LABOUCHERE AND MR. GLADSTONE'S EGYPTIAN POLICY
Lord Morley has commented on the irony of fate which imposed on Mr.
Gladstone the unwelcome task of Egyptian occupation. "It was one of
the ironies," he says, "in which every active statesman's life
abounds." Disparity between intentions and achievements is indeed
inevitable in all departments of activity, but nowhere more so than
in cases of what may be called creative policy. Destruction is easy.
But a constructive policy which shall bring about a new and more
favourable state of things, and may, therefore, in this sense be
called creative, is strangely apt either to overshoot its mark or to
deviate into unexpected channels, with results wholly unlooked for by
the statesman responsible for its conduct.
Certainly this ironic force of circumstances was peculiarly apparent
in the case of Mr. Gladstone's Egyptian policy. The problem of Egypt
was not of his seeking, but was a legacy from the Tories. In 1875
Disraeli, against the advice of Lord Derby, his Foreign Minister, and
without consulting the other members of his Cabinet, arranged with
the London Rothschilds to purchase Khedive Ismail's shares in the
Suez Canal for four millions sterling. Ismail, whose absolute reign
of eighteen years had cost Egypt[1] no less a sum than four hundred
millions sterling, had been {191} driven by his preposterous
extravagance, and the consequent exhaustion of both his legitimate
and illegitimate methods of procuring revenue, to look abroad for
financial assistance. France, besides being crippled by the war of
1870, was regarded with suspicion in the matter of the canal, and the
only alternative to France was England. A trifle like four millions
was very far from what Ismail really required to give any sort of
financial stability to his government, and, after the loan with
Rothschild had been negotiated, the British Cabinet sent out a series
of commissioners to study the state of affairs on the spot, and to
see what could be done in the interests of Egyptian rule and,
incidentally, of the foreign bondholders. Eventually a settlement of
Ismail's affairs, known as the Goschen-Joubert arrangement, was made,
by which the enormous yearly payment of nearly seven millions
sterling was charged on the Egyptian revenue. Greek usurers attended
the tax-gatherers on their rounds, and the ruined fellaheen were
forced to mortgage their lands to meet these amazing demands. Even
such methods failed of success owing to the famine of the two
preceding years. The obviously juster course was now to let Ismail
become bankrupt and abandon the Goschen-Joubert arrangement, but the
foreign bondholders were naturally opposed to this, and pointed out
reasonably enough that the English Government had guaranteed the
loan. The moment was favourable to their views. Dizzy had succeeded
in converting his colleagues, with the exception of Derby, who
retired and was succeeded by Lord Salisbury as Foreign Secretary, to
his neo-Imperialism in which an Asiatic Empire under British rule was
an element. About this time, too, the secret convention relating to
the lease of Cyprus was signed with the Porte. When, a month later,
the Berlin Congress was called together, such was the suspicion with
which the plenipotentiaries regarded each other that each ambassador
was obliged, before entering the Congress, to affirm that he was not
bound by any secret engagement with the Porte. {192} Disraeli and
Salisbury both gave the required declaration. "It must be
remembered," says Mr. Blunt indulgently, "that both were new to
diplomacy." A few weeks later the _Globe_ published the text of the
Cyprus Convention, bought by that journal from one Marvin, an
Oriental scholar, who had been imprudently employed as translator of
the Turkish text. In London the authenticity of the document was
denied, but the truth had to come out at Berlin. The discovery
almost broke up the Congress. Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian
representative, and M. Waddington, the Ambassador of France, both
announced that they would withdraw at once from the sittings, and
Waddington literally packed his trunks. It needed the cynical good
offices of Bismarck to reconcile the English and the French
plenipotentiaries.[2] There were two very significant points on
which agreement was reached:
1. "That as a compensation to France for England's acquisition of
Cyprus, France should be allowed on the first convenient opportunity,
and without opposition from England, to occupy Tunis."
{193}
2. "That in the financial arrangements being made in Egypt, France
should march _pari passu_ with England."
This was the source of the Anglo-French condominium in Egypt.
Sir Rivers Wilson, who was then acting in Egypt as English
Commissioner, received instructions to see that France should be
equally represented with England in all financial appointments made
in connection with his inquiry. Wilson's appointment as English
Commissioner on the nominally International Commission of Inquiry was
almost the first signed by Lord Salisbury on taking over the Foreign
Office from Lord Derby. He was a man from whom much was expected.
In 1878 he was appointed Finance Minister in Egypt. His predecessor,
Ismail Sadyk, had been treacherously murdered by the Khedive Ismail,
but this fact did not dash his confidence. He had great faith in
Nubar, Ismail's Prime Minister. His French education would, he
thought, enable him to preserve the Anglo-French character of the
Ministry. He also had behind him the full interest and power of the
house of Rothschild, whom he had persuaded to advance the loan of
nine millions, known as the Kedival Domains Loan. But his brief
career as Finance Minister (the Nubar Ministry was overthrown in the
February of 1879) was a failure. It is the opinion of Mr. Blunt, and
no one would have been more likely to know the true state of affairs,
that the Khedive himself intrigued against him and that the internal
policy of the country was entirely in the hands of Nubar, who, as a
Christian, was at a disadvantage in governing a Mohammedan country,
and in whose political value Wilson seems to have been greatly
mistaken. The loan which he had negotiated did not relieve the
taxpayer, but went in paying the more immediately urgent calls. His
suggestion of a scheme which would have involved the confiscation by
the Government of landed property to the value of fifteen millions
disturbed the minds of the land-owners, and the mistakes of the
Ministry reached their {194} climax when the native army, including
2500 officers, was disbanded without receiving their arrears of pay.
The fall of Nubar was brought about by the _émeute_ of February,
1879, skilfully engineered by the Khedive, and Sir Rivers's position
as Finance Minister became very difficult. The Consul-General Vivian
(afterwards Lord Vivian) was a personal enemy of his and refrained
from smoothing his path, and when, in March, the crafty Ismail
arranged a little incident at Alexandria similar to that of February,
the Foreign Office, instead of backing his demand for redress,
advised him to resign, which he accordingly did. Soon, however, he
was able to take a crushing revenge on the perfidious Ismail. On his
return from Egypt he went straight to the Rothschilds and explained
to them that their money was in great danger, as the Khedive intended
to repudiate the debt, sheltering himself behind the excuse of
constitutional government. The Rothschilds brought financial
pressure to bear first on Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay. Their
efforts in these quarters being in vain, they applied to Bismarck,
who was, perhaps, not sorry to have an excuse to state the intention
of the German Government to intervene in the bondholders' interests
in case the French and English Governments were unable to do so.
German intervention would have been a quite unendurable solution, and
the Sultan was at once approached from London and Paris and begged to
depose his vassal. European pressure was too much for him, and, in
spite of the many millions which he had paid in bribery to the Porte,
Ismail received a curt notice from Sir Frank Lascelles, then acting
English diplomatic agent in Egypt, that a telegram had reached him
from the Sultan announcing that his viceregal duties had passed to
his son Tewfik. Ismail cleared the treasury of its current account
and retired with a final spoil of some three millions sterling. No
one hindered his departure.
For a few months after Mr. Gladstone formed his second administration
things seemed to have quieted down in {195} Egypt. The new Khedive
was a weak character and the country was practically governed by
French and English Ministers in the Cabinet. Sir Evelyn Baring
(afterwards Lord Cromer) and M. de Blaquières worked together in
perfect harmony. Sir Evelyn Baring had originally come to Egypt as
Commissioner of the Debt, and had worked so successfully towards a
new settlement that when the question of the appointment of an
English controller to advise the Khedive's Ministers arose, he was
the person naturally indicated for the post. "Thus," as he says,
"the various essential parts of the State machine were adjusted. A
new Khedive ruled. The relations between the Khedive and his
Ministers were placed on a satisfactory footing. A Prime Minister
(Riaz Pasha) had been nominated who had taken an active part in
opposing the abuses prevalent during the reign of Ismail Pasha. The
relations between the Sultan and the Khedive had been regulated in
such a way as to ensure the latter against any excessive degree of
Turkish interference. The system which had been devised for
associating Europeans with the Government held out good promise of
success, inasmuch as it was in accordance with the Khedive's own
views. Lastly, an International Commission had been created with
full powers to arrange matters between the Egyptian Government and
their creditors."[3] But, suddenly, as it seemed to those who had
not been watching events on the spot, across this peaceful sky
flashed the red meteor of rebellion, massacre, and arson.
It is no easy matter to estimate the character of Arabi Pasha. He
seems, from even so friendly an account as that of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt,
not to have been particularly intelligent or particularly brave. It
appears likely that he, at least, connived at the burning and loot of
Alexandria. All this, however, would not have prevented his being a
true patriot according to his lights. As Mr. Herbert Paul observes:
"How far Arabi was a mutinous soldier guided by personal {196}
ambition and how far he was an enthusiastic patriot burning to free
his country from a foreign yoke, would admit of an easier answer if
one alternative excluded the other."[4] One thing, however, is
certain. The movement he led was far more than the merely military
revolt which Mr. Gladstone and everyone in England at first thought
it; it was in fact a genuine Nationalist movement directed rather
against the alien Turk than against the alien Englishman. That the
truth of this is now generally admitted is principally due to Mr.
Blunt and in a lesser degree to Mr. Labouchere and the group of
extreme Radicals of which he was already beginning to be the
unofficial leader in Parliament. During the spring and summer of
1882, Mr. Labouchere's first observations in the House of Commons on
Egyptian affairs were of a thoroughly orthodox nature. On May 12 we
find him asking the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles
Dilke) "whether any steps are being taken by Her Majesty's Government
in view of the critical state of affairs in Egypt to maintain our
influence in that country."[5] On July 27 he replies in a vein at
once serious and sarcastic to Mr. McCarthy, who had made a speech in
Arabi's favour. He thought that Mr. McCarthy had drawn on his
imagination for the character of Arabi Pasha. They knew perfectly
well that the most eminent men in the world were frequently great
patriots; and they also knew that military adventurers always called
themselves patriots in order to advance their own ends. They knew
little of the career of Arabi Pasha, but they did know that he had
designedly massacred Europeans in Alexandria, and had deliberately
burnt down one of the noblest cities of his native land. What would
be the effect of the vote[6] they proposed to give if it were
successful? The English nation would have to withdraw entirely from
their present position in Egypt, and the result would be that {197}
we should have behaved in a contemptible manner in the face of
Europe. India would not be worth one year's purchase. He was not a
great believer in prestige; but if we were to retire after our men
had been massacred our Empire in the East would not be worth a year's
purchase. This speech, occupying eight columns of _Hansard_, aims at
cutting away the relations between England and Turkey (which shows
that even at so early a date Mr. Labouchere realised something of the
true nature of the grievance of the Egyptian Nationalists) and
upholding British intervention.[7] Labby among the prophets indeed!
After the retirement of Arabi from Alexandria, he issued a
proclamation stating that "irreconcilable war existed between the
Egyptians and the English, and all those who proved traitors to their
country would not only be subjected to the severest penalty in
accordance with martial law, but would be for ever accursed in the
next world." Three more towns were plundered and the European
inhabitants massacred. British public opinion was now thoroughly
aroused, and probably no Government could have stayed in power
without taking some overt action. The action taken by Mr.
Gladstone's Government was very definite. On July 22 the Prime
Minister obtained, by a majority of 275 to 19, a vote of £2,300,000.
A force of 6000 men was sent to Egypt from India; 15,000 men were
despatched to Cyprus and Malta. Sir Garnet (afterwards Viscount)
Wolseley was placed in command in Egypt, "in support of the authority
of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the Firmans of the
Sultan and the existing international engagements, to suppress a
military revolt in that country."
The French Government, while declining to co-operate with the British
troops, assured Lord Granville of their moral support. In the month
of September the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, in which the Egyptian army
was completely routed, was fought. By this event British
intervention was justified {198} in the eyes of the world, and what
became in the long run hardly distinguishable from British rule was
established on the banks of the Nile. It was the battle of
Tel-el-Kebir that convinced Mr. Labouchere of what would be, and in
fact what came to be, the end of the course on which the Government
was embarked, for he very soon sold his Egyptian shares. "They fell
off his back like Christian's burden in _Pilgrim's Progress_, and
Labby became an honest politician," said Mr. Wilfrid Blunt to me.
The following letter to Sir Charles Dilke very clearly expresses his
new views on Egyptian policy:
REFORM CLUB, October 10, 1882.
DEAR DILKE,--The great ones of the earth who, like you, live in
Government Offices, never really understand the bent of public
opinion. This is probably a dispensation of Providence by means of
which Ministers are not eternal.
Personally, I should be glad to see the Liberal Party, after passing
a Franchise Bill, sent about their business, and the country divided
between Conservatives and Radicals. I speak, therefore, from the
Radical standpoint, and viewing the matter from that point, I see
that the dissatisfaction against your Egyptian policy is growing.
Arabi (like most patriots) was "on the make." His force consisted in
siding with the Notables in their legitimate demands.
Now that the war is over, it is really impossible for Radicals to
accept a policy based upon administering Egypt, partly for the good
of its inhabitants, but mainly for the good of the bond-holders. I
am a bondholder, so it cannot be said that I am personally prejudiced
against such a policy. But I am sure that it will not go down, and
indeed that our whole course of action has been so tainted with it,
that there will be great disaffection in the Radical ranks throughout
the country unless the tree be now made to bend the other way.
You are now the man in possession in Egypt, so you can make terms
with Europe. I would therefore humbly suggest that you should, after
insisting upon an amnesty, call together the Notables and hand the
country over to them, stipulating alone that there should be
Ministerial responsibility, and the control of the purse. {199} The
International Obligation of Egypt to pay its bondholders was _bon à
professer_, when the Expedition had to be defended, but it is in
reality a pure fiction. Moreover, if it were not, we cannot decently
join in a holy alliance to maintain Khedives, and to deprive nations
of what is the very basis of representative government.
Having handed Egypt over to the Notables, you can then go before
Europe with a clean bill of health--propose that the connection of
the country with Turkey shall be a purely nominal one and that,
henceforward, no European power shall directly or indirectly
interfere with its internal affairs.
At the same time, you ought to take advantage of your being in Egypt
to establish yourself in some vantage post on the Suez Canal. This
once done, Egypt separated from Turkey, and all European powers
warned off, we remain in reality absolute masters of the position.
Very probably the Egyptians will make a muddle of these finances, but
this will no more affect us than the mistakes of Spanish finances
affect our tenure of Gibraltar.
Controllers, a swarm of foreign bureaucrats, European administrators,
Khedives ruling against the wishes of their subjects, an English army
of occupation or an army commanded by my esteemed friend, Baker,
composed of black ex-slaves, Ottoman cut-throats, and Swiss cowboys,
are abominations, only equal to that of concerning ourselves with the
payment of interest on a public debt. To attempt these things will
be to keep open a perpetual Radical sore, and in the end will only
land us in another expedition.
Pray excuse the observations of a humble admirer. The Jingoes, it is
true, are not so hostile as they were, but you do not suppose that
they would vote for the present Government, whilst on the other hand
the Radicals will sulk and not vote so long as Radical principles are
ignored in Egypt. Government has not yet announced its policy, so at
present no great harm is done, but the appointment of Baker, the
handing over of Arabi to the Khedive, the reign of Generals and
diplomatists, the absence of any appearance of consulting the
Egyptians, and various other similar things are producing distrust.
You will say, "What can a fellah know of politics?" To this I can
only answer, {200} "What does a Wiltshire peasant know about
them?"--Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
Mr. Labouchere soon began to put forward his reformed views in
Parliament. On October 30 we find him asking Sir Charles Dilke
whether "Her Majesty's Government is a party to any treaty, alliance,
or compact with any foreign power which would oblige it to prevent
the Egyptians from exercising that control over their taxation,
expenditure, and administration which is enjoyed by the inhabitants
of the independent or semi-independent States which formerly were
integral parts of the Ottoman Empire,"[8] and demanding information
as to the cruelty and insults to which it was alleged the Egyptian
prisoners had been subjected. Mr. Labouchere wrote a long article in
_Truth_ under the heading: "Egypt was glad when they departed" (Psalm
cv., 38), the following extracts from which put the situation very
clearly as he conceived it.
"That a small body of English troops should remain for a brief time
in Egypt at the expense of that country is, perhaps, a necessity of
the position. But what I contend is, that during their stay the
Notables ought to be called together, that every place of emolument
ought to be filled up by an Egyptian, that the bag and baggage policy
ought to be adopted towards the Turkish officials, who are as
objectionable to the natives as were the Turkish officials to the
Bulgarians, and that a free constitutional government ought to be
established, based on the two corner stones of all constitutional
liberty--Ministerial responsibility and the right of taxpayers over
the purse. In order to carry out this programme--distasteful alike
to professional diplomatists and to professional soldiers--we ought
at once to send to Egypt a stalwart and experienced Liberal, who has
graduated in the school of Parliamentary Government, and not in those
of the Horse Guards, of the Foreign Office, or of the India Office.
Looking round, I see no man better able to fill the post than Mr.
Shaw {201} Lefevre. He is able, he is a skilled and successful
administrator, he is untainted with the creed that all Orientals are
made to be bondsmen for Europeans, and his political principles are
exceptionally sound.
What our diplomacy has to do is, to discover some means to render the
high road to India through the Canal secure. Obviously we cannot do
in this matter precisely as we should like, which would be to say
that in time of peace all war vessels may pass through the Canal, and
in time of war only ours. I hardly see how we can go beyond making
the passage neutral in times of peace, and excluding from it in times
of war the ships of belligerents. If Egypt were left to herself, I
believe that she could very safely be left in charge of the Canal.
Her people would be glad to be clear of all European complications,
and, in case of war, she would occupy Port Said, and notify
belligerents that their ships would not be allowed to pass."
On the question of India he expressed himself thus:
I am not at all of the "Perish India" school of politics. If it
could be proved that our Empire would perish if we did not establish
ourselves in Egypt, I am by no means certain but what I should be in
favour of our establishment. But I am a believer not only in the
justice, but in the expediency of an alliance with the people of a
country, and not with its ruler against the people. Any intermixture
in the internal affairs of Egypt on our part is not only opposed to
Liberal principles, but opposed to English interests. To what has it
already led? To a most costly military expedition; to our being
arrayed against rights without which there can be no true liberty or
sound government; to the slaughter of Englishmen and Egyptians with
all the "pomp and pride of glorious war"; and lastly to our soldiers
acting as retrievers, to hunt down and hand over to punishment to an
Ottoman potentate, men many of whom--whether they were ambitious and
whether they were ill-advised--had unquestionably a perfect right to
fight in support of the principle that the only authority of their
nation ought to be its representatives.[9]
{202}
A correspondent at once asked him: "How is it that you were in favour
of the control and in favour of the Expedition, and yet now tell your
readers that the control ought to cease, and that having by means of
the Expedition established a firm foothold in Egypt, our next step
ought to be to evacuate the country?" The following number of
_Truth_ delivered itself in reply as follows:
The Control, when first established, simply meant that Egypt should
go into liquidation, and pay so much in the pound to its creditors, a
couple of European controllers with half a dozen clerks, being
appointed by the Egyptian Government to receive the composition from
the Egyptian Treasury, and to hand it over to the various classes of
bondholders. To this there could have been no sort of objection;
but, little by little, this simple and semi-private arrangement was
converted into a so-called international obligation on the part of
the Egyptians to remain eternally divested from all control over
their own expenditure, and to allow their entire financial
administration to be placed in the hands of about 1300 Europeans,
with salaries amounting to nearly £400,000 per annum, whilst the
Controllers themselves had seats in the Cabinet, with a veto upon
everything proposed by their Egyptian colleagues. France and England
were the executive officers of this scheme. If the Egyptian officers
had assented to it, nothing further was to be said, except that they
were singularly and curiously wanting in patriotism. However we find
now that they did not, and that we have been under an illusion. The
Notables and the entire country were--to their credit be it
said--opposed to it. Arabi took advantage of this feeling. He sided
with the country, and at the same time made his bargain. "I," he
practically said to the Notables, "support you in your rights; as a
_quid pro quo_ you must support me in what I am pleased to call the
rights of the army--that is to say, that it shall be increased by
18,000 men." Without the army the Notables were powerless; they
accordingly accepted the terms. We therefore find ourselves in the
position that we were fully justified in asserting that Arabi was a
self-seeking military adventurer, but that he was also the exponent
of the legitimate {203} demands of the Egyptian people. The Control
had become political--it was no longer a reasonable financial
arrangement, but an unreasonable and improper attempt to deprive the
Egyptians of their rights, in order to secure high salaries for a
swarm of European locusts, and certainty of interest to European
bond-holders. Those, therefore, who had regarded it in its natural
original conception, as fair and useful, have a perfect right to
assert that this original conception had been so perverted that it
had become a monstrous instrument for the suppression of all national
vitality.
We, however, were tied to France. If we had not interfered, France
probably would have done so. Moreover, we foolishly had pledged
ourselves to maintain the Khedive in his position. The only way,
therefore, to get out of the complication was to cut the Gordian
knot; but, in order to do this, we were necessarily obliged to adopt
the theory that Arabi was a mere military adventurer, who was
attempting for his own ends to coerce not only the Khedive but the
Egyptian people.
Our expedition, as was to be anticipated, has proved successful. Our
troops hold Egypt. What then ought we to do? Obviously to hand it
over to the Notables, who are the representatives of the Egyptian
people, and to inform these Notables that we have no intention of
repeating our previous error, but that, experience having shown us
the fatal results of allowing ourselves little by little to be
dragged into an attempt to manage other people's finances with a view
to public creditors being paid interest, we shall leave Egypt and
Egypt's creditors to settle their conflicting interests as they best
please. This is the logical consequence of our having acted upon the
assumption that Arabi was terrorising the Egyptians....
It is evident to me, therefore, that the only policy which an English
Liberal Ministry can adopt is to go before Europe with a proposal to
make Egypt an Eastern Belgium, and to base our suggestion upon our
own renunciation of interference in its internal affairs. I hear it
said that the Liberal party is popular owing to its successes in
Egypt. It may, perhaps, be for the nonce popular--or, to put it more
correctly, not quite so unpopular--as it was with Jingoes, but these
same Jingoes will not cease to vote for Conservatives....
{204}
How then about the Canal? Well, I should base my policy upon that
pursued in like cases by the United States. I should explain to
Europe that the Canal is the connecting link between Great Britain
and India, and that consequently the exigencies of geography and an
enlightened self-interest render it absolutely necessary for us to be
paramount there. There might be a little grumbling, but no one would
go to war to hinder this, because its plain common-sense would be too
obvious.[10]
In the meantime Arabi was lying in prison at Cairo awaiting his
trial, and Mr. Labouchere took up his case energetically in the House
of Commons. A military tribunal was to be charged with the trial,
and it was no secret that the Khedive was determined that the death
penalty should be inflicted on the heads of the rebellion. Mr.
Wilfrid Blunt wrote, on September 1, a long letter to Mr. Gladstone,
stating his intention of providing Arabi with an English counsel at
his own expense and that of his friends, and hoping that "every
facility will be afforded me and those with me in Egypt to prosecute
our task." Mr. Gladstone, who was deeply hostile to Arabi, replied
through his secretary, that "all that he can say at the present
moment is that he will bring your request before Lord Granville, with
whom he will consult, but that he cannot hold out any assurance that
it will be complied with."
Mr. Labouchere continued to enquire into the Government's intentions
towards Arabi in the House of Commons. A timely question on October
31 to Sir Charles Dilke secured the intervention of the press at the
trial, and further questions on the following days forestalled the
attempts of the Khedive to wriggle out of the conditions that Mr.
Blunt's advocate had obtained from Mr. Gladstone. Arabi was, on
December 4, condemned to death, and in spite of Mr. Gladstone's being
at first inclined to let the law take its course, the sentence was
commuted to banishment to Ceylon. Mr. Labouchere commented in
_Truth_ as follows: "The farce {205} of the rebel's condemnation to
exile with retention of his rank and with a handsome allowance, is a
fitting conclusion to the trial. I see it stated that Arabi will be
invited to take up his residence in this or that portion of British
territory. It need hardly be said that he may reside in any part of
the world, outside Egypt, that he pleases. There is no existing law
which enables us to detain an Egyptian in deference to the wishes of
an Egyptian Khedive; and it is not likely that we shall ever consent
to convert any portion of our territory into an international gaol,
where all who are in disfavour with foreign rulers are to be
deported, and restrained in their liberty."[11]
When Parliament met after Christmas, Mr. Labouchere seconded Sir
Wilfrid Lawson's amendment to the Reply to the Speech from the Throne
to the effect that no sufficient reason had been shown for the
employment of British forces in reconstituting the Government of
Egypt. It was certain, he said, that Arabi was supported by the
entire Egyptian nation. He could quite understand why the Opposition
did not challenge the policy of the Government. The Government were
practically dragged into the war by the acts of the Opposition when
in power. Anyone who read the Blue Books must see that. A great
many Liberals and all the Radicals in the country regretted the
Government plunging into the war. There could be no doubt that it
was entered into for the sake of the bondholders and for that reason
only. We were going to place the Egyptian army under an English
General and a financier at the side of the Khedive, and then tell
Europe that the Khedive was an independent ruler and that we had
nothing to do with the Government of Egypt. Why were we there? For
the single object of collecting the debts of the bondholders.[12]
He wrote to Mr. Chamberlain on January 9, 1883:
You people do not seem to have a very clear policy in Egypt. I
cannot understand why you do not settle the French by adopting {206}
the line of "Egypt for the Egyptians" and convert the country into a
sort of Belgium. If you can establish the principle that no one is
to interfere, you have got all that you want. To do this only two
things are necessary:
1. Fair Courts of Justice where "meum and tuum" is recognised.
2. A Representative Assembly with a right to vote the Budget.
As regards the debt there are three loans, secured by special
mortgages; two on land, and one on the railroads. Let the mortgagees
take these securities, when the loans would be converted into
companies, and the interest on them not be dependent upon any
political arrangement. Rothschild has always told me that the
domains, on which his loan of £400,000,000 is secured, are worth
£400,500,000. By handing over to him the security, £500,000 would
therefore be obtained.
As regards the General Debt (the United), it is a swindle, but
without going into this it might be regarded as the general debt of
the country, and the Egyptians, like any other nation, would be left
to pay or not as they pleased.
The main swindle of the Goschen-Rivers-Wilson scheme was that the
fellahs had paid £17,000,000 to free the land from a portion of the
land tax after 1886. The law which partially liberated the land was
abrogated, and, instead of the fellahs being treated like
bondholders, although they had paid cash, whereas the latter had
really paid about 20% on the value of the bonds, they were told that
as a _quid pro quo_ they would receive 1% on their £17,000,000 for
fifty years. The Canal question is nonsense. If we hold the Red Sea
we hold the Canal, in the sense that we can stop all traffic. If we
are at war with a maritime power, either we should have the command
of the Mediterranean or we should not. In the latter case, we should
still by our hold on the Red Sea be able to close the Canal; in the
former case we should be able not only to close it to others, but to
use it for our own powers. Protocols and treaties are waste paper,
they never hold against the exigencies of a belligerent; and, if we
were at war with one maritime power, we should not have the others
interfering to maintain our treaty rights, for, differing on many
things, all continental powers regard us as the bullies {207} of the
ocean. An English garrison at Port Said is a reality; as we are not
likely to have one there, our best plan is to leave things alone,
and, in the event of a serious maritime war, at once to occupy Port
Said.
The interests of the Egyptian exiles also claimed Mr. Labouchere's
attention. We find him in March putting searching questions as to
their precise legal status, demanding satisfactory evidence of their
support being adequately provided for, and enquiring why the Egyptian
Government had unlawfully deprived Arabi of his title of Pasha.
In the debate of March 2 on a supplementary estimate of £728,000 "for
additional expenditure for army services consequent on the dispatch
of an expeditionary force to Egypt," he spoke with his accustomed
frankness. He would like to know where the money was to come from.
He had seen it stated in the papers and other organs that it was to
be raised by an increase on the Income Tax. For his part, he should
like to see it raised in one of two ways--one, by raising it from the
landed interest--or, since he was afraid the Government would not
accept that plan--in default, by a general tax on every individual in
the country poor or rich. Let every one of those shrieking Jingoes
who went out calling on the Government to go to war, now here and now
there, understand that they would have to pay for the cost of those
wars. Then he thought they would be less inclined than now to
advance the Jingo policy which he was sorry to see had been adopted
by the Government, and which they had inherited from gentlemen on the
other side of the House. He believed that the war had been a mistake
all through. If we went to Egypt at all we ought to have installed
Arabi instead of the Khedive. He believed that as long as British
troops supported the Khedive and supported him against his own
subjects, England was absolutely responsible for what was going on in
Egypt. No doubt Lord Dufferin did his best to procure trustworthy
information, but he was {208} necessarily very much in the hands of
the Europeans and of the Ministers and friends of the Khedive. He
did not gather from the dispatches that Lord Dufferin had consulted
the people of Egypt. Sir George Campbell, the member for Kirkcaldy,
said that he had read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested Lord
Dufferin's scheme of government. For his own part, although he had
read, marked, and learned it to a certain degree he could not digest
it because it was objectionable to a Radical stomach. Lord
Dufferin's scheme was a perfect sham of constitutional government.
If any species of representative government were established in Egypt
it must be based on control of the purse. But when anything was said
to the noble Lord, the Under-secretary, on this subject, he vaguely
alluded to representative government and international obligations.
Was Lord Dufferin prevented from doing what he thought desirable for
the country by any obligations which the Egyptians were supposed to
be under to pay the interest on their debt? If there was any
obligation on their part it was not our business to go there to carry
it out.... He denied that the people of Egypt were bound by any such
thing, but, supposing they were, it was not England's business to
deprive them of the most elementary and necessary basis of
representative government--the government of the purse.[13]
On June 11, he proposed the reduction of Lord Wolseley's grant from
£30,000 to £12,000. What, he said, had Lord Wolseley done in Egypt?
He went to Ismailia and from thence marched his men to Cairo. He
took the straight road, and on the road he found a lot of miserable
Arabs entrenched; he advanced and the Arabs marched away. That was
the whole history of the exploit in Egypt.[14]
Lord Dufferin left Egypt in May, 1883, He was pleased with the
success of his mission. To use his own words--"the fellah like his
own Memnon had not remained {209} irresponsive to the beams of the
new dawn." He left Sir Edward Malet as Consul-General, and resumed
his normal functions at Constantinople. He departed under a shower
of compliments, and he left Egypt apparently prosperous. Arabi was
an exile in Ceylon. Sherif Pasha was the Khedive's loyal and
obedient Minister. Sir Archibald Alison was in command of the
British garrison. The Egyptian army, about six thousand in number,
was under the fostering care of Sir Evelyn Wood. Colonel
Scott-Moncrieff directed the work of irrigation, and another Briton,
Sir Benson Maxwell, superintended the native tribunals. Hitherto the
British Government had made no mistakes, and Egypt had reaped only
benefit from the intrusion of the foreigner. The false position in
which England stood with full authority, ample power, and no legal
right, had not yet led to any consequences of a serious and practical
kind.[15]
Danger, was, however, creeping up to Egypt from the south. A vast,
vaguely limited country, extending from Assouan to the Equator, and
known as the Soudan, had been claimed as Egyptian territory by
Ismail, who had appointed the famous Gordon Governor-General. On
Ismail's fall in '79, Gordon was recalled and the Soudan fell a prey
to local bandits. The reconstituted Egyptian Government was
incapable of interference, and towards the end of '82 a Mussulman,
Mohamed Ahmed, raised the standard of religious reform and rebellion
against the distant and incapable Egyptian authorities. The Mahdi,
or Messiah, as he called himself, took El Obeid and made himself
master of Kordofan by the end of January, '83. In the summer of the
same year seven thousand Egyptian troops, under the command of Hicks
Pasha, a retired officer of the Indian army, who had entered the
service of the Khedive, were dispatched against him by the Egyptian
Government. Granville was careful to formally disengage the
responsibility of the English Cabinet in this measure. It is
certain, however, that he {210} could have prevented this action of
the Khedive's Ministers, and, as he was perfectly well aware through
the information of Colonel Stewart, who had been associated with
Gordon's administration, of the utter impossibility of Hicks's task,
it is difficult to acquit him of moral responsibility. "The faith in
the power of phrases to alter facts," says Lord Milner in his
_England in Egypt_, "has never been more strangely manifested than in
this idea, that we could shake off our virtual responsibility for the
policy of Egypt in the Soudan by a formal disclaimer." On November
5, the Egyptian force was cut to pieces near Shekan, about two days'
journey from El Obeid, by the Mahdi at the head of forty thousand
men, and Hicks and his staff died fighting at hopeless odds. On the
advice of Sir Evelyn Baring, who had just arrived in Egypt from
India, where he had filled the post of Financial Minister to Lord
Ripon's Government, the English Cabinet recognised at last their
responsibility. It was decided that the Soudan must be abandoned and
that the Mahdi must be induced to allow the Egyptian garrisons,
amounting to about forty thousand men, still remaining there, to
retire.
Mr. Labouchere wrote to Mr. Chamberlain as follows on December 15,
1883: "I hope that we are not going to undertake the reconquest of
the Soudan. The difficult position in which we are comes from not
having broken entirely with the Conservative policy in Egypt. _They_
might have annexed the country: we cannot, so we give advice which is
not taken, try to tinker up an impossible financial situation, and
make ourselves responsible for every folly committed by a gang of
corrupt and silly Pashas. The result is that we are now told that we
have a new frontier somewhere in the direction of the Equator, and
that our honour is concerned, etc., etc. If the French are so
foolish as to wish to acquire influence in the Soudan, I cannot
conceive why we should seek to acquire it in order to prevent them.
I believe that the Khedive and his friends are {211} delighted at
what has occurred, because they hope that our evacuation will be put
off; so long as we retain one soldier there, or indeed assume the
part of bailiffs for the locusts who make money out of the country,
something will always occur to force us to remain."
Mr. Chamberlain replied on December 18: "I do not think there is the
slightest intention of engaging in any operations in the Soudan. The
utmost we are likely to do is to undertake the defence of Egypt
proper, and I hope there is no fear of that being attacked. I wish
we could get out of the whole business, but I have always thought
that, at the time we interfered, we really had no possible
alternative. I am not Christian enough to turn the other cheek after
one has been slapped, and we had unfortunately put ourselves in a
position in which the first slap had already been administered. It
is, however, a warning and a lesson to look a little more closely
into the beginnings of things."
On the 20th Labouchere wrote again to Mr. Chamberlain: "From all I
hear, matters are in a mess in Egypt. Tewfik is a weak creature, and
he and his entourage intrigue against us, and yet intrigue to keep us
there, as they are afraid of what may happen when we go. If the
fellahs have any opinion, it is dislike of Tewfik as the puppet of
'foreigners.' The Mahdi will never attack Egypt proper, which is the
valley of the Nile and the Delta. If we send more troops there, it
will be the more difficult to evacuate. As long as we retain a
corporal's guard, it will be the object of Tewfik and all the locusts
to get up disturbances in order to compromise us. Surely it would be
easy to come to an arrangement by which Egypt would be neutralised
and left to itself: the reply always is that interest of the debt
would not be paid and that, in consequence of the Law of Liquidation,
some Power would interfere for the benefit of its Egyptian
bondholders. But these worthy people must be comparatively few in
numbers, and except as a pretext, no Power would think of taking up
the cudgels for them, any more {212} than they did for Peruvian
bondholders. The whole thing is a mere bugbear. Even if France did
go there we should not suffer." To which Mr. Chamberlain replied on
December 22: "I think I agree with you on all points of Egyptian
policy, but my hands are so full just now that I have to let foreign
affairs work themselves out, and to content myself with occasionally
giving a push in the right direction."
Public opinion in England was deeply stirred by the disaster at
Shekan, and one of those popular cries that are so often and so
disastrously interpreted as heavenly voices went up all over the
land. The nation called for Gordon. The question of Gordon's
mission has been exhaustively discussed from every point of view.
The responsibility for his failure and tragic death is apportioned by
Lord Cromer between Gordon himself and the Government who overruled
his (Cromer's) objection to employing him, and went on to make every
mistake they could. Gordon misinterpreted his orders, and the
Government was then made responsible for the consequences of a policy
of which they had never dreamt. He thus placed himself in a
situation from which it was impossible to extricate him in time. Mr.
Wilfrid Blunt, on the other hand, places the responsibility of the
tragedy principally at the door of Cromer. I am not here concerned
with this delicate controversy. Of this at least there is no doubt,
Gordon's mission was understood by the country and Parliament to be
of a purely peaceful nature. Its avowed object was one which
approved itself to Liberal ideas, _i.e._ the disengaging of British
responsibility from a purely Egyptian matter and the rescue of the
Egyptian garrisons. Radicals understood that these purposes were to
be achieved by purely peaceful means. The Mahdi was presumably to be
approached by recognised methods of negotiation. It is well known
that when Gordon got to Khartoum, these instructions went by the
board. He had been nominated, while on his way, at Cairo,
Governor-General of the Soudan, and the Government left, by means
{213} of supplementary clauses in their instructions, a considerable
latitude to Baring under whose orders, at his (Baring's) request,
Gordon was placed. Lord Cromer has told the world in his _Modern
Egypt_ of the difficulties of the situation. Gordon was a mystic and
suffered chronically from "inspirations," which changed a dozen times
a day. He does not seem to have made any attempt to carry out his
mission by diplomatic methods. He soon came to conceive of that
mission as a sort of rival "Mahdism." He became the Angel of the
Lord fighting with Apollyon. All this must have been inexpressibly
disconcerting to the prudent _homme d'affaires_ at Cairo, and no less
so to his nominal superior in Downing Street.
Mr. Labouchere's attitude in the matter was simple and consistent.
On February 14, four days before Gordon started, the Opposition moved
a vote of censure on the Government in consequence of the Hicks
disaster, and were supported by several Radical members. Sir Wilfrid
Lawson was supported by Mr. Labouchere in an amendment to Sir
Stafford Northcote's motion: "That this House, whilst declining at
present to express an opinion on the Egyptian policy which Her
Majesty's Government have pursued during the last two years with the
support of the House, trusts that in future British forces may not be
employed for the purpose of interfering with the Egyptian people in
their selection of their own Government."[16] On February 25, by
which time news of the conquest of Tokar by Osman Digna, the ablest
of the Mahdi's lieutenants, had reached England, Mr. Labouchere asked
the Secretary for War whether it was within the discretion of General
Graham to advance beyond Suakim against Osman Digna. Hartington
replied oracularly that that appeared to him a question highly
undesirable to answer and that the general object of Graham's
instructions had been already stated to the House.
{214}
Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's Diary for April 4, 1884, records the following
conversation with Mr. Labouchere: "Lunched with Labouchere. He is
more practical, and we have discussed every detail of the policy to
be suggested to Gladstone. He will feel the ground through Herbert
Gladstone, which is his way of consulting the oracle. He told me the
history of Gordon's mission. Gordon's idea had been to go out and
make friends with the Mahdi, and to have absolutely nothing to do
with Baring or the Khedive, or with anybody in Egypt. He was going
to Suakim straight, where he counted upon one of the neighbouring
Sheiks, whose sons' lives he had saved or spared, and his mission was
to be one entirely of peace. But the Foreign Office and Baring
caught hold of him as he passed through Egypt, and made him stop to
see the Khedive, and so he was befooled into going to Khartoum as the
Khedive's lieutenant. Now he had failed altogether in his mission of
peace, and the Government had recalled him more than once in the last
few days, but he had refused to come back. Gladstone had decided
absolutely to recall all the troops in Egypt when Hicks' defeat was
heard of, and was in a great rage. The expedition to Suakim had been
forced upon him by the Cabinet, and Hartington had taken care to give
Graham no special instructions, so that he might fight without
orders. This Graham, of course, had done, and Gladstone, more angry
still, had gone down to sulk at Coombe. Now he would stand it no
longer, and he had let Hartington in by the speech he had made last
night. Nobody expected it. Labouchere thought the moment most
favourable for a new move."[17] And on May 19 Mr. Labouchere asked
in the House: "Whether, for the satisfaction of those who believe
that it has never been brought to the knowledge of the Mahdi and of
the Soudanese who are engaged in military operations what the object
of the mission of General Gordon is, he will consider the feasibility
of conveying to them that Her Majesty's Government, {215} in sending
an English General to the Soudan, only desired to effect by peaceful
means the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, employés, and other
foreigners who many wish to leave the country, and whether he will
take steps to enter into diplomatic relations with the Mahdi, or
whomsoever else may be the governing power in the Soudan, in order to
prevent if possible all further effusion of blood, to establish a
fixed frontier between Egypt and the Soudan, and to effect an
arrangement by which General Gordon and those who may wish to
accompany him will be enabled peaceably to withdraw from the
Soudan."[18] Mr. Gladstone replied to Mr. Labouchere's question,
finishing his remarks with these words: "Whatever measures the
Government take will be in the direction indicated by the
question--to make effective arrangements with regard to putting all
the difficulties at an end."
Mr. Labouchere, to whom, as a Radical and a Nationalist, the position
of the Mahdi appealed, did not confine himself to work in Parliament.
Mr. Wilfrid Blunt was attempting to negotiate with Mr. Gladstone to
stop the war, which had followed Gordon's death, and had taken Mr.
Labouchere into his confidence. Mr. Labouchere wrote to Mr. Blunt on
February 20, 1885, as follows:
DEAR BLUNT,--I had a talk with H(erbert) G(ladstone) last night. He
wants to know what evidence can be given--that the man who came to me
was Arabi's Minister of Police at Cairo, and what was his name--and
that the Mahdi's man is the Mahdi's man. It is clear that so far he
is right. If the latter has no credentials he should get them. Let
us assume that he either has them or can get them. Then there must
be a basis of terms. I would suggest then that the Soudan, with the
exception of the Port of Suakim, be recognised as an independent
state under, if wished, the suzerainty of the Sultan, and that all
Egyptian Pashas who wish to leave it be allowed to leave it.
If the credentials hold water, and if these terms are agreed to,
{216} then the Mahdi's man should write them out and say that he will
agree to them.
But it is very essential that nothing should be known about the
matter. I should have to work others in the Cabinet, and, if
necessary, to appeal to Parliament. Clearly we could not send a
mission to the Mahdi, but if an agreement were come to, an emissary
from the Mahdi and one from our Government might meet for details.
What I want is to establish a discussion with the Mahdi--the rest
would follow.--Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
P.S.--You see, if something is to be done to stop this war, we must
leave the vague, and come to hard and fast facts.
In elucidation of the above letter Mr. Blunt writes to me on February
20, 1913: "The person referred to in your uncle's letter of February
20, 1885, is clearly Ismail Bey Jowdat, who acted as Prefect of
Police at Cairo during the war of 1882.... Later he came to London
in connection with negotiations I was attempting to get entered into
by Gladstone with the Mahdi, through Sezzed Jamal ed Din, as to which
I was in communication with your uncle.... I had, no doubt, sent
Jowdat to your uncle, and, at one time, it seemed as if we were
likely to succeed in getting a mission sent or negotiations of some
kind entered into to stop the war.... Jowdat was never himself an
agent of the Mahdi, but he was for the time with Jamal ed Din, who
was in communication with Khartoum...."
Communication with the Mahdi was apparently not easy, for we find Mr.
Labouchere writing again to Mr. Blunt the following month (March 4,
1885):
It appears to me that there will be a pause in our Soudan operations.
It might therefore be desirable to take advantage of this in order to
learn on what terms an agreement might be come to between us and the
Soudanese. Those in Parliament who, like myself, see no reason why
we should interfere in the internal affairs of that country would be
greatly strengthened, were we to know the precise views of the Mahdi.
{217}
I would therefore suggest to you that, if possible, his agent should
let us know definitely, and after conversation with the Mahdi,
whether the latter would agree to the following terms:
1. The recognition on the part of England of the independence of the
Soudan, and of the Mahdi as its ruler.
2. The Northern frontier of the Soudan to be drawn at or near Wady
Halfa; the Eastern frontier to exclude Suakim and the coast.
3. The Mahdi to pledge himself not to molest any Soudanese who have
taken our side, and to allow all who wish to leave the country to do
so.
4. The Mahdi to receive a Consular and Diplomatic Agent at Khartoum;
to allow all foreigners to carry on their business unmolested in the
Soudan.
5. The establishment of some sort of Consular Courts.
6. If possible some clause with regard to the export of slaves
forbidding it.
It is our object to meet the assertion of the Government that the
Mahdi is a religious fanatic with whom it is impossible to treat,
because he does not regard himself, alone, as the temporal ruler of
the Soudan, but as a spiritual leader of Islam against
Christianity--a species of Oriental Peter the Hermit. What we want
to show is that he is the proper ruler of the Soudan, and that,
whilst it will be open to any one outside that country to regard him
as a prophet, he seeks to establish no temporal sway beyond the
Soudan. If the Mahdi would declare his assent to the above terms, I
am convinced that popular feeling here, and the real wishes of the
members of the Government, would soon bring this war to a close, and
that in a very short time we and the Mahdi would be the best of
friends.
It seems unlikely that the terms laid down in this letter were
suggested by Mr. Labouchere without consultation with Mr. Herbert
Gladstone.
He missed no opportunity in Parliament of fighting the good fight of
Radical principles. At one moment he is pointing out the two
cardinal heresies in the policy of the Government--one political and
the other financial: "The {218} political heresy is that we insist on
putting up the Khedive and maintaining him in power against his
subjects. The result is that we are absolutely hated in Egypt, and
wherever we are not hated we are regarded with contempt." The
financial heresy is that "we always insist in our treatment of
Egyptian finance that the payment of interest on the debt should come
first, and the expenses of administration second. The result of this
policy is over-taxation, the postponement of reform, and a
deficit."[19] The policy of the Liberal Government was in reality,
though not in profession, he asserted, Jingo policy, and the Radicals
who had worked for Mr. Gladstone's return to power, relying on his
Midlothian speeches, had been jockeyed. If only Mr. Gladstone would
take his (Labouchere's) advice. No doubt the Prime Minister when
thinking the matter over would say--Why did I not follow the member
for Northampton? I should not have been in such a mess as I am now.
For his own part Mr. Labouchere stood by the policy of the Midlothian
campaign, when the Prime Minister denounced the Jingo policy of
annexation and war. If any one had then said: "You will acquire
power and become the most powerful Minister England has had for many
a day; you will bombard Alexandria; you will massacre Egyptians at
Tel-el-Kebir and Suakim, and you will go on a sort of wild-cat
expedition into the wilds of Ethiopia in order to put down a prophet"
the right honourable gentleman would have replied in the words of
Hazael to the King of Syria--"Is thy servant a dog that he should do
this thing?"[20]
This kind of sword-play went on day after day in the House, and it is
impossible to doubt that, although Mr. Labouchere was unquestionably
sincere in deploring the policy of the Government, he must have
greatly enjoyed the opportunity which it afforded him of displaying
his wit and humour. Mr. Gladstone did not always appreciate these
{219} qualities, and on one occasion, when Mr. Labouchere was
attempting to divide the House against the Government, his object
being, as he said, "not adverse to the Government, but to strengthen
the good intentions of the Prime Minister in future," that much
enduring statesman turned and solemnly rebuked him for making an
"inopportune and superficial speech."[21]
The case against the Government from the Radical point of view was,
of course, very obvious and easy to put, nor was there anything
particularly original about Mr. Labouchere's arguments. He rang the
changes incessantly on three points: the essential injustice of our
position in Egypt towards the Egyptians--the underlying venality of
the Government's position owing to their connection with the
bondholders--and the monstrous expense to the British taxpayer of
British military intervention. It was not the matter of his charges,
but the manner in which he made them that delighted the House.
Sometimes he would lay aside his dialectical weapons and let the
facts speak for themselves. One day he asks the Secretary for War if
his attention has been drawn to the following statements in the
_Times_ of May 7:
Daylight broke almost imperceptibly. We were nearer the village of
Dhakool, when the friendly scouts came running in with the news that
the inhabitants were at prayer, and that if we attacked at once we
should catch them. General Graham pushed on with a troop of the
Bengal Lancers.... The enemy fled on camels in all directions, and
the Mounted Infantry and Camel corps, coming up, gave chase. Some
two hundred attempted to stand, and showed a disposition to come at
us, but evidently lost heart and disappeared, not before having at
least twenty men killed.... It was curious to witness the desperate
efforts of the enemy to drive their flocks up the steep mountain
side, turning now and again to fire on the Bengal Lancers. The
"Friendlies" tried to cut off the flocks, and succeeded in catching
{220} some thousands of animals.... The village was looted and
burnt.... We also destroyed the well with gun-cotton.... But, for
our being unaware of the existence of some narrow hillock walks up
which the enemy retired, we might have exterminated them. Our loss
has been hitherto only two Mounted Infantry men wounded.... We have
done the enemy all the harm we could, thus fulfilling the primary
object of war.
Lord Hartington could find nothing to say, but that such incidents
were unfortunately inseparable from war.[22]
It may be doubted, however, whether Mr. Labouchere's advocacy did
very much for his cause, or for his own reputation as a serious
politician. The British public (and the House of Commons is a sort
of microcosm of the British public) finds it hard to believe in
sincerity accompanied by banter and persiflage. Not so are
Englishmen wont to express their conscientious convictions. Mr.
Labouchere was, of course, not an Englishman. He was a Frenchman
and, as I have said before, in his mentality a lineal descendant of
Voltaire. He could hardly hope to succeed where John Bright had
failed.
That Mr. Labouchere's attitude on the subject of Egypt was
appreciated by the Egyptians is proved by a perusal of the letters he
received from Arabi in exile, long after the subject had ceased to be
a stone on which the Radical axe could be ground. I append some of
these, and another letter from Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt on
the subject of the Exiles.
COLOMBO, September 15, 1891.
MY DEAR SIR,--I beg the liberty to trouble you with this in the hope
of your being able to learn more of the state of our health than you
have been hitherto. One of the most eminent medical practitioners in
Ceylon, Dr. Vandort, left for England in the last week in the German
mail steamship _Preussen_. I have asked him to call on you and Sir
William Gregory and inform you of {221} the actual state of such of
us as he has attended on. By the death of Dr. White we lost our best
evidence, and it pleased those in authority not to heed at all the
opinion of our regular medical advisers and to rely on that of
gentlemen who, whatever their high standing and attainments, had but
one opportunity of seeing us. Had they questioned also those who
attended on us and our families for years they might have been better
able to form an opinion.
I am now suffering very much from my eyes, being scarcely able to
read anything, and am waiting until an oculist from Madras could
examine them and tell me what I may expect.
Pray forgive me for troubling with this letter. We have so few of
your kind feelings and position to look up to--and if we are too
importunate we would only beg to be pardoned.
In the hope that you are in the enjoyment of the blessing of health,
and begging the kind acceptance of all respectful regards--I remain,
yours most obediently,
A. ARABI, the Egyptian.
COLOMBO, December 9, 1891.
MY DEAR SIR,--I had the great pleasure to receive your kind letters
of the 2d and 8th October, and should have replied earlier but for
having had to communicate with my brethren in exile, and for there
being time before the next meeting of Parliament. We beg your kindly
acceptance of our grateful thanks.
We have been officially informed of the decision of H.M.'s Government
on our memorial to Lord Salisbury, but for which we were prepared by
yourself and Sir William Gregory; and also by Lord de la Warr, who
very kindly sent to me copies of the papers (Egypt, No. 1, 1891),
printed for both Houses of Parliament, in March last, and of his
speeches and Lord Salisbury's reply in May and June last. I now send
copies as requested of the medical certificates had by Toulba Pasha
and the late Abdulal Pasha since the memorial, also the Colonial
Secretary's letter to us and my reply. [All these were enclosed with
this letter.]
You will permit me to ask your notice of Riaz Pasha's Memorandum of
July 9, 1890, to the Foreign Office concluding with: "H.M's
Government should in any case remember that the exiles were pardoned
and allowances granted to them on the express {222} condition that
they should remain at some distant spot, such as the island of
Ceylon." On this rather qualified assertion it would quite do to
refer to Mr. Broadley's book _How we Defended Arabi and his Friends_,
where the terms of the arrangement which put an end to the
proceedings in connection with our "trial" will be found. Mr.
Broadley and Mr. Napier could not, as I cannot, in honour reveal more
than they have done, but my steadfast friend, Mr. Blunt, was not so
constrained to be reticent, and his communications to the _Pall Mall
Gazette_ showed what even the great noble-minded General Gordon
believed the nature and extent of our exile to be.
We should not perhaps however complain of our not being permitted to
end our days in the land of our birth, although what harm that, or
our being in Cyprus, could now do I cannot conceive. That none of us
have desired or sought in the least to be disloyal to our parole the
testimony of Sir Arthur Gordon to our conduct should be sufficient.
If all my correspondence, family and other, for the last nine years
were read, or any of the hundreds of my visitors, from every part of
the world, were questioned, nothing would there be to show the least
wish to disturb or stay the progress of my loved native land since my
poor efforts failed.
If you would kindly refer to Mr. Broadley's book you will find Lord
Dufferin's scheme in 1883 for the reorganisation of my country, and
my views on Egyptian reform in 1882. After nine years, when almost
the whole of that scheme and so many of my humble views have been
successfully carried out, is it possible that any one beyond my
personal enemies in my own country could deem me capable of even
dreaming of doing anything to see her in misery again? My greatest
trust is yet what it was when I wrote to the _Times_ from my prison
in 1882: "I hope the people of England will complete the work which I
commenced. If England accomplishes this task, and thus really gives
Egypt to the Egyptians, she will then make clear to the world the
real aim and object of Arabi the Rebel" (Mr. Broadley's book, p.
349). I cannot hope to see the time, but it must come under such
auspices when Egypt will cease to be a "reproach to the nations,"
Islam although she be.
My fellow exiles and I have considered much on the subject {223} of
the parole you suggest in regard to Cyprus. Our simple parole was
all that Lord Dufferin required of us when exiled. We gave it, and
he was satisfied. We have honourably kept our word, and it is only
now, when we find our place of sojourn proving so increasingly
injurious to the health of most of us and our families, that we pray
for a change to a more congenial climate. In every other respect we
could not dream nor hope for a better home of exile. We leave
everything to your judgment. If you think a repetition of our parole
necessary, or of any use, we shall gladly give it again, although our
first, religiously observed, has been so slighted; and we shall send
it to you as soon as you may desire it. You have done much for us,
and our return for it all could only be gratefully felt, not
expressed; and you will permit us to leave it to you to do for us
whatever more in your judgment may be expedient, and, whatever that
may be, permit us to assure you of our fullest trust.
If any prospect of the change of residence we seek is hopeless, and
Lord Salisbury should adhere to his wish to keep us here, I may but
beg your best endeavour to obtain the increase of allowance I have
applied for in my letter to the Colonial Secretary, to enable me to
have the benefit of such change as the variable climate of this
island could in some degree afford.
I had the pleasure last week of two kind visits by Mr. J. R. Cox,
M.P., on his return home from Australia in the _Orizaba_. He
mentioned your request and his promise to see me if he came to
Colombo, and your desire that he should learn from me all I had to
say; and he asked me to give him a statement, which I have done to
the best of my ability both by word of mouth and in writing. He said
he had been long away, and had not seen the papers Lord de la Warr
sent me until then. I need not say how deeply gratifying it was to
hear from him of your interest in us and of your exertions on our
behalf, and of the wide feelings of sympathy you have raised for us.
You will forgive me for trespassing on your time and work with this
long letter; and if I have been led to say anything that I have
troubled your attention with before, I may only beg the extension of
your indulgence for it. Placed as I am now, able to think only of
the past, and with no hope for life's future on earth, and deprived
more and more of my greatest solace, study, {224} by the growing
weakness of sight, I fear that my communications to you and to those
who have likewise generously extended sympathy to us in our strait
are of too melancholy a tinge. As any prospect of better days seems
all but closed to us, we may but bow in humble resignation and
submission to the Divine Will. When this letter comes to you it will
be your great season of joy and peace. Permit me and my family to
offer you our best regards and wishes for many a happy enjoyment
together and return of the things to you and all dear to you.--And
believe me, yours most gratefully and sincerely,
AHMED ARABI, the Egyptian.
5 OLD PALACE YARD, S.W., Feb. 1, 1893.
MY DEAR BLUNT,--Jingoism under Rosebery reigns supreme. I will,
however, see if anything can be done about Arabi. Your details are
very interesting respecting the late events in Egypt. Cannot the
Khedive be induced to do this?: Get his Chamber to pass a resolution
declaring that Egypt wishes for independence of all European
intervention, and trusts that the British occupation will cease. If
it did this we should be able to meet the persistent statements that
the Fellaheen wants us and loves us. The Turkish Pashas might agree
so as to spite us, but if once the country were left to itself, the
Chamber could assert (?) itself.
It is difficult to say how long the Government will last. Probably
through the session.--Yours truly,
H. LABOUCHERE.
[1] Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, _Secret History of the English Occupation
of Egypt_.
[2] I have taken this account of the Cyprus Convention and its
results at the Berlin Congress from Mr. Blunt's _Secret History of
the English Occupation of Egypt_. He says in a footnote (_op. cit._,
p. 277): "I have given the story of the arrangement made with
Waddington as I heard it first from Lord Lytton at Simla in May,
1879. The details were contained in a letter which he showed me
written to him from Berlin, while the Congress was still sitting, by
a former diplomatic colleague, and have since been confirmed to me
from more than one quarter, though with variations. In regard to the
main feature of the agreement, the arrangement about Tunis, I had it
very plainly stated to me in the autumn of 1884 by Count Corti, who
had been Italian Ambassador at the Congress. According to his
account, the shock of the revelation to Disraeli had been so great
that he took to his bed, and for four days did not appear at the
sittings, leaving Lord Salisbury to explain matters as he best could.
He said that there had been no open rupture with Waddington, the case
having been submitted by Waddington to his fellow-ambassadors, who
agreed that it was not one that could possibly be publicly disputed:
_Il faut la guerre ou se taire_. The agreement was a verbal one
between Waddington and Salisbury, but was recorded in a despatch
subsequently written by the French Ambassador in London in which he
reminded Salisbury of the Convention conversation held in Berlin, and
so secured its acknowledgment in writing."
[3] Herbert Paul, _A History of Modern England_, vol. iv., p. 247.
[4] Herbert Paul, _A History of Modern England_, vol. iv., p. 247.
[5] _Hansard_, May 12, 1882, vol. 269.
[6] Vote of credit for forces in the Mediterranean.
[7] _Hansard_, July 27, 1882, vol. 272.
[8] _Hansard_, October 30, 1882, vol. 274.
[9] _Truth_, October 5, 1882.
[10] _Truth_, October 12, 1882.
[11] _Truth_, December 7, 1882.
[12] _Hansard_, February 15, 1883, vol. 276.
[13] _Hansard_, March 2, 1883, vol. 276.
[14] _Ibid._, June 11, 1883, vol. 280.
[15] Herbert Paul, _A History of Modern England_, vol. iv.
[16] _Hansard_, February 14, 1884, vol. 284.
[17] Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, _Gordon and Khartoum_.
[18] _Hansard_, May 19, 1884, vol. 288.
[19] _Hansard_, March 26, 1885, vol. 295.
[20] _Ibid._, Feb. 27, 1885, vol. 294.
[21] _Hansard_, April 13, 1885, vol. 296.
[22] _Hansard_, May 8, 1885, vol. 298.
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