Investigation of Possible Conspiracy
This chapter sets forth the findings of the Commission as to whether
Lee Harvey Oswald had any accomplices in the planning or execution of
the assassination. Particularly after the slaying of Oswald by Jack
Ruby under the circumstances described in the preceding chapter, rumors
and suspicions developed regarding the existence of a conspiracy to
assassinate President Kennedy. As discussed in appendix XII, many of
these rumors were based on a lack of information as to the nature and
extent of evidence that Oswald alone fired the shots which killed
President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally. Others of the more
widely publicized rumors maintained that Oswald must have received aid
from one or more persons or political groups, ranging from the far
left to the far right of the political spectrum, or from a foreign
government, usually either the Castro regime in Cuba or the Soviet
Union.
The Commission faced substantial difficulties in determining whether
anyone conspired with or assisted the person who committed the
assassination. Prior to his own death Oswald had neither admitted his
own involvement nor implicated any other persons in the assassination
of the President. The problem of determining the existence or
nonexistence of a conspiracy was compounded because of the possibility
of subversive activity by a foreign power. Witnesses and evidence
located in other countries were not subject to subpena, as they would
have been if they had been located in the United States. When evidence
was obtained from a foreign nation, it could not be appraised as
effectively as if it had been derived from a domestic source. The
Commission has given the closest scrutiny to all available evidence
which related or might have related to a foreign country. All such
evidence was tested, whenever possible, against the contingency that it
had been fabricated or slanted to mislead or confuse.
In order to meet its obligations fully, the Commission has investigated
each rumor and allegation linking Oswald to a conspiracy which
has come to its attention, regardless of source. In addition,
the Commission has explored the details of Lee Harvey Oswald’s
activities and life, especially in the months immediately preceding
the assassination, in order to develop any investigative lead
relevant to the issue of conspiracy. All of Oswald’s known writings
or other possessions which might have been used for code or other
espionage purposes have been examined by either the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or the National Security Agency, or both agencies, to
determine whether they were so used.[C6-1]
In setting forth the results of this investigation, the first section
of this chapter reviews the facts related to the assassination itself,
previously considered in more detail in chapter IV. If any conspiracy
did exist, it might have manifested itself at some point during
Oswald’s preparation for the shooting, his execution of the plan, or
his escape from the scene of the assassination. The Commission has
therefore studied the precise means by which the assassination occurred
for traces of evidence that Oswald received any form of assistance in
effecting the killing.
The second section of the chapter deals more broadly with Oswald’s life
since 1959. During the period following his discharge from the Marines
in 1959, Oswald engaged in several activities which demand close
scrutiny to determine whether, through these pursuits, he developed
any associations which were connected with the planning or execution
of the assassination. Oswald professed commitment to Marxist ideology;
he defected to the Soviet Union in 1959; he attempted to expatriate
himself and acquire Soviet citizenship; and he resided in the Soviet
Union until June of 1962. After his return to the United States he
sought to maintain contacts with the Communist Party, Socialist Workers
Party, and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee; he associated with various
Russian-speaking citizens in the Dallas-Fort Worth area--some of whom
had resided in Russia; he traveled to Mexico City where he visited
both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies 7 weeks before the assassination;
and he corresponded with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. In
view of these activities, the Commission has instituted a thorough
investigation to determine whether the assassination was in some manner
directed or encouraged through contacts made abroad or through Oswald’s
politically oriented activities in this country. The Commission has
also considered whether any connections existed between Oswald and
certain right-wing activity in Dallas which, shortly before the
assassination, led to the publication of hostile criticism of President
Kennedy.
The final section of this chapter considers the possibility that Jack
Ruby was part of a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. The
Commission explored Ruby’s background and his activities in the months
prior to the assassination, and especially his activities in the 2 days
after the assassination, in an effort to determine whether there was
any indication that Ruby was implicated in that event. The Commission
also sought to ascertain the truth or falsity of assertions that Oswald
and Ruby were known to one another prior to the assassination.
In considering the question of foreign involvement, the Commission
has received valuable assistance from the Department of State, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
other Federal agencies with special competence in the field of foreign
investigation. Some of the information furnished by these agencies is
of a highly confidential nature. Nevertheless, because the disclosure
of all facts relating to the assassination of President Kennedy is of
great public importance, the Commission has included in this report all
information furnished by these agencies which the Commission relied
upon in coming to its conclusions, or which tended to contradict those
conclusions. Confidential sources of information, as contrasted with
the information itself, have, in a relatively few instances, been
withheld.
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ASSASSINATION
Earlier chapters have set forth the evidence upon which the Commission
concluded that President Kennedy was fired upon from a single window
in the southeast corner of the sixth floor of the Texas School
Book Depository, and that Lee Harvey Oswald was the person who
fired the shots from this point. As reflected in those chapters, a
certain sequence of events necessarily took place in order for the
assassination to have occurred as it did. The motorcade traveled past
the Texas School Book Depository; Oswald had access to the sixth
floor of the building; Oswald brought the rifle into the building;
the cartons were arranged at the sixth-floor window; and Oswald
escaped from the building before the police had sealed off the exits.
Accordingly, the Commission has investigated these circumstances
to determine whether Oswald received help from any other person in
planning or performing the shooting.
Selection of Motorcade Route
The factors involved in the choice of the motorcade route by the Secret
Service have been discussed in chapter II of this report.[C6-2] It
was there indicated that after passing through a portion of suburban
Dallas, the motorcade was to travel west on Main Street, and then
to the Trade Mart by way of the Stemmons Freeway, the most direct
route from that point. This route would take the motorcade along the
traditional parade route through downtown Dallas; it allowed the
maximum number of persons to observe the President; and it enabled the
motorcade to cover the distance from Love Field to the Trade Mart in
the 45 minutes allocated by members of the White House staff planning
the President’s schedule in Dallas. No member of the Secret Service,
the Dallas Police Department, or the local host committee who was
consulted felt that any other route would be preferable.
To reach Stemmons Freeway from Main Street, it was determined that
the motorcade would turn right from Main Street onto Houston Street
for one block and then left onto Elm Street, proceeding through the
Triple Underpass to the Stemmons Freeway access road. This route took
the motorcade past the Texas School Book Depository Building on the
northwest corner of Elm and Houston Streets. Because of the sharp turn
at this corner, the motorcade also reduced its speed. The motorcade
would have passed approximately 90 yards further from the Depository
Building and made no turn near the building if it had attempted to
reach the Stemmons Freeway directly from Main Street. The road plan in
Dealey Plaza, however, is designed to prevent such a turn. In order to
keep motorists from reaching the freeway from Main Street, a concrete
barrier has been erected between Main and Elm Streets extending beyond
the freeway entrance. (See Commission Exhibits Nos. 2114-2116, pp.
35-37.) Hence, it would have been necessary for the motorcade either
to have driven over this barrier or to have made a sharp =S=-turn
in order to have entered the freeway from Main Street. Selection
of the motorcade route was thus entirely appropriate and based on
such legitimate considerations as the origin and destination of the
motorcade, the desired opportunity for the President to greet large
numbers of people, and normal patterns of traffic.
Oswald’s Presence in the Depository Building
Oswald’s presence as an employee in the Texas School Book Depository
Building was the result of a series of happenings unrelated to the
President’s trip to Dallas. He obtained the Depository job after
almost 2 weeks of job hunting which began immediately upon his arrival
in Dallas from Mexico on October 3, 1963.[C6-3] At that time he was
in poor financial circumstances, having arrived from Mexico City
with approximately $133 or less,[C6-4] and with his unemployment
compensation benefits due to expire on October 8.[C6-5] Oswald and
his wife were expecting the birth of their second child, who was
in fact born on October 20.[C6-6] In attempting to procure work,
Oswald utilized normal channels, including the Texas Employment
Commission.[C6-7]
On October 4, 1963, Oswald applied for a position with Padgett Printing
Corp., which was located at 1313 Industrial Boulevard, several blocks
from President Kennedy’s parade route.[C6-8] Oswald favorably impressed
the plant superintendent who checked his prior job references, one
of which was Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, the firm where Oswald had done
photography work from October 1962 to April 1963.[C6-9] The following
report was written by Padgett’s plant superintendent on the reverse
side of Oswald’s job application: “Bob Stovall does not recommend this
man. He was released because of his record as a troublemaker.--Has
Communistic tendencies.”[C6-10] Oswald received word that Padgett
Printing had hired someone else.[C6-11]
Oswald’s employment with the Texas School Book Depository came about
through a chance conversation on Monday, October 14, between Ruth
Paine, with whom his family was staying while Oswald was living in
a roominghouse in Dallas, and two of Mrs. Paine’s neighbors.[C6-12]
During a morning conversation over coffee, at which Marina Oswald was
present, Oswald’s search for employment was mentioned. The neighbors
suggested several places where Oswald might apply for work. One of
the neighbors present, Linnie Mae Randle, said that her brother had
recently been hired as a schoolbook order filler at the Texas School
Book Depository and she thought the Depository might need additional
help. She testified, “and of course you know just being neighborly and
everything, we felt sorry for Marina because her baby was due right
away as we understood it, and he didn’t have any work * * *.”[C6-13]
When Marina Oswald and Mrs. Paine returned home, Mrs. Paine promptly
telephoned the Texas School Book Depository and spoke to Superintendent
Roy Truly, whom she did not know.[C6-14] Truly agreed to interview
Oswald, who at the time was in Dallas seeking employment. When Oswald
called that evening, Mrs. Paine told him of her conversation with
Truly.[C6-15] The next morning Oswald went to the Texas School Book
Depository where he was interviewed and hired for the position of order
filler.[C6-16]
On the same date, the Texas Employment Commission attempted to refer
Oswald to an airline company which was looking for baggage and cargo
handlers at a salary which was $100 per month higher than that offered
by the Depository Co.[C6-17] The Employment Commission tried to advise
Oswald of this job at 10:30 a.m. on October 16, 1963. Since the records
of the Commission indicate that Oswald was then working,[C6-18] it
seems clear that Oswald was hired by the Depository Co. before the
higher paying job was available. It is unlikely that he ever learned of
this second opportunity.
Although publicity concerning the President’s trip to Dallas appeared
in Dallas newspapers as early as September 13, 1963, the planning of
the motorcade route was not started until after November 4, when the
Secret Service was first notified of the trip.[C6-19] A final decision
as to the route could not have been reached until November 14, when
the Trade Mart was selected as the luncheon site.[C6-20] Although
news reports on November 15 and November 16 might have led a person
to believe that the motorcade would pass the Depository Building, the
route was not finally selected until November 18; it was announced
in the press on November 19, only 3 days before the President’s
arrival.[C6-21] Based on the circumstances of Oswald’s employment and
the planning of the motorcade route, the Commission has concluded that
Oswald’s employment in the Depository was wholly unrelated to the
President’s trip to Dallas.
Bringing Rifle Into Building
On the basis of the evidence developed in chapter IV the Commission
concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald carried the rifle used in the
assassination into the Depository Building on Friday, November 22,
1963, in the handmade brown paper bag found near the window from
which the shots were fired.[C6-22] The arrangement by which Buell
Wesley Frazier drove Oswald between Irving and Dallas was an innocent
one, having commenced when Oswald first started working at the
Depository.[C6-23] As noted above, it was Frazier’s sister, Linnie May
Randle, who had suggested to Ruth Paine that Oswald might be able to
find employment at the Depository. When Oswald started working there,
Frazier, who lived only a half block away from the Paines, offered to
drive Oswald to and from Irving whenever he was going to stay at the
Paines’ home.[C6-24] Although Oswald’s request for a ride to Irving on
Thursday, November 21, was a departure from the normal weekend pattern,
Oswald gave the explanation that he needed to obtain curtain rods for
an “apartment” in Dallas.[C6-25] This served also to explain the long
package which he took with him from Irving to the Depository Building
the next morning.[C6-26] Further, there is no evidence that Ruth Paine
or Marina Oswald had reason to believe that Oswald’s return was in
any way related to an attempt to shoot the President the next day.
Although his visit was a surprise, since he arrived on Thursday instead
of Friday for his usual weekend visit, both women testified that they
thought he had come to patch up a quarrel which he had with his wife a
few days earlier when she learned that he was living in Dallas under an
assumed name.[C6-27]
It has also been shown that Oswald had the opportunity to work in
the Paines’ garage on Thursday evening and prepare the rifle by
disassembling it, if it were not already disassembled, and packing
it in the brown bag.[C6-28] It has been demonstrated that the paper
and tape from which the bag was made came from the shipping room of
the Texas School Book Depository and that Oswald had access to this
material.[C6-29] Neither Ruth Paine nor Marina Oswald saw the paper
bag or the paper and tape out of which the bag was constructed.[C6-30]
If Oswald actually prepared the bag in the Depository out of materials
available to him there, he could have concealed it in the jacket or
shirt which he was wearing.[C6-31] The Commission has found no evidence
which suggests that Oswald required or in fact received any assistance
in bringing the rifle into the building other than the innocent
assistance provided by Frazier in the form of the ride to work.
Accomplices at the Scene of the Assassination
The arrangement of boxes at the window from which the shots were fired
was studied to determine whether Oswald required any assistance in
moving the cartons to the window. Cartons had been stacked on the
floor, a few feet behind the window, thus shielding Oswald from the
view of anyone on the sixth floor who did not attempt to go behind
them.[C6-32] (See Commission Exhibit No. 723, p. 80.) Most of those
cartons had been moved there by other employees to clear an area for
laying a new flooring on the west end of the sixth floor.[C6-33]
Superintendent Roy Truly testified that the floor-laying crew moved
a long row of books parallel to the windows on the south side
and had “quite a lot of cartons” in the southeast corner of the
building.[C6-34] He said that there was not any particular pattern that
the men used in putting them there. “They were just piled up there more
or less at that time.”[C6-35] According to Truly, “several cartons”
which had been in the extreme southeast corner had been placed on
top of the ones that had been piled in front of the southeast corner
window.[C6-36]
The arrangement of the three boxes in the window and the one on which
the assassin may have sat has been described previously.[C6-37] Two
of these four boxes, weighing approximately 55 pounds each, had been
moved by the floor-laying crew from the west side of the floor to the
area near the southwest corner.[C6-38] The carton on which the assassin
may have sat might not even have been moved by the assassin at all.
A photograph of the scene depicts this carton on the floor alongside
other similar cartons. (See Commission Exhibit No. 1301, p. 138.)
Oswald’s right palmprint on this carton may have been placed there as
he was sitting on the carton rather than while carrying it. In any
event both of these 55-pound cartons could have been carried by one
man. The remaining two cartons contained light block-like reading aids
called “Rolling Readers” weighing only about 8 pounds each.[C6-39]
Although they had been moved approximately 40 feet[C6-40] from their
normal locations at the southeast corner window, it would appear that
one man could have done this in a matter of seconds.
In considering the possibility of accomplices at the window, the
Commission evaluated the significance of the presence of fingerprints
other than Oswald’s on the four cartons found in and near the window.
Three of Oswald’s prints were developed on two of the cartons.[C6-41]
In addition a total of 25 identifiable prints were found on the 4
cartons.[C6-42] Moreover, prints were developed which were considered
as not identifiable, i.e., the quality of the print was too fragmentary
to be of value for identification purposes.[C6-43]
As has been explained in chapter IV, the Commission determined that
none of the warehouse employees who might have customarily handled
these cartons left prints which could be identified.[C6-44] This was
considered of some probative value in determining whether Oswald moved
the cartons to the window. All but 1 of the 25 definitely identifiable
prints were the prints of 2 persons--an FBI employee and a member of
the Dallas Police Department who had handled the cartons during the
course of the investigation.[C6-45] One identifiable palmprint was not
identified.[C6-46]
The presence on these cartons of unidentified prints, whether or
not identifiable, does not appear to be unusual since these cartons
contained commercial products which had been handled by many people
throughout the normal course of manufacturing, warehousing, and
shipping. Unlike other items of evidence such as, for example, a
ransom note in a kidnaping, these cartons could contain the prints of
many people having nothing to do with the assassination. Moreover,
the FBI does not maintain a filing system for palmprints because,
according to the supervisor of the Bureau’s latent fingerprint section,
Sebastian F. Latona, the problems of classification make such a system
impracticable.[C6-47] Finally, in considering the significance of the
unidentified prints, the Commission gave weight to the opinion of
Latona to the effect that people could handle these cartons without
leaving prints which were capable of being developed.[C6-48]
Though the fingerprints other than Oswald’s on the boxes thus provide
no indication of the presence of an accomplice at the window, two
Depository employees are known to have been present briefly on the
sixth floor during the period between 11:45 a.m., when the floor-laying
crew stopped for lunch, and the moment of the assassination. One of
these was Charles Givens, a member of the floor-laying crew, who went
down on the elevator with the others and then, returned to the sixth
floor to get his jacket and cigarettes.[C6-49] He saw Oswald walking
away from the southeast corner, but saw no one else on the sixth floor
at that time. He then took one of the elevators back to the first floor
at approximately 11:55 a.m.[C6-50]
Bonnie Ray Williams, who was also working with the floor-laying crew,
returned to the sixth floor at about noon to eat his lunch and watch
the motorcade.[C6-51] He looked out on Elm Street from a position
in the area of the third or fourth set of windows from the east
wall.[C6-52] At this point he was approximately 20-30 feet away from
the southeast corner window. He remained for about “5, 10, maybe 12
minutes” eating his lunch which consisted of chicken and a bottle of
soda pop.[C6-53] Williams saw no one on the sixth floor during this
period, although the stacks of books prevented his seeing the east side
of the building.[C6-54] After finishing his lunch Williams took the
elevator down because no one had joined him on the sixth floor to watch
the motorcade.[C6-55] He stopped at the fifth floor where he joined
Harold Norman and James Jarman, Jr., who watched the motorcade with
him from a position on the fifth floor directly below the point from
which the shots were fired. Williams left the remains of his lunch,
including chicken bones and a bottle of soda, near the window where he
was eating.[C6-56]
Several witnesses outside the building claim to have seen a person in
the southeast corner window of the sixth floor. As has already been
indicated, some were able to offer better descriptions than others and
one, Howard L. Brennan, made a positive identification of Oswald as
being the person at the window.[C6-57] Although there are differences
among these witnesses with regard to their ability to describe the
person they saw, none of these witnesses testified to seeing more than
one person in the window.[C6-58]
One witness, however, offered testimony which, if accurate, would
create the possibility of an accomplice at the window at the time of
the assassination. The witness was 18-year-old Arnold Rowland, who
testified in great detail concerning his activities and observations
on November 22, 1963. He and his wife were awaiting the motorcade,
standing on the east side of Houston Street between Maine and
Elm,[C6-59] when he looked toward the Depository Building and noticed
a man holding a rifle standing back from the southwest corner window
on the sixth floor. The man was rather slender in proportion to his
size and of light complexion with dark hair.[C6-60] Rowland said that
his wife was looking elsewhere at the time and when they looked back
to the window the man “was gone from our vision.”[C6-61] They thought
the man was most likely someone protecting the President. After the
assassination Rowland signed an affidavit in which he told of seeing
this man, although Rowland was unable to identify him.[C6-62]
When Rowland testified before the Commission on March 10, 1964, he
claimed for the first time to have seen another person on the sixth
floor. Rowland said that before he had noticed the man with the rifle
on the southwest corner of the sixth floor he had seen an elderly Negro
man “hanging out that window” on the southeast corner of the sixth
floor.[C6-63] Rowland described the Negro man as “very thin, an elderly
gentleman, bald or practically bald, very thin hair if he wasn’t
bald,” between 50 and 60 years of age, 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 10
inches tall, with fairly dark complexion.[C6-64] Rowland claimed that
he looked back two or three times and noticed that the man remained
until 5 or 6 minutes prior to the time the motorcade came. Rowland did
not see him thereafter. He made no mention of the Negro man in his
affidavit.[C6-65] And, while he said he told FBI agents about the man
in the southeast corner window when interviewed on the Saturday and
Sunday following the assassination,[C6-66] no such statement appears in
any FBI report.[C6-67]
Mrs. Rowland testified that her husband never told her about seeing
any other man on the sixth floor except the man with the rifle in
the southwest corner that he first saw. She also was present during
Rowland’s interview with representatives of the FBI[C6-68] and said
she did not hear him make such a statement,[C6-69] although she also
said that she did not hear everything that was discussed.[C6-70]
Mrs. Rowland testified that after her husband first talked about
seeing a man with the rifle, she looked back more than once at the
Depository Building and saw no person looking out of any window on
the sixth floor.[C6-71] She also said that “At times my husband is
prone to exaggerate.”[C6-72] Because of inconsistencies in Rowland’s
testimony and the importance of his testimony to the question of a
possible accomplice, the Commission requested the FBI to conduct an
inquiry into the truth of a broad range of statements made by Rowland
to the Commission. The investigation showed that numerous statements
by Rowland concerning matters about which he would not normally be
expected to be mistaken--such as subjects he studied in school, grades
he received, whether or not he had graduated from high school, and
whether or not he had been admitted to college--were false.[C6-73]
The only possible corroboration for Rowland’s story is found in the
testimony of Roger D. Craig, a deputy sheriff of Dallas County, whose
testimony on other aspects of the case has been discussed in chapter
IV. Craig claimed that about 10 minutes after the assassination he
talked to a young couple, Mr. and Mrs. Rowland,
* * * and the boy said he saw two men on the sixth floor of
the Book Depository Building over there; one of them had a
rifle with a telescopic sight on it--but he thought they were
Secret Service agents or guards and didn’t report it. This
was about--oh, he said, 15 minutes before the motorcade ever
arrived.[C6-74]
According to Craig, Rowland said that he looked back a few minutes
later and “the other man was gone, and there was just one man--the man
with the rifle.”[C6-75] Craig further testified that Rowland told him
that when he first saw the two men, they were walking back and forth in
front of the window for several minutes. They were both white men and
one of them had a rifle with a scope on it.[C6-76] This report by Craig
is contradicted by the testimony of both the Rowlands, and by every
recorded interview with them conducted by law enforcement agencies
after the assassination.
As part of its investigation of Rowland’s allegation and of the
general question of accomplices at the scene of the assassination,
the Commission undertook an investigation of every person employed
in the Texas School Book Depository Building. Two employees might
possibly fit the general description of an elderly Negro man, bald or
balding. These two men were on the first floor of the building during
the period before and during the assassination.[C6-77] Moreover, all
of the employees were asked whether they saw any strangers in the
building on the morning of November 22.[C6-78] Only one employee saw
a stranger whom he described as a feeble individual who had to be
helped up the front steps of the building. He went to a public restroom
and left the building 5 minutes later, about 40 minutes before the
assassination.[C6-79]
Rowland’s failure to report his story despite several interviews
until his appearance before the Commission, the lack of probative
corroboration, and the serious doubts about his credibility, have led
the Commission to reject the testimony that Rowland saw an elderly
balding Negro man in the southeast corner window of the sixth floor of
the Depository Building several minutes before the assassination.
Oswald’s Escape
The Commission has analyzed Oswald’s movements between the time of
the assassination and the shooting of Patrolman Tippit to determine
whether there is any evidence that Oswald had assistance in his flight
from the building. Oswald’s activities during this period have been
traced through the testimony of seven witnesses and discussed in detail
in chapter IV.[C6-80] (See Commission Exhibit No. 1119-A, p. 158
and Commission Exhibit No. 1118, p. 150.) Patrolman M. L. Baker and
Depository superintendent Roy Truly saw him within 2 minutes of the
assassination on the second floor of the building. Mrs. R. A. Reid saw
him less than 1 minute later walking through the second-floor offices
toward the front of the building. A busdriver, Cecil J. McWatters,
and Oswald’s former landlady, Mrs. Mary Bledsoe, saw him board a bus
at approximately 12:40 p.m., and get off about 4 minutes later. A
cabdriver, William W. Whaley, drove Oswald from a cabstand located a
few blocks from where Oswald left the bus to a point in Oak Cliff about
four blocks from his roominghouse; and Earlene Roberts, the housekeeper
at Oswald’s roominghouse, saw him enter the roominghouse at about 1
p.m. and leave a few minutes later. When seen by these seven witnesses
Oswald was always alone.
Particular attention has been directed to Oswald’s departure from
the Depository Building in order to determine whether he could have
left the building within approximately 3 minutes of the assassination
without assistance. As discussed more fully in chapter IV, the building
was probably first sealed off no earlier than 12:37 by Inspector
Herbert Sawyer.[C6-81] The shortest estimate of the time taken to seal
off the building comes from Police Officer W. E. Barnett, one of the
officers assigned to the corner of Elm and Houston Streets for the
Presidential motorcade, who estimated that approximately 3 minutes
elapsed between the time he heard the last of the shots and the time he
started guarding the front door.[C6-82] According to Barnett, “there
were people going in and out” during this period.[C6-83] The evidence
discussed in chapter IV shows that 3 minutes would have been sufficient
time for Oswald to have descended from the sixth floor and left the
building without assistance.[C6-84]
One witness, James R. Worrell, Jr., claims to have seen a man running
from the rear of the building shortly after the assassination, but in
testimony before the Commission he stated that he could not see his
face.[C6-85] Two other witnesses who watched the rear of the building
during the first 5 minutes after the shooting saw no one leave.[C6-86]
The claim of Deputy Sheriff Roger Craig that he saw Oswald leave the
Depository Building approximately 15 minutes after the assassination
has been discussed in chapter IV.[C6-87] Although Craig may have seen
someone enter a station wagon 15 minutes after the assassination, the
person he saw was not Lee Harvey Oswald, who was far removed from the
building at that time.
The possibility that accomplices aided Oswald in connection with
his escape was suggested by the testimony of Earlene Roberts, the
housekeeper at the 1026 North Beckley roominghouse.[C6-88] She
testified that at about 1 p.m. on November 22, after Oswald had
returned to the roominghouse, a Dallas police car drove slowly by the
front of the 1026 North Beckley premises and stopped momentarily; she
said she heard its horn several times.[C6-89] Mrs. Roberts stated that
the occupants of the car were not known to her even though she had
worked for some policemen who would occasionally come by.[C6-90] She
said the policeman she knew drove car No. 170 and that this was not the
number on the police car that honked on November 22. She testified that
she first thought the car she saw was No. 106 and then said that it was
No. 107.[C6-91] In an FBI interview she had stated that she looked out
the front window and saw police car No. 207.[C6-92] Investigation has
not produced any evidence that there was a police vehicle in the area
of 1026 North Beckley at about 1 p.m. on November 22.[C6-93] Squad car
207 was at the Texas School Book Depository Building, as was car 106.
Squad cars 170 and 107 were sold in April 1963 and their numbers were
not reassigned until February 1964.[C6-94]
Whatever may be the accuracy of Mrs. Roberts’ recollection concerning
the police car, it is apparent from Mrs. Roberts’ further testimony
that she did not see Oswald enter a car when he hurriedly left the
house. She has stated that when she last saw Oswald, shortly after
1 p.m., he was standing at a bus stop in front of the house.[C6-95]
Oswald was next seen less than 1 mile away, at the point where he shot
Patrolman Tippit. Oswald could have easily reached this point on foot
by about 1:16 p.m., when Tippit was shot. Finally, investigation has
produced no evidence that Oswald had prearranged plans for a means to
leave Dallas after the assassination or that any other person was to
have provided him assistance in hiding or in departing the city.
BACKGROUND OF LEE HARVEY OSWALD
Finding no evidence in the circumstances immediately surrounding
the assassination that any person other than Lee Harvey Oswald was
involved in the killing of the President, the Commission directed an
intensive investigation into his life for the purpose, among others,
of detecting any possible traces that at some point he became involved
in a conspiracy culminating in the deed of November 22, 1963. As a
product of this investigation, the Commission has compiled a detailed
chronological biography of Oswald which is set forth as appendix XIII.
Study of the period from Oswald’s birth in 1939 to his military service
from 1956 to 1959 has revealed no evidence that he was associated with
any type of sinister or subversive organization during that period.
Though his personality and political views took shape during these
early years, the events of that period are significant primarily to an
understanding of the personality of Lee Harvey Oswald and are discussed
in that connection in chapter VII. Beginning with his preparation for
defection to the Soviet Union in 1959, however, Oswald engaged in
several activities which required close scrutiny by the Commission.
In an appraisal of Oswald’s actions since 1959 for the purpose of
determining whether he was part of a conspiracy, several aspects of
his background and character must be borne in mind. He was young,
inexperienced, and had only a limited education. As will be more fully
discussed in chapter VII, he was unable to establish relationships
with others and had a resentment for authority and any discipline
flowing from it. While he demonstrated the ability to act secretively
and alone, without regard to the consequences to himself, as in his
defection to the Soviet Union, he does not appear to have been the
kind of person whom one would normally expect to be selected as a
conspirator.
Residence in the Soviet Union
Lee Harvey Oswald was openly committed to Marxist ideology, he defected
to the Soviet Union in 1959, and resided there until June of 1962,
eventually returning to the United States with a Russian wife. In
order to evaluate rumors and speculations[C6-96] that Oswald may have
been an agent of the Soviet Union, the Commission investigated the
facts surrounding Oswald’s stay in Russia. The Commission was thus
fulfilling its obligation to probe all facts of possible relevance to
the assassination, and does not suggest by this investigation that the
rulers of the Soviet Union believed that their political interests
would be advanced by the assassination of President Kennedy. On this
question, the Secretary of State testified before the Commission on
June 10, 1964 as follows:
I have seen no evidence that would indicate to me that the
Soviet Union considered that it had an interest in the removal
of President Kennedy or that it was in any way involved in the
removal of President Kennedy.
* * * * *
I have not seen or heard of any scrap of evidence indicating
that the Soviet Union had any desire to eliminate President
Kennedy nor in any way participated in any such event.
Now, standing back and trying to look at that question
objectively despite the ideological differences between our two
great systems, I can’t see how it could be to the interest of
the Soviet Union to make any such effort.
* * * * *
I do think that the Soviet Union, again objectively considered,
has an interest in the correctness of state relations. This
would be particularly true among the great powers, with which
the major interests of the Soviet Union are directly engaged.
* * * * *
I think that although there are grave differences between
the Communist world and the free world, between the Soviet
Union and other major powers, that even from their point of
view there needs to be some shape and form to international
relations, that it is not in their interest to have this world
structure dissolve into complete anarchy, that great states
and particularly nuclear powers have to be in a position to
deal with each other, to transact business with each other, to
try to meet problems with each other, and that requires the
maintenance of correct relations and access to the leadership
on all sides.
I think also that although there had been grave differences
between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, I think
there were evidences of a certain mutual respect that had
developed over some of the experiences, both good and bad,
through which these two men had lived.
I think both of them were aware of the fact that any Chairman
of the Soviet Union, and any President of the United States,
necessarily bear somewhat special responsibility for the
general peace of the world. Indeed without exaggeration, one
could almost say the existence of the northern hemisphere in
this nuclear age.
* * * * *
So that it would be an act of rashness and madness for Soviet
leaders to undertake such an action as an active policy.
Because everything would have been put in jeopardy or at stake
in connection with such an act.
It has not been our impression that madness has characterized
the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years.[C6-97]
The Commission accepts Secretary Rusk’s estimate as reasonable
and objective, but recognizes that a precise assessment of Soviet
intentions or interests is most difficult. The Commission has thus
examined all the known facts regarding Oswald’s defection, residence
in the Soviet Union, and return to the United States. At each step the
Commission sought to determine whether there was any evidence which
supported a conclusion that Soviet authorities may have directly or
indirectly influenced Oswald’s actions in assassinating the President.
_Oswald’s entry into the Soviet Union._--Although the evidence is
inconclusive as to the factors which motivated Oswald to go to the
Soviet Union, there is no indication that he was prompted to do so by
agents of that country. He may have begun to study the Russian language
when he was stationed in Japan, which was intermittently from August
1957 to November 1958.[C6-98] After he arrived in Moscow in October
1959 he told several persons that he had been planning his defection
for 2 years, which suggests that the decision was made while he was
in the Far East.[C6-99] George De Mohrenschildt, who met Oswald after
his return from the Soviet Union, testified that Oswald once told him
much the same thing: “I met some Communists in Japan and they got me
excited and interested, and that was one of my inducements in going
to Soviet Russia, to see what goes on there.”[C6-100] This evidence,
however, is somewhat at variance with Oswald’s statements made to two
American newspaper reporters in Moscow shortly after his defection
in 1959,[C6-101] and to other people in the United States after his
return in 1962.[C6-102] Though his remarks were not inconsistent as to
the time he decided to defect, to these people he insisted that before
going to the Soviet Union he had “never met a Communist” and that the
intent to defect derived entirely from his own reading and thinking.
He said much the same to his brother in a letter he wrote to him from
Russia explaining why he had defected.[C6-103] Which of Oswald’s
statements was the more accurate remains unknown.
There is no evidence that Oswald received outside assistance in
financing his trip to the Soviet Union. After he arrived in Moscow,
Oswald told a newspaper correspondent, Aline Mosby, that he had saved
$1,500 out of his Marine Corps salary to finance his defection,[C6-104]
although the news story based upon Oswald’s interview with Aline Mosby
unaccountably listed the sum of $1,600 instead of $1,500.[C6-105]
After this article had appeared, Marguerite Oswald also related the
$1,600 figure to an FBI agent.[C6-106] Either amount could have been
accumulated out of Oswald’s earnings in the Marine Corps; during
his 2 years and 10 months of service he received $3,452.20, after
all taxes, allotments and other deductions.[C6-107] Moreover Oswald
could certainly have made the entire trip on less than $1,000. The
ticket on the ship he took from New Orleans to Le Havre, France, cost
$220.75;[C6-108] it cost him about $20 to reach London from Le Havre;
his plane fare from London to Helsinki, where he received his visa,
cost him $111.90; he probably purchased Russian “tourist vouchers”
normally good for room and board for 10 days for $300; his train fare
from Helsinki to Moscow was about $44; in Moscow he paid only $1.50 to
$3 a night for his room and very little for his meals after his tourist
vouchers ran out;[C6-109] and apparently he did not pay his hotel bill
at all after November 30, 1959.[C6-110] Oswald’s known living habits
indicate that he could be extraordinarily frugal when he had reason to
be, and it seems clear that he did have a strong desire to go to the
Soviet Union.
While in Atsugi, Japan, Oswald studied the Russian language, perhaps
with some help from an officer in his unit who was interested in
Russian and used to “talk about it” with Oswald occasionally.[C6-111]
He studied by himself a great deal in late 1958 and early 1959 after
he was transferred from Japan to California.[C6-112] He took an Army
aptitude test in Russian in February 1959 and rated “Poor.”[C6-113]
When he reached the Soviet Union in October of the same year he could
barely speak the language.[C6-114] During the period in Moscow while
he was awaiting decision on his application for citizenship, his diary
records that he practiced Russian 8 hours a day.[C6-115] After he was
sent to Minsk in early January 1960 he took lessons from an interpreter
assigned to him for that purpose by the Soviet Government.[C6-116]
Marina Oswald said that by the time she met him in March 1961 he spoke
the language well enough so that at first she thought he was from one
of the Baltic areas of her country, because of his accent. She stated
that his only defects were that his grammar was sometimes incorrect and
that his writing was never good.[C6-117]
Thus, the limited evidence provides no indication that Oswald was
recruited by Soviet agents in the Far East with a view toward defection
and eventual return to the United States. Moreover, on its face such a
possibility is most unlikely. If Soviet agents had communicated with
Oswald while he was in the Marine Corps, one of the least probable
instructions they would have given him would have been to defect. If
Oswald had remained a Marine radar specialist, he might at some point
have reached a position of value as a secret agent. However, his
defection and the disloyal statements he made publicly in connection
with it eliminated the possibility that he would ever gain access to
confidential information or programs of the United States. The very
fact that he defected, therefore, is itself persuasive evidence that he
was not recruited as an agent prior to his defection.
The Commission has investigated the circumstances under which Oswald
obtained a visa to enter the Soviet Union for possible evidence that
he received preferential treatment in being permitted to enter the
country. Oswald left New Orleans, La., for Europe on September 20,
1959,[C6-118] having been released from active duty in the Marine Corps
on September 11, 1959.[C6-119] He went directly to Helsinki, Finland,
by way of Le Havre, France, and London, England, arriving at Helsinki
on Saturday, October 10, 1959.[C6-120] Oswald probably arrived in
Helsinki too late in the evening to have applied for a visa at the
Soviet Union consulate that night.[C6-121] In light of the rapidity
with which he made connections throughout his entire trip,[C6-122] he
probably applied for a visa early on Monday, October 12. On October 14,
he was issued Soviet Tourist Visa No. 403339, good for one 6-day visit
in the U.S.S.R.[C6-123] He left Helsinki on a train destined for Moscow
on October 15.[C6-124]
The Department of State has advised the Commission that it has some
information that in 1959 it usually took an American tourist in
Helsinki 1 to 2 weeks to obtain a visa,[C6-125] and that it has other
information that the normal waiting period during the past 5 years has
been a week or less.[C6-126] According to the Department’s information,
the waiting period has always varied frequently and widely, with one
confirmed instance in 1963 of a visa routinely issued in less than
24 hours.[C6-127] The Central Intelligence Agency has indicated that
visas during the 1964 tourist season were being granted in about 5 to 7
days.[C6-128]
This information from the Department of State and the Central
Intelligence Agency thus suggests that Oswald’s wait for a visa may
have been shorter than usual but not beyond the range of possible
variation. The prompt issuance of Oswald’s visa may have been merely
the result of normal procedures, due in part to the fact that the
summer rush had ended. It might also mean that Oswald was unusually
urgent in his demands that his visa be issued promptly. Oswald himself
told officials at the American Embassy in Moscow on October 31, when
he appeared to renounce his citizenship, that he had said nothing to
the Soviets about defecting until he arrived in Moscow.[C6-129] In
any event, the Commission has found nothing in the circumstances of
Oswald’s entry into the Soviet Union which indicates that he was at the
time an agent of the U.S.S.R.
_Defection and admission to residence._--Two months and 22 days elapsed
from Oswald’s arrival in Moscow until he left that city to take up
residence in Minsk. The Commission has considered the possibility that
Oswald was accepted for residence in the Soviet Union and sent to Minsk
unusually soon after he arrived, either because he had been expected
or because during his first weeks in Moscow he developed an undercover
relationship with the Soviet Government. In doing so, the Commission
has attempted to reconstruct the events of those months, though it is,
of course, impossible to account for Oswald’s activities on every day
of that period.
Oswald’s “Historic Diary,”[C6-130] which commences on October 16,
1959, the date Oswald arrived in Moscow, and other writings he later
prepared,[C6-131] have provided the Commission with one source of
information about Oswald’s activities throughout his stay in the
Soviet Union. Even assuming the diary was intended to be a truthful
record, it is not an accurate guide to the details of Oswald’s
activities. Oswald seems not to have been concerned about the accuracy
of dates and names,[C6-132] and apparently made many of his entries
subsequent to the date the events occurred. Marina Oswald testified
that she believed that her husband did not begin to keep the diary
until he reached Minsk, 3 months after his arrival in Russia,[C6-133]
and scraps of paper found in Oswald’s possession, containing much the
same information as appears in his diary,[C6-134] suggest that he
transcribed the entries into the diary at a later time. The substance
of Oswald’s writings has been carefully examined for consistency
with all other related information available to the Commission. In
addition, the writings have been checked for handwriting,[C6-135] and
for consistency of style, grammar, and spelling with earlier and later
writings which are known to be his.[C6-136] No indication has been
found that entries were written or coached by other persons.[C6-137]
However, the most reliable information concerning the period Oswald
spent in Moscow in the latter part of 1962 comes from the records
of the American Embassy in Moscow,[C6-138] the testimony of Embassy
officials,[C6-139] and the notes of two American newspaper reporters,
Aline Mosby [C6-140] and Priscilla Johnson,[C6-141] who interviewed
Oswald during this period. Oswald’s correspondence with his brother and
mother has also been relied upon for some relatively minor information.
The findings upon which the Commission based its conclusion concerning
Soviet involvements in the assassination were supported by evidence
other than material provided by the Soviet Union[C6-142] or Oswald’s
writings. The Central Intelligence Agency has also contributed data
on the normal practices and procedures of the Soviet authorities in
handling American defectors.
The “Historic Diary” indicates that on October 16, 1959, the day Oswald
arrived in Moscow, he told his Intourist guide, Rima Shirokova, that
he wished to renounce his American citizenship and become a Soviet
citizen. The same day, the guide reportedly helped Oswald prepare a
letter to the Soviet authorities requesting citizenship.[C6-143] The
diary indicates, however, that on October 21 he was informed that
his visa had expired and that he would be required to leave Moscow
within 2 hours.[C6-144] During the preceding days, according to the
diary, he had been interviewed once and perhaps twice by Soviet
officials.[C6-145] During this period the KGB,[B] the agency with
primary responsibility for examining defectors arriving in Russia,
undoubtedly investigated Oswald as fully as possible. In 1959,
virtually all Intourist guides were KGB informants, and there is no
reason to believe that this was not true of Oswald’s guide.[C6-146]
[B] The Committee for State Security, best known by its
Russian initials, “KGB,” is a lineal descendant of the
revolutionary ChEKA and has passed through numerous
changes of name since 1917 with little change of function.
Presently the KGB handles all Soviet counterintelligence
operations and is the instrument for various types of
subversive activities. It is responsible for the internal
security of the Soviet state and the safety of its leaders.
In addition it shares responsibility for foreign espionage
activities with the intelligence component of the Ministry
of Defense, the “GRU.” The KGB would have the primary
responsibility for keeping track of a defector such as
Oswald.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs or “MVD” was for many years
the designation of the organization responsible for civil
law enforcement and administration of prisons and forced
labor camps in the Soviet Union. During a part of its
history it also directed vast economic combines. In January
1960, the central or all-union MVD was abolished and its
powers transferred to the MVD’s of the several Soviet
republics. A further change took place in the summer of
1962, when the republic MVD’s were renamed Ministries for
the Preservation of Public Order and Safety. In the past
few years the republic MVD’s have been gradually divesting
themselves of their economic functions. When Lee Harvey
Oswald was in the Soviet Union though, the MVD still
carried on substantial economic activities. For example,
inmates of the MVD-administered “corrective labor colonies”
engaged in brickmaking, heavy construction work, and
lumbering.
In the Commission’s report, the term KGB will be used, as
above, to describe the principal Soviet counterintelligence
and espionage service. Oswald often inaccurately referred
to the “secret police” as the MVD; and in any quotations
from him, the Commission will reproduce his actual words.
Whenever the Commission refers to the MVD, it will be
referring to it as defined in this footnote.
According to Oswald’s diary he attempted suicide when he learned
his application for citizenship had been denied.[C6-147] If true,
this would seem to provide strong evidence that, at least prior to
October 21, there was no undercover relationship between Oswald and
the Soviet Government. Though not necessarily conclusive, there is
considerable direct evidence which indicates that Oswald did slash his
wrist. Oswald’s autopsy showed that he had a scar on his left wrist
and that it was of the kind which could have been caused by a suicide
attempt.[C6-148] The medical records from the Botkinskaya Hospital in
Moscow, furnished by the Soviet Government, reveal that from October
21 to October 28 he was treated there for a self-inflicted wound on
the left wrist.[C6-149] The information contained in these records is
consistent with the facts disclosed by the autopsy examination relating
to Oswald’s wrist and to other facts known about Oswald. Although no
witness recalled Oswald mentioning a suicide attempt,[C6-150] Marina
Oswald testified that when she questioned her husband about the
scar on his wrist, he became “very angry,” and avoided giving her a
reply.[C6-151] Oswald’s character, discussed in the following chapter,
does not seem inconsistent with a suicide or feigned suicide attempt,
nor with his having failed to disclose the suicide attempt. Many
witnesses who testified before the Commission observed that he was not
an “open” or trusting person, had a tendency toward arrogance, and was
not the kind of man who would readily admit weaknesses.[C6-152]
Oswald appeared at the American Embassy in Moscow on October 31,
1959, 3 days after his release from the Botkinskaya Hospital.[C6-153]
He did not give the officials at the Embassy any indication that he
had recently received medical treatment.[C6-154] Oswald’s appearance
was the first notification to the American Government that he was
in Russia, since he had failed to inform the Embassy upon his
arrival,[C6-155] as most American tourists did at the time.[C6-156]
In appendix XV, Oswald’s dealings with the Embassy in 1959 until his
return to the United States in 1962 are described in full, and all
action taken by the American officials on his case is evaluated. His
conduct at the Embassy has also been considered by the Commission for
any indication it may provide as to whether or not Oswald was then
acting under directions of the Soviet Government.
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 913
NOTE HANDED BY OSWALD TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW ON OCT. 31,
1959]
At the Embassy, Oswald declared that he wished to renounce his U.S.
citizenship,[C6-157] but the consul to whom he spoke, Richard E.
Snyder, refused to accept his renunciation at that time, telling him
that he would have to return to complete the necessary papers.[C6-158]
However, Oswald did give the consul his passport[C6-159] and a
handwritten statement requesting that his American citizenship be
“revoked” and “affirm[ing] [his] * * * allegiance” to the Soviet
Union.[C6-160] (See Commission Exhibit No. 913, p. 261.) The FBI has
confirmed that this statement is in Oswald’s handwriting,[C6-161]
and Snyder has testified that the letter’s phrases are consistent
with the way Oswald talked and conducted himself.[C6-162] During the
approximately 40-minute interview, Oswald also informed Snyder that he
had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps, intimating that he might
know something of special interest, and that he had informed a Soviet
official that he would give the Soviets any information concerning
the Marine Corps and radar operation which he possessed.[C6-163]
Although Oswald never filed a formal renunciation, in a letter to the
Embassy dated November 3, 1959, he again requested that his American
citizenship be revoked and protested the refusal to accept his
renunciation on October 31.[C6-164] (See Commission Exhibit No. 912, p.
263.)
While at the Embassy,[C6-165] and in a subsequent interview with
an American journalist,[C6-166] Oswald displayed familiarity with
Communist ideological arguments, which led those with whom he spoke
to speculate that he may have received some instruction from Soviet
authorities. Oswald’s familiarity with the law regarding renunciation
of citizenship, observed by both Embassy officials,[C6-167] could also
be construed as a sign of coaching by Soviet authorities. However,
Oswald is known to have been an avid reader[C6-168] and there is
evidence that he had read Communist literature without guidance while
in the Marine Corps and before that time.[C6-169] After his arrival in
Moscow, Oswald most probably had discussions with his Intourist guide
and others,[C6-170] but none of the Americans with whom he talked in
Moscow felt that his conversations necessarily revealed any type of
formal training.[C6-171] The “Historic Diary” indicates that Oswald did
not tell his guide that he intended to visit the Embassy because he
feared she would disapprove.[C6-172] (See Commission Exhibit No. 24,
p. 264.) Though Oswald gave Snyder the impression “of an intelligent
person who spoke in a manner and on a level, which seemed to befit
his apparent level of intelligence,”[C6-173] correspondent Priscilla
Johnson, who spent about 5 hours talking with him,[C6-174] received a
much less favorable impression:
He liked to create the pretense, the impression that he was
attracted to abstract discussion and was capable of engaging in
it, and was drawn to it. But it was like pricking a balloon.
I had the feeling that if you really did engage him on this
ground, you very quickly would discover that he didn’t have
the capacity for a logical sustained argument about an abstract
point on economics or on noneconomic, political matters or any
matter, philosophical.[C6-175]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 912
LETTER MAILED BY OSWALD TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 24
OSWALD’S OWN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW
OCT. 31, 1959
Excerpts from his “Historic Diary”]
A comparison of the formal note Oswald handed Snyder[C6-176] and his
letter of November 3[C6-177] with the provisions of section 349(a)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act[C6-178] suggests that Oswald
had read the statute but understood it imperfectly; he apparently was
trying to use three out of the four ways set out in the statute to
surrender his citizenship, but he succeeded in none.
Moreover, persuasive evidence that Oswald’s conduct was not carefully
coached by Soviet agents is provided by some of his actions at the
Embassy. The single statement which probably caused Oswald the most
future trouble was his declaration that he had already volunteered to a
Soviet official that he would, if asked, tell the Soviet Government all
that he knew about his job in radar as a Marine. Certainly a statement
of this type would prejudice any possibility of his being an effective
pro-Communist agent.
Further, though unquestionably evidencing anti-American sentiments,
Oswald’s behavior at the Embassy, which brought him exceedingly close
to expatriation, was unlikely to have increased his value in any
capacity to the Soviet Union. Richard E. Snyder, the official who
interviewed Oswald on October 31, testified that he “had every reason
to believe” that Oswald would have carried through a formal--and
therefore effective--renunciation of his American citizenship
immediately if he had let him.[C6-179] However, as a defector, Oswald
could have had considerable propaganda value without expatriating
himself; and if he had expatriated himself his eventual return to
the United States would have been much more difficult and perhaps
impossible. If Snyder’s assessment of Oswald’s intentions is accurate,
it thus tends to refute the suggestion that Oswald was being coached
by the Soviets. In addition, reporters noticed Oswald’s apparent
ambivalence in regard to renouncing his citizenship--stormily demanding
that he be permitted to renounce while failing to follow through by
completing the necessary papers[C6-180]--behavior which might have
detracted from his propaganda value.
According to Oswald’s “Historic Diary”[C6-181] and the documents
furnished to the Commission by the Soviet Government,[C6-182] Oswald
was not told that he had been accepted as a resident of the Soviet
Union until about January 4, 1960. Although on November 13 and 16
Oswald informed Aline Mosby[C6-183] and Priscilla Johnson[C6-184] that
he had been granted permission to remain in the country indefinitely,
the diary indicates that at that time he had been told only that
he could remain “until some solution is found with what to do with
me.”[C6-185] The diary is more consistent with the letter Oswald
wrote to his brother Robert on December 17, saying that he was then,
more than a month after he saw Johnson and Mosby, about to leave his
hotel,[C6-186] and with some later correspondence with his mother.
Oswald mailed a short note to his mother which she received in Texas on
January 5; that same day she mailed a money order to him in Moscow,
but it apparently got there too late, because she received it back,
unopened, on February 25.[C6-187] Oswald’s conflicting statement to the
correspondents also seems reconcilable with his very apparent desire to
appear important to others. Moreover, so long as Oswald continued to
stay in a hotel in Moscow, the inference is that the Soviet authorities
had not yet decided to accept him.[C6-188] This inference is supported
by information supplied by the CIA on the handling of other defectors
in the Soviet Union.[C6-189]
Thus, the evidence is strong that Oswald waited at least until November
16, when he saw Miss Johnson, and it is probable that he was required
to wait until January 4, a little over 2½ months from October 16,
before his application to remain in Russia was granted. In mid-November
Miss Johnson asked Oswald whether the Russians were encouraging his
defection, to which Oswald responded: “The Russians are treating
it like a legal formality. They don’t encourage you and they don’t
discourage you.”[C6-190] And, when the Soviet Government finally acted,
Oswald did not receive Soviet citizenship, as he had requested, but
merely permission to reside in Russia on a year-to-year basis.[C6-191]
Asked to comment upon the length of time, 2 months and 22 days, that
probably passed before Oswald was granted the right to remain in the
Soviet Union, the CIA has advised that “when compared to five other
defector cases, this procedure seems unexceptional.”[C6-192] Similarly,
the Department of State reports that its information “indicated that a
2-month waiting period is not unusual.”[C6-193] The full response of
the CIA is as follows:
Oswald said that he asked for Soviet citizenship on 16 October
1959. According to his diary, he received word a month later
that he could stay in the USSR pending disposition of his
request, but it was another month and a half before he was
given his stateless passport.
When compared to five other defector cases, this procedure
seems unexceptional. Two defectors from US Army intelligence
units in West Germany appear to have been given citizenship
immediately, but both had prior KGB connections and fled as
a result of Army security checks. Of the other three cases,
one was accepted after not more than five weeks and given a
stateless passport apparently at about the same time. The
second was immediately given permission to stay for a while,
and his subsequent request for citizenship was granted three
months later. The third was allowed to stay after he made his
citizenship request, but almost two months passed before he was
told that he had been accepted. Although the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs soon after told the US Embassy that he was a
Soviet citizen, he did not receive his document until five or
six months after initial application. We know of only one case
in which an American asked for Soviet citizenship but did not
take up residence in the USSR. In that instance, the American
changed his mind and voluntarily returned to the United
States less than three weeks after he had requested Soviet
citizenship.[C6-194]
The Department of State has commented as follows:
The files of the Department of State reflect the fact that
Oswald first applied for permission to remain in Russia
permanently, or at least for a long period, when he arrived in
Moscow, and that he obtained permission to remain within one or
two months.
A. Is the fact that he obtained permission to stay within this
period of time usual?
_Answer_--Our information indicates that a two months waiting
period is not unusual. In the case of [name withheld] the
Supreme Soviet decided within two months to give Soviet
citizenship and he was thereafter, of course, permitted to stay.
B. Can you tell us what the normal procedures are under similar
circumstances?
_Answer_--It is impossible for us to state any “normal”
procedures. The Soviet Government never publicizes the
proceedings in these cases or the reasons for its action.
Furthermore, it is, of course, extremely unusual for an
American citizen to defect.[C6-195]
The information relating to Oswald’s suicide attempt indicates that
his application to remain in the Soviet Union was probably rejected
about 6 days after his arrival in Moscow. Since the KGB is the Soviet
agency responsible for the initial handling of all defectors,[C6-196]
it seems likely that the original decision not to accept Oswald was
made by the KGB. That Oswald was permitted to remain in Moscow after
his release from the hospital suggests that another ministry of the
Soviet Government may have intervened on his behalf. This hypothesis
is consistent with entries in the “Historic Diary” commenting that the
officials Oswald met after his hospital treatment were different from
those with whom he had dealt before.[C6-197] The most plausible reason
for any such intervention may well have been apprehension over the
publicity that would follow the rejection of a devout convert to the
Communist cause.
_Oswald’s Life in Minsk._--According to the “Historic Diary”[C6-198]
and documents received from the Soviet Government,[C6-199] Oswald
resided in the city of Minsk from January 1960 until June 1962.
Oswald’s life in Minsk is the portion of his life concerning which the
least is known. The primary sources of information are Oswald’s own
writings and the testimony of Marina Oswald. Other evidence, however,
establishes beyond doubt that Oswald was in fact located in Minsk on
at least two occasions. The Commission has obtained two photographs
which were taken by American tourists in Minsk in August 1961 in which
Oswald appears.[C6-200] The tourists did not know Oswald, nor did
they speak with him; they remembered only that several men gathered
near their car.[C6-201] (See Kramer Exhibit 1, p. 268.) In addition,
Oswald was noticed in Minsk by a student who was traveling with the
University of Michigan band on a tour of Russia in the spring of
1961.[C6-202] Oswald corresponded with the American Embassy in Moscow
from Minsk,[C6-203] and wrote letters from Minsk to his family in
the United States.[C6-204] Oswald and his wife have many photographs
taken of themselves which show Minsk backgrounds and persons who are
identifiable as residents of Minsk.[C6-205] After he returned to the
United States, Oswald conversed about the city with Russian-born
American citizens who were familiar with it.[C6-206] Marina Oswald
is also familiar with the city.[C6-207] The Commission has also
been able independently to verify the existence in Minsk of many of
the acquaintances of Oswald and his wife whom they said they knew
there.[C6-208] (See Commission Exhibits Nos. 1392, 1395, 2606, 2609,
2612 and 2623, pp. 270-271.)
[Illustration: OSWALD, MAN STANDING ON RIGHT IN FIGURED SHIRT.
PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN MINSK, U.S.S.R. BY AN AMERICAN TOURIST IN AUGUST,
1961.
(KRAMER DEPOSITION 1)]
Once he was accepted as a resident alien in the Soviet Union, Oswald
was given considerable benefits which ordinary Soviet citizens in his
position in society did not have. The “Historic Diary” recites that
after Oswald was informed that he could remain in the Soviet Union and
was being sent to Minsk he was given 5,000 rubles[C] ($500) by the “Red
Cross, * * * for expenses.” He used 2,200 rubles to pay his hotel bill,
and another 150 rubles to purchase a train ticket. With the balance
of slightly over 2,500 rubles, Oswald felt, according to the diary,
like a rich man.[C6-209] Oswald did not receive free living quarters,
as the diary indicates the “Mayor” of Minsk promised him,[C6-210] but
about 6 weeks after his arrival he did receive an apartment, very
pleasant by Soviet standards, for which he was required to pay only 60
rubles ($6.00) a month. Oswald considered the apartment “almost rent
free.”[C6-211] Oswald was given a job in the “Byelorussian Radio and
Television Factory,” where his pay on a per piece basis ranged from
700 to 900 rubles ($70-$90) a month.[C6-212] According to his wife,
this rate of pay was average for people in his occupation but good
by Soviet standards generally.[C6-213] She explained that piecework
rates throughout the Soviet Union have generally grown out of line
with compensation for other jobs.[C6-214] The CIA has confirmed that
this condition exists in many areas and occupations in the Soviet
Union.[C6-215] In addition to his salary, Oswald regularly received
700 rubles ($70) per month from the Soviet “Red Cross.”[C6-216] The
well-paying job, the monthly subsidy, and the “almost rent-free”
apartment combined to give Oswald more money than he needed. The only
complaint recorded in the “Historic Diary” is that there was “no place
to spend the money.”[C6-217]
[C] About a year after Oswald received this money, the ruble
was revalued to about 10 times its earlier value.
The Commission has found no basis for associating Oswald’s preferred
income with Soviet undercover activity. Marina Oswald testified that
foreign nationals are commonly given special treatment in the Soviet
Union,[C6-218] and the Central Intelligence Agency has confirmed that
it is standard practice in the Soviet Union for Americans and other
foreign defectors from countries with high standards of living to be
“subsidized.”[C6-219] Apparently it is Soviet practice to attempt
to make life sufficiently pleasant for a foreign defector so that
he will not become disillusioned and return to his native country.
The Commission has also assumed that it is customary for Soviet
intelligence agencies to keep defectors under surveillance during their
residence in the Soviet Union, through periodic interviews of neighbors
and associates of the defector.[C6-220] Oswald once mentioned that the
Soviet police questioned his neighbors occasionally.[C6-221]
[Illustration: PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE OSWALDS IN MINSK, U.S.S.R.
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 1392)
OSWALD AND MARINA ON A BRIDGE IN MINSK
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2623)
UNCLE VASILY AKSIONOV AND AUNT LUBOVA AKSIONOVA, WITH THE OSWALDS
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT 1395)
MARINA WAITING FOR BUS]
[Illustration: PHOTOGRAPHS OF OSWALDS IN U. S. S. R.
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2609)
ROSA KUZNETSOVA, ELLA GERMAN, LEE HARVEY OSWALD, AND PAVEL GOLOVACHEV
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2612)
OSWALD AND ALFRED (LAST NAME UNKNOWN), A HUNGARIAN FRIEND OF ANITA ZIGER
(COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2606)
VIEW OVERLOOKING THE SYISLOCH RIVER FROM THE BALCONY OF THE OSWALDS’
APARTMENT IN MINSK]
Moreover, it is from Oswald’s personal writings alone that the
Commission has learned that he received supplementary funds from the
Soviet “Red Cross.” In the notes he made during the return trip to
the United States Oswald recognized that the “Red Cross” subsidy had
nothing to do with the well-known International Red Cross. He frankly
stated that the money was paid to him for having “denounced” the
United States and that it had come from the “MVD.”[C6-222] Oswald’s
papers reveal that the “Red Cross” subsidy was terminated as soon as
he wrote the American Embassy in Moscow in February 1961 asking that
he be permitted to return.[C6-223] (See Commission Exhibit No. 25, p.
273.) Marina Oswald’s testimony confirmed this; she said that when she
knew Oswald he no longer was receiving the monthly grant but still
retained some of the savings accumulated in the months when he had been
receiving it.[C6-224] Since she met Oswald in March and married him in
April of 1961, her testimony was consistent with his records.
The nature of Oswald’s employment while in Minsk has been examined
by the Commission. The factory in which he worked was a large plant
manufacturing electronic parts and radio and television sets. Marina
Oswald has testified that he was an “apprentice machinist” and “ground
small metallic parts for radio receivers, on a lathe.”[C6-225] So far
as can be determined, Oswald never straightforwardly described to
anyone else in the United States exactly what his job was in the Soviet
Union.[C6-226] Some of his acquaintances in Dallas and Fort Worth had
the impression that he was disappointed in having been given a menial
job and not assigned to an institution of higher learning in the Soviet
Union.[C6-227] Marina Oswald confirmed this and also testified that
her husband was not interested in his work and not regarded at the
factory as a very good worker.[C6-228] The documents furnished to the
Commission by the Soviet government were consistent with her testimony
on this point, since they included a report from Oswald’s superior at
the factory which is critical of his performance on the job.[C6-229]
Oswald’s employment and his job performance are thus consistent with
his known occupational habits in this country and otherwise afford no
ground for suspicion.
Oswald’s membership in a hunting club while he was in the Soviet Union
has been a matter of special interest to the Commission. One Russian
emigre testified that this was a suspicious circumstance because no one
in the Soviet Union is permitted to own a gun for pleasure.[C6-230] The
Commission’s investigation, however, has established that this is not
so. The Central Intelligence Agency has advised the Commission that
hunting societies such as the one to which Oswald belonged are very
popular in the Soviet Union.[C6-231] They are frequently sponsored
by factories for their employees, as was Oswald’s.[C6-232] Moreover,
Soviet citizens (or foreigners residing in the Soviet Union) are
permitted to own shotguns, but not rifles, without joining a society;
all that is necessary is that the gun be registered at the local
militia office immediately after it has been purchased.[C6-233] Experts
from the Central Intelligence Agency have examined Oswald’s club
membership certificate and gun permit and expressed the opinion that
its terms and numbers are consistent with other information the CIA has
about the Soviet Union.[C6-234]
[Illustration: (COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 25)
EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH OSWALD NEVER DELIVERED, WHICH HE PROBABLY WROTE
ABOARD THE SHIP WHILE RETURNING FROM THE U. S. S. R. WITH HIS FAMILY]
Marina Oswald testified that her husband went hunting only on one
occasion during the time of their marriage.[C6-235] However, Oswald
apparently joined the Byelorussian Society of Hunters and Fishermen
in the summer of 1960[C6-236] and did not marry until April 30,
1961,[C6-237] so he could have been more active while he was still a
bachelor. Oswald made no secret of his membership in the hunting club.
He mentioned it on occasion to friends after he returned to the United
States;[C6-238] discussed it at some length in a speech at a Jesuit
Seminary in Mobile, Ala., in the summer of 1962;[C6-239] included it
in his correspondence with his brother Robert;[C6-240] and kept his
membership certificate[C6-241] and gun permit[C6-242] until the day
he was killed. In view of these facts, it is unlikely that Oswald’s
membership in a hunting club was contrived to conceal some sort of
secret training. Moreover, the CIA has informed the Commission that it
is in possession of considerable information on the location of secret
Soviet training institutions and that it knows of no such institution
in or near Minsk during the time Oswald was there.[C6-243]
Oswald’s marriage to Marina Prusakova on April 30, 1961,[C6-244] is
itself a fact meriting consideration. A foreigner living in Russia
cannot marry without the permission of the Soviet Government.[C6-245]
It seems unlikely that the Soviet authorities would have permitted
Oswald to marry and to take his wife with him to the United States if
they were contemplating using him alone as an agent. The fact that
he had a Russian wife would be likely, in their view, to increase
any surveillance under which he would be kept by American security
agencies, would make him even more conspicuous to his neighbors as “an
ex-Russian,” and would decrease his mobility. A wife’s presence in the
United States would also constitute a continuing risk of disclosure.
On the other hand, Marina Oswald’s lack of English training and her
complete ignorance of the United States and its customs[C6-246] would
scarcely recommend her to the Soviet authorities as one member of
an “agent team” to be sent to the United States on a difficult and
dangerous foreign enterprise.
_Oswald’s departure from the Soviet Union._--On February 13, 1961, the
American Embassy in Moscow received a letter from Oswald postmarked
Minsk, February 5, asking that he be readmitted to the United
States.[C6-247] This was the first time that the Embassy had heard
from or about Oswald since November 16, 1959.[C6-248] The end of the
15-month silence came only a few days after the Department of State in
Washington had forwarded a request to the Moscow Embassy on February
1, 1961, informing the Embassy that Oswald’s mother was worried about
him, and asking that he get in touch with her if possible.[C6-249]
The simultaneity of the two events was apparently coincidental. The
request from Marguerite Oswald went from Washington to Moscow by
sealed diplomatic pouch and there was no evidence that the seal had
been tampered with.[C6-250] The officer of the Department of State
who carried the responsibility for such matters has testified that
the message was not forwarded to the Russians after it arrived in
Moscow.[C6-251]
Oswald’s letter does not seem to have been designed to ingratiate him
with the Embassy officials. It starts by incorrectly implying that he
had written an earlier letter that was not answered, states that he
will return to the United States only if he can first “come to some
agreement” on there being no legal charges brought against him, and
ends with a reminder to the officials at the Embassy that they have a
responsibility to do everything they can to help him, since he is an
American citizen.[C6-252]
The Embassy’s response to this letter was to invite Oswald to
come personally to Moscow to discuss the matter.[C6-253] Oswald
at first protested because of the difficulty of obtaining Soviet
permission.[C6-254] He wrote two more protesting letters during the
following 4 months,[C6-255] but received no indication that the Embassy
would allow him to handle the matter by mail.[C6-256] While the
Department of State was clarifying its position on this matter,[C6-257]
Oswald unexpectedly appeared in Moscow on Saturday, July 8,
1961.[C6-258] On Sunday, Marina Oswald flew to Moscow,[C6-259] and was
interviewed by officials in the American Embassy on Tuesday.[C6-260]
The Commission asked the Department of State and the Central
Intelligence Agency to comment on whether the Oswalds’ travel to Moscow
without permission signified special treatment by the Soviet Union.
From their responses, it appears that since Marina Oswald possessed a
Soviet citizen’s internal passport, she did not require prior approval
to make the trip.[C6-261] Although Soviet law did require her husband,
as the holder of a “stateless passport,” to obtain advance permission
for the trip, his failure to do so would not normally have been
considered a serious violation. In this respect, the CIA has advised
the Commission as follows:
OSWALD’S travel from Minsk to Moscow and return in July 1961
would normally have required prior authorization. Bearers of a
Soviet “passport for foreigners” (_vid na zhitelstov v. SSSR
dlya innostrantsa_) are required to obtain travel authorization
from the Visa and Registration Department (OVIR) (or Passport
Registration Department (PRO) in smaller towns) if they desire
to leave the city (or oblast) where they are domiciled.
This same requirement is believed to apply to persons, such
as OSWALD, holding Soviet “stateless passports” (_vid na
zhitelstvo_ v. _SSSR dlya lits bez grazhdanstva_).
The practicality of even “unauthorized” travel was demonstrated
by events related by a United States citizen who defected
in 1960, and subsequently was sent to Kiev to study. After
repatriating this defector told U.S. authorities he had made
a total of seven unauthorized trips from Kiev during his stay
in the USSR. He was apprehended on two of his flights and was
returned to Kiev each time, the second time under escort. On
both occasions he was merely reprimanded by the deputy chief
of the institute at which he was studying. Since Marina had a
Soviet citizen’s internal passport there would have been no
restrictions against her making the trip to Moscow.[C6-262]
The answers of the Department of State, together with the Commission’s
specific questions, are as follows:
B. Could resident foreigners normally travel in this manner
without first obtaining such permission?
_Answer_--There are only a few U.S. nationals now living in the
Soviet Union. They include an American Roman Catholic priest,
an American Protestant minister, a number of correspondents,
some students and technical advisers to Soviet businesses. We
know that the priest, the minister, the correspondents and the
students must obtain permission from Soviet authorities before
taking any trips. The technical advisers notify officials of
their project before they travel and these officials personally
inform the militia.
C. If travel of this type was not freely permitted, do you
believe that Oswald normally would have been apprehended during
the attempt or punished after the fact for traveling without
permission?
_Answer_--Based on the information we have, we believe that
if Oswald went to Moscow without permission, and this was
known to the Soviet authorities, he would have been fined or
reprimanded. Oswald was not, of course, an average foreign
resident. He was a defector from a foreign country and the
bearer of a Soviet internal “stateless” passport * * * during
the time when he was contemplating the visit to Moscow to come
to the Embassy * * *
The Soviet authorities probably knew about Oswald’s trip
even if he did not obtain advance permission, since in most
instances the Soviet militia guards at the Embassy ask for the
documents of unidentified persons entering the Embassy grounds
* * *
An American citizen who, with her American citizen husband,
went to the Soviet Union to live permanently and is now trying
to obtain permission to leave, informed the Embassy that she
had been fined for not getting permission to go from Odessa to
Moscow on a recent trip to visit the Embassy.
D. Even if such travel did not have to be authorized, do you
have any information or observations regarding the practicality
of such travel by Soviet citizens or persons in Oswald’s status?
_Answer_--It is impossible to generalize in this area. We
understand from interrogations of former residents in the
Soviet Union who were considered “stateless” by Soviet
authorities that they were not permitted to leave the town
where they resided without permission of the police. In
requesting such permission they were required to fill out a
questionnaire giving the reason for travel, length of stay,
addresses of individuals to be visited, etc.
Notwithstanding these requirements, we know that at least
one “stateless” person often traveled without permission of
the authorities and stated that police stationed at railroad
stations usually spotchecked the identification papers of
every tenth traveler, but that it was an easy matter to avoid
such checks. Finally, she stated that persons who were caught
evading the registration requirements were returned to their
home towns by the police and sentenced to short jail terms
and fined. These sentences were more severe for repeated
violations.[C6-263]
When Oswald arrived at the Embassy in Moscow, he met Richard E. Snyder,
the same person with whom he had dealt in October of 1959.[C6-264]
Primarily on the basis of Oswald’s interview with Snyder on Monday,
July 10, 1961, the American Embassy concluded that Oswald had not
expatriated himself.[C6-265] (See app. XV, pp. 752-760.) On the
basis of this tentative decision, Oswald was given back his American
passport, which he had surrendered in 1959.[C6-266] The document was
due to expire in September 1961,[C6-267] however, and Oswald was
informed that its renewal would depend upon the ultimate decision by
the Department of State on his expatriation.[C6-268] On July 11, Marina
Oswald was interviewed at the Embassy and the steps necessary for her
to obtain an American visa were begun.[C6-269] In May 1962, after 15
months of dealings with the Embassy, Oswald’s passport was ultimately
renewed and permission for his wife to enter the United States was
granted.[C6-270]