systematization of local forces and _matériel_, could not and did not
begin until some years after the bestowal of autonomy on Natal, and the
first step in the process was the passing by the legislature of the
Militia Act (1903) imposing on every class of the European inhabitants,
between certain ages, the liability to undergo military training and
service. By exacting compulsory service universally, with, of course,
certain exceptions, a powerful instrument was placed in the hands of
the Commandant of Militia, and one which enabled the Colony to be put
in a more thorough-going state of defence than had ever before been
attempted.
The word "organization" is used here in a precise and definite sense,
and is taken to mean establishment of the requisite regiments or
corps, personnel, horses, arms, transport, etc., and a placing of the
same by constant training, inspection or otherwise, in a condition
of readiness, with the object, on the outbreak of hostilities, of
realizing, in the shortest possible time, the general purpose in
the minds of those in authority. Connected with such organization
is the ascertainment by the responsible officer of the resources of
his command in regard to provisions, labourers, horses, the means of
transporting troops and stores, and the obtaining of accurate knowledge
of all the strategic features of the country, of fortified places, and
the means of defence, the erection of lagers, making of roads and means
of communication, and of every particular which may increase his power
of acting with advantage against an enemy.[49] But it is one thing to
enact a law and frame accompanying regulations, quite another to see
that the various provisions are complied with by the three arms and
administrative services in such way as will conduce to efficiency and
the smooth working of every part when the force is called upon to take
the field.
General peace organization, of course, in the way of holding annual
camps of exercise, rifle meetings, sending of patrols from time to
time through Native locations, arranging for the conveyance of camp
equipment, saddlery, etc., by railway or by ox and mule waggon,
purchase and hire of remounts, registration and insurance of horses,
etc., continued just as they had done for years prior to the passing of
the Militia Act, except that improvements on the efforts of preceding
years were continually being introduced.
Having regard to the great importance of the new Act, it is proposed
to allude briefly to the genesis thereof, to some of its principal
features, and to the way in which it was administered. Unless the
fundamental provisions are grasped at the outset, it is not unlikely
that indistinct impressions will arise in the mind of the reader, with
the result that the achievements of the Colony during an important
crisis, full of meaning as they are and of lessons for the future, will
be insufficiently appreciated.
In 1902, a motion, introduced into Parliament by Mr. (now Sir) Thomas
Watt, K.C.M.G., member for Newcastle, in favour of universal compulsory
service, was carried unanimously. A bill was next drafted and formally
introduced by the Prime Minister, Sir Albert Hime, K.C.M.G., but was
withdrawn. This was followed by the appointment of a Commission in
November, 1902, under the chairmanship of Mr. Ernest L. Acutt, C.M.G.,
"to consider and report upon the general measures proper to be taken
for the defence of the Colony and to advise as to the most suitable
mode of constituting a defence force according to the general object
of the bill (No. 36), which was introduced into Parliament at its last
ordinary session."
This Commission reported in favour of compulsory military service,
drafted another bill and recommended the enactment thereof. The
recommendations were supported by the then Commandant of Volunteers
(Colonel Leader, whose services had been specially lent to Natal by the
Imperial Government). This officer was appointed to take command of
the troops during the period of their transition from a volunteer to a
militia force, or otherwise to institute such other radical changes as
might appear imperative.
The bill was passed into law with but little opposition towards the
end of 1903.[50] The labour of initiating, drafting and supporting in
Parliament this statesmanlike measure was undertaken chiefly by Sir
Thomas Watt.
Among its principal features were the following:
"That the Militia, with the Governor as Commander-in-Chief, and a
Commandant of Militia, with the rank of Colonel, as responsible for the
administration of all Militia and Defence matters, should consist of
all the male inhabitants of European descent in the Colony, from the
age of 18 to the age of 50 years inclusively ... not being aliens."
Certain exemptions were allowed.
The Force was divided into four classes:
"(_a_) Active Militia, consisting of all men who may volunteer and who
may be accepted for service in this class, and all other men who may be
balloted for service.
"(_b_) Militia First Reserve, consisting of all unmarried men from 18
to 30 years of age inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia.
"(_c_) Militia Second Reserve, consisting of all married men between 18
and 30 years of age inclusive, and all men from 31 to 40 years of age
inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia.
"(_d_) Militia Third Reserve, consisting of all men from 41 to 50 years
of age inclusive, who are not in the Active Militia...."
The strength of the Active Militia was to be determined from time to
time, by the Governor-in-Council, but, in time of peace, might not
exceed 4,000 men.
Whenever called out for active service, it became competent for the
Governor-in-Council to place the Militia "under the orders of the
Commander of His Majesty's Regular Forces in the Colony, provided such
officer shall not be below the substantive rank of Major-General in the
Army."[51]
In the event of the Active Militia being mobilized for military
service, the Commandant was required to advertise in the Government
Gazette and the press for volunteers, and "should enough men have not
volunteered and been accepted in any district to complete the quota
required for that district," within the time specified, "the men
enrolled in the Militia First Reserve shall be balloted for" and "any
man balloted for ... shall be attached to such corps in his military
district as the District Commandant may notify."
The period of service in time of peace was not less than three years,
irrespective of age at time of enrolment.
The Militia Reserves were liable to be called out by the
Governor-in-Council for active service in time of "war, invasion or
insurrection, or danger of any of them." Their officers (designated
Chief Leaders and Sub-Leaders) were appointed "at the instance of the
Commandant of Militia in pursuance of a vote passed by a majority
of the members of such Militia Reserves," in accordance with the
regulations.
In so far as the Native, Indian or coloured male population
(outnumbering the European by about 10 to 1) was concerned, the Act
empowered the Governor to call out any portion thereof, being British
subjects, for military training or service in time of peace, or for
active service in time of war, and to form the same into contingents
for employment as scouts, drivers, labourers, stretcher-bearers, etc.,
under officers subject to the Commandant of Militia.
An amending Act, passed in 1906, enabled the Commandant to call out the
Reserves for training, and so introduce some degree of organization
among them, impossible under the main Act.
Although, during 1906, the entire European population was under
100,000, it was found that 5,000 men (all volunteers) were at the
disposal of the State as Active Militia, with about 15,000 Reserves,
divided into the three classes referred to.
A defect in the principal Act was the concession to Reserves of
the privilege of electing their own officers (Chief Leaders and
Sub-Leaders), as the selections, in many cases, were not determined by
the military knowledge, military service, firmness of character and so
forth of the candidate, but simply by the degree of wealth possessed,
or popularity enjoyed, by him in the district. When the Reserves of
certain parts were called out for active service, the seriousness of
this mistake speedily manifested itself, with the result that the best
efforts of which some of the corps were capable were not put forth.
Having regard to the numerical strength of the Reserves, it was of
the greatest importance that only efficient officers should have been
selected.
But, given the power of exacting compulsory service and the
availability of _matériel_, there was wanting another and most
important factor, namely, something which could so co-ordinate and
systematize the heterogeneous elements as to weld them into that for
which they were intended, namely, an engine of war, endowed with the
power of life, movement and destruction. There was wanted, in short, an
organizer. It was one thing for the legislature to provide the law, the
money, the men, the horses, the equipment, ordnance and transport, but
he that was to transform these masses of incongruous material into the
desired entity could only be born, not made.
Without the active sympathy of a Government, an organizer can
accomplish but little. To prepare for war is a task which, in order
that it may be properly fulfilled, exacts tribute in numberless
directions. Its dimensions are of universal scope and variety, and,
unless the State is prepared to meet the reasonable demand of its
agent, his efforts are foredoomed to failure. As the goal is to
transform the material at hand into a living thing, it devolves on a
Government to see that means are forthcoming or the efforts of the
artificer become lacking both in efficiency and usefulness. This lesson
the Government of Natal had learnt far better than did Canning and his
Council at the time of the Indian Mutiny. Instead of refusing offers
of assistance from local volunteers, every expedient was adopted by
Natal to encourage volunteering; instead of an unsympathetic ruler, the
Colony found in the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, an ideal helmsman,
who, supported by a strong and capable Ministry[52] and a far-seeing
Commandant, strained every nerve to suppress the Insurrection in a
swift and vigorous manner, well knowing that clemency and indecision
would help only to aggravate the situation and imperil the State.
On the Militia Act becoming law in 1904, the Government appointed its
Commandant of Volunteers, Col. H.P. Leader, as the first Commandant
of Militia. He, thereupon, temporarily assumed the rank of Brigadier
General. A District Commandant was also appointed to each of the three
military districts into which the Colony was then divided.
Assisted by these officers, his staff and the various commanding
officers of corps, the Commandant took early steps to establish the
system envisaged by the Act.
It will be remembered that May 31st, 1902, saw the conclusion of
hostilities between England and the South African Republics. In
that great conflict, Natal had thrown all her regular volunteer
forces, numbering only about 2000 men, into the field.[53] Such
forces, distinctly well-organized, were maintained at a high state of
efficiency as long as the war lasted.
There can be no question but that the exacting discipline undergone by
the troops during the Boer War prepared them and the rest of the Colony
for the compulsory service imposed by the 1903 Act. But for the serious
risks and trials of that war, even though commonly said to have "killed
volunteering" in Natal, it is highly probable greater objection would
have been offered than was done when the Militia bill was debated in
Parliament. The War was, indeed, a blessing in disguise for Natal. It
taught her manhood what defensive warfare was, as well as the necessity
of establishing an adequate and constantly efficient force. In these
circumstances, Leader found his task much easier than it would have
been under ordinary conditions. His commanding and other officers were
all ready and eager to co-operate. If he was crippled for the want of
funds, owing to the Colony passing through a time of severe financial
depression, an excellent spirit prevailed, men being anxious to enrol
in the various corps and help forward the realization of the general
purposes of the Act.
Among the District Commandants was Lieut.-Col. (now Colonel), H.T.
Bru-de-Wold, D.S.O., C.M.G., V.D., J.P.[54] This officer, whilst
discharging the ordinary duties of his post, observed, not long after
peace had been concluded with the Boers, what, no doubt, a number of
other colonists also did, namely, that there was a certain amount of
restlessness and disregard of authority among the younger sections of
the Natives of his district which, on its south-western side, bordered
on Pondoland. He made a point of visiting European homesteads in
various parts, where he found his observations frequently corroborated,
whilst his attention was drawn to other suspicious indications. He took
steps to gather, from all available sources, information regarding the
tribes, including those living along the border in the Cape Colony.
Their probable fighting strength was ascertained, as also tribal
differences, distinctions being drawn between hereditary blood-feuds
and those of a minor character. Those tribes that had established
intimate relations by marriage, etc., or were off-shoots of existing
older stocks, though commonly designated by different names, were also
noted. These particulars were tabulated so as to show which group was
likely to take the field against another in the event of hostilities,
and so on. By degrees, there grew up in his mind the idea that an
open rupture between the white and the black races would occur in
the near future, and on such presentiment appearing more reasonable
and palpable as time went on, he set himself to consider how far he
would be ready should any such contingency arise in his particular
district. He prepared mobilization schemes on a small scale, that is to
say, assumed a revolt had broken out at a particular point within the
Colony, and then devoted himself to utilizing all available resources
so as to grapple with the imaginary outbreak in the most effective
manner. These schemes, along with others on somewhat similar lines by
the other district officers, were submitted to headquarters. Those
by Bru-de-Wold evoked a special interest, with the result that he
was invited to prepare others. This time, he was not limited to the
resources of his own district, but was instructed to lay under tribute
those of the entire Colony. This "day-dreaming," as persons devoid of a
military sense may choose to style it, soon turned out to be, not only
an amusing and engrossing pastime, but the thing of all others that the
Colony stood most in need of at that particular juncture. That this
view is correct, will become clearer the further we proceed.
On the post of Commandant being vacated by Leader in August, 1905,
Bru-de-Wold was appointed thereto with the rank of Colonel.
But, although Col. Bru-de-Wold was so mindful of the necessity of
preparing for war, it is only fair to remember that the foundations of
Militia organization were laid whilst the first Commandant was still in
office, not to refer to the various other and important contributory
efforts in earlier days. The organization of the Volunteers during the
Boer War, for instance, was everything that could have been desired,
though, of course, it differed in character from a scheme which had in
view hostilities with savages, who might rise in a number of places
at the same moment. Royston had in view and prepared for possible
hostilities with civilized forces living _beyond the borders_ of the
Colony, a very different undertaking to operating against barbarians
residing _within_ the Colony. "For the latter, one must have each
division complete in itself, but, in organizing for a European war,
one knows perfectly well that he must collect his men together in the
bulk before there is to be any resort to arms at all. So long as one's
brigade is organized as a brigade, that is sound. In Native warfare,
however, there should be organization practically of the individuals,
for each of these might be called on to deal with a Native enemy in his
immediate vicinity. Just before the Rebellion, each little unit was
absolutely complete and prepared to take the field as it stood."[55]
Manuals of instruction based on those of the Imperial army, but adapted
to local requirements, were prepared and issued. In these, the various
duties of each arm, on receipt of an order to mobilize, were fully and
clearly set forth.
Had Leader not felt obliged to resign, it is more than probable that
with, for instance, so enthusiastic a lieutenant as Bru-de-Wold, the
highly creditable system subsequently developed by the latter would
have fully matured. But, whatever _may_ have happened in his time,
cannot be allowed to obscure well-deserved distinction and prevent
the bestowal of that meed of praise the Colony owes to the man who,
if he did not actually initiate, took infinite pains, in season
and out of season, assisted by an efficient and willing staff, to
further the scheme, until it actually assumed the solidarity it did
and that capacity for simultaneous and harmonious movement which are
the leading characteristics of every sound system of defence. Natal,
therefore, owes her gratitude to Col. Bru-de-Wold as to one who, keenly
alive to her best interests, in the face of much political and other
discouragement, resolutely held to the course he had embarked on,
until the long-entertained idea had been fairly realized. Without him,
it is conceivable, the Colony might have become so involved during
the Rebellion as to have been unable to suppress it without appealing
for help to the Mother Country, when the command of the whole of the
operations would have passed automatically from her own hands to those
of the Imperial Government. That is to say, a Colony which, but a
dozen or so years previously, had deliberately resolved to take on
the burden of responsible government and all attendant risks, would
have been so far incapable of exercising control and utilizing her own
resources as, at the first sign of trouble in connection with purely
internal affairs, to seek the aid of external authority to set them in
order. Had any such assistance been invoked and rendered, Natal must
inevitably have forfeited, especially in the eyes of the Natives, much
of the prestige she had so long enjoyed and which she was determined,
if possible, to maintain. But let no one suppose these remarks to be
made in any ungenerous spirit or unmindfully of that bond of sympathy
and warm attachment that will for ever endure between the Motherland
and her sons in Natal. It is impossible to gauge the degree to which
Natal is indebted to the "old block" of which she is but a chip; her
social system, laws, education, and institutions were, for the most
part, "made in England," so, too, were many of the better features
of the military system of which she is so justly proud. She is not
oblivious of the instruction and encouragement her officers have
received from innumerable representatives of His Majesty's army, in
South Africa and at home, or of the keen interest that has constantly
been shown in the general development of her forces.
[Illustration:
COLONEL H.T. BRU-DE-WOLD,
C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commandant of Militia.
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN G. DARTNELL,
K.C.B., C.M.G.
COLONL G. LEUCHARS, C.M.G., D.S.O.
SIR ABE BAILEY, K.C.M.G.]
COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE MILITIA.
_Active Militia._--The strength of the Active Militia was limited to
4,000 in time of peace. This figure, as a matter of fact, was never
reached, owing to the severe financial depression the Colony passed
through in the years 1902-1906, and later. Although the strength rose
from 1,864 officers and men in 1902 to 3,449 in 1904--that it did
not increase beyond the latter figure was due to Government fixing
3,500 as the temporary maximum strength--it decreased in 1906 to
2,854. Consequently, there was a shortfall of no less than 1,146 men
on a maximum authorized peace establishment at the outbreak of the
Rebellion. In his report, dated January, 1907, Bru-de-Wold says:
"Assuming office in October, 1905,[56] during a period of great
financial depression, I was confronted with the task of immediately
reducing expenditure.... At the same time, I was convinced that, at no
period since I became connected with the Defence Forces of the Colony,
had there been a greater urgency for efficiency and readiness to take
the field. I felt sure that the Native trouble, which I had seen for
some years past drawing nearer and nearer, was now within a measurable
distance, and in my own mind I fixed the latter end of May or June
as the most probable time for the disturbance to break out. I was
instructed to reduce the Active Militia to 2,500 of all ranks...."[57]
Again: "To organize the Force with its reduced numbers, and still to
retain its efficiency as an effective fighting force, I arranged a
Peace and War establishment for each regiment, the ranks to be filled
up when required for war purposes by supernumeraries, or special
service men...."[58]
Nothing could show more clearly than the foregoing facts how severe
must have been the financial depression through which the Colony passed
in 1905 and 1906, and how great the risks run by being compelled to
reduce to 2,500 men, the first line of defence of a Colony controlling
about a million warlike savages. When, as then situated, Natal
determined to deal with the trouble by means of her own resources, she
took a bold and even hazardous course. But it was just such decision
that appealed to the imagination of the staunchest of her colonists,
and it was not long before she had the satisfaction of knowing that her
courageous attitude was amply justified by the results.
Having decided, in 1904, to recruit to a figure falling short by 500
of the maximum peace strength authorized by law, and again, in 1905,
directed a further reduction by 1,000 men, it would be thought the
Government, on the first acts of rebellion occurring in February and
April, would have been only too glad to avail themselves of the power
to ballot for recruits,[59] to raise the depleted ranks to at least
the maximum peace establishment. By rights, the final word as to when
the ballot should be brought into force, should rest with the officer
responsible for the defence of the country. Experience has shown that
an elective ministry will not so act if it can possibly be avoided.[60]
If not imperative, so as to restore the authorized establishment,
such necessity certainly appeared to arise when the character of the
_terrain_ selected by the rebels came to be closely considered. For
operations in connection with Nkandhla forest alone--an area covering
100 square miles, _i.e._ equivalent to that of Greater London, some
10,000 European troops were declared by competent military advisers to
be required. If others advised lesser numbers, it was because they were
confident (though having no military reasons for saying so) that their
extremely elusive foes could be hoodwinked at their own game, and in a
country, too, as well-known to them as a cornfield is to the mice that
run up and down and between the growing stalks.