Detention and Death of Oswald
Lee Harvey Oswald spent almost all of the last 48 hours of his life
in the Police and Courts Building, a gray stone structure in downtown
Dallas that housed the headquarters of the Dallas Police Department and
the city jail. Following his arrest early Friday afternoon, Oswald was
brought immediately to this building and remained there until Sunday
morning, November 24, when he was scheduled to be transferred to the
county jail. At 11:21 that morning, in full view of millions of people
watching on television, Oswald was fatally wounded by Jack Ruby, who
emerged suddenly from the crowd of newsmen and policemen witnessing the
transfer and fired a single shot at Oswald.
Whether the killing of Oswald was part of a conspiracy involving
the assassination of President Kennedy is considered in chapter VI.
Aside from that question, the occurrences within the Police and
Courts Building between November 22 and 24 raise other important
issues concerning the conduct of law enforcement officials, the
responsibilities of the press, the rights of accused persons, and
the administration of criminal justice in the United States. The
Commission has therefore deemed it necessary to determine the facts
concerning Oswald’s detention and death and to evaluate the actions and
responsibilities of the police and press involved in these events.
TREATMENT OF OSWALD IN CUSTODY
The focal center of the Police and Courts Building during Oswald’s
detention was the third floor, which housed the main offices of the
Dallas Police Department. The public elevators on this floor opened
into a lobby midpoint of a corridor that extended along the length of
the floor for about 140 feet. At one end of this 7-foot-wide corridor
were the offices occupied by Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry and his
immediate subordinates; at the other end was a small pressroom that
could accommodate only a handful of reporters. Along this corridor were
other police offices, including those of the major detective bureaus.
Between the pressroom and the lobby was the complex of offices
belonging to the homicide and robbery bureau, headed by Capt. J. Will
Fritz.[C5-1] (See Commission Exhibit No. 2175, p. 197.)
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2175
THIRD FLOOR PLAN DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT DALLAS, TEXAS]
Chronology
The policemen who seized Oswald at the Texas Theatre arrived with him
at the police department building at about 2 p.m. and brought him
immediately to the third floor offices of the homicide and robbery
bureau to await the arrival of Captain Fritz from the Texas School
Book Depository. After about 15 or 20 minutes Oswald was ushered into
the office of Captain Fritz for the first of several interrogation
sessions.[C5-2] At 4:05 p.m. he was taken to the basement assembly room
for his first lineup.[C5-3] While waiting outside the lineup room,
Oswald was searched, and five cartridges and other items were removed
from his pockets.[C5-4] After the lineup, at about 4:20, Oswald was
returned to Captain Fritz’ office for further questioning.[C5-5] Two
hours later, at 6:20 p.m., Oswald was taken downstairs for a second
lineup and returned to Captain Fritz’ office within 15 minutes for
additional interrogation.[C5-6] Shortly after 7 p.m., Captain Fritz
signed a complaint charging Oswald with the murder of Patrolman Tippit.
Oswald was formally arraigned, i.e., advised of the charges, at 7:10
p.m., before Justice of the Peace David L. Johnston, who came to
Captain Fritz’ office for the occasion.[C5-7]
After a third lineup at about 7:40 p.m., Oswald was returned to Fritz’
office.[C5-8] About an hour later, after further questioning, Oswald’s
fingerprints and palmprints were taken and a paraffin test (see
app. XI) administered in Fritz’ office, after which the questioning
resumed.[C5-9] At 11:26 p.m. Fritz signed the complaint charging Oswald
with the murder of President Kennedy.[C5-10] Shortly after midnight,
detectives took Oswald to the basement assembly room for an appearance
of several minutes before members of the press.[C5-11] At about 12:20
a.m. Oswald was delivered to the jailer who placed him in a maximum
security cell on the fifth floor.[C5-12] His cell was the center one in
a block of three cells that were separated from the remainder of the
jail area. The cells on either side of Oswald were empty and a guard
was nearby whenever Oswald was present.[C5-13] Shortly after 1:30 a.m.
Oswald was brought to the identification bureau on the fourth floor
and arraigned before Justice of the Peace Johnston, this time for the
murder of President Kennedy.[C5-14]
Questioning resumed in Fritz’ office on Saturday morning at about 10:25
a.m., and the session lasted nearly an hour and 10 minutes.[C5-15]
Oswald was then returned to his cell for an hour, and at 12:35 p.m.
he was brought back to Fritz’ office for an additional half-hour of
questioning.[C5-16] From 1:10 to 1:30 p.m., Oswald’s wife and mother
visited him in the fourth floor visiting area;[C5-17] at 1:40 p.m.
he attempted to call an attorney in New York.[C5-18] He appeared in
another lineup at 2:15 p.m.[C5-19] At 2:45 p.m., with Oswald’s consent,
a member of the identification bureau obtained fingernail scrapings
and specimens of hair from him.[C5-20] He returned to the fourth floor
at 3:30 p.m. for a 10-minute visit with his brother, Robert.[C5-21]
Between 4 and 4:30 p.m., Oswald made two telephone calls to Mrs. Ruth
Paine[C5-22] at her home in Irving; at about 5:30 p.m. he was visited
by the president of the Dallas Bar Association[C5-23] with whom he
spoke for about 5 minutes. From 6 to 7:15 p.m. Oswald was interrogated
once again in Captain Fritz’ office and then returned to his
cell.[C5-24] At 8 p.m. he called the Paine residence again and asked to
speak to his wife, but Mrs. Paine told him that his wife was no longer
there.[C5-25]
Oswald was signed out of jail at 9:30 a.m. on Sunday, November 24, and
taken to Captain Fritz’ office for a final round of questioning.[C5-26]
The transfer party left Fritz’ office at about 11:15 a.m.;[C5-27] at
11:21 a.m. Oswald was shot.[C5-28] He was declared dead at Parkland
Hospital at 1:07 p.m.[C5-29]
Interrogation Sessions
During the period between 2:30 p.m. on Friday afternoon and 11:15 a.m.
Sunday morning, Oswald was interrogated for a total of approximately 12
hours.[C5-30] Though subject to intermittent questioning for more than
7 hours on Friday, Oswald was given 8 to 9 hours to rest that night.
On Saturday he was questioned for a total of only 3 hours during three
interrogation sessions, and on Sunday he was questioned for less than 2
hours.[C5-31] (These interrogations are discussed in ch. IV.)
Captain Fritz’ office, within which the interrogations took place,
was a small room, 14 feet by 9½ feet in size.[C5-32] In addition to
the policemen guarding the prisoner, those present usually included
Dallas detectives, investigators from the FBI and the Secret Service,
and occasionally other officials, particularly a post office inspector
and the U.S. marshal. (See statements in app. XI.) As many as seven
or eight people crowded into the small office.[C5-33] In all, more
than 25 different persons participated in or were present at some
time during interrogations. Captain Fritz, who conducted most of
the interrogations, was frequently called from the room. He said,
“I don’t believe there was any time when I went through a very long
period without having to step to the door, or step outside, to get
a report from some pair of officers, or to give them additional
assignments.”[C5-34] In his absence, others present would occasionally
question Oswald.[C5-35]
The interrogators differ on whether the confusion prevailing in the
main third floor corridor penetrated Fritz’ office and affected the
atmosphere within.[C5-36] Oswald’s processions through the third floor
corridor, described more fully below, tended, in Fritz’ opinion,
to keep Oswald upset, and the remarks and questions of newsmen
sometimes caused him to become annoyed. Despite the confusion that
frequently prevailed, Oswald remained calm most of the time during the
interrogations.[C5-37] According to Captain Fritz:
You know I didn’t have trouble with him. If we would just
talk to him quietly like we are talking right now, we talked
all right until I asked him a question that meant something,
every time I asked him a question that meant something, that
would produce evidence he immediately told me he wouldn’t tell
me about it and he seemed to anticipate what I was going to
ask.[C5-38]
Special Agent James W. Bookhout, who represented the FBI at most of the
interrogations, stated, “I think generally you might say anytime that
you asked a question that would be pertinent to the investigation, that
would be the type of question he would refuse to discuss.”[C5-39]
The number of people in the interrogation room and the tumultuous
atmosphere throughout the third floor made it difficult for the
interrogators to gain Oswald’s confidence and to encourage him to be
truthful. As Chief Curry has recognized in his testimony, “we were
violating every principle of interrogation * * * it was just against
all principles of good interrogation practice.”[C5-40]
Oswald’s Legal Rights
All available evidence indicates that Oswald was not subjected to any
physical hardship during the interrogation sessions or at any other
time while he was in custody. He was fed and allowed to rest. When he
protested on Friday against being handcuffed from behind, the cuffs
were removed and he was handcuffed in front.[C5-41] Although he made
remarks to newsmen about desiring a shower and demanding his “civil
rights,” Oswald did not complain about his treatment to any of the
numerous police officers and other persons who had much to do with him
during the 2 days of his detention.[C5-42] As described in chapter IV,
Oswald received a slight cut over his right eye and a bruise under his
left eye during the scuffle in the Texas Theatre with the arresting
officers, three of whom were injured and required medical treatment.
These marks were visible to all who saw him during the 2 days of his
detention and to millions of television viewers.[C5-43]
Before the first questioning session on Friday afternoon, Fritz warned
Oswald that he was not compelled to make any statement and that
statements he did make could be used against him.[C5-44] About 5 hours
later, he was arraigned for the Tippit murder and within an additional
6½ hours he was arraigned for the murder of President Kennedy. On each
occasion the justice of the peace advised Oswald of his right to obtain
counsel and the right to remain silent.[C5-45]
Throughout the period of detention, however, Oswald was not represented
by counsel. At the Friday midnight press conference in the basement
assembly room, he made the following remarks:
OSWALD. Well, I was questioned by Judge ---- [Johnston].
However, I protested at that time that I was not allowed legal
representation during that very short and sweet hearing. I
really don’t know what the situation is about. Nobody has
told me anything except that I am accused of, of, murdering
a policeman. I know nothing more than that and I do request
someone to come forward to give me legal assistance.
Q. Did you kill the President?
A. No. I have not been charged with that. In fact nobody has
said that to me yet. The first thing I heard about it was when
the newspaper reporters in the hall asked me that question.
* * * * *
Q. Mr. Oswald, how did you hurt your eye?
A. A policeman hit me.[C5-46]
At this time Oswald had been arraigned only for the murder of
Patrolman Tippit, but questioning by Captain Fritz and others had
been substantially concerned with Oswald’s connection with the
assassination.[C5-47]
On Friday evening, representatives of the American Civil Liberties
Union visited the police department to determine whether Oswald was
being deprived of counsel. They were assured by police officials and
Justice of the Peace Johnston that Oswald had been informed of his
rights and was being allowed to seek a lawyer.[C5-48] On Saturday
Oswald attempted several times to reach John Abt, a New York lawyer,
by telephone, but with no success.[C5-49] In the afternoon, he called
Ruth Paine and asked her to try to reach Abt for him, but she too
failed.[C5-50] Later in the afternoon, H. Louis Nichols, president of
the Dallas Bar Association, visited Oswald in his cell and asked him
whether he wanted the association to obtain a lawyer for him. Oswald
declined the offer, stating a first preference for Abt and a second
preference for a lawyer from the American Civil Liberties Union.[C5-51]
As late as Sunday morning, according to Postal Inspector Harry D.
Holmes, Oswald said that he preferred to get his own lawyer.[C5-52]
ACTIVITY OF NEWSMEN
Within an hour of Oswald’s arrival at the police department on November
22, it became known to newsmen that he was a possible suspect in the
slaying of President Kennedy as well as in the murder of Patrolman
Tippit. At least as early as 3:26 p.m. a television report carried this
information. Reporters and cameramen flooded into the building and
congregated in the corridor of the third floor, joining those few who
had been present when Oswald first arrived.[C5-53]
On the Third Floor
Felix McKnight, editor of the Dallas Times-Herald, who handled press
arrangements for the President’s visit, estimated that within 24 hours
of the assassination more than 300 representatives of news media were
in Dallas, including correspondents from foreign newspapers and press
associations.[C5-54] District Attorney Henry M. Wade thought that the
crowd in the third floor hallway itself may have numbered as many as
300.[C5-55] Most estimates, including those based on examination of
video tapes, place upwards of 100 newsmen and cameramen in the third
floor corridor of the police department by the evening of November
22.[C5-56] (See Commission Exhibit No. 2633, p. 203.)
In the words of an FBI agent who was present, the conditions at the
police station were “not too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush
hour, maybe like the Yankee Stadium during the World Series games. *
* *”[C5-57] In the lobby of the third floor, television cameramen set
up two large cameras and floodlights in strategic positions that gave
them a sweep of the corridor in either direction. Technicians stretched
their television cables into and out of offices, running some of them
out of the windows of a deputy chief’s office and down the side of the
building. Men with newsreel cameras, still cameras, and microphones,
more mobile than the television cameramen, moved back and forth seeking
information and opportunities for interviews. Newsmen wandered into the
offices of other bureaus located on the third floor, sat on desks, and
used police telephones; indeed, one reporter admits hiding a telephone
behind a desk so that he would have exclusive access to it if something
developed.[C5-58]
By the time Chief Curry returned to the building in the middle of the
afternoon from Love Field where he had escorted President Johnson from
Parkland Hospital, he found that “there was just pandemonium on the
third floor.”[C5-59] The news representatives, he testified:
* * * were jammed into the north hall of the third floor,
which are the offices of the criminal investigation division.
The television trucks, there were several of them around the
city hall. I went into my administrative offices, I saw cables
coming through the administrative assistant office and through
the deputy chief of traffic through his office, and running
through the hall they had a live TV set up on the third floor,
and it was a bedlam of confusion.[C5-60]
According to Special Agent Winston G. Lawson of the Secret Service:
At least by 6 or 7 o’clock * * * [the reporters and cameramen]
were quite in evidence up and down the corridors, cameras on
the tripods, the sound equipment, people with still cameras,
motion picture-type hand cameras, all kinds of people with tape
recorders, and they were trying to interview people, anybody
that belonged in police headquarters that might know anything
about Oswald * * *[C5-61]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2633
Scene in third floor corridor.]
The corridor became so jammed that policemen and newsmen had to
push and shove if they wanted to get through, stepping over cables,
wires, and tripods.[C5-62] The crowd in the hallway was so dense that
District Attorney Wade found it a “strain to get the door open” to
get into the homicide office.[C5-63] According to Lawson, “You had to
literally fight your way through the people to get up and down the
corridor.”[C5-64] A witness who was escorted into the homicide offices
on Saturday afternoon related that he
tried to get by the reporters, stepping over television cables
and you couldn’t hardly get by, they would grab you and wanted
to know what you were doing down here, even with the detectives
one in front and one behind you.[C5-65]
The television cameras continued to record the scene on the third floor
as some of the newsmen kept vigil through the night.[C5-66]
Such police efforts as there were to control the newsmen were
unavailing. Capt. Glen D. King, administrative assistant to Chief
Curry, witnessed efforts to clear an aisle through the hallway, but
related that “this was a constant battle because of the number of
newsmen who were there. They would move back into the aisleway that had
been cleared. They interfered with the movement of people who had to
be there.”[C5-67] According to one detective, “they would be asked to
stand back and stay back but it wouldn’t do much good, and they would
push forward and you had to hold them off physically.” The detective
recalled that on one occasion when he was escorting a witness through
the corridor he “stopped * * * and looked down and there was a joker
had a camera stuck between * * * [his] legs taking pictures. * *
*”[C5-68] Forrest V. Sorrels of the Secret Service had the impression
that the “press and the television people just * * * took over.”[C5-69]
Police control over the access of other than newsmen to the third floor
was of limited but increasing effectiveness after Oswald’s arrival
at the police department. Initially no steps were taken to exclude
unauthorized persons from the third floor corridor, but late Friday
afternoon Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor stationed guards at the
elevators and the stairway to prevent the admission of such persons. He
also directed the records room in the basement to issue passes, after
verification by the bureaus involved, to people who had legitimate
business on the third floor.[C5-70] Throughout the 3 days of Oswald’s
detention, the police were obliged to continue normal business in
all five bureaus located along the third floor hallway. Thus many
persons--relatives of prisoners, complainants, witnesses[C5-71]--had
occasion to visit police offices on the third floor on business
unrelated to the investigation of the assassination.
Newsmen seeking admission to the third floor were required to identify
themselves by their personal press cards; however, the department
did not follow its usual procedure of checking the authenticity of
press credentials.[C5-72] Captain King felt that this would have
been impossible in light of “the atmosphere that existed over there,
the tremendous pressures that existed, the fact that telephones were
ringing constantly, that there were droves of people in there * * *
the fact that the method by which you positively identify someone * * *
it’s not easy.”[C5-73]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2631
Oswald being moved through third floor corridor.]
Police officers on the third floor testified that they carefully
checked all persons for credentials, and most newsmen indicated that
after Batchelor imposed security they were required to identify
themselves by their press cards.[C5-74] Special Agent Sorrels of the
Secret Service stated that he was requested to present credentials on
some of his visits to the third floor.[C5-75] However, other newsmen
apparently went unchallenged during the entire period before Oswald was
killed, although some of them were wearing press badges on their lapels
and some may have been known to the police officers.[C5-76]
According to some reporters and policemen, people who appeared to
be unauthorized were present on the third floor after security
procedures were instituted, and video tapes seem to confirm their
observations.[C5-77] Jack Ruby was present on the third floor on Friday
night.[C5-78] Assistant Chief of Police N. T. Fisher testified that
even on Saturday “anybody could come up with a plausible reason for
going to one of the third floor bureaus and was able to get in.”[C5-79]
Oswald and the Press
When the police car bringing Oswald from the Texas Theatre drove into
the basement of police headquarters at about 2 p.m. on Friday, some
reporters and cameramen, principally from local papers and stations,
were already on hand. The policemen formed a wedge around Oswald and
conducted him to the elevator, but several newsmen crowded into the
elevator with Oswald and the police. When the elevator stopped at the
third floor, the cameramen ran ahead down the corridor, and then turned
around and backed up, taking pictures of Oswald as he was escorted
toward the homicide and robbery bureau office. According to one
escorting officer, some six or seven reporters followed the police into
the bureau office.[C5-80]
From Friday afternoon, when Oswald arrived in the building, until
Sunday, newspaper reporters and television cameras focused their
attention on the homicide office. In full view and within arm’s length
of the assembled newsmen, Oswald traversed the 20 feet of corridor
between the homicide office and the locked door leading to the jail
elevator at least 15 times after his initial arrival. The jail
elevator, sealed off from public use, took him to his fifth floor cell
and to the assembly room in the basement for lineups and the Friday
night news conference.[C5-81]
On most occasions, Oswald’s escort of three to six detectives and
policemen had to push their way through the newsmen who sought to
surround them. (See Commission Exhibit No. 2631, p. 205.) Although
the Dallas press normally did not take pictures of a prisoner without
first obtaining permission of the police, who generally asked the
prisoner, this practice was not followed by any of the newsmen with
Oswald.[C5-82] Generally when Oswald appeared the newsmen turned their
cameras on him, thrust microphones at his face, and shouted questions
at him. Sometimes he answered. Reporters in the forefront of the throng
would repeat his answers for the benefit of those behind them who could
not hear. On Saturday, however in response to police admonitions,
the reporters exercised more restraint and shouted fewer questions at
Oswald when he passed through the corridor.[C5-83]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2965
OSWALD AT PRESS CONFERENCE IN ASSEMBLY ROOM, FRIDAY NIGHT]
Oswald’s most prolonged exposure occurred at the midnight press
conference on Friday night. In response to demands of newsmen, District
Attorney Wade, after consulting with Chief Curry and Captain Fritz, had
announced shortly before midnight that Oswald would appear at a press
conference in the basement assembly room.[C5-84] An estimated 70 to 100
people, including Jack Ruby, and other unauthorized persons, crowded
into the small downstairs room. No identification was required.[C5-85]
The room was so packed that Deputy Chief M. W. Stevenson and Captain
Fritz who came down to the basement after the crowd had assembled could
not get in and were forced to remain in the doorway.[C5-86]
Oswald was brought into the room shortly after midnight.[C5-87] Curry
had instructed policemen not to permit newsmen to touch Oswald or
get close to him, but no steps were taken to shield Oswald from the
crowd.[C5-88] Captain Fritz had asked that Oswald be placed on the
platform used for lineups so that he could be more easily removed “if
anything happened.”[C5-89] Chief Curry, however, insisted that Oswald
stand on the floor in front of the stage, where he was also in front of
the one-way nylon-cloth screen customarily used to prevent a suspect
from seeing those present in the room. This was done because cameramen
had told Curry that their cameras would not photograph well through the
screen.[C5-90]
Curry had instructed the reporters that they were not to “ask any
questions and try to interview * * * [Oswald] in any way,” but when he
was brought into the room, “immediately they began to shoot questions
at him and shove microphones into his face.”[C5-91] It was difficult
to hear Oswald’s answers above the uproar. Cameramen stood on the
tables to take pictures and others pushed forward to get close-ups.
(See Commission Exhibit No. 2965, p. 207.) The noise and confusion
mounted as reporters shouted at each other to get out of the way and
camermen made frantic efforts to get into position for pictures.[C5-92]
After Oswald had been in the room only a few minutes, Chief Curry
intervened and directed that Oswald be taken back to the jail because,
he testified, the newsmen “tried to overrun him.”[C5-93]
THE ABORTIVE TRANSFER
In Dallas, after a person is charged with a felony, the county sheriff
ordinarily takes custody of the prisoner and assumes responsibility for
his safekeeping. Normally, the Dallas Police Department notifies the
sheriff when a prisoner has been charged with a felony and the sheriff
dispatches his deputies to transport the accused to the county jail.
This is usually done within a few hours after the complaint has been
filed. In cases of unusual importance, however, the Dallas city police
sometimes transport the prisoners to the county jail.[C5-94]
The decision to move Oswald to the county jail on Sunday morning
was reached by Chief Curry the preceding evening. Sometime after
7:30 Saturday evening, according to Assistant Chief Batchelor, two
reporters told him that they wanted to go out to dinner but that “they
didn’t want to miss anything if we were going to move the prisoner.”
Curry came upon them at that point and told the two newsmen that
if they returned by 10 o’clock in the morning, they wouldn’t “miss
anything.”[C5-95] A little later, after checking with Captain Fritz,
Curry made a similar announcement to the assembled reporters. Curry
reported the making of his decision to move Oswald as follows:
Then, I talked to Fritz about when he thought he would transfer
the prisoner, and he didn’t think it was a good idea to
transfer him at night because of the fact you couldn’t see, and
if anybody tried to cause them any trouble, they needed to see
who they were and where it was coming from and so forth, and
he suggested that we wait until daylight, so this was normal
procedure, I mean, for Fritz to determine when he is going to
transfer his prisoners, so I told him “Okay.” I asked him, I
said, “What time do you think you will be ready tomorrow?”
And he didn’t know exactly and I said, “Do you think about 10
o’clock,” and he said, “I believe so,” and then is when I went
out and told the newspaper people * * * “I believe if you are
back here by 10 o’clock you will be back in time to observe
anything you care to observe.”[C5-96]
During the night, between 2:30 and 3 a.m., the local office of the FBI
and the sheriff’s office received telephone calls from an unidentified
man who warned that a committee had decided “to kill the man that
killed the President.”[C5-97] Shortly after, an FBI agent notified
the Dallas police of the anonymous threat. The police department and
ultimately Chief Curry were informed of both threats.[C5-98]
Immediately after his arrival at the building on Sunday morning between
8:30 and 8:45 a.m., Curry spoke by telephone with Sheriff J. E. Decker
about the transfer. When Decker indicated that he would leave to Curry
the decision on whether the sheriff’s office or the police would move
Oswald, Curry decided that the police would handle it because “we had
so much involved here, we were the ones that were investigating the
case and we had the officers set up downstairs to handle it.”[C5-99]
After talking with Decker, Curry began to discuss plans for the
transfer. With the threats against Oswald in mind, Curry suggested to
Batchelor and Deputy Chief Stevenson that Oswald be transported to the
county jail in an armored truck, to which they agreed. While Batchelor
made arrangements to have an armored truck brought to the building,
Curry and Stevenson tentatively agreed on the route the armored truck
would follow from the building to the county jail.[C5-100]
Curry decided that Oswald would leave the building via the basement. He
stated later that he reached this decision shortly after his arrival
at the police building Sunday morning, when members of the press had
already begun to gather in the basement. There is no evidence that
anyone opposed this decision.[C5-101] Two members of the Dallas police
did suggest to Captain Fritz that Oswald be taken from the building
by another exit, leaving the press “waiting in the basement and on
Commerce Street, and we could be to the county jail before anyone
knew what was taking place.”[C5-102] However, Fritz said that he did
not think Curry would agree to such a plan because he had promised
that Oswald would be transferred at a time when newsmen could take
pictures.[C5-103] Forrest Sorrels also suggested to Fritz that Oswald
be moved at an unannounced time when no one was around, but Fritz again
responded that Curry “wanted to go along with the press and not try to
put anything over on them.”[C5-104]
Preliminary arrangements to obtain additional personnel to assist
with the transfer were begun Saturday evening. On Saturday night,
the police reserves were requested to provide 8 to 10 men on Sunday,
and additional reservists were sought in the morning.[C5-105] Capt.
C. E. Talbert, who was in charge of the patrol division for the city
of Dallas on the morning of November 24, retained a small number of
policemen in the building when he took charge that morning and later
ordered other patrolmen from several districts to report to the
basement.[C5-106] At about 9 a.m. Deputy Chief Stevenson instructed
all detectives within the building to remain for the transfer.[C5-107]
Sheriff Decker testified that his men were ready to receive Oswald at
the county jail from the early hours of Sunday morning.[C5-108]
With the patrolmen and reserve policemen available to him, Captain
Talbert, on his own initiative, undertook to secure the basement
of the police department building. He placed policemen outside the
building at the top of the Commerce Street ramp to keep all spectators
on the opposite side of Commerce Street. Later, Talbert directed
that patrolmen be assigned to all street intersections the transfer
vehicle would cross along the route to the county jail.[C5-109] His
most significant security precautions, however, were steps designed to
exclude unauthorized persons from the basement area.
The spacious basement of the Police and Courts Building contains, among
other things, the jail office and the police garage. (See Commission
Exhibit No. 2179, p. 211.) The jail office, into which the jail
elevator opens, is situated on the west side of an auto ramp cutting
across the length of the basement from Main Street, on the north side
of the building, to Commerce Street, on the south side. From the foot
of this ramp, on the east side, midway through the basement, a decline
runs down a short distance to the =L=-shaped police garage. In addition
to the auto ramp, five doors to the garage provide access to the
basement from the Police and Courts Building on the west side of the
garage and the attached Municipal Building on the east. Three of these
five doors provide access to three elevators opening into the garage,
two for passengers near the central part of the garage and one for
service at the east end of the garage. A fourth door near the passenger
elevator opens into the municipal building; the fifth door, at the
Commerce Street side of the garage, opens into a sub-basement that is
connected with both buildings.[C5-110]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2179
BASEMENT
DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, DALLAS, TEXAS]
Shortly after 9 o’clock Sunday morning, policemen cleared the basement
of all but police personnel. Guards were stationed at the top of the
Main and Commerce Streets auto ramps leading down into the basement,
at each of the five doorways into the garage, and at the double doors
leading to the public hallway adjacent to the jail office. Then, Sgt.
Patrick T. Dean, acting under instructions from Talbert, directed
14 men in a search of the garage. Maintenance workers were directed
to leave the area. The searchers examined the rafters, tops of air
conditioning ducts, and every closet and room opening off the garage.
They searched the interior and trunk compartment of automobiles parked
in the garage. The two passenger elevators in the central part of the
garage were not in service and the doors were shut and locked; the
service elevator was moved to the first floor, and the operator was
instructed not to return it to the basement.[C5-111]
Despite the thoroughness with which the search was conducted, there
still existed one and perhaps two weak points in controlling access
to the garage. Testimony did not resolve positively whether or not
the stairway door near the public elevators was locked both from the
inside and outside as was necessary to secure it effectively.[C5-112]
And although guards were stationed near the double doors, the hallway
near the jail office was accessible to people from inside the Police
and Courts Building without the necessity of presenting identification.
Until seconds before Oswald was shot, newsmen hurrying to photograph
Oswald were able to run without challenge through those doors into the
basement.[C5-113]
After the search had been completed, the police allowed news
representatives to reenter the basement area and gather along the
entrance to the garage on the east side of the ramp. Later, the police
permitted the newsmen to stand in front of the railing on the east side
of the ramp leading to Main Street. The policemen deployed by Talbert
and Dean had instructions to allow no one but identified news media
representatives into the basement. As before, the police accepted any
credentials that appeared authentic, though some officers did make
special efforts to check for pictures and other forms of corroborating
identification. Many newsmen reported that they were checked on more
than one occasion while they waited in the basement. A small number did
not recall that their credentials were ever checked.[C5-114]
Shortly after his arrival on Sunday morning, Chief Curry issued
instructions to keep reporters and cameramen out of the jail office
and to keep television equipment behind the railing separating the
basement auto ramp from the garage. Curry observed that in other
respects Captain Talbert appeared to have security measures in hand and
allowed him to proceed on his own initiative. Batchelor and Stevenson
checked progress in the basement during the course of the morning,
and the officials were generally satisfied with the steps Talbert had
taken.[C5-115]
At about 11 a.m., Deputy Chief Stevenson requested that Capt. O. A.
Jones of the forgery bureau bring all available detectives from the
third floor offices to the basement. Jones instructed the detectives
who accompanied him to the basement to line the walls on either side
of the passageway cleared for the transfer party.[C5-116] According to
Detective T. D. McMillon,
* * * Captain Jones explained to us that, when they brought
the prisoner out, that he wanted two lines formed and we were
to keep these two lines formed, you know, a barrier on either
side of them, kind of an aisle * * * for them to walk through,
and when they came down this aisle, we were to keep this line
intact and move along with them until the man was placed in the
car.[C5-117]
With Assistant Chief Batchelor’s permission, Jones removed
photographers who had gathered once again in the basement jail office.
Jones recalled that he instructed all newsmen along the Main Street
ramp to remain behind an imaginary line extending from the southeast
corner of the jail office to the railing on the east side of the ramp;
other officers recalled that Jones directed the newsmen to move away
from the foot of the Main Street ramp and to line up against the east
railing. In any event, newsmen were allowed to congregate along the
foot of the ramp after Batchelor observed that there was insufficient
room along the east of the ramp to permit all the news representatives
to see Oswald as he was brought out.[C5-118]
By the time Oswald reached the basement, 40 to 50 newsmen and 70 to 75
police officers were assembled there. Three television cameras stood
along the railing and most of the newsmen were congregated in that
area and at the top of the adjacent decline leading into the garage.
A group of newsmen and police officers, best estimated at about 20,
stood strung across the bottom of the Main Street ramp. Along the south
wall of the passageway outside the jail office door were about eight
detectives, and three detectives lined the north wall. Two officers
stood in front of the double doors leading into the passageway from the
corridor next to the jail office.[C5-119] (See Commission Exhibit No.
2634, p. 214.)
Beginning Saturday night, the public had been kept informed of the
approximate time of the transfer. At approximately 10:20 a.m. Curry
told a press conference that Oswald would be moved in an armored truck
and gave a general description of other security precautions.[C5-120]
Apparently no newsmen were informed of the transfer route, however,
and the route was not disclosed to the driver of the armored truck
until the truck arrived at the Commerce Street exit at about 11:07
a.m.[C5-121] When they learned of its arrival, many of the remaining
newsmen who had waited on the third floor descended to the basement.
Shortly after, newsmen may have had another indication that the
transfer was imminent if they caught a glimpse through the glass
windows of Oswald putting on a sweater in Captain Fritz’ office.[C5-122]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2634
Scene in areaway outside jail office immediately before shooting
(Sunday, November 24).]
Because the driver feared that the truck might stall if it had to start
from the bottom of the ramp and because the overhead clearance appeared
to be inadequate, Assistant Chief Batchelor had it backed only into the
entranceway at the top of the ramp. Batchelor and others then inspected
the inside of the truck.[C5-123]
When Chief Curry learned that the truck had arrived, he informed
Captain Fritz that security controls were in effect and inquired how
long the questioning of Oswald would continue. At this point, Fritz
learned for the first time of the plan to convey Oswald by armored
truck and immediately expressed his disapproval. He urged the use of an
unmarked police car driven by a police officer, pointing out that this
would be better from the standpoint of both speed and maneuverability.
Curry agreed to Fritz’ plan; the armored truck would be used as a
decoy. They decided that the armored truck would leave the ramp first,
followed by a car which would contain only security officers. A police
car bearing Oswald would follow. After proceeding one block, the car
with Oswald would turn off and proceed directly to the county jail; the
armored truck would follow a lead car to the jail along the previously
agreed upon and more circuitous route.[C5-124]
Captain Fritz instructed Detectives C. W. Brown and C. N. Dhority and
a third detective to proceed to the garage and move the followup car
and the transfer car into place on the auto ramp. He told Lt. Rio S.
Pierce to obtain another automobile from the basement and take up a
lead position on Commerce Street.[C5-125] Deputy Chief Stevenson went
back to the basement to inform Batchelor and Jones of the change in
plans.[C5-126] Oswald was given his sweater, and then his right hand
was handcuffed to the left hand of Detective J. R. Leavelle.[C5-127]
Detective T. L. Baker called the jail office to check on security
precautions in the basement and notify officials that the prisoner was
being brought down.[C5-128]
On arriving in the basement, Pierce asked Sgts. James A. Putnam and
Billy Joe Maxey to accompany him in the lead car. Since the armored
truck was blocking the Commerce Street ramp, it would be necessary to
drive out the Main Street ramp and circle the block to Commerce Street.
Maxey sat on the back seat of Pierce’s car, and Putnam helped clear a
path through reporters on the ramp so that Pierce could drive up toward
Main Street. When the car passed by the reporters at about 11:20 a.m.,
Putnam entered the car on the right front side. Pierce drove to the
top of the Main Street ramp and slowed momentarily as Patrolman Roy
E. Vaughn stepped from his position at the top of the ramp toward the
street to watch for traffic.[C5-129] After Pierce’s car left the garage
area, Brown drove another police car out of the garage, moved part way
up the Commerce Street ramp, and began to back down into position to
receive Oswald. Dhority also proceeded to drive the followup car into
position ahead of Brown.[C5-130]
As Pierce’s car started up the ramp at about 11:20 a.m., Oswald,
accompanied by Captain Fritz and four detectives, arrived at the jail
office. Cameramen in the hallway of the basement took pictures of
Oswald through the interior glass windows of the jail office as he was
led through the office to the exit.[C5-131] Some of these cameramen
then ran through the double doors near the jail office and squeezed
into the line which had formed across the Main Street ramp.[C5-132]
Still others remained just inside the double doors or proceeded through
the double doors after Oswald and his escort emerged from the jail
office.[C5-133] (See Commission Exhibit No. 2177, p. 217.)
When Fritz came to the jail office door, he asked if everything was
ready, and a detective standing in the passageway answered yes.[C5-134]
Someone shouted, “Here he comes!”; additional spotlights were turned on
in the basement, and the din increased. A detective stepped from the
jail office and proceeded toward the transfer car. Seconds later Fritz
and then Oswald, with Detective Leavelle at his right, Detective L. C.
Graves at his left, and Detective L. D. Montgomery at his rear, came
through the door. Fritz walked to Brown’s car, which had not yet backed
fully into position; Oswald followed a few feet behind. Newsmen near
the double door moved forward after him.[C5-135] Though movie films
and video tapes indicate that the front line of newsmen along the Main
Street ramp remained fairly stationary, it was the impression of many
who were close to the scene that with Oswald’s appearance the crowd
surged forward. According to Detective Montgomery, who was walking
directly behind Oswald, “as soon as we came out this door * * * this
bunch here just moved in on us.”[C5-136] To Detective B. H. Combest,
standing on the Commerce Street side of the passageway from the jail
office door, it appeared that
Almost the whole line of people pushed forward when Oswald
started to leave the jail office, the door, the hall--all the
newsmen were poking their sound mikes across to him and asking
questions, and they were everyone sticking their flashbulbs up
and around and over him and in his face.[C5-137]
After Oswald had moved about 10 feet from the door of the jail office,
Jack Ruby passed between a newsman and a detective at the edge of the
straining crowd on the Main Street ramp. With his right hand extended
and holding a .38 caliber revolver, Ruby stepped quickly forward
and fired a single fatal bullet into Oswald’s abdomen.[C5-138] (See
Commission Exhibit No. 2636, p. 218.)
POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO JACK RUBY IN ENTERING THE BASEMENT
The killing of Lee Harvey Oswald in the basement of police headquarters
in the midst of more than 70 police officers gave rise to immediate
speculation that one or more members of the police department provided
Jack Ruby assistance which had enabled him to enter the basement and
approach within a few feet of the accused Presidential assassin. In
chapter VI, the Commission has considered whether there is any evidence
linking Jack Ruby with a conspiracy to kill the President. At this
point, however, it is appropriate to consider whether there is evidence
that Jack Ruby received assistance from Dallas policemen or others
in gaining access to the basement on the morning of November 24. An
affirmative answer would require that the evidence be evaluated for
possible connection with the assassination itself. While the Commission
has found no evidence that Ruby received assistance from any person in
entering the basement, his means of entry is significant in evaluating
the adequacy of the precautions taken to protect Oswald.
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2177
JAIL OFFICE AND IMMEDIATE VICINITY
BASEMENT, DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2636
Ruby shooting Oswald (Sunday, November 24).]
Although more than a hundred policemen and newsmen were present in
the basement of police headquarters during the 10 minutes before the
shooting of Oswald, none has been found who definitely observed Jack
Ruby’s entry into the basement. After considering all the evidence,
the Commission has concluded that Ruby entered the basement unaided,
probably via the Main Street ramp, and no more than 3 minutes before
the shooting of Oswald.
Ruby’s account of how he entered the basement by the Main Street ramp
merits consideration in determining his means of entry. Three Dallas
policemen testified that approximately 30 minutes after his arrest,
Ruby told them that he had walked to the top of the Main Street ramp
from the nearby Western Union office and that he walked down the
ramp at the time the police car driven by Lieutenant Pierce emerged
into Main Street.[C5-139] This information did not come to light
immediately because the policemen did not report it to their superiors
until some days later.[C5-140] Ruby refused to discuss his means of
entry in interrogations with other investigators later on the day of
his arrest.[C5-141] Thereafter, in a lengthy interview on December 21
and in a sworn deposition taken after his trial, Ruby gave the same
explanation he had given to the three policemen.[C5-142]
The Commission has been able to establish with precision the time
of certain events leading up to the shooting. Minutes before Oswald
appeared in the basement, Ruby was in the Western Union office located
on the same block of Main Street some 350 feet from the top of the
Main Street ramp. The time stamp on a money order which he sent and
on the receipt found in his pocket establish that the order was
accepted for transmission at almost exactly 11:17 a.m. Ruby was then
observed to depart the office walking in the direction of the police
building.[C5-143] Video tapes taken without interruption before the
shooting establish that Lieutenant Pierce’s car cleared the crowd
at the foot of the ramp 55 seconds before the shooting. They also
show Ruby standing at the foot of the ramp on the Main Street side
before the shooting.[C5-144] (See Commission Exhibit No. 2635, p.
220.) The shooting occurred very close to 11:21 a.m. This time has
been established by observing the time on a clock appearing in motion
pictures of Oswald in the basement jail office, and by records giving
the time of Oswald’s departure from the city jail and the time at which
an ambulance was summoned for Oswald.[C5-145]
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2635
Ruby in basement (extreme right) immediately before shooting (Sunday,
November 24).]
The Main Street ramp provided the most direct route to the basement
from the Western Union office. At normal stride, it requires
approximately 1 minute to walk from that office to the top of the Main
Street ramp and about 20-25 seconds to descend the ramp.[C5-146] It is
certain, therefore, that Ruby entered the basement no more than 2-3
minutes before the shooting. This timetable indicates that a little
more than 2 of the 4 minutes between Ruby’s departure from the Western
Union office and the time of the shooting are unaccounted for. Ruby
could have consumed this time in loitering along the way, at the top of
the ramp, or inside the basement. However, if Ruby is correct that he
passed Pierce’s car at the top of the ramp, he could have been in the
basement no more than 30 seconds before the shooting.[C5-147]
The testimony of two witnesses partially corroborates Ruby’s claim
that he entered by the Main Street ramp. James Turner, an employee
of WBAP-TV Fort Worth, testified that while he was standing near
the railing on the east side of the Main Street ramp, perhaps 30
seconds before the shooting, he observed a man he is confident was
Jack Ruby moving slowly down the Main Street ramp about 10 feet from
the bottom.[C5-148] Two other witnesses testified that they thought
they had seen Ruby on the Main Street side of the ramp before the
shooting.[C5-149]
One other witness has testified regarding the purported movements
of a man on the Main Street ramp, but his testimony merits little
credence. A former police officer, N. J. Daniels, who was standing at
the top of the ramp with the single patrolman guarding this entrance,
R. E. Vaughn, testified that “3 or 4 minutes, I guess”[C5-150] before
the shooting, a man walked down the Main Street ramp in full view of
Vaughn but was not stopped or questioned by the officer. Daniels did
not identify the man as Ruby. Moreover, he gave a description which
differed in important respects from Ruby’s appearance on November 24,
and he has testified that he doesn’t think the man was Ruby.[C5-151]
On November 24, Vaughn telephoned Daniels to ask him if he had seen
anybody walk past him on the morning of the 24th and was told that he
had not; it was not until November 29 that Daniels came forward with
the statement that he had seen a man enter.[C5-152]
Although the sum of this evidence tends to support Ruby’s claim that
he entered by the Main Street ramp, there is other evidence not fully
consistent with Ruby’s story. Patrolman Vaughn stated that he checked
the credentials of all unknown persons seeking to enter the basement,
and his testimony was supported by several persons.[C5-153] Vaughn
denied that the emergence of Lieutenant Pierce’s car from the building
distracted him long enough to allow Ruby to enter the ramp unnoticed,
and neither he nor any of the three officers in Lieutenant Pierce’s car
saw Ruby enter.[C5-154]
Despite Vaughn’s denial the Commission has found no credible evidence
to support any other entry route. Two Dallas detectives believed
they observed three men pushing a WBAP-TV camera into the basement
minutes before the shooting, while only two were with the camera after
Oswald had been shot.[C5-155] However, films taken in the basement
show the WBAP-TV camera being pushed past the detectives by only two
men.[C5-156] The suspicion of the detectives is probably explained by
testimony that a third WBAP-TV employee ran to help steady the incoming
camera as it entered the basement, probably just before the camera
became visible on the films.[C5-157] Moreover, since the camera entered
the basement close to 4 minutes before the shooting,[C5-158] it is
virtually impossible that Ruby could have been in the basement at that
time.
The possibility that Ruby entered the basement by some other route
has been investigated, but the Commission has found no evidence to
support it. Ruby could have walked from the Western Union office to
the Commerce Street ramp on the other side of the building in about 2½
minutes.[C5-159] However, during the minutes preceding the shooting
video tapes show the armored truck in the entranceway to this ramp
with only narrow clearance on either side. (See Commission Exhibit No.
2710, p. 223.) Several policemen were standing near the truck and a
large crowd of spectators was gathered across the street.[C5-160] It is
improbable that Ruby could have squeezed past the truck without having
been observed. If Ruby entered by any other means, he would have had
to pass first through the Police and Courts Building or the attached
Municipal Building, and then secondly through one of the five doors
into the basement, all of which, according to the testimony of police
officers, were secured. The testimony was not completely positive about
one of the doors.[C5-161]
There is no evidence to support the speculations that Ruby used
a press badge to gain entry to the basement or that he concealed
himself in a police car. Police found no form of press card on Ruby’s
person after his apprehension, nor any discarded badges within the
basement.[C5-162] There is no evidence that any police officer admitted
Ruby on the pretense that he was a member of the press or any other
pretense.[C5-163]
Police vehicles in the basement were inspected during the course of
the search supervised by Sergeant Dean.[C5-164] According to Patrolman
Vaughn, the only vehicles that entered the basement while he was at the
top of the Main Street ramp were two patrol cars, one of which entered
twice, and a patrol wagon which was searched by another policeman
after it entered the basement. All entered on official police business
and considerably more than 4 minutes before Oswald was shot.[C5-165]
None of the witnesses at the top of the Main Street ramp recalled any
police car entering the basement in the 4-minute period after Ruby
left the Western Union office and preceding the shooting.[C5-166] The
possibility that Ruby could have entered the basement in a car may
therefore be completely discounted.
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2710]
The Dallas Police Department, concerned at the failure of its security
measures, conducted an extensive investigation that revealed no
information indicating complicity between any police officer and Jack
Ruby.[C5-167] Ruby denied to the Commission that he received any
form of assistance.[C5-168] The FBI interviewed every member of the
police department who was on duty in the basement on November 24, and
Commission staff members took sworn depositions from many. With few
exceptions, newsmen who were present in the basement at the time also
gave statements and/or depositions. As the record before the Commission
indicated, Ruby had had rather free access to the Dallas police
quarters during the period subsequent to the assassination, but there
was no evidence that implicated the police or newsmen in Ruby’s actions
on that day.[C5-169]
Ruby was known to have a wide acquaintanceship with Dallas policemen
and to seek their favor. According to testimony from many sources, he
gave free coffee at his clubs to many policemen while they were on
duty and free admittance and discounts on beverages when they were off
duty.[C5-170] Although Chief Curry’s estimate that approximately 25 to
50 of the 1,175 men in the Dallas Police Department knew Ruby[C5-171]
may be too conservative, the Commission found no evidence of any
suspicious relationships between Ruby and any police officer.
The Commission found no substantial evidence that any member of the
Dallas Police Department recognized Jack Ruby as an unauthorized person
in the basement prior to the time Sgt. P. T. Dean, according to his
testimony, saw Ruby dart forward toward Oswald. But Dean was then
part way up the Commerce Street ramp, too far removed to act.[C5-172]
Patrolman W. J. Harrison, Capt. Glen King, and reserve officers Capt.
C. O. Arnett and Patrolman W. M. Croy were among those in front of
Ruby at the time Dean saw him. They all faced away from Ruby, toward
the jail office.[C5-173] Video tapes show that Harrison turned in the
direction of the ramp at the time Lieutenant Pierce’s car passed,
and once again 25 seconds later, but there is no indication that he
observed or recognized Ruby.[C5-174] The policemen standing on the
south side of the passageway from the jail office, who might have
been looking in Ruby’s direction, had the glare of television and
photographer’s lights in their eyes.[C5-175]
The Commission also considered the possibility that a member of the
police department called Ruby at his apartment and informed him, either
intentionally or unintentionally, of the time of the planned transfer.
From at least 10:19 a.m., until close to 11 a.m., on Sunday, Ruby was
at his apartment,[C5-176] where he could have received a call that the
transfer was imminent. He apparently left his apartment between 10:45
and 11 a.m.[C5-177] However, the drive from Ruby’s apartment to the
Western Union office takes approximately 15 minutes.[C5-178] Since
the time of the contemplated transfer could not have been known to
anyone until a few minutes before 11:15 a.m., a precise time could not
have been conveyed to Ruby while he was at his apartment. Moreover,
the television and radio publicized the transfer plans throughout
the morning, obviating the need for Ruby to obtain information
surreptitiously.
ADEQUACY OF SECURITY PRECAUTIONS
The shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald obviously resulted from the failure
of the security precautions which the Dallas Police Department had
taken to protect their prisoner. In assessing the causes of the
security failure, the Commission has not overlooked the extraordinary
circumstances which prevailed during the days that the attention of the
world was turned on Dallas. Confronted with a unique situation, the
Dallas police took special security measures to insure Oswald’s safety.
Unfortunately these did not include adequate control of the great crowd
of newsmen that inundated the police department building.
The Dallas police had in custody a man whose alleged act had brought
upon him immediate and universal opprobrium. There were many possible
reasons why people might have attempted to kill him if given the
opportunity. Concerned that there might be an attempt on Oswald’s life,
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a message to Chief Curry on November
22 through Special Agent Manning C. Clements of the FBI’s Dallas
office, urging that Oswald be afforded the utmost security. Curry does
not recall receiving the message.[C5-179]
Although the presence of a great mass of press representatives
created an extraordinary security problem in the building, the
police department pursued its normal policy of admitting the press.
That policy, set forth in General Order No. 81 of the Dallas Police
Department, provided--
* * * that members of this Department render every assistance,
except such as obviously may seriously hinder or delay the
proper functioning of the Department, to the accredited
members of the official news-gathering agencies and this
includes newspaper, television cameramen and news-reel
photographers.[C5-180]
In a letter to all members of the police department, dated February 7,
1963, Chief Curry explained the general order, in part, as follows:
The General Order covering this subject is not merely
permissive. It does not state that the Officer may, if he
so chooses, assist the press. It rather places on him a
responsibility to lend active assistance.
* * * * *
* * * as a Department we deal with public affairs. It is the
right of the public to know about these affairs, and one of
the most accurate and useful avenues we have of supplying this
information is through the newspapers and radio and television
stations.
Implied in the General Order is a prohibition for the Officer
to improperly attempt to interfere with the news media
representative, who is functioning in his capacity as such.
Such activity on the part of any Police Officer is regarded
by the press as an infringement of rights, and the Department
shares this view.[C5-181]
Under this policy, news representatives ordinarily had access to the
Police and Courts Building. The first newsmen to arrive on Friday
afternoon were admitted in accordance with the policy; others who
came later simply followed behind them. Shortly after Oswald arrived,
Captain King granted permission to bring television cameras to the
third floor.[C5-182] By the time the unwieldy proportions of the crowd
of newsmen became apparent, it had already become well entrenched on
the third floor. No one suggested reversing the department’s policy
expressed in General Order No. 81. Chief Curry testified that at no
time did he consider clearing the crowd from the building; he “saw no
particular harm in allowing the media to observe the prisoner.”[C5-183]
Captain King later stated candidly that he simply became “accustomed to
the idea of them being out there.”[C5-184]
The general policy of the Dallas police recognized that the rule
of full cooperation did not apply when it might jeopardize an
investigation.[C5-185] In retrospect, most members of the department
believed that the general rule allowing admittance of the press to the
police quarters should not have been followed after the assassination.
Few, if any, thought this at the time.[C5-186] By failing to exclude
the press from the building on Friday and Saturday, the Dallas police
made it possible for the uncontrolled crowd to nearly surround Oswald
on the frequent occasions that he moved through the third floor
corridor. The decision to allow newsmen to observe the transfer on
Sunday followed naturally the policy established during these first 2
days of Oswald’s detention.
The reporters and cameramen descended upon the third floor of the
Police and Courts Building in such numbers that the pressroom on the
third floor proved wholly inadequate. Rather than the “two or three
or maybe a half dozen reporters” who normally appeared to cover local
police stories,[C5-187] the police were faced with upward of 100.
Bringing with them cameras, microphones, cables, and spotlights, the
newsmen inevitably spilled over into areas where they interfered
with the transaction of police business and the maintenance of
security.[C5-188]
Aside from numbers, the gathering of reporters presented a problem
because most of them were representatives of the national and foreign
press, rather than the local press.[C5-189] These newsmen carried
individual press cards rather than identification cards issued by the
Dallas police. Therefore, it was impossible for the police to verify
quickly the identity of this great number of unfamiliar people who
appeared almost simultaneously.[C5-190] Because of the close physical
proximity of the milling mass of insistent newsmen to the prisoner, the
failure to authenticate press credentials subjected the prisoner to a
serious security risk.
Although steps were taken on Friday afternoon to insure that persons
seeking entry to the third floor were there for a legitimate purpose,
reasons could be fabricated. Moreover, because of the large crowd,
it was easier for unauthorized persons to slip by those guarding
the entrances. Jack Ruby, for one, was able to gain entry to the
third-floor corridor on Friday night.[C5-191]
The third-floor corridor provided the only passageway between the
homicide and robbery bureau and the jail elevator. No thought seems to
have been given, however, to the possibility of questioning Oswald on
some other floor.[C5-192] Moreover, Oswald’s most extended exposure to
the press, at the Friday evening press conference, was unrelated to any
phase of the investigation and was motivated primarily by the desire to
satisfy the demands of the news media to see the prisoner.[C5-193] The
risks attendant upon this appearance were emphasized by the presence of
unauthorized persons, including Jack Ruby, at the press conference in
the basement assembly room.[C5-194]
Although Oswald was repeatedly exposed to possible assaults on Friday
and Saturday, he met his death on Sunday, when police took the most
extensive security precautions. The assembly of more than 70 police
officers, some of them armed with tear gas, and the contemplated use
of an armored truck, appear to have been designed primarily to repel
an attempt of a mob to seize the prisoner.[C5-195] Chief Curry’s own
testimony indicated that such a focus resulted not from any appraisal
of the varied risks to Oswald’s life but came about in response to the
telephone threat Sunday morning that a hundred men were going to attack
Oswald.[C5-196]
A more balanced appraisal would have given thought to protection
against any attack. For example, the acceptance of inadequate press
credentials posed a clear avenue for a one-man assault. The likelihood
of an unauthorized person obtaining entry by such means is confirmed
not alone by the fact that Jack Ruby managed to get by a guard at one
entrance. Several newsmen related that their credentials were not
checked as they entered the basement Sunday morning. Seconds before
Oswald was shot, the double doors from the hallway next to the jail
office afforded a means of entry to the basement without presentation
of credentials earlier demanded of newsmen.[C5-197]
The swarm of newspeople in the basement also substantially limited the
ability of the police to detect an unauthorized person, once he had
entered the basement. While Jack Ruby might have been easily spotted
if only police officers had been in the basement,[C5-198] he remained
apparently unnoticed in the crowd of newsmen until he lunged forward
toward Oswald. The near-blinding television and motion picture lights
which were allowed to shine upon the escort party further increased the
difficulty of observing unusual movements in the basement.
Moreover, by making public the plans for the transfer, the police
attracted to the city jail many persons who otherwise might not
have learned of the move until it had been completed. This group
included the onlookers gathered on Commerce Street and a few people
on Main Street. Also, continuous television and radio coverage of the
activities in the basement might have resulted in compromise of the
transfer operation.
These risks to Oswald’s safety, growing in part out of adherence to
the general policy of the police department, were also accepted for
other reasons. Many members of the police department believed that the
extraordinary public attention aroused by the tragic death of President
Kennedy obliged them to make special efforts to accommodate the press.
Captain King carefully articulated one reason why the newsmen were
permitted
* * * to remain in the hallways, * * * to view the
investigation and to keep in constant touch with progress of
the investigation.
* * * * *
We realized that if we arrested a suspect, that if we brought
him into the police station and then conducted all of our
investigations behind closed doors, that if we gave no reports
on the progress of our investigation and did not permit the
newsmen to see the suspect--if we excluded them from it--we
would leave ourselves open not only to criticisms that we were
fabricating a suspect and were attempting to pin something on
someone, but even more importantly, we would cause people to
lose faith in our fairness and, through losing faith in our
fairness, to lose faith to a certain extent in the processes of
law.
We felt it was mandatory that as many people knew about it as
possible. We knew, too, that if we did exclude the newsmen,
we would be leaving ourselves open to a charge that we were
using improper action, duress, physical abuse, all of these
things.[C5-199]
While Oswald was in custody, the Dallas police kept the press informed
about the treatment Oswald was receiving. The public could have been
assured that the prisoner was not mistreated and that his rights
were fully respected by the police, without each one of hundreds
of cameramen and reporters being permitted to satisfy himself that
the police had not abused the prisoner. This result could have been
accomplished by obtaining reports from members of the family who
visited him, or by a committee of the bar or other substantial citizens
of the community. When it became known on Saturday that Oswald did
not have an attorney, the president of the Dallas Bar Association
visited him to inquire whether he wished assistance in obtaining
counsel.[C5-200]
Moreover, the right of the public to know does not give the press
license to interfere with the efficient operation of law-enforcement
agencies. Permitting the press to remain on the third floor of the
building served no valid purpose that could not have been met if the
press had been excluded from the third floor, as it was from the fourth
and fifth floors, and informed of developments either through press
releases or at press conferences elsewhere in the building.
Having failed to exclude the mass of the press from the basement during
the transfer of Oswald, the police department’s security measures could
not be completely effective. Despite the pressures that prevailed,
planning and coordination of security arrangements could have been
more thorough and precise. No single member of the Dallas Police
Department ever assumed full responsibility for the details of Oswald’s
transfer.[C5-201] Chief Curry participated in some of the planning, but
he felt that primary authority for the transfer should be Fritz’, since
Fritz had charge of the investigation. According to Chief Curry--
Fritz and I, I think, discussed this briefly, the possibility
of getting that prisoner out of the city hall during the night
hours and by another route and slipping him to the jail, but
actually Fritz was not too much in favor of this and I more or
less left this up to Fritz as to when and how this transfer
would be made, because he has in the past transferred many of
his prisoners to the county jail and I felt that since it was
his responsibility, the prisoner was, to let him decide when
and how he wanted to transfer this prisoner.[C5-202]
Fritz, on the other hand, felt that Curry was directing the transfer
arrangements: “I was transferring him like the chief told me to
transfer him.”[C5-203] When Capt. W. B. Frazier notified Fritz by
telephone early Sunday morning about the threats to Oswald’s life,
Fritz replied that Curry should be notified, since he was handling
the transfer.[C5-204] When urged to modify the transfer plans to
avoid the press, as he later testified he would have preferred to do,
Fritz declined on the ground that Curry had already decided to the
contrary.[C5-205] Hence, if the recollection of both officials is
accurate, the basic decision to move Oswald at an announced time and
in the presence of the news media was never carefully thought through
by either man. Curry and Fritz had agreed Saturday evening that Oswald
should not be moved at night, but their discussion apparently went
little further.[C5-206]
Perhaps the members of the Dallas Police Department were, as many
testified, accustomed to working together so that formal instructions
were sometimes unnecessary. On the other hand, it is clear, at least
in retrospect, that this particular occasion demanded more than the
usual informal unspoken understandings. The evidence indicates that no
member of the department at any time considered fully the implications
of moving Oswald through the basement. Nor did any single official or
group of officials coordinate and direct where the transfer vehicle
would be stationed to accept Oswald, where the press would stand, and
the number and positioning of police officers in the basement. Captain
Jones indicated that there were to be two solid lines of policemen from
the jail office door to the transfer vehicle,[C5-207] but lines were
formed only along the walls of the areaway between the jail office
door and the ramp. The newsmen were not kept east of the auto ramp
where a railing would have separated them from Oswald. No strong ranks
of policemen were ever placed in front of the newsmen once they were
allowed to gather in the area of the Main Street ramp.[C5-208] Many
policemen in the basement did not know the function they were supposed
to perform. No instructions were given that certain policemen should
watch the crowd rather than Oswald.[C5-209] Apparently no one gave any
thought to the blinding effect of television and other camera lights
upon the escort party.
Largely on his own initiative, Captain Talbert undertook to secure the
basement, with only minimal coordination with those responsible for
and familiar with the route Oswald would take through the basement.
Several officials recalled that Lt. Woodrow Wiggins was directed to
clear the basement jail office, but Wiggins testified that he received
no such assignment.[C5-210] In any event, less than 20 minutes before
the transfer, Captain Jones observed newsmen in the jail office and had
them removed. But no official removed news personnel from the corridor
beside the jail office; indeed, cameramen took pictures through the
glass windows of the jail office as Oswald walked through it toward
the basement, and then approached to within 20 feet of Oswald from
the rear at the same time that Jack Ruby moved toward Oswald from the
front.[C5-211]
A clear example of the inadequacy of coordination was the last-minute
change in plans to transfer Oswald in an unmarked police car rather
than by armored truck.[C5-212] The plan to use an armored vehicle was
adopted without informing Fritz. When Fritz was told of the arrangement
shortly after 11 o’clock, he objected, and hurried steps were taken
to modify the arrangements. Fritz was then prematurely informed that
the basement arrangements were complete. When Oswald and the escorting
detectives entered the basement, the transfer car had not yet been
backed into position, nor had the policemen been arranged to block the
newsmen’s access to Oswald’s path.[C5-213] If the transfer car had been
carefully positioned between the press and Oswald, Ruby might have been
kept several yards from his victim and possibly without a clear view
of him. Detective Leavelle, who accompanied Oswald into the basement,
testified:
* * * I was surprised when I walked to the door and the car was
not in the spot it should have been, but I could see it was in
back, and backing into position, but had it been in position
where we were told it would be, that would have eliminated
a lot of the area in which anyone would have access to him,
because it would have been blocked by the car. In fact, if the
car had been sitting where we were told it was going to be,
see--it would have been sitting directly upon the spot where
Ruby was standing when he fired the shot.[C5-214]
Captain Jones described the confusion with which Oswald’s entry into
the basement was in fact received:
Then the change--going to put two cars up there. There is no
reason why that back car can’t get all the way back to the jail
office. The original plan would be that the line of officers
would be from the jail door to the vehicle. Then they say,
“Here he comes.” * * * It is too late to get the people out of
the way of the car and form the line. I am aware that Oswald is
already coming because of the furor, so, I was trying to keep
everybody out of the way and keep the way clear and I heard a
shot.[C5-215]
Therefore, regardless of whether the press should have been allowed to
witness the transfer, security measures in the basement for Oswald’s
protection could and should have been better organized and more
thorough. These additional deficiencies were directly related to the
decision to admit newsmen to the basement. The Commission concludes
that the failure of the police to remove Oswald secretly or to control
the crowd in the basement at the time of the transfer were the major
causes of the security breakdown which led to Oswald’s death.
NEWS COVERAGE AND POLICE POLICY
Consistent with its policy of allowing news representatives to remain
within the working quarters of the Police and Courts Building, the
police department made every effort to keep the press fully informed
about the progress of the investigation. As a result, from Friday
afternoon until after the killing of Oswald on Sunday, the press was
able to publicize virtually all of the information about the case
which had been gathered until that time. In the process, a great deal
of misinformation was disseminated to a worldwide audience. (For some
examples see app. XII.)
As administrative assistant to Chief Curry, Captain King also handled
departmental press relations and issued press releases. According to
King, it was “the responsibility of each member of the department
to furnish to the press information on incidents in which they,
themselves, were involved, except on matters which involved * *
* personnel policies of the department, or * * * unless it would
obviously interfere with an investigation underway.”[C5-216] In
Oswald’s case, Chief Curry released most of the information to the
press. He and Assistant Chief Batchelor agreed on Friday that Curry
would make all announcements to the press.[C5-217] However, there is no
evidence that this decision was ever communicated to the rest of the
police force. The chief consequence appears to have been that Batchelor
refrained from making statements to the news media during this period.
Most of the information was disclosed through informal oral statements
or answers to questions at impromptu and clamorous press conferences in
the third floor corridor. Written press releases were not employed. The
ambulatory press conference became a familiar sight during these days.
Whenever Curry or other officials appeared in the hallway, newsmen
surrounded them, asking questions and requesting statements. Usually
the officials complied. (See Commission Exhibit No. 2632, p. 232.)
[Illustration: COMMISSION EXHIBIT NO. 2632
Press interview with Chief Curry in third floor corridor.]
Curry appeared in interviews on television and radio at least a
dozen times during November 22-24. He did not attend any of the
interrogations of Oswald in Captain Fritz’ office except at the
beginning and toward the end of Sunday morning’s session; he received
his information through Captain Fritz and other sources.[C5-218]
Nevertheless, in sessions with the newsmen on Friday and Saturday he
gave detailed information on the progress of the case against Oswald.
Recorded statements of television and radio interviews with Curry and
other officials in Dallas during November 22-24 have been transcribed
and included in the record compiled by the Commission.[C5-219] An
example of these interviews is the following transcript of remarks made
by Curry to newsmen on Saturday:
Q. Chief Curry, I understand you have some new information in
this case. Could you relate what that is?
A. Yes, we’ve just been informed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, that they, the FBI, have the order letter from
a mail order house, and the order was sent to their laboratory
in Washington and the writing on this order was compared with
known samples of our suspect, Oswald’s handwriting and found to
be the same.
Q. This order was for the rifle?
A. This order was for the rifle to a mail order house in
Chicago. It was [inaudible]. The return address was to Dallas,
Texas, to the post office box under the name of A. Hidell,
H-I-D-E-double L. This is the post office box of our suspect.
This gun was mailed parcel post March 20, 1963. I understand
he left Dallas shortly after this and didn’t come back until I
think about two months ago.
Q. Do you know again on what date this rifle was ordered and
are you able to link it definitely as the rifle which you
confiscated at the School Book Depository?
A. That we have not done so far. If the FBI has been able to do
it I have not been informed of it yet. We do know that this man
ordered a rifle of the type that was used in the assassination
of the President from this mail order house in Chicago and
the FBI has definitely identified the writing as that of our
suspect.
Q. On another subject--I understand you have photographs of
the suspect, Oswald, with a rifle like that used. Could you
describe that picture?
A. This is the picture of Oswald standing facing a camera with
a rifle in his hand which is very similar to the rifle that we
have in our possession. He also had a pistol strapped on his
hip. He was holding two papers in his hand, with one of them
seemed to be The Worker and the other says Be Militant--I
don’t know whether that was headlines or the name of the paper.
Q. How much did the gun cost from the mail order house?
A. I understand the gun was advertised for $12.78, I believe.
Q. Have you received any results on the ballistics test
conducted on the gun and on Oswald?
A. They’re going to be favorable. I don’t have a formal report
yet.
Q. But you are sure at this time they will be favorable?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you feel now that you have the case completely wrapped
up, or are you continuing?
A. We will continue as long as there is a shred of evidence to
be gathered. We have a strong case at this time.
Q. I believe you said earlier this afternoon that you have a
new development which does wrap up the case--the first time you
said the case definitely is secure. Is that correct?
A. That was this morning. This additional evidence just makes a
stronger case.
Q. But this is not the same evidence you were referring to then?
A. No, that’s true.
Q. Would you be willing to say what that evidence was?
A. No, sir. I don’t wish to reveal it. It might jeopardize our
case.
Commentator: Thank you very much Chief Jesse Curry of the
Dallas Police Department.[C5-220]
Although Captain Fritz permitted himself to be interviewed by the
news media less frequently than did Chief Curry, he nevertheless
answered questions and ventured opinions about the progress of the
investigation. On Saturday he told reporters that he was convinced
beyond a doubt that Oswald had killed the President. He discussed some
of the evidence in the case, especially the rifle, but his contribution
to the knowledge of the reporters was small compared with that of Chief
Curry.[C5-221]
Many other members of the police department, including high
officials, detectives, and patrolmen, were also interviewed by news
representatives during these days.[C5-222] Some of these men had
participated in specific aspects of the case, such as the capture of
Oswald at the Texas Theatre and the search for evidence at the Texas
School Book Depository Building. Few, if any, seemed reluctant to
submit to questions and to being televised. It seemed to District
Attorney Wade that the newsmen “just followed everybody everywhere they
went * * * they interviewed some of your patrolmen * * * on the corner
* * * they were interviewing anybody.”[C5-223]
Wade himself also made several statements to the press. He visited
police headquarters twice on Friday, twice on Saturday, and twice on
Sunday. On most of these occasions he was interviewed by the press
and appeared on television.[C5-224] After Oswald had appeared before
the press on Friday night, Wade held an impromptu conference with
reporters in the overflowing assembly room.[C5-225] Wade told the
press on Saturday that he would not reveal any evidence because it
might prejudice the selection of a jury.[C5-226] On other occasions,
however, he mentioned some items of evidence and expressed his opinions
regarding Oswald’s guilt. He told the press on Friday night that
Oswald’s wife had told the police that her husband had a rifle in the
garage at the house in Irving and that it was missing the morning of
the assassination. On one occasion he repeated the error that the
murder rifle had been a Mauser. Another time, he stated his belief that
Oswald had prepared for the assassination months in advance, including
what he would tell the police. He also said that Oswald had practiced
with the rifle to improve his marksmanship.[C5-227]
The running commentary on the investigation by the police inevitably
carried with it the disclosure of many details that proved to be
erroneous. In their efforts to keep the public abreast of the
investigation, the police reported hearsay items and unverified
leads; further investigation proved many of these to be incorrect or
inaccurate. For example, the rifle found on the sixth floor of the
Texas School Book Depository Building was initially identified as a
Mauser 7.65 rather than a Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5 because a deputy
constable who was one of the first to see it thought it looked like a
Mauser. He neither handled the weapon nor saw it at close range.[C5-228]
Police sources were also responsible for the mistaken notion that the
chicken bones found on the sixth floor were the remains of Oswald’s
lunch. They had in fact been left by another employee who ate his lunch
there at least 15 minutes before the assassination.[C5-229] Curry
repeated the erroneous report that a Negro had picked up Oswald near
the scene of the assassination and driven him across town.[C5-230]
It was also reported that the map found in Oswald’s room contained a
marked route of the Presidential motorcade when it actually contained
markings of places where Oswald may have applied for jobs, including,
of course, the Texas School Book Depository.[C5-231]
Concern about the effects of the unlimited disclosures was being
voiced by Saturday morning. According to District Attorney Wade,
he received calls from lawyers in Dallas and elsewhere expressing
concern about providing an attorney for Oswald and about the amount of
information being given to the press by the police and the district
attorney.[C5-232] Curry continued to answer questions on television and
radio during the remainder of the day and Sunday morning.[C5-233]
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover became concerned because “almost as
soon as * * * [FBI Laboratory reports] would reach the Dallas Police
Department, the chief of police or one of the representatives of the
department would go on TV or radio and relate findings of the FBI,
giving information such as the identification of the gun and other
items of physical evidence.”[C5-234] On Sunday, after Oswald was
shot, Hoover dispatched a personal message to Curry requesting him
“not to go on the air any more until this case * * * [is] resolved.”
Hoover testified later that Curry agreed not to make any more
statements.[C5-235]
The shooting of Oswald shocked the Dallas police, and after the
interviews that immediately followed the shooting they were disposed
to remain silent. Chief Curry made only one more television appearance
after the shooting. At 1:30 p.m., he descended to the assembly room
where, tersely and grimly, he announced Oswald’s death. He refused to
answer any of the questions shouted at him by the persistent reporters,
concluding the conference in less than a minute.[C5-236]
District Attorney Wade also held one more press conference. Before
doing so on Sunday evening, he returned once more to the police
station and held a meeting with “all the brass” except Curry. Wade
told them that “people are saying * * * you had the wrong man and you
all were the one who killed him or let him out here to have him killed
intentionally.” Wade told the police that “somebody ought to go out in
television and lay out the evidence that you had on Oswald, and tell
them everything.” He sat down and listed from memory items of evidence
in the case against Oswald. According to Wade, Chief Curry refused to
make any statements because he had told an FBI inspector that he would
say no more. The police refused to furnish Wade with additional details
of the case.[C5-237]
Wade nonetheless proceeded to hold a lengthy formal press conference
that evening, in which he attempted to list all of the evidence that
had been accumulated at that point tending to establish Oswald as the
assassin of President Kennedy. Unfortunately, at that time, as he
subsequently testified, he lacked a thorough grasp of the evidence and
made a number of errors.[C5-238] He stated that Oswald had told a woman
on a bus that the President had been killed, an error apparently caused
by the busdriver having confused Oswald with another passenger who was
on the bus after Oswald had left. Wade also repeated the error about
Oswald’s having a map marked with the route of the motorcade. He told
reporters that Oswald’s description and name “went out by the police
to look for him.”[C5-239] The police never mentioned Oswald’s name in
their broadcast descriptions before his arrest.[C5-240]
Wade was innocent of one error imputed to him since November 24.
The published transcript of part of the press conference furnished
to newspapers by the Associated Press represented Wade as having
identified the cabdriver who took Oswald to North Beckley Avenue
after the shooting, as one named “Darryl Click.” The transcript as it
appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post of November 26,
reads:
A. [Wade] a lady. He then--the bus, he asked the bus driver to
stop, got off at a stop, caught a taxicab driver, Darryl Click.
I don’t have his exact place--and went to his home in Oak
Cliff, changed his clothes hurriedly, and left.[C5-241]
The correct transcript of the press conference, taken from an audio
tape supplied by station WBAP, Fort Worth, is as follows:
A. [Wade] A lady. He then--the bus, he asked the bus driver to
stop, got off at a stop, caught a taxicab driver.
Q. Where?
A. In Oak Cliff. I don’t have the exact place--and went to
his home in Oak Cliff, changed his clothes hurriedly and
left.[C5-242]
In this manner, a section of Dallas, “Oak Cliff,” became a nonexistent
taxicab driver, “Darryl Click.” Wade did not mention the cabdriver
by name at any time. In transcribing the conference from the sound
tape, a stenographer apparently made an error that might have become
permanently imbedded in the literature of the event but for the
preservation and use of an original sound tape.
Though many of the inaccuracies were subsequently corrected by the
police and are negated by findings of the Commission included elsewhere
in this report, the publicizing of unchecked information provided much
of the basis for the myths and rumors that came into being soon after
the President’s death. The erroneous disclosures became the basis for
distorted reconstruction and interpretations of the assassination.
The necessity for the Dallas authorities to correct themselves or
to be corrected by other sources gave rise not only to criticism of
the police department’s competence but also to doubts regarding the
veracity of the police. Skeptics sought to cast doubt on much of the
correct evidence later developed and to find support for their own
theories in these early police statements.
The immediate disclosure of information by the police created a further
risk of injuring innocent citizens by unfavorable publicity. This
was the unfortunate experience of Joe R. Molina, a Dallas-born Navy
veteran who had been employed by the Texas School Book Depository
since 1947 and on November 22, 1963, held the position of credit
manager. Apparently because of Molina’s employment at the Depository
and his membership in a veterans’ organization, the American G.I.
Forum, that the Dallas police considered possibly subversive, Dallas
policemen searched Molina’s home with his permission, at about 1:30
a.m., Saturday, November 23. During the day Molina was intermittently
interrogated at police headquarters for 6 or 7 hours, chiefly about his
membership in the American G.I. Forum, and also about Oswald. He was
never arrested, charged, or held in custody.[C5-243]
While Molina was being questioned, officials of the police department
made statements or answered questions[C5-244] that provided the basis
for television reports about Molina during the day. These reports spoke
of a “second suspect being picked up,” insinuated that the Dallas
police had reason to suspect another person who worked in the Texas
School Book Depository, stated that the suspect had been arrested and
his home searched, and mentioned that Molina may have been identified
by the U.S. Department of Justice as a possible subversive.[C5-245]
No evidence was ever presented to link Molina with Oswald except as
a fellow employee of the Texas School Book Depository. According to
Molina, he had never spoken to Oswald.[C5-246] The FBI notified the
Commission that Molina had never been the subject of an investigation
by it and that it had never given any information about Molina to
the Dallas police concerning any alleged subversive activities by
him.[C5-247] The Dallas police explained in a statement to the FBI that
they had never had a file on Molina, but that they did have one on the
American G.I. Forum.[C5-248]
Molina lost his job in December. He felt that he was being discharged
because of the unfavorable publicity he had received, but officials of
the Depository claimed that automation was the reason. Molina testified
that he had difficulty in finding another position, until finally, with
the help of a fellow church member, he secured a position at a lower
salary than his previous one.[C5-249]
If Oswald had been tried for his murders of November 22, the effects
of the news policy pursued by the Dallas authorities would have proven
harmful both to the prosecution and the defense. The misinformation
reported after the shootings might have been used by the defense to
cast doubt on the reliability of the State’s entire case. Though each
inaccuracy can be explained without great difficulty, the number
and variety of misstatements issued by the police shortly after the
assassination would have greatly assisted a skillful defense attorney
attempting to influence the attitudes of jurors.
A fundamental objection to the news policy pursued by the Dallas
police, however, is the extent to which it endangered Oswald’s
constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. Because of the
nature of the crime, the widespread attention which it necessarily
received, and the intense public feelings which it aroused, it would
have been a most difficult task to select an unprejudiced jury, either
in Dallas or elsewhere. But the difficulty was markedly increased
by the divulgence of the specific items of evidence with which the
police linked Oswald to the two killings. The disclosure of evidence
encouraged the public, from which a jury would ultimately be impaneled,
to prejudge the very questions that would be raised at trial.
Moreover, rules of law might have prevented the prosecution from
presenting portions of this evidence to the jury. For example, though
expressly recognizing that Oswald’s wife could not be compelled to
testify against him, District Attorney Wade revealed to the Nation that
Marina Oswald had affirmed her husband’s ownership of a rifle like that
found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository.[C5-250]
Curry stated that Oswald had refused to take a lie detector test,
although such a statement would have been inadmissible in a
trial.[C5-251] The exclusion of such evidence, however, would have been
meaningless if jurors were already familiar with the same facts from
previous television or newspaper reports. Wade might have influenced
prospective jurors by his mistaken statement that the paraffin test
showed that Oswald had fired a gun. The tests merely showed that he had
nitrate traces on his hands, which did not necessarily mean that he had
fired either a rifle or a pistol.[C5-252]
The disclosure of evidence was seriously aggravated by the statements
of numerous responsible officials that they were certain of Oswald’s
guilt. Captain Fritz said that the case against Oswald was “cinched.”
Curry reported on Saturday that “we are sure of our case.”[C5-253]
Curry announced that he considered Oswald sane, and Wade told the
public that he would ask for the death penalty.[C5-254]
The American Bar Association declared in December 1963 that “widespread
publicizing of Oswald’s alleged guilt, involving statements by
officials and public disclosures of the details of ‘evidence,’ would
have made it extremely difficult to impanel an unprejudiced jury and
afford the accused a fair trial.”[C5-255] Local bar associations
expressed similar feelings.[C5-256] The Commission agrees that
Lee Harvey Oswald’s opportunity for a trial by 12 jurors free of
preconception as to his guilt or innocence would have been seriously
jeopardized by the premature disclosure and weighing of the evidence
against him.
The problem of disclosure of information and its effect on trials is,
of course, further complicated by the independent activities of the
press in developing information on its own from sources other than
law enforcement agencies. Had the police not released the specific
items of evidence against Oswald, it is still possible that the other
information presented on television and in the newspapers, chiefly of a
biographical nature, would itself have had a prejudicial effect on the
public.
In explanation of the news policy adopted by the Dallas authorities,
Chief Curry observed that “it seemed like there was a great demand by
the general public to know what was going on.”[C5-257] In a prepared
statement, Captain King wrote:
At that time we felt a necessity for permitting the newsmen as
much latitude as possible. We realized the magnitude of the
incident the newsmen were there to cover. We realized that not
only the nation but the world would be greatly interested in
what occurred in Dallas. We believed that we had an obligation
to make as widely known as possible everything we could
regarding the investigation of the assassination and the manner
in which we undertook that investigation.[C5-258]
The Commission recognizes that the people of the United States, and
indeed the world, had a deep-felt interest in learning of the events
surrounding the death of President Kennedy, including the development
of the investigation in Dallas. An informed public provided the
ultimate guarantee that adequate steps would be taken to apprehend
those responsible for the assassination and that all necessary
precautions would be taken to protect the national security. It was
therefore proper and desirable that the public know which agencies were
participating in the investigation and the rate at which their work
was progressing. The public was also entitled to know that Lee Harvey
Oswald had been apprehended and that the State had gathered sufficient
evidence to arraign him for the murders of the President and Patrolman
Tippit, that he was being held pending action of the grand jury, that
the investigation was continuing, and that the law enforcement agencies
had discovered no evidence which tended to show that any other person
was involved in either slaying.
However, neither the press nor the public had a right to be
contemporaneously informed by the police or prosecuting authorities
of the details of the evidence being accumulated against Oswald.
Undoubtedly the public was interested in these disclosures, but
its curiosity should not have been satisfied at the expense of the
accused’s right to a trial by an impartial jury. The courtroom, not the
newspaper or television screen, is the appropriate forum in our system
for the trial of a man accused of a crime.
If the evidence in the possession of the authorities had not been
disclosed, it is true that the public would not have been in a position
to assess the adequacy of the investigation or to apply pressures for
further official undertakings. But a major consequence of the hasty
and at times inaccurate divulgence of evidence after the assassination
was simply to give rise to groundless rumors and public confusion.
Moreover, without learning the details of the case, the public could
have been informed by the responsible authority of the general scope of
the investigation and the extent to which State and Federal agencies
were assisting in the police work.
RESPONSIBILITY OF NEWS MEDIA
While appreciating the heavy and unique pressures with which the
Dallas Police Department was confronted by reason of the assassination
of President Kennedy, primary responsibility for having failed to
control the press and to check the flow of undigested evidence to the
public must be borne by the police department. It was the only agency
that could have established orderly and sound operating procedures to
control the multitude of newsmen gathered in the police building after
the assassination.
The Commission believes, however, that a part of the responsibility
for the unfortunate circumstances following the President’s death
must be borne by the news media. The crowd of newsmen generally
failed to respond properly to the demands of the police. Frequently
without permission, news representatives used police offices on the
third floor, tying up facilities and interfering with normal police
operations. Police efforts to preserve order and to clear passageways
in the corridor were usually unsuccessful. On Friday night the
reporters completely ignored Curry’s injunction against asking Oswald
questions in the assembly room and crowding in on him. On Sunday
morning, the newsmen were instructed to direct no questions at Oswald;
nevertheless, several reporters shouted questions at him when he
appeared in the basement.[C5-259]
Moreover, by constantly pursuing public officials, the news
representatives placed an insistent pressure, upon them to disclose
information. And this pressure was not without effect, since the police
attitude toward the press was affected by the desire to maintain
satisfactory relations with the news representatives and to create a
favorable image of themselves. Chief Curry frankly told the Commission
that
I didn’t order them out of the building, which if I had it
to do over I would. In the past like I say, we had always
maintained very good relations with our press, and they had
always respected us. * * * [C5-260]
Curry refused Fritz’ request to put Oswald behind the screen in the
assembly room at the Friday night press conference because this might
have hindered the taking of pictures.[C5-261] Curry’s subordinates had
the impression that an unannounced transfer of Oswald to the county
jail was unacceptable because Curry did not want to disappoint the
newsmen; he had promised that they could witness the transfer.[C5-262]
It seemed clear enough that any attempt to exclude the press from the
building or to place limits on the information disclosed to them would
have been resented and disputed by the newsmen, who were constantly and
aggressively demanding all possible information about anything related
to the assassination.
Although the Commission has found no corroboration in the video and
audio tapes, police officials recall that one or two representatives of
the press reinforced their demands to see Oswald by suggesting that the
police had been guilty of brutalizing him. They intimated that unless
they were given the opportunity to see him, these suggestions would be
passed on to the public.[C5-263] Captain King testified that he had
been told that
A short time after Oswald’s arrest one newsman held up a
photograph and said, “This is what the man charged with the
assassination of the President looks like. Or at least this is
what he did look like. We don’t know what he looks like after
an hour in the custody of the Dallas Police Department.”[C5-264]
City Manager Elgin Crull stated that when he visited Chief Curry in
his office on the morning of November 23, Curry told him that he “felt
it was necessary to cooperate with the news media representatives, in
order to avoid being accused of using Gestapo tactics in connection
with the handling of Oswald.” Crull agreed with Curry.[C5-265] The
Commission deems any such veiled threats to be absolutely without
justification.
The general disorder in the Police and Courts Building during November
22-24 reveals a regrettable lack of self-discipline by the newsmen.
The Commission believes that the news media, as well as the police
authorities, who failed to impose conditions more in keeping with the
orderly process of justice, must share responsibility for the failure
of law enforcement which occurred in connection with the death of
Oswald. On previous occasions, public bodies have voiced the need
for the exercise of self-restraint by the news media in periods when
the demand for information must be tempered by other fundamental
requirements of our society.
At its annual meeting in Washington in April 1964, the American
Society of Newspaper Editors discussed the role of the press in Dallas
immediately after President Kennedy’s assassination. The discussion
revealed the strong misgivings among the editors themselves about the
role that the press had played and their desire that the press display
more self-discipline and adhere to higher standards of conduct in the
future.[C5-266] To prevent a recurrence of the unfortunate events which
followed the assassination, however, more than general concern will be
needed. The promulgation of a code of professional conduct governing
representatives of all news media would be welcome evidence that the
press had profited by the lesson of Dallas.
The burden of insuring that appropriate action is taken to establish
ethical standards of conduct for the news media must also be borne,
however, by State and local governments, by the bar, and ultimately
by the public. The experience in Dallas during November 22-24 is a
dramatic affirmation of the need for steps to bring about a proper
balance between the right of the public to be kept informed and the
right of the individual to a fair and impartial trial.