CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL CONSERVATISM OF MODERN RELIGION

The charge against religion most frequently made by critics who are

interested in social reconstruction is that it is a conservative

force which impedes social progress. If it has resources which are

indispensable for the life of society, social idealists will not

appreciate them if its contemporary forms are invariably aligned

with the social forces most intent upon preserving the status quo.

Contemporary liberal Christianity refutes the charge of social

conservatism by appealing to the social radicalism of Jesus which it

alleges to have appropriated. By this appeal liberal Christianity

exhibits one of the very tendencies of religion which subjects it

to the criticism of social liberals. Religion is easily tempted to

make devotion to the ideal a substitute for its realization and to

become oblivious to the inevitable compromise between its ideal and

the brute facts of life. The absolute nature of the ethics of Jesus

and the perfect harmony between his religion and his ethics may be

the guarantee of the perennial spiritual and ethical renewal of the

Christian religion; but it is also occasion for the self-deception of

many professed disciples. Many streams of thought have contributed to

the current of modern liberal Christianity and it contains alluvial

deposits from all Western civilizations. Yet it imagines that it

represents a simple return to radical and dynamic ethics of the

religion of Jesus. By this deception it easily becomes the façade

behind which the brutal facts of modern industrial civilization may be

obscured rather than a force by which they might be eliminated. The

Protestant Reformation suffered from the same deception. It thought of

itself as a return to the original ideal when it was, as a matter of

fact, a new type of compromise.

Catholicism was a compound of early Christianity and the thought and

life of Græco-Roman civilization. The medieval church was a kind of

ghostly aftermath of the Roman empire and the popes were inspired by

the genius of Cæsar as much as by the spirit of Christ. The north

European peoples first accepted this latinized Christianity, partly

because they were attracted by those universal elements in it which

have made their appeal to all peoples, and particularly those of

the Western world, and partly because it was for them the symbol

of the ordered civilization of Rome which they first envied, then

destroyed, and finally tried to rebuild. In time they reacted against

the ecclesiastical, international and feudal solidarities of this

whole politico-religious world, prompted no doubt by the untamed

spirit of liberty which characterized the northern peoples and which

resented the tyranny by which the middle ages achieved their high

measure of social cohesion. Thus Protestantism became the handmaiden

of a budding nationalism which was impatient of the restraints of

an international papacy, as it has since been impatient of every

other type of international control. In time it also came to be the

peculiar spiritual possession of those classes among the northern

peoples who developed modern commerce and industry. The affinity

between its sanctification of the principle of liberty and the

necessary individualism of classes which were intent upon destroying

the traditional restraints of the ancient world for the sake of giving

unhampered play to a growing commercial and industrial life, has been

so perfect that it is hardly possible to decide which of the two is

cause and which effect. Max Weber[6] has made an interesting analysis

of commercial and industrial superiority of Protestant nations. It

may be that the aptitude for commercial and industrial pursuits and

an inclination to the Protestant form of the Christian faith are

concomitant characteristics of north European peoples rather than

casually related phenomena. Yet they have become so intimately related

in history that the most typical commercial classes and nations are

most generally Protestant, and most uniquely Protestant. In England

the nonconformist sects are almost identical with the commercial

middle classes, while the established church with its semi-Catholic

genius has spiritual affinities both with the old Tories and the

new world of the industrial worker. In Germany there is a similar

alignment with Catholic and agrarian Bavaria on the one hand and

the highly industrialized and Protestant Prussia on the other. The

contrast between Protestant and industrial Ulster and Catholic and

agrarian south Ireland is equally significant. Everywhere in Western

civilization, and nowhere more than in America, Protestantism with its

individualism became a kind of spiritual sanctification of the peculiar

interests and prejudices of the races and classes which dominate the

industrial and commercial expansion of Western civilization.

Since liberal Christianity is the product of an adjustment of the main

tenets of orthodox Protestantism to the sophistication of the cities

and the growing intelligence of the privileged and therefore educated

classes, its whole moral atmosphere is much more determined by the

special interests of these classes than it is willing to admit. The

authority of Jesus, to which it appeals, has indeed been given a new

emphasis, but this has been done because liberal Christianity valued

the theological simplicity rather than the moral austerity of his

gospel. In the same way many liberal Jews have appealed from the law

to the prophets, not because they had a great passion for the ethical

rigors of an Amos or Isaiah but because they found obedience to the

minute exactions of the law too onerous in a sophisticated age. Jesus

is valuable to the modern Christian because he offers an escape from

the theological absurdities of the ancient creeds; meanwhile his

ethical and religious idealism will not leave the lives of those who

profess to follow him unaffected. In time it may become the instrument

of the regeneration of Western society; but this will not be possible

if the liberal church does not overcome its self-deception and realizes

that its religious and moral life is a composite into which have

entered the imperialism of Rome, the sophistication of the Greeks, the

fierce tribalism and individualism of the Nordics and the prudential

ethics of an industrial civilization.

Religion can be healthy and vital only if a certain tension is

maintained between it and the civilization in which it functions. In

time this tension is inevitably resolved into some kind of compromise.

The tendency of religion to become a conservative social force is

partly derived from its ambition to defend the resultant compromise in

the name of its original ideal. Thus all partial values, determined

by geographic, economic, social and political forces, are given a

pseudo-absolute character by the religious elements which entered

into the compromise; and their defects are sufficiently obscured and

sanctified to make them comparatively impregnable to the attacks

of the critics of the status quo. The Russian moujik was more than

ordinarily docile under the tyranny of the czars and more than

ordinarily patient with the imperfections of his society, because his

obedience was claimed not by Russia but by “holy Russia,” the historic

incarnation of his religion. In the same way the medieval church

became organically involved with feudalism and forced the critics of

feudal society to undermine its influence before they could hope to

change the feudal social order. Orthodox Protestantism is intimately

related to this day with Nordicism, with the racial arrogance of north

European peoples. The Ku Klux Klan, which thrives in the hinterlands

of America, maintains its influence over simple minds by screening

racial prejudice against Slavic, Latin and Semitic peoples behind

a devotion to the spiritual treasures of Protestantism and their

defense against the fancied peril of allegedly inferior religions. In

Ireland the racial pride of Ulstermen expresses itself in a passionate

espousal of the Presbyterian religion and a contemptuous attitude

toward the Catholicism of the Irish. In modern prewar Germany there

was a curious partnership between “Thron und Altar,” the interests

of the nationalist German state, as integrated by the Prussian royal

house, with the interests of Protestantism. To this day the fanatic

monarchists of Germany are also Protestant extremists who imagine that

the monarchy was undermined by religiously motivated conspiracies of

Jews and Catholics. Incidentally the Lutheran type of Protestantism

which flourishes in Germany has always been less intimately aligned

with the commercial classes than the Calvinistic sects of other Western

nations. While the German socialists include the Lutheran church among

the forces of reaction with which they must contend, the church’s real

strength is among the peasants and junkers, who are also the strongest

support of monarchist opinion and who abhor the democratic liberalism

of commercial and industrial Germany as much as they despise socialist

radicalism; and they imagine both to be inspired by Semitic designs

upon their national integrity. The real inspiration of this liberalism

with its emphasis on international conciliation and coöperation is

born out of the economic and political necessities of an industrial

and commercial state which cannot afford to indulge in the fanatic

nationalism to which peasants and agrarian aristocrats are prone.

Liberal Christianity as it has developed in the urban centers of the

Western world grew out of the intellectual and religious needs of

the privileged classes and bears the marks of its social environment

just as much as the other types of religion which have preceded it

and with which it is historically related. It is in the same danger

of becoming a spiritual sublimation of the peculiar interests and

prejudices of these classes while it imagines itself the bearer

of an unconditioned message to its day. It has preserved the same

individualistic ethics which has characterized orthodox Protestantism

and which is so dear to the hearts of the commercial classes, and so

unequal to the moral problems of a complex civilization in which the

needs of interdependence outweigh the values of personal liberty. The

supposed devotion of the privileged classes to a religion in which the

sacrifice rather than the stubborn preservation of individual rights is

enjoined and in which the prudential and utilitarian root of morality

is completely plucked out is one of the incongruities which frequently

occur when a civilization harks back to the spiritual visions of its

childhood in order to obscure the sober and disenchanted practicality

of its maturity.

If the modern church is really to become an instrument of social

redemption, it must learn how to divorce itself from the moral

temper of its age even while it tries to accommodate itself to the

intellectual needs of the generation. The religion of Jesus is free

of theological absurdities. Its very simplicity saves it from undue

entanglements with discredited cosmologies. But those who espouse it

chiefly for this reason easily miss its real genius. Its essential

assumptions may not outrage the mind, but neither are they readily

accepted by an age which has sanctified cool and careful, moral

prudence. Its solemn injunction, “Take no thought for your life,

what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink ... but seek ye first the

kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be

added unto you,” is strangely anachronistic in a day which worships

obvious and tangible success and appreciates virtue only as it

insures those advantages of health and prosperity which are its

highest desiderata. Prudential morality has its own uses. Few men have

either the imagination or the courage to pursue an ideal if it does

not justify itself by some fairly immediate advantage. Society is not

altogether the loser if men discover that “Godliness is profitable

unto all things,” and espouse an ideal because they have their eye

upon the concrete and obvious advantages which flow from it. But a

prudential morality has its limitations and these will prove less

detrimental to society if they are not sanctified by religion. It is

better therefore to seek no other basis for utilitarian ethics than the

social experience from which it is really derived. Honesty will prove

itself the best policy without the authority of religion. The function

of religion is to nerve men for an ethical achievement when it promises

no immediate returns. From the perspective of an impartial observer

there is an element of hypocrisy in all prudential morality. The cool

intelligence which computes selfish advantage which may flow from

moral action is not imaginative enough to include all persons who are

affected by an action and not dynamic enough to balance the drive of

self-interest which influences it.

In modern industrial society those who are in position of power and

privilege are most inclined to espouse an ethical ideal because it

tends to stabilize social life and thus insures the perpetuation of

privilege. They are also most easily tempted to restrict ethical action

so that it will prompt to no sacrifices which are not consistent with

a wise self-interest. Since they are also the classes which have, for

reasons previously discussed, maintained their loyalty to religion,

the church can avoid connivance with their prudential morality only by

a continual regeneration of its religious life. Failing to maintain

a distinction between utilitarian ethics and a religiously inspired

moral life, the church cannot escape the fate of becoming a useful

adjunct of the forces of privilege in the social and economic conflict

in which modern society is engaged. It may be good business to pay

high wages, but social good may demand an increase in the wages of

workers beyond the point where economic advantage is derived from an

enlightened wage policy. It may be wise to share some privileges so

that all of them will not be lost, but sensitive ethical insight will

detect the selfishness and insincerity in such a course. A religion

which sanctifies such social prudence is ultimately a hindrance to the

ethical reconstruction of modern society. A religion which discovers

and amends the limitations of prudential morality by the elements of

its reverence for personality and its quest for the absolute is a

necessary factor in social reconstruction.

The question which faces the modern church is whether it will help

to hide or to discover the limitations in the ethical orientation of

modern life. Its devotion to the gospel of Jesus may serve either

purpose. The contempt for ethical opportunism implied in the whole

idealism of Jesus and its scorn for immediate advantages are the

very ethical values which the generation needs, but they are also

the values which have given the Christian religion its great moral

authority and prestige which the church can so easily misuse. If the

authority of Jesus prompts men to a courage and imagination which

escapes the defects of contemporary morality, its influence will be

redemptive; if it is used merely to hide the defects, the critics of

the church will be justified in regarding it as detriment to social

progress. The religion which is socially most useful is one which

can maintain a stubborn indifference to immediate ends and thus give

the ethical life of man that touch of the absolute without which all

morality is finally reduced to a decorous but essentially unqualified

self-assertiveness. The paradox of religion is that it serves the world

best when it maintains its high disdain for the world’s values. Its

social usefulness is dependent upon its ability to maintain devotion

to absolute moral and spiritual values without too much concern for

their practical, even for their social usefulness. The church is in a

very favorable position to make a necessary contribution to social

life, for it reveres as Lord one whose life incarnates the strategy

which saves morality from insincerity. But its assets easily became

moral liabilities when it compounds the pure idealism of Jesus with the

calculated practicalities of the age and attempts to give the resultant

compromise the prestige of absolute authority.

Does civilization need religion? · 第 4 / 9 章