you should not now wonder, that it has had its effect in the increase of
poverty. Repeal that law, and you will soon see a change in their
manners. _Saint Monday_ and _Saint Tuesday_ will soon cease to be
holidays. SIX _days shalt thou labour_, though one of the old
commandments long treated as out of date, will again be looked upon as a
respectable precept; industry will increase, and with it plenty among
the lower people; their circumstances will mend, and more will be done
for their happiness by inuring them to provide for themselves, than
could be done by dividing all your estates among them.
Excuse me, Messieurs the Public, if, upon this _interesting_ subject, I
put you to the trouble of reading a little of _my_ nonsense. I am sure I
have lately read a great deal of _yours_, and therefore from you (at
least from those of you who are writers) I deserve a little indulgence.
I am yours, &c.
ARATOR.
AN EDICT BY THE KING OF PRUSSIA[81]
[From the _Gentleman's Magazine_, October, 1773.]
Dantzic, Sept. 5, [1773].
We have long wondered here at the supineness of the English nation,
under the Prussian impositions upon its trade entering our port. We did
not, till lately, know the claims, ancient and modern, that hang over
that nation; and therefore could not suspect that it might submit to
those impositions from a sense of duty or from principles of equity. The
following Edict, just made publick, may, if serious, throw some light
upon this matter.
"FREDERIC, by the grace of God, King of Prussia, &c., &c., &c., to all
present and to come, (_à tous présens et à venir_,) Health. The peace
now enjoyed throughout our dominions, having afforded us leisure to
apply ourselves to the regulation of commerce, the improvement of our
finances, and at the same time the easing our domestic subjects in their
taxes: For these causes, and other good considerations us thereunto
moving, we hereby make known, that, after having deliberated these
affairs in our council, present our dear brothers, and other great
officers of the state, members of the same, we, of our certain
knowledge, full power, and authority royal, have made and issued this
present Edict, viz.
"Whereas it is well known to all the world, that the first
German settlements made in the Island of Britain, were by
colonies of people, subject to our renowned ducal ancestors,
and drawn from their dominions, under the conduct of Hengist,
Horsa, Hella, Uff, Cerdicus, Ida, and others; and that the
said colonies have nourished under the protection of our
august house for ages past; have never been emancipated
therefrom; and yet have hitherto yielded little profit to the
same: And whereas we ourself have in the last war fought for
and defended the said colonies, against the power of France,
and thereby enabled them to make conquests from the said
power in America, for which we have not yet received adequate
compensation: And whereas it is just and expedient that a
revenue should be raised from the said colonies in Britain,
towards our indemnification; and that those who are
descendants of our ancient subjects, and thence still owe us
due obedience, should contribute to the replenishing of our
royal coffers as they must have done, had their ancestors
remained in the territories now to us appertaining: We do
therefore hereby ordain, and command, that, from and after
the date of these presents, there shall be levied and paid
to our officers of the _customs_, on all goods, wares, and
merchandizes, and on all grain and other produce of the
earth, exported from the said Island of Britain, and on all
goods of whatever kind imported into the same, a duty of four
and a half per cent _ad valorem_, for the use of us and our
successors. And that the said duty may more effectually be
collected, we do hereby ordain, that all ships or vessels
bound from Great Britain to any other part of the world, or
from any other part of the world to Great Britain, shall in
their respective voyages touch at our port of Koningsberg,
there to be unladen, searched, and charged with the said
duties.
"And whereas there hath been from time to time discovered in
the said island of Great Britain, by our colonists there,
many mines or beds of iron-stone; and sundry subjects, of our
ancient dominion, skilful in converting the said stone into
metal, have in time past transported themselves thither,
carrying with them and communicating that art; and the
inhabitants of the said island, presuming that they had a
natural right to make the best use they could of the natural
productions of their country for their own benefit, have not
only built furnaces for smelting the said stone into iron,
but have erected plating-forges, slitting-mills, and
steel-furnaces, for the more convenient manufacturing of the
same; thereby endangering a diminution of the said
manufacture in our ancient dominion;--we do therefore hereby
farther ordain, that, from and after the date hereof, no mill
or other engine for slitting or rolling of iron, or any
plating-forge to work with a tilt-hammer, or any furnace for
making steel, shall be erected or continued in the said
island of Great Britain: And the Lord Lieutenant of every
county in the said island is hereby commanded, on information
of any such erection within his county, to order and by force
to cause the same to be abated and destroyed; as he shall
answer the neglect thereof to us at his peril. But we are
nevertheless graciously pleased to permit the inhabitants of
the said island to transport their iron into Prussia, there
to be manufactured, and to them returned; they paying our
Prussian subjects for the workmanship, with all the costs of
commission, freight, and risk, coming and returning; any
thing herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding.
"We do not, however, think fit to extend this our indulgence
to the article of wool; but, meaning to encourage, not only
the manufacturing of woollen cloth, but also the raising of
wool, in our ancient dominions, and to prevent both, as much
as may be, in our said island, we do hereby absolutely forbid
the transportation of wool from thence, even to the mother
country, Prussia; and that those islanders may be farther and
more effectually restrained in making any advantage of their
own wool in the way of manufacture, we command that none
shall be carried out of one county into another; nor shall
any worsted, bay, or woollen yarn, cloth, says, bays,
kerseys, serges, frizes, druggets, cloth-serges, shalloons,
or any other drapery stuffs, or woollen manufactures
whatsoever, made up or mixed with wool in any of the said
counties, be carried into any other county, or be waterborne
even across the smallest river or creek, on penalty of
forfeiture of the same, together with the boats, carriages,
horses, &c., that shall be employed in removing them.
Nevertheless, our loving subjects there are hereby permitted
(if they think proper) to use all their wool as manure for
the improvement of their lands.
"And whereas the art and mystery of making hats hath arrived
at great perfection in Prussia, and the making of hats by our
remoter subjects ought to be as much as possible restrained:
And forasmuch as the islanders before mentioned, being in
possession of wool, beaver and other furs, have
presumptuously conceived they had a right to make some
advantage thereof, by manufacturing the same into hats, to
the prejudice of our domestic manufacture: We do therefore
hereby strictly command and ordain, that no hats or felts
whatsoever, dyed or undyed, finished or unfinished, shall be
loaded or put into or upon any vessel, cart, carriage, or
horse, to be transported or conveyed out of one county in the
said island into another county, or to any other place
whatsoever, by any person or persons whatsoever; on pain of
forfeiting the same, with a penalty of five hundred pounds
sterling for every offence. Nor shall any hat-maker, in any
of the said counties, employ more than two apprentices, on
penalty of five pounds sterling per month; we intending
hereby, that such hatmakers, being so restrained, both in the
production and sale of their commodity, may find no advantage
in continuing their business. But, lest the said islanders
should suffer inconveniency by the want of hats, we are
farther graciously pleased to permit them to send their
beaver furs to Prussia; and we also permit hats made thereof
to be exported from Prussia to Britain; the people thus
favoured to pay all costs and charges of manufacturing,
interest, commission to our merchants, insurance and freight
going and returning, as in the case of iron.
"And, lastly, being willing farther to favour our said
colonies in Britain, we do hereby also ordain and command,
that all the _thieves_, highway and street robbers,
house-breakers, forgerers, murderers, s--d--tes, and villains
of every denomination, who have forfeited their lives to the
law in Prussia; but whom we, in our great clemency, do not
think fit here to hang, shall be emptied out of our gaols
into the said island of Great Britain, for the better
peopling of that country.
"We flatter ourselves, that these our royal regulations and
commands will be thought just and reasonable by our
much-favoured colonists in England; the said regulations
being copied from their statutes of 10 and 11 William III. c.
10, 5 Geo. II, c. 22, 23, Geo. II. c. 29, 4 Geo. I. c. 11,
and from other equitable laws made by their parliaments; or
from instructions given by their Princes; or from resolutions
of both Houses, entered into for the good government of their
_own colonies in Ireland and America_.
"And all persons in the said island are hereby cautioned: not
to oppose in any wise the execution of this our Edict, or any
part thereof, such opposition being high treason; of which
all who are suspected shall be transported in fetters from
Britain to Prussia, there to be tried and executed according
to the Prussian law.
"Such is our pleasure.
"Given at Potsdam, this twenty-fifth day of the month of
August, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-three, and in
the thirty-third year of our reign.
"By the King, in his Council.
"RECHTMAESSIG, _Sec._"
Some take this Edict to be merely one of the King's _Jeux d'Esprit_:
others suppose it serious, and that he means a quarrel with England; but
all here think the assertion it concludes with, "that these regulations
are copied from acts of the English parliament respecting their
colonies," a very injurious one; it being impossible to believe, that a
people distinguished for their love of liberty, a nation so wise, so
liberal in its sentiments, so just and equitable towards its neighbours,
should, from mean and injudicious views of petty immediate profit, treat
its own children in a manner so arbitrary and tyrannical!
RULES BY WHICH A GREAT EMPIRE MAY BE REDUCED TO A SMALL ONE
Presented to a late Minister, when he entered upon his Administration
[From the _Gentleman's Magazine_, Sept., 1773.]
An ancient Sage boasted, that, tho' he could not fiddle, he knew how to
make a _great city_ of _a little one_. The science that I, a modern
simpleton, am about to communicate, is the very reverse.
I address myself to all ministers who have the management of extensive
dominions, which from their very greatness are become troublesome to
govern, because the multiplicity of their affairs leaves no time for
_fiddling_.
I. In the first place, gentlemen, you are to consider, that a great
empire, like a great cake, is most easily diminished at the edges. Turn
your attention, therefore, first to your _remotest_ provinces; that, as
you get rid of them, the next may follow in order.
II. That the possibility of this separation may always exist, take
special care the provinces are never incorporated with the mother
country; that they do not enjoy the same common rights, the same
privileges in commerce; and that they are governed by _severer_ laws,
all of _your enacting_, without allowing them any share in the choice of
the legislators. By carefully making and preserving such distinctions,
you will (to keep to my simile of the cake) act like a wise
ginger-bread-baker, who, to facilitate a division, cuts his dough half
through in those places where, when baked, he would have it _broken to
pieces_.
III. Those remote provinces have perhaps been acquired, purchased, or
conquered, at the _sole expence_ of the settlers, or their ancestors,
without the aid of the mother country. If this should happen to increase
her _strength_, by their growing numbers, ready to join in her wars; her
_commerce_, by their growing demand for her manufactures; or her _naval
power_, by greater employment for her ships and seamen, they may
probably suppose some merit in this, and that it entitles them to some
favour; you are therefore to _forget it all_, _or resent it_, as if they
had done you injury. If they happen to be zealous whigs, friends of
liberty, nurtured in revolution principles, _remember all that_ to their
prejudice, and resolve to punish it; for such principles, after a
revolution is thoroughly established, are of _no more use_; they are
even _odious_ and _abominable_.
IV. However peaceably your colonies have submitted to your government,
shewn their affection to your interests, and patiently borne their
grievances; you are to _suppose_ them always inclined to revolt, and
treat them accordingly. Quarter troops among them, who by their
insolence may _provoke_ the rising of mobs, and by their bullets and
bayonets _suppress_ them. By this means, like the husband who uses his
wife ill _from suspicion_, you may in time convert your _suspicions_
into _realities_.
V. Remote provinces must have _Governors_ and _Judges_, to represent the
Royal Person, and execute everywhere the delegated parts of his office
and authority. You ministers know, that much of the strength of
government depends on the _opinion_ of the people; and much of that
opinion on the _choice of rulers_ placed immediately over them. If you
send them wise and good men for governors, who study the interest of the
colonists, and advance their prosperity, they will think their King
wise and good, and that he wishes the welfare of his subjects. If you
send them learned and upright men for Judges, they will think him a
lover of justice. This may attach your provinces more to his government.
You are therefore to be careful whom you recommend for those offices. If
you can find prodigals, who have ruined their fortunes, broken gamesters
or stockjobbers, these may do well as _governors_; for they will
probably be rapacious, and provoke the people by their extortions.
Wrangling proctors and pettifogging lawyers, too, are not amiss; for
they will be for ever disputing and quarrelling with their little
parliaments. If withal they should be ignorant, wrong-headed, and
insolent, so much the better. Attornies' clerks and Newgate solicitors
will do for _Chief Justices_, especially if they hold their places
_during your pleasure_; and all will contribute to impress those ideas
of your government, that are proper for a people _you would wish to
renounce it_.
VI. To confirm these impressions, and strike them deeper, whenever the
injured come to the capital with complaints of maladministration,
oppression, or injustice, punish such suitors with long delay, enormous
expence, and a final judgment in favour of the oppressor. This will have
an admirable effect every way. The trouble of future complaints will be
prevented, and Governors and Judges will be encouraged to farther acts
of oppression and injustice; and thence the people may become more
disaffected, and at length desperate.
VII. When such Governors have crammed their coffers, and made themselves
so odious to the people that they can no longer remain among them, with
safety to their persons, _recall and reward_ them with pensions. You may
make them _baronets_ too, if that respectable order should not think fit
to resent it. All will contribute to encourage new governors in the same
practice, and make the supreme government, _detestable_.
VIII. If, when you are engaged in war, your colonies should vie in
liberal aids of men and money against the common enemy, upon your simple
requisition, and give far beyond their abilities, reflect that a penny
taken from them by your power is more honourable to you, than a pound
presented by their benevolence; despise therefore their voluntary
grants; and resolve to harass them with novel taxes. They will probably
complain to your parliaments, that they are taxed by a body in which
they have no representative, and that this is contrary to common right.
They will petition for redress. Let the Parliaments flout their claims,
reject their petitions, refuse even to suffer the reading of them, and
treat the petitioners with the utmost contempt. Nothing can have a
better effect in producing the alienation proposed; for though many can
forgive injuries, _none ever forgave contempt_.
IX. In laying these taxes, never regard the heavy burthens those remote
people already undergo, in defending their own frontiers, supporting
their own provincial governments, making new roads, building bridges,
churches, and other public edifices, which in old countries have been
done to your hands by your ancestors, but which occasion constant calls
and demands on the purses of a new people. Forget the _restraints_ you
lay on their trade for _your own_ benefit, and the advantage a
_monopoly_ of this trade gives your exacting merchants. Think nothing of
the wealth those merchants and your manufacturers acquire by the colony
commerce; their encreased ability thereby to pay taxes at home; their
accumulating, in the price of their commodities, most of those taxes,
and so levying them from their consuming customers; all this, and the
employment and support of thousands of your poor by the colonists, you
are _intirely to forget_. But remember to make your arbitrary tax more
grievous to your provinces, by public declarations importing that your
power of taxing them has _no limits_; so that when you take from them
without their consent one shilling in the pound, you have a clear right
to the other nineteen. This will probably weaken every idea of _security
in their property_, and convince them, that under such a government they
_have nothing they can call their own_; which can scarce fail of
producing the _happiest consequences_!
X. Possibly, indeed, some of them might still comfort themselves, and
say, "Though we have no property, we have yet _something_ left that is
valuable; we have constitutional _liberty_, both of person and of
conscience. This King, these Lords, and these Commons, who it seems are
too remote from us to know us, and feel for us, cannot take from us our
_Habeas Corpus_ right, or our right of trial _by a jury of our
neighbours_; they cannot deprive us of the exercise of our religion,
alter our ecclesiastical constitution, and compel us to be Papists, if
they please, or Mahometans." To annihilate this comfort, begin by laws
to perplex their commerce with infinite regulations, impossible to be
remembered and observed; ordain seizures of their property for every
failure; take away the trial of such property by Jury, and give it to
arbitrary Judges of your own appointing, and of the lowest characters in
the country, whose salaries and emoluments are to arise out of the
duties or condemnations, and whose appointments are _during pleasure_.
Then let there be a formal declaration of both Houses, that opposition
to your edicts is _treason_, and that any person suspected of treason in
the provinces may, according to some obsolete law, be seized and sent to
the metropolis of the empire for trial; and pass an act, that those
there charged with certain other offences, shall be sent away in chains
from their friends and country to be tried in the same manner for
felony. Then erect a new Court of Inquisition among them, accompanied by
an armed force, with instructions to transport all such suspected
persons; to be ruined by the expence, if they bring over evidences to
prove their innocence, or be found guilty and hanged, if they cannot
afford it. And, lest the people should think you cannot possibly go any
farther, pass another solemn declaratory act, "that King, Lords, Commons
had, hath, and of right ought to have, full power and authority to make
statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the unrepresented
provinces IN ALL CASES WHATSOEVER." This will include _spiritual_ with
temporal, and, taken together, must operate wonderfully to your purpose;
by convincing them, that they are at present under a power something
like that spoken of in the scriptures, which can not only _kill their
bodies_, but _damn their souls_ to all eternity, by compelling them, if
it pleases, _to worship the Devil_.
XI. To make your taxes more odious, and more likely to procure
resistance, send from the capital a board of officers to superintend the
collection, composed of the most _indiscreet_, _ill-bred_, and
_insolent_ you can find. Let these have large salaries out of the
extorted revenue, and live in open, grating luxury upon the sweat and
blood of the industrious; whom they are to worry continually with
groundless and expensive prosecutions before the abovementioned
arbitrary revenue Judges; _all at the cost of the party prosecuted_,
tho' acquitted, because _the King is to pay no costs_. Let these men,
_by your order_, be exempted from all the common taxes and burthens of
the province, though they and their property are protected by its laws.
If any revenue officers are _suspected_ of the least tenderness for the
people, discard them. If others are justly complained of, protect and
reward them. If any of the under officers behave so as to provoke the
people to drub them, promote those to better offices: this will
encourage others to procure for themselves such profitable drubbings, by
multiplying and enlarging such provocations, and _all will work towards
the end you aim at_.
XII. Another way to make your tax odious, is to misapply the produce of
it. If it was originally appropriated for the _defence_ of the
provinces, the better support of government, and the administration of
justice, where it may be _necessary_, then apply none of it to that
_defence_, but bestow it where it is _not necessary_, in augmented
salaries or pensions to every governor, who has distinguished himself by
his enmity to the people, and by calumniating them to their sovereign.
This will make them pay it more unwillingly, and be more apt to quarrel
with those that collect it and those that imposed it, who will quarrel
again with them, and all shall contribute to your _main purpose_, of
making them _weary of your government_.
XIII. If the people of any province have been accustomed to support
their own Governors and Judges to satisfaction, you are to apprehend
that such Governors and Judges may be thereby influenced to treat the
people kindly, and to do them justice. This is another reason for
applying part of that revenue in larger salaries to such Governors and
Judges, given, as their commissions are, _during your pleasure_ only;
forbidding them to take any salaries from their provinces; that thus the
people may no longer hope any kindness from their Governors, or (in
Crown cases) any justice from their Judges. And, as the money thus
misapplied in one province is extorted from all, probably _all will
resent the misapplication_.
XIV. If the parliaments of your provinces should dare to claim rights,
or complain of your administration, order them to be harassed with
_repeated dissolutions_. If the same men are continually returned by new
elections, adjourn their meetings to some country village, where they
cannot be accommodated, and there keep them _during pleasure_; for this,
you know, is your PREROGATIVE; and an excellent one it is, as you may
manage it to promote discontents among the people, diminish their
respect, and _increase their disaffection_.