A Jacobin General.
Transformation in Buonaparte's Character -- Confirmed as a
French General -- Conduct of His Brothers -- Napoleon's
Caution -- His Report on Marseilles -- The New French Army
-- Buonaparte the Jacobin Leader -- Hostilities with Austria
and Sardinia -- Enthusiasm of the French Troops --
Buonaparte in Society -- His Plan for an Italian Campaign.
[Sidenote: 1793-94.]
Hitherto prudence had not been characteristic of Buonaparte: his
escapades and disobedience had savored rather of recklessness. Like
scores of others in his class, he had fully exploited the looseness of
royal and early republican administration; his madcap and hotspur
versatility distinguished him from his comrades not in the kind but in
the degree of his bold effrontery. The whole outlook having changed
since his final flight to France, his conduct now began to reveal a
definite plan--to be marked by punctilious obedience, sometimes even
by an almost puerile caution. His family was homeless and penniless;
their only hope for a livelihood was in coöperation with the Jacobins,
who appeared to be growing more influential every hour. Through the
powerful friends that Napoleon had made among the representatives of
the Convention, men like the younger Robespierre, Fréron, and Barras,
much had already been gained. If his nomination to the office of
general of brigade were confirmed, as it was almost certain to be, the
rest would follow, since, with his innate capacity for adapting
himself to circumstances, he had during the last few weeks
successfully cultivated his power of pleasing, captivating the hearts
of Marmont, Junot, and many others.
With such strong chances in his favor, it appeared to Buonaparte that
no stumbling-block of technicality should be thrown in the path of his
promotion. Accordingly, in the record of his life sent up to Paris, he
puts his entrance into the service over a year earlier than it
actually occurred, omits as unessential details some of the places in
which he had lived and some of the companies in which he had served,
declares that he had commanded a battalion at the capture of
Magdalena, and, finally, denies categorically that he was ever noble.
To this paper, which minimizes nearly to the vanishing-point all
mention of Corsica, and emphasizes his services as a Frenchman by its
insidious omissions, the over-driven officials in Paris took no
exception; and on February sixth, 1794, he was confirmed, receiving an
assignment for service in the new and regenerated Army of Italy, which
had replaced as if by magic the ragged, shoeless, ill-equipped, and
half-starved remnants of troops in and about Nice that in the previous
year had been dignified by the same title. This gambler had not drawn
the first prize in the lottery, but what he had secured was enough to
justify his course, and confirm his confidence in fate. Eight years
and three months nominally in the service, out of which in reality he
had been absent four years and ten months either on furlough or
without one, and already a general! Neither blind luck, nor the
revolutionary epoch, nor the superlative ability of the man, but a
compound of all these, had brought this marvel to pass. It did not
intoxicate, but still further sobered, the beneficiary. This effect
was partly due to an experience which demonstrated that strong as are
the chains of habit, they are more easily broken than those which his
associates forge about a man.
In the interval between nomination and confirmation the young
aspirant, through the fault of his friends, was involved in a most
serious risk. Salicetti, and the Buonaparte brothers, Joseph, Lucien,
and Louis, went wild with exultation over the fall of Toulon, and
began by reckless assumptions and untruthful representations to reap
an abundant harvest of spoils. Joseph, by the use of his brother's
Corsican commission, had posed as a lieutenant-colonel; he was now
made a commissary-general of the first class. Louis, without regard to
his extreme youth, was promoted to be adjutant-major of artillery--a
dignity which was short-lived, for he was soon after ordered to the
school at Châlons as a cadet, but which served, like the greater
success of Joseph, to tide over a crisis. Lucien retained his post as
keeper of the commissary stores in St. Maximin, where he was the
leading Jacobin, styling himself Lucius Brutus, and rejoicing in the
sobriquet of "the little Robespierre."
The positions of Lucien and Louis were fantastic even for
revolutionary times. Napoleon was fully aware of the danger, and was
correspondingly circumspect. It was possibly at his own suggestion
that he was appointed, on December twenty-sixth, 1793, inspector of
the shore fortifications, and ordered to proceed immediately on an
inspection of the Mediterranean coast as far as Mentone. The
expedition removed him from all temptation to an unfortunate display
of exultation or anxiety, and gave him a new chance to display his
powers. He performed his task with the thoroughness of an expert; but
in so doing, his zeal played him a sorry trick, eclipsing the caution
of the revolutionist by the eagerness of the sagacious general. In his
report to the minister of war he comprehensively discussed both the
fortification of the coast and the strengthening of the navy, which
were alike indispensable to the wonderful scheme of operations in
Italy which he appears to have been already revolving in his mind. The
Army of Italy, and in fact all southeastern France, depended at the
moment for sustenance on the commerce of Genoa, professedly a neutral
state and friendly to the French republic. This essential trade could
be protected only by making interference from the English and the
Spaniards impossible, or at least difficult.
Arrived at Marseilles, and with these ideas occupying his whole mind,
Buonaparte regarded the situation as serious. The British and Spanish
fleets swept the seas, and were virtually blockading all the
Mediterranean ports of France. At Toulon, as has been told, they
actually entered, and departed only after losing control of the
promontory which forms the harbor. There is a similar conformation of
the ground at the entrance to the port of Marseilles, but Buonaparte
found that the fortress which occupied the commanding promontory had
been dismantled. With the instinct of a strategist and with no other
thought than that of his duties as inspector, he sat down, and on
January fourth, 1794, wrote a most impolitic recommendation that the
fortification should be restored in such a way as to "command the
town." These words almost certainly referred both to the possible
renewal by the conquered French royalists and other malcontents of
their efforts to secure Marseilles, and to a conceivable effort on the
part of the Allies to seize the harbor. Now it happened that the
liberals of the town had regarded this very stronghold as their
Bastille, and it had been dismantled by them in emulation of their
brethren of Paris. The language and motive of the report were
therefore capable of misinterpretation. A storm at once arose among
the Marseilles Jacobins against both Buonaparte and his superior,
General Lapoype; they were both denounced to the Convention, and in
due time, about the end of February, were both summoned before the bar
of that body. In the mean time Buonaparte's nomination as general of
brigade had been confirmed, his commission arriving at Marseilles on
February sixteenth. It availed nothing toward restoring him to
popularity; on the contrary, the masses grew more suspicious and more
menacing. He therefore returned to the protection of Salicetti and
Robespierre, then at Toulon, whence by their advice he despatched to
Paris by special messenger a poor-spirited exculpatory letter,
admitting that the only use of restoring the fort would be to "command
the town," that is, control it by military power in case of
revolution. Having by this language pusillanimously acknowledged a
fault which he had not committed, the writer, by the advice of
Salicetti and Robespierre, refused to obey the formal summons of the
Convention when it came. Those powerful protectors made vigorous
representations to their friends in Paris, and Buonaparte was saved.
Both they and he might well rely on the distinguished service rendered
by the culprit at Toulon; his military achievement might well outweigh
a slight political delinquency. On April first, 1794, he assumed the
duties of his new command, reporting himself at Nice. Lapoype went to
Paris, appeared at the bar of the Convention, and was triumphantly
acquitted. Naturally, therefore, no indictment could lie against the
inferior, and Buonaparte's name was not even mentioned.
A single circumstance changed the French Revolution from a sectarian
dogma into a national movement. By the exertions and plans of Carnot
the effective force of the French army had been raised in less than
two years from one hundred and twelve thousand to the astonishing
figure of over seven hundred and thirty thousand. The discipline was
now rigid, and the machine was perfectly adapted to the workman's
hand, although for lack of money the equipment was still sadly
defective. In the Army of Italy were nearly sixty-seven thousand men,
a number which included all the garrisons and reserves of the coast
towns and of Corsica. Its organization, like that of the other
portions of the military power, had been simplified, and so
strengthened. There were a commander-in-chief, a chief of staff, three
generals of division, of whom Masséna was one, and thirteen generals
of brigade, of whom one, Buonaparte, was the commander and inspector
of artillery. The former was now thirty-four years old. His sire was a
wine-dealer of a very humble sort, probably of Jewish blood, and the
boy, Italian in origin and feeling, had almost no education.
Throughout his wonderful career he was coarse, sullen, and greedy;
nevertheless, as a soldier he was an inspired genius, ranked by many
as the peer of Napoleon. Having served France for several years as an
Italian mercenary, he resigned in 1789, settled in his native town of
Nice, and married; but the stir of arms was irresistible and three
years later he volunteered under the tricolor. His comrades at once
elected him an officer, and in about a year he was head of a
battalion, or colonel in our style. In the reorganization he was
promoted to be a division general because of sheer merit. For sixteen
years he had an unbroken record of success and won from Napoleon the
caressing title: "Dear Child of Victory."
The younger Robespierre, with Ricord and Salicetti, were the
"representatives of the people." The first of these was, to outward
appearance, the leading spirit of the whole organism, and to his
support Buonaparte was now thoroughly committed. The young artillery
commander was considered by all at Nice to be a pronounced
"Montagnard," that is, an extreme Jacobin. Augustin Robespierre had
quickly learned to see and hear with the eyes and ears of his Corsican
friend, whose fidelity seemed assured by hatred of Paoli and by a
desire to recover the family estates in his native island. Many are
pleased to discuss the question of Buonaparte's attitude toward the
Jacobin terrorists. The dilemma they propose is that he was either a
convinced and sincere terrorist or that he fawned on the terrorists
from interested motives. This last appears to have been the opinion of
Augustin Robespierre, the former that of his sister Marie, for the
time an intimate friend of the Buonaparte sisters. Both at least have
left these opinions on record in letters and memoirs. There is no need
to impale ourselves on either horn, if we consider the youth as he
was, feeling no responsibility whatever for the conditions into which
he was thrown, taking the world as he found it and using its
opportunities while they lasted. For the time and in that place there
were terrorists: he made no confession of faith, avoided all snares,
and served his adopted country as she was in fact with little
reference to political shibboleths. He so served her then and
henceforth that until he lost both his poise and his indispensable
power, she laid herself at his feet and adored him. Whatever the ties
which bound them at first, the ascendancy of Buonaparte over the young
Robespierre was thorough in the end. His were the suggestions and the
enterprises, the political conceptions, the military plans, the
devices to obtain ways and means. It was probably his advice which was
determinative in the scheme of operations finally adopted. With an
astute and fertile brain, with a feverish energy and an unbounded
ambition, Buonaparte must attack every problem or be wretched. Here
was a most interesting one, complicated by geographical, political,
naval, and military elements. That he seized it, considered it, and
found some solution is inherently probable. The conclusion too has all
the marks of his genius. Yet the glory of success was justly
Masséna's. A select third of the troops were chosen and divided into
three divisions to assume the offensive, under Masséna's direction,
against the almost impregnable posts of the Austrians and Sardinians
in the upper Apennines. The rest were held in garrison partly as a
reserve, partly to overawe the newly annexed department of which Nice
was the capital.
Genoa now stood in a peculiar relation to France. Her oligarchy,
though called a republic, was in spirit the antipodes of French
democracy. Her trade was essential to France, but English influence
predominated in her councils and English force worked its will in her
domains. In October, 1793, a French supply-ship had been seized by an
English squadron in the very harbor. Soon afterward, by way of
rejoinder to this act of violence, the French minister at Genoa was
officially informed from Paris that as it appeared no longer possible
for a French army to reach Lombardy by the direct route through the
Apennines, it might be necessary to advance along the coast through
Genoese territory. This announcement was no threat, but serious
earnest; the plan had been carefully considered and was before long to
be put into execution. It was merely as a feint that in April, 1794,
hostilities were formally opened against Sardinia and Austria. Masséna
seized Ventimiglia on the sixth. Advancing by Oneglia and Ormea, in
the valley of the Stura, he turned the position of the allied
Austrians and Sardinians, thus compelling them to evacuate their
strongholds one by one, until on May seventh the pass of Tenda,
leading direct into Lombardy, was abandoned by them.
The result of this movement was to infuse new enthusiasm into the
army, while at the same time it set free, for offensive warfare, large
numbers of the garrison troops in places now no longer in danger.
Masséna wrote in terms of exultation of the devotion and endurance
which his troops had shown in the sacred name of liberty. "They know
how to conquer and never complain. Marching barefoot, and often
without rations, they abuse no one, but sing the loved notes of '_Ça
ira_'--'T will go, 't will go! We'll make the creatures that surround
the despot at Turin dance the Carmagnole!" Victor Amadeus, King of
Sardinia, was an excellent specimen of the benevolent despot; it was
he whom they meant. Augustin Robespierre wrote to his brother
Maximilien, in Paris, that they had found the country before them
deserted: forty thousand souls had fled from the single valley of
Oneglia, having been terrified by the accounts of French savagery to
women and children, and of their impiety in devastating the churches
and religious establishments.
Whether the phenomenal success of this short campaign, which lasted
but a month, was expected or not, nothing was done to improve it, and
the advancing battalions suddenly stopped, as if to make the
impression that they could go farther only by way of Genoese
territory. Buonaparte would certainly have shared in the campaign had
it been a serious attack; but, except to bring captured stores from
Oneglia, he did nothing, devoting the months of May and June to the
completion of his shore defenses, and living at Nice with his mother
and her family. That famous and coquettish town was now the center of
a gay republican society in which Napoleon and his pretty sisters were
important persons. They were the constant companions of young
Robespierre and Ricord. The former, amazed by the activity of his
friend's brain, the scope of his plans, and the terrible energy which
marked his preparations, wrote of Napoleon that he was a man of
"transcendent merit." Marmont, speaking of Napoleon's charm at this
time, says: "There was so much future in his mind.... He had acquired
an ascendancy over the representatives which it is impossible to
describe." He also declares, and Salicetti, too, repeatedly
asseverated, that Buonaparte was the "man, the plan-maker" of the
Robespierres.
The impression which Salicetti and Marmont expressed was doubtless due
to the conclusions of a council of war held on May twentieth by the
leaders of the two armies--of the Alps and of Italy--to concert a plan
of coöperation. Naturally each group of generals desired the foremost
place for the army it represented. Buonaparte overrode all objections,
and compelled the acceptance of a scheme entirely his own, which with
some additions and by careful elaboration ultimately developed into
the famous plan of campaign in Italy. These circumstances are
noteworthy. Again and again it has been charged that this grand scheme
was bodily stolen from the papers of his great predecessors, one in
particular, of whom more must be said in the sequel. Napoleon was a
student and an omnivorous reader, he knew what others had done and
written; but the achievement which launched him on his career was due
to the use of his own senses, to his own assimilation and adaptation
of other men's experiences and theories, which had everything to
commend them except that perfection of detail and energy of command
which led to actual victory. But affairs in Genoa were becoming so
menacing that for the moment they demanded the exclusive attention of
the French authorities. Austrian troops had disregarded her neutrality
and trespassed on her territory; the land was full of French
deserters, and England, recalling her successes in the same line
during the American Revolution, had established a press in the city
for printing counterfeit French money, which was sent by secret
mercantile communications to Marseilles, and there was put into
circulation. It was consequently soon determined to amplify greatly
the plan of campaign, and likewise to send a mission to Genoa.
Buonaparte was himself appointed the envoy, and thus became the pivot
of both movements--that against Piedmont and that against Genoa.