Plan of campaign--Native levies--Special service officers--The
advance--Pearson's column--Glyn's column--Wood's
column--Utrecht--First brush with the enemy--Difficulties of
transport--Action on Inyezani--Pearson at Ekowe--Glyn's
advance--Durnford's failure--Isandhlwana--Description of camp--The
battle--Details--Reconnaissance and return of Lord
Chelmsford--Rorke's Drift--Causes of Isandhlwana--Remarks.
The plan of the campaign now commenced was to advance into Zululand in
four columns, each column complete in itself, having its own artillery,
cavalry, and independent leader. Each column was also to keep up
communications with the columns on flank, thus creating, as it were, the
effect of an advance in one extended line.
By this means it was intended to thoroughly sweep the entire Zulu
territory, and at the same time to prevent any large body of the enemy
from slipping between the columns, and so getting to the rear and
delivering a counter-attack on the colonies.
In addition to the regular European forces, large native levies had been
raised, amounting in all to 7400. It is a great error to suppose that
these were without arms, dress, or discipline. On the contrary, a great
many of them came to us well armed with serviceable-looking rifles,
evidently of Birmingham or Sheffield make, while some of the
older-fashioned fire-arms had the Tower mark.
Nor were they clothed only with the conventional blanket. On the
contrary, their uniform was neat, and, at the same time, workmanlike,
and consisted of a corduroy tunic, or rather patrol jacket, and
breeches, with long boots of untanned leather, and a broad-leafed
_sombrero_ as a head-dress.
Several native corps were rapidly formed, in the following manner:--The
commandant and his staff officers were British officers, the captains
mostly retired British officers, colonists, or settlers; the
non-commissioned officers, white settlers of different nationalities,
and the privates usually Kaffirs.
Among the English officers who received commands in this native
contingent were Captain Nolan (Pioneers), Major Bengough, Captain
Russell (Rocket Battery), Captain Ulich de Burgh (5th West York
Militia), Captain Cherry (32nd Foot), and Lieutenant Hon. H. Gough.
Colonel Durnford had command of the whole column, which was to be
entirely native so far as the rank and file were concerned, and to be
composed of all the three arms--artillery, cavalry, and infantry.
There was also a considerable contingent of European Volunteers--more
especially of mounted men, whose total reached close on 1000.
Conspicuous amongst these were the Volunteer Hussars and Alexandra
Mounted Rifles, the Durban Mounted Rifles, Captain Raaf's Diamond Field
and Free State Horse, and a contingent of mounted Boers under Piet Uys,
who gallantly responded to Colonel Wood's spirited and soldierlike
appeal. These Boers were a splendid body of men, most of them crack
shots with the rifle, and although somewhat fierce and uncompromising
towards their ancient enemies, the Zulus, proved of invaluable service
through their knowledge of localities.
The following "special service" officers, sent out from England, had
also arrived and entered on their respective duties:--Captain Cherry
(32nd Light Infantry), was placed in command of the 3rd battalion Natal
Contingent; Captain Gardner (14th Hussars), was sub-director of
transports at headquarters, as well as Captain Huntley (10th Regiment),
who was posted to the River Mooi; Captains Essex (76th), and Hon. H.
Campbell (Coldstream Guards), were also directors of transports. Major
Hopton had this duty at Pietermaritzburg. Captain Brunker, of the
Cameronians (26th), had the command of a squadron of Light Horse.
Captain Barton (7th Regiment), was staff officer to Colonel Durnford;
Captains Pelly Clark (103rd Regiment), Spratt (29th), and Lieutenant
Lawrence (18th), were all employed on transport duty at Durban, where,
as most of the ammunition and stores were landed, their office was no
sinecure. Captain Macgregor (29th Regiment), was staff officer to
Colonel Pearson, and Captain Hart (31st Regiment) was on the staff of
Lord Chelmsford.
Meanwhile Cetywayo's term of grace had expired; the 11th of January had
come and gone without any sign from the Zulu monarch. On the following
day the war had begun, and the Tugela was successfully crossed. By four
o'clock on the 12th the Buffs, four companies of the 99th, the Victoria
Mounted Rifles, the native Sappers, the 1st Natal Native Contingent, and
the Naval Brigade were well over the Lower Tugela, near Fort
Buckingham. The pontoon worked remarkably well, making three trips an
hour. Four small boats were also employed. A herd of cattle was brought
into the camp by the vedettes, who also reported that a large Zulu force
was in position about twenty miles off, and also at Ondini. It has been
mentioned that four columns would be formed from out of the three (whose
details have been given above), and these four were now advancing into
Zululand in a line which partly described a crescent, of which the left
extremity rested on Luneberg and the Pongolo, the right upon the Lower
Drift of the Tugela, close to the sea, while the inner half of the
circle was represented by the boundaries of Natal and the Transvaal.
The centre may be considered as being at Fort Pearson, where there was a
strongly entrenched camp on the summit of a rising or bluff overlooking
the river Tugela. The column moving from Fort Pearson consisted of 1500
regular infantry, that is to say, eight companies of the Buffs, under
Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one
company Royal Artillery and two 7-pounder guns, drawn by mules under
Lieutenant Lloyd; one Naval Brigade of 276 bluejackets and Marines,
under Captain Campbell, from her Majesty's ships "Active" and "Tenedos,"
with three Gatlings; 200 Mounted Infantry, under Captain Barrow, and 200
Mounted Volunteers (Durban Mounted Rifles), under Captain W. Shepstone;
the Alexandra Mounted Rifles, Captain Arbuthnot; Victoria Mounted
Rifles, Captain Saner; Stanger Mounted Rifles, Captain Addison; the
Natal Hussars, Captain Norton. Colonel Pearson, of the Buffs, was in
command of the column, and had to co-operate with him a native
contingent of 2000 men, under Major Graves, as well as two companies of
the 99th posted at Stanger and Durban. The total strength of Colonel
Pearson's column may, therefore, be set down at 2200 Europeans and 2000
natives.
The second or right centre column moved from Kranz Kop, a most
formidable position, supported by Fort Buckingham. This was the scene of
operations in 1861. The heights are commanding and look over a wide
field of country. The position is unassailable except from the Natal
side, and this was strongly fortified. Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanded
this district and attack, and had with him now the 1st Regiment Native
Contingent, which then consisted of three fine battalions, with three
rocket tubes, under Lieutenant Russell, and 250 mounted natives, making
altogether 3300 natives, officered by 200 European officers.
Following the line of advance to the left, and occupying about fifty or
sixty miles of frontier, we come to column three, the left centre
attack, commanded by Colonel Glyn. Take any good map and you will remark
how the boundary winds serpentine fashion in its length from Fort
Buckingham to Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar. Helpmakaar made an excellent
base to Rorke's Drift. Being situated on a lofty plateau, it formed an
admirable place for a permanent encampment. It also had depôts at
Greytown on the one side and Ladismith on the other. Colonel Glyn had
with him seven companies of the 1st battalion 24th and eight companies
of the 2nd battalion 24th, six 7-pounder guns with Kaffrarian carriages
under Colonel Harness, a squadron of mounted infantry under Captain
Browne, the Natal Mounted Police (150 men), the Natal Carabineers under
Captain Shepstone, the Buffalo Border Guard (Captain Robson), the
Newcastle Mounted Rifles (Captain Bradstreet), also the native
contingent (2nd Regiment), 2000 strong, under Commandant Lonsdale,
officered by 200 whites. From Rorke's Drift, about five miles over the
river is Ungusdana, and thence on the traveller comes to the Intalalala
river, which is about fifteen miles inland. The country all about the
district is rugged and broken, and calculated to afford positions of
great defensive strength. Colonel Glyn was, if possible, to bear a
little to his left flank after crossing the boundary with a view to
communication being opened with Wood's right flank. To effect this
connexion, however, there was a sad need of cavalry.
We now come to the extreme left of the advance, whose headquarters were
Utrecht, and which was thus composed:--Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., C.B.,
90th Light Infantry, commanding No. 4 Column; Staff Orderly Officer,
Lieutenant Lysons, 90th Infantry; Principal Staff Officer, Captain Hon.
R. G. E. Campbell, Coldstream Guards; general Staff duties, Captain
Woodgate, 4th Regiment; transport duties, Captain Vaughan, R.A.; senior
commissary officer, Commissary Hughes; commissary of ordnance, Assistant
Commissary Philimore; subdistrict paymaster, Paymaster M'Donald; senior
medical officer, Surgeon-Major Cuffe. Corps--Royal Artillery, six
7-pounders, Major Tremlett, R.A.; 1st-13th Light Infantry,
Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, 13th; 90th Light Infantry, Brevet
Lieutenant-Colonel Cherry, 90th; Frontier Light Horse, Brevet
Lieut.-Colonel Buller, C.B., 60th; Wood's Irregulars, 700 men,
Commandant Henderson. In addition, a few Boers were coming in, and more
were expected.
Utrecht is the most southerly part of the Transvaal, and lies upon the
border of both Natal and Zululand. It is separated from the former by
the Buffalo river, and, after crossing the Blood river, a few marches
bring one to the territories of King Cetywayo. From the lowest, or most
southerly portions of Utrecht, just where the Buffalo and Blood rivers
form a junction, to the port of Durban, on the coast of Natal, is but
100 miles, and the capital city is about thirty miles from Newcastle,
the most northern of Natal towns. The two districts are connected by a
tolerably fair road and a drift over the Buffalo river. Utrecht, in a
strategical point of view, wedged in as it were between Natal and
Zululand, cannot be equalled by any position of a similar nature. The
interior of this district extends away to the summit of the Drakenberg
range, one of which reaches an altitude of 4000 feet. Most of the
Utrecht land lies in what is called the "terrace country," and has the
advantage of the most splendid bracing air, added to which are mountain
ridge and peak, precipice, wooded gorge, and grass-land, and scenery
whose characteristics are of a grander and nobler nature than that of
the Cape Colony. The portion of the Drakenberg which runs through
Utrecht has its eastern front and glacis looking towards the sea, which
is about eighty miles distant, and as each terrace or range slopes down
the character of the country changes, presenting many of the features
of the upper portions of the Cape Colony, that is to say, broad
undulating downs in one part and immense flats covered with bush on the
other. All the principal rivers and streams of Utrecht and their
tributaries flow eastward to the Indian Ocean. On one boundary there is
the Pongola, and on the other the Buffalo, while the Blood river passes
through it with a south-eastern flow, and the Pifan does the same, but
with an inclination to the north-east. From the wild highlands between
these two streams issue the head waters of the Umoolosi, which traverses
Zululand and empties itself into St. Lucia Bay.
Wood's column marched from Utrecht on the 7th, so as to be on the
borderland in order to operate with the right-hand column on the
appointed day. General Lord Chelmsford had given orders that Colonel
Wood was to be at a certain point on the 10th, and consequently
arrangements were made to carry out these instructions. It was known
that Sirayo would probably oppose the crossing of Colonel Glyn at
Rorke's Drift, and Colonel Wood had been told, if possible, to get
sufficiently near to operate on the enemy's right and rear should such
an attempt be made. Leaving a small guard at his camps at Sandspruit,
the rest of Wood's force paraded in the lightest possible order at 1.30
p.m. on the 10th, and marched from two that afternoon until six p.m. A
halt was then made until 1.30 a.m., when by the light of a glorious moon
the advance was pursued. A mounted advanced guard was thrown out,
flanking patrols were organized and told off, and the troops moved in
the greatest silence, not a word in the ranks being allowed to be
spoken. At 3 a.m., a short halt took place, and the chief ordered
forward a reconnaissance, consisting of Buller's Light Horse, two
7-pounder guns under Major Tremlett, and twenty-four picked shots from
the 13th and 90th Regiments respectively. These men were to be carried
in some of the mule waggons, and were accompanied by the 700 irregulars,
horse and foot. Colonel Wood accompanied this advanced force, leaving
the remaining (main) body in charge of Colonel Gilbert, who was ordered
to follow at a fixed time. The advanced body arrived within ten miles of
Rorke's Drift at 7.30 a.m., and by eight the camp fires were lit and the
men comfortably having their breakfasts on the banks of a small stream;
the mounted men having at once off-saddled, the infantry piled arms, and
the horses and mules turned out to graze under a strong guard.
About nine o'clock the general, Lord Chelmsford, cantered up to the
camp, accompanied by his staff and an escort of 100 mounted infantry and
some Natal mounted police. The general seemed delighted at the celerity
with which his orders had been carried out, as in eighteen hours Wood's
party had covered twenty-seven miles, and the men and horses were as
fresh as paint. A long consultation took place with the general, and
then the order was issued for the return to the main body; but this was
not found necessary, as Colonel Gilbert met them after about ten miles.
In this day, or rather twenty-four hours, the men had marched thirty-one
miles, and were not fated, on camp being pitched, to enjoy the fruits of
their labour and toil, for soon after they were settled for the evening
a heavy thunderstorm came suddenly over the tents, and in a quarter of
an hour they were up to their ankles in a perfect river of water. The
tents went down in all directions, and in many cases poles were snapped.
The next day, however, a patrol of Buller's horse was paraded soon after
daybreak, as scouts had brought in information that a large number of
cattle were to be seen in the neighbouring kloof. Soon after leaving
camp Buller's men were fired upon, but the Zulus did not stand their
ground, and by the afternoon they had brought in nearly 1000 cattle.
Captain Barton, who had gone out later in the day with another party,
marched twenty miles in the direction of Umkanga's kraal, where in the
skirmish which resulted 550 cattle were taken, and seven of the Zulus
were killed and wounded. On the following morning a strong
reconnaissance was made in the direction of the Bushee Valley. The Zulus
were in considerable force, and their general tried to induce the
English skirmishers to follow him to ground of his own choosing. Colonel
Wood, however, kept his men well in hand, and contented himself by
sending forward two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, Colonel
Gilbert's fine corps, and menacing the Zulu flank with some score or
more horsemen, who, galloping to a favouring eminence, made capital
practice at the Zulu main body with their rifles at 700 and 800 yards.
The Zulus still continued to creep up in rear, getting what cover they
could from the bushes, and a sharp fire was kept up on both sides. As
the men in skirmishing order pushed the enemy gradually before them, the
mounted force harassed them on either flank, sometimes galloping round
to the right and left to obtain vantage-ground and cover, and then
dismounting in sections, and acting as infantry, while the main body was
kept carefully out of sight in the dense mimosa which was found in the
rear. The bush, as they advanced, gradually became more dense, and the
path scarcely allowed them to move in fours by a steep descent into a
wooded valley. Instinctively it was guessed that here would be the main
body of the foe, and this turned out to be the case, for away to the
left front, on a tall "copjie" or circular hill, about twenty mounted
Zulus were to be seen, evidently the commander and his staff giving
orders and directing the operations of the columns in the plain. The
firing had now become general, but the soldiers were not allowed to
waste their ammunition, and nearly every shot told with fatal effect.
Colonel Wood had taken the precaution to strengthen his flanks as he
advanced, and as the enemy could not tell how strong he was, the main
body being still invisible, they were completely puzzled by the daring
of the mounted men, who seemed ubiquitous. The guns were found rather a
nuisance; one of the carriages broke down, and the limber had to be left
behind, while the gun itself was secured. The head of the first line of
skirmishers had now made good their way through the kloof with slight
loss, and the Zulus attempted in vain to get round to its rear, but
found all hopes of such a man[oe]uvre utterly futile--as the flanking
parties were on the _qui-vive_. It was now Wood's turn to push them, and
he used the opportunity. Two more companies were advanced at the double
to force the centre of the Zulu line, and in a few moments we had cut
it in two. In the meanwhile one of the light field-pieces had obtained a
favourable position, and had got the enemy's range exactly, but the
execution done was not what could have been obtained with a good honest
nine or twelve-pounder. The pursuit was carried on for about a mile, and
the Zulus were scattered in all directions, but the commander was too
wary to allow his men to go too far, and the recall was sounded, and in
a short time brought back the excited fellows, puffing and blowing, to
rejoin the main body.
For some days this column continued to advance steadily without meeting
any serious opposition. Having moved on from the Blood River, Wood's
force encamped at Bemba's Kop till the 20th January. The country over
which they had passed since they left Utrecht may be described as a
succession of large rolling plains, interspersed in all directions by
watercourses (_dongas_), which radiate from the bases of the
table-topped mountains rising at intervals throughout this part of the
country. These watercourses are as a rule about twelve to fourteen feet
deep, and serve to irrigate the country, which seems prosperous and
well-populated. What would be called a road in England does not exist in
Zululand. The tracks made by the traders with their waggons answer the
purpose. These tracks are, however, tolerably good, and experience
proved that artillery could be moved almost anywhere, except in wet
weather. Waggons could pass each other at almost any part of the main
road from Utrecht to Ulundi, except at that portion leading across the
Inhlazatye Mountain, which runs along a narrow ledge, and where it
ascends the Intendeka table-land. Wherever the troops moved they came
across numerous kraals, each kraal containing from eight to fifteen
huts, and each hut ten to fifteen men. From Bemba's Kop they moved on
the 20th to Wolpoint, as nearly as possible seven miles west of the
White Umbolosi, and thence went on to Tunguin's Neck, where a laager was
planned and completed. After a reconnaissance made by Colonel Wood on
the 22nd, in which his troops had a slight skirmish with a small body of
Zulus, suffering no casualties, and inflicting a slight loss upon them,
he halted on the 23rd, and sent out strong patrols in the direction of
the Ingwazini River. These men rode over an open plain admirably suited
for cavalry operations, but found nothing but some deserted kraals and
the dead bodies of some Zulus, who, it was subsequently discovered, were
wounded at Isandula the previous day. On their return the party were
fortunate enough to discover the whereabouts of a strong body, some 4000
to 5000 Zulu warriors, who, it was imagined, were merely the nucleus of
a force intended to surprise Wood's column. They were posted in a
well-chosen position at a place called Tintas Hill, and when they moved
down in his direction the following day, Wood had concealed a portion of
his force so well, that he got them between two fires, and in about half
an hour had killed about sixty or seventy of them, his own casualties
being only two men wounded. It was during this action that information
was brought by Captain Alan Gardner, who gallantly rode without any
escort from Helpmakaar to Utrecht, notifying the terrible disaster of
the 22nd, and the destruction of No. 3 Column. This news caused Colonel
Wood to change his plans, and after a halt of a couple of hours, he
turned back towards the Umbolosi, where his little force arrived at
seven a.m. on the 25th. On Sunday (26th) he moved on to Ugaba Ka Hawana,
where good camping-ground and a defensive position were chosen, and
where the minor essentials of wood and water were in plenty.
Colonel Pearson, who commanded No. 1 Column on the extreme right, had
also been prosecuting his advance with the greatest vigour, and the
results were in every way satisfactory, though already the tremendous
difficulties of commissariat and transport had made themselves
unpleasantly evident. This force assembled near Fort Stanger, and
crossed the Lower Tugela on the 12th, having as nearly as possible 1500
regular troops, consisting of eight companies of the old Buffs, under
Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one
company Royal Engineers, and two 7-pounder guns. A naval brigade,
however, which might be considered as a little army in itself, went with
them, and were under Colonel Pearson's command. This force consisted of
270 bluejackets and marines, under Captain Campbell, of her Majesty's
ships "Active" and "Tenedos," with three of the new-pattern Gatling. Two
hundred mounted infantry and 200 colonial mounted riflemen also formed
part of the column, while the whole force was supplemented by Major
Griffiths and about 2000 men of the Native Contingent. The crossing of
the river was at first impeded by the rains, and another delay occurred
at the lower drift, where the river was at least 400 yards wide, but all
these difficulties were overcome, and after a week's delay a flying
column was sent forward on the 18th in the direction of Ekowe, which is
a mission-station not quite forty miles inland, and distant nearly
seventy from the king's kraal at Ulundi. It was the intention of Colonel
Pearson to establish here an entrenched post as a _point d'appui_ to the
invading army. On the following day the colonel was followed by the rear
division, escorting the heavy baggage, necessary though inconvenient
_impedimenta_, as it contained stores and ammunition. The column of
waggons extended for five miles, and it took the officers in charge all
their time and the services of three horses each during the day to
supervise its progress from inspan till outspan. Again, two days later,
came the commissariat, and here imagination fails to describe the
difficulties encountered. The subject of transport is one that must be
considered in any future operations in Africa. The waggons must be
stronger than those employed; the animals should be proof against
sickness caused by climate, the tulip plant, and the tsetse fly, and
this can be avoided by choosing one's own season for marching. The
employment of mules would be much preferable to that of oxen, although
in many books the converse is stated, the Dutch being infatuated in
regard to the superior qualities of the latter. Mules, for instance,
have this advantage over oxen. They can travel twenty-five miles a day
with ease, while twelve or fifteen a day with oxen is considered good
work; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that a mule costs
twice as much as an ox, apart from the cost of feeding. The mule must,
of course, be fed on forage carried for him or bought on the road,
while the ox will feed on the veldt, except during the three winter
months, when his services are not often required. Two kinds of mules can
be procured about Pretoria--the Montevidean and the home-bred animal.
The latter is generally preferred, although no doubt the former is most
tractable. There is an immense trouble in selecting oxen for
campaigning, as none but those bred in the sour veldt of Natal or
Zululand are of any use for such rough food and hard work; and, as a
rule, these will live where others would die. The usual load is 7000
lbs., placed on a waggon weighing 3000 lbs., and drawn by sixteen or
eighteen oxen. The cost for oxen averages about 9_l._ each, but during
this war they went up to 18_l._, and even 25_l._ Each waggon, with
dissel-boom and yokes complete, costs at least 180_l._ The cost of mules
will average 20_l._ each, and mule waggons 100_l._, with harness at
5_l._ for each animal.
The road, after crossing the river Tugela, crosses no less than four
streams, and before reaching Ekowe passes through a broken bushy
country. On the 22nd, the day on which Isandula was attacked, Colonel
Pearson had a sharp engagement with the enemy at a place called by the
natives Inyezane, about four or five miles beyond his camping-ground of
the 21st. Major Barrow had been sent forward along a fertile valley
which led to the Inyezane, when Colonel Pearson received a despatch from
him, saying that he had selected a tolerably good place for camping,
which he had carefully guarded by vedettes. On receiving this
information the colonel at once rode on to the spot, and although he did
not quite approve of the ground, as being too full of bush for an
outspan, he decided to allow the waggons to be outspanned for two hours
on account of there being no water near at hand. This was done to rest
and feed the oxen, and to allow the men to have their morning meal.
About eight o'clock, just as the waggons had begun to park, and while
the officers were busy in directing the posting of pickets, scouts, and
sentries, the advanced company of the Native Contingent, which had been
scouting in front under Captain Hart, discovered the Zulus in force
rapidly advancing over the slopes and attempting to gain the bushes on
both flanks. They came on in skirmishing and extended order in the
finest style, rushing from bush to bush in a steady but stealthy manner
until within 100 or 150 yards of the outposts. Captain Hart's men, being
in the open, had to bear the brunt of a heavy fire, and not without
casualties, as they lost one officer, four non-commissioned officers,
and four privates almost at once. These poor fellows, it is feared, were
sacrificed, inasmuch as they did not understand the order to retire and
seek cover, and concluded that it was their duty to remain in the open.
The Naval Brigade was now ordered into action, and most ably they
acquitted themselves. Two 7-pounders and two 24-pounder Naval Brigade
rockets were smartly brought into action on a knoll at the base of the
pass, but commanding the valley from which the flank attack was made.
Meanwhile two companies of the Buffs and A and B companies of the Naval
Brigade opened a heavy and well-directed fire upon the enemy, and
effectually held him in check. This coign of vantage was occupied by
Colonel Pearson, whence he directed the movements of his troops during
the fight. All this time the waggons continued to park, and while the
fire was kept up by Commander Campbell, Lieutenant Lloyd, with his guns,
and Lieutenant Martin with the Buffs, two other companies of the same
regiment which had been employed in guarding waggons were moved down,
ready to clear the bush as soon as it was well shelled and swept with
rockets and musketry. Colonel Pearson selected Captain Macgregor to
undertake this duty, with the assistance of Captains Harrison and Wyld,
who, getting their men into skirmishing order, and bringing their
shoulders gradually forward as steadily as if man[oe]uvring at a
field-day, sent the Zulu braves flying discomfited before them, and
exposed them once more in the open to the hail of shot and shell which
swept the plain. Colonel Welman, 99th Regiment, now took advantage of
this favourable moment, when the enemy was demoralized, to send forward
Captain Wynne and Major Barrow with the infantry. These, with
skirmishers and flankers on the left, and supported by two
half-companies of the Buffs and 99th, now moved forward at a steady
pace.
The Zulus, however, were not beaten, though evidently puzzled, and
Campbell, who was in charge of the Naval Brigade, saw that they were
making a flank movement on the left. This officer at once obtained
permission from Colonel Pearson to take a portion of his men and drive
out a body of Zulus who had obtained possession of a kraal about 400
yards from the knoll. Captain Hart, with part of his Native Contingent,
gallantly supported this movement. They managed to obtain possession of
the high ground to the left of the Ekowe road, and effectually checked
the enemy in their movement on the British left.
But the gallant sailor Campbell was not satisfied with this partial
success, and sent for further permission to follow up his _coup_ by
driving on the foe to a more respectable distance. Colonel Parnell, of
the Buffs, who up to this time had been acting as a sort of reserve with
Captain Foster's company at the foot knoll, where Colonel Pearson
remained throughout the action, had now an opportunity of mingling in
the fray. Smartly deploying his men, he advanced at the double, and
forming up on the right of the bluejackets, swept the heights beyond the
kraal which a few moments before were crowned with savage warriors. This
decided the action, as the Zulus, thoroughly distracted, fled in all
directions, the guns making capital practice wherever a group collected.
The last round from the rocket-tubes seemed to carry destruction and
confusion amongst them, and was fired a little before ten a.m.
Colonel Pearson and Colonel Parnell both had their horses shot under
them, and several officers remarked that the fire of the Zulus was
principally directed at the English leaders. The regiments opposed to
Pearson were composed of the Umxapu, Umdhlanefu, and Ingulubi, and as
near as could be judged, and from the information subsequently received,
numbered about 5000 men. Of these at the very least 300 were slain,
while the number of wounded, as a rule carried away into the bush, could
not have been less than double that. Pearson's loss was eight killed and
sixteen wounded, and of these were six officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Native Contingent. The following day two companies of
the Buffs, two companies Native Contingent, and a few mounted men were
sent off to the help of Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who with three
companies of his regiment was bringing up a convoy, much wanted, of
seventy waggons of stores and ammunition, while on Saturday, the 18th,
Major Coates started with fifty extra waggons to bring up more supplies.
On the day after the Inyezane engagement Pearson arrived at Ekowe. The
position was a strong one, and he immediately set to work to make it
still more formidable. Water was close to the fort, and well under its
fire.
At this juncture news of the Isandhlwana disaster reached Colonel
Pearson. After consultation with his officers, he decided to remain
where he was, feeling confident that even without further supplies or
reinforcements he could hold his position for at least a couple of
months. All his waggons came in safety to the fort except five, which
broke down and had to be abandoned. The mounted men and Native
Contingent were sent back to save food, and there thus remained 1200
British troops, having 320 rounds per man.
The first failure in the carrying out of Lord Chelmsford's plans
occurred to No. 4 Column, and proved the initial step to the crowning
disaster of Isandhlwana. The right centre column, which should have
operated simultaneously with Colonel Wood's force, was unfortunately
composed almost entirely of natives, and these fellows did not succeed
in getting over at the point directed in orders. As this column could
not be brought over the river, a portion of it was left behind to keep
open communications and guard the frontier, while the remainder, under
Colonel Durnford, was moved up to Rorke's Drift to reinforce Colonel
Glyn's command. The following day (12th) Colonel Glyn had his first
brush with the enemy. Lord Chelmsford had joined this column, and after
crossing the Tugela ordered out a reconnaissance by the Bashee Valley
and along the road leading to Izpizi. Glyn took with him three companies
of the 1st battalion 24th and one battalion 3rd Regiment Natal Native
Contingent, while the mounted men, crossing the valley, went rapidly
along the road leading over the Ngudu mountains, where high cliffs close
in the gorge for more than three miles. Cattle and armed Zulus were seen
on the heights, and some of the 24th and the natives were ordered to
bear round to the right flank and cut them off. The skirmish which
followed lasted about twenty minutes, and was a very smart affair. It
resulted in the taking of the fastnesses and the precipitate flight of
the Zulus, who suffered a loss of ten killed, three wounded, and nine
prisoners taken, together with a quantity of cattle, horses, and sheep.
Colonel Glyn's loss was two privates Natal Contingent killed, one
officer of the same, Lieutenant Purvis, severely wounded; Corporal
Mayer, Natal Native Contingent, severe wound in thigh. Four companies of
the 2nd battalion 24th, and four companies of the 2nd battalion 3rd
Regiment Natal Native Contingent, under Colonel Degacher, were now
ordered by the General to advance up the Bashee and attack Usirayo's
kraal, a place called Loxie, about two or three miles farther on. This
place, situated in a wild and mountainous gorge or krantz, interspersed
with caves, guarded by huge boulders, was completely explored by these
men. In the meantime Russell and his mounted men had ascended to the
summit of the Ngudu mountain, where they were fired upon at a distance
of 90 or 100 yards. Sixteen of the Zulus were killed, and a very heavy
thunderstorm came on during the fight. No signs could be observed of any
Zulu force in reserve, and this was explained by the subsequent news
that Usirayo had made a precipitate flight in the direction of the
king's kraal. On the following day communications were opened between
Wood's column and that of Colonel Glyn. The General's movements from the
first appear to have been hampered by baggage and transport
arrangements, and a similar reason delayed Colonel Pearson. Lord
Chelmsford was present with this column when it moved from Rorke's
Drift, and saw the site which was chosen by Colonel Glyn at Insalwana,
ten miles on the road to the Indeni forest. He then left Colonel Glyn in
charge of the camp, and on the same day moved, with a portion of the
force, ten miles further on, to reconnoitre the country in front.
Returning to camp that evening, without having had time to fully
explore, the General, the following morning, sent out two separate
reconnoitring columns, under the command respectively of Major Dartnell,
who took with him the Mounted Police and Natal Volunteers, of which he
is commandant, and Commandant Lonsdale with two battalions of his Native
Contingent. Dartnell went along the same road as that explored by the
General the previous day, while Lonsdale moved along the southern slope
of the Inhlazatye range, towards a hill called Malaka's Kop. If
possible a junction between these two bodies was to be effected; and, as
soon as information could be obtained as to the situation of the enemy
and the strategical features of the locality, both were to return to the
headquarter camp. By some extraordinary oversight, neither of these
reconnoitring columns seems to have been supplied with rations, while it
was usual on such expeditions for the men to take preserved meat and
three days' biscuit in their haversacks, supposing that mule transport
cannot be had. On the afternoon of the Tuesday Major Dartnell sent an
officer to the headquarter camp, to inform the General that he could not
advance beyond the Insangu river, a small stream near Inkankla Mountain,
as the Zulus were posted there in force. Dartnell, therefore, sent an
orderly to call up Lonsdale with his Native Contingent, and sent to Lord
Chelmsford to request a reinforcement of regulars to enable him to
attack the enemy. His lordship did not consider it advisable to comply
with this demand, as the daylight was almost gone, and the distance was
long. A supply of biscuit was, however, sent out to the exploring party,
who bivouacked at the foot of the Inhlazatye. During the night, however,
Major Dartnell appears to have become aware of his critical position,
and at half-past two on the morning of the 22nd (Wednesday), Colonel
Glyn received a letter from him, saying that the Zulus had been strongly
reinforced, and were now in his front in great strength. Instead of
recalling the column, or at once pushing forward troops to its
assistance, a delay took place, and a staff officer was despatched to
ask Dartnell what he wished done. After some further lapse of time the
General ordered Colonel Glyn to march to Major Dartnell's assistance
with the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment, consisting of six companies, the
mounted infantry, and four of Harness's guns. As this detachment would
considerably weaken the camp, the General at the same time sent off two
expresses to Colonel Durnford, who had been left at Rorke's Drift,
telling him to move up at once to Isandula with his 500 native troops,
250 of whom were mounted. The General then decided to accompany Colonel
Glyn's force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1-24th, was left in
charge of the camp, with orders to defend it, pending the arrival of
Durnford's natives. The actual fighting strength of Pulleine's force
consisted of 2 officers, 78 men, and 2 guns R.A.; 1-24th Regiment, 15
officers, 334 men; 2-24th Regiment, 5 officers, 90 men; mounted
Europeans, 5 officers, 204 men; Native Contingent, 19 officers, 391 men;
Natal Pioneers, 1 officer, 10 men; while Durnford, when he arrived very
soon after, brought with him 18 officers and 450 men, thus making an
aggregate of 772 Europeans and 850 natives, or in all 1622 combatants.
On his arrival at the camp, Colonel Durnford, being the senior officer,
of course immediately assumed the command.
To the right understanding of what follows it is necessary to give a
somewhat detailed account of the situation. The leading feature of the
plain on the southern slopes of which the English camp was placed is the
Isandhlwana, or Lion Hill. To the west it rises abruptly, forming the
head of the crouching animal it resembles in shape; after forming the
back it descends sharply to the east. At both ends are necks or ridges
connecting the hill with the smaller undulations of which the more level
part of the country consists. The road from Rorke's Drift passes over
the western ridge, while on the north facing the camp was a deep ravine
and watercourse. To the immediate right was a small copse; beyond this
the ground was much broken, irregular krantzes and hills all covered
with huge boulders continuing as far as the Buffalo river. To the left
of the camp, at the distance of rather more than a mile, ran a long
ridge towards the south, connecting it with the great Isandhlwana hill,
having on its summit a plateau which, towards the east, opened on to an
open and extensive valley. On the extreme left of the camp, looking
towards the ridge, were pitched the tents of the Natal Native
Contingent; between these and the next two battalions intervened a space
of rather less than 300 yards; occupying the centre were the British
regular Infantry, just above whom came the headquarters camp of Lord
Chelmsford, and in close proximity the headquarters of the column. On
the right were the guns and mounted corps lining the edge of the road.
Soon after it came over the neck at the back of the camp the ground rose
considerably, until the bottom of the precipitous Isandhlwana was
reached: the camp therefore literally had its back to a wall.
At six a.m. on the 22nd, a company of the Natal Natives was ordered to
scout towards the left, the enemy having appeared in that direction.
Whilst these were away Durnford arrived, about nine o'clock, with a
rocket battery under Colonel Russell, R.A., 250 mounted natives, and 250
native foot. News was now brought in that the Zulus in very large
numbers were driving the pickets before them. A later messenger--a
native without uniform, supposed by some to be a Zulu purposely sent
with false intelligence--brought the news that the Zulus had divided
into three columns, one of which it was supposed was about to attack
Colonel Durnford's baggage, still on the road from Rorke's Drift, the
other to harass Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn's party in their rear,
whilst the third was to hover round and watch the camp. Finally came the
news "Zulus retiring in all directions." Colonel Durnford thereupon
asked Colonel Pulleine to lend him a couple of the 24th companies, but
he declined, saying his orders were to guard the camp, and he could not,
under the circumstances, let them go without a positive command.
Durnford then determined to go on with his own force, which he divided
into three, one part being sent up the hill to the left (east), one to
the left front, and the third to the rear, in the direction of Rorke's
Drift, to act as an escort for the baggage not yet arrived. The rocket
battery was of the party that proceeded to the front under Colonel
Durnford in person, to a distance of four or five miles from the camp,
but being unable to keep pace with the mounted force was soon left
behind.
The body of troops despatched to the left became engaged with the enemy
almost immediately, and firing was soon heard all along the crest of the
hill. In about an hour Durnford's mounted men re-appeared over the
hills, hotly pursued by swarms of Zulus; at the same time the horsemen
to the front were also driven back. These, after retiring steadily in
skirmishing order for about two miles, came upon the remains of the
rocket battery, which had been cut off and broken up, whilst a hand to
hand engagement was going on with those who remained. It appears that
Russell, whilst advancing with his battery, perceived a body of the
enemy on his left, he fired three rockets with some effect; then the
Zulus fired a volley, upon which the Native Contingent of infantry
retreated, the mules were frightened, and disorder ensued. Taking
advantage of this, the enemy charged down the hill, a _mêlée_ ensued,
and Russell was killed. As the mounted men retired towards them, the
Zulus retreated to their cover, and they, after making a final stand in
a spruit about a mile and a half in front of the camp, were eventually
driven in.
As the cavalry on the left was being pushed rapidly back, Captain Mostyn
was ordered to advance with two companies of 1-24th on the eastern neck
of the Isandhlwana, where at a distance of about a mile and a half the
Zulus were advancing in large numbers along the north of the
Isandhlwana, to outflank the camp on the right, and with this wing of
the foe they at once became engaged.
Meanwhile the Zulu left rapidly, and the centre steadily, though more
slowly, pushed forward, despite the artillery fire poured into them.
Orders were now given for three companies of the 1-24th to occupy ground
near the Native Contingent camp, facing the hill over which the Zulu
force was streaming. These three companies were supported to their right
front by the Natal Native Contingent.
Immediately to the right of the Native Contingent tents came the guns,
at a distance of about four hundred yards from the left, and rather more
from the right, which was composed of two companies, 24th Regiment and
the Mounted Corps, and which occupied the extreme right of the camp and
rested on the road. The infantry, in extended order, were by this time
engaged along the whole line, and were firing rapidly and steadily.
Though the enemy fell in hundreds they kept advancing in apparently
undiminished numbers. As rank after rank of the foremost were swept down
others pressed on, till at length the companies of the 1-24th above
mentioned had been driven back to within 300 yards of that portion of
the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. A number of the native
infantry now began a hasty retreat to the camp; their officers
endeavoured to restrain them, but without effect. Captain Essex pointed
this out to Colonel Durnford, who ordered him to take men to that
portion of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check. But
before this could be executed the natives rushed back in the utmost
disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of the
first battalion of the 24th on the left and rear, and the enemy dashing
forward at once poured in through this part of the line. In a moment all
was disorder, and but few had time to fix bayonets before the Zulus were
amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect. Then followed a
scene of utter confusion; horse and foot, black and white, English and
Zulu, friend and foe, in a struggling, fighting crowd, pushed gradually
through the camp towards the road, where the Zulu right already barred
the way. Every man endeavoured to escape towards the Buffalo river, but
this was almost an impossibility even for mounted men. The ground was
rugged, broken with water-washes, boulder-strewn: ground over which an
active native Zulu could progress even faster than a horse. In front ran
the river, swift, deep, and fordless, sharp rocks, and deep water
alternating. Not half of those who escaped from the camp succeeded in
crossing this obstacle: many were drowned, many assegaied, some few
shot, and so the pursuit continued right into Natal. The guns moved from
right to left across the camp, and endeavoured to get on the Rorke's
Drift road. This being occupied by the enemy, they turned off to the
left, and coming to grief in a donga had to be abandoned. Major Smith,
though wounded, managed to reach the Buffalo, but was there shot.
Lieuts. Melvill and Coghill, seeing all was lost, made an attempt to
escape on horseback with the colours of the 24th. Coghill succeeded in
getting safely across the Buffalo, but Melvill was struck by a shot just
as he was reaching the far bank of the river. Coghill, with heroic
devotion, turned back to assist his less fortunate comrade--alas! only
to share his fate. Their bodies were subsequently discovered in close
proximity, and around them a group of dead Zulus. The colours which they
had so desperately defended were also found in the bed of the river,
saved from the degradation of capture and contamination by the hands of
savages.
In this sad affair there perished twenty-six Imperial officers and 600
non-commissioned officers and men. The loss of the Colonial forces was
not less terrible, twenty-four officers being included in the list.
The following is a detailed list of the victims of that sad
day:--1-24th, Col. Pulleine, Major White; Captains Degacher, Wardell,
Mostyn, Younghusband; Lieuts. Hodson, Cavaye, Atkinson, Daly, Anstey,
Porteous, Melvill, Quarter-Master Pullen, and five entire companies:
2-24th, Lieuts. Pope, Austin, Dyer, Griffiths, Quarter-Master
Bloomfield, and ninety men. Royal Engineers, Colonel Durnford, Lieut.
McDowell, Captain G. Shepstone (political assistant to Col. Durnford),
Lieut. Coghill, A.D.C. (to Sir Bartle Frere), Surgeon-Major Shepherd.
The Mounted Police Carabineers and Volunteers lost forty-three out of
seventy-one, including Captain Bradstreet, Lieut. F. J. D. Scott, and
Quarter-Master Hitchcock. The Mounted Infantry lost thirty out of
thirty-four. The N Battery 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery, under Major
Stuart Smith, was destroyed (Lieut. Curling escaped), as also the Rocket
Battery under Major Russell, R.A. 1st Battalion 3rd Regiment, N.N.C.,
lost in officers, Captains Robert Krohn and James Lonsdale, Lieuts.
Avery, Holcraft, and Jameson; Surgeon F. Bull, Quarter-Master John
McCormick. 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment, N.N.C., lost Captains Erskine,
Barry, and Murray; Lieuts. Pritchard, Young, Gibson, Standish Vereker,
and Rivers, Quarter-Master A. Chambers. The loss of material is put down
at 102 waggons, 1400 oxen, 2 guns, 400 shot and shell, 1200 rifles,
250,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 60,000_l._ worth of commissariat
supplies, a rocket trough, and a number of tents.
Four special-service officers, viz. Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars
and Essex 75th Regiment, and Lieuts. Smith, Dorien, 95th, and Cochrane,
32nd, together with Lieut. Curling, R.A., succeeded in escaping, and
rode away to Helpmakaar, where a laager was immediately formed. The same
night, as no other messenger could be found, and it was feared Wood's
column might be cut off in rear, Captain Gardner started to give him
timely warning. Riding all night, he reached Utrecht about four o'clock
next day, thence despatching a messenger to Colonel Wood, he himself
returned to Helpmakaar.
The following account is of great interest as having been given by a
Zulu deserter:--
"The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps about 3000 strong, the
Nokenke 2000, the Nkobamakosi, including the Uve, 5000 strong, the
Umcityu 4000 strong, the Nodwengu 2000 strong, the Umbonambi 3000, and
the Udkloko 1000--a total of 20,000 men in all--after an address from
the king left the Nodwengu military kraal on January 17th, and proceeded
on their march towards Rorke's Drift. On the 20th they halted for the
night close by the Isipezi hill, and on the 21st, keeping to the
eastward, they occupied a valley running north and south under the spurs
of the Ngutu hill, which concealed that of Isandhlwana, distant about
four miles nearly due west. The order of encampment was--on the right,
the Nodwengu, Nokenke and Umcityu; in the centre, the Nkobamakosi and
Umbonambi; on the left, the Ulundi and Udkloko corps. On the morning of
the 22nd there was no intention of making an attack on account of some
superstition as to the state of the moon, and they were sitting down
resting when firing was heard by the Zulus on the right. This was at
first supposed by them to be an attack on the centre, but a move being
made in that direction this proved not to be the case; and it was soon
found out that this was the whites engaged with Matyana's people some
ten miles off to the left front. Just after the Zulus had resumed their
position, and again sat down, a herd of cattle came past their line
driven down by some of their scouts from the right. Just when these were
opposite the Umcityu regiment a body of mounted men on the hill to the
west were seen galloping and evidently trying to cut them off. When
several hundred yards off, seeing the Umcityu, they dismounted, fired a
volley, and retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged. This
example was followed by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on the right, as well
as by the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi in the centre, whilst the Undi and
Udkloko formed a circle--as is customary with the Zulus when a force is
about to engage--and remained in their position. With these were the two
chief officers Mavamingwana and Tyugwayo, who after a short pause led
away these centre troops in a north-westerly direction, and keeping to
the north of the Isandhlwana performed a turning movement, unseen by the
English through the nature of the ground. Thus the original Zulu left
became the extreme right, the right the centre, and the centre the left.
The two regiments forming the latter--the Nkobamakosi and
Umbonambi--made a turning movement along the front of the camp to the
English right, but became engaged before they could complete it. The Uve
battalion of the Nkobamakosi had to retire till reinforced; and the
Umbonambi suffered heavily from the artillery fire. Meanwhile the Zulu
centre, consisting of the Umcityu (left centre) and Nokenke and
Nodwengu (higher up on the right) under the hill, were making a direct
attack on the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely from
both artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire alone;
while the Nodwengu suffered least. When the camp was carried the
regiments became all mixed up together; some pursued the fugitives to
the Buffalo; the remainder plundered the camp: but the Undi and Udkloko
made the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, in order to plunder the
post there."
It is now time to turn attention to the remainder of the troops that had
left the camp before this sad event occurred.
The force under Colonel Glyn, accompanied by Lord Chelmsford, moved off
at early dawn, and had reached Major Dartnell by 6.15 a.m. The General
at once took command, and ordered out scouting parties of mounted men to
gain intelligence of the positions and strength of the enemy, who soon
after showed in some force on the opposing heights parallel to the
Inhlazatye Mountains. A general advance of the troops was made, and the
enemy retired slowly, but without firing. The guns and 24th Regiment
meanwhile moved up the valley, their left being protected by the Mounted
Infantry, while the Mounted Police and Volunteers guarded the right
flank. The main body of the enemy drew back in regular order and took up
a position with great skill on the spurs of the Isipisi Mountain,
distant about six miles, but Captain Shepstone, with his Natal
Carabineers, managed to cut off about 300 of the stragglers and
destroyed fifty of them. At nine a.m. a messenger, whose horse was
panting and covered with foam, arrived before Colonel Glyn with a brief
despatch from Colonel Pulleine, notifying that musketry firing was heard
on the left front of the camp. Lord Chelmsford at once sent a staff
officer, Lieutenant Milne, to an eminence from whence the camp and
valley of Insalwana could be seen, and it seems that a delay of an hour
took place while this officer was vainly scanning the horizon. The
actual scene of conflict where Colonel Durnford was engaged with the
Zulu army was five miles away, and hidden by some hills intervening
between Lord Chelmsford's position and the British camp. The General,
therefore, seems to have felt no apprehensions in regard to the safety
of the camp, and continued his operations against the supposed main body
of the Zulus.
About two o'clock Lord Chelmsford was on the banks of the Amange stream,
selecting a fit spot for a camp, he having already in the morning sent
Captain Gardner back to Colonel Pulleine with an order to that officer
to forward the camping materials of the party out on reconnaissance.
While thus engaged a native on horseback galloped down from the opposite
ridge saying that an attack was being made on the camp, and that he had
seen heavy firing and heard the big guns. Lord Chelmsford immediately
hastened to the crest of the hill, whence through a glass the camp could
be plainly seen. All, however, seemed quiet: the sun was shining on the
white tents; no signs of firing were seen, and the bodies of men moving
about in the camp were put down to be English soldiers and friendly
natives. Knowing how careful were his dispositions and how positive his
orders for the defence of the camp, one and all of Lord Chelmsford's
escort came to the conclusion that an attack had been made and repulsed.
It was then decided that the headquarters camp should move to the spot
selected on the Amange stream, whilst the General himself, who was
anxious to know the details of the attack, should proceed back to camp.
The Carabineers and the Mounted Infantry accompanied him: the 1st
battalion 24th Regiment, the four guns, the Mounted Police and 2nd
battalion of 3rd Regiment Native Contingent were left to form the new
camp. During the first seven miles of the journey nothing occurred to
excite the General's suspicion. Certainly some of the tents had
disappeared, but then this was in accordance with the orders given in
the morning. When about four miles from the camp he fell in with the
Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered to return many hours
previously, but which seeing the camp attacked by forces superior to its
own had wisely halted. In about half-an-hour they were met by a solitary
horseman coming at a foot pace from the direction of the camp.
Commandant Lonsdale, for it was he, rode up to the General and uttered
the astounding words "The camp is in possession of the enemy." It
appears that Lonsdale, who had been ill, being very tired was quietly
returning from Glyn's column to the camp. He had crossed the small
water-wash to the south of the camp and was jogging slowly along in a
sort of lethargy, from which he was roused by the discharge of a rifle
close to him. Looking up, he saw a native, who had evidently just fired,
and him he imagined to be one of his own contingent indulging in
reckless firing; so he pursued his way. Sitting in and around the tents
were groups of red-coats, so he still kept on till within a bare ten
yards of the tents. He then saw a great black Zulu come out of one with
a blood-besmeared assegai in his hand. Gazing more carefully, he saw
that black men, and black men only, were the wearers of the red-coats.
The truth flashed on him: turning his pony sharp round he galloped off
before the enemy knew what he was about. Not less than 150 shots were
fired at him as he did so, but, providentially, he escaped to warn the
General, who, without such warning, his staff and troops with him, would
have walked unsuspiciously into the trap, and the whole force would
probably have perished to a man.
The General at once sent back to hurry up Colonel Glyn and his force,
while Colonel Russell was sent on to reconnoitre the camp, which was
found to be as Commandant Lonsdale had reported. On Colonel Glyn's
arrival the whole force was disposed in fighting order, and moved
rapidly across the plain, but could not arrive in the vicinity of the
camp until after dark. All was found a wreck--corpses, broken tents,
dead horses, oxen, and other _débris_ were strewed around; and the men,
most of whom were without ammunition, and had not tasted food for
forty-eight hours, were ordered to bivouac amidst the crowd of
blood-stained relics which marked the day's slaughter. Our soldiers had
covered more than thirty miles on the previous day without food or
ammunition, and if resolutely attacked by the entire force of Zulus
might have shared the fate of their comrades. The next morning,
therefore, before daylight a sad retreat was effected to Rorke's Drift,
where the first glad tidings were heard of the glorious defence which
had been made by Chard and Bromhead, with their handful of men.
It came about thus. Lieutenant Chard, with one sergeant and six men, had
been left in charge of the ponts over the Tugela at this point. Close by
was a commissariat depôt in charge of Lieutenant Bromhead and a company
of the 24th Regiment. About three o'clock on January 22nd news of the
disaster at Isandhlwana reached this officer, together with a note,
saying that the enemy were advancing in force against his post, which
was to be held at all costs. Chard immediately withdrew his small party,
and in concert with Bromhead arranged for the loopholing and barricading
the store-building and hospital, and for connecting the defences of the
two by building walls of mealie-bags. At 3.30 an officer of Durnford's
Horse with about 100 men came in, and was asked to send them out as
vedettes; these, when pressed, to fall back and assist in the defence of
the buildings. At 4.30 this officer returned with the news that the
enemy was close at hand, that his men would not obey orders, but had
galloped off to Helpmakaar. About the same time Captain Stephenson and
his detachment of natives also withdrew. It was at once perceived that
the line of defence was now too extended for the small force left, and
an inner entrenchment of biscuit-boxes was made, and this had been
completed to a wall two boxes high, when suddenly 600 of the enemy
turned the hill to the south. They advanced at a run against the
southern wall, and notwithstanding a tremendous fire reached to within
fifty yards of it. Being here encountered by a cross-fire from the store
they were stopped. Taking advantage, however, of some shelter afforded
by the cookhouse and ovens, they kept up heavy musketry volleys thence,
whilst the main body moved on to the left round the hospital, whence
they made a rush upon the north-west wall and breastwork of mealie-bags.
Meanwhile the mass of the advancing foe lined a ledge of rocks and
filled the caves overlooking the English position at a distance of 100
yards to the south, whence they too kept up a constant fire. Another
party to the left occupied a garden in a hollow in the road, and also
the bush beyond, which time had not permitted to be cut down. The enemy
could thus advance close to the English works, and were soon in
possession of one whole side of the wall, whilst on the other in a line
extending from the hospital all along the wall to the bush they made a
series of determined onsets. But each attack was met and splendidly
repulsed with the bayonet, Corporal Schiess (N.N.C.) especially
distinguishing himself. The fire from the ledge of rock and caves at
length became so galling, that it was necessary to retire behind the
inner line of biscuit-boxes.
All this time the enemy had been trying to force the hospital, and at
length they did set fire to the roof. The garrison defended the place
room by room, bringing out all the sick who could be moved before they
retired. Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 24th Regiment,
were the last to leave, holding the doorway against the Zulus with their
bayonets, their ammunition being quite expended. Five sick men, owing to
the smoke and want of interior communication, had unfortunately to be
left to their fates. Two heaps of mealie-bags were now converted into a
sort of redoubt, and a second line of fire was thus obtained all round.
Darkness now came on, and after several more furious attacks had been
repulsed the defenders had ultimately to retire to the middle, and then
to the inner wall of the kraal, east of the position they had at first
held. The attacks continued all night, the soldiers firing with the
utmost coolness, and never wasting a shot. At four a.m., January 23rd,
firing ceased, and by daybreak the enemy were disappearing over the hill
to the south-west. The ground was then patrolled, the arms of the dead
Zulus collected, and the position strengthened as far as possible. About
seven a.m. a large body of the enemy was again seen on the hill to the
south-west, and a friendly Kaffir, who had come in shortly before, was
sent to Helpmakaar to ask for assistance. However, about eight a.m. the
British 3rd column began to appear, whereupon the enemy, who had been
again advancing, fell back as the troops advanced, and Rorke's Drift
Post had been saved.
The number of English engaged in this action was eight officers and 131
non-commissioned officers and men; of these fifteen were killed and
twelve wounded, two subsequently dying of their hurts. The attacking
Zulu force consisted of two regiments--the Undi and Udkloko--in all a
total of something less than 4000. Of these 370 lay dead around the post
on the morning that Lord Chelmsford so opportunely arrived.
Surgeon Reynolds, Acting Commissary Officer Dalton, and Assistant
Commissary Dunne were throughout conspicuous for their gallantry and
coolness. Lieutenants Chard, R.E., and Bromhead, 24th Regiment,
subsequently received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament for their
heroic conduct, and were advanced to the rank of majors.
So much has been said and written as to the cause of, and so many people
have been held responsible for the Isandhlwana disaster that the subject
cannot here be passed over in silence.
The living no less than the dead have a claim to a full share of justice
and truth; but remembering that the mouths of one party--"les morts qui
ne reviennent pas"--are closed, we should be extremely careful in
drawing any conclusion from acts which, could the testimony of the
fallen be obtained, it would not only explain and excuse, but amply
justify.
The court of inquiry held at Helpmakaar found itself unable to form from
the available evidence any positive judgment; but the facts disclosed
point irresistibly to a negative conclusion. Had the troops acted on the
defensive, the camp would not have been lost.
Still there may have been cogent--nay irresistible reasons which caused
Colonel Durnford to push forward his forces. Were Colonel Pulleine
alive, he might give equally good reasons for acceding to Durnford's
urgent request and sending out the reinforcements.
The British regular infantry advanced successfully, retired slowly and
in unbroken order; they were still firing rapidly, coolly, and with
great effect. Things though desperate were by no means hopeless.
Suddenly the native levies, "though their officers tried to restrain
them, rushed back in the utmost disorder," thus exposing the flank and
rear of the regulars. "Few of the men had time to fix bayonets before
the enemy were amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect."
Here is the answer to "How did it happen?" The natives on one side--the
Zulu--were regarded too lightly; on the other, fighting for the English
with too great confidence. "Why," it will be asked, "were not the
waggons laagered? Whose duty was it to see this done?" Lord Chelmsford
had issued a standing order at the very commencement of the campaign,
that this was to be the first consideration in all camps. Lord
Chelmsford, accompanied Colonel Glyn from Rorke's Drift, saw the site
chosen at Isandhlwana, and then immediately started on a reconnaissance
which lasted till after nightfall. Doubtless Lord Chelmsford supposed
Colonel Glyn had done what was necessary. On the following morning with
the first streak of dawn Colonel Glyn was ordered to proceed to Major
Dartnell's assistance, and Lord Chelmsford determined to accompany him,
after despatching an express to Colonel Durnford ordering him up "to
strengthen the camp." Doubtless Colonel Glyn supposed that Colonel
Pulleine would see to laagering the waggons. Colonel Pulleine was in
command of the camp a bare three hours, and doubtless, knowing how brief
his tenure of office was to be, preferred to let things remain as they
were till his successor's arrival. Colonel Durnford had not been a
single half-hour in camp before the action was commenced.
It is asked why did not the troops form squares? Hastings, we are told,
had Harold's men only remained in their position, would have been a
Saxon victory--Torres Vedras a disgrace instead of a glory had the
British troops been rashly taunted into leaving their trenches: and
Waterloo a more glowing theme for Beranger's lyre had Napoleon been able
to entice the patient English squares to forsake their adamantine
formation. But why was Colonel Durnford to form squares? How was he to
imagine that such an immense force was arrayed against him when the
Commander-in-chief had with him a superior force to that left in the
camp avowedly to operate against the enemy's main body? For such his
information and personal observation led him to believe was the force
against whom he and Major Dartnell were acting.
Colonel Durnford was no novice in South African war; like Cæsar, he had
the gift of the pen no less than the sword; he had both written and
fought well. Colonel Pulleine was an experienced officer of no mean
reputation, and by whatever device they were deceived, we may be sure
that it was no ordinary one, and that few would have stood where they
fell.
Again, who could have anticipated the attack? We have it from the lips
of a Zulu that the onset was unpremeditated, and the result of accident.
With all humbleness, let it be confessed that--
"Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well
When our deep plots do fail; and that should teach us
There's a divinity that shapes our ends
Rough hew them as we will."
Another question, often asked, is, "Why did not Lord Chelmsford,
immediately on his return, make a counter-attack on the enemy." First of
all he had to wait for Colonel Glyn and the main body to come up to
him. Meanwhile darkness had come on. When Glyn arrived he did advance
with his troops formed up for action, and with the intention of
re-taking the camp, which he had every reason to suppose was occupied by
the enemy. The event proved they had abandoned it. Was not this a good
reason for striking a blow? Let the facts of the case be well borne in
mind. Lord Chelmsford knew that there was a large force in his rear; the
force that had sacked the camp was supposed, and reasonably enough, to
be on the right flank. In front were the bright watchfires of another
force, and the blazing hospital at Rorke's Drift, which, together with
Helpmakaar, there was every ground to believe had been captured and
looted by the foe; in a word, his force was surrounded. The men had only
fifty rounds of ammunition apiece; they had been twenty-four hours
without food; they were physically exhausted by eighteen hours'
continuous marching, and no less morally by the loss of their camp;
their probabilities of escape were distant. How could a general lead
troops in such a condition against a foe flushed and elated with spoil
and recent victory?