LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
THE MEANING AND VALUE OF LIFE
Translated by W. R. BOYCE GIBSON
Crown 8vo, cloth, price 3s. 6d. net.
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And by W. R. BOYCE GIBSON
RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
Second Edition, crown 8vo, cloth, price 3s. 6d. net.
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LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
BY
RUDOLF EUCKEN
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA
TRANSLATED, WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTE
BY
ALBAN G. WIDGERY
FORMERLY SCHOLAR OF ST. CATHARINE'S COLLEGE, AND BURNEY STUDENT,
CAMBRIDGE, AND MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA
[Illustration]
LONDON
ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK
1912
_First published December 1911_
_Second and Revised Edition, February 1912_
CONTENTS
PAGE
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE vii
AUTHOR'S PREFACE xxi
I. INTRODUCTORY: THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE IN THE PRESENT DAY 1
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 3
I. STATEMENT AND CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS OF LIFE 6
(a) The Older Systems 6
1. The Religious System 6
2. The System of Immanent Idealism 15
(b) The Newer Systems 22
1. The Naturalistic System 24
2. The Socialistic System 41
3. The System of Æsthetic Individualism 61
II. Consideration of the Situation as a Whole, and
Preliminaries for Further Investigation 81
(a) The Nature of the New as a Whole and its Relation to
the Old 81
(b) The Condition of the Present 86
(c) The Form of the Problem 92
II. THE OUTLINE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 99
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND CONSIDERATIONS 101
I. THE MAIN THESIS 110
(a) The Ascent to the Main Thesis 110
1. Man as a Being of Nature 110
2. The Growth of Man beyond Nature 113
3. The Inner Contradiction of the New Life 134
(b) The Development of the Main Thesis 144
1. The Main Thesis and the Possibility of a New
System of Life 144
(a) _The Development of the Spiritual Life to
Independence_ 144
(b) _The Demands of a New System of Life_ 150
(c) _The Spiritual Basis of the System of Life_ 152
(d) _Human Existence_ 161
(e) _Results and Prospects_ 166
2. The Transformation and the Elevation of Human
Life 168
(a) _Aims and Ways_ 168
(b) _The Nature of Freedom_ 174
(c) _The Beginnings of the Independent Spiritual
Life_ 183
(d) _The Transcending of Division_ 187
i. _The Spiritual Conception of History_ 188
ii. _The Spiritual Conception of Society_ 196
(e) _The Elevation of Life above Division_ 201
II. THE MORE DETAILED FORM OF OUR SPIRITUAL LIFE 216
(a) The Problem of Truth and Reality 216
(b) Man and the World 226
(c) The Movement of the Spiritual Life in Man 233
(d) The Emergence of a New Type of Life 240
1. _Life's Attainment of Greatness_ 240
2. _The Increase of Movement_ 247
3. _The Gain of Stability_ 251
(e) Activism, a Profession of Faith 255
III. THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN MAN IN CONFLICT AND IN VICTORY 262
(a) Doubt and Prostration 262
(b) Consideration and Demand 267
(c) The Victory 273
III. APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT: CONSEQUENCES AND REQUIREMENTS 287
_Introductory Considerations_ 289
I. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FORM OF LIFE AS A WHOLE 298
(a) The Character of Culture 298
(b) The Organisation of the Work of Culture 315
II. THE FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS 322
_Preliminary Remarks_ 322
(a) Religion, Morality, Education 324
1. Religion 324
2. Morality 335
3. Education and Instruction 343
(b) Science and Philosophy 345
(c) Art and Literature 354
(d) Social and Political Life 358
(e) The Life of the Individual 369
CONCLUSION 373
INDEX 375
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE
With the consent of the author the title "Life's Basis and Life's Ideal"
has been adopted for this translation of "Die Grundlinien einer neuen
Lebensanschauung," with the hope that thereby the purpose of the work
will be more directly indicated than by a literal translation of the
German title. It is hoped, further, that the title adopted will make an
appeal to the general reading public. To make such an appeal is not the
desire of every writer on philosophical subjects: but in the present
instance it is the case. The author feels that he has a message for the
present time, and one that is vital to the true interests of all. It has
been remarked, and the present writer would be among the first to
acknowledge the truth of the statement, that the voice is that of a
prophet in the sense of an ethical teacher, rather than that of a
philosopher in the more technical sense. Nevertheless, the use of a
philosophical terminology, and the constant implicit reference to the
results of philosophical endeavour in the past and present, combined
with the peculiarities of the author's own views, make it difficult to
understand his message. To non-philosophical readers who are not already
acquainted with the more popular works which have been translated under
the titles of "Christianity and the New Idealism," "The Life of the
Spirit," and "The Meaning and Value of Life," the present work will
appear of considerable difficulty. Difficulty in such a work is,
however, by no means necessarily an evil, for it may compel more careful
reading and thought. The present work is the latest and best general
statement, by the author, of his philosophical position. By some
reference here to certain ideas, principles, and aims of the
philosophy, the attention of the reader may be drawn to those aspects
which, in personal contact with the author, one comes to feel are
regarded by him as of most importance. It is not invariably so, but in
this case to know the man is to gain immensely in the power to
understand and appreciate the message. He inspires us with his
confidence and enthusiasm, even when we have doubts as to the adequacy
of his philosophical creed. His philosophy is, indeed, the outcome of an
attitude of life. To know the man is to understand more fully than from
all his written works what he means when he speaks of the development of
_personality_ and _spiritual individuality_. Whatever may be the value
of what is written about Professor Eucken's position, no substitute can
be found for reading his own words in as many of his different
expositions as possible.
Should anyone seek in this work for a systematic discussion of
philosophical problems on the lines of traditional Rationalism, which,
though often assumed to be dead, still asserts a strong influence upon
us, he will not only look in vain but will also lose much that is of
value in that which is offered. The aim of the philosophy is not to
discuss the basis and ideal of thought, but to probe to the depth of
life in all its complexity, and to advance to an all-inclusive ideal.
The starting-point for us all is life as we experience it, not an
apparent ultimate, such as the _cogito ergo sum_ of Descartes, the _I
ought_ of Kant, or the _pure being_ of Hegel. At the outset, therefore,
it is necessary to note the nature of the relation between philosophy
and life. Philosophy arises within life as an expression of its nature
and general import. Life may assume various forms, may be, that is, of
different types; with different individuals and societies it is
organised in divers ways. Life so organised, having certain definite
tendencies, is called by Professor Eucken a _system of life_. In the
philosophies of life which arise in these types or systems of life, life
becomes more explicitly conscious of its own nature. Further, a
philosophy of life is also a means of justification and defence of one
system of life in opposition to other systems. Life as experienced, as
organised in some way, is prior to any definite intellectual or
conceptual expression of it. On the other hand a type of life may be
influenced and modified by changes in the accepted philosophy of life,
or by the adoption of a new philosophy. A philosophy, therefore, is to
be judged by the system of life it represents and by its spiritual
fruitfulness. As the roots of the differences between philosophies are
in the systems of life from which the philosophies arise, the conflict
is primarily not between theories, but between systems of life. The
ground of the author's general appeal thus becomes apparent. The problem
is a vital one; in one form or another, at one time or another, everyone
is faced with it: how shall I mould my life? And it is here that we must
insist upon the importance of Professor Eucken's contention that we have
to make our decision for one system of life as a whole, and thus for one
philosophy of life as a whole, as against other systems and other
philosophies taken as wholes.
Life as experienced is a process, a growth; and in this growth it
oversteps the bounds of the philosophy in which at an earlier stage it
expressed itself, and according to which it strove to fashion itself.
The need for a new philosophy is then felt. Generally, the need is for a
philosophy more comprehensive and more clearly defined than any of the
previous philosophies. Now, Professor Eucken contends that none of the
philosophies of life which are common among us in the present time are
adequate to represent and guide our life at this stage of its
development. He calls us to turn for a few moments from the rush and
turmoil of modern life to "come and reason together" as to life's basis
and ideal. In justification of his view, and in accordance with his own
principle that we must start with life as we experience it, he considers
in the first place the common philosophies of life of the present time
in relation to the systems of life from which they spring. Few will
disagree with his negative view that Religion--at least as
ecclesiastically presented--Immanent Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism,
and Individualism involve limitations, and sometimes unjustifiable
tendencies and claims, and are inadequate to satisfy the age. His next
and chief endeavour is to indicate the direction in which a new
philosophy is to be sought, and also tentatively to sketch the outlines
of such a philosophy. In the nature of the case--as life is a
process--no such philosophy can be regarded as complete. It can and
should strive to take up into itself all that is of value in the
discarded philosophies. Any attempt to outline a "new" philosophy will
be judged by how far, with the incompleteness on all hands, it takes the
different threads of life, and blending them into a unity aids their
growth individually and as a whole.
Brief reference maybe made here to an attitude, common in the present
time especially among English-speaking peoples, which the author does
not explicitly mention. I mean the attitude of Agnosticism. This, he
would contend and it would seem rightly, is in the main theoretical and
does not, as such, correspond to or represent a system of life. The
agnostic's system of life is formed of aspects of the systems discussed,
with a strong tendency to Naturalism. The case of Huxley, who coined the
term _Agnosticism_, is an excellent example: notwithstanding his
frequently insisting with considerable force upon truths essentially
idealistic, no one can doubt the predominant naturalistic tendency of
his thought. As a rule the adoption of the attitude of Agnosticism is an
attempt, as Dr. Ward has so clearly and forcibly argued in his
"Naturalism and Agnosticism,"[1] to escape from the difficulties of
Naturalism, which in the end it betrays. Agnosticism is, in fact, only
an assumed absence of a theory of life. Professor Eucken would insist
that the instability of the position is intolerable in actual life.
Life's demand for unification, for consciousness of a meaning and a
value, drives us beyond it. "Mere research," he writes, p. 272, "can
tolerate a state of hesitation between affirmation and negation; it must
often refrain from a decision in the case of special problems. Life,
however, cannot endure any such intermediary position; for life, such
hesitation in arriving at a decision must result in complete stagnation,
and this would help the mere negation to victory."
The great objection to all the systems of life mentioned is that they
are too narrow, and in some aspects superficial. The new system must
unite comprehensiveness with depth. The insufficiency of intellectualism
is now generally recognised: the desire of the age is to do justice to
the content of experience. Though the new system of life is to include
all that is of value of earlier systems, it is by no means an
eclecticism, for it has its integrating principle. This we shall best
see by considering the method and the result of the philosophy. Life as
experienced has already been referred to as the starting-point. To
whatever extent we may seem, on the surface of experience, to be under
the antithesis of subject and object, when we probe deeper we recognise
that both are within life: they are a duality in unity. Here again
reference may be made to the above-mentioned work[2] of Dr. Ward, in
which probably the best exposition in English of this same truth is to
be found. Life as experienced is not simply the empirical states of
consciousness: its basis lies deeper. The method of the philosophy is in
consequence described as _noölogical_ in distinction from the
_psychological_ method, which treats of man out of relation to a world,
and ends with the examination of psychical states; and from the
_cosmological_ method, which treats the world out of relation to man and
aims chiefly at comprehension in universals of thought. Expressed in
another way, life is fundamentally spiritual. Self-consciousness is the
unifying principle: it is only by relation to life as self-conscious
that we can predicate meaning or value. All that is regarded as true and
valuable in all the above-mentioned systems presupposes this relation.
The self-conscious life is not to be confused with the subjective life
of the "mere" individual. In fact, there is no "mere" individual, for in
all there are tendencies which transcend the limits of individual
experience. For example, life includes the relation of man and world;
and the life of society is more than a mere sum of the lives of the
individuals. Perhaps a more correct way to state the author's position
is to say that the individual shares the self-conscious, or, otherwise
expressed, the spiritual life which transcends nature, the individual,
and society. This world-pervading and world-transcending self-conscious
life--_the Independent Spiritual Life_--may be regarded as an absolute
or universal life. The pursuit of the ideals of truth, goodness, and
beauty carries us far beyond considerations of the welfare of the
individual, or the society, or even humanity as a whole. In our
activities we often attain something quite different from and far better
than that at which we aim. Nevertheless, unless truth, goodness, beauty,
and all tendencies leading to them are self-consciously experienced they
have neither meaning nor value: viewed universally, they presuppose the
Independent Spiritual Life. The highest development of the spiritual
life known to us is personality, our "being-for-self," which is not to
be identified with subjective individuality. We are not personalities to
begin with, but have the potentiality to become such through our own
effort. Personality is our highest ideal: in it, as self-conscious
experience all other values for us are included. The author calls us,
therefore, from that excessive occupation with the environment in which
we forget ourselves, to spiritual concentration and the pursuit of
spiritual ideals. The spirit of his message may be expressed in words
familiar to all: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world
and lose his own soul." Remembering that life is fundamentally
self-conscious or spiritual, it may be said that life's basis and life's
ideal is life itself--life completely self-conscious and following out
its own necessities. The basis of man's life is the Independent
Spiritual Life which is appropriated but not created by him in his
striving for a comprehensive and harmonious personality. The ideal of
man's life is such a personality. The more man "loses his life" in the
pursuit of the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty, the more surely
will he "save it," the more comprehensive, harmonious, and spiritual in
nature will he become. Then he will realise himself as a personality,
and become conscious of his unity with the Independent Spiritual Life.
The dominant Idealism of this philosophy of life is evident: but the
meanings of truth, goodness, and beauty are different from what they
appear to be in many of the older presentations of Idealism. Truth,
goodness and beauty are not abstract ideals but concrete experiences.
The present writer has long been of the opinion that much of
contemporary idealistic philosophy, including that of Professor Eucken,
might be better termed _Spiritualism_ than _Idealism_.
If life as experienced is a process, it is not difficult to understand
that importance should be attributed to history. In the author's
exposition not only is constant reference made to historical
development, but the nature of history is made a definite subject of
discussion. I would call attention to this aspect of the author's work:
it appears a means of doing more justice to the content of experience
than is done in most forms of Idealism. On the one hand a Rationalism
which tends to shut out the historical as transient and merely
appearance is avoided, and on the other a Historical Relativism which
denies all stability and permanence is strenuously opposed. While the
absolute and eternal--the Independent Spiritual Life--is the
presupposition of the temporal manifestation of the spiritual life in
man, for man the historical is real. The form of our spiritual life is
due to our own acts and decisions. It is in this connection that the
fundamental nature of our spiritual effort may best be seen. The
author's voice is that of a prophet in so far as his whole exposition is
presented as an endeavour to arouse men from their apathy and from the
pursuit of what they themselves know to be unsatisfying ideals. The
importance attached to spiritual effort in his philosophy leads
Professor Eucken to adopt the term "_Activism_" as a definite
philosophical badge. The activistic note is evident throughout, much
more so perhaps in the present volume than in those which have preceded
it. The significance of this emphasis is most clear in its bearing upon
our relation to the past and the present. The present is neither to be
dominated by the past nor sacrificed to the future, but the past is to
be appropriated by our activity in the present, and the present, while
possessing reality and value in itself, looks forward to the future.
Historical content, spiritual endeavour in past, present, and future,
must be unified by a common task. The past is ours only so far as we
appropriate it. Spiritual inheritance is not the same as natural
inheritance. We may by our spiritual effort adopt or reject ideas or a
system of life which have come to us from the past. The character which
the past will have for us will depend on our present spiritual
condition. All spiritual progress involves a break with the past. In the
same way we may take up an attitude of antagonism to the confusions
which exist in modern life, and we may follow a new course. All this is
not to deny the value of history in itself and for our present efforts:
the reverse of such a denial is nearer the truth. For if we realise the
depths and independence of our own life we are not only in a position to
understand and appreciate the movement of history, but, by the nature of
life, we are then driven beyond the mere present. The past relives with
a new spiritual meaning in the consciousness that makes it its own.
History is more than a succession of facts; it must be revalued as a
present experience. Life is not subjectively individual, and to realise
it we must find our place in universal tendencies which are working
themselves out in history. The content of history cannot be pressed into
the narrow scheme of moral effort and attainment, as that is usually
conceived, but in it all spheres of life assert their independent right.
History is not an evolution of categories, but a conflict of concrete
realities, of systems of life, of personalities. Though the great man
cannot be understood out of relation to his time, he is not simply a
product of the social environment. The great man strives to raise the
time to his own level. It may be said that in order adequately to
appreciate the author's position in regard to history the book
translated into English under the title of "The Problem of Human Life
as viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time" should
be read in the light of the general principles of his philosophy. The
reality of evil and of antitheses in life are fully acknowledged; but by
the spiritual life being thereby called to assert its independence and
to strive to overcome them they may be a factor leading to good. Evil,
so regarded, is not explained away, but the solution is essentially a
practical one. The theoretical problem of evil remains an enigma to us.
The author's message is positive, not negative: it is a call to pursue
definite positive aims rather than to eradicate painful experiences.
"Not suffering, but spiritual destitution is man's worst enemy" (p.
314).
It has been said with, it would seem, a large amount of truth, that the
philosophy of Hegel has been most fruitfully studied on English soil.
There is reason to believe that it will be somewhat the same in the case
of Professor Eucken's philosophy. His debts to Kant and Hegel are
obvious, but it is interesting to notice that the points in which he
more especially diverges from Hegelianism are largely the same as have
been emphasised in England. The importance he attaches to personality
and ethical activity, his insistence upon human endeavour as a
determining factor in reality, and his emphasis on the dialectic as
being not one of categories but of concrete realities, are in accord
with much of the best of recent English philosophical thought. In the
present work there is much of value for those who--while dissenting from
such perversions as Pragmatism--hold what is commonly termed a "Personal
Idealism." The position of our author is not the same as that of English
Personal Idealism, nevertheless his work aids it in many ways, and
especially in its insistence upon the distinction between personality
and subjective individuality. A comparison of some of the views of the
three philosophical writers who have been most discussed in our
time--the late Professor James, M. Bergson, and our author--would be of
interest. To enter upon a systematic and exhaustive comparison here is
far from my intention, but a few points may be suggested. The modes of
exposition, which in a greater or less degree indicate the respective
methods, manifest striking contrasts: in many respects the positions of
M. Bergson and Professor Eucken appear totally dissimilar. The
acquaintance with natural science, and the constant reference to its
data, that we find in the works of M. Bergson, are not found in those of
our author. Their place is taken, however, by what some will regard as
more interesting, and even more important, an acquaintance with the
present condition of human life, and also a constant reference to
history. Common to these writers is a reaction against formalism and
intellectualism, and in one form or another there is in their writings a
strong element of empiricism. Freedom in some sense is insisted upon by
all; though so far as we may judge from their published expositions
there seem to be considerable differences of view in this matter.
Together with this assertion of the reality of Freedom, both M. Bergson
and our author definitely acknowledge the reality of Necessity and
recognise the importance of struggle in development. Neither writer
claims that we can gain more than the knowledge of a direction in which
the solution of the problem may be sought. Our author himself might
quite well have said, though with application in the main to different
classes of facts, what M. Bergson has said: "It seems to me that in a
great number of different fields there is a great number of collections
of facts, each of which, considered apart, gives us a direction in which
the answer to the problem may be sought--a direction only. But it is a
great thing to have even a direction, and still more to have several
directions, for at the precise point where these directions converge
might be found the solution we are seeking. What we possess meanwhile
are lines of facts.[3]..." "But what is this new reality," writes
Professor Eucken (p. 135), "and this whole to which the course of the
movement trends? The more we reflect over the question the more strongly
we feel that it is a direction rather than a conclusion that is offered
to us in this matter...." There is another passage from M. Bergson the
quotation of which in the present context is justified by its harmony
with so much that Professor Eucken himself says with regard to man's
ideal of life: "If, then, in every province, the triumph of life is
expressed by creation, ought we not to think that the ultimate reason of
human life is a creation which, in distinction from that of the artist
or the man of science, can be pursued at every moment and by all men
alike; I mean the creation of self by self, the continual enrichment of
personality by elements which it does not draw from outside, but causes
to spring forth from itself?"[4] Whether in the works of the late
Professor James there is evidence of a lurking desire for an Absolute
may be left undiscussed. M. Bergson certainly gives more than a hint of
something like an Absolute. Of the absolutist (not rationalistic)
tendency in the philosophy of our author there can be no doubt.
Notwithstanding the antagonism to intellectualism shown in this
philosophy, the influence of Hegel seems evident in its absolutist
tendency. Dr. Ward has justly said that, "with Hegel, the Absolute seems
at one time to be a perfect Self with no hint of aught beside or beyond
its own completed self-consciousness, and at another not to be a self at
all, but only the absolutely spiritual--art, religion, and
philosophy--the over-individual ends, as they are sometimes called,
which become realised in subjective spirits: not self-conscious Spirit,
but simply the impersonal Spirit in all spirits."[5] How far a
corresponding criticism is applicable to the ideas of the Independent
Spiritual Life, and the spiritual life in humanity and the world, in the
present philosophy, its readers must be left to decide.
The relation of philosophy to life as Professor Eucken conceives it may
justify him in treating primarily of what may be called in a special
sense the problems of life. The difficulty of the problems of the theory
of knowledge no one will deny, though many are impatient of
considerations of them. In any general appeal such as we have to do with
in this work it is almost impossible to deal seriously with them. Still
the problems of the theory of knowledge force themselves upon us, and
will not be thrust on one side. The late Professor James did his best to
leave us in no doubt as to his position in this matter: we have more
than a glimpse of the attitudes of M. Bergson and Professor Eucken. We
await, however, as likely to aid us in a fuller understanding and
estimate of the philosophy, the volume the author has promised us on the
theory of knowledge. Whatever the points of similarity may be in the
views of those mentioned, we cannot fail to note the differences--to
some of these in the case of Pragmatism the author has himself called
our attention; further, we cannot mistake the dominant Idealism of the
philosophy of life here presented to us. One word must be said as to the
author's attitude towards Mysticism; an attitude that has not always
been understood. The Mysticism he opposes is of the type that is
virtually the negation of the Activism which is to him fundamental. But
when that is recognised, the careful reader cannot fail to see that,
ultimately, the philosophy is essentially mystical.
As I understand it, the suggestion that our author's philosophy would
form a rallying-point for Idealists of various kinds is a tribute to its
unity and comprehensiveness, of which there can be no doubt. Roughly, we
may take up one of two attitudes to the work of a philosopher. We may
accept his general point of view, his main principles, in a word his
"system," however tentative, and modify it in detail. On the other hand
we may reject his main position, and yet find much to accept in his
working out of various aspects of detail, and we may incorporate this in
some other general system. It is not for me to state here the attitude I
take towards, or the difficulties I feel in, the philosophy; I think
that there will be few who will not gain much from the inspiration and
originality which are shown by the author. For his own philosophy of
life he seeks no other treatment than that which he has meted to others:
a sincere endeavour to understand its basis and its ideal. His hope is
that however much its limitations may be pointed out, the truth in it
may be acknowledged and appropriated, if possible in a higher view. The
acquisition of a higher view would cause no one more real joy than
Professor Eucken.
I have to thank the author for his personal kindness in the discussion
of some difficult points and in the revision of a portion of the proof
sheets. At his suggestion or with his consent a number of small
alterations, as, for example, in the titles of sections, have been made
from the present German text. Owing to an accident, the time for the
preparation of this translation was unfortunately curtailed: I should be
indebted for any suggestions for its improvement. I am indebted to the
Rev. Felix Holt, B.A., for reading through the whole in manuscript and
making many valuable suggestions. For all defect and error I alone am
responsible.
ALBAN G. WIDGERY
CAMBRIDGE, _October 1911_
FOOTNOTES:
[1] "Naturalism and Agnosticism." 3rd Edition, 1906. Vols. I. and II.
A. & C. Black.
[2] _Ibid._ Vol. II. Lects. xiv.-xx.
[3] _Hibbert Journal_, October 1911: p. 26.
[4] _Ibid._ p. 42.
[5] "The Realm of Ends; or, Pluralism and Theism" (1911), p. 46.
NOTE TO SECOND EDITION
I have taken the opportunity given by reprinting to revise the whole. I
have made a number of alterations rendering the author's meaning more
clear. My thanks are again due to Mr. Holt for his help.
ALBAN G. WIDGERY
CAVERSWALL, STOKE-ON-TRENT,
_January 1912_
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
We may hope for a friendly reception of our investigation only by those
who acknowledge that that which occupies us here is a real problem. It
is hardly open to dispute that life in the present time displays a
serious incongruity between an incalculably rich and fruitful activity
with regard to the material, and complete uncertainty and destitution in
respect of the spiritual, side of life. Attempt after attempt is made to
deliver us from this state of perplexity, and to give more soul and
unity to a culture which outwardly is so imposing. But in the main these
attempts are far too irresolute in their advance from superficiality to
depth, and from individual appearances to the whole: in their innermost
nature they are under the influence of the temporary conditions beyond
which they wish to lead us. In truth, we cannot make an advance in
relation to our life as a whole unless we win a new basis for it. This,
however, we cannot do without raising the problem of our relation to
reality, and, if it is in any way possible, moulding this relationship
in a new way: further, we can be of service in the satisfaction of the
needs of the time only when we gain an independence of it and a
superiority to it.
Here, therefore, so far as the realm of conviction is concerned, we have
a task for philosophy. The confusion that reigns, however, makes the way
difficult for philosophy also; and sets insuperable limits to its power.
We do not meet in immediate experience with facts upon which a new type
of life might be based: much toil and trouble are necessary to arrive at
that, which, when it is once attained, may seem to be simple and easy.
He who finds the problem too complex, and shirks to expend the necessary
effort, can do nothing else than resign himself submissively to the
prevailing confusion. To-day we are unable at first to sketch more than
the outlines and to indicate fundamentals: we must be quite sure of the
basis and the main tendency of life if we would undertake the
construction of systems; and yet it is just these things which are
to-day the subject of agitation and conflict. Not for a moment do we
doubt the imperfection of our own attempt; we can but hope that others
will take up and pursue the matter further.
Notwithstanding these limitations and this trouble, an urgent inner
necessity compels us to recognise that there can be no enduring life of
genuine culture unless humanity is inwardly united by common aims. More
and more clearly this main question is seen to be involved in all the
particular questions of the time; more and more does it become evident
to us that our achievement in individual matters can be but
insignificant, if life as a whole is in a state of stagnation and
exhaustion. Though some who may already have taken up a definite course,
or who in their attention to work in some special sphere have lost all
sense for the whole, may refuse to consider the matter, yet wherever
life is still flowing, and where fresh impulse resists the tendency to
division which deprives it of all soul, to deal with the problem will be
felt to be a necessity. Above all, therefore, we trust in the young,
who, among all cultured nations, are striving for a deeper and nobler
life. The more successful this striving, the sooner shall we advance
from a state of confusion to one of order and clearness, from a realm of
illusions to the kingdom of truth, and in face of the chaotic whirl of
appearances we shall attain stability within ourselves.
RUDOLF EUCKEN
JENA, _Christmas 1906_
I
INTRODUCTORY
THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE IN THE PRESENT DAY
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
He who strives after a new philosophy of life confesses himself thereby
to be of the conviction that the philosophies of the present no longer
satisfy mankind; and so we must begin by giving reasons for sharing this
conviction. In doing this we hope to be able to take a positive survey
of the present situation as a whole, and also to gain a firm
starting-point for the course in which the new is to be sought, and not
simply to remain fixed in a mere negative attitude. A precise statement
of the question is the first condition for a correct answer; to satisfy
this requirement is the chief concern of the first part of our treatise.
Philosophies of life, representations of human life as a whole, surround
us to-day in abundance and court our adherence. The fusion of rich
historical development with active reflection gives occasion to the most
diverse combinations and makes it easy for the individual to project a
representation corresponding to his circumstances and his mood. Thus,
to-day, the philosophies of life of individuals whirl together in
chaotic confusion, gain and lose the passing favour, displace one
another, and themselves change kaleidoscopically. It is not the concern
of philosophy to occupy itself more closely with opinions so accidental
and so fleeting.
There are, however, philosophies of life of another kind, conceptions of
life, which unite and dominate large numbers of people, hold up a common
ideal for their activity, and constitute a power in the life of
universal history. These philosophies of life are rooted in particular
concrete forms of life, in actual combinations of working and striving,
which with dominating power surround the individual and point out his
course. With such ascendancy they may seem to him to be unassailable and
a matter of natural necessity; in reality they are a product of the
industry of universal history, and from this point of view appear merely
as attempts to comprehend the boundless stream of life and to win a
character for our otherwise indefinite existence. For at first we stand
defenceless and helpless in face of the wealth of impressions and
suggestions which throng upon us and draw us in opposite directions.
Only in one way are we able to prevail: life must concentrate and
acquire a controlling centre within itself, and from that begin a
process of counteraction. We lack distinction of centre and environment;
we need an inner aspiration, an aspiration which seeks to draw the whole
of existence to itself and to mould it in its own particular way. This,
however, is impossible, unless at the same time a philosophy of life, a
profession of faith as to the nature of the whole, a justification of
our undertaking, is evolved. A philosophy of life established in this
manner will be incomparably more powerful, and fuller in content, than
the mere foam on the surface of time.
Nevertheless, with all its advantages, such a philosophy of life, like
the corresponding system of life itself, is not ultimate truth: it
remains an attempt, a problem which, ever anew, divides men into
opposing camps. For the experience of history teaches us that the effort
after concentration and an inner synthesis of life does not follow one
clear, direct course throughout, but that different possibilities offer
themselves and, in course of time, struggle upwards to reality.
Different systems thus advance by the side of and in opposition to one
another, each making the claim to undivided supremacy, to a superiority
over all others. Philosophies of life now become means and instruments
to justify and to establish such claims. They must enter into the
severest conflict one with another, and the strife keeps up a powerful
tension and pressure because here, by means of the ideas, tendencies of
life compete with one another; because not mere representations of
reality but realities themselves struggle together. It is manifest from
the existence of these last problems that we do not grow up in a
finished world, but have first to form and build up our world. We are
concerned not merely with interpreting a given reality, but first of all
with winning the true, primary, and all-comprehensive reality. By this
our life is made uncertain and laborious, but it is raised at the same
time to an inner freedom and a more genuine independence.
And now for the first time we see in its true light the fact that its
own views of life can become inadequate to an age. For the fact that an
age lacks an inner unity, that cogent reasons drive it beyond the extant
syntheses, is now a sign that it is not clear and certain as to its own
life. To open up a way for a new synthesis, to organise life more
adequately, becomes the most pressing of all demands, the question of
questions. Even the most cautious and most subtle reflection will not
lead us far in this matter; all hope of success depends upon our life
containing greater depths, which hitherto have not been fully grasped,
and more especially upon a transcendent unity present in it, which
hitherto has not come to complete recognition. All thought and
reflection is thus called to direct itself to the comprehension of such
depths and of such a unity. Everything here depends on facts; on facts,
however, which do not come to us opportunely from without, but which
reveal themselves only to the eye of the spirit and to aspiration.
I. STATEMENT AND CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS OF LIFE
It must be admitted that the first glance at the present conditions of
life shows a chaotic confusion. A more careful examination, however,
soon discloses a limited number of schemes of life, which, although they
are often combined by individuals, are in their nature distinct and
remain differentiated. We recognise five such systems of life: those of
Religion and of Immanent Idealism on the one hand, and those of
Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism on the other hand. For, two
main groups may be clearly distinguished: one, older, which gives to
life an invisible world for its chief province; and one, newer, which
places man entirely in the realm of sense experience; within these
groups, the ways again lead in diverse directions. Let us see what each
of these organisations makes out of life; on what each supports itself;
and what each accomplishes. Let us see also where each meets with
opposition and in what it finds its limits; and this not according to
our individual opinion, but according to the experiences of the age.
(a) THE OLDER SYSTEMS
1. THE RELIGIOUS SYSTEM
The religious organisation of life has influenced us in the past with
especial power. This has worked in the form of Christianity, which, as
an ethical religion of redemption, occupies a thoroughly unique position
among religions. As a religion it unites life to a supernatural world,
and subjects our existence to its supremacy; as a religion of redemption
it heightens the contrast between the two worlds to such a degree of
harshness that a complete revolution becomes a necessity; as an ethical
religion it regards the spiritual life as a power of positive creation
and self-determination, and insists upon a complete change of the heart.
Arising in an age of decay, an age weary of life, it confidently took up
the conflict against this faintness; it did not carry on this conflict,
however, by a further development of the natural world and of culture,
but through the revelation of a supernatural order, of a new community
of life, which, through the building up of an invisible Kingdom of
God--which wins a visible expression in the Church--becomes to man in
faith and hope the most certain presence. Christianity ratified an
affirmation of life; still, it did not accomplish this immediately, but
by the most fundamental and definite negation; and thus to a cursory
consideration it might appear to be a flight from the world. In reality,
it unites the negation and the affirmation, flight from, and renewal of,
the world; the deepest feeling of, and the happiest deliverance from,
guilt and suffering, and thereby gives to life a greater breadth as well
as a ceaseless activity in search of its true self. Religion does not
mean a special domain by the side of others; its intention is rather to
be the innermost soul and the supreme power of the whole life. Through
its ideals and its standards it lends to the whole sphere of life a
distinctive character; it leads to a definite organisation of mankind
and offers powerful opposition to all dissipation, all merely individual
caprice. It comes to the individual as a supreme power which brings to
him salvation and truth, shapes him for the highest ends, and connects
his thought and feeling with an invisible world.
With such an undertaking Christianity has exercised most deep-reaching
influences on the course of history; in the first place it implanted a
new vitality in an exhausted humanity; then in the Middle Ages it worked
to the education of a new race; and now that it has become mature it
has not ceased to exercise strong, though quieter, influences:
considering all the facts, it appears to be the most powerful force in
history.
But all the greatness of past achievement could not prevent a strong
movement from arising in the Modern Age against Christianity; a movement
which still continues to increase in power and which undermines the
position of Christianity, where outwardly it still appears quite secure.
It is true that there never was a period when it was not opposed by
individuals, but through the lack of any spiritual import these isolated
oppositions had never combined so as to produce a united effect. An
effect of this kind was first produced with the emergence of new systems
of thought and new streams of life since the beginning of the
seventeenth century; as long, however, as this movement was limited to
the cultured classes and left the masses untouched, that which existed
in it as a menace did not produce its full effect. It was the conviction
of Bayle, that the spirit of the Enlightenment would never permeate the
masses. In the nineteenth century this "unexpected" happened, and the
nature of spiritual endeavour and the disposition of men join together
in an assault upon Christianity; an assault which no one with insight
will call anything but dangerous.
The thing most evident and most talked of is the subversion of the old
conception of the world; a conception which is usually associated with
Christianity. This conception is less and less able to assert itself in
face of the triumphant onward march of modern science. The
representation of nature, like that of human history, has been broadened
immeasurably and at the same time has acquired inner unity, law, and
order; a direct intervention of a supernatural power is felt more and
more to be an intolerable derangement. The earth, hitherto the centre of
the whole and the chief platform upon which the destiny of the universe
was decided, sinks to a position of more correct proportion, and man is
much more closely linked to nature and fitted into a common order. How
then can that which takes place in him decide what shall be the destiny
of the whole?
If we would withdraw from this shattered conception of the world, as
from a mere external matter, to the substance of Christianity, this
substance must be much more clearly and much more forcibly present to us
than it really is. For, in this change we are concerned not simply with
individual phrases, but with the whole mode of thought. We have learnt
to think far more causally and critically; we perceive the peculiarity
of the historical circumstances in which Christianity arose, and, along
with this, become aware of a wide disparity from the circumstances of
the present. We question all historical tradition as to its grounds, and
so overthrow the weight of authority; our thought has become throughout
less naïve and we strive to transcend the form of the immediate
impression. From this point of view it comes about quite easily that the
religious mode of thought appears to be a mere anthropomorphism, a
childlike, imaginative interpretation of the world, which, to an
intelligence equipped with the clearness of objective consideration, can
pass only for a stage in evolution, which has once for all been
overcome. Such is the teaching of Positivism, and it is just in this
reference to religion that its influence extends far beyond the limits
of the positivistic school.
The change of thought would not be so far-reaching and so dangerous if
it did not give expression to a change of life as a whole; but this is
what it really does: the Modern Age through the whole course of its
development sets a universal--a system--over against the religious
system of life. That all departments of life should subordinate
themselves to Religion, that every activity has value only so far as it
either directly or indirectly furthers Religion, appears to the Modern
Age a much too narrow conception, and one which is a mischievous denial
of the truth that these departments of life contain. So the different
branches of the spiritual life--for example, science and art, politics
and economics--liberate themselves radically from the supremacy of
Religion, and this is felt to be an incalculable gain in freedom and
breadth. Since, unimpeded, the new life increases in comprehensiveness,
and draws the whole content of reality into itself, it seems to rest
firmly and securely in itself and to need no completion of any kind
whatever.