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.”[C8-119]
When asked what his next step would have been, Hosty replied:
Well, as I had previously stated, I have between 25 and 40
cases assigned to me at any one time. I had other matters to
take care of. I had now established that Lee Oswald was not
employed in a sensitive industry. I can now afford to wait
until New Orleans forwarded the necessary papers to me to
show me I now had all the information. It was then my plan to
interview Marina Oswald in detail concerning both herself and
her husband’s background.
Q. Had you planned any steps beyond that point?
A. No. I would have to wait until I had talked to Marina to see
what I could determine, and from there I could make my plans.
Q. Did you take any action on this case between November 5 and
November 22?
A. No, sir.[C8-120]
The official Bureau files confirm Hosty’s statement that from
November 5 until the assassination, no active investigation was
conducted.[C8-121] On November 18 the FBI learned that Oswald recently
had been in communication with the Soviet Embassy in Washington and so
advised the Dallas office in the ordinary course of business. Hosty
received this information on the afternoon of November 22, 1963.[C8-122]
_Nonreferral of Oswald to the Secret Service._--The Commission has
considered carefully the question whether the FBI, in view of all
the information concerning Oswald in its files, should have alerted
the Secret Service to Oswald’s presence in Dallas prior to President
Kennedy’s visit. The Secret Service and the FBI differ as to whether
Oswald fell within the category of “threats against the President”
which should be referred to the Service.
Robert I. Bouck, special agent in charge of the Protective Research
Section, testified that the information available to the Federal
Government about Oswald before the assassination would, if known
to PRS, have made Oswald a subject of concern to the Secret
Service.[C8-123] Bouck pointed to a number of characteristics besides
Oswald’s defection the cumulative effect of which would have been to
alert the Secret Service to potential danger:
I would think his continued association with the Russian
Embassy after his return, his association with the Castro
groups would have been of concern to us, a knowledge that he
had, I believe, been courtmartialed for illegal possession
of a gun, of a hand gun in the Marines, that he had owned a
weapon and did a good deal of hunting or use of it, perhaps
in Russia, plus a number of items about his disposition and
unreliability of character, I think all of those, if we had had
them altogether, would have added up to pointing out a pretty
bad individual, and I think that, together, had we known that
he had a vantage point would have seemed somewhat serious to
us, even though I must admit that none of these in themselves
would be--would meet our specific criteria, none of them alone.
But it is when you begin adding them up to some degree that you
begin to get criteria that are meaningful.[C8-124]
Mr. Bouck pointed out, however, that he had no reason to believe that
any one Federal agency had access to all this information, including
the significant fact that Oswald was employed in a building which
overlooked the motorcade route.[C8-125]
Agent Hosty testified that he was fully aware of the pending
Presidential visit to Dallas. He recalled that the special agent
in charge of the Dallas office of the FBI, J. Gordon Shanklin, had
discussed the President’s visit on several occasions, including the
regular biweekly conference on the morning of November 22:
Mr. Shanklin advised us, among other things, that in view
of the President’s visit to Dallas, that if anyone had any
indication of any possibility of any acts of violence or any
demonstrations against the President, or Vice President,
to immediately notify the Secret Service and confirm it in
writing. He had made the same statement about a week prior at
another special conference which we had held. I don’t recall
the exact date. It was about a week prior.[C8-126]
In fact, Hosty participated in transmitting to the Secret Service two
pieces of information pertaining to the visit.[C8-127] Hosty testified
that he did not know until the evening of Thursday, November 21,
that there was to be a motorcade, however, and never realized that
the motorcade would pass the Texas School Book Depository Building.
He testified that he did not read the newspaper story describing the
motorcade route in detail, since he was interested only in the fact
that the motorcade was coming up Main Street, “where maybe I could
watch it if I had a chance.”[C8-128]
Even if he had recalled that Oswald’s place of employment was on the
President’s route, Hosty testified that he would not have cited him
to the Secret Service as a potential threat to the President.[C8-129]
Hosty interpreted his instructions as requiring “some indication
that the person planned to take some action against the safety of
the President of the United States or the Vice President.”[C8-130]
In his opinion, none of the information in the FBI files--Oswald’s
defection, his Fair Play for Cuba activities in New Orleans, his lies
to Agent Quigley, his recent visit to Mexico City--indicated that
Oswald was capable of violence.[C8-131] Hosty’s initial reaction on
hearing that Oswald was a suspect in the assassination, was “shock,
complete surprise,” because he had no reason to believe that Oswald
“was capable or potentially an assassin of the President of the United
States.”[C8-132]
Shortly after Oswald was apprehended and identified, Hosty’s superior
sent him to observe the interrogation of Oswald.[C8-133] Hosty parked
his car in the basement of police headquarters and there met an
acquaintance, Lt. Jack Revill of the Dallas police force. The two men
disagree about the conversation which took place between them. They
agree that Hosty told Revill that the FBI had known about Oswald and,
in particular, of his presence in Dallas and his employment at the
Texas School Book Depository Building.[C8-134] Revill testified that
Hosty said also that the FBI had information that Oswald was “capable
of committing this assassination.”[C8-135] According to Revill, Hosty
indicated that he was going to tell this to Lieutenant Wells of the
homicide and robbery bureau.[C8-136] Revill promptly made a memorandum
of this conversation in which the quoted statement appears.[C8-137]
His secretary testified that she prepared such a report for him that
afternoon[C8-138] and Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry and District
Attorney Henry M. Wade both testified that they saw it later that
day.[C8-139]
Hosty has unequivocally denied, first by affidavit and then in his
testimony before the Commission, that he ever said that Oswald was
capable of violence, or that he had any information suggesting
this.[C8-140] The only witness to the conversation was Dallas Police
Detective V. J. Brian, who was accompanying Revill. Brian did not hear
Hosty make any statement concerning Oswald’s capacity to be an assassin
but he did not hear the entire conversation because of the commotion at
police headquarters and because he was not within hearing distance at
all times.[C8-141]
Hosty’s interpretation of the prevailing FBI instructions on referrals
to the Secret Service was defended before the Commission by his
superiors. After summarizing the Bureau’s investigative interest in
Oswald prior to the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover concluded that
“There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any
indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm
to the President or to the Vice President.”[C8-142] Director Hoover
emphasized that the first indication of Oswald’s capacity for violence
was his attempt on General Walker’s life, which did not become known
to the FBI until after the assassination.[C8-143] Both Director Hoover
and his assistant, Alan H. Belmont, stressed also the decision by the
Department of State that Oswald should be permitted to return to the
United States.[C8-144] Neither believed that the Bureau investigation
of him up to November 22 revealed any information which would have
justified referral to the Secret Service. According to Belmont, when
Oswald returned from the Soviet Union,
* * * he indicated that he had learned his lesson, was
disenchanted with Russia, and had a renewed concept--I am
paraphrasing, a renewed concept--of the American free society.
We talked to him twice. He likewise indicated he was
disenchanted with Russia. We satisfied ourselves that we had
met our requirement, namely to find out whether he had been
recruited by Soviet intelligence. The case was closed.
We again exhibited interest on the basis of these contacts with
The Worker, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which are relatively
inconsequential.
His activities for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New
Orleans, we knew, were not of real consequence as he was not
connected with any organized activity there.
The interview with him in jail is not significant from the
standpoint of whether he had a propensity for violence.
Q. This is the Quigley interview you are talking about?
A. Yes; it was a self-serving interview.
The visits with the Soviet Embassy were evidently for the
purpose of securing a visa, and he had told us during one
of the interviews that he would probably take his wife back
to Soviet Russia some time in the future. He had come back
to Dallas. Hosty had established that he had a job, he was
working, and had told Mrs. Paine that when he got the money he
was going to take an apartment when the baby was old enough,
he was going to take an apartment, and the family would live
together.
He gave evidence of settling down. Nowhere during the course
of this investigation or the information that came to us from
other agencies was there any indication of a potential for
violence on his part.
Consequently, there was no basis for Hosty to go to Secret
Service and advise them of Oswald’s presence. * * *[C8-145]
As reflected in this testimony, the officials of the FBI believed that
there was no data in its files which gave warning that Oswald was a
source of danger to President Kennedy. While he had expressed hostility
at times toward the State Department, the Marine Corps, and the FBI
as agents of the Government,[C8-146] so far as the FBI knew he had
not shown any potential for violence. Prior to November 22, 1963, no
law enforcement agency had any information to connect Oswald with the
attempted shooting of General Walker. It was against this background
and consistent with the criteria followed by the FBI prior to November
22 that agents of the FBI in Dallas did not consider Oswald’s presence
in the Texas School Book Depository Building overlooking the motorcade
route as a source of danger to the President and did not inform the
Secret Service of his employment in the Depository Building.
The Commission believes, however, that the FBI took an unduly
restrictive view of its responsibilities in preventive intelligence
work, prior to the assassination. The Commission appreciates the
large volume of cases handled by the FBI (636,371 investigative
matters during fiscal year 1963).[C8-147] There were no Secret Service
criteria which specifically required the referral of Oswald’s case
to the Secret Service; nor was there any requirement to report the
names of defectors. However, there was much material in the hands of
the FBI about Oswald: the knowledge of his defection, his arrogance
and hostility to the United States, his pro-Castro tendencies, his
lies when interrogated by the FBI, his trip to Mexico where he was
in contact with Soviet authorities, his presence in the School Book
Depository job and its location along the route of the motorcade. All
this does seem to amount to enough to have induced an alert agency,
such as the FBI, possessed of this information to list Oswald as a
potential threat to the safety of the President. This conclusion may be
tinged with hindsight, but it stated primarily to direct the thought
of those responsible for the future safety of our Presidents to the
need for a more imaginative and less narrow interpretation of their
responsibilities.
It is the conclusion of the Commission that, even in the absence of
Secret Service criteria which specifically required the referral
of such a case as Oswald’s to the Secret Service, a more alert and
carefully considered treatment of the Oswald case by the Bureau might
have brought about such a referral. Had such a review been undertaken
by the FBI, there might conceivably have been additional investigation
of the Oswald case between November 5 and November 22. Agent Hosty
testified that several matters brought to his attention in late October
and early November, including the visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico
City, required further attention. Under proper procedures knowledge of
the pending Presidential visit might have prompted Hosty to have made
more vigorous efforts to locate Oswald’s roominghouse address in Dallas
and to interview him regarding these unresolved matters.
The formal FBI instructions to its agents outlining the information
to be referred to the Secret Service were too narrow at the time
of the assassination. While the Secret Service bears the principal
responsibility for this failure, the FBI instructions did not
reflect fully the Secret Service’s need for information regarding
potential threats. The handbook referred thus to “the possibility of
an attempt against the person or safety of the President.”[C8-148]
It is clear from Hosty’s testimony that this was construed, at least
by him, as requiring evidence of a plan or conspiracy to injure the
President.[C8-149] Efforts made by the Bureau since the assassination,
on the other hand, reflect keen awareness of the necessity of
communicating a much wider range of intelligence information to the
Service.[C8-150]
Most important, notwithstanding that both agencies have professed
to the Commission that the liaison between them was close and fully
sufficient,[C8-151] the Commission does not believe that the liaison
between the FBI and the Secret Service prior to the assassination was
as effective as it should have been. The FBI Manual of Instructions
provided:
Liaison With Other Government Agencies
To insure adequate and effective liaison arrangements, each
SAC should specifically designate an Agent (or Agents) to be
responsible for developing and maintaining liaison with other
Federal Agencies. This liaison should take into consideration
FBI-agency community of interests, location of agency
headquarters, and the responsiveness of agency representatives.
In each instance, liaison contacts should be developed to
include a close friendly relationship, mutual understanding
of FBI and agency jurisdictions, and an indicated willingness
by the agency representative to coordinate activities and to
discuss problems of mutual interest. Each field office should
determine those Federal agencies which are represented locally
and with which liaison should be conducted.[C8-152]
The testimony reveals that liaison responsibilities in connection
with the President’s visit were discussed twice officially by the
special agent in charge of the FBI office in Dallas. As discussed in
chapter II, some limited information was made available to the Secret
Service.[C8-153] But there was no fully adequate liaison between the
two agencies. Indeed, the Commission believes that the liaison between
all Federal agencies responsible for Presidential protection should be
improved.
Other Protective Measures and Aspects of Secret Service Performance
The President’s trip to Dallas called into play many standard operating
procedures of the Secret Service in addition to its preventive
intelligence operations. Examination of these procedures shows that
in most respects they were well conceived and ably executed by the
personnel of the Service. Against the background of the critical events
of November 22, however, certain shortcomings and lapses from the high
standards which the Commission believes should prevail in the field of
Presidential protection are evident.
_Advance preparations._--The advance preparations in Dallas by Agent
Winston G. Lawson of the White House detail have been described in
chapter II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels of the
Dallas field office of the Secret Service, Lawson was responsible for
working out a great many arrangements for the President’s trip. The
Service prefers to have two agents perform advance preparations. In
the case of Dallas, because President Kennedy had scheduled visits to
five Texas cities and had also scheduled visits to other parts of the
country immediately before the Texas trip, there were not enough men
available to permit two agents to be assigned to all the advance work.
Consequently, Agent Lawson did the advance work alone from November 13
to November 18, when he was joined by Agent David B. Grant, who had
just completed advance work on the President’s trip to Tampa.
The Commission concludes that the most significant advance arrangements
for the President’s trip were soundly planned. In particular, the
Commission believes that the motorcade route selected by Agent Lawson,
upon the advice of Agent in Charge Sorrels and with the concurrence
of the Dallas police, was entirely appropriate, in view of the known
desires of the President. There were far safer routes via freeways
directly to the Trade Mart, but these routes would not have been in
accordance with the White House staff instructions given the Secret
Service for a desirable motorcade route.[C8-154] Much of Lawson’s
time was taken with establishing adequate security over the motorcade
route and at the two places where the President would stop, Love Field
and the Trade Mart. The Commission concludes that the arrangements
worked out at the Trade Mart by these Secret Service agents with the
cooperation of the Dallas police and other local law enforcement
agents, were carefully executed. Since the President was to be at the
Trade Mart longer than at any other location in Dallas and in view of
the security hazards presented by the building, the Secret Service
correctly gave particular attention in the advance preparations
to those arrangements. The Commission also regards the security
arrangements worked out by Lawson and Sorrels at Love Field as entirely
adequate.
The Commission believes, however, that the Secret Service has
inadequately defined the responsibilities of its advance agents, who
have been given broad discretion to determine what matters require
attention in making advance preparations and to decide what action
to take. Agent Lawson was not given written instructions concerning
the Dallas trip or advice about any peculiar problems which it might
involve; all instructions from higher authority were communicated to
him orally. He did not have a checklist of the tasks he was expected to
accomplish, either by his own efforts or with the cooperation of local
authorities.[C8-155] The only systematic supervision of the activities
of the advance agent has been that provided by a requirement that he
file interim and final reports on each advance assignment. The interim
report must be in the hands of the agent supervising the protective
group traveling with the President long enough before his departure to
apprise him of any particular problems encountered and the responsive
action taken.[C8-156] Agent Lawson’s interim report was received by
Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before departure on the Texas
trip.[C8-157]
The Secret Service has advised the Commission that no unusual
precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and that “the precautions
taken for the President’s trip were the usual safeguards employed
on trips of this kind in the United States during the previous
year.”[C8-158] Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the
advance preparations followed on this occasion were “pretty much the
same” as those followed in 1936 during a trip to Dallas by President
Roosevelt, which was Sorrels’ first important assignment in connection
with Presidential work.[C8-159]
In view of the constant change in the nature of threats to the
President and the diversity of the dangers which may arise in the
various cities within the United States, the Commission believes
that standard procedures in use for many years and applied in all
parts of the country may not be sufficient. There is, for example, no
Secret Service arrangement for evaluating before a trip particular
difficulties that might be anticipated, which would bring to bear the
judgment and experience of members of the White House detail other than
the advance agent. Constant reevaluation of procedures, with attention
to special problems and the development of instructions specific to
particular trips, would be a desirable innovation.
_Liaison with local law enforcement authorities._--In the description
of the important aspects of the advance preparations, there have
been references to the numerous discussions between Secret Service
representatives and the Dallas Police Department. The wholehearted
support of these local authorities was indispensable to the Service
in carrying out its duties. The Service had 28 agents participating
in the Dallas visit.[C8-160] Agent Lawson’s advance planning called
for the deployment of almost 600 members of the Dallas Police
Department, Fire Department, County Sheriff’s Department, and the
Texas Department of Public Safety.[C8-161] Despite this dependence on
local authorities, which would be substantially the same on a visit
by the President to any large city, the Secret Service did not at the
time of the assassination have any established procedure governing
its relationships with them.[C8-162] It had no prepared checklist of
matters to be covered with local police on such visits to metropolitan
areas and no written description of the role the local police were
expected to perform. Discussions with the Dallas authorities and
requests made of them were entirely informal.
The Commission believes that a more formal statement of assigned
responsibilities, supplemented in each case to reflect the peculiar
conditions of each Presidential trip, is essential. This would help to
eliminate varying interpretations of Secret Service instructions by
different local law enforcement representatives. For example, while the
Secret Service representatives in Dallas asked the police to station
guards at each overpass to keep “unauthorized personnel” off, this term
was not defined. At some overpasses all persons were excluded, while
on the overpass overlooking the assassination scene railroad and yard
terminal workmen were permitted to remain under police supervision,
as discussed in chapter III.[C8-163] Assistant Chief Batchelor of the
Dallas police noted the absence of any formal statement by the Secret
Service of specific work assigned to the police and suggested the
desirability of such a statement.[C8-164] Agent Lawson agreed that
such a procedure would assist him and other agents in fulfilling their
responsibilities as advance agents.[C8-165]
_Check of buildings along route of motorcade._--Agent Lawson did not
arrange for a prior inspection of buildings along the motorcade route,
either by police or by custodians of the buildings, since it was not
the usual practice of the Secret Service to do so.[C8-166] The Chief of
the Service has provided the Commission a detailed explanation of this
policy:
Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign
dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has
not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys
or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential
motorcade. For the inauguration and certain other parades in
Washington where the traditional route is known to the public
long in advance of the event, buildings along the route can be
checked by teams of law enforcement officers, and armed guards
are posted along the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town
trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few
days in advance, buildings are not checked either by Secret
Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the
request of the Secret Service. With the number of men available
to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of
hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical.
In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing
through the principal downtown section between tall buildings.
While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be
avoided and other choices made, it was not practical to select
a route where the President could not be seen from roofs or
windows of buildings. At the two places in Dallas where the
President would remain for a period of time, Love Field and
the Trade Mart, arrangements were made for building and roof
security by posting police officers where appropriate. Similar
arrangements for a motorcade of ten miles, including many
blocks of tall commercial buildings is not practical. Nor is it
practical to prevent people from entering such buildings, or
to limit access in every building to those employed or having
business there. Even if it were possible with a vastly larger
force of security officers to do so, many observers have felt
that such a procedure would not be consistent with the nature
and purpose of the motorcade to let the people see their
President and to welcome him to their city.
In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other
check was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law
enforcement agency at its request, of the Texas School Book
Depository Building or those employed there prior to the time
the President was shot.[C8-167]
This justification of the Secret Service’s standing policy is not
persuasive. The danger from a concealed sniper on the Dallas trip was
of concern to those who had considered the problem. President Kennedy
himself had mentioned it that morning,[C8-168] as had Agent Sorrels
when he and Agent Lawson were fixing the motorcade route.[C8-169]
Admittedly, protective measures cannot ordinarily be taken with regard
to all buildings along a motorcade route. Levels of risk can be
determined, however, as has been confirmed by building surveys made
since the assassination for the Department of the Treasury.[C8-170] An
attempt to cover only the most obvious points of possible ambush along
the route in Dallas might well have included the Texas School Book
Depository Building.
Instead of such advance precautions, the Secret Service depended in
part on the efforts of local law enforcement personnel stationed along
the route. In addition, Secret Service agents riding in the motorcade
were trained to scan buildings as part of their general observation
of the crowd of spectators.[C8-171] These substitute measures were of
limited value. Agent Lawson was unable to state whether he had actually
instructed the Dallas police to scan windows of buildings lining the
motorcade route, although it was his usual practice to do so.[C8-172]
If such instructions were in fact given, they were not effectively
carried out. Television films taken of parts of the motorcade by a
Dallas television station show the foot patrolmen facing the passing
motorcade, and not the adjacent crowds and buildings, as the procession
passed.[C8-173]
Three officers from the Dallas Police Department were assigned to the
intersection of Elm and Houston during the morning of November 22 prior
to the motorcade.[C8-174] All received their instructions early in the
morning from Capt. P. W. Lawrence of the traffic division.[C8-175]
According to Captain Lawrence:
I then told the officers that their primary duty was traffic
and crowd control and that they should be alert for any persons
who might attempt to throw anything and although it was not a
violation of the law to carry a placard, that they were not to
tolerate any actions such as the Stevenson incident and arrest
any person who might attempt to throw anything or try to get
at the President and his party; paying particular attention to
the crowd for any unusual activity. I stressed the fact that
this was our President and he should be shown every respect
due his position and that it was our duty to see that this was
done.[C8-176]
Captain Lawrence was not instructed to have his men watch buildings
along the motorcade route and did not mention the observation of
buildings to them.[C8-177] The three officers confirm that their
primary concern was crowd and traffic control, and that they had no
opportunity to scan the windows of the Depository or any other building
in the vicinity of Elm and Houston when the motorcade was passing.
They had, however, occasionally observed the windows of buildings in
the area before the motorcade arrived, in accordance with their own
understanding of their function.[C8-178]
As the motorcade approached Elm Street there were several Secret
Service agents in it who shared the responsibility of scanning the
windows of nearby buildings. Agent Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did
observe the Texas School Book Depository Building as he passed by, at
least for a sufficient number of seconds to gain a “general impression”
of the lack of any unusual activity.[C8-179] He was handicapped,
however, by the fact that he was riding in a closed car whose roof at
times obscured his view.[C8-180] Lawson, also in the lead car, did
not scan any buildings since an important part of his job was to look
backward at the Presidents car.[C8-181] Lawson stated that he “was
looking back a good deal of the time, watching his car, watching the
sides, watching the crowds, giving advice or asking advice from the
Chief and also looking ahead to the known hazards like overpasses,
underpasses, railroads, et cetera.”[C8-182] Agent Roy H. Kellerman,
riding in the front seat of the Presidential car, stated that he
scanned the Depository Building, but not sufficiently to be alerted
by anything in the windows or on the roof.[C8-183] The agents in the
followup car also were expected to scan adjacent buildings. However,
the Commission does not believe that agents stationed in a car behind
the Presidential car, who must concentrate primarily on the possibility
of threats from crowds along the route, provide a significant safeguard
against dangers in nearby buildings.
_Conduct of Secret Service agents in Fort Worth on November 22._--In
the early morning hours on November 22, 1963, in Fort Worth, there
occurred a breach of discipline by some members of the Secret Service
who were officially traveling with the President. After the President
had retired at his hotel, nine agents who were off duty went to the
nearby Fort Worth Press Club at midnight or slightly thereafter,
expecting to obtain food; they had had little opportunity to eat during
the day.[C8-184] No food was available at the Press Club. All of the
agents stayed for a drink of beer, or in several cases, a mixed drink.
According to their affidavits, the drinking in no case amounted to
more than three glasses of beer or 1½ mixed drinks, and others who
were present say that no agent was inebriated or acted improperly.
The statements of the agents involved are supported by statements of
members of the Fort Worth press who accompanied or observed them and by
a Secret Service investigation.[C8-185]
According to their statements, the agents remained at the Press Club
for periods varying from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, and the last
agent left the Press Club by 2 a.m.[C8-186] Two of the nine agents
returned to their rooms. The seven others proceeded to an establishment
called the Cellar Coffee House, described by some as a beatnik place
and by its manager as “a unique show place with continuous light
entertainment all night [serving] only coffee, fruit juices and no
hard liquors or beer.” [C8-187] There is no indication that any of the
agents who visited the Cellar Coffee House had any intoxicating drink
at that establishment.[C8-188] Most of the agents were there from about
1:30 or 1:45 a.m. to about 2:45 or 3 a.m.; one agent was there from 2
until 5 a.m.[C8-189]
The lobby of the hotel and the areas adjacent to the quarters of the
President were guarded during the night by members of the midnight to 8
a.m. shift of the White House detail. These agents were each relieved
for a half hour break during the night.[C8-190] Three members of this
shift separately took this opportunity to visit the Cellar Coffee
House.[C8-191] Only one stayed as long as a half hour, and none had any
beverage there.[C8-192] Chief Rowley testified that agents on duty in
such a situation usually stay within the building during their relief,
but that their visits to the Cellar were “neither consistent nor
inconsistent” with their duty.[C8-193]
Each of the agents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee
House (apart from the three members of the midnight shift) had duty
assignments beginning no later than 8 a.m. that morning. President
Kennedy was scheduled to speak across the street from his hotel in Fort
Worth at 8:30 a.m.,[C8-194] and then at a breakfast, after which the
entourage would proceed to Dallas. In Dallas, one of the nine agents
was assigned to assist in security measures at Love Field, and four had
protective assignments at the Trade Mart. The remaining four had key
responsibilities as members of the complement of the followup car in
the motorcade. Three of these agents occupied positions on the running
boards of the car, and the fourth was seated in the car.[C8-195]
The supervisor of each of the off-duty agents who visited the Press
Club or the Cellar Coffee House advised, in the course of the Secret
Service investigation of these events, that each agent reported
for duty on time, with full possession of his mental and physical
capabilities and entirely ready for the performance of his assigned
duties.[C8-196] Chief Rowley testified that, as a result of the
investigation he ordered, he was satisfied that each of the agents
performed his duties in an entirely satisfactory manner, and that their
conduct the night before did not impede their actions on duty or in
the slightest way prevent them from taking any action that might have
averted the tragedy.[C8-197] However, Chief Rowley did not condone
the action of the off-duty agents, particularly since it violated a
regulation of the Secret Service, which provides:
_Liquor, use of._--a. Employees are strictly enjoined to
refrain from the use of intoxicating liquor during the hours
they are officially employed at their post of duty, or when
they may reasonably expect that they may be called upon to
perform an official duty. During entire periods of travel
status, the special agent is officially employed and should not
use liquor, until the completion of all of his official duties
for the day, after which time a very moderate use of liquor
will not be considered a violation. However, all members of the
White House Detail and special agents cooperating with them on
Presidential and similar protective assignments are considered
to be subject to call for official duty at any time while in
travel status. Therefore, the use of intoxicating liquor of any
kind, including beer and wine, by members of the White House
Detail and special agents cooperating with them, or by special
agents on similar assignments, while they are in a travel
status, is prohibited.[C8-198]
The regulations provide further that “violation or slight disregard” of
these provisions “will be cause for removal from the Service.”[C8-199]
Chief Rowley testified that under ordinary circumstances he would
have taken disciplinary action against those agents who had been
drinking in clear violation of the regulation. However, he felt that
any disciplinary action might have given rise to an inference that
the violation of the regulation had contributed to the tragic events
of November 22. Since he was convinced that this was not the case, he
believed that it would be unfair to the agents and their families to
take explicit disciplinary measures. He felt that each agent recognized
the seriousness of the infraction and that there was no danger of a
repetition.[C8-200]
The Commission recognizes that the responsibilities of members of the
White House detail of the Secret Service are arduous. They work long,
hard hours, under very great strain, and must travel frequently. It
might seem harsh to circumscribe their opportunities for relaxation.
Yet their role of protecting the President is so important to the
well-being of the country that it is reasonable to expect them to
meet very high standards of personal conduct, so that nothing can
interfere with their bringing to their task the finest qualities and
maximum resources of mind and body. This is the salutary goal to which
the Secret Service regulation is directed, when it absolutely forbids
drinking by any agent accompanying the President on a trip. Nor is
this goal served when agents remain out until early morning hours,
and lose the opportunity to get a reasonable amount of sleep. It is
conceivable that those men who had little sleep, and who had consumed
alcoholic beverages, even in limited quantities, might have been more
alert in the Dallas motorcade if they had retired promptly in Fort
Worth. However, there is no evidence that these men failed to take
any action in Dallas within their power that would have averted the
tragedy. As will be seen, the instantaneous and heroic response to
the assassination of some of the agents concerned was in the finest
tradition of Government service.
_The motorcade in Dallas._--Rigorous security precautions had been
arranged at Love Field with the local law enforcement authorities by
Agents Sorrels and Lawson. These precautions included reserving a
ceremonial area for the Presidential party, stationing police on the
rooftops of all buildings overlooking the reception area, and detailing
police in civilian clothes to be scattered throughout the sizable
crowd.[C8-201] When President and Mrs. Kennedy shook hands with members
of the public along the fences surrounding the reception area, they
were closely guarded by Secret Service agents who responded to the
unplanned event with dispatch.[C8-202]
As described in chapter II, the President directed that his car stop
on two occasions during the motorcade so that he could greet members
of the public.[C8-203] At these stops, agents from the Presidential
follow-up car stood between the President and the public, and on one
occasion Agent Kellerman left the front seat of the President’s car to
take a similar position. The Commission regards such impromptu stops
as presenting an unnecessary danger, but finds that the Secret Service
agents did all that could have been done to take protective measures.
_The Presidential limousine._--The limousine used by President Kennedy
in Dallas was a convertible with a detachable, rigid plastic “bubble”
top which was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant.[C8-204] The
last Presidential vehicle with any protection against small-arms
fire left the White House in 1953. It was not then replaced because
the state of the art did not permit the development of a bulletproof
top of sufficiently light weight to permit its removal on those
occasions when the President wished to ride in an open car. The
Secret Service believed that it was very doubtful that any President
would ride regularly in a vehicle with a fixed top, even though
transparent.[C8-205] Since the assassination, the Secret Service, with
the assistance of other Federal agencies and of private industry, has
developed a vehicle for the better protection of the President.[C8-206]
_Access to passenger compartment of Presidential car._--On occasion
the Secret Service has been permitted to have an agent riding in the
passenger compartment with the President. Presidents have made it
clear, however, that they did not favor this or any other arrangement
which interferes with the privacy of the President and his guests.
The Secret Service has therefore suggested this practice only on
extraordinary occasions.[C8-207] Without attempting to prescribe or
recommend specific measures which should be employed for the future
protection of Presidents, the Commission does believe that there are
aspects of the protective measures employed in the motorcade at Dallas
which deserve special comment.
The Presidential vehicle in use in Dallas, described in chapter II, had
no special design or equipment which would have permitted the Secret
Service agent riding in the driver’s compartment to move into the
passenger section without hindrance or delay. Had the vehicle been so
designed it is possible that an agent riding in the front seat could
have reached the President in time to protect him from the second and
fatal shot to hit the President. However, such access to the President
was interfered with both by the metal bar some 15 inches above the back
of the front seat and by the passengers in the jump seats. In contrast,
the Vice Presidential vehicle, although not specially designed for that
purpose, had no passenger in a jump seat between Agent Youngblood and
Vice President Johnson to interfere with Agent Youngblood’s ability
to take a protective position in the passenger compartment before the
third shot was fired.[C8-208]
The assassination suggests that it would have been of prime importance
in the protection of the President if the Presidential car permitted
immediate access to the President by a Secret Service agent at the
first sign of danger. At that time the agents on the running boards of
the followup car were expected to perform such a function. However,
these agents could not reach the President’s car when it was traveling
at an appreciable rate of speed. Even if the car is traveling more
slowly, the delay involved in reaching the President may be crucial. It
is clear that at the time of the shots in Dallas, Agent Clinton J. Hill
leaped to the President’s rescue as quickly as humanly possible. Even
so, analysis of the motion picture films taken by amateur photographer
Zapruder reveals that Hill first placed his hand on the Presidential
car at frame 343, 30 frames and therefore approximately 1.6 seconds
after the President was shot in the head.[C8-209] About 3.7 seconds
after the President received this wound, Hill had both feet on the car
and was climbing aboard to assist President and Mrs. Kennedy.[C8-210]
_Planning for motorcade contingencies._--In response to inquiry by
the Commission regarding the instructions to agents in a motorcade of
emergency procedures to be taken in a contingency such as that which
actually occurred, the Secret Service responded:
The Secret Service has consistently followed two general
principles in emergencies involving the President. All agents
are so instructed. The first duty of the agents in the
motorcade is to attempt to cover the President as closely
as possible and practicable and to shield him by attempting
to place themselves between the President and any source of
danger. Secondly, agents are instructed to remove the President
as quickly as possible from known or impending danger.
Agents are instructed that it is not their responsibility to
investigate or evaluate a present danger, but to consider any
untoward circumstances as serious and to afford the President
maximum protection at all times. No responsibility rests
upon those agents near the President for the identification
or arrest of any assassin or an attacker. Their primary
responsibility is to stay with and protect the President.
Beyond these two principles the Secret Service believes a
detailed contingency or emergency plan is not feasible because
the variations possible preclude effective planning. A number
of steps are taken, however, to permit appropriate steps to
be taken in an emergency. For instance, the lead car always
is manned by Secret Service agents familiar with the area and
with local law enforcement officials; the radio net in use in
motorcades is elaborate and permits a number of different means
of communication with various local points. A doctor is in the
motorcade.[C8-211]
This basic approach to the problem of planning for emergencies is
sound. Any effort to prepare detailed contingency plans might well have
the undesirable effect of inhibiting quick and imaginative responses.
If the advance preparation is thorough, and the protective devices
and techniques employed are sound, those in command should be able to
direct the response appropriate to the emergency.
The Commission finds that the Secret Service agents in the motorcade
who were immediately responsible for the President’s safety reacted
promptly at the time the shots were fired. Their actions demonstrate
that the President and the Nation can expect courage and devotion to
duty from the agents of the Secret Service.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commission’s review of the provisions for Presidential protection
at the time of President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas demonstrates the
need for substantial improvements. Since the assassination, the Secret
Service and the Department of the Treasury have properly taken the
initiative in reexamining major aspects of Presidential protection.
Many changes have already been made and others are contemplated,
some of them in response to the Commission’s questions and informal
suggestions.
Assassination a Federal Crime
There was no Federal criminal jurisdiction over the assassination
of President Kennedy. Had there been reason to believe that the
assassination was the result of a conspiracy, Federal jurisdiction
could have been asserted; it has long been a Federal crime to conspire
to injure any Federal officer, on account of, or while he is engaged
in, the lawful discharge of the duties of his office.[C8-212] Murder
of the President has never been covered by Federal law, however, so
that once it became reasonably clear that the killing was the act of a
single person, the State of Texas had exclusive jurisdiction.
It is anomalous that Congress has legislated in other ways touching
upon the safety of the Chief Executive or other Federal officers,
without making an attack on the President a crime. Threatening harm
to the President is a Federal offense,[C8-213] as is advocacy of
the overthrow of the Government by the assassination of any of its
officers.[C8-214] The murder of Federal judges, U.S. attorneys and
marshals, and a number of other specifically designated Federal law
enforcement officers is a Federal crime.[C8-215] Equally anomalous are
statutory provisions which specifically authorize the Secret Service
to protect the President, without authorizing it to arrest anyone who
harms him. The same provisions authorize the Service to arrest without
warrant persons committing certain offenses, including counterfeiting
and certain frauds involving Federal checks or securities.[C8-216] The
Commission agrees with the Secret Service[C8-217] that it should be
authorized to make arrests without warrant for all offenses within its
jurisdiction, as are FBI agents and Federal marshals.[C8-218]
There have been a number of efforts to make assassination a
Federal crime, particularly after the assassination of President
McKinley and the attempt on the life of President-elect Franklin D.
Roosevelt.[C8-219] In 1902 bills passed both Houses of Congress but
failed of enactment when the Senate refused to accept the conference
report.[C8-220] A number of bills were introduced immediately following
the assassination of President Kennedy.[C8-221]
The Commission recommends to the Congress that it adopt legislation
which would:
Punish the murder or manslaughter of, attempt or conspiracy to
murder, kidnaping of and assault upon
the President, Vice President, or other officer next in
the order of succession to the Office of President, the
President-elect and the Vice-President-elect,
whether or not the act is committed while the victim is in
the performance of his official duties or on account of such
performance.
Such a statute would cover the President and Vice President or,
in the absence of a Vice President, the person next in order of
succession. During the period between election and inauguration,
the President-elect and Vice-President-elect would also be covered.
Restricting the coverage in this way would avoid unnecessary
controversy over the inclusion or exclusion of other officials who are
in the order of succession or who hold important governmental posts.
In addition, the restriction would probably eliminate a need for the
requirement which has been urged as necessary for the exercise of
Federal power, that the hostile act occur while the victim is engaged
in or because of the performance of official duties.[C8-222] The
governmental consequences of assassination of one of the specified
officials give the United States ample power to act for its own
protection.[C8-223] The activities of the victim at the time an
assassination occurs and the motive for the assassination bear no
relationship to the injury to the United States which follows from the
act. This point was ably made in the 1902 debate by Senator George F.
Hoar, the sponsor of the Senate bill:
* * * what this bill means to punish is the crime of
interruption of the Government of the United States and the
destruction of its security by striking down the life of the
person who is actually in the exercise of the executive power,
or of such persons as have been constitutionally and lawfully
provided to succeed thereto in case of a vacancy. It is
important to this country that the interruption shall not take
place for an hour * * *[C8-224]
Enactment of this statute would mean that the investigation of any of
the acts covered and of the possibility of a further attempt would be
conducted by Federal law enforcement officials, in particular, the
FBI with the assistance of the Secret Service.[C8-225] At present,
Federal agencies participate only upon the sufferance of the local
authorities. While the police work of the Dallas authorities in the
early identification and apprehension of Oswald was both efficient
and prompt, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who strongly supports such
legislation, testified that the absence of clear Federal jurisdiction
over the assassination of President Kennedy led to embarrassment
and confusion in the subsequent investigation by Federal and local
authorities.[C8-226] In addition, the proposed legislation will insure
that any suspects who are arrested will be Federal prisoners, subject
to Federal protection from vigilante justice and other threats.[C8-227]
Committee of Cabinet Officers
As our Government has become more complex, agencies other than the
Secret Service have become involved in phases of the overall problem
of protecting our national leaders. The FBI is the major domestic
investigating agency of the United States, while the CIA has the
primary responsibility for collecting intelligence overseas to
supplement information acquired by the Department of State. The Secret
Service must rely in large part upon the investigating capacity and
experience of these and other agencies for much of its information
regarding possible dangers to the President. The Commission believes
that it is necessary to improve the cooperation among these agencies
and to emphasize that the task of Presidential protection is one of
broad national concern.
The Commission suggests that consideration might be given to assigning
to a Cabinet-level committee or the National Security Council (which
is responsible for advising the President respecting the coordination
of departmental policies relating to the national security)[C8-228]
the responsibility to review and oversee the protective activities
of the Secret Service and the other Federal agencies that assist in
safeguarding the President. The Committee should include the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Attorney General, and, if the Council is used,
arrangements should be made for the attendance of the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General at any meetings which are concerned
with Presidential protection.[C8-229] The Council already includes, in
addition to the President and Vice President, the Secretaries of State
and Defense and has a competent staff.
The foremost assignment of the Committee would be to insure that the
maximum resources of the Federal Government are fully engaged in the
job of protecting the President, by defining responsibilities clearly
and overseeing their execution. Major needs of personnel or other
resources might be met more easily on its recommendation than they have
been in the past.
The Committee would be able to provide guidance in defining the general
nature of domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential security. As
improvements are recommended for the advance detection of potential
threats to the President, it could act as a final review board. The
expert assistance and resources which it could draw upon would be
particularly desirable in this complex and sensitive area.
This arrangement would provide a continuing high-level contact for
agencies that may wish to consult respecting particular protective
measures. For various reasons the Secret Service has functioned largely
as an informal part of the White House staff, with the result that
it has been unable, as a practical matter, to exercise sufficient
influence over the security precautions which surround Presidential
activities. A Cabinet-level committee which is actively concerned with
these problems would be able to discuss these matters more effectively
with the President.
Responsibilities for Presidential Protection
The assignment of the responsibility of protecting the President to
an agency of the Department of the Treasury was largely an historical
accident.[C8-230] The Secret Service was organized as a division of the
Department of the Treasury in 1865, to deal with counterfeiting. In
1894, while investigating a plot to assassinate President Cleveland,
the Service assigned a small protective detail of agents to the White
House. Secret Service men accompanied the President and his family to
their vacation home in Massachusetts and special details protected him
in Washington, on trips, and at special functions. These informal and
part-time arrangements led to more systematic protection in 1902, after
the assassination of President McKinley; the Secret Service, then the
only Federal investigative agency, assumed full-time responsibility
for the safety of the President. Since that time, the Secret Service
has had and exercised responsibility for the physical protection of
the President and also for the preventive investigation of potential
threats against the President.
Although the Secret Service has had the primary responsibility for
the protection of the President, the FBI, which was established
within the Department of Justice in 1908, has had in recent years an
increasingly important role to play. In the appropriations of the
FBI there has recurred annually an item for the “protection of the
person of the President of the United States,” which first appeared
in the appropriation of the Department of Justice in 1910 under the
heading “Miscellaneous Objects.”[C8-231] Although the FBI is not
charged with the physical protection of the President, it does have an
assignment, as do other Government agencies, in the field of preventive
investigation in regard to the President’s security. As discussed
above, the Bureau has attempted to meet its responsibilities in this
field by spelling out in its Handbook the procedures which its agents
are to follow in connection with information received “indicating
the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the
President” or other protected persons.
With two Federal agencies operating in the same general field of
preventive investigation, questions inevitably arise as to the scope
of each agency’s authority and responsibility. As the testimony of
J. Edgar Hoover and other Bureau officials revealed, the FBI did not
believe that its directive required the Bureau to notify the Secret
Service of the substantial information about Lee Harvey Oswald which
the FBI had accumulated before the President reached Dallas. On the
other hand, the Secret Service had no knowledge whatever of Oswald,
his background, or his employment at the Book Depository, and Robert
I. Bouck, who was in charge of the Protective Research Section of the
Secret Service, believed that the accumulation of the facts known to
the FBI should have constituted a sufficient basis to warn the Secret
Service of the Oswald risk.
The Commission believes that both the FBI and the Secret Service
have too narrowly construed their respective responsibilities. The
Commission has the impression that too much emphasis is placed by
both on the investigation of specific threats by individuals and not
enough on dangers from other sources. In addition, the Commission has
concluded that the Secret Service particularly tends to be the passive
recipient of information regarding such threats and that its Protective
Research Section is not adequately staffed or equipped to conduct the
wider investigative work that is required today for the security of the
President.
During the period the Commission was giving thought to this situation,
the Commission received a number of proposals designed to improve
current arrangements for protecting the President. These proposals
included suggestions to locate exclusive responsibility for all phases
of the work in one or another Government agency, to clarify the
division of authority between the agencies involved, and to retain the
existing system but expand both the scope and the operations of the
existing agencies, particularly those of the Secret Service and the FBI.
It has been pointed out that the FBI, as our chief investigative
agency, is properly manned and equipped to carry on extensive
information gathering functions within the United States. It was also
suggested that it would take a substantial period of time for the
Secret Service to build up the experience and skills necessary to meet
the problem. Consequently the suggestion has been made, on the one
hand, that all preventive investigative functions relating to the
security of the President should be transferred to the FBI, leaving
with the Secret Service only the responsibility for the physical
protection of the President, that is, the guarding function alone.
On the other hand, it is urged that all features of the protection
of the President and his family should be committed to an elite and
independent corps. It is also contended that the agents should be
intimately associated with the life of the Presidential family in
all its ramifications and alert to every danger that might befall
it, and ready at any instant to hazard great danger to themselves in
the performance of their tremendous responsibility. It is suggested
that an organization shorn of its power to investigate all the
possibilities of danger to the President and becoming merely the
recipient of information gathered by others would become limited solely
to acts of physical alertness and personal courage incident to its
responsibilities. So circumscribed, it could not maintain the esprit
de corps or the necessary alertness for this unique and challenging
responsibility.
While in accordance with its mandate this Commission has necessarily
examined into the functioning of the various Federal agencies concerned
with the tragic trip of President Kennedy to Dallas and while it
has arrived at certain conclusions in respect thereto, it seems
clear that it was not within the Commission’s responsibility to make
specific recommendations as to the long-range organization of the
President’s protection, except as conclusions flowing directly from
its examination of the President’s assassination can be drawn. The
Commission was not asked to apply itself as did the Hoover Commission
in 1949, for example, to a determination of the optimum organization
of the President’s protection. It would have been necessary for the
Commission to take considerable testimony, much of it extraneous to
the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy, to put it in a
position to reach final conclusions in this respect. There are always
dangers of divided responsibility, duplication, and confusion of
authority where more than one agency is operating in the same field;
but on the other hand the protection of the President is in a real
sense a Government-wide responsibility which must necessarily be
assumed by the Department of State, the FBI, the CIA, and the military
intelligence agencies as well as the Secret Service. Moreover, a number
of imponderable questions have to be weighed if any change in the
intimate association now established between the Secret Service and the
President and his family is contemplated.
These considerations have induced the Commission to believe that
the determination of whether or not there should be a relocation of
responsibilities and functions should be left to the Executive and the
Congress, perhaps upon recommendations based on further studies by the
Cabinet-level committee recommended above or the National Security
Council.
Pending any such determination, however, this Commission is convinced
of the necessity of better coordination and direction of the
activities of all existing agencies of Government which are in a
position to, and do, furnish information and services related to the
security of the President. The Commission feels the Secret Service and
the FBI, as well as the State Department and the CIA when the President
travels abroad, could improve their existing capacities and procedures
so as to lessen the chances of assassination. Without, therefore,
coming to final conclusions respecting the long-range organization
of the President’s security, the Commission believes that the facts
of the assassination of President Kennedy point to certain measures
which, while assuming no radical relocation of responsibilities, can
and should be recommended by this Commission in the interest of the
more efficient protection of the President. These recommendations are
reviewed below.
General Supervision of the Secret Service
The intimacy of the Secret Service’s relationship to the White House
and the dissimilarity of its protective functions to most activities of
the Department of the Treasury have made it difficult for the Treasury
to maintain close and continuing supervision. The Commission believes
that the recommended Cabinet-level committee will help to correct many
of the major deficiencies of supervision disclosed by the Commission’s
investigation. Other measures should be taken as well to improve the
overall operation of the Secret Service.
Daily supervision of the operations of the Secret Service within the
Department of the Treasury should be improved. The Chief of the Service
now reports to the Secretary of the Treasury through an Assistant
Secretary whose duties also include the direct supervision of the
Bureau of the Mint and the Department’s Employment Policy Program, and
who also represents the Secretary of the Treasury on various committees
and groups.[C8-232] The incumbent has no technical qualifications in
the area of Presidential protection.[C8-233] The Commission recommends
that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special assistant
with the responsibility of supervising the Service. This special
assistant should be required to have sufficient stature and experience
in law enforcement, intelligence, or allied fields to be able to
provide effective continuing supervision, and to keep the Secretary
fully informed regarding all significant developments relating to
Presidential protection.
This report has already pointed out several respects in which the
Commission believes that the Secret Service has operated with
insufficient planning or control. Actions by the Service since the
assassination indicate its awareness of the necessity for substantial
improvement in its administration. A formal and thorough description of
the responsibilities of the advance agent is now in preparation by the
Service.[C8-234] Work is going forward toward the preparation of formal
understandings of the respective roles of the Secret Service and other
agencies with which it collaborates or from which it derives assistance
and support. The Commission urges that the Service continue this effort
to overhaul and define its procedures. While manuals and memoranda
are no guarantee of effective operations, no sizable organization
can achieve efficiency without the careful analysis and demarcation
of responsibility that is reflected in definite and comprehensive
operating procedures.
The Commission also recommends that the Secret Service consciously set
about the task of inculcating and maintaining the highest standard of
excellence and esprit for all of its personnel. This involves tight and
unswerving discipline as well as the promotion of an outstanding degree
of dedication and loyalty to duty. The Commission emphasizes that it
finds no causal connection between the assassination and the breach of
regulations which occurred on the night of November 21 at Fort Worth.
Nevertheless, such a breach, in which so many agents participated, is
not consistent with the standards which the responsibilities of the
Secret Service require it to meet.
Preventive Intelligence
In attempting to identify those individuals who might prove a danger
to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the passive
recipient of threatening communications to the President and reports
from other agencies which independently evaluate their information for
potential sources of danger. This was the consequence of the Service’s
lack of an adequate investigative staff, its inability to process large
amounts of data, and its failure to provide specific descriptions of
the kind of information it sought.[C8-235]
The Secret Service has embarked upon a complete overhaul of its
research activities.[C8-236] The staff of the Protective Research
Section (PRS) has been augmented, and a Secret Service inspector has
been put in charge of this operation. With the assistance of the
President’s Office of Science and Technology, and of the Advanced
Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, it has
obtained the services of outside consultants, such as the Rand Corp.,
International Business Machines Corp., and a panel of psychiatric
and psychological experts. It has received assistance also from data
processing experts at the CIA and from a specialist in psychiatric
prognostication at Walter Reed Hospital.[C8-237] As a result of
these studies, the planning document submitted by the Secretary of
the Treasury to the Bureau of the Budget on August 31, 1964, makes
several significant recommendations in this field.[C8-238] Based
on the Commission’s investigation, the following minimum goals for
improvements are indicated:
_Broader and more selective criteria._--Since the assassination, both
the Secret Service and the FBI have recognized that the PRS files can
no longer be limited largely to persons communicating actual threats
to the President. On December 26, 1963, the FBI circulated additional
instructions to all its agents, specifying criteria for information to
be furnished to the Secret Service in addition to that covered by the
former standard, which was the possibility of an attempt against the
person or safety of the President. The new instructions require FBI
agents to report immediately information concerning:
Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists (a)
possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b)
who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or
employees of Federal, state or local government or officials
of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed
strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been
involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct
indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts
or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against
organized government.[C8-239]
Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI, testified that
this revision was initiated by the FBI itself.[C8-240] The volume of
references to the Secret Service has increased substantially since the
new instructions went into effect; more than 5,000 names were referred
to the Secret Service in the first 4 months of 1964.[C8-241] According
to Chief Rowley, by mid-June 1964, the Secret Service had received from
the FBI some 9,000 reports on members of the Communist Party.[C8-242]
The FBI now transmits information on all defectors,[C8-243] a category
which would, of course, have included Oswald.
Both Director Hoover and Belmont expressed to the Commission the
great concern of the FBI, which is shared by the Secret Service,
that referrals to the Secret Service under the new criteria might,
if not properly handled, result in some degree of interference with
the personal liberty of those involved.[C8-244] They emphasized the
necessity that the information now being furnished be handled with
judgment and care. The Commission shares this concern. The problem is
aggravated by the necessity that the Service obtain the assistance of
local law enforcement officials in evaluating the information which it
receives and in taking preventive steps.
In June 1964, the Secret Service sent to a number of Federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies guidelines for an experimental
program to develop more detailed criteria.[C8-245] The suggestions of
Federal agencies for revision of these guidelines were solicited. The
new tentative criteria are useful in making clear that the interest of
the Secret Service goes beyond information on individuals or groups
threatening to cause harm or embarrassment to the President.[C8-246]
Information is requested also concerning individuals or groups who have
demonstrated an interest in the President or “other high government
officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or
implied determination to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to
satisfy any grievance, real or imagined.”[C8-247] Under these criteria,
whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service depends on
the existence of a previous history of mental instability, propensity
toward violent action, or some similar characteristic, coupled with
some evaluation of the capability of the individual or group to further
the intention to satisfy a grievance by unlawful means.[C8-248]
While these tentative criteria are a step in the right direction, they
seem unduly restrictive in continuing to require some manifestation of
animus against a Government official. It is questionable whether such
criteria would have resulted in the referral of Oswald to the Secret
Service. Chief Rowley believed that they would, because of Oswald’s
demonstrated hostility toward the Secretary of the Navy in his letter
of January 30, 1962.[C8-249]
I shall employ all means to right this gross mistake or
injustice to a boni-fied U.S. citizen and ex-service man. The
U.S. government has no charges or complaints against me. I ask
you to look into this case and take the necessary steps to
repair the damage done to me and my family.[C8-250]
Even with the advantage of hindsight, this letter does not appear to
express or imply Oswald’s “determination to use a means, other than
legal or peaceful, to satisfy [his] grievance” within the meaning of
the new criteria.[C8-251]
It is apparent that a good deal of further consideration and
experimentation will be required before adequate criteria can be
framed. The Commission recognizes that no set of meaningful criteria
will yield the names of all potential assassins. Charles J. Guiteau,
Leon F. Czolgosz, John Schrank, and Guiseppe Zangara--four assassins
or would-be assassins--were all men who acted alone in their criminal
acts against our leaders.[C8-252] None had a serious record of prior
violence. Each of them was a failure in his work and in his relations
with others, a victim of delusions and fancies which led to the
conviction that society and its leaders had combined to thwart him. It
will require every available resource of our Government to devise a
practical system which has any reasonable possibility of revealing such
malcontents.
_Liaison with other agencies regarding intelligence._--The Secret
Service’s liaison with the agencies that supply information to it has
been too casual. Since the assassination, the Service has recognized
that these relationships must be far more formal, and each agency
given clear understanding of the assistance which the Secret Service
expects.[C8-253]
Once the Secret Service has formulated its new standards for collection
of information, it should enter into written agreements with each
Federal agency and the leading State and local agencies that might
be a source of such information. Such agreements should describe in
detail the information which is sought, the manner in which it will be
provided to the Secret Service, and the respective responsibilities for
any further investigation that may be required.
This is especially necessary with regard to the FBI and CIA, which
carry the major responsibility for supplying information about
potential threats, particularly those arising from organized groups,
within their special jurisdiction. Since these agencies are already
obliged constantly to evaluate the activities of such groups, they
should be responsible for advising the Secret Service if information
develops indicating the existence of an assassination plot and for
reporting such events as a change in leadership or dogma which indicate
that the group may present a danger to the President. Detailed formal
agreements embodying these arrangements should be worked out between
the Secret Service and both of these agencies.
It should be made clear that the Secret Service will in no way seek
to duplicate the intelligence and investigative capabilities of the
agencies now operating in this field but will continue to use the
data developed by these agencies to carry out its special duties.
Once experience has been gained in implementing such agreements with
the Federal and leading State and local agencies, the Secret Service,
through its field offices, should negotiate similar arrangements with
such other State and local law enforcement agencies as may provide
meaningful assistance. Much useful information will come to the
attention of local law enforcement agencies in the regular course of
their activities, and this source should not be neglected by undue
concentration on relationships with other Federal agencies. Finally,
these agreements with Federal and local authorities will be of little
value unless a system is established for the frequent formal review of
activities thereunder.
In this regard the Commission notes with approval several recent
measures taken and proposed by the Secret Service to improve its
liaison arrangements. In his testimony Secretary of the Treasury C.
Douglas Dillon informed the Commission that an interagency committee
has been established to develop more effective criteria. According to
Secretary Dillon, the Committee will include representatives of the
President’s Office of Science and Technology, Department of Defense,
CIA, FBI, and the Secret Service.[C8-254] In addition, the Department
of the Treasury has requested five additional agents for its Protective
Research Section to serve as liaison officers with law enforcement and
intelligence agencies.[C8-255] On the basis of the Department’s review
during the past several months, Secretary Dillon testified that the
use of such liaison officers is the only effective way to insure that
adequate liaison is maintained.[C8-256] As a beginning step to improve
liaison with local law enforcement officials, the Secret Service on
August 26, 1964, directed its field representatives to send a form
request for intelligence information to all local, county, and State
law enforcement agencies in their districts.[C8-257] Each of these
efforts appears sound, and the Commission recommends that these and the
other measures suggested by the Commission be pursued vigorously by the
Secret Service.
_Automatic data processing._--Unless the Secret Service is able to
deal rapidly and accurately with a growing body of data, the increased
information supplied by other agencies will be wasted. PRS must develop
the capacity to classify its subjects on a more sophisticated basis
than the present geographic breakdown. Its present manual filing system
is obsolete; it makes no use of the recent developments in automatic
data processing which are widely used in the business world and in
other Government offices.
The Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury now recognize
this critical need. In the planning document currently under review
by the Bureau of the Budget, the Department recommends that it be
permitted to hire five qualified persons “to plan and develop a
workable and efficient automated file and retrieval system.”[C8-258]
Also the Department requests the sum of $100,000 to conduct a detailed
feasibility study; this money would be used to compensate consultants,
to lease standard equipment or to purchase specially designed pilot
equipment.[C8-259] On the basis of such a feasibility study, the
Department hopes to design a practical system which will fully meet the
needs of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service.
The Commission recommends that prompt and favorable consideration be
given to this request. The Commission further recommends that the
Secret Service coordinate its planning as closely as possible with all
of the Federal agencies from which it receives information. The Secret
Service should not and does not plan to develop its own intelligence
gathering facilities to duplicate the existing facilities of other
Federal agencies. In planning its data processing techniques, the
Secret Service should attempt to develop a system compatible with those
of the agencies from which most of its data will come.[E]
[E] In evaluating data processing techniques of the Secret
Service, the Commission had occasion to become informed, to
a limited extent, about the data processing techniques of
other Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
The Commission was struck by the apparent lack of effort,
on an interagency basis, to develop coordinated and
mutually compatible systems, even where such coordination
would not seem inconsistent with the particular purposes of
the agency involved. The Commission recognizes that this is
a controversial area and that many strongly held views are
advanced in resistance to any suggestion that an effort be
made to impose any degree of coordination. This matter is
obviously beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, but it
seems to warrant further study before each agency becomes
irrevocably committed to separate action. The Commission,
therefore, recommends that the President consider ordering
an inquiry into the possibility that coordination might
be achieved to a greater extent than seems now to be
contemplated, without interference with the primary mission
of each agency involved.
_Protective Research participation in advance arrangements._--Since
the assassination, Secret Service procedures have been changed to
require that a member of PRS accompany each advance survey team to
establish liaison with local intelligence gathering agencies and to
provide for the immediate evaluation of information received from
them.[C8-260] This PRS agent will also be responsible for establishing
an informal local liaison committee to make certain that all protective
intelligence activities are coordinated. Based on its experience
during this period, the Secret Service now recommends that additional
personnel be made available to PRS so that these arrangements can
be made permanent without adversely affecting the operations of the
Service’s field offices.[C8-261] The Commission regards this as a most
useful innovation and urges that the practice be continued.
Liaison With Local Law Enforcement Agencies
Advice by the Secret Service to local police in metropolitan areas
relating to the assistance expected in connection with a Presidential
visit has hitherto been handled on an informal basis.[C8-262]
The Service should consider preparing formal explanations of the
cooperation anticipated during a Presidential visit to a city, in
formats that can be communicated to each level of local authorities.
Thus, the local chief of police could be given a master plan, prepared
for the occasion, of all protective measures to be taken during the
visit; each patrolman might be given a prepared booklet of instructions
explaining what is expected of him.
The Secret Service has expressed concern that written instructions
might come into the hands of local newspapers, to the prejudice of
the precautions described.[C8-263] However, the instructions must be
communicated to the local police in any event and can be leaked to
the press whether or not they are in writing. More importantly, the
lack of carefully prepared and carefully transmitted instructions
for typical visits to cities can lead to lapses in protection, such
as the confusion in Dallas about whether members of the public were
permitted on overpasses.[C8-264] Such instructions will not fit
all circumstances, of course, and should not be relied upon to the
detriment of the imaginative application of judgment in special cases.
Inspection of Buildings
Since the assassination of President Kennedy, the Secret Service has
been experimenting with new techniques in the inspection of buildings
along a motorcade route.[C8-265] According to Secretary Dillon, the
studies indicate that there is some utility in attempting to designate
certain buildings as involving a higher risk than others.[C8-266] The
Commission strongly encourages these efforts to improve protection
along a motorcade route. The Secret Service should utilize the
personnel of other Federal law enforcement offices in the locality to
assure adequate manpower for this task, as it is now doing.[C8-267]
Lack of adequate resources is an unacceptable excuse for failing to
improve advance precautions in this crucial area of Presidential
protection.
Secret Service Personnel and Facilities
Testimony and other evidence before the Commission suggest that the
Secret Service is trying to accomplish its job with too few people
and without adequate modern equipment. Although Chief Rowley does not
complain about the pay scale for Secret Service agents, salaries are
below those of the FBI and leading municipal police forces.[C8-268] The
assistant to the Director of the FBI testified that the caseload of
each FBI agent averaged 20-25, and he felt that this was high.[C8-269]
Chief Rowley testified that the present workload of each Secret Service
agent averages 110.1 cases.[C8-270] While these statistics relate to
the activities of Secret Service agents stationed in field offices
and not the White House detail, field agents supplement those on the
detail, particularly when the President is traveling. Although the
Commission does not know whether the cases involved are entirely
comparable, these figures suggest that the agents of the Secret Service
are substantially overworked.