immediately before the Rebellion, we cannot come to any other
conclusion than that his decision to pay was actuated, not by a natural
desire to comply with the law, but rather because afraid, his social
rank being what it was, that the first attention of the Government
would be directed to himself, when he might, before he knew where
he was, find that a _casus belli_ had arisen between him and people
whom his father's entire army had been unable to withstand. It is,
therefore, not surprising that he should have paid, and that his people
paid four months before they need have done, in order to escape the
prescribed penalty. Just as his compliance did not arise out of a
natural desire to obey (any more than, at that time, there was such
disposition on the part of hundreds of thousands of other Natives in
Natal and Zululand), so it cannot be said that his object was to parade
before other Chiefs his approval of the new and strongly-resented law.
He was never tired of referring to, and, at his trial, never ceased to
quote, his action in being among the first to pay the tax and claiming
greater credit therefor than he actually deserved. His compliance
was undoubtedly a satisfactory feature, but the act should not be
considered except in connection with the general political situation
and his own to a large extent underhand conduct at that time and
afterwards.
In or about 1903, Chiefs living outside Zululand and north of the
Pongolo sent messengers to complain to him of being taxed £3 per hut in
the Transvaal, whereas only 14s. was being paid in Natal. The Governor
later on spoke to Dinuzulu about this, asking why he had interfered. It
was bad enough to exercise influence over Chiefs in Natal and Zululand,
but a far more serious matter to do so in regard to those of a
different administration. He replied that he had reported the incident
to his Magistrate, when he received orders not to concern himself
with the matter. These orders, he added, were obeyed. He pressed the
Governor to produce the informant, but as this could not be done, he
felt aggrieved that an insinuation of his having done wrong was allowed
to drop, although informed that his explanation was satisfactory.
This accusation, in conjunction with the further allegations that he
and his tribe were in possession of unregistered firearms obtained at
Dhleke and Holkrantz, were the origin of a definite application by him
that a full inquiry into his conduct should be held. The application
was repeated on various occasions, but the Government was unable to
comply. At the same time, the Governor strongly supported him in
connection with the Holkrantz affair, and told him he had done so.
In consequence of evidence given at various courts-martial tending
to implicate him in the Rebellion, the Government had no alternative
but to decide to hold some form of inquiry. A difficulty arose as
to the composition of the proposed Commission. In the meantime, an
investigation had been started by the Magistrate, Mahlabatini, into
the circumstances attending his predecessor's murder. The evidence
therein, too, was found to some extent to implicate Dinuzulu. Under
all the circumstances, Ministers, in November, 1906, resolved to
refrain from holding an inquiry until a _prima facie_ charge could be
established against him, as the effect of any inquiry being abortive
would have been greatly to increase his prestige.
The desire for inquiry was again referred to by the Chief in May,
1907, when, with his indunas, he paid Sir Henry McCallum a visit
at Pietermaritzburg. By this time, however, the Government was in
possession of a good deal of other reliable information tending to
prove that he was personally concerned in the Rebellion, especially by
harbouring rebels, including the ringleaders, at Usutu, well knowing
warrants were out for their arrest, and either inspiring, or being
privy to, various murders of Native loyalists that had taken place in
Zululand.
Shortly after Dinuzulu's return to Usutu, the murder of Sitshitshili
occurred, followed by the escape from Usutu of Bambata's wife and
children.
After fully considering the situation, the new Governor (Sir Matthew
Nathan) "reluctantly came to the conclusion ... that Ministers are
right in view that the peace of the Colony requires the removal of
Dinuzulu from Zululand."[340] He concurred in the advice that Dinuzulu
should be required to attend an inquiry into "the present state of
affairs in Zululand and into his alleged connection with last year's
Rebellion." He also agreed with the proposal that two companies of
Imperial troops should be stationed at Eshowe, to discourage breaches
of the peace and reassure loyalists more than was possible for a
detachment of Militia to do. Representations were made accordingly to
the Secretary of State by cable. The latter replied on the 14th October
that His Majesty's Government would no doubt be "prepared to concur
in the policy of enquiry, and, if necessary, to move the troops as
desired, if the enquiry is to be into the best means of securing the
peace of the country, including the redress of grievances and if the
Natal Government will pledge itself to do its best, in consultation
with His Majesty's Government, to carry out the reforms recommended
by the Commission [Native Affairs]. Such enquiry might be based on
Dinuzulu's own request ... [and] be an important open enquiry ... not
a mere police enquiry...."[341] Dinuzulu, in the meantime, nervous
on account of the police patrol that had passed Usutu on the 30th
September, contemplated leaving Usutu to live in a still more isolated
quarter by the Black Umfolozi and nearer the sea.
Shortly after receipt of the Secretary of State's message (14th
October), another Chief, Mpumela, was murdered by being shot after
dark when sitting in his own hut--again was the murder commonly
associated with Usutu kraal, not, in the first instance, by Europeans,
but by Natives. Ministers now advised that a warrant of arrest should
forthwith be issued against Dinuzulu and a strong body of Militia
be sent to reinforce the Police when executing it. The Imperial
Government abode by the policy, quoted above, with the result that the
two companies of infantry applied for were not sent as requested. Had
this comparatively minor point been conceded, it is probable that the
murder of the loyal Chief, Mpumela, not to refer to attempts to murder
others, would not have occurred. It is not surprising that, under the
circumstances, the Colony decided to effect Dinuzulu's arrest with its
own troops, without further appeal for Imperial assistance.
Having seen how Dinuzulu's desire for a public inquiry became, through
gradual denouement, transformed into a decision to arrest him on a
charge of high treason, we will now pass on to consider other aspects
of the case.
One often hears it said that, with the country in so disturbed a state,
a magnificent opportunity for plotting and fomenting rebellion was
afforded the Chief during the latter end of 1905 and beginning of 1906
had he been so inclined. That is true. But the outlook from Dinuzulu's
own point of view should not be lost sight of. Here was a man, by far
the most important in Natal and Zululand, in so far as social rank was
concerned, who, but a few years before, had returned from a long exile.
He was in a better position than was any Native in Natal to know what
it meant to take up arms against Europeans. This had been tried in 1879
as well as in 1887, but had failed. It was not likely that, with his
men in a disorganized condition and the nation split up into hundreds
of separate tribes, the prospects of success would be any greater in
1906. Had he shown resistance, it was inevitable that the Government
would have attacked him forthwith, before a strong _impi_ could have
been assembled and supplies collected, quite apart from his being
physically unfit to take the field. In other words, the widespread
feelings of loyalty towards him by hordes of undisciplined barbarians
meant little or nothing against organized troops, armed with modern
weapons, until an opportunity had been afforded for openly mobilizing
them and evolving order out of chaos. Dinuzulu had taken part in
military operations, and was sufficiently a soldier to know _that_.
A further reason for disinclination was because, living but a few miles
from him in different directions, were three Chiefs, Tshanibezwe,
Mciteki and Kambi. These were all important men: the first was the
son of Cetshwayo's prime minister; the second a son and temporary
successor of Zibebu; and the third a son of Hamu (one of Dinuzulu's
uncles). That is, sons of three of the thirteen 'kinglets' appointed
by Sir Garnet (later Viscount) Wolseley. But the opportunity at hand,
such as it was, was too good to lose. It might not occur again. He
knew that the great mass of the people, already incensed against the
Government, were looking to him. He knew that the large number of
Chiefs in Natal and Zululand, and even beyond, expected him to take
the lead. He knew they were ready to follow if he did. But the risks
of failure were too imminent. Like Hamlet, he began to soliloquize.
What, in this predicament, he actually did will perhaps be never fully
known. Whether he specially sent for Bambata, on hearing this petty
Chief was being harassed at Mpanza, or that Bambata came of his own
accord with one of his wives (and children) to seek a place on which
to live; whether Mankulumana, in Dinuzulu's presence, actually incited
him to start a rebellion and flee across to Nkandhla, where Dinuzulu
would meet him, or that Dinuzulu simply confined himself to saying he
was unable to give a site; whether Mankulumana handed Bambata a rifle
with which to begin the fighting, and provided him with emissaries to
assist in inciting Natives, or that Dinuzulu, on hearing from Bambata
of a certain doctor who could cure the ailment from which Dinuzulu was
suffering, sent two messengers merely to summon the doctor: all this
is to a large extent obscure. Witnesses have testified on oath to each
of the alternatives. The Special Court found Dinuzulu not guilty of
inciting Bambata to rebel, owing mainly to the evidence of the wife
and children appearing to be an improbable version of what actually
happened; but, whilst discrediting this evidence, the Court did not say
it accepted Dinuzulu's own plausible story.
It is unnecessary to deal with other counts than the one referred to.
The prosecution and defence were at one in concluding that: (_a_)
Bambata fled to Dinuzulu, with his wife and children, after wilfully
disobeying an order of the Government; (_b_) he had two or more
interviews with Dinuzulu and his indunas towards the end of March;
(_c_) he received exceptionally favourable treatment during the three
or four days he was at Usutu; (_d_) he was accompanied to Mpanza,
Natal, by two 'messengers' from Dinuzulu; (_e_) on reaching Mpanza, he
made preparations to rebel, being actively assisted therein by one of
the 'messengers' referred to, who, in Dinuzulu's name, openly incited
members of his tribe to rebel; (_f_) with the assistance of Dinuzulu's
messenger, three distinct acts of rebellion were committed on the
2nd, 3rd, and 4th April; (_g_) Bambata, along with the same messenger
and about 130 men then fled to Nkandhla; (_h_) at Nkandhla, it was
represented by the said messenger that Bambata had the authority
of Dinuzulu to rebel and take refuge there; and (_i_) Dinuzulu's
messenger thereupon usurped control of Sigananda's tribe in order to
assist Bambata. As there is unanimity in these and other particulars,
and as the Court found Dinuzulu not guilty, the question arises: Who,
then, was the cause of the Rebellion? The question is a fair one and
obviously demands an answer, if one can be given.
Let us attempt an analysis. The names of the ringleaders were Bambata,
Cakijana (Dinuzulu's messenger), Mangati, Sigananda and Mehlokazulu,
whilst those who are declared to have instigated it are Dinuzulu,
Mgwaqo and Mankulumana. If the author of the Insurrection is not among
these, then he is nowhere.
Mgwaqo and Mankulumana may be eliminated because, being indunas
of Dinuzulu, the latter must be held to have been privy to, and
responsible for, everything they did. Bambata would never have been
incited, nor would he have agreed to rebel, except on receiving an
assurance from Dinuzulu himself that they were voicing his wishes.
Mangati and Mehlokazulu, again, only appeared on the scene _after_
the Rebellion had started, and Bambata was at Nkandhla. No one who
knows the facts would regard either of them as the cause. They were
accessory, but _ex post facto_.
Now, as regards Bambata, Cakijana, Sigananda and Dinuzulu. We have seen
that Cakijana was a 'messenger.' The prosecution declared he was an
emissary, but, assuming him to have been merely a messenger on his way
to fetch a doctor, it is agreed that, when he accompanied Bambata to
Natal, he did not receive his instructions from Dinuzulu or at Usutu,
but at his own kraal many miles away.[342] But for having been ordered
to accompany Bambata, he would probably not have gone at all. Cakijana
declares Bambata had already arrived at the decision to rebel when he
joined him; consequently, if this be true, the instigator could not
have been Cakijana--for instance, when he represented to Bambata's and
Sigananda's tribes that it was Dinuzulu's order that they should rebel.
There is not a shred of evidence that any communication passed between
Sigananda and Bambata until after the Rebellion had started, and this
notwithstanding the blood relation between the tribes. Sigananda, at
his trial at Nkandhla, in June, 1906, a couple of weeks after Mome,
stated that, in the absence of Dinuzulu and Mankulumana, he would say
nothing, they being the people "who drew this man (_i.e._ Bambata)
along here...." _President of Court-Martial_--"I want the names of the
people who brought you into trouble." _Answer_--"I say their names
are Dinuzulu and Mankulumana.... This man Bambata came from their
country." Another of Sigananda's reasons for not giving his evidence
was because he had just heard the messenger he sent to Dinuzulu to
report Bambata's arrival at Nkandhla give evidence. With such evidence
he fully concurred. What was it? Briefly that Dinuzulu had sent the
following reply: "Tell my grandfather, Sigananda, that he is to receive
my man Bambata into his bosom and take care of him." The witness added
that Dinuzulu was at the bottom of the Rebellion, and had said he would
assist by ordering various tribes to support Sigananda. And the tribes
referred to _did_ actively support. Other evidence was given showing
conclusively that Sigananda rebelled solely because of the instructions
he had received from Dinuzulu. Now, this is independent and remarkable
testimony by one of the oldest and staunchest supporters of the Usutu
cause in Zululand.
There remain the names of Bambata and Dinuzulu. We know Bambata
rebelled. But was he the principal, or merely an agent or instrument?
He has been called a 'madman.' The word '_hlanya_,' however, that
was commonly applied to him, also means 'firebrand,' 'desperado,' or
'anarchist'; it was in the latter senses that it was used. Cakijana was
the same type of man, though, in addition, with considerable experience
of European warfare, arms, ammunition, etc. This Dinuzulu knew when he
directed him to accompany Bambata. Indeed, had the mission been merely
the absurdly trivial one of fetching a doctor from a low-caste tribe, a
hundred other equally suitable and less martially-inclined messengers
could have been got within ten miles of Dinuzulu's kraal and within
his own ward. And then not two but one would have been necessary and
usual for such a purpose, especially as the man who had recommended
the doctor was himself accompanying the messenger. Cakijana lived in
another ward, and was not a member of Dinuzulu's tribe.
Bambata was killed during the Rebellion, hence his evidence is not
available. His wife and children (the latter aged about 17 and 14 in
1907), declare that he was presented with a rifle and ammunition at
Usutu with Dinuzulu's knowledge, whilst the first-mentioned adds that
she heard Mankulumana, in Dinuzulu's presence and hearing, incite
Bambata to rebel and to use the rifle and ammunition referred to for
the purpose. Bambata, too, is known to have informed other people that
Dinuzulu had given him the rifle.
On no occasion had Bambata fought against the Government until he met
and conversed with Dinuzulu and his indunas, and the fatal blow was
struck within a few days of the interviews. The first thing any Native
would do when meditating resistance would be to calculate if his force
is likely to succeed. That such is Native character, just as it is
the character of other races, was brought out by witnesses both in
Dinuzulu and Sigananda's trials, to refer to no others. That the same
calculation was made by Bambata is probable. That it was because he
recognized the futility of taking up arms that he fled when a handful
of Police were sent in March to arrest him is abundantly clear. From
where, then, did he derive that confidence to attack which at first
he lacked? Like a wise man, wishing to oppose the Government when
depriving him of his chieftainship, but realizing his inability to do
so with success, he went to the only person who _was_ able to assist,
one described by Natives themselves as "a high tree, upon which all
the birds fed or congregated." That another Chief would be appointed in
his place became a certainty to him as soon as he deserted. He, an old
Natal resident, well knew the consequences of defiant conduct. Hence,
feelings of hostility, together with the motive to fight, were already
in his mind when he went to Dinuzulu. They did not arise merely after
he got back and saw his uncle had been appointed, for the choice of
a successor necessarily lay between the uncle and Bambata's brother,
Funizwe. Support is given to this view by the boast Bambata is said to
have made to his tribesmen when leaving for Usutu in March: "When next
you set eyes on me, I shall be at the head of an army!"
We believe that Bambata went to Dinuzulu _with the resolution to
rebel already formed_, and that the sole object of the visit was to
obtain from Dinuzulu, at that time believed by ignorant Natives to be
all-powerful, an assurance that if he, Bambata, belled the cat, he
would obtain the Zulu Chief's support. We believe, after a long and
careful study of the facts, that such assurance was unequivocably,
though subtly, given. The proof of this is that Bambata fled
unhesitatingly to Nkandhla as soon as he rebelled, where he immediately
got the support of an acknowledged Usutu adherent, and such was given
because Sigananda was directed by Dinuzulu to 'protect' Bambata. We do
not believe Dinuzulu went out of his way to incite the man to rebel,
still less that he sent for him in a cold-blooded way with the object
of inciting him to rebel, nor even that he suggested his so doing,
because, as we have endeavoured to show, the intent was probably
already latent in Bambata's own mind. The 'suggestion' theory is
plausible and appears to fit the case exactly, except for the _animus
injuriandi_ that may reasonably be supposed to have been present in
Bambata's mind _before_ he started for Usutu. In other words, we
believe he was the author, but only because Dinuzulu was accessory. But
for the feeling to rebel having occurred spontaneously, we can hardly
picture to ourselves his going off to start a rebellion with only a
couple of Dinuzulu's men in attendance. Surely, had the initiative
come from Dinuzulu himself, Bambata would not have been content with
the terms. On such a hypothesis, they would have been most unusual. No
mere agent would have acted with the dash and daring Bambata did. His
actions were those of a principal. But for Cakijana, the whole of the
men who struck the first blow were members of Bambata's own tribe and
entirely under his command. What experience had Dinuzulu of Bambata's
fighting capacity that he should select him, a young man, to carry
out so vast an undertaking, assuming Dinuzulu to have been actively
directing its execution?
Then, it should be remembered, Dinuzulu was nothing very much to
Bambata. His allegiance was allegiance-for-the-time-being, mere
opportunism. Bambata belonged to a class (not only a tribe, but a
set of tribes) generally looked down on by the Zulus. He was a Lala.
Lalas were and are still held by Zulus to be an inferior people;
ancient slanders to the effect that they do not wash before meals, and
habitually lie down to sleep in an indecent manner, are indications
of the attitude assumed by the aristocratic Zulus towards them. It
was with that hereditary social antipathy in mind, conscious that
he was accused of being the actual formenter of insurrection, that
Dinuzulu, in his famous message to the Government protesting loyalty
and innocence, spoke of the man, with whom he had just had intimate
dealings, as 'this dog Bambata.' Zulus regard dogs as filthy creatures
and keep them at a distance; the term, therefore, was intended to
give the impression that it was opprobrious. As a matter of fact, it
was nothing of the kind. Under these circumstances, it can be seen
Bambata's loyalty towards Dinuzulu was not pervaded with that depth of
affection and sincerity of devotion which would have animated tribes of
a higher class.
As regards 'this dog Bambata' being connected with Dinuzulu through the
latter's marriage with a girl, Nomadhlangala, the contention can be
dismissed in a word. The girl belonged to the Bomvu tribe, that is,
to a tribe living next to Bambata's, whose services to the Government,
by invading and spoiling Bambata's ward along with the troops, besides
other acts of conspicuous loyalty during the Rebellion, have become
widely known.
Bambata was naturally impulsive, determined and daring, with an
experience of fighting, if only faction fighting. A man of that kind,
already inclined to intemperance, with all his substance wasted, and
ruin, in the shape of loss of chieftainship, staring him in the face,
would not require urging to take up arms. The only point for him to
consider, then, would be the amount of support that could be reckoned
on.
That the foregoing theory is reasonable is further borne out by
what actually happened. Testimony was repeatedly given at various
trials--which cannot all be brushed aside by Dinuzulu's petulant
exclamation that the witnesses are personal enemies--that Dinuzulu had,
at different stages of the Rebellion, either "_given_ Sigananda to
Bambata," or "_given_ Mehlokazulu to Bambata," or _given_ some other
Chief. The meaning was that Dinuzulu had instructed these Chiefs, in
some way and at different moments, to assist or support Bambata in
fighting the Government. And all the Chiefs that were named did assist.
The probabilities are, moreover, that the gun and ammunition obtained
by Bambata at Usutu, if given by Dinuzulu, were given not as ocular
proof of incitement, but in token of his sympathy and support--not in
the shape of fighting material, but to influence others who controlled
such material. Such sympathy, however, we believe, was extended only on
condition that the identity of the giver was not revealed.
Messengers were sent from Uzutu to Sigananda soon after Bambata got
to the forests, directing him to "place Bambata under his armpit,"
implying, of course, that the man was to be protected from the
Government troops that were sure to follow.