you decline the Trial of what is Good, by reason: And had rather make a
bold Attack upon Providence; the usual Way of you Gentlemen of Fashion,
who, when by living in Defiance of the eternal Rules of Reason, you have
plunged yourselves into a thousand Difficulties, endeavour to make
yourselves easy by throwing the Burden upon Nature. You are, _Horatio_,
in a very miserable Condition indeed; for you say you can't be happy if
you controul your Passions; and you feel yourself miserable by an
unrestrained Gratification of 'em; so that here's Evil, irremediable
Evil, either way.
_Hor._ That is very true, at least it appears so to me: Pray, what have
you to say, _Philocles_! in Honour of Nature or Providence; methinks I'm
in Pain for her: How do you rescue her? poor Lady!
_Phil._ This, my dear _Horatio_, I have to say; that what you find Fault
with and clamour against, as the most terrible Evil in the World,
Self-denial; is really the greatest Good, and the highest
Self-gratification: If indeed, you use the Word in the Sense of some
weak sour Moralists, and much weaker Divines, you'll have just Reason to
laugh at it; but if you take it, as understood by Philosophers and Men
of Sense, you will presently see her Charms, and fly to her Embraces,
notwithstanding her demure Looks, as absolutely necessary to produce
even your own darling sole Good, Pleasure: For, Self-denial is never a
Duty, or a reasonable Action, but as 'tis a natural Means of procuring
more Pleasure than you can taste without it so that this grave,
Saint-like Guide to Happiness, as rough and dreadful as she has been
made to appear, is in truth the kindest and most beautiful Mistress in
the World.
_Hor._ Prithee, _Philocles_! do not wrap yourself in Allegory and
Metaphor. Why do you teaze me thus? I long to be satisfied, what this
Philosophical Self-denial is, the Necessity and Reason of it; I'm
impatient, and all on Fire; explain, therefore, in your beautiful,
natural easy Way of Reasoning, what I'm to understand by this grave Lady
of yours, with so forbidding, downcast Looks, and yet so absolutely
necessary to my Pleasures. I stand ready to embrace her; for you know,
Pleasure I court under all Shapes and Forms.
_Phil._ Attend then, and you'll see the Reason of this Philosophical
Self-denial. There can be no absolute Perfection in any Creature;
because every Creature is derived, and dependent: No created Being can
be All-wise, All-good, and All-powerful, because his Powers and
Capacities are finite and limited; consequently whatever is created
must, in its own Nature, be subject to Error, Irregularity, Excess, and
Disorder. All intelligent, rational Agents find in themselves a Power of
judging what kind of Beings they are; what Actions are proper to
preserve 'em, and what Consequences will generally attend them, what
Pleasures they are form'd for, and to what Degree their Natures are
capable of receiving them. All we have to do then, _Horatio_, is to
consider, when we are surpriz'd with a new Object, and passionately
desire to enjoy it, whether the gratifying that Passion be consistent
with the gratifying other Passions and Appetites, equal if not more
necessary to us. And whether it consists with our Happiness To-morrow,
next Week, or next Year; for, as we all wish to live, we are obliged by
Reason to take as much Care for our future, as our present Happiness,
and not build one upon the Ruins of t'other. But, if thro' the Strength
and Power of a present Passion, and thro' want of attending to
Consequences, we have err'd and exceeded the Bounds which Nature or
Reason have set us; we are then, for our own Sakes, to refrain, or deny
ourselves a present momentary Pleasure for a future, constant and
durable one: So that this Philosophical Self-denial is only refusing to
do an Action which you strongly desire; because 'tis inconsistent with
your Health, Fortunes, or Circumstances in the World; or, in other
Words, because 'twould cost you more than 'twas worth. You would lose by
it, as a Man of Pleasure. Thus you see, _Horatio_! that Self-denial is
not only the most reasonable, but the most pleasant Thing in the World.
_Hor._ We are just coming into Town, so that we can't pursue this
Argument any farther at present; you have said a great deal for Nature,
Providence, and Reason: Happy are they who can follow such divine
Guides.
_Phil._ _Horatio!_ good Night; I wish you wise in your Pleasures.
_Hor._ I wish, _Philocles_! I could be as wise in my Pleasures as you
are pleasantly Wise; your Wisdom is agreeable, your Virtue is amiable,
and your Philosophy the highest Luxury. Adieu! thou enchanting Reasoner!
A SECOND DIALOGUE BETWEEN PHILOCLES AND HORATIO, CONCERNING VIRTUE AND
PLEASURE
[From the _Pennsylvania Gazette_, July 9, 1730.]
_Philocles._ Dear _Horatio_! where hast thou been these three or four
Months? What new Adventures have you fallen upon since I met you in
these delightful, all-inspiring Fields, and wondred how such a
Pleasure-hunter as you could bear being alone?
_Horatio._ O _Philocles_, thou best of Friends, because a Friend to
Reason and Virtue, I am very glad to see you. Don't you remember, I told
you then, that some Misfortunes in my Pleasures had sent me to
Philosophy for Relief? But now I do assure you, I can, without a Sigh,
leave other Pleasures for those of Philosophy; I can hear the Word
_Reason_ mentioned, and Virtue praised, without Laughing. Don't I bid
fair for Conversion, think you?
_Phil._ Very fair, _Horatio_! for I remember the Time when Reason,
Virtue, and Pleasure, were the same Thing with you: When you counted
nothing Good but what pleas'd, nor any thing Reasonable but what you got
by; When you made a Jest of a Mind, and the Pleasures of Reflection, and
elegantly plac'd your sole Happiness, like the rest of the Animal
Creation, in the Gratifications of Sense.
_Hor._ I did so: But in our last Conversation, when walking upon the
Brow of this Hill, and looking down on that broad, rapid River, and yon
widely-extended beautifully-varied Plain, you taught me another
Doctrine: You shewed me, that Self-denial, which above all Things I
abhorred, was really the greatest Good, and the highest
Self-gratification, and absolutely necessary to produce even my own
darling sole Good, Pleasure.
_Phil._ True: I told you that Self-denial was never a Duty but when it
was a natural Means of procuring more Pleasure than we could taste
without it: That as we all strongly desire to live, and to live only to
enjoy, we should take as much Care about our future as our present
Happiness; and not build one upon the Ruins of 'tother: That we should
look to the End, and regard Consequences: and if, thro' want of
Attention we had err'd, and exceeded the Bounds which Nature had set us,
we were then obliged, for our own Sakes, to refrain or deny ourselves a
present momentary Pleasure for a future, constant, and durable Good.
_Hor._ You have shewn, _Philocles_, that Self-denial, which weak or
interested Men have rendred the most forbidding, is really the most
delightful and amiable, the most reasonable and pleasant Thing in the
World. In a Word, if I understand you aright, Self-denial is, in Truth,
Self-recognising, Self-acknowledging, or Self-owning. But now, my
Friend! you are to perform another Promise; and shew me the Path which
leads up to that constant, durable, and invariable Good, which I have
heard you so beautifully describe, and which you seem so fully to
possess: Is not this Good of yours a mere Chimera? Can any Thing be
constant in a World which is eternally changing! and which appears to
exist by an everlasting Revolution of one Thing into another, and where
every Thing without us, and every Thing within us, is in perpetual
Motion? What is this constant, durable Good, then, of yours? Prithee,
satisfy my Soul, for I'm all on Fire, and impatient to enjoy her.
Produce this eternal blooming Goddess with never-fading Charms, and see,
whether I won't embrace her with as much Eagerness and Rapture as you.
_Phil._ You seem enthusiastically warm, _Horatio_; I will wait till you
are cool enough to attend to the sober, dispassionate Voice of Reason.
_Hor._ You mistake me, my dear _Philocles_! my Warmth is not so great as
to run away with my Reason: it is only just raised enough to open my
Faculties, and fit them to receive those eternal Truths, and that
durable Good, which you so triumphantly boasted of. Begin, then; I'm
prepared.
_Phil._ I will. I believe, _Horatio_! with all your Skepticism about
you, you will allow that Good to be constant which is never absent from
you, and that to be durable, which never Ends but with your Being.
_Hor._ Yes, go on.
_Phil._ That can never be the Good of a Creature, which when present,
the Creature may be miserable, and when absent, is certainly so.
_Hor._ I think not; but pray explain what you mean; for I am not much
used to this abstract Way of Reasoning.
_Phil._ I mean all the Pleasures of Sense. The Good of Man cannot
consist in the mere Pleasures of Sense; because, when any one of those
Objects which you love is absent, or can't be come at, you are certainly
miserable: and if the Faculty be impair'd, though the Object be present,
you can't enjoy it. So that this sensual Good depends upon a thousand
Things without and within you, and all out of your Power. Can this then
be the Good of Man? Say, _Horatio_! what think you, Is not this a
chequer'd, fleeting, fantastical Good? Can that, in any propriety of
Speech, be called the Good of Man which even, while he is tasting, he
may be miserable; and which when he cannot taste, he is necessarily so?
Can that be our Good, which costs us a great deal of Pains to obtain;
which cloys in possessing; for which we must wait the Return of Appetite
before we can enjoy again? Or, is that our Good, which we can come at
without Difficulty; which is heightened by Possession, which never ends
in Weariness and Disappointment; and which, the more we enjoy, the
better qualified we are to enjoy on?
_Hor._ The latter, I think; but why do you torment me thus? _Philocles_!
shew me this Good immediately.
_Phil._ I have shewed you what 'tis not; it is not sensual, but 'tis
rational and moral Good. It is doing all the Good we can to others, by
Acts of Humanity, Friendship, Generosity, and Benevolence: This is that
constant and durable Good, which will afford Contentment and
Satisfaction always alike, without Variation or Diminution. I speak to
your Experience now, _Horatio_! Did you ever find yourself weary of
relieving the Miserable? or of raising the Distressed into Life or
Happiness? Or rather, don't you find the Pleasure grow upon you by
Repetition, and that 'tis greater in the Reflection than in the Act
itself? Is there a Pleasure upon Earth to be compared with that which
arises from the Sense of making others happy? Can this Pleasure ever be
absent, or ever end but with your Being? Does it not always accompany
you? Doth not it lie down and rise with you? live as long as you live?
give you Consolation in the Article of Death, and remain with you in
that gloomy Hour, when all other Things are going to forsake you, or you
them?
_Hor._ How glowingly you paint, _Philocles_! Methinks _Horatio_ is
amongst the Enthusiasts. I feel the Passion: I am enchantingly
convinced; but I don't know why: Overborn by something stronger than
Reason. Sure some Divinity speaks within me; but prithee, _Philocles_,
give me cooly the Cause, why this rational and moral Good so infinitely
excels the meer natural or sensual.
_Phil._ I think, _Horatio_! that I have clearly shewn you the Difference
between merely natural or sensual Good, and rational or moral Good.
Natural or sensual Pleasure continues no longer than the Action itself;
but this divine or moral Pleasure continues when the Action is over,
and swells and grows upon your Hand by Reflection: The one is
inconstant, unsatisfying, of short Duration, and attended with
numberless Ills; the other is constant, yields full Satisfaction, is
durable, and no Evils preceding, accompanying, or following it. But, if
you enquire farther into the Cause of this Difference, and would know
why the moral Pleasures are greater than the sensual; perhaps the Reason
is the same as in all other Creatures, That their Happiness or chief
Good consists in acting up to their chief Faculty, or that Faculty which
distinguishes them from all Creatures of a different Species. The chief
Faculty in a Man is his Reason; and consequently his chief Good; or that
which may be justly called his Good, consists not merely in Action, but
in reasonable Action. By reasonable Actions, we understand those Actions
which are preservative of the human Kind, and naturally tend to produce
real and unmixed Happiness; and these Actions, by way of Distinction, we
call Actions morally Good.
_Hor._ You speak very clearly, _Philocles_! but, that no Difficulty may
remain upon my Mind, pray tell me what is the real Difference between
natural Good and Ill, and moral Good and Ill? for I know several People
who use the Terms without Ideas.
_Phil._ That may be: The Difference lies only in this; that natural Good
and Ill is Pleasure and Pain: Moral Good and Ill is Pleasure or Pain
produced with Intention and Design; for 'tis the Intention only that
makes the Agent morally Good or Bad.
_Hor._ But may not a Man, with a very good Intention, do an ill Action?
_Phil._ Yes, but, then he errs in his Judgment, tho' his Design be good.
If his Error is inevitable, or such as, all Things considered, he could
not help, he is inculpable: But if it arose through want of Diligence in
forming his Judgment about the Nature of human Actions, he is immoral
and culpable.
_Hor._ I find, then, that in order to please ourselves rightly, or to do
good to others morally, we should take great Care of our Opinions.
_Phil._ Nothing concerns you more; for, as the Happiness or real Good of
Men consists in right Action, and right Action cannot be produced
without right Opinion, it behoves us, above all Things in this World, to
take Care that our Opinions of Things be according to the Nature of
Things. The Foundation of all Virtue and Happiness is Thinking rightly.
He who sees an Action is right, that is, naturally tending to Good, and
does it because of that Tendency, he only is a moral Man; and he alone
is capable of that constant, durable, and invariable Good, which has
been the Subject of this Conversation.
_Hor._ How, my dear philosophical Guide, shall I be able to know, and
determine certainly, what is Right and Wrong in Life?
_Phil._ As easily as you distinguish a Circle from a Square, or Light
from Darkness. Look, _Horatio_, into the sacred Book of Nature; read
your own Nature, and view the Relation which other Men stand in to you,
and you to them; and you'll immediately see what constitutes human
Happiness, and consequently what is Right.
_Hor._ We are just coming into Town, and can say no more at present. You
are my good Genius, _Philocles_. You have shewed me what is good. You
have redeemed me from the Slavery and Misery of Folly and Vice, and made
me a free and happy Being.
_Phil._ Then I am the happiest Man in the World. Be steady, _Horatio_!
Never depart from Reason and Virtue.
_Hor._ Sooner will I lose my Existence. Good Night, _Philocles_.
_Phil._ Adieu! dear _Horatio_!
A WITCH TRIAL AT MOUNT HOLLY
[From the _Pennsylvania Gazette_, Oct. 22, 1730.]
"Saturday last, at Mount-Holly, about 8 Miles from this Place
[Burlington, N. J.] near 300 People were gathered together to see an
Experiment or two tried on some Persons accused of Witchcraft. It seems
the Accused had been charged with making their Neighbours' Sheep dance
in an uncommon Manner, and with causing Hogs to speak and sing Psalms,
etc., to the great Terror and Amazement of the king's good and
peaceable Subjects in this Province; and the Accusers, being very
positive that if the Accused were weighed in Scales against a Bible, the
Bible would prove too heavy for them; or that, if they were bound and
put into the River they would swim; the said Accused, desirous to make
Innocence appear, voluntarily offered to undergo the said Trials if 2 of
the most violent of their Accusers would be tried with them. Accordingly
the Time and Place was agreed on and advertised about the Country; The
Accusers were 1 Man and 1 Woman: and the Accused the same. The Parties
being met and the People got together, a grand Consultation was held,
before they proceeded to Trial; in which it was agreed to use the Scales
first; and a Committee of Men were appointed to search the Men, and a
Committee of Women to search the Women, to see if they had any Thing of
Weight about them, particularly Pins. After the Scrutiny was over a huge
great Bible belonging to the Justice of the Place was provided, and a
Lane through the Populace was made from the Justice's House to the
Scales, which were fixed on a Gallows erected for that Purpose opposite
to the House, that the Justice's Wife and the rest of the Ladies might
see the Trial without coming amongst the Mob, and after the Manner of
Moorfields a large Ring was also made. Then came out of the House a
grave, tall Man carrying the Holy Writ before the supposed Wizard etc.,
(as solemnly as the Sword-bearer of London before the Lord Mayor) the
Wizard was first put in the Scale, and over him was read a Chapter out
of the Books of Moses, and then the Bible was put in the other Scale,
(which, being kept down before) was immediately let go; but, to the
great Surprize of the Spectators, Flesh and Bones came down plump, and
outweighed that great good Book by abundance.[25] After the same Manner
the others were served, and their Lumps of Mortality severally were too
heavy for Moses and all the Prophets and Apostles. This being over, the
Accusers and the rest of the Mob, not satisfied with this Experiment,
would have the Trial by Water. Accordingly a most solemn Procession was
made to the Millpond, where both Accused and Accusers being stripped
(saving only to the Women their Shifts) were bound Hand and Foot and
severally placed in the Water, lengthways, from the Side of a Barge or
Flat, having for Security only a Rope about the Middle of each, which
was held by some in the Flat. The accused man being thin and spare with
some Difficulty began to sink at last; but the rest, every one of them,
swam very light upon the Water. A Sailor in the Flat jump'd out upon the
Back of the Man accused thinking to drive him down to the Bottom; but
the Person bound, without any Help, came up some time before the other.
The Woman Accuser being told that she did not sink, would be duck'd a
second Time; when she swam again as light as before. Upon which she
declared, That she believed the Accused had bewitched her to make her so
light, and that she would be duck'd again a Hundred Times but she would
duck the Devil out of her. The Accused Man, being surpriz'd at his own
Swimming, was not so confident of his Innocence as before, but said, 'If
I am a Witch, it is more than I know.' The more thinking Part of the
Spectators were of Opinion that any Person so bound and placed in the
Water (unless they were mere Skin and Bones) would swim, till their
Breath was gone, and their Lungs fill'd with Water. But it being the
general Belief of the Populace that the Women's shifts and the Garters
with which they were bound help'd to support them, it is said they are
to be tried again the next warm Weather, naked."
AN APOLOGY FOR PRINTERS
[From the _Pennsylvania Gazette_, June 10, 1731.]
Being frequently censur'd and condemn'd by different Persons for
printing Things which they say ought not to be printed, I have sometimes
thought it might be necessary to make a standing Apology for my self,
and publish it once a Year, to be read upon all Occasions of that
Nature. Much Business has hitherto hindered the execution of this
Design; but having very lately given extraordinary Offence by printing
an Advertisement with a certain N. B. at the End of it, I find an
Apology more particularly requisite at this Juncture, tho' it happens
when I have not yet Leisure to write such a Thing in the proper Form,
and can only in a loose manner throw those Considerations together which
should have been the Substance of it.
I request all who are angry with me on the Account of printing things
they don't like, calmly to consider these following Particulars.
1. That the Opinions of Men are almost as various as their Faces; an
Observation general enough to become a common Proverb, _So many Men so
many Minds._
2. That the Business of Printing has chiefly to do with Mens Opinions;
most things that are printed tending to promote some, or oppose others.
3. That hence arises the peculiar Unhappiness of that Business, which
other Callings are no way liable to; they who follow Printing being
scarce able to do any thing in their way of getting a Living, which
shall not probably give Offence to some, and perhaps to many; whereas
the Smith, the Shoemaker, the Carpenter, or the Man of any other Trade,
may work indifferently for People of all Persuasions, without offending
any of them: and the Merchant may buy and sell with Jews, Turks,
Hereticks and Infidels of all sorts, and get Money by every one of them,
without giving Offence to the most orthodox, of any sort; or suffering
the least Censure or Ill will on the Account from any Man whatever.
4. That it is as unreasonable in any one Man or Set of Men to expect to
be pleas'd with every thing that is printed, as to think that nobody
ought to be pleas'd but themselves.
5. Printers are educated in the Belief, that when Men differ in Opinion,
both Sides ought equally to have the Advantage of being heard by the
Publick; and that when Truth and Error have fair Play, the former is
always an overmatch for the latter: Hence they chearfully serve all
contending Writers that pay them well, without regarding on which side
they are of the Question in Dispute.
6. Being thus continually employ'd in serving both Parties, Printers
naturally acquire a vast Unconcernedness as to the right or wrong
Opinions contain'd in what they print; regarding it only as the Matter
of their daily labour: They print things full of Spleen and Animosity,
with the utmost Calmness and Indifference, and without the least
Ill-will to the Persons reflected on; who nevertheless unjustly think
the Printer as much their Enemy as the Author, and join both together in
their Resentment.
7. That it is unreasonable to imagine Printers approve of every thing
they print, and to censure them on any particular thing accordingly;
since in the way of their Business they print such great variety of
things opposite and contradictory. It is likewise as unreasonable what
some assert, "That Printers ought not to print any Thing but what they
approve;" since if all of that Business should make such a Resolution,
and abide by it, an End would thereby be put to Free Writing, and the
World would afterwards have nothing to read but what happen'd to be the
Opinions of Printers.
8. That if all Printers were determin'd not to print any thing till they
were sure it would offend no body, there would be very little printed.
9. That if they sometimes print vicious or silly things not worth
reading, it may not be because they approve such things themselves, but
because the People are so viciously and corruptly educated that good
things are not encouraged. I have known a very numerous Impression of
Robin Hood's Songs go off in this Province at 2s. per Book, in less than
a Twelvemonth; when a small Quantity of David's Psalms (an excellent
Version) have lain upon my Hands above twice the Time.